ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE POST-9/11 UNITED STATES: CAUSES, MANIFESTATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS

by

ANDREA ELIZABETH CLUCK

(Under the Direction of Alan Godlas)

ABSTRACT

For the well-being of all Americans, it is necessary to understand and ameliorate the resurgence of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 USA. Many relevant works have been published since 2001; these can be organized according to whether they represent open or closed-view scholarship. Few seek, however, to comprehensively decipher the mechanisms and themes underlying Islamophobia. When these issues are explored, American Islamophobia emerges as a distinct, contemporary phenomenon with deep historical roots, driven by "othering" and exploited for personal gain. It becomes manifest in society in various ways, especially in polemical discourse. In order to better understand (and address) such polemics, we have focused on five themes within Islamophobic discourse: violence, relations with Judaism and Christianity, democracy, modernity, and misogyny. Finally, in order to mitigate Islamophobia, it is suggested here to further develop Christian-Muslim interfaith dialogue by including in it affective, behavioral, and cognitive methodological components.

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ANDREA ELIZABETH CLUCK

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by

ANDREA ELIZABETH CLUCK

Major Professor: Alan Godlas

Committee: Alan Godlas
Kenneth Honerkamp
Carolyn Jones-Medine

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
August 2012
DEDICATION

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

O mankind! Indeed, We created you from a male and female, and We made you into nations and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you. Indeed, God is All-Knowing, All-Aware. (Qur'an 49:13)
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</th>
<th>v</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1

2 LITERATURE REVIEW: OPEN AND CLOSED-VIEW PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMOPHOBIA ........................................ 5
   Introduction ............................................................................ 5
   Open-View Perspectives ....................................................... 7
   Closed-View Perspectives ..................................................... 26
   Conclusion: Points of Consensus and Controversy .................. 30

3 UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA: CAUSES AND MANIFESTATIONS ....................................... 32
   Introduction ............................................................................ 32
   Historical Factors ............................................................... 36
   The Psychology of Contemporary Islamophobia ....................... 57
   Contemporary Societal Factors: Power .................................... 60
   The Contemporary Islamophobic Mindset .................................. 63
   Contemporary Manifestations of American Islamophobia .......... 66
   Dangers of Islamophobia ...................................................... 69
   Conclusion .............................................................................. 70

4 VIOLENT DISCOURSE: THEMES IN ISLAMOPHOBIC POLEMICS ........... 73
   Introduction ............................................................................ 73
   Theme One: Muslims Are Violent .......................................... 73
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Greek Slave</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Harem&quot;</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>&quot;Husband-Wife Imagined Role Reversal&quot;</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Although fear and hatred of Muslims is as old as Islam itself, the term “Islamophobia” is a relatively recent neologism that is used to “draw attention to a normalized prejudice and unjustified discrimination against Muslims.”¹ The term has been popularized because of the resurgence in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 United States of the phenomenon it describes.² According to the 1997 report by the Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, hereafter referred to as the Runnymede Trust report, Islamophobia includes discrimination against Muslims in employment practices, the provision of health care and education; exclusion of Muslims from government, politics, and employment (including management and positions of responsibility); violence toward Muslims including physical assaults, verbal abuse and vandalizing of property; and prejudice against Muslims in the media and in “everyday conversation.”³ Although the term “Islamophobia” has gained a considerable


³ Ibid. Islamophobes are often indiscriminate in including all Arabs and often South Asians within their stereotype of the “Muslim other,” regardless of the targeted individuals’ religious affiliations. However, the present work will focus, for the most part, on Muslims themselves.
degree of acceptance, the notion that an unjustified fear of Muslims exists is not without controversy, as will be seen in the subsequent discussion of closed-views of Islam.

Regardless of one’s feelings toward Islam, Muslims, and the term Islamophobia itself, anti-Muslim sentiment is an important issue for Americans to address, for reasons outlined by professor of religion Peter Gottschalk and his former student Gabriel Greenberg in Islamophobia: Making Muslims the New Enemy. First, the American Muslim population often is increasingly "the target of hate crimes and discrimination;" this violation of the civil rights of American citizens must be addressed. Second, the lack of differentiation between moderate and extremist Muslims is symptomatic of a broader danger not only to Muslims, but also to American society in general. Painting Muslims in broad strokes leaves Americans less equipped to identify and counter the actual threats which do exist. Third, foreign Muslim populations feel increasingly threatened by American foreign policy and expanding global interests. Although the vast majority of these Muslims would not retaliate against civilians via violent means, a small number would justify doing so. Thus, a fourth reason why Americans need to address anti-Muslim sentiment is that Americans must develop a more nuanced understanding of Islam. Accurately understanding Islam and the Muslim world will enable Americans to identify and react to real threats appropriately and not waste time and energy on scapegoating. Lastly, Islamophobia is a self-fulfilling prophecy and vicious cycle -- it produces backlash by Muslims, which in turn makes Americans more Islamophobic.4

On this basis, the current work undertakes to systematically analyze and address the problem of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 United States. Many books related to the topic of Islamophobia have been published since 2001; these can be organized according to whether they represent open or closed-view scholarship, as defined in the Runnymede Trust report.5 However, few of these works seek to comprehensively decipher the mechanisms and themes underlying Islamophobia. When these issues are explored, American Islamophobia emerges as a distinct,
contemporary phenomenon with deep historical roots. In the modern United States, Islamophobia is driven by the identity formation process of "othering" and is often exploited for personal gain. It is manifested in society in various ways, including within polemical discourse about Islam and Muslims. These polemics are best understood (and countered) via organizing them into the following five themes: violence, Judaism/Christianity, democracy, modernity, and misogyny. Christian/Muslim interfaith dialogue can also be effective in countering Islamophobia, but current approaches are incomplete. They should be adapted to include affective, behavioral, and cognitive methodological components.

To begin addressing these issues, chapter two surveys a representative sample of major books and articles, published between late 2001 and early 2010, that are important to the study of American Islamophobia. The works are organized according to the major themes they address and by whether they represent open or closed-view scholarship.

Chapter three seeks to identify some of the underlying causes of American Islamophobia and how it currently has become manifest. The chapter first explores the historical origins of American Islamophobia from Europe's first encounters with Islam up through the twentieth century United States' complex relationship with the Muslim world. Next, contemporary factors which exacerbate Islamophobia are pinpointed, including the manipulation of Islamophobia by certain individuals in order to obtain money or power. The chapter next provides an outline of how Islamophobia manifests itself in the contemporary closed-view mindset and in other areas of society, including Americans' beliefs about Muslims and violations of American Muslims' civil rights. Lastly, it warns of the dangers of Islamophobia which were outlined above in the introduction.

Chapter four moves toward solving the problem of Islamophobia. It attempts to develop a further understanding of one of the manifestations of Islamophobia identified in chapter three, anti-Muslim polemics. It argues that the best way to understand Islamophobic polemics is to organize them thematically. To that end, five themes are suggested: the accusation that Muslims are violent, that they hate Jews and Christians; that they are anti-modernity; that they oppose
democracy; and that Muslim men are misogynistic. Within each theme, representative polemics and responses from scholars are provided, countering some of the closed-view works reviewed in chapter one and lending credibility to the open-view mindset. Aside from the utility of discrediting individual polemical statements, developing a more nuanced understanding of the themes underlying anti-Islamic discourse is one way to combat Islamophobia.

Chapter five offers a further, concrete suggestion for countering Islamophobia at the grassroots level: a coherent, systematic, and relatively objective methodology for Muslim-Christian interfaith dialogue. Growing Muslim involvement in and leadership of dialogue efforts with Christians since 9/11 is encouraging, but problems exist with current methodologies commonly utilized. First, dialogue efforts are often inadequately planned; this can be addressed by making current approaches to and planning strategies for dialogue more widely known among Muslims. Second, even the best-planned dialogue methodologies currently in use are incomplete, representing a solely behavioral approach. Therefore, a multi-faceted strategy, incorporating not only well-structured behavioral but also cognitive and affective methodologies, is proposed. Although Islamophobia is deeply entrenched in American society, its perpetuation is not inevitable. Muslims and non-Muslims can and must work together toward its elimination for the welfare of both groups.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW: OPEN AND CLOSED-VIEW PERSPECTIVES ON

ISLAMOPHOBIA

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is to synthesize what has already been written on the subject of Islamophobia so that subsequent chapters can build upon this foundation. As a good deal of material relevant to American Islamophobia already existed pre-9/11 and the market for such works exploded afterwards, the current study is limited to major works about or directly relevant to Islamophobia in the United States published between late 2001 and early 2010. European Islamophobia, although also a serious issue, is not the main focus of the current study and is only occasionally referenced, except as it pertains to the historical roots of American Islamophobia. In addition, although there is a body of visual media that is worthy of consideration, video is not included in the present study, except for brief notes on the role of Hollywood and the media in perpetuating Islamophobia.

The authors discussed here are divided into two major categories: open and closed-views of Islam and Muslims. According to the Runnymede Trust report, a “key distinction is to be made between closed-views of Islam and open-views,” which have eight contrasting characteristics. The closed-view sees Islam as monolithic, separate from the West/Christianity, inferior to the West, an enemy to it, and as a manipulative quasi-religious political entity. In addition, criticism of the West is rejected within the closed-view, discrimination against Muslims is defended, and Islamophobia is seen as a natural response to a threat. Thus, while closed-view and Islamophobic are not synonyms, Islamophobia is one possible component of the closed-view mindset. One important facet (or perhaps product) of the closed-view mindset is the clash of civilizations theory. Clash theory was popularized via an article by Bernard Lewis which originally appeared

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6 Runnymede Trust Commission, Islamophobia, 5.
in a 1990 issue of Atlantic Monthly and was reprinted the following year in Policy. The late Samuel P. Huntington, who expanded upon and helped to popularize Lewis' theory, had a slightly different focus in that he was concerned with the post-Cold War world: today's clash of civilizations is primarily between Western post-Christian civilization and Sinic (Chinese) and Islamic civilizations. One facet of clash theory that is important to the closed-view perspective is that Islam has reemerged as the necessary antithesis to the West in the absence of a Communist threat.

The open-view of Islam holds that Islam is diverse, not monolithic; that the Muslim world interacts and overlaps with the West; that the Muslim world is different from but not inferior to the West; that Muslims are potential partners, not inevitable enemies; and that Islam is a genuine faith with sincere practitioners. Proponents of the open-view are willing to take Muslim criticisms of the West into consideration, condemn discrimination against Muslims, and hold that Islamophobia is a problem for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Since the open-view is most compatible with the aims of the current work and a greater amount of credible scholarship has been done within this framework than by closed-view authors, the open-view will be given the most in-depth consideration in the following literature review.


8 Lewis asserts that the conflict stems from the “classical Islamic view” that the world is divided into the House of Peace and the House of War (non-Muslims) In addition, Lewis argues that Muslims believe it is their duty to “dispatch” non-Muslims, and that Islamic extremism is the correct interpretation of Islam rather than a deviation.


11 Runnymede Trust Commission, Islamophobia, 5.
After being designated as open-view, works are further broken down as follows: anthologies, works that provide definition and overview, historical approaches, those that address sociopolitical and religious factors, psychological approaches, and authors who provide potential solutions. Closed-view authors are included based on their popularity and widespread influence. It should be understood that a range of opinions on Islam and Muslims exists within each of the categories and the binary system should not indicate that authors who are grouped together necessarily represent a homogenous group or fit perfectly within each of the criteria listed below. As the current work will argue against the veracity of rigidly dichotomous world-views, it would be ironic to thus classify the authors who have written about the relevant issues. However, the authors in each category can be better understood, however, based on the broad similarities by which which they are grouped.

**Open-View Perspectives**

**Anthologies**

*The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael Sells, is an anthology of essays critiquing the clash of civilizations theory from a variety of angles. A running theme throughout the introduction and subsequent essays is that clash theory presents a grave problem not because it is fundamentally correct, but rather because it is believed to be so by people who identify with opposing sides of the perceived Islam-West dichotomy; it is essentially a self-fulfilling prophecy. Qureshi and Sells’ introduction provides an overview of clash theory: highlighting its major proponents (Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and V.S. Naipaul) and its basic premises according to Lewis and Huntington. Some works are included in the review of closed-view literature (e.g., those by Robert Spencer) because they have a large following and help to represent the full range of views on Islamophobia rather than because the author in question has a solid grounding in either traditional Islamic sciences or the Western academic study of religion and the necessary background to study primary Islamic texts in their original languages. Other authors, such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, have a great deal more credibility. The present goal is not to evaluate the veracity of the arguments, but rather to document and organize them. Evaluations of some of the polemical statements made in these works take place in later chapters.


14 Ibid., 4, 12.
and Sells provide their own refutation of clash theory as well as its problematic areas and potential dangers.

Six of the essays in The New Crusades pertain directly to the study of Islamophobia in the United States. Fatema Mernissi’s “Palace Fundamentalism and Liberal Democracy” refutes the assertion that a liberal, democratic Western society and a reactionary Islamic world are two distinct, conflicting entities. Edward Said, John Trumpbour, and Roy Mottahedeh all refute clash theory from an open-view perspective, specifically focusing on its role in Western, particularly American politics and foreign policy. Rob Nixon examines V. S. Naipaul’s influence among “academics and intellectuals in Britain and North America” as well as among a “more popular audience.” Essays in part two of the anthology explore examples of the West’s Islam-as-the-antithesis construct. María Rosa Menocal, for example, gives information important for understanding American Islamophobia’s historical roots by discussing post-medieval Europe’s identity construction via a concerted self-cleansing of its Jewish and Islamic history.

A second anthology, Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism, was compiled by the co-editors of the Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture, Hillel Schenker and Ziad Abu-Zayyad, as an extension of the journal’s special issue on the same topic. The anthology includes articles from that issue, additional relevant articles from past issues, and some new material. Editors Hillel Schenker and Ziad Abu-Zayyad’s endeavor to help clarify the “origins, meaning, and implications” of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. In addition, the book is intended to advance the overall aims of the journal: to clarify the (sometimes opposing) positions of both sides, further the debate, and work toward a solution. The editors’ basis for addressing both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the same volume are their underlying similarities and interrelatedness.

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15 Ibid., 16.
16 Ibid., 19.
17 Ibid., 20.
The anthology’s most relevant section, “Islamophobia,” contains three articles by Abdujalil Sajid, Mustafa Abu Sway, and Eugenio Chahúan, which are summarized later in this review. Part two contains information on the “new anti-Semitism” and how it compares to Islamophobia. The final section, “Approaches to a Better World,” includes articles by Charfi and Stolov on democracy in Islam and interfaith dialogue, respectively, that are also reviewed later in this chapter.

*Confronting Islamophobia in Educational Practice*, an anthology edited by Dutch scholar Barry Van Driel, brings together essays composed by a diverse collection of experts in academia and the non-profit sector who seek to understand Islamophobia in Western society and to search for possible solutions, all within the realm of educational environments. Van Driel, like other open-view scholars, believes that Islamophobia is a complex issue with deep historical roots. He also argues, like many open-view scholars, that Islamophobia harms not only its immediate victims, but that it is detrimental to Western society as a whole. However, the anthology’s overall outlook is positive; the contributors suggest practical measures that can be taken to alleviate Islamophobia via educational practice, ideally making Muslim students and their families more comfortable with attending Western educational institutions and making society as a whole more respectful toward and understanding of Muslims.

Van Driel’s anthology contains writings from international experts concerned with the United States, Europe, Israel, and Australia; those most relevant to American Islamophobia are reviewed here. Chapter 1, “Islamophobia in North America: Confronting the Menace,” by psychologist and professor of psychology Amber Haque, provides a broad demographic overview of American Muslims and relevant controversial topics (e.g., *jihād*). Haque also offers insight into causes for recent manifestations of Islamophobia (within the last twenty years), its consequences

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19 Barry Van Driel, ed., *Confronting Islamophobia in Educational Practice* (Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books, 2004), x.

20 Van Driel, *Confronting Islamophobia*, xiii.
within and outside of the educational sphere, and the role of both Muslims and non-Muslims in tackling Islamophobia for society’s overall good.\textsuperscript{21}

In Chapter 5, “The Subtleties of Prejudice,” American scholar J’Lien Liese discusses the complex nature of American schools’ post-9/11 struggle to balance pride in multiculturalism with patriotism and the War on Terror. Liese stresses the importance of differentiating between people and politics. For example, the fact that the United States is at war with Iraq does not mean that Iraqi-American students must feel ashamed of their cultural heritage. Additionally Liese discusses the role of fear in threat perception; identifies different levels of prejudice and discrimination; explains how to promote respect within a culture of fear; and identifies different groups which efforts to counter prejudice and racism should focus on. Liese also suggests strategies for educators and specific school programs that can be used to combat Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{22}

In Chapter 6, “Practical Educational Programming that Confronts Islamophobia,” Beth Finkelstein, Assistant Program Director for Education at the nonprofit, nonsectarian Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, introduces the center’s educational program "Building Blocks for Democracy: Children Celebrate their Traditions." "Building Blocks" is a kindergarten through fourth grade level program designed to educate students in an age-appropriate fashion about “diverse religious traditions” and teach “the skills necessary to live in a pluralistic...society." The chapter includes a description of the “rationale and conception for the programme’s design, and its implementation.”\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{Works that Provide Definition and Overview}

Abdujalil Sajid’s article "Islamophobia: A New Word for an Old Fear," defines Islamophobia and related terms and categorizes world-views connected to Islamophobia. Sajid was a member of the Runnymede Trust committee that published the 1997 report; hence, he draws heavily from it and expands upon it in this article. Although much of the information he

\vspace{1em}
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 1.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 64-72.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 77.
gives is not new, the article was useful in making existing information more accessible, as the 1997 report had gone out of print at the time his article was written and was not readily available on Runnymede's website. Sajid, like Mustafa Abu Sway below, focuses mostly on Europe (specifically the United Kingdom), but the definitions and categories he provides are useful for discussing Western Islamophobia as a whole.

Sajid defines Islamophobia and discusses it as a necessary but imperfect neologism. He also analyzes the term “fundamentalist” and why it is inappropriate to use as a description for Muslims. He lists some of the contextual factors that he believes give rise to Islamophobia, echoing other open-view authors and adding new points: disproportionate media coverage given to terrorism, the high numbers of Muslim refugees and asylum-seekers, the media’s outlook on religion overall, and Western foreign policy. In addition, Sajid discusses the negative impact that Islamophobia has on both Muslims and non-Muslims: Muslims feel alienated in their own countries, their voices are not heard on ethical and social issues, and legitimate self-criticism is silenced.

Most of the remainder of the article is devoted to illustrating the differences between open and closed-views of Islam and Muslims, essentially the same as those summarized above from the Runnymede Trust report. Similar to other authors included here, Sajid gives broad suggestions (although not specific instructions) for how both Muslims and non-Muslims can fight the prejudice and ignorance that cause Islamophobia, including grassroots interfaith interactions, the adoption of democracy in the Muslim world, and adherence to true Islamic principles.

Historical Approaches to Islamophobia

In American Christians and Islam: Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Terrorism, scholar of American religion Thomas Kidd provides a historical

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26 Ibid., 7-10.
account of key themes in conservative American Protestant (evangelical) thought on Islam from the colonial period to the present. Although Kidd does not use the word “Islamophobic” to describe the Christian viewpoints captured within his work (which are often very negative), the viewpoints he describes are essentially compatible with the closed-view of Islam. Aspects of Islamophobia that other authors have pinpointed within secular society show up here, albeit within a religious framework, and with a vengeance.

However, Kidd’s aim is not to assess whether the viewpoints expressed in the book are accurate or not, nor to vilify all evangelical Christians. Kidd does not call for the end of evangelical or exclusivist religion. However, he approaches the issue from the stance that Islam is not monolithic, Muslim terrorists are an extreme minority, and the viewpoints expressed “generally tell us more about American Christians than [they do about] any Muslims in particular.” Kidd asserts that his aim is not to push for a particular course of action, but does assert that there is much room for improvement in the “public behavior of religious traditionists” and that “too much American Christian writing has cultivated sensationalized ideas about Islam and the Prophet Muhammad, at the expense of charitable understanding.” Thus in his conclusion, he offers a mindset for believers, both Christian and Muslim, to employ in order to move forward together constructively.

Like the other authors in this category, Kidd believes that there has been a resurgence and increase of Islamophobia since 2001, but he emphasizes that it has historical origins in America’s colonial period. He identifies four key themes that have developed from the colonial period to the present age: “the desire to see Muslims convert to Christianity, the fascination with missionary

28 Kidd, American Christians and Islam, 165-167.
29 Ibid., xii, 65.
30 Ibid., xiii.
31 Ibid., 165-167.
work among Muslims, the mixing of political policy and theology as it relates to the Muslim
world (and Israel), and the insertion of Islam into eschatological schemes.”  

*Understanding Christian-Muslim Relations* is scholar of Islam Clinton Bennett’s
comparative analysis of selected Christian and Muslim scholarly contributions to interfaith
dialogue from Islam’s inception to the present. The texts discussed are mostly theological in
nature and come from a wide variety of Christian and Muslim backgrounds (e.g., Orthodox,
Roman Catholic, Protestant, Sunni, Shi’ah, and pro-and anti-Sufi Muslims). Bennett’s aim is to
“shed some light on the main issues, debates, and agendas that feature in the story of Christian-
Muslim relations, with a view to improving understanding of the issues involved.” Specifically,
his book examines “the role of the Bible and Qur’an in encounter” and discusses traditional and
contemporary Christian and Muslim contributions to interfaith encounters.

Bennett classifies dialogue contributors into two groups, conciliatory and confrontational.
These bear similarities to the open-view/closed-view system of classification but are specifically
grounded toward classifying approaches to faith-based encounters of the religious other.
Confrontational authors take the stance that they exclusively possess ultimate truth, know all
about the other, and that the other has nothing valuable to offer. The ultimate goal of this
approach is conversion or surrender on the part of the other. The conciliatory approach, on the
other hand, seeks a “better understanding of the Other’s religion and a resolution of some of the
traditional points of disagreement.”

Bennett identifies himself as a conciliatory Christian and proponent of interfaith dialogue.
He does concede that one limitation to dialogue efforts is that conciliation rarely impacts

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32 Ibid., xi-xii, 165.
36 Ibid., 13.
37 Ibid., 1, 9.
confrontation and vice versa, because the two have different agendas, goals, and methods.\textsuperscript{38} This raises the interesting question of whether interfaith dialogue is only effective when the participants are conciliatory, which will be further considered in the final chapter of the present work. In his conclusion, Bennett discusses lessons to be learned from past Muslim-Christian interactions and examines the progress that has been made (e.g., that faculty members teaching Islamic Studies now often come from Muslim as well as Christian backgrounds).\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{Approaches to Social, Religious, and Political Factors}

\textit{In Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy}, Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg attempt to demonstrate and analyze the presence of Islamophobia in America via an examination of relevant political cartoons; theirs is the first work of its kind to do so at length.\textsuperscript{40} Their aim is to identify widespread stereotypes, which Americans have the responsibility to address and move beyond, particularly the underlying notion of the Muslim as the "other." Gottschalk and Greenberg argue that the media in general and political cartoons specifically both capture and reinforce stereotypes about Muslims.\textsuperscript{42}

Gottschalk and Greenberg first give an overview of the West’s encounters with the Muslim world, beginning with the inception and spread of Islam, then through the Crusades, and finally up to the twenty-first century; this provides the historical background that they, like other open-view authors, deem so important. Next, they analyze prominent symbols (e.g., the mosque, veil, and crescent) that signify Islam for Americans, discussing how these symbols are utilized and what they communicate.\textsuperscript{43} Then, Gottschalk and Greenberg explore how Muslims are stereotyped (e.g., “all Muslims are Arab”) via political cartoons into becoming the antithesis to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 9.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 13; 213-214.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Gottschalk and Greenberg, \textit{Making Muslims the Enemy}, in Esposito and Kalin, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 9-11.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 144.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 46.
\end{itemize}
America as the “good norm.” Following from this is a more in-depth analysis of five themes that Americans have used to depict themselves as representing this “norm,” and Muslims, by contrast, as extremists who are beyond the pale of the norm. The final chapter examines four historical events that prompted the publication of political cartoons. It illustrates the evolution of political cartoons which depict events that only incidentally involve Muslims, to today's cartoons that portray negative events and people as inherently primarily Islamic to the exclusion of other identities.

English literature professor Stephen Spector’s *Evangelicals and Israel: The Story of American Christian Zionism* explores how politics and religion converge in evangelical Christian attitudes regarding the state of Israel and Judaism. It is relevant to a discussion of American Islamophobia because many Christian Zionists maintain a closed-view attitude toward Islam. They view themselves as the allies of the Jewish people against Islam from both a political and theological standpoint. Although reasons for evangelical support of Israel are complex, the belief in a clash of civilizations and the perceived role of Israel in Christian eschatology are prominent factors.

Two chapters in Spector's book focus on evangelical attitudes toward Israel. “The Arab and Muslim Enemy” elaborates on the political side of this opposition: many evangelicals believe that many Muslims' opposition to the state of Israel is not due to politics surrounding Gaza and the West Bank, but rather that these Muslims want to take over the world, and that Israel is simply the front line in their war for domination. The chapter “The War with Islam as a Faith” explores the theological compliment to political Zionists’ support of Israel: “their opposition to Israel’s

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44 Ibid., 92.
45 Ibid., 91.
46 Ibid., 111.
49 Ibid., 50.
enemies in theology." Essentially, their viewpoint is that the God of Judaism and Christianity is in opposition to the false deity worshipped by Muslims.⁵⁰

In *Homeland Insecurity: The Arab-American and Muslim American Experience after 9/11*, sociologist Louis Cainkar analyzes the collective post-9/11 experience of Arabs (Muslim and non-Muslim) living in metropolitan Chicago. Via a sociological and ethnographic study, Cainkar provides concrete data to back up the intangible feeling of insecurity experienced by Arab Americans in the years following 9/11.⁵¹ An important theme in Cainkar’s work is that the negative treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim Arabs did not occur in a vacuum. Because the stereotype of Arabs as a violent other had explained turmoil in the Middle East throughout the twentieth century, it was easy to make them a scapegoat following the attacks.⁵²

Cainkar found that the majority of American Muslims experienced a deepening of their faith following the 9/11 attacks. Many previously non-practicing Muslims began to practice, and many Muslims also felt obligated to increase their religious knowledge.⁵³ She also found that the majority of Arab American Muslims perceive their future in a positive light; they see their struggle as similar to that of other American minority groups who have successfully integrated. Hence American Muslims believe that they, too, will eventually be included in mainstream society. Cainkar also concluded that the Bush administration provoked much more fear among Arab Americans than did private citizens. Arabs quickly reacted after 9/11 to confront the challenge of government injustice and popular violence; this included grassroots mobilizations that were joint efforts between Muslims and non-Muslims. (This phenomenon will be further explored in chapter five of the present work.) In order to successfully continue their efforts to combat Islamophobia, Cainkar stresses that it is important for Arab Americans to maintain

⁵⁰ Ibid., 76.


⁵³ Ibid., 6.
organized social ties with non-Muslim/non-Arab Americans in order foster political social
integration, and the protection of Arab Americans’ civil rights.\textsuperscript{54}

In \textit{Scapegoats of September 11: Hate Crimes and State Crimes in the War on Terror},
sociologist Michael Welch discusses the scapegoating of Muslims and non-Muslim ethnic Arabs
and South Asians on the popular and government levels ("hate crimes" and "state crimes,"
respectively) as a response to 9/11, especially via the War on Terror. For Welch, scapegoating, a
social phenomenon, is a form of Islamophobia. Welch’s book is unique among the sources
reviewed here in that it analyzes the official government dimension of Islamophobia. Welch
utilizes the sociological societal reaction perspective, particularly "moral panic theory," ultimately
concluding that “America’s war on terror is better understood in the context of a ‘risk society’
rather than in the traditional realm of moral panic.”\textsuperscript{55}

Welch analyzes the War on Terror in detail, documenting and analyzing mistakes in
counterterrorism tactics and the various manifestations of scapegoating that have occurred during
the War on Terror. Welch’s goal is to prove the that the War on Terror does not effectively
contribute to public safety and national security.\textsuperscript{56} He also highlights the many problems it causes
not only for the scapegoats themselves, but also for society at large, domestically and
internationally.\textsuperscript{57} Welch not only gives a chronology of representative incidents from 9/11 up to
the time of his writing, he also explores scapegoating as an ancient phenomenon; thus the War on
Terror is a “continuation of a more ancient campaign against evil.”\textsuperscript{58} Welch’s tone is grave

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 7-8.

\textsuperscript{55} Michael Welch, \textit{Scapegoats of September 11: Hate Crimes and State Crimes in the War on
Terror; Critical Issues in Crime and Society}, ed. Raymond J. Michalowski (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2006), 13-14. Welch defines "moral panic" as “a turbulent and
exaggerated response to a perceived social problem whereby there is considerable concern and
consensus that such a problem actually exists. Blame is then shifted to suitable villains who
absorb societal hostility;” a risk society is one preoccupied with the future and its security and
safety (\textit{Scapegoats} 13).

\textsuperscript{56} Welch, \textit{Scapegoats}, 5.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., ix, 13, 18.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., x, 4.
throughout the book, but he is ultimately optimistic, pointing toward a potentially “emerging awareness of human rights” via “efforts to reduce potential violence, most importantly protecting civil liberties and human rights along with cultivating genuine international relations.”

Important topics that Welch covers include an interpretation of discourse about terrorism and war, an analysis of the dynamics of blame and how it relates to "scapegoat theory," insight into the religious and cultural dimensions of post-9/11 American counterterrorism policies, a survey of post-9/11 hostility toward Middle Eastern and South Asian people post-9/11, and an exploration of a negative practice within the criminal justice system that includes ethnic/religious profiling, the Special Registration Program. Welch also includes criticism of what he perceives as the criminal justice system’s “hard line tactics." Additionally, he explores also explores what he deems state crimes and the problems that they cause, including the Iraq War, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, torture, and extraordinary rendition.60 Lastly, Welch attempts to dispel the notion that the War on Terror is effective and investigates what he deems to be government intrusions on private life, such as the USA PATRIOT Act.61

In “Islamophobia: Meaning, Manifestations, and Causes," Islamic Studies professor Mustafa Abu Sway seeks to provide both a definition and socio-political context for Islamophobia. Although he focuses primarily on manifestations of Islamophobia in Europe, his discussion of the different levels of society in which Islamophobia happens is applicable to the West in general, including the United States. Abu Sway’s definition of Islamophobia is based on that originally provided in the Runnymede Trust report. He perceives Islamophobia not as an isolated phenomenon unique to one country; rather, it occurs in every state that has a Muslim minority.62

59 Ibid., x, 18.
60 Welch defines "extraordinary rendition" as, essentially, the outsourcing of torture (Ibid., 17).
61 Ibid., 15-17.
Abu Sway perceives the perpetrators of Islamophobia as falling along a spectrum from individual to institutional. The line can become blurred because institutions have enormous influence on individuals. Individuals may be affected by Islamophobia in the media (which is, in turn, linked to the “centers of power”), politics, school curricula, and/or theological world views that do not accommodate the “other.” Institutionalized Islamophobia is seen in laws and policies, which “creates constitutional and legal structures behind which Islamophobes can hide.” Most notable here is unrestricted Islamophobic free speech protected by the First Amendment.\(^63\)

He also includes thoughts on accepting Islamophobia as a new word for an old phenomenon. For Abu Sway, the problem of Islamophobia did not originate overnight; rather, its historical origins go back to the Crusades and Inquisition. Abu Sway points out that discrimination against Jews similarly existed for centuries before the term “anti-Semitism” was coined. Both Islamophobia are derived from a xenophobic European paradigm which Abu Sway stresses needs to be replaced, arguing that they are rooted in “xenophobic Eurocentrism which was and still is a barrier in fostering a multicultural world not dominated by nationalism and national interests.”\(^64\)

**Psychological Perspectives**

In his brief article “An East-West Dichotomy: Islamophobia,” professor of history and director of the Center of Arabic Studies at the University of Chile Eugenio Chahúan explores the necessity of a stereotypical "other" as vital to the closed-view Western identity.

Stereotyping Islam, Arabs, and the East is part of the construction of an in-group identity through opposition to and demonization of an antithetical "other." Superiority over the "other" also justifies neocolonial values, which include “colonial interests, military and economic expansionist ideologies.”\(^65\) Coupled with these ideologies is a belief in Western intellectual and

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\(^{64}\) Ibid., 21-22.

moral superiority and a view of the East as backward and static.\textsuperscript{66} Ironically, in order to construct this binary opposition, the West negates its own multiculturalism and paints itself as a monolith.\textsuperscript{67} Stereotypes are perpetuated in part through the media, which functions as a tool of the closed-view ideologues, and exist even in the highest levels of society. Although Islam has recently reemerged to replace Communism as the "other," the roots of the role of Islamophobia in identity creation go back to the seventh century and thus a familiarity with the historical development of the East-West opposition is vital in understanding the issue.\textsuperscript{68}

Chahúan offers solutions in broad strokes. For him, today’s problems in the Arab world are social in origin: economic, political, and cultural. Arabs are not culturally, religiously, or genetically predisposed to violence, although there is a danger that the stereotypes could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus solutions should be social, not military, a notion which will be corroborated in chapters four and five of the present work.\textsuperscript{69}

While Chahúan approaches the psychology of Islamophobia in general terms, Nerina Rustomji of St. Johns University focuses on a specific instance of "othering" in her article “American Visions of the Houri.” Explicitly, Rustomji examines criticisms of Islam in America’s post-9/11 popular media discourse on a prevalent topic, the Islamic eschatological concept of the ḥūr al-`ayn, known in English as the "houri."\textsuperscript{70} Similar to Chahúan, Rustomji asserts that Americans form much of their understanding of Islam from its portrayal in the popular media.\textsuperscript{71} Rustomji’s examination of how the portrayal of the ḥūr al-`ayn in the popular media has shaped

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 26-27.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{71} Rustomji, “Houri,” 80.
\end{quote}
American perceptions of the topic “offers insight into how Americans [come to] conceive of Islam as a monolithic system of belief.”

Americans' discussion of the *houri* a microcosm of their understanding of Islam as a whole. More specifically, Rustomji argues that “the *houri* in American discourse reveals perceptions of Islam as a system of belief with an inherent sensual, violent, and irrational nature.” To support this claim, Rustomji begins with a brief examination of the romanticized, sensualized way in which the Anglicized term *houri* has come to be understood and used. This is different from the classic Qur'anic understanding of the *ḥūr al-`ayn*, which is not overtly sexual. However, non-Muslims assume that the Orientalized notion of the *houri* is an accurate representation of the Qur'anic *ḥūr al-`ayn*.

Rustomji examines three themes within the *houri* discourse: the *houri* as an exemplar of Islam’s supposed inherent sensuality, as a reward for committing violent acts, and as interpreted in Western revisionist readings (i.e., Christoph Luxembourg's Aramaic theory of the Qur'an). Rustomji points out that all three themes meet Edward Said's criteria for Orientalism -- they “construct a knowledge about Islamic societies that is driven by projected fantasies” of and a desire to Westernize the Muslim world. In addition all three themes characterize Muslims as irrational.

Rustomji's work intersects with that of Chahúan because both authors illustrate how Islam serves as an antithesis to the Western self-image of rationality in the closed-view mindset.

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72 Ibid., 90.

73 Ibid., 90.

74 The term "*houri*” has come into English via French, which originally borrowed the word from the Persian *hūrī*, from the Arabic *ḥur*. See Rustomji, "*Houri*”, 90; *New Oxford American Dictionary*, 2012 online version, s.v. "*houri*.”

75 Rustomji, "*Houri*,” 80-81; 86.

76 Rustomji, "*Houri*”, 88; Christoph Luxembourg, *The Syro-Aramaic Reading of the Koran: A Contribution to Decoding the Language of the Koran* (Berlin: Verlag Hans Schiler, 2007). Luxembourg's arguments will be further examined in chapter 4.

77 Rustomji, "*Houri*,” 90.
Also, by invoking the long-standing Western fascination with the violent, sex-crazed Muslim male, Rustomji asserts (although more implicitly than Chahuán) the importance of understanding Islamophobia’s historical roots.\textsuperscript{78}

“Religion and anti-Islamic Attitudes,” a study published in the \textit{Review of Religious Research} by Stephen D. Johnson, seeks to determine, via a telephone survey of a representative American community, whether affiliation with certain branches of American Christianity (conservative fundamentalist churches versus mainline Protestant and Catholic churches), coupled with certain personality traits in an individual (authoritarianism or a social-dominance orientation) might lead to hostility and prejudice toward American Muslims in post-9/11 society.\textsuperscript{79} Johnson’s study, one of the first of its kind, needs more testing to further validate its conclusions, but Johnson provide some insight into the origin of anti-Islamic attitudes and a potential basis for reducing negative attitudes toward Islam among Americans.\textsuperscript{80}

Johnson’s results indicate that some, but “not a great deal,” of Islamophobia existed within the study group. In the survey, “about sixty-eight percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that most Americans of Islamic faith support the activities of Osama Bin Laden, about sixteen percent were neutral, and about sixteen percent agreed with that position.” However, members of conservative, fundamentalist churches were shown to be more Islamophobic than members of mainline Protestant and Catholic churches. In addition, fundamentalists with an authoritarian or social dominance orientation were significantly more prejudiced than those without. For non-fundamentalists, personality traits did not make a significant difference. Thus it is not necessarily religious affiliation that leads to anti-Islamic attitudes, but rather religious affiliation coupled with particular personality traits.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 85; 88.


\textsuperscript{80} Johnson, “Attitudes,” 14.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 10-12.
Suggestions for Potential Solutions

Among the works focusing primarily on practical solutions to Islamophobia is “On Overcoming Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia” by Yehuda Stolov, executive director of the Jerusalem-based Interfaith Encounter Association (IEA). The purpose of Stolov’s article is to offer practical solutions for overcoming “Arab anti-Semitism and Israeli Arab-Phobia.” For Stolov, phobia of the "other" is due to ignorance and is best countered via “intensive interfaith encounter, the process of which he outlines in the article. The parties potentially go from deriving knowledge about the other almost solely from the media to receiving first-hand information via direct one-on-one encounters. The lasting relationships that are built function as a barrier against ignorance. Chapter five of the present work will corroborate Stolov's argument for the importance of building knowledge about and facilitating positive encounters with the religious "other," but will expand upon this methodology to add a third, affective dimension.

“Religion: Source of Terror and Transformation,” is Eileen Kinch’s account of her interfaith encounter with Rachida El-Dinawi. El-Dinawi was a visiting Fulbright Scholar and instructor at Chatham College in 2002-2003, where Kinch was an undergraduate. Kinch, a Mennonite-Quaker Christian, and El-Dinawi, a Sunni Muslim hijabi, met through Chatham’s Global Focus program, in which El-Dinawi lived in an apartment in Kinch’s residence hall and taught courses on Islam. Ultimately, the two developed a more personal relationship that added an additional element of emotional involvement with the "other" to the academic instruction about Islam that Kinch received. The present work corroborates Kinch's assertion that emotional involvement with the "other" is an important part of interfaith dialogue; chapter five will present a methodology for formally structuring this affective component.


Although Kinch’s article approaches the issue of Islamophobia indirectly, it attests to the importance of grassroots interfaith interaction and the cultivation of positive, adaptive affect regarding Muslims in combating fear and ignorance of the Muslim "other." Rather than eliminating the "us-them" dichotomy, Kinch’s experience allowed her to appropriate the concept of the "other" as something positive, with the "other" becoming, for her, a mirror for the self and the Divine. Kinch’s experience illustrates that education, while important, is only the beginning; emotional involvement with the "other" is also vital. Kinch’s experience, although not formally structured in the way that Yehuda Stolov proposes in his article, was nevertheless facilitated by Chatham and thus is an example of the flexibility and potential impact of the interfaith encounter model.

In “Islam and Democracy: Are they Compatible?,” Abdelmajid Charfi, Islamic thinker and instructor at Manebah University in Tunis, questions closed-view assumptions that Islam itself is the reason for the lack of democracy in Muslim countries, particularly the Middle East. Charfi examines the reasons behind the closed-view camp’s willingness to take the perceived lack of democracy in the Middle East at face value. He speculates that it is fueled by material interests (i.e., justification for Western political and economic agendas), but that there are also cultural and psychological dimensions to it. He agrees with the other open-view scholars included here that although today’s West is largely secularized, its attitudes toward Islam remain rooted in history going back to Christianity's tumultuous contact with Islam at its conception.

Charfi offers suggestions for how the dearth of democracy in the Middle East should in fact be understood. The problem is not that Islam is incompatible with democracy, but that the societies in which it is the majority religion have not “generally succeeded in modernizing their production and social systems, or in acquiring institutions that guarantee popular sovereignty." Islam can be adapted to “any political regime,” although all political regimes do not necessarily


measure up to Islam's standards for how a society is to be governed. In fact, Charfi argues that Islam equips man to fully “exercise [his] freedom and responsibility,” so democracy is in fact ideal.  

On the basis of this approach, Charfi suggests that it is best to help create conditions that will help foster the emergence of democracy rather than attempting to impose it via force. In addition, genuine democracy is needed in “international relations and in the functioning of related institutions.” Lastly, support (both covert and overt) of dictatorial regimes should be ended.

A final author focusing on solutions is Anton Karl Kozlovic of Flinders University. Although his article “Islam, Muslims, and Arabs in the Popular Hollywood Cinema” could easily be classified as a source that documents sociopolitical factors in Islamophobia (specifically, the role of entertainment media), it is catalogued here as a work that primarily offers solutions. These solutions not only encompass countering Islamophobic depictions of Islam, Muslims, and Arabs in film generally, but also using films themselves as an antidote to Islamophobia.

Kozlovic argues that films should be “proactively integrated” into religion curricula as more than visual aids; that they are a “viable pedagogic resource.” In addition, they can be enjoyed as a means and aid for interfaith dialogue, especially through exposing the Islamophobia embedded in popular films. Kozlovic also advocates the wide-scale production of films depicting Islam in a positive light, both through creating overt hagiographies of the Prophet Muḥammad and through including “Islamic sacred subtexts” in plots. Doing so will, according to Kozlovic, contribute to a more robust understanding and appreciation of Islamic teachings and values.

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87 Ibid., 188. Since the time of Charfi’s writing, the events of the Arab Spring have lent further credence to his arguments. Muslims across North Africa and the Middle East have demanded democratic governments which are also in accordance with Islamic principles.

88 For example, the International Monetary Fund and the UN Security Council.

89 Ibid.


91 Kozlovic’s article includes a review of popular Hollywood films and critical literature; he identifies an extensive list of films that misrepresent Islam, Muslims, and Arab culture (see page 213).

to Kozlović, “enrich the world’s filmic diet,” spread Islam’s message in a positive fashion, enhance interfaith dialogue, and combat Islamophobic stereotypes.93

Closed-View Perspectives

In this section, selected authors representing the closed-view of Islam on both the academic and popular levels are considered. Daniel Pipes, Robert Spencer, V.S. Naipaul, Francis Fukuyama, Bernard Lewis, and Samuel Huntington are among the most preeminent members of this group. However, only works by Pipes, Spencer, and Huntington are included below because they have published non-fiction (or released a new edition of a previous work) post-9/11 that is directly relevant to or addresses the topic at hand. However, the current influence of Naipaul, Fukuyama, and Lewis should not be overlooked.94

Although the late Harvard University professor of political science Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* was originally published in 1996, it is included here because it was reissued in 2003 and continues to have a considerable impact on members of the closed-view camp; those influenced by it include authors, scholars, politicians, policy makers, and laypeople.95 Huntington intended the work to expand upon, clarify, and refine the arguments in his original article “The Clash of Civilizations?” in order to answer that title’s question.96

93 Ibid.


95 As Qureshi and Sells note, Huntington’s original 1993 article “The Clash of Civilizations?” was published in *Foreign Affairs*, which is popular with government officials and policymakers. This book is an expansion on the ideas in that article and thus can be said to be popular with those in the same circle who have continued interest in Huntington’s ideas (Qureshi and Sells, "Introduction," in Qureshi and Sells 12). The enduring popularity of Huntington's ideas has further been confirmed since the writing of this present work; a new edition of *The Clash of Civilizations* was released in 2011. See Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2011).

Huntington’s “interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War” is that
global politics are now reconfigured along cultural lines rather than being organized around the
two superpowers. Huntington stresses that an enemy "other" is an important part of identity
creation. In this, members of the open-view camp do not completely disagree with him. However,
Huntington makes "othering" inescapable; in-group identity and conflict between the world's
major civilizations is natural and inevitable. Huntington classifies the main post-Cold War
civilizations as Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American, and
"possibly African", with Islamic and Chinese civilizations being most in conflict with the West.
Huntington cites various reasons why Islam is apparently or actually more violent than other
civilizations/religions -- including a defense of his now-infamous 1993 statement that "Islam has
bloody borders" and citing the “classical Islamic idea” of the "House of Peace" and the "House of
War." In the face of these clashing civilizations, the West’s survival depends on “Americans
reaffirming their Western identity, and being aware of the dangers that multiculturalism poses to
American’s Western cultural heritage. For Huntington, “avoidance of a global war of
civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the character of
global politics.”

A second closed-view author, Daniel Pipes (who holds a PhD from Harvard but does not
hold an academic position) is known for his prolific production of polemics, including via his
website, which focuses on Muslims and the Middle East. A representative article from the New
York Sun, to which Pipes is a regular contributor, will be considered. In the article, titled

97 Ibid., 19-21.
98 Ibid., 20, 30, 129.
99 Ibid., 29.
100 A more accurate translation than "house of peace" (dār al-salām) and "house of war" (dār al-
    harb) would be "realm of peace" and "realm of war."
101 Ibid., 21, 307.
102 Ibid., 21.
“Islamophobia?,” Pipes questions the validity of the term “Islamophobia” and actually advocates discontinuing its use. Pipes is writing partially in response to what he concedes to be the widespread acceptance of the Runnymede Trust’s 1997 definition of Islamophobia. He argues, however, that the term is problematic. First, it denotes undue fear of Muslims, yet Muslims are the “premier source of worldwide aggression.” Second, he argues, it does not distinguish between a fear of Muslims and a fear of radical Islam, with fear of the latter being legitimate. Third, proponents of the term are exaggerating the prevalence of “Islamophobic” incidents. Pipes suggests that Muslims should do away with the term and instead focus on recognizing what he perceives to be the root cause of the fear, the Islamist extremists who have hijacked the faith. Not surprisingly, the present work does not support Pipe's views.104

Robert Spencer, a popular author who holds an M.A. in Religious Studies from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has written four full-length works on Islam and the Prophet Muhammad since 2001: Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions about the World’s Fastest-Growing Faith in 2002, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam and the Crusades (or PIG Guide, for short) in 2005, and The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World’s Most Intolerant Religion in 2006.105 Of the three, Islam Unveiled has the most serious tone and air of scholarship, perhaps in order to capitalize on the many Americans who were seeking more information about Islam following 9/11. The other two books are more openly polemical and seem to cater toward those who are already inclined to agree with Spencer. Only the most recent of these works will be discussed below as it is representative of the tone and content of the other two and repeats many of Spencer’s earlier arguments.


Although Spencer's books do contain some refutation of the validity of the term “Islamophobic,” the main thrust of Spencer’s writing is polemics about Islam. Rather than being about Islamophobia, his work is itself Islamophobic.\textsuperscript{106} To the open-view analyst, they provide a useful catalogue of the most popular closed-view claims about Islam and Muslims. Spencer’s books are also noteworthy because they refute open-view authors such as Karen Armstrong and popularize (and distort somewhat) Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory and Christoph Luxemborg’s linguistic theory of Qur’an interpretation.\textsuperscript{107}

Spencer argues that a biography of the Prophet Muhammad is relevant today because Muslims continue to revere and follow him: it is necessary to know what Muḥammad “really” taught so that Westerners can “plan public policy accordingly.”\textsuperscript{108} Rather than writing a comprehensive biography, Spencer states that his aim is to examine the “problematic” aspects of Muḥammad’s life that Muslims use to justify violence and other human rights violations.\textsuperscript{109} Spencer also claims to reveal why “moderate Muslims...appear so weak and marginalized compared to jihadist movements in the Muslim world” and “why Muslims find Muhammad’s example so compelling, and why that example can be used to justify such widely divergent actions.”\textsuperscript{110}

Spencer concludes that the Prophet was a pedophile, misogynist, condoned “draconian” punishments, was chiefly occupied with war, and was intolerant toward non-Muslims, including Christians and Jews.\textsuperscript{111} On this basis, he provides suggestions for Muslims and non-Muslims to


\textsuperscript{107} Because Armstrong is a popular rather than academic author, her work is not included in this review section. However, she is noteworthy for making open-view arguments accessible to a wider audience, particularly via her first biography of the Prophet Muhammad, which was re-released with a new forward shortly after 9/11. In this way, she can be seen as a sort of antithesis to Spencer. Karen Armstrong, \textit{Muḥammad: A Biography of the Prophet} (London: Phoenix Press, 2001).

\textsuperscript{108} Spencer, \textit{The Truth About Muhammad}, 6.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. 11.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 170-182.
act on this information. Muslims, rather than denying the existence of these aspects of Islam which Spencer believes to exist, should “acknowledge and confront the words and deeds of Muhammad and the doctrines of Islam that teach jihad violence and sharia supremacism, and to construct a case for the rejection of Qur’anic literalism and the definitive discarding of these teachings.”112 He suggests that non-Muslims should “stop insisting that Islam is a religion of peace,” “end the Western dependence on oil from the Islamic world,” ”make western aid contingent upon renunciation of the jihad ideology,” ”call upon American advocacy groups to work against the jihad ideology,” and “revise immigration policies with the jihad ideology in view.”113 Although a comprehensive refutation of these polemics is beyond the scope of the present work, representative open-view responses to some of Spencer's inflammatory statements will be included in chapter three.

Conclusion: Points of Consensus and Controversy

In conclusion, open-view and closed-view authors have different aims and often a fundamentally different understanding of basic facts regarding Islam and Muslims. On the one hand, open-view authors have repeatedly pointed out the necessity of an enemy "other”— currently, Muslims and Islam— as a construct necessary for the formation of the Western closed-view identity. They do not see "othering," however, as an inextricable aspect of human nature. Rather, they argue that the West’s view of the "other" (whether from a secular or religious standpoint) is more a mirror of the West’s fears and faults than it is an accurate portrayal of the other. On the other hand, closed-view authors see the Muslim "other" as an objective part of reality and "othering" as a necessary and unavoidable aspect of Western identity formation.

In addition, many open-view authors have also asserted that Islamophobia and clash theory are self-fulfilling prophecies; identities constructed in opposition to one another are essentially just that. Closed-view authors, however, tend to see anti-Islamic attitudes as based on justifiable fear rather than phobia, viewing clash theory as presenting an accurate, if

112 Ibid., 191.
113 Ibid., 192-193.
oversimplified, model of post-Cold War reality. Another open-view theme has been that popular media exacerbates the problem of Islamophobia because it under-represents and rarely makes accessible the opinions of the moderate Muslim majority; this theme will be further elucidated in later chapters. The closed-view response is that the moderate Muslim majority is either a fiction or is at fault for not responding more vocally to Islamic extremism. Lastly, open-view authors tend to be cautiously optimistic about Islamophobia, viewing it as an evil that can be (if not eradicated completely), then at least combatted by Muslims and non-Muslims together for the good of both groups. In contrast, closed-view authors see Islamophobia as a legitimate response to a threat or a dubious construct altogether and are thus unlikely partners in helping to combat it.

Despite this seemingly polar opposition, at least one underlying similarity has emerged: nearly all of the authors above understand the conflict between the Muslim world and the West (as problematic as that dichotomy is), as having deep historical roots. In the following chapter, this idea will be further supported. Although open-view authors would argue that Islam is not monolithic and has not itself remained static, both groups agree that key themes in the conflict have remained the same as the centuries have passed. Only the closed-view mindset, however, makes Islamophobia inevitable.
CHAPTER 3
UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA:
CAUSES AND MANIFESTATIONS

Introduction

Although it is often claimed that Islamophobia is justified and hence not a phobia, in this chapter it is argued that Islamophobia does in fact describe a real phenomena that has clear historical causes and contemporary manifestations. Before endeavoring to develop an understanding of the causes and manifestations of contemporary American Islamophobia, Daniel Pipe's claim that the term is a misnomer because Muslims constitute a real threat should be reviewed. It is true that not all fear of Muslims is phobic. Terrorism and human rights violations by people who self-identify as Muslims is a legitimate cause for concern among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. (In fact, given that most people killed in terrorist attacks or who live under oppressive "Islamic" regimes are Muslim, Muslims themselves are particularly justified in feeling this type of fear.) As I argue, however, the actual threat of Islamic extremism is quite small and has been blown out of proportion by the media. Gallup's groundbreaking, comprehensive poll of the world's Muslims showed that a tiny number of Muslims would actually endeavor to use violence to as a means to achieve their end goals, not a substantial minority (or majority) as Americans have been led to believe. A small minority, seven percent, of poll respondents thought that the 9/11 attacks were “completely” justified and also view the United States unfavorably.

114 Based on analyzing data from the University of Maryland START Center's Global Terrorism Database (see http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/), Charles Kurzman has shown that the majority of people killed in terrorist attacks globally were in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Source: Charles Kurzman, "The Missing Martyrs," (lecture, spring meeting of the Southeast Regional Islamic Studies Seminar, Chapel Hill, NC, March 17, 2012). For more information on this topic, see Dr. Kurzman's book The Missing Martyrs: Why There are So Few Muslim Terrorists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). On the topic of the absence of democracy in the Islamic world, John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed have recently argued that the roots of the lack of democracy in Muslim countries are more political and historical than religious. John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), 38-46.
However, out of this seven percent, only a fraction of one percent of those Muslims polled would actually consider committing an act of violence personally.  

The Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition both had their basis in particular interpretations of Christianity. More contemporary examples of extremism based in Christianity are Nazi Germany, the Ku Klux Klan and the Aryan Brotherhood. No effort need be made to separate these groups from the beliefs of the majority of Christians, as it is already widely understood that they do not represent mainstream Christian belief. Yet with Islam, there is a widespread inability in the West to separate the actions of extremists -- those who go beyond the pale of what is considered by the majority of Muslims as acceptable -- from the moderate majority. The factors which will be discussed below contribute to this inability. When all of this is considered together, it constitutes evidence for the existence of an Islamophobia that is separate from legitimate fear.

Thus, as many of the open-view works reviewed above espouse, practical arguments can be made for the necessity of better understanding the phenomenon of Islamophobia itself and working toward its elimination. If Muslims are indeed being unfairly stereotyped, it is morally just to come to the aid of moderate practitioners of Islam who are being lumped in with those who commit acts of terrorism. A practical concern for more self-interested Americans should be that a more nuanced understanding of Islam would in fact increase their national security. As mentioned previously, this would better enable Americans to understand which Muslims do and do not constitute an actual threat to the safety of Americans and allow for a better allocation of resources to identify and address any real threats. A more nuanced understanding of Islam and Islamophobia could also lead to policy adaptations which would improve relations with Muslims around the world. These arguments will become clearer as the dangers implicit in Islamophobia are elaborated upon below.

In this chapter, it is argued that contemporary American Islamophobia is a distinct phenomenon with deep historical roots. Although American Islamophobia is not precisely

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equivalent to the anti-Muslim sentiment which has become manifest in Western Europe, events in European history have contributed to the formation of American Islamophobia. American Islamophobia is also contiguous to a certain event with historical anti-Islamic sentiment, but other aspects are purely contemporary. Thus, Islamophobia in the United States today is an entity unique to its place and time. Additionally, building upon the statements of the open-view scholars reviewed above, it is argued that the common element linking eighth century European anti-Islamism to American Islamophobia in 2012 is not a 1500 year-old Christian conspiracy against Muslims or vice versa, but rather the phenomenon of “othering” Islam and Muslims. The creation of a Muslim "other" is a vital mechanism in Western closed-view identity construction. Within this mindset, there cannot be an “us” without a “them.” These points (Islamophobia's historical roots, the distinct nature of contemporary American Islamophobia, and the psychology of othering) will be illustrated below.

First, my discussion of "historical factors" surveys relevant events spanning the time from Europe’s initial encounters with Islam up through the nineteenth century United States. This historical section focuses particularly on the nineteenth century as a formative period for Islamophobia in the United States. The treatment of this period will necessarily be both broad and selective, but understanding historical events such as America’s encounters with the Barbary States is vital to understanding Islamophobia as it existed long before being exacerbated by contemporary crisis events such as the Iranian Revolution and September 11.

The chapter transitions into the modern era by exploring a contemporary societal factor which exacerbates Islamophobia: the deliberate use of anti-Muslim fears as a means to achieve
various ends, such as gaining financial resources or power.\textsuperscript{116} The contemporary psychology of Islamophobia, which was considered in the literature review above, is elucidated in this current chapter, including the concept of “othering” and the utility of such convenient but flawed terms as “East” and “West.” The significance of Edward Said’s paradigm-shifting \textit{Orientalism} and follow-up work \textit{Covering Islam} in popularizing these notions is also briefly considered here, as they continue to provide a theoretical basis for scholarly work on Islamophobia today. The psychological concepts explored in this section are implicitly present throughout subsequent sections of the chapter.

The next section, "Aspects of the Contemporary Islamophobic Mindset," elaborates on the open-view and closed-view characteristics put forth in the Runnymede Trust report. From there, the discussion moves on to "Contemporary Manifestations of Islamophobia." This section includes recent statistical data concerning the scope and nature of American Islamophobia, suggesting that the phenomenon is still on the rise in some respects.\textsuperscript{117} Manifestations addressed indicate the wide scope of Islamophobia, ranging from individual, relatively unorganized Islamophobic acts to organized Islamophobia that occurs at the higher levels of society, such as discriminatory immigration policies. Lastly, as a prelude to the solutions presented in the last two chapters, the dangers of Islamophobia to both Muslims and non-Muslims are outlined.

\textsuperscript{116} A comprehensive overview of all the factors which perpetuate contemporary Islamophobia is beyond the scope of this brief chapter; many were highlighted in the literature review above. However, a future, more comprehensive, version of this work could go on to explore other contemporary societal factors that exacerbate and shape American Islamophobia. It should be noted that these categories are not neatly delineated and that all together, they constitute a network that perpetuates Islamophobia. A few examples from each of the following categories would need to be included: religion (including certain interpretations of Christianity), politics (including secular support of Israel), academia (including so-called pseudo-scholars), the news media (online, radio, and television), and popular entertainment (including films). The factor perpetuating contemporary Islamophobia that is focused on in the current work is the propagation of Islamophobia for power gains.

Historical Factors

Theoretical Background

In spite of the fact that one might imagine that Islamophobia is an entirely new contemporary phenomenon, it is argued here that clear historical factors in the genesis and development of American Islamophobia: first, Europe's initial contact with Islam culminating in the Crusades; second, the Puritan worldview; third, later American religio-political beliefs; fourth, Americans' contact with the Muslim world; fifth, art and literature; and sixth, later American religious movements. British scholar Chris Allen considers the question of whether Islamophobia has historical roots in his recent book Islamophobia. There is the possibility that “Islamophobia is an entirely new and contemporary phenomenon, relevant only to the here and now and quite independent of...the past’s historical manifestations and contexts.” This approach is generally rejected; nearly all the works reviewed above agree upon the importance of historically contextualizing Islamophobia rather than viewing it as an isolated contemporary phenomenon. Authors of more recent works also corroborate this view. For example Anas Al-Sheikh-Ali, one of the contributors to John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin's 2010 anthology on Islamophobia, states that it is “clear that historical Islamophobia is informing contemporary Islamophobia.” For Al-Sheikh-Ali, Islamophobia, including the perception of Muslims as the "other" and the perceived superiority of the West, should be seen as emerging from not only the contemporary context of perceived civilizational clash, but also from other factors including European colonialism. Allen himself agrees with this position, stating that “clearly, without a thorough understanding of history and an awareness of its meanings, that which is happening in the contemporary cannot be


121 Maira, "War on Terror," 109-110, 122.
either fully understood or indeed appreciated.”¹²² This is the viewpoint that will be elucidated upon below.

**European Roots**

Whether or not one believes a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West is inevitable, it seems that Europe’s early encounters with Islam, at least, can be classified as a clash which left psychological scars. Jane I. Smith, author of works on Islam in America, states that “centuries of encounter between Islam and Western Christianity, including the endemic growth and spread of the frontiers of Christian territory, as well as the long, drawn-out battles and skirmishes of the Crusades, left on both sides a legacy of misunderstanding, fear, prejudice, and, in some cases, hatred.”¹²³

To begin exploring these ideas, the chapter will first consider the earliest period of contact between Christian Europe and the newly emerging Islamic world, the seventh through tenth centuries. Geography played a role in the initial conflict. In their work on Islam in America, Ilyas Ba-Yunus and Kassim Kone observe that the civilizations ringing the Mediterranean Sea have often been on less-than-friendly terms with each other; this was true before the advent of Islam as well. Things were no different when the Arabs emerged from their relative backwater during the rise of Islam in the seventh century and began to expand their territory.¹²⁴ The Mediterranean continued to be a place of conflict between surrounding peoples.

At first, the East-West conflict “that took place as a result of the Arab expansion in the eighth century was mostly political, economic, and cultural.” The specifically religious conflict between Islam and Christianity would not develop until later with the Crusades in the tenth century.¹²⁵ Edward Said summarizes the period in *Covering Islam*, stating that real world events “made of Islam a considerable political force. For hundreds of years great Islamic armies and

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navies threatened Europe, destroyed its outposts, [and] colonized its domains.”126 The Islamic domain eventually spread into Spain, France, and the Balkans.127 For six hundred years, the Arabs ruled Spain and were “knocking at the doors of Vienna.”128

Christian Europe was seriously shaken by the Arab conquests, which were understandably perceived as unwelcome encroachments, and was led into a defensive state, from a political and eventually a religious perspective.129 Said elaborates, “it was as if a younger, more virile and energetic version of Christianity had arisen in the East, equipped itself with the learning of the ancient Greeks, invigorated itself with the a simple, fearless, and warlike creed, and set about destroying Christianity.”130 Ba-Yunus and Kone illustrate, “It looked to many as if Islam could not be stopped and that the days of Christianity were numbered.” Eventually, Islam also came to be seen as a religious threat, too. Islam, as a proselytizing religion like Christianity, presented a challenge to the Roman Catholic Church. In addition, Islam professed to finalize the Abrahamic revelation, thus purporting to supersede Christianity.

Islam’s territorial expansion eventually prompted Europe to respond in earnest beginning in the eleventh century. In Western Europe, Pope Urban II sanctioned the Reconquista of Spain in addition to the liberation of Italy and Sicily. In the east, the “Byzantine Empire’s Alexius I called on the Vatican and the entire Roman Christendom to unite and mobilise against the advancing Abbasid armies.” This was the beginning of Crusades: a “militaristic pilgrimage” to defeat the Muslim armies and take back the Holy Land for Christianity.131

The Crusades were not entirely religiously motivated; politically, they were also an opportunity for the Pope to “reassert the supremacy of the Roman Catholic Church.” The

127 Allen, Islamophobia, 26
128 Ba-Yunus and Kone, Muslims in America, 109.
130 Said, Covering Islam, 5.
131 Allen, Islamophobia, 26-27.
“Islamic threat” came at a time of internal strife for Christianity, contemporary with Eastern Orthodoxy's split from the Roman Catholic Church. Allen notes, “the threat and encroachment of Muslim armies therefore provided a convenient scapegoat, a much-needed and necessary enemy against which the Vatican and its supporters could wage war.”  

This was one factor in the beginning of the process of "othering" Islam and Muslims.

However, the most prominent contribution of the Crusades (which took place between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries) was the added emphasis on Islam as being not only a political "other," but also a religious "other." Despite the cultural exchange and increased understanding that direct contact can potentially provide among two peoples, the Crusades brought about little of this. As Allen notes, the Crusaders instead brought back myths and folk tales that reinforced “the misconceptions already in existence about Muslims and Islam.”

During the Crusades and Reconquista, the process of codifying myths and subjective scholarship about Islam and Muḥammad began. As will be seen in chapter four, some of these stereotypes are still perpetuated by Islamophobia today.

For example, the romanticized Islamic world served as a foil for Europe of the Middle Ages: fantastic tales came back with the Crusaders about the “promiscuity, wealth, and luxury of Muslims” at a time when Christians in Europe were living in “inherent bleakness.” In addition to these myths about Muslims in general, the Crusaders brought back myths about the Prophet Muḥammad himself. Some even went so far as to view Muḥammad as the anti-Christ. Whereas Christ was the guiding light of the world, Muhammad was seen as a false prophet, an “agent of the devil.”

Muḥammad was imbued with worldly qualities that contrasted with Christ’s spirituality: “licentiousness, promiscuity, sexual depravity, and political power. In

132 Ibid. 27-28.
133 Ibid., 28.
134 Ibid., 27; Chahúan, "Dichotomy," 50-51.
135 Allen, Islamophobia, 28-29.
136 Ibid., 5.
contrast to Christ’s perceived pacifism, Muḥammad was "violent, barbaric, and merciless. He was the epitome of what Islam was, and what Christianity emphatically professed not to be.\textsuperscript{137}

Beginning in the thirteenth century, the Muslim world entered a period of relative decline and Europe one of ascendancy.\textsuperscript{138} However, even when the threat of the Islamic world geographically encroaching upon Europe lessened, Islam always remained a latent threat by virtue of its close proximity to Europe.\textsuperscript{139} Eugenio Chahúan and Chris Allen both argue for a shift in emphasis from a religiously-based antagonism back to a cultural and political one between the Occidental and Oriental worlds. There was a shift from Islam and Muḥammad as a foil for Christianity and Jesus from an emphasis on the Muslim world as antithetical to the West. It is also noteworthy that during this time period the Ottoman Turks eclipsed the Arabs in terms of political power; the Turk would become the primary stereotypical "other" for the Europe.

Although the "religious antagonism" toward the Islamic world became less prominent at this time, it did not diminish completely. For example, Allen notes that the Roman Catholic Church still deemed it important to commission translations of the Qur'an. The point of this early study of Islam was not to gain a better appreciation of Islam, but to better understand a perceived enemy.\textsuperscript{140} This laid some of the groundwork for the Orientalist discipline that would emerge in Europe in the centuries to come.

Through the end of the Crusades in the fifteenth century and the beginning of the Colonial period in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, this period of European ascendancy continued. Technological advances during this period meant that the Europeans were able to finally oust the Arabs and Turks from their territory altogether. In addition, Europe began to expand outward, looking to dominate not only the Middle East, but the whole world.\textsuperscript{141} The

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid. 29.


\textsuperscript{139} Chahúan, "Dichotomy," 50-51.

\textsuperscript{140} Allen, \textit{Islamophobia}, 28.

\textsuperscript{141} Ba-Yunus and Kone, \textit{Muslims in the United States}, 110.
"othering" of Muslims continued and Europe’s religious, cultural, and political superiority was seen as a justification for colonization of not only Muslim lands but also for colonization of the New World and its peoples. In her contribution to Esposito and Kalin's anthology, Sunaina Maira states, “In the New World, Christian missionaries from Europe transplanted ideas of ‘barbaric infidels’ to North America, superimposing them on the ‘heathen savages’ or indigenous peoples of North America, who needed to be civilized, according to divine mandate.”

The United States: 17th-20th Centuries

It is out of this tradition that the colonizers of the United States emerged, taking their stereotypes of Muslims along with them. These European roots continue to influence American Islamophobia today; Ba-Yyunus and Kone state that “most Americans, being descendants of European immigrants, grow up with a folklore in which negative images of the people, cultures, and religion of the Middle East persist.” However, American Islamophobia has its own unique contributing historical factors; this next section, then, is an examination of how the sentiments of these European immigrants, beginning in the sixteenth century, transitioned into a distinctly American Islamophobia, to which the initial contributing factors were the Puritan worldview, continued influences from Europe, and secular literature.

One important historical factor in the emergence of American Islamophobia is the worldview of the Puritans who settled in the New World beginning in the sixteenth century. Their beliefs and way of life are foundational to American secular and religious thought and the American self-image, as well as America’s attitude toward "others," including Muslims and Arabs. In particular, Puritan beliefs have had a lasting impact on American Islamophobia: specifically, the Puritans held the conviction that they were a Chosen People who had entered into a covenant with God. This covenant had two aspects: first, God had blessed the Puritans with the

142 Maira, "War on Terror," 110.
divine right to their New World colony, the American Israel. Second, with this gift came the obligation to act ethically, establishing God's will on earth; this included a special missionary obligation to the rest of the world. These beliefs will be explained in further detail below.

The Puritans, like their European religious counterparts, believed in a Providential plan for humanity. What made the Puritan vision of God's plan unique was the special place the Puritans conceived of for themselves within it. The Puritans, like the ancient Israelites before them, were God's Chosen People who had been selected to enter into a covenant with God and implement his will on earth. Protestant theology stated that those “who believed in the true Church of Christ had a special relationship with the Creator, referred to as the Covenant of Grace.”

The Puritan belief in being Chosen People who were upholding a divine covenant was not just an abstract religious concept; rather, it had an impact on the daily lives and the social and political institutions which the Puritans and their progeny constructed in the New World. The Puritan's colony was not just any church-state; rather, it was the New World Kingdom of God: the American Israel. The Puritans, like the Israelites before them, had crossed “desert and sea” to establish themselves in the wilderness and live in accordance with God's will.

This put the Puritans in a special position in relationship to the rest of the world: they were privileged via the covenant to emigrate to their American Promised Land, but they also had a responsibility to uphold: spreading God's message to those people who were outside the covenant. In the New World, this would mean evangelizing to the Native Americans. Abroad, particularly later in the nineteenth century, American Protestants' focus would expand to Muslims and Arabs in general. Thus the belief in being a Chosen People gave the Puritans the divine right to found their colony in America, but also obligated them to evangelize to others. These were central aspects of Puritan belief which would shape later American perspectives on Islam and Muslims.

145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 5-10.
Aside from religious influences, secular factors influenced early American opinions about Islam and Muslims as well; first, the American settlers continued to be influenced by beliefs brought over from Europe and second, they were influenced by more secular literature published in America. *The True Travels, Adventures, and Observations of Captain John Smith* holds the distinction of being the first American book written and also the first in a long line of Islamophobic popular fiction titles.\(^{147}\) The book, written by the famous British-American sailor Captain John Smith, purports to be the "true" story of his adventures, including an encounter with the Ottoman Turks.

In the story, Smith claims that “while fighting against the Turks in Hungary in 1602, he was wounded in battle, captured, and sold as a slave to a Turkish pasha. The pasha then sent Smith to Istanbul as a gift to his sweetheart who, according to Smith, fell in love with him and sent him to her brother to be trained for the Turkish imperial service. Smith escaped after murdering the brother.”\(^{148}\) Although scholars have debated the historical veracity of the book and criticized its literary value, it was enormously popular in its time and is illustrative of the stereotypes about Muslims which people like Smith carried from Europe to America.\(^{149}\) Its lasting importance is that Smith was one of the first American heroes; he has had an enduring impact on the American psyche because of his place in American folklore. For this reason, regardless of the debate about its artistic and historical merit, Smith's book and its anti-Muslim sentiments are noteworthy.

The Puritan vision of Americans as a people chosen to enter into a covenant with God, establish a New American Israel, and evangelize to outsiders did not end with the American Revolution and Independence in the eighteenth century. In his work *Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought: The Roots of Orientalism*, Fuad Sha’ban elaborates, “in fact, in spite of the political atmosphere which characterized the polemics of [this period], many of the basic

\(^{147}\) Anas Al-Sheikh-Ali, “Islamophobic Discourse ” 150-152.

\(^{148}\) Ibid., 150.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., 150-151.
premises of the early American religious communities continued to inform the idiom and
thinking” at that time.\textsuperscript{150}

The newly independent Americans continued to hold three basic beliefs: first, that the
Americans were people chosen to enter into a covenant with God, second, that America was a
new Israel, and third, that they had a missionary obligation to outsiders. However, these beliefs
continued to evolve in the nineteenth century, now having a distinctly more political cast. The
United States was still founded on a covenant “drawn before God and in obedience to his will.”
The difference between this and the earlier Puritan system, however, was that now, “the
ecclesiastical and sociopolitical covenant of the Puritans…[was] dressed in the new garb of an
eighteenth century system of rational thought.” So although the Founding Fathers had insisted on
the separation of church and state, there was still a strong association between “the ideals of the
American political system and those of American [Protestant] Christianity.”

Americans also continued to hold the belief that their divine rights came along with
divine obligations. Americans were not only selected by God to establish “His Kingdom in this
newly-independent territory,” but also to “extend that kingdom to the rest of the world” via
missionary work. Geography played a role in perpetuating this belief: “the continent of
America…was so centrally situated that it made it possible for Americans to reach every part of
the world with the light of the Gospel and the American system.” In addition, America’s relative
isolation between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans was seen as insulating it from “invasion and
from the corrupting experiences of other, less civilized nations. Lastly, “the variety of climactic
conditions, terrain, and natural resources was also an advantage…which prepare[d] Americans to
go anywhere.” Thus during this period (and even more so in the nineteenth century, as will be
seen shortly) both political ideologues and religious missionaries felt justified in attempting and
prepare to convert the rest of the world to their beliefs.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{150} Sha’ban, Islam and Arabs, 13.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 15-18.
The ideologies the colonists imported from Europe, in addition to the uniquely American views which developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, would have a substantial impact on America’s interactions with Muslims abroad in the nineteenth century and their conceptions of the Muslim world back at home in the United States. Additionally, three new concepts would emerge or intensify during the nineteenth century which were important to the formation of American Islamophobia: millenarianism, Manifest Destiny, and Zionism. Art, literature, and American contact with Muslims abroad would also shape American views of Muslims.  

Millenarianism, although present in American thinking since the seventeenth century, was intensified in the nineteenth century: many American writings from this period reference “signs of the times.” Millenarianists believed that a thousand-year age of blessedness was at hand, an age that would begin with or culminate in the Second Coming of Christ. Notably, Judaism played an important role in this belief: the gradual influx of Jews back into the Holy Land was seen as a prerequisite to this event. In addition, perceptions of Muslims, specifically the Ottoman Empire, figured into millenarianist beliefs; the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire was seen as a stage in the unfolding of God’s plan. Islam’s perceived fall contrasts here with Christianity, which is seen as ultimately triumphant.

A political ideology within the United States which would have a direct impact not only upon views of the Islamic world within the United States but also upon the nation's interactions with the Islamic world is Manifest Destiny. Manifest Destiny involved a belief in the United States as the new, ideal state whose ideology should be shared with the world. In political terms, this justified Westward territorial expansion. For religious believers, Manifest Destiny further justified the American missionary enterprise, which was already well established in the Muslim

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152 Ibid., 21.
153 Ibid., 150.
155 Sha’ban, Islam and Arabs, 152-153, 167.
world. Sha’ban writes, “the symbolic Kingdom of God was transferred into a concrete endeavor in the Holy Land, and thus the Orient became for many Americans the field of action for both the political and religious sides of the Manifest Destiny.”

The Manifest Destiny ideology was a blend of the secular-political and religious, encompassing not only the spread of the Gospel but also American Revolutionary ideas. Americans believed that the “extension of the American system was to be for the good of mankind,” including the spread of “social equality [and] a progressive educational system.” Sha’ban states, “Americans saw in their new nation a true hope for humanity, and recognized their responsibilities to the whole world in secular, as well as in religious, terms. This feeling was very instrumental in shaping America’s attitude toward other nations.” This outlook toward others would continue to manifest itself in American encounters with the Muslim world abroad, particularly in political conflicts with the Barbary Coast and in missionary work.

Besides religious and political beliefs, other aspects of American culture affected perceptions of Muslims as the "other." A large body of periodical articles, the precursor to modern popular media, was available to the general reading public regarding Islam and the Muslim world. In addition, Western Qur'an translations (including Western commentary) and biographies of the Prophet Muḥammad were available. Also available to the reading public was travel literature -- which was immensely popular -- missionary writings, and fiction, notably translations of the Arabian Nights and its ilk.

Although some of these publications were representative of uniquely American thought (encompassing ideas such as Manifest Destiny), others are illustrative of the continued influence of European thought on the formation of American Islamophobia. For example, Sha’ban confirms that British writings on Islam were available from the early colonial days and that “Americans

156 Ibid., ix, 23.
157 Ibid., 196.
158 Ibid., 21-23.
159 Ibid., x, 27.
continued to be influenced by European, especially British, treatments of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad well into the nineteenth century."\textsuperscript{160} Thus European publications “had a lasting influence on American perceptions of Arabs, Muslems, and Islam, as well as on attitudes and behavior towards them.”\textsuperscript{161}

Few open-view works were written on the subject of Islam in the United States during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{162} Rather, most were produced with the intent of convincing the reader of the veracity of arguments against Islam. For example, one goal of authors was to explain the reason why, if Muḥammad was a false prophet, had Islam risen so quickly and gained so many followers, superseding Christianity in its place of birth. Many writers utilized the traditional explanations that Islam had been spread by the sword and was appealing because it allowed men to indulge in their baser desires.\textsuperscript{163} Additionally, authors often felt the need to justify writing about Islam at all. The introduction of books on Islam from this era sometimes include defensive statements, as though the authors were expecting a rebuke. They might state that they have a duty to provide information about Islam to the public not for its own sake, but in order to aid in efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity.\textsuperscript{164}

Two editions of the Qur'an that were readily available to American readers in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries included such introductions. One widely available option was the 1806 American edition of Ross's 1649 Qur'an translation (this was the first American edition of a Qur'an translation to be publicly available). Of the two options, Ross’ was the most well-known and influential “in shaping early American conceptions of Islam and Muslems,” but it was the least accurate. Ross had translated the Qur'an not from its original

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 27.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 30.


\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 40.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 33.
Arabic, but had worked from the basis of Andre de Reyer's problematic 1647 French translation, including its polemical marginal notes. Ross’ main original contribution was an apologetic introduction in the vein of other contemporary works on Islam, an “Address to the Christian Reader,” a ‘Caveat or Admonition, for them who desire to know what use may be made of, or if there be a danger in reading the ALCORAN.” Sha’ban explains that this introduction consists of “a confused, brief biography of the Prophet Muhammad and a description of the religious beliefs of Islam...the prevailing tone of this introductory matter is antagonistic and condemnatory.”

George Sale’s 1734 Qur'an translation contains similar material. It is more accurate and scholarly than Ross’ translation, including “many explanatory footnotes, biblical comparisons and analogies, and textual explications. Sale also provides the reader with a book-length ‘Preliminary Discourse’ in which he introduces the religion of Islam, the Qur’an, and the Prophet Muhammad as he sees them.” However, despite its “accurate and scholarly...rendering [of] the Qur'an into readable English,” the preface itself is derogatory to Islam and its basic theme is to defeat the religion and convert Muslims to Christianity.

Works of fiction produced during this time also offer insight into nineteenth century perceptions of Islam and the Muslim world. In contrast to the virulent opposition espoused in much of the scholarly literature above, works of fiction painted a more romantic picture, rendering the Islamic world an exotic "other." As with the other types of writing, American literature emerges from the European tradition. Sha’ban writes, “for a long time Americans remained dependent for their literary entertainment and taste on England. The novels of Sir Walter Scott were very popular with the public.”

One widely popular title was, of course, The Arabian Nights, which helped to [precondition] the American attitude to the Orient and Orientals,” painting Muslim lands as “

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165 Ibid., 31.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid., 31, 33.
168 Ibid., 178.
world of dreams and romance." This material influenced not only the perceptions of Americans at home, but also those who actually travelled abroad to the Muslim world. They carried with them not only their religious beliefs about the Holy Land, but also childhood associations of the exotic Orient. Sha’ban elaborates, “very often an American traveller in the Orient was reminded of the Arabian Nights by a scene in a street in Damascus or in a Bedouin encampment. Even the most austere Christians among the pilgrims could not fail to read into a scene their boyhood memories of those romantic tales.”

A final historical, cultural factor contributing to the formation of contemporary American Islamophobia is art. Similar to the written word, it can be “used as a vehicle to project propaganda.” One of the most famous and popular examples of nineteenth century art with this type of function is Hiram Power’s sculpture The Greek Slave. Like the seventeenth century example The True Travels, Adventures, and Observations of Captain John Smith, The Greek Slave is a classic not because of its enduring artistic merit, but rather because it “[has] exerted and continue[s] to exert influence beyond [its] time and space, due in part to the pragmatic utility of the racist and xenophobic content of [its] message.”

Al-Shaikh-Ali explains that the real key to The Greek Slave's popularity was not in its artistic brilliance, but rather “in the underlying story of its subject matter,” which was “carefully supplied by the artist and tour organizers.” The statue is said to depict a young, Christian virgin who has been taken captive by Muslim Turks. They kill her family, kidnap her, and put her up for sale as a sex slave -- we are to imagine her with the eyes of the hated, barbaric heathens upon her. The Slave stands naked, chained to a post, with her head bowed, yet upheld and spared from shame by her faith in Christ.

169 Ibid., x.
170 Ibid., 179.
172 A contemporary photograph of the statue, which now resides in the Brooklyn Museum of Art, is included at the end of this chapter.
173 Ibid., 147.
Despite the conservative religious sentiment in nineteenth century America, the public could view the explicitly nude statue without guilt, but rather with a “devotional reaction.” Al-Shaikh-Ali postulates that the political outlook toward the Muslim world (at that time, the Ottoman Empire in particular) enabled this reaction. He states, “the coming rape of *The Greek Slave* represented a possible rape of the West, and religious sentiment was drowned by religious hatred. Spectators convinced themselves that this type of explicit nudity was not for the sake of sensuality but for a noble cause and therefore well worth viewing.”\(^{174}\) One might hazard to guess that for those who did not share these lofty views, the pretense of such would provide a socially acceptable excuse to view the statue regardless.

All of these cultural factors preconditioned the perceptions of Americans who had more direct contact with the Muslim world. Sha’ban says that “when Americans traveled to the Orient they were, in most cases, seeking to fulfill the vision of Zion or the dream of Baghdad. This is the focal point of American Orientalism as it appeared in the nineteenth century.”\(^{175}\) Americans visited the Muslim world for a variety of reasons: warfare with the Barbary States, private tours (both pilgrimages and pleasure trips), and missionary work in the region. These will all be discussed in more detail below.

In order to understand America’s relations with the Barbary States and the impact this has had on the development of Islamophobia, it is necessary to look back into the colonial period predating American independence. America, like its European counterparts, had established diplomacy and commerce with the Ottoman Empire, including the Barbary States (the North African Muslim countries of Tripoli (modern Libya), Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.)\(^{176}\) However, the piratic practices of these nations made things more complicated and would have a deep impact on America’s impression of the Muslim world.

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\(^{174}\) Ibid., 155.

\(^{175}\) Sha’ban, *Islam and Arabs*, x.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., 66.
America's first conflict with the Barbary States happened in 1679, when the British-appointed governor of Carolina, Seth Southell, was intercepted en-route to America by Barbary pirates. He negotiated with the king for his ransom, and was finally released after a few months, but not before the incident had its impact on American views of the Muslim world. Sha’ban notes that “other similar incidents took place during the Colonial period.”177 After independence, in the eighteenth century, the United States was to come “into conflict with the same Barbary States, once again over American captives.”178

The motivation for the pirate attacks lay in part in the Barbary States’ strategic position. Sha’ban explains that a major source of income for these states were tributes paid by European countries in exchange for permission for their ships to travel freely in the Mediterranean. If this was not done, their ships were intercepted and their goods and passengers taken into custody. The Barbary States were of course not the only nation to implement piratical practices (the French, British, and Americans all employed privateers or pirates at some point for various reasons, but as pirate attacks were among the newly independent America’s first encounters with Muslims, the incidents understandably left a lasting impact on the American psyche.179

Specifically, when America gained independence, England understandably withdrew its protection of American vessels. Thus when the new country America attempted to conduct its own commerce in the Mediterranean as an independent nation, it was faced with the same choice of establishing “treaties” and paying a tribute or running the risk of its ships being captured. The United States government chose not to follow the European precedent of paying tribute, but rather to actively resist when necessary -- this culminated in the American bombardment of Algiers in 1815 and the beginning of the Barbary Wars. Sha’ban writes, “the experience was novel and challenging, and the United States was obviously probing for a policy which would

177 Ibid.
178 Ibid., 65-66.
179 Ibid., 65-67.
guarantee dignity and national pride, as well as the opportunity to extend American trade and ideas to the larger world."\textsuperscript{180}

The impact of the news of the Barbary Wars at home in the United States was substantial, as is evidenced in the adventure stories about American escapades along the Barbary Coast which were popular subjects for travel literature at the time. As with John Smith’s tale, these accounts tended to stretch the truth. They sensationalized accounts of American captivity in order to capture the public's interest and sell more copies. They heavily emphasized the cruelty of the Muslim barbarians, and tales of horrors, torture, and death at the hands of Muslims contrasted with the nobility and fortitude of valiant American heroes.\textsuperscript{181}

The Barbary Coast encounters and resulting literary publications had a strong impact the nascent American psyche. Sha'ban writes that “these popular accounts, together with the stories brought back by the captives themselves, must have made a strong impression on the American public, and consequently contributed to the popular conception of the Muslem \textit{sic}, or Arab, at that early stage in the history of the young nation.”\textsuperscript{182} The overwhelming impression left was that of the Muslim as a cruel and violent "other." As will be seen in the following chapter, these stereotypes of Muslims continue to be manifest in Islamophobia in the present day.

Other reasons for contact with the Muslim world were less overtly militant. One such point of contact was the "Oriental tour." Reasons for undertaking these tours could be religious (as a sort of pilgrimage) or for purposes of general education and pleasure, but often there were elements of all three combined. Despite the hardships and expense involved in undertaking such a journey, Oriental tours were popular with Americans of all walks of life in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{183} Visitors to the Muslim world had preconceived expectations of visiting an exotic land, partially because of the above-mentioned literature available at home. They also wrote travel

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 68, 27.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 76-78.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 78.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., vii, 115-116.
accounts through the filter of their own Western conceptions of what they saw, perpetuating stereotypes at home. Sha’ban writes, “for the majority of Americans, the Orient presented a prospect that was quite thrilling and very different from what they expected to see on a European tour. There was something about that part of the world -- quite apart from its religious associations -- which promised an experience which was as novel as it was exciting.”

For travelers with overtly religious reasons for visiting the Holy Land, their experience could be disillusioning. Upon arriving in “Hebron, Jerusalem or Constantinople after a long journey, with great expectations, [they would find] that the guardians of [their] holy place were either Muslems [sic], or, at best, Eastern Christians and Catholics.” In addition, Christians were sometimes turned away from Muslim holy sites, such as the Mosque of Omar, further causing feelings of resentment. American travelers saw the Muslims as alien occupiers; some longed for the “repossession by the West of the Holy Land and the speedy demise of Islam.” These sentiments were mutually reinforced by Zionism at home.

Due in part to these proprietary sentiments about the Holy Land, a substantial number of Americans also traveled to the Orient (the Levant and the Holy Land in particular) as missionaries. Sha’ban states that “by the second half of the nineteenth century there were more Americans in the Levant than any other foreign nationals except for the British. Most of these Americans were directly or indirectly associated with the missionary enterprise.” Although American missionaries were closely related to their European counterparts, the American missionary endeavor had qualities that rendered it a distinct product of the newly independent nation. Theses included the beliefs in millenarianism, Manifest Destiny, Zionism, and also the distinctly American renderings of the residents of Muslim lands as “others” which were discussed above and which will be further elucidated upon below.

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184 Ibid., 123.
185 Ibid., 132.
186 Ibid., 134.
187 Ibid., 83.
There was a significant overlap between religious and political beliefs in the United States in the nineteenth century, and the same held true for missionaries. American missionaries in the Orient had specific political ideologies and objectives that influenced the nature of their work and the driving force behind it. Like the Puritans before them and their contemporary American brethren at home, these missionaries had a clear sense of being chosen by God for a specific set of duties.\textsuperscript{188}

The link between Manifest Destiny and missionary endeavors is an example of the American religious conviction of being a chosen people. As stated above, the ultimate aim of Manifest Destiny is to acquire more territory, particularly through Westward expansion of the United States. Behind this was a belief that territorial acquisition was sanctioned by God as part of developing America as the ideal state, the Kingdom of God in the New World. By extension, missionary work was to extend this kingdom throughout the world, reclaiming lost souls for God.\textsuperscript{189}

Other nineteenth century religious ideals were closely linked to missionary work, including Zionism, and movements such as the Great Awakening and Revivals fostered missionary zeal.\textsuperscript{190} Many Americans, including missionaries, upheld Zionist beliefs that the coming fall of Islam, including Muslims’ ultimate conversion to Christianity; the restoration of the Jews to the Holy Land; and the rebuilding of the Kingdom of Israel would inevitably happen as part of God’s divine plan. Missionaries looked to play a role in the fulfillment these prophecies through endeavoring to convert Muslims to Christianity. As with Manifest Destiny, they saw this as a divinely sanctioned duty and privilege.\textsuperscript{191} This, coupled with the “religious Zeal of the Great Awakening and Revivals...gave rise to the missionary spirit.” In particular, “The Second

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 84-85.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 106.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 88-89, 114.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., ix, 43-54; 157-158.
Awakening, with its popular revivals and camp meetings, was the setting which gave birth to the missionary enterprise and which supplied it with nourishment and continued sustenance."  

Underlying all this religious fervor is the same theme that has been seen to run throughout Western perceptions of Islam from the seventh century to the present: the concept of the "other." Sha’ban postulates that “by its very nature the missionary tendency is based on the premise that the missionary is a superior being and the objects of his efforts is an inferior being. The addressee is a passive entity, waiting for salvation by the missionary worker. The ‘saved’ are Us, the ‘lost’ are They. This idiom can be applied to others besides Muslims - initially in the colonial days, the "others" were the “savage Red Indians.” Even Eastern Christians were not seen as coreligionists with the missionaries -- they were to be converted to the "true" form of Christianity. However, the primary target of "othering" in this "us/them" construct was Muslims.

Missionaries had mixed feelings about the Muslim "other," however; some felt that it was possible to convert them to Christianity, and “expression[s] of joy appear in missionary literature whenever success is achieved in converting the Muslems, [sic] and a feeling of frustration is obvious because of the slow progress which leads to the final goal.” Due to this slow progress other missionaries felt that efforts were wasted on Muslims, and the real focus should be on Eastern Christians. Still, Muslims remained the primary focus of conversion efforts, and the basic stance of missionaries toward Islam during this time period echoes older sentiments: that the Muslims were the followers of a false prophet and were imbued with characteristics of “backwardness,” “bigotry,” “ignorance,” “cruelty,” and “injustice.”

In conclusion, various historical factors have contributed to the development of American Islamophobia as a distinct entity. First, the foundations of the mechanism of "othering" were seen to exist in Europe's earliest political and religious encounters with the Muslim world. During the

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192 Ibid., 89.
193 Ibid., 109-110.
194 Ibid., 93.
195 Ibid., 94-95.
Crusades, stereotypes of Islam and Muslims which survive to this day were crystallized. With the relative decline of Islam and the rise of European power, Islam would be seen as less of a threat, but Islam would remain as a bogeyman in the European mind.

Additionally, although Europe continued to influence the American mindset toward Islam via shared literature, separate factors contributed to a distinctly American Islamophobia. The belief in Puritans as a Chosen People in a covenant with God who settled in their Promised Land contributed to conceptions of Americans as superior to and needing to proselytize to "others," including Muslims. This is evident in early literary works such as the travel memoirs of John Smith.

As the newly independent United States moved forward through the eighteenth into the nineteenth centuries, the perception of Americans as a superior "us" to the inferior "them" of Muslims (and others such as Native Americans) continued to be justified on politico-religious grounds via concepts such as millenarianism, Zionism, and Manifest Destiny. Encounters with Muslims in their own lands, including conflicts with the Barbary Coast, private Oriental tours, and missionary trips, would also build American's perceptions through widely read travel memoirs. The final factors discussed that contributed to the development of American Islamophobia were art and literature concerning Islam. It was seen that reading material on Islam and Muslims, although widely available, was usually very biased and thus contributed further to perpetuating American stereotypes of the Muslim "other." In the nineteenth century, the Great Awakening and Revivals gave added zeal to the missionary movement. All these factors together contribute to the "othering" of outsiders, including Muslims.

As America entered the twentieth century. Muslims as the "other" temporarily took a back seat to the threats posed by Nazism and Communism during World War II and the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, however, meant that Americans would need a new target for "othering" and crisis events such as the Iranian Revolution and hostage situation, the Gulf War, and ultimately September 11 ensured that Muslims would again emerge as a central focus for "othering." This chapter does not provide a detailed discussion of these twentieth century events because it is
assumed their role in perpetuating and intensifying Islamophobia is well established; however, a future study might extend the present work to include events in the twentieth century up through the present day that have exacerbated Islamophobia in order to see how the themes which have been established so far continue to develop.\textsuperscript{196} With this historical foundation in mind, however, the present chapter will next move on to a consideration of the aspects and manifestations of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 United States.

**The Psychology of Contemporary Islamophobia**

As has been seen above, part of American identity formation has been a perception of Islam and Muslims as something that is essentially “other” than and opposed to the collective “us” or “West;” this continues to be a primary driving force behind American Islamophobia today. This is one component of what Edward Said first identified as Orientalism in his now-classic book by the same title. Briefly stated, Orientalism is both an ideology and the Western academic institution that perpetuates it. As Said himself summarizes, “the general basis of Orientalist thought is an imaginative and yet drastically polarized geography dividing the world into two unequal parts, the larger, ‘different’ one called the Orient; the other, also known as ‘our’ world, called the Occident or West. This construct arises from the West's conceptualizing the East as an “inferior part of the world,” which is nevertheless simultaneously “endowed both with greater size and with a greater potential for power (usually destructive) than the West.”\textsuperscript{197}

In its broadest rendering, Orientalism pits the West against an East that includes not only the Muslim world, but also China and India as well, for example. Here the Orient is everything that is not “us.” As was illustrated in the historical section above, however, Islam has always had a special place as the West’s primary opponent (originally because it posed both a religious and political threat), often even being synonymous with “the Orient.” Thus, in the present work, the primary aspect of the Orient focused on is Islam.

\textsuperscript{196} For a discussion of contemporary events contributing to Islamophobia, see Welch, *Scapegoats*.

\textsuperscript{197} Said, *Covering Islam*, 4.
Today, Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory has popularized the notion originating with Orientalists that the West is in a perpetual, inevitable state of clash with the East (with “Confucian” and “Islamic” societies posing the biggest threat). Although clash theory was already outlined in the literature review above, it bears further consideration here. Is there any truth to this notion of perpetual clash? First, we might ask whether Islam and the West are actually the distinct and independent entities that clash theory presupposes.  

Edward Said makes his position clear: for him, the concepts of the Orient and the West might be convenient signifiers, but they are purely manmade constructs with no “ontological stability.” He wryly observes that in having written a book that denounces the way in which the West has constructed the Orient, he has helped to perpetuate these fictitious constructs.

A seemingly solid definition of the “West,” at least, originally postulated by Russian scholar Galina Yemlianova and cited in Chris Allen's work on Islamophobia, identifies the West as the liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America; such societies as those of Japan and Southeast Asia are not included in this definition because, although they are also technologically advanced and have living standards similar to those in the West, they do not emerge from the same cultural or political traditions. This is the commonly held definition of the West, and it is not without utility.

However, there are limitations to this definition of the West. For example, there are quite simply individuals living in the United States who are both Western and Muslim. For example, Caucasian converts to Islam and second-generation Pakistani American Muslims might self-identify primarily as both American and Muslim. In the case of the Caucasian converts, they have no home country with which to identify other than the United States, and in the case of the Pakistan-Americans, although they might consider Pakistan an important part of their cultural heritage, they would be more likely to identify primarily with American culture than with that of

198 Qureshi and Sells, "Introduction," in Qureshi and Sells, 15.
their parents or grandparents. Just as in reality the Muslim world is not a monolith, neither is the West in general nor the United States specifically.

In addition, it might be pointed out that the relationship between the United States and a Muslim-majority country such as Saudi Arabia is far more complex than that of two diametrically opposed societies. In the introduction to their anthology, Qureshi and Sells point out that “for many Muslims it is a bitter irony that the dominant stereotype of Islam is based upon the Saudi model of police-state repression, religious intolerance, oppression of women, moral hypocrisy among the male elite, and an aggressive and highly funded export of militant anti-Western ideology -- and that the Saudi monarchy is kept in power by the very Western nations that display fear and loathing at that stereotype.” They continue by stating that “the symbiotic relationship between Western liberal democracies and the palace fundamentalisms of the Gulf states...puts into question the supposition of a rational, democratic, liberal West facing an irrational and fundamentalist East.”

Thus, it is clear that the West and the Orient are not as distinct from each or diametrically opposed to each other as clash theory suggests.

Of course, even though the definitions of East and West are not neatly delineated or based in a concrete reality, that does not mean that they are without power or utility: indeed, they have both because of their widespread currency. As a simple signifier for a complex concept, the above-stated definition of “the West” renders everyday speech less cumbersome and allows for effective communication. In addition, having an agreed-upon definition of the West can be useful in societal identity construction, in of itself not a bad thing. In a multicultural society such as the United States, a notion of “us” creates a sense of commonality uniting diverse individuals. Thus, the terms “West” and “East/Orient” are reluctantly utilized in the current work, with the above limitations in mind and with a specific focus on the United States and Islam (in of itself an oversimplified designation) as the elements of the West and East in question.

Yet beyond the utility of these terms for labeling complex concepts in a simple way, the East/West or us/them designation has its dangers. The most worrying aspect of the West/East

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201 Qureshi and Sells, "Introduction," 12.
delineation lies beyond the comparatively neutral designation of the West as culturally similar democracies in certain geographical areas. Today, just as in the nineteenth century, there is an underlying element of cultural superiority in the notion of the West as a discrete entity, hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world. In order for a superior “us” to exist, there must be an inferior, negatively perceived “them.” The Muslim world is painted as a negatively perceived, inferior, monolithic entity, at best exotic and at worst violent and dangerous, a threat to all “we” hold dear.²⁰² The historical reasons for why Islam, specifically, is designated as the “other” in this construct were discussed above. Here, let it suffice to note that Islam’s role in closed-view identity construction is a vital factor in the perpetuation of Islamophobia.

**Contemporary Societal Factors: Power**

In addition to the historical and psychological factors already discussed, various elements within contemporary society also contribute to Islamophobia -- for example, some politicians and media pundits both play a role in perpetuating contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment. Although a detailed discussion of the ways in which politicians and the mass media perpetuate Islamophobia is beyond the scope of the present work, one reason why both groups uphold Islamophobic stereotypes should be discussed here: personal gain. Simply put, some individuals utilize Islamophobia as a currency for personal advancement, including gaining money or societal influence. They are able to do so because genuine Islamophobia does exist; there are Americans who fear or dislike Muslims because of ignorance or erroneous information. Some Americans may fear Muslims, for examples because they mistakenly believe the actions of violent extremists are representative of the aspirations of the majority of Muslims.²⁰³ There are other people, however, who do not necessarily believe the stereotypes about Muslims, but nevertheless

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²⁰³ The legitimate fear of terrorists or extremists, when they are recognized as a minority, would not, of course, constitute an illogical phobia. This issue will be further explained in a later section, and a solution for ameliorating the problem of maladaptive fear of Muslims will be addressed in chapter five.
deliberately perpetuate them, or at least capitalize on those already in existence, in order to achieve personal gain.

Deliberately perpetuating negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslims can be done for a variety of reasons, of which we will discuss three: to gain political leverage during elections, to make money through perpetuating Islamophobia in popular media, and to situate the West in a position of power against Muslims. First, Mohamed Nimer notes that “in political seasons, fear of Islam and Muslims has proven to be a useful mobilizer across party lines. The rumor about President (then Senator) Obama’s being secretly Muslim serves as a vivid illustration." It was used to dissuade Democrats and Republicans alike from voting for Obama; and Obama quickly moved to disprove the allegations. Nimer notes that rather than “using his old Muslim ties as an added advantage for any future president who might be dealing heavily with the Muslim world, the senator mobilized supporters, including his church pastor, to provide witness that he is not a Muslim but a practicing Christian.”

This indicates that “Muslim” is such a pejorative label in the United States today that no good could be salvaged from the situation and Obama had to distance himself from the signifier completely.

Aside from politicians, media pundits can also utilize Islamophobia for personal gain. Exacerbating Islamophobia can be extremely lucrative; a good deal of money is to be made from books, television shows, films, and countless other creative ventures linking Islam to terrorism.

204 Mohamed Nimer, "Islamophobia and Anti-Americanism: Measurements, Dynamics, and Consequences," 82.

205 One such deliberate use of Islamophobia in order to gain political leverage is by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), who use Islamophobic propaganda in order to achieve their political goal: the survival of the state of Israel. Specifically, AIPAC believes that an essential pillar for preserving Israel's security is to portray Islam and Muslims as inveterate enemies of Israel. See Max Blumenthal, "The Sugar Mama of Anti-Muslim Hate," The Nation, July 2-6, 2012 or http://www.thenation.com/article/168374/sugar-mama-anti-muslim-hate# (accessed July 26, 2012). Yet John Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt, Professor of International Relations at Harvard, have argued in their controversial but well-researched paper and follow-up book that AIPAC propaganda produces a self-fulfilling prophecy which is, in the end, actually harmful to Israel. See John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2008); also see Mearsheimer and Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," Harvard University: Faculty Research Working Paper Series, http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=3670 (accessed July 25, 2012).
There is truth to the saying “if it bleeds, it leads.” A story about an interfaith potluck dinner at a local mosque is not very exciting and unlikely to make the nightly news. Alleged Muslim sleeper cells in the United States are far more newsworthy, however, regardless of the credibility of the claims. To give a concrete example of how polemics can generate cash, at least one of Robert Spencer's popular, controversial works on Islam was a *New York Times* Bestseller for several weeks.\(^{206}\)

In addition to gains at a more personal level for politicians and pundits, Edward Said notes that a widespread policy of Islamophobia puts the West itself in a position of superiority, a position of power, in relation to the Islamic world. In *Covering Islam*, he discusses this power differential at length. He points out that an “anti-Islam campaign virtually eliminates the possibility of any sort of equal dialogue between Islam and the Arabs.”\(^{207}\) Although Americans assume that there is a degree of objectivity in journalism, Said argues that this is often not the case with Islam, and that “all discourse on Islam has an interest in some authority or power;” he takes care in the book to identify the “various groups in society that have an interest in ‘Islam’ such as academia, the government, corporations, and the media.\(^{208}\) Hence, it should be taken into account that Islamophobia does not just happen on an individual level among ill-informed individuals, but rather the institutionalized manipulation of Islamophobia for personal gain does exist, and happens in order to achieve political gain, to make money through the popular media, and to perpetuate Western superiority.

In summary, historically the primary causal factors of American Islamophobia were Europe's initial contact with Islam, the Puritan worldview, later American religio-political beliefs, Americans' contact with the Muslim world, American art and literature, and finally, later American religious movements. Today, main factors driving Islamophobia include its

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208 Ibid., lviii.
manipulation for political gain, for financial gain via the mass media, and finally, for the perpetuation of Western superiority.

**The Contemporary Islamophobic Mindset**

The previous sections of this chapter have been concerned with understanding historical and contemporary factors that contribute to contemporary American Islamophobia. An additional necessary prelude (before elucidating the chief contemporary manifestations of Islamophobia) is the major aspects of the contemporary Islamophobic mindset. The open and closed-views outlined in the Runnymede Report, although initially meant to describe Islamophobia in Great Britain, are general enough to be equally descriptive of the American Islamophobic mindset. They can serve as guidelines for identifying the characteristics that we may see Islamophobes and “Islamophiles” exhibiting. It should be kept in mind, however, that there is not a perfect correlation between the list and the real-world characteristics that people exhibit; it simply provides potential indicators. The report categorizes eight contrasting closed and open-views of Islam:

1. Monolithic: In the closed-view, “Islam is seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.”

   In his article (and eventually book chapter) which was reviewed above, Runnymede Report contributor Abdujalil Sajid elaborates on this characteristic. He explains that it means the Islamophobe does not acknowledge diversity within the world of Islam, including disagreements among Muslims. As has been mentioned before, this is potentially quite problematic in that it renders the Islamophobe unable to differentiate between Muslim extremists and harmless moderate Muslims: one wonders what the implications are for the War on Terror when all 1.5 billion of the world’s Muslims become suspect. The open-view, conversely, is that Islam is seen as “diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development.”

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211 Runnymede Trust Commission, Islamophobia, 2.
2. Separate: “Islam seen as separate and other...not having any aims or values in common with other cultures,” “not affected by them,” and “not influencing them.” This creates a total dichotomy between Islam and “us/the West,” with no common roots or shared heritage. From the open-view perspective, Islam would be seen as “interacting,” meaning that it is seen as being “interdependent with other faiths and cultures...having certain shared values and aims,” and “enriching them.”

3. Inferior: “Islam is seen as inferior to the West;” Muslims may be seen as “barbaric,” “irrational,” “primitive,” and “sexist.” From the open-view perspective, in contrast, “Islam is seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect.” Sajid adds that these perceptions of the inferiority of Islam includes such examples as the belief that Muslim cultures mistreat women; that Muslims co-opt religious observance and beliefs to bolster or justify political and military projects; that they do not distinguish between universal religious tenets, on the one hand, and local cultural mores on the other; and that they are compliant, unreflective, and literalist in their interpretations of scriptures. One implication here is that Muslims are insincere -- they are not above co-opting religious observances for worldly gain; this idea is further developed with the “manipulative/sincere” dichotomy below.

4. Enemy: In the closed-view, the implication in the “inferior/different” dichotomy that Islam is violent is now stated outright: Islam is seen as “violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a ‘clash of civilisations.’” This last statement refers to the thesis put forth by Samuel Huntington in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, which was discussed above. The open-view converse is “partner:”

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212 Runnymede Trust Commission, Islamophobia, 5; Sajid, "A New Word," 7.
213 Ibid.
214 Runnymede Trust Commission, Islamophobia, 5; Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 47.
entails that “Islam is seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems.”

5. Manipulative: To continue further with the closed/open-view distinction, Islamophobes potentially see Islam “as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.” Sajid further elaborates that this often includes the idea that Islam focuses on submission, not peace, and its aim is to make the whole world submit; “the best that non-Muslims...can hope for is that they be treated as dhimmis, second-class citizens within the Islamic state.” From the open-view perspective, however, Islam is “seen as a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents.” In the open-view, then, it is not necessary to evaluate whether Islam constitutes ontological truth, but simply to respectfully regard that its practitioners regard it as such.

6. Criticism of the West rejected: In the closed-view mindset, “criticisms made by Islam of ‘the West’” are “rejected out of hand;” it is assumed that a religion with the above qualities cannot possibly have anything constructive to say about the naturally superior West. From the open-view perspective, by contrast, “criticism of ‘the West’ and other cultures are considered and debated." Thus criticisms need not be accepted without question in order to qualify for the open-view, but it is at least assumed that the Islamic world has inherent value as a partner with “the West” for constructive dialogue.

7. Discrimination defended: in the closed-view “hostility towards Islam [is] used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.” The open-view recognizes that certain practices toward Muslims are discriminatory (examples will be discussed below), and that efforts must be made to combat discrimination

215 Runnymede Trust Commission, Islamophobia, 5.
216 Ibid., 2.
217 Sajid, "A New Word," 8
218 Runnymede Trust Commission, Islamophobia, 5.
where it exists. “Debates and disagreements” between Islam and the West exist and are valid, but
should not diminish those efforts.²¹⁹

8. Islamophobia seen as natural: “anti-Muslim hostility [is] accepted as natural and
‘normal.’²²⁰ Sajid qualifies that this includes Islamophobic discourse, which permeates not only
casual conversation, but also in nearly all types of media.²²¹ In the open view of Islam, “critical
views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair.”²²² Thus,
the open-view sees Islam as a diverse but sincere faith, and asserts that it is often unfairly
stereotyped, and sees it as necessary to work toward eliminating Islamophobia.

Contemporary Manifestations of American Islamophobia

Having previously identified both the historical and contemporary factors that led up to
American Islamophobia as well as the chief characteristics of the contemporary Islamophobic
mindset, the following major manifestations of American Islamophobia today can now be
clarified: first, Americans' beliefs about Muslims and second, violations of American Muslims'
civil rights. Scholars have stated that Islamophobia appears to be on the rise since 9/11, citing its
pervasiveness and acceptability among all levels of society.²²³ Specifically the above-described
closed views of Islam are made increasingly manifest in real-world Islamophobia in two areas:
Americans' beliefs about Muslims and violations of Muslim civil rights. Two groups, Gallup, Inc.,
and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) have collected concrete data quantifying
this rise in manifestations of Islamophobia in the years following 9/11. Specifically, Gallup has
collected information on manifestations of Islamophobic belief: Americans' self-reported negative

²¹⁹ Ibid.


²²¹ A detailed discussion of the way that Islamophobia is manifested in the media is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, it deserves merit and could be discussed at length in a future study.

²²² Runnymede Trust Commission, Islamophobia, 5.

²²³ Abu Sway, "Islamophobia," 15; Smith, Islam in America, 215;
Nimer, "Anti-Americanism," 77-80; John Esposito, "Introduction," in Islamophobia: The
image of Muslims coupled with little knowledge of Islam and also Americans' self-reported belief in stereotypes about Islam. CAIR has shown that Islamophobia is manifested in three types of civil rights infringements against Muslims, among others: hate crimes, incidents (such as vandalism) at Muslim institutions, and discrimination in schools.

Gallup’s 2010 publication *Religious Perceptions in America: With an In-Depth Analysis of U.S. Attitudes Toward Muslims and Islam* “is a study of Americans’ opinions regarding a number of world religions with a special focus on Islam and Muslims.” Of all the faiths that Americans were asked about (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism), Islam was perceived in the most negative light. Fifty-three percent of Americans self-reported that their opinion of Islam was “not too favorable” (twenty-two percent) or “not favorable at all” (thirty-one percent). This was twice as high as the instance of negative feelings for the other three religions included in the poll. Yet those polled also admitted to not knowing much about Islam: forty percent said that they had “very little knowledge” of the faith, while nearly a quarter of Americans, twenty-three percent, said that they knew nothing at all about Islam. Those who did not know a Muslim personally were twice as likely to report feeling a “great deal” of prejudice. This is one argument for the formulation of interfaith dialogue groups, which will be suggested as a solution to Islamophobia in chapter.

The Gallup poll differentiated between Islam and Muslims; study participants professed viewing Islam itself more negatively than Muslims. Forty-three percent of Americans said that they felt at least “a little” prejudice toward Muslims. Encouragingly, only nine percent stated that they felt a “great deal” of prejudice, and fifty-seven percent reported feeling no prejudice at all toward Muslims.

The study also dealt with stereotypes about Muslim beliefs. Sixty-six percent of Americans polled responded that most Muslims are not accepting of other religions. Forty-seven percent disagreed with the statement that “most Muslims around the world are accepting of others

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from different races.” Sixty-eight percent disagreed that basic elements of belief are the same in Christianity and Islam. Seventy percent of Americans agree with the statement that “most Muslims want peace,” but over a quarter of Americans (twenty-seven percent) disagree. The vast majority of the American public, eighty-one percent, believe that most Muslims do not advocate equal rights for men and women.225

In addition to the work done by Gallup, Inc., CAIR issues an annual report on the status of Muslim civil rights in the United States. One portion of the report documents civil rights complaints made by Muslims; these infringements on the civil rights of American Muslims are also a manifestation of American Islamophobia. CAIR’s 2009 civil rights report states that “for the 2008 calendar year, CAIR and its affiliate chapters processed a total of 2,728 civil rights complaints.” This “represents a 3 percent increase in reported cases from 2007 (2,652) reports and an 11 percent increase over cases reported in 2006 (2,467).” However, “anti-Muslim hate crime complaints fell by 14 percent...decreasing from 135 total complaints in 2007 to 116 in 2008.” Based on this data, CAIR expresses with “cautious optimism that America may be witnessing a leveling-off of the post-9/11 backlash against Americans of the Islamic faith. Yet the increase of incidents at Muslim institutions (such as mosques) rose from “221 cases in 2006 to 564 cases in 2007 to 721 cases in 2008,” representing a “28 percent increase from 2007 to 2008. There was a similar increase of reported discrimination in schools: 118 reported in 2007 and 153 reported in 2008 -- this is an increase of thirty-one percent.226

Viewed together, the CAIR reports and Gallup poll illustrate some of the ways in which the Islamophobic mindset is concretely manifest in American society. The CAIR reports show ways in which Islamophobia is manifested in Americans' actions: hate crimes, incidents at Muslim institutions, and discrimination in schools. The Gallup poll showed how Islamophobia manifests itself in beliefs about Muslims: one manifestation is some Americans' self-reported negative opinions combined with a professed lack of knowledge about Islam; the second is some

225 Ibid.

226 Council on American-Islamic Relations, Muslim Civil Rights, 4.
Dangers of Islamophobia

As has been stated already, Islamophobia has negative consequences not only for Muslims, but also for the well-being of non-Muslims in Western society. Three primary negative consequences are its hindering Muslims from contributing to Western society, its making them psychologically defensive, and its creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy of a clash between Islam and the West. First, Ibrahim Kalin, among others, notes that Islamophobia prevents Muslims from being full participants in Western society; it could be added that it also prevents Muslims from living outside the West from contributing to the West in a positive way. Second, Islamophobia makes Muslims defensive; they are less likely to constructively self-criticize because they perceive that group cohesion in the face of the perceived threat to Islam is more important.  

Last, it should be noted that Huntington’s theorized “clash of civilizations” could prove true by way of being a self-fulfilling prophecy. Recall from the literature review Eugenio Chahúan's statement that even if a neat East-West dichotomy is not an ontological reality, arbitrary identities created in opposition to each other will necessarily be just that -- in opposition to each other. He states that “those who perceive themselves as marginalized and are labeled as the new face of the enemy could be drawn into reconstructing their identity accordingly.” Fear, distrust, and hatred on the part of the West could lead to a mirror construct in the Muslim world's depiction of the West. In sum, Islamophobia harms Western society by hampering the ability of Muslims to make positive societal contributions, by decreasing their ability to be self-critical, and by increasing the prevalence of the very kind of East-West clash-oriented Muslim identity that Islamophobic discourse deplores. Yet however deeply rooted, neither this East-West dichotomy nor the phenomenon of American Islamophobia it drives are inevitabilities. Thus, the final two


chapters of the current work will be devoted to developing solutions to the problem of Islamophobia.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide a broad overview of Islamophobia as it originated and currently exists in the contemporary United States. The chapter began by tracing historical factors that have contributed to a distinctly American brand of Islamophobia. First, American Islamophobia has its historical roots in Europe's earliest encounters with Islam. During the Crusades in particular, enduring stereotypes about Muslims crystallized and Muslims became entrenched as the West's "other." After the end of the Crusades and the beginning of the West's ascendancy, the Muslim "other" remained a bogeyman in the European mind. When the American colonies were founded beginning in the sixteenth century, European thought and literature continued to contribute to American Islamophobic perceptions of Islam and Muslims, but other contributing factors were distinctly American. The Puritan belief in being a Chosen People in a Covenant with God, blessed with their New American Israel, but obligated to proselytize to outsiders, contributed to a view of Muslims as an inferior "other." Post-Independence, those beliefs continued to exist among Americans, but they took on a more political cast due to the influence of the Enlightenment. America's favorable geographical setting for proselytization also contributed to notions of American superiority. Beginning in the eighteenth century, religio-political beliefs were factors which exacerbated American anti-Islamic sentiment: millenarianism, Manifest Destiny, and Zionism. In the nineteenth century, the Great Awakening and Revivals added zeal to ongoing missionary efforts directed at Muslims and "others." Other nineteenth century factors contributing to Islamophobia among Americans included contact with the Muslim world, art, and the written word.

Next, contemporary factors contributing to American Islamophobia were discussed. The psychology of contemporary American Islamophobia was explored, with special emphasis placed on Islam’s role as the "other" in Western closed-view identity construction. Also considered was a contemporary societal factor contributing to Islamophobia: power. Specifically, this factor
includes the manipulation of Islamophobia by politicians and media pundits to achieve personal gains, as well as the broader use of Islamophobia by Westerners to retain superiority over the Muslim world. Next, aspects of the contemporary Islamophobic and contrasting "Islamophilic" mindsets were outlined, based on the 1997 Runnymede Trust report. Then, a recent Gallup poll and CAIR’s 2007-2009 Annual Civil Rights Reports provided concrete examples of the shape Islamophobia takes in the United States, specifically how it becomes manifest in the form of distorted beliefs about Muslims and in the form of violations of American Muslims' civil rights. It was made clear that Islamophobes exist as a substantial minority sentiment in the United States and that while certain manifestations of Islamophobia are decreasing, the rise of others indicate that the situation still needs to improve. Lastly, three dangers of Islamophobia were identified as being its hindering Muslims from contributing to Western society, its making them psychologically defensive, and its creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy of a clash between Islam and the West.

The next two chapters in the current work will focus on taking steps to further understand and offer concrete solutions to the problem of Islamophobia. Chapter four will thematically organize Islamophobic polemics and stereotypes, some of which have noted in chapters two and three. Chapter five will provide a concrete solution to Islamophobia by presenting a suggested methodology for Muslim-Christian interfaith dialogue.
Figure 1: *The Greek Slave*  

CHAPTER 4
VIOLENT DISCOURSE: THEMES IN ISLAMOPHOBIC POLEMICS

Introduction

Among the contemporary manifestations of Islamophobia which was mentioned in chapter three was Islamophobic polemics. Although much has been published on the topic of polemics in the post-9/11 United States by both closed-and open-view scholars, crisis events or the polemical statements themselves are often the main focal point. While this type of work is useful for examining particular current events or controversial statements in-depth, it does not contribute to an understanding of the larger themes that are emerging within American Islamophobic discourse. In order to understand and counter the phenomenon of Islamophobia, polemical, closed-view statements about Islam should be examined according to key themes. This chapter explores five of the themes present within this violent discourse: first, the perception that Muslims are violent; second, that they hate Jews and Christians; third, that they oppose democracy; fourth, that they refuse to modernize; and fifth, that Muslim men are misogynists.\footnote{Polemicists differ as to whether they state outright that these characteristics are inherent within Islam, or they qualify their statements by ascribing them to certain Muslims. However, these stereotypes are often broadly applied, and the Islam v. Muslim (and sometimes even the Muslim v. Arab) distinction becomes obscured, especially after the polemical statements become part of popular discourse.}

The commonalities within each theme will be illustrated via a sampling of representative polemics. In addition, one polemic from each category and scholars’ responses to it will be discussed in more detail.

Theme One: Muslims are Violent

The first theme to be considered is the notion that Muslims are inherently violent. A significant minority of Americans hold this belief: in the above-cited 2009 Gallup poll of Americans’ perceptions of religious practitioners, twenty-seven percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that “Muslims around the world want peace.” However, only thirty-seven
percent of those polled said that they had “some” or a “a great deal of knowledge” about Islam -- sixty-three percent of respondents either professed to having no or “very little knowledge of Islam.”

If Americans profess to being ill-informed about Islam, why have so many formed the definite opinion that Muslims are not peaceful people? Part of the answer lies in how the media portrays Islam: a 2008 study by research group Media Tenor showed that approximately eighty percent of the “media relationship” between the West and the Muslim world features political protagonists from both groups, and that discourse in online forums was even more negative. In addition, Media Tenor’s study indicated surges of media coverage of Islam in correlation with violent events (such as the Iraq War).

Although ample polemical material is available for each of the five categories, controversial statements about Islam’s supposed violent nature are particularly widespread. Polemicists range from so-called scholars of Islam to religious leaders to media pundits and utilize a wide variety of platforms. Protestant minister Pat Robertson has often commented on Islam’s alleged violence on his show 700 Club: that Islam is a “bloody, brutal type of religion,” (aired April 26, 2006), and its followers “only deal with history and the truth with violence” and “don’t understand what reasoned dialogue is” (aired September 25, 2006). The potential scope of Robertson’s influence is troubling: his Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) boasts reaching ninety-seven percent of U.S. television markets and approximately 200 countries worldwide.

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Daniel Pipes, who has been billed as a scholar of Islam on FOX, CBS, and CNN, is equally widely accessible. His columns have been featured in a range of publications: the *New York Sun*, *New York Times*, and National Public Radio’s website. In a rather Orwellian twist, he was also appointed by George W. Bush as the director of the Institute of Peace from 2003-2005. Pipes warns that militant Islam is widespread and that it poses an existential threat to America. In addition, he has stated that mainstream, legal American groups like the Muslim Students Association and the Arab Anti-Defamation League are in fact fronts for a stealth Islamic takeover of America.

Steve Emerson is also frequently cited by national media as an expert on Islam, particularly in regard to terrorism. Examples of outlets where he has appeared include the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, CNN, and NBC. He has even testified on terrorism in congressional hearings. However, Emerson's track record is less than perfect: he incorrectly attributed the Oklahoma City bombing to Arabs, proclaiming on the CBS Evening News, “this was done with the attempt to inflict as many casualties as possible; that is a Middle Eastern Trait” (aired April 19, 1995). Ironically, although the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing actually were Arabs, Emerson mistakenly attributed it to Yugoslavians (aired March 2, 1993).

Let us consider a fourth polemicist, Robert Spencer, in more detail. Like Emerson and Pipes, Spencer lends a scholarly facade to Islamophobia. As mentioned in chapter three, Spencer has written multiple popular exposé-style books on Islam. The first three all cover similar themes; for example, that Islam is a religion of war, that Islam promotes immorality (lying, theft, murder), and that the West should fear an Islamic takeover. The books also specialize in selectively

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236 Ibid., 6.


239 Ibid. 5-9.
referencing anonymous English translations of Qur'anic verses; Spencer seems to be utilizing the N.J. Dawood Qur'an translation as a basis, but never clearly indicates which translation he uses or why and rarely references Arabic terms.\textsuperscript{240}

In \textit{The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam and the Crusades}, Spencer argues that the Qur'an is a “book of war.” He states that “there are over a hundred verses in the Qur’an that exhort believers to wage jihad against unbelievers,” who for Spencer include both hypocrites (\textit{munāfiqūn}) and those who have rejected Islam outright (\textit{kāfirun}).\textsuperscript{241} He provides an English translation of Qur'an \textit{ayah} 9:5: “‘Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due, then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.’”\textsuperscript{242} Spencer does not reference the historical context for this \textit{ayah} and implies that it applies to any hypocrite or non-believer. As will be illustrated below, he also fails to provide Islamic scholarly definitions for what officially constitutes an unbeliever or hypocrite.

Open-view scholars have refuted statements by Spencer and others that \textit{ayah} 9:5 promotes unfettered violence against non-Muslims. In \textit{Who Speaks for Islam?}, John Esposito and Dahlia Mogahed’s recent book based on the seminal 2007 Gallup Muslim World Poll, Esposito and Mogahed argue that \textit{ayah} 9:5 is a commonly cited to demonstrate that Islam is inherently violent, but is equally as often taken out of context and thus misunderstood. However, they concede that the \textit{ayah} has also been abused by Muslims. During Islam's classical period, for example, some of the ‘\textit{ulamā’} selectively used \textit{ayah} 9:5 to provide a rationale for ruler’s imperial aspirations in exchange for the ruler’s royal patronage.\textsuperscript{243}

\textsuperscript{240} Rendall, Macdonald, Cassidy, and Jacir, \textit{Smearcasting}, 9.

\textsuperscript{241} Spencer, \textit{The Politically Incorrect Guide}, 19.

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., 20.

\textsuperscript{243} Esposito and Mogahed, \textit{Who Speaks for Islam?}, 19.
Muhammad Abdel Haleem, whose recent English translation of the Qur'an was published by Oxford University Press, offers further insight into *ayah* 9:5, among others. He agrees with Esposito that *ayah* 9:5 has been taken out of context by both Muslims and non-Muslims to suit their purposes, but its meaning is best understood within its textual and temporal context. Abdel Haleem translates the *ayah* as: “When the [four] forbidden months are over, wherever you encounter the idolaters, kill them, seize them, besiege them, wait for them at every lookout post; but if they turn [to God], maintain the prayer, and pay the prescribed alms, let them go on their way, for God is most forgiving and merciful.” Unlike Spencer, Abdel Haleem pays special attention to the context of "idolaters" (actually *mushrikīn*, which Abdel Haleem renders more accurately as polytheists). Spencer implies that the command to kill refers to any *mushrik*, but Abdel Haleem illustrates that this is not the case. The definite article "*al*" accompanying *mushrikīn* indicates that these are not just any *mushrikīn*, but rather those who have just been referred to in *ayah* 9:1.

In addition to this grammatical context, the historical context of this *ayah* is relevant: these particular *mushrikīn* are the Meccans, who persecuted the nascent Muslim community for a decade before the Muslims were given permission to defend themselves.\(^{244}\) The *mushrikīn* and the Muslims had subsequently been in a state of war and had struck a treaty; however, *ayah* 9:1 alludes to the fact that the *mushrikīn* have just broken this treaty. After a a four-month respite, the Muslims are allowed to attack the *mushrikīn*. Abdel Haleem would have us understand the *ayah* in this limited way, rather than taking the phrase “kill the polytheists” out of context in order to justify warfare in other situations, as Spencer does.

Lastly, Abdel Haleem reminds the reader that the warfare in this *ayah* is subject to the principles of just war stated elsewhere in the Qur'an, and that all warfare waged by the Prophet Muḥammad himself upheld these principles. For example, war must be in self-defense, Muslims

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\(^{244}\) Esposito and Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam?*, xxiii; also see Qur'an 2:217, 2:913, and 8:39 for further injunctions on war.
are never to become the aggressors, and they must not harm non-combatants. Abdel Haleem also reminds the reader of Islam’s epistemological hierarchy: rulings based on ‘ijmāʿ (the consensus of Muslim scholars) and qiyās (reasoning by analogy) are not acceptable if they contradict the Qur’an or the sunnah. Thus, any interpretation of ayah 9:5 that contradicts the principles of just war outlined elsewhere in the Qur’an and in the sunnah is invalid.

**Theme Two: Muslims Hate Jews and Christians**

As with the theme that Muslims are violent, the belief that Muslims hate or are intolerant of Jews and Christians is also widespread among Americans. In the above-cited 2009 Gallup poll, sixty-eight percent of survey respondents disagreed that “Christians’ and Muslims’ religious beliefs are basically the same.” In addition, sixty-six percent disagreed with the statement “that most Muslims around the world are accepting of other religions.”

As with Americans’ perceptions of Muslims as violent, polemicists play a role in shaping this view. For example, Steven Emerson has stated that Islamic doctrine sanctions “planned genocide” against Jews and Christians. Aside from illustrating the polemic that Muslims are anti-Judeo-Christian, Emerson’s statement also indicates that there is a close link between this stereotype and that of Muslim violence. This link will become more explicit with the following in-depth example: the clash of civilizations theory and its implications that Muslims are inextricably locked in a battle with the Judeo-Christian West.

As discussed in chapter two, the clash of civilizations theory, or clash theory for short, was originally postulated in Princeton historian Bernard Lewis' 1990 article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” and popularized by Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington’s 1993 article

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246 Ibid., 59.


“The Clash of Civilizations?” and similarly titled follow-up book.\textsuperscript{249} It should be noted that although Lewis and Huntington are designated as closed view scholars in the present work, they are still respected as academics. Huntington’s original article was published in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, which is read by the political and military elite. Clash theory, although controversial, remains influential to this day; although Huntington himself is now deceased, new editions of his book have been released in 2003 and 2011.

In brief, Lewis’ clash theory originally postulated that Islam and the West are in a state of clash because Islam classically divides the world into the House of Peace (Islam) and the house of War (the rest of the world). Overlooking arguments about whether this is a valid representation of the “classical” Islamic view or whether Muslim extremists today receive a “classical” Islamic education, Lewis argues that Muslim extremists are problematic not because they misinterpret Islam, but rather because they are interpreting it correctly.\textsuperscript{250} For Lewis, the Islamic cultural grouping remains in a state of conflict with the Western Christian European cultural grouping which includes the United States.\textsuperscript{251}

In his book, \textit{The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order}, Samuel Huntington extends Lewis’ theory into an interpretation of the dynamics of the post-Cold War world. He argues that global politics are now reconfigured along cultural lines rather than being organized around the two superpowers.\textsuperscript{252} Huntington groups the world into nine major civilizations, including Western and Islamic, the two civilizations most at odds with each other.\textsuperscript{253} Huntington cites various reasons why Islamic civilization is more violent than other civilizations or religions -- including a defense of his now-infamous 1993 statement that Islam has “bloody

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{249} Huntington, \textit{Clash of Civilizations}; Lewis, “Roots of Muslim Rage."
  \item \textsuperscript{250} Qureshi and Sells, "Introduction,” in Qureshi and Sells, 9; Lewis, "Roots of Muslim Rage,” 18-19.
  \item \textsuperscript{251} Lewis, “Roots of Muslim Rage,” 20-25.
  \item \textsuperscript{252} Huntington, \textit{The Clash of Civilizations}, 21.
  \item \textsuperscript{253} Ibid., 47. Recall that Huntington also states that the Western and Confucian (Sinic) civilizations are highly likely to come into conflict.
\end{itemize}
borders” and citing Lewis’ “classical Islamic idea” of the House of Peace and the House of War.254

Huntington’s arguments are, for the most part, not overtly rooted in theology, and his description of the Western cultural grouping is mostly secular. However, many of the historical and modern-day examples he provides to support his “Islam has bloody borders” statement portray Christians and Muslims in stereotypical conflict. These examples seem troubling, but as Harvard Islamicist Roy Mottahedeh points out in his essay on Huntington’s original article, many of Huntington’s examples are easily refuted.255 For example, Mottahedeh criticizes Huntington’s account of the Crusaders’ attempt to bring Christianity to the Holy Land as pandering to stereotypes but not holding up to scrutiny. He points out that the Crusaders could not very well “bring” Christianity to the Holy Land, as Christianity had originated and continually existed there. He also reminds the reader that Muslims historically had not only tolerated Christianity in the Middle East in general, but had given Christians (as well as Jews) a protected status under Islamic law.256

In addition to presenting historical examples of the Western Christian cultural grouping as being at odds with the Islamic grouping, Huntington also provides contemporary examples of Muslims at odds with another major cultural grouping: Eastern Orthodox Christians. The first example is violence between the Muslim Ingush ethnic group and the Orthodox Christian Ossetians (who, notably, include at least a twenty percent Muslim minority); the second is the Armenian (Christian)-Azerbaijani (Muslim) conflict.257 In response, Mottahedeh provides examples of other Central Asian conflicts in which tensions between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christians do not neatly explain the violence.

254 Ibid., 129, 258.
256 Ibid., 133.
257 Mottahedeh, "Islamicist's Critique," 135; Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 33.
For example, Shi’ah Muslim-majority Iran joined forces with Orthodox Christian Russia against the “Islamist” Taliban in support of Afghan’s more secular-leaning Rabbani government. In addition, Iran favored Tajikistan’s pro-Russian government over Muslim religious rebels (who even shared a cultural similarity with Iran by way of Tajik Persian). Mottahedeh argues that viewing international relations among Russia and the central Asian states as predominantly religiously motivated would be similar to arguing the same thing about U.S. relations with Caribbean or Central American countries. He states that Russia and the U.S. both simply have a strong interest in what happens in their “backyards” and that religious differences are not always the primary motivation for conflict.258

Theme Three: Muslims are Anti-Democracy

The third theme to be discussed is the perception that Muslims oppose democracy. Some closed-view authors explain the apparent lack of democracy in the Muslim world by arguing that there must be something inherent within Islam that discourages democratic institutions. In addition, many polemical statements within this theme involve misconceptions about *sharī‘ah* law. On the *700 Club*, Pat Robertson stated that Islam not a religion; rather, it is a “worldwide political movement...meant to subjugate all people under Islamic Law (aired July 12, 2007).”259

In addition, television personalities Sean Hannity and Glenn Beck have expressed their doubts about the ability of Keith Ellison, the first American Muslim elected to Congress, to uphold the duties of his office as loyal U.S. citizen. Upon learning that Ellison was to be sworn in to office on a Qur'an, Hannity asked, “Would you have allowed him to choose, you know, Hitler’s

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Beck questioned Ellison even more directly when Ellison appeared on Beck’s eponymous TV program. Beck stated, “I have been nervous about this interview with you, because what I feel like saying is, ‘Sir, prove to me that you are not working with our enemies. I’m not accusing you of being an enemy, but that’s the way I feel, and I think a lot of Americans will feel that way” (aired November 14, 2006). Fortunately for Ellison, however, his constituents in Minnesota’s Fifth District do not appear to be fans of of Beck’s program.

We can once again count on Robert Spencer to provide polemical material for us to consider in more detail. He devotes an entire chapter of Islam Unveiled to the question “Is Islam Compatible with Liberal Democracy?” The chapter aims to provoke Americans’ fear of Muslims immigrating to the United States. “Consider a thought experiment,” Spencer asks, “What would happen if these Muslim citizens became a majority in the United States...a secular American republic with a Muslim majority would continue as before, no?” Spencer acknowledges that Muslims are not likely to soon become the majority in America, but he still paints a bleak picture, playing to Americans’ fear of shari‘ah law. He cites examples of Muslim thinkers, past and present, who have advocated democracy but who also argued that shari‘ah law should be the main framework of a Muslim society’s government.

Spencer correctly asserts that shari‘ah encompasses both private worship and social interactions, but he goes a step further in asserting that this means all aspects of life would be “subject to religious authority.” He provides the nascent Muslim community as a historical

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261 Rendall, Macdonald, Cassidy, and Jacir, Smearcasting, 16.

262 Spencer, Islam Unveiled, 93-95.
example: “state power and religious power were fused in Islam from its inception, centering on the caliph as the leader chosen for Allah by his people.” However, Spencer does not explore whether or not most Muslims would want a caliphate today. In addition, he argues that an implementation of sharī‘ah law would necessarily be authoritarian -- “the Sharia is not designed to coexist with alternate forms of governance, including one in which consensus is achieved through the ballot box. Disputed questions are for the ‘ulamā’, not for the voters.” He concludes his “thought experiment” by stating that “this means that the values at the heart of American law and society would change with Muslim majority.”

A chapter Esposito and Mogahed’s *Who Speaks for Islam?* provides insight into whether Spencer’s conclusions are valid. An overwhelming majority of the Muslims polled supported the concept of democratic governance, wanting neither a secular democracy or an absolute theocracy, but rather something in between. Majorities in most Muslim countries polled did want to see *sharī‘ah* as at least “a source” of legislation. However, is this so shocking? A 2006 Gallup poll of Americans indicated that a majority of them similarly wanted the Christian Bible to be at least “a” source of legislation.

In addition, an incorporation of *sharī‘ah* into a Muslim majority country’s laws might turn out to be the authoritarian, all-encompassing system that Spencer portrays; Muslims’ visions of the role of *sharī‘ah* vary greatly. Esposito and Mogahed have pointed out that there is a distinction between fixed aspects of the *sharī‘ah* (such as the broad precepts for divorce or inheritance outlined in the Qur'an) and the man-made laws that early jurists created but which can be updated by jurists for contemporary times. Some Muslims want a full implementation of a classical legal system but others polled support a more restricted approach, which might include simply creating *sharī‘ah*-based family law courts or simply a written constitution that does not violate the fundamental principles of the Qur'an and *sunnah*. Additionally, Esposito argues that

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263 Ibid., 95-96.


265 Ibid., 47.
the Islamic epistemological sources of ‘ijtihād (independent legal judgment), shūrā (consultation between the government and the people), and ‘ijmā’ (community consensus) are all democracy-friendly, yet Spencer discusses none of these concepts.266 Neither does Spencer take into account countries such as Indonesia, which is a democracy that incorporates Islamic principles into its system of governance.

**Theme Four: Muslims are Anti-Modernity**

A fourth theme within anti-Islamic discourse is the perception that Muslims oppose modernity. This can mean that people of the Islamic faith are reactionary and opposed to forward into the twenty-first century, or that Islamic governmental, religious, and social institutions prevent Muslims from moving forward technologically and ideologically. In either case, Muslims are seen as unwilling to or incapable of moving into modernity as defined by the technological and ideological standards (e.g., secularism) set by the United States and Western Europe. It is the case that many Muslim-majority countries are developmentally behind the West, but the dispute is over whether Muslims or Islam are completely to blame, or whether the installation of Western-friendly dictators in the Middle East and North Africa have also played a part.

Again, Robert Spencer is an example of a polemicist who has stirred up debate, dedicating a chapter of *Islam Unveiled* to the question “Can Science and Culture Flourish Under Islam?” He acknowledges that it once did; while Europe descended into the Dark Ages during the seventh through twelfth centuries, the Muslim world produced great works of science, philosophy, and literature.267 In addition, Spencer argues out that the Muslim world was traditionally open to learning from other cultures (as opposed to now).

However, Spencer cites the "downfall" of Islamic philosophy as an example of Islam’s decline from this pinnacle. For Spencer, Al-Ghāzâlî’s writing of *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* marked the beginning of the gradual decline of Islamic philosophy.268 He argues

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266 Ibid., 53-53.


268 Ibid., 118, 122.
that Al-Ghazālī’s writing “helped reinforce an anti-intellectual strain of thought that was present in Islam from the beginning,” and which was based on the notion that the Qur'an is the only epistemological source that a Muslim really needs. Ultimately, the “temptation to uphold Islam against enlightenment and sophistication won out,” and from the time of the Crusades onward, Muslims also became increasingly less open to the idea that they could learn from non-Muslims. Spencer perceives this to be the root of the contemporary Muslim “reluctance” to learn from the West and modernize Islamic governmental and social institutions.269

Spencer argues that Muslims will never be able to modernize unless they rethink their notion of God. He explains that Jews and Christians have long been able to make scientific progress because they believe that God created the universe according to predictable laws which he could suspend, but freely chooses to uphold. Christians and Jews believed that they could come to understand these laws because they could rely on God's laws to remain constant. Spencer says Muslims, on the other hand, believed that God was free to act as “whimsically as he pleased,” and therefore science could not flourish in the Muslim world. Spencer says this is supported by a portion of Qur'an 5:64, which he translates as: "The Jews say: 'God's hand is chained.' May their own hands be chained! May they be cursed for what they say! By no means. His hands are both outstretched: He bestows as he will." 270 In addition, philosophy itself could be seen as blasphemy, as saying that God’s hand is chained.271 Thus, although some Muslims might have once been innovators, the Islamic conception of God itself ultimately prevents them from continuing to move forward.

In this chapter, Spencer makes sweeping generalizations and disregards counter examples that would weaken his argument. For example, he fails to take into account other vital Islamic epistemological sources that are utilized alongside the Qur'an; for example, qiyās (analogical reasoning) necessitates active utilization of the intellect. In addition, throughout the Qur'an, God

269 Ibid., 125
270 Ibid., 126.
271 Ibid., 127.
enjoins the believers to consider His signs for themselves, not to blindly accept it as revealed scripture. He also disregards the continued tradition of Islamic philosophy that continued even after the publication of *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, up until today, particularly in Shi’ah Islam with scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Spencer also fails to take into account that Muslim nations do not fit neatly into a pre-modern East/modern West dichotomy -- Turkey, for example, is a Muslim nation that is both considerably “Westernized” and modernized. Lastly, he failed to explain why Muslims led the world in scientific discovery for centuries, despite the presence of Qur'an 5:64 all along.

Esposito and Mogahed show us via the Gallup Muslim World Poll that the issue is more complex than Spencer makes it. They agree that Muslims today are struggling with questions of how to live out their faith in the modern world, just as people of other religions do. Muslims are engaging with issues of how their “faith relates to science, reason, and technology on a range of issues,” everything from ecology to birth control. However, Esposito and Mogahed state that most Muslims believe their faith has the inherent “pluralism and flexibility” to allow them to engage with these issues. Only a small minority of Muslims hold the belief that Islam cannot modernize while still retaining its integrity. 272

Beyond Spencer’s book, there are other examples of this theme in current popular discourse. Daniel Pipes, a scholar-turned-polemicist already mentioned above, has also implied in his writings that Muslims are anti-modern. In his article “The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!” Pipes argues that people harboring anti-Islamic sentiment are divided into two major camps: those who view Muslims as a security threat from the outside, and those who worry that Muslim immigrants to the West, including the United States, will ultimately undermine Western civilization from within. 273 Pipes sides with the latter group, stating that “jihad is not a serious threat to American security, but that fears of a Muslim influx have more substance.”


It is here that Pipes makes his infamous statement that “Western Europeans societies are unprepared for the massive immigration of brown-skinned peoples cooking strange foods and maintaining different standards of hygiene.” Muslims, Pipes says, are immigrating into the Western world, attracted by it, yet resistant to assimilation, insisting that “factories keep to the Islamic calendar...or that public schools be segregated by gender.” He goes even further in stating that a significant number of Muslims hope to make over America and Europe into “Islamic” societies, and that this could feasibly happen. However, Pipes says that there is “hope” -- if the world’s Muslim population will only concede and modernize. This would alleviate what he perceives to be cultural tensions between the Western and Muslim world. Then, Pipes states, Muslims will “no longer need to train terrorists or build missiles for use against the West, to emigrate to Europe and American; or, once having moved, to resist integration into Western societies.”

Examples of controversial statements such as these by Spencer and Pipes abound, but let us consider one, and its refutation, in greater detail. In 2000, a scholar writing in German under the pseudonym Christoph Luxemborg published *The Syro-Aramaic Reading of the Koran.* In the book, Luxemborg argues that in sections where reading the Qur'an in seventh-century classical Arabic does not render a clear, logical meaning, an attempt should be made, via his methodology, to understand the text in Syro-Aramaic. Luxemborg argues that Syro-Aramaic, which was “the most important written and cultural language in the region in which the Koran emerged.” Aside from implying that the Qur'an was not, as Muslims believe, revealed in "clear Arabic" (e.g., Qur'an 16:103), Luxemborg’s methodology can also produce meanings of the

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274 Ibid., 30-31.


Qur'anic text that are vastly at odds with centuries of Islamic scholarship and widely-held beliefs. One such example is Luxemborg’s challenge to the traditional Islamic reading of ḥūr al-`ayn, often referred to as *houris* in English.

Although Luxemborg’s connotative understanding of the ḥūr al-`ayn as mythical virgins of Paradise based his reading of the *Encyclopedia of Islam* article on the topic is more reflective of Western scholarship than the Islamic understanding of the ḥūr al-`ayn and could have been more extensively researched, this is not the main issue at point.277 The real controversy lies in Luxemborg’s new rendering of the Qur'an’s “dark, wide-eyed maidens” as “white, crystal [-clear] (grapes)” via his Syro-Aramaic reading.278

The question arises whether this reading, while highly controversial, is Islamophobic. I would argue that while Luxemborg’s intent in writing, while not particularly reverent toward Islam or the Qur'an, is also not overtly anti-Islamic. Luxemborg states his objective as “illuminating a number of obscurities in the language of the Koran” and “lessening the discrepancy between the Koran as it is to be understood historically and the previous understanding of the text.”279 He makes no outright demands that Muslims should immediately adopt his reading of their sacred text.

However, in choosing to remain anonymous, Luxemborg rightly predicted the controversy that would surround the publication of his book. In the United States, the book had inauspicious beginnings: an English translation was not available until 2007, and even when it did become available, few Americans would have the backgrounds in philology, Arabic, Syriac, and Islamic Studies necessary to evaluate its argument for themselves. Yet, because of the book’s premise, which potentially undermined the classical Islamic understanding of the Qur'an as a text revealed directly from God in Arabic, the story of its publication was picked up by the popular American media and the discourse took on Islamophobic overtones. Part of the discourse

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279 Ibid., 10, 283.
included the perception that Muslim resistance to Luxemborg’s book arose from the fact that they refused to modernize, as Christians and Jews had, in their understanding of their sacred text.

For example, a 2003 *Newsweek* article by Stefan Thiel, “Challenging the Qur’an,” helped bring the book into the American sphere of consciousness. However, it over-simplified and sensationalized Luxemborg’s work. For those already inclined to view Islam negatively, Thiel's article would be further proof. Thiel says that because Muslims are resistant to revisionist scholarship of the Qur'an, they resist moving forward into modernity. Thiel writes, “in the West, questioning the literal veracity of the Bible was a crucial step in breaking the church’s grip on power -- and in developing a modern, secular society. That experience as much as the questioning itself, is no doubt what concerns conservative Muslims as they struggle over the meaning and influence of Islam in the 21st century. But if Luxemborg’s work is any indication, the questioning is just getting underway.”

A *New York Times* op-ed piece, “Martyrs, Virgins, and Grapes,” by Nicholas Kristof, does a better job of explaining the finer points of Luxemborg’s argument, but its arrogant undertone is similar to that of Thiel’s article. Both share the assumption that the Qur'an and the Christian Bible are fundamentally similar as epistemological sources and can go through the same modernization process. This superimposes a Christian worldview and does not represent a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the Qur'an. Many Jews and Christians have no problem believing that multiple, perhaps divinely inspired, writers and editors contributed to the Hebrew Bible and New Testament over the centuries. For Muslims, however, it is a basic tenet of faith that the Qur'an was revealed directly from Allah 1400 years ago, and has remained essentially the same ever since. Although interpretations of the text can change, the Qur'an itself cannot be revised or relegated to a minor role in the lives of believing Muslims.

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In her article “American Visions of the Houri,” Nerina Rustomji of St. John’s University points out some of these shortcomings in the popular discourse on Luxemborg’s work. It is doubtful that Rustomji herself had access to a copy of Luxemborg’s book, as the English edition was not yet available at the time her article was published, and she provides no citation for the text in its original German. Some of the points she makes, however, regarding the discourse surrounding the publication of The Syro-Aramaic Reading of the Koran are astute. She agrees that the average American would likely not have had the scholarly background necessary to analyze a book such as Luxemborg’s. However, she points out that “Luxemborg’s story did not make it to the New York Times Op-Ed page based on its philological merits. Rather, what attracted Americans was the implication that revision of the Qur'an could lead to reform of Muslim societies and perhaps even Islam itself.” Rustomji continues, “in discourse, the [ḥūr al-`ayn] after being transformed confidently into ‘virgins,’ has now been turned more arrogantly into a white raisin.” She argues that this discourse makes clear the desire that Muslims “live in societies that are rational and secular.” However, the discourse does not make it clear what that should entail for any society, let alone a Muslim one.282

Theme Five: Muslims are Misogynistic

The notion that Muslim men are misogynistic or that Islam itself does not afford equal right to women is pervasive, perhaps equally as widespread as the notion that Muslims are violent. Stereotypes include the idea that modest dress, particularly the ḥijāb, or head covering, is oppressive. Also included are misconceptions about the Qur'an, including the belief that it gives Muslim men free reign in polygamy and permission to discipline their wives by beating them. The 2009 Gallup poll of Americans' religious perceptions showed that eighty-one percent of those polled disagreed with the statement “most Muslims around the world believe that women and men should have equal rights.”283 However, this does not reflect the reality of Muslim opinion around the world, as the Gallup Muslim World Poll illustrates. Esposito and Mogahed concede

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283 Gallup, Inc, Religious Perceptions in America, 27.
that it is true that women have suffered under shari‘ah-based governments in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Talibani Afghanistan. Yet poll data indicates that the majority of Muslims around the world “want women to have autonomy and equal rights. Majorities of respondents in most countries surveyed believe that women should have the same legal rights as men, rights to vote, the right to hold any job they are qualified for, [and] the right to hold leadership positions at cabinet and national levels.”

As with the prior polemical categories, the media plays a role in perpetuating the stereotype of oppressed Muslim women. Michael Savage, host of radio talk show Savage Nation, believes (like Pipes) that Muslims are infiltrating the U.S. and could possibly wage a cultural coup. Savage perpetuates the notion that Muslims are misogynistic: he said on air that “I’m not gonna put my wife in a hijab. And I’m not going to put my daughter in a burqa. And I’m not getting down on my all-fours and braying to Mecca...I don’t wanna hear any more about Islam. Take your religion and shove it up your behind (aired October 29, 2007). Troublingly, Savage’s show is no obscure internet broadcast -- rather, he reaches millions of talk radio fans each week.

Other excellent illustrations of the misogyny theme can be found in American political cartoons. Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg explore the issue in their contribution to John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin’s recent Islamophobia anthology. Gottschalk and Greenberg argue that Arab and Muslim women are generally portrayed at one stereotypical extreme or another they are rarely portrayed as normal and self-determining, but rather as either objects of desire (too scantily clad) or objects of oppression (too covered up). In the first part of the twentieth century, the stereotype was that of passive, alluring femininity. However, as events such as the

284 Esposito and Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam?, 50.
OPEC oil crisis and Iranian Revolution unfolded, aggressive masculine figures began to replace passive feminine ones and the women depicted symbolized oppression, not sexuality.

For example, Gottschalk and Greenberg include a copy of the cartoon entitled “Harem.”287 In it, a fat, lecherous stereotypical Arab man (complete with turban and big nose), representing OPEC, sat in front of a dozen fearful, veiled women labeled “importing nations.”288 One might argue that these political cartoons are not necessarily Islamophobic; after all, political cartoons often make their points via caricature, and no group is safe. However, cartoons such as these at least indicate widely-held stereotypes in American society at the time of their publication. Political cartoons must communicate wordlessly, and if stereotypes were not universal, the cartoons’ “language” would not be decipherable.

A more contemporary political cartoon discussed in Gottschalk and Greenberg’s chapter cartoon utilized the Abu Ghraib scandal as an opportunity for the cartoonist to comment upon what he perceived to be “the current juxtaposition of women and men in Muslim societies. Gottschalk and Greenberg explain that the cartoon depicted “a stereotypical Arab man, sitting in a chair with his feet across his prostrate wife’s back. While he reads a newspaper with the well-publicized image of an American female soldier holding a leash connected to the prone Iraqi man, she imagines that she holds a leash with her husband at the end.” They explain, “through this fantasy turnabout, the cartoonist suggested that the humiliations practiced by U.S. soldiers paled in comparison with those supposedly meted out by all Iraqi (or perhaps all Arab) husbands.”289

Let us consider the accusation that the Qur'an sanctions wife-beating in ayah 4:34 as our in-depth example for this section. This has been stated by numerous opponents of Islam, and some Muslims, for that mater. Robert Spencer in Islam Unveiled is representative of the polemic.

287 Copies of both cartoons referenced here are included at the end of this chapter.
288 Ibid., 202.
289 Gottschalk and Greenberg, "From Muhammad to Obama," 204.
Spencer, renders the *ayah* as, “Good women are obedient.” They guard their unseen parts because God has guided them. As for those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them and send them to beds apart and beat them.”

Spencer does concede that there is disagreement among Muslims as to the proper meaning of this *ayah*, citing differences in translation between, for example, Abdullah Yusuf `Ali who renders “beat them” as “spank them (lightly)” and Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, “scourge them.” Spencer criticizes those translators such as Yusuf `Ali who utilize parenthetical commentary, yet Spencer does not hesitate to utilize Qur’anic verses and hadīth which are liberally sprinkled with parenthetical commentary when those texts support his argument. He also neglects to explain why the English translation of 4:34 he chose is most appropriate or why parenthetical commentaries might sometimes be appropriate translation tools. Spencer concludes that most translations of the Qur'an do render the “Arabic with at least some notion of physical punishment.” This may well be true, but Spencer leaves the reader to believe that this is because those translations accurately represent the Qur'an’s original Arabic.

However, Abdel Haleem argues in his Qur'anic commentary that the original intent of the Arabic is quite different. He states that the *ayah* has been “subjected, both in the popular understanding and even by some exegetes, to selective and subjective interpretation, decontextualisation, and blatant disregard for the Prophet’s own interpretation of certain elements of the verse.” He adds that English translations (such as that given by Spencer) have contributed to the problem, with mistranslation and misinterpretation based on male chauvinism as part of

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290 Spencer does not make it clear in his book which translation he is using, or if he has undertaken to translate the verses himself. His translation is similar but not identical to N.J. Dawood's translation of the Qur'an, however, so it is likely that Spencer's translations are based in Dawood's text. N.J. Dawood, trans., *The Koran* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003).

291 Spencer, *Islam Unveiled*, 76.


293 Spencer, *Islam Unveiled*, 76.

294 Ibid., 75.
their shortcomings. He sets out to translate and interpret the *ayah* anew for the reader, using linguistic interpretation, other relevant Qur’anic passages for context, and the Prophet Muhammad’s own interpretation of the *ayah*. Abdel Haleem points out that what scholars, Muslim or non-Muslim, say about the *ayah* is secondary in Islam’s epistemological hierarchy and should be disregarded if it contradicts these higher-order sources.

Abdel Haleem takes N.J. Dawood’s translation of the *ayah* as a representative example of inaccurate English translations, which is particularly useful because it is similar to the mystery translation that Spencer uses. Dawood’s translation is: “men have authority over women because God has made the one superior to the other, and because they spend their wealth to maintain them. Good women are obedient. They guard their unseen parts because God has guarded them. As for those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them, forsake them in beds apart, and beat them.”

Abdel Haleem begins by pointing out that the Arabic *rajul* and *nisā’* here in the classical Qur’anic context means not just “man” and “woman” as they do in Modern Standard Arabic (and as Dawood renders them), but rather “husband” and “wife” in this specific context. At the time of the Qur’an’s revelation, *zawj* was a general word for spouse and there was not yet a differentiated, feminine *zawjah* for “wife.”

Abdel Haleem also explains that the phrase “have authority over them” is best translated as “maintain her and have authority over her affairs.” This role is not arbitrarily assigned to the husband, but rather he is the head of the family because he spends his money to provide for the wife. Nor is he to use his authority tyrannically; he must adhere to Qur’anic principles regarding leadership and proper social interaction. He and his wife should live together with “mutual consultation” (*tashāwar*), with “mutual acceptance” (*tarādi*), and “according to what is honorable and commendable” (*al-ma’rūf*).

Abdel Haleem understands the Arabic *bimā faḍdal*...
Allah similarly, as meaning that the husband has a “degree” over his wife because he spends out of his earnings to provide for her, not because he has inherent superiority over her.²⁹₈

Next, the ayah describes two classes of women: those who are ṣālihāt and those who are nushūz. Abdel Haleem explains that ultimately, women are ṣālihāt (righteous) due to their obedience to God, not their husbands. They are also ḥafīzāt, or chaste women who only engage in sexual intercourse with their spouses. Women who are nushūz are neither ṣālihāt nor ḥafīzāt, but rather they are guilty of sexual infidelity, a major sin in Islam for both sexes. Because of this serious infraction, the Qur'an instructs the husband to go through stages of reprimanding a nushūz woman, which does not make the husband a disciplinarian, but rather upholds the general Islamic injunction that believers should enjoin the good upon each other and forbid the bad. The first stage of reprimand is the command izuhunna, which is not “admonish them,” (as Dawood renders it) but rather “remind them of God’s teachings.” Second, wahjurūhunna fī ’l maḍāji, translated by Dawood as “send them to beds apart” but more accurately translated as a verbal (and sexual) boycott of the wife by the husband. Abdel Haleem notes that this means the reprimand is discreet and private, not done in front of other family such as children, which allows both spouses to retain their dignity in this delicate situation.²⁹⁹

Lastly comes the final step in the process of chastisement: the controversial imperative wadribuhunna, translated by Dawood as “beat them.” Abdel Haleem first states that as with other Qur'anic commands that are provided in lists, this third step is only to be taken if the first two steps are inadequate for correcting the problem. He points out that the Arabic verb daraba, which has a range of meanings, has a less severe connotation in this instance -- “hit lightly” instead of “beat.” This is because the command should only be executed as the Prophet Muḥammad understood it; he never hit any of his wives, and only condoned the practice among his followers in the event of infidelity. The hitting must be done with something light, such as a miswak (traditional toothbrush stick). Additionally, Abdel Haleem stresses that “many Muslim scholars

²⁹⁸ Abdel Haleem, Understanding the Qur’an, 50.
²⁹⁹ Ibid., 52.
are also of the opinion that hitting is only permissible if the husband is sure that it will bring about the right results.”

Finally, the following ayah indicates that when the wife refrains from sexual infidelity, the husband may take no action against her.

Abdel Haleem’s tafsīr is representative of a well-informed, mainstream Islamic interpretation of ayah 4:34. However, at least one recent translation of the Qur'an goes even further in refuting the “wife beating” misconception. Laleh Bakhtiar, the first American Muslim woman to publish an English translation of the Qur'an, offers an alternative perspective. Bakhtiar’s professed intention in translating the Qur'an was not to produce a deliberately feminist reading of the Qur'an, but to add a woman’s voice to a conversation that has often been dominated by men. In doing so she has received support from the American Muslim community, including Islamic Society of North America president Ingrid Mattson. The most significant feature of her translation is her argument that wādribuhunna did not originally mean “to hit” but rather “to go away.”

In the introduction to her translation, Bakhtiar presents her arguments for translating wādribuhunna as “go away” instead of “beat.” First, she argues that there is no record of the Prophet Muhammad beating any woman, wife or otherwise, in the canonical ḥadīth collections. He also stated that he opposed any such practice by others. This is the Prophet’s sunnah, and the Qur'an and the sunnah may not contradict each other. Bakhtiar argues that the most logical solution for this apparent paradox is to apply one of the other Form I Classical Arabic meanings of idrib to the situation: “to go away,” as in other Qur'anic ayāt (e.g., 57:13). Bakhtiar renders the entire ayah, then, as

men are supporters of wives because God has given some of them an advantage over others and because they spend of their wealth. So the ones (f) who are in accord with morality are the ones (f) who are morally obligated, the ones (f) who guard the unseen of what God has kept safe. But those (f) whose resistance you fear, then admonish them (f) and abandon them (f) in their sleeping place then go away from them (f); and if they obey

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300 Ibid., 54.


you, surely look not for any way against them (f); truly God is Lofty, Great.\textsuperscript{303}

While neither Abdel Haleem nor Bakhtiar have the definitive say on the issue, their contributions to the debate contradicts those such as Michael Savage or Robert Spencer who persist in a closed-view of Islam.

**Conclusion**

The current chapter has endeavored to provide a system for classifying anti-Islamic polemics. It was argued that five key themes within Islamophobic polemics are that Muslims are violent, that they are anti-Judeo-Christian, that they are anti-modern, that they are anti-democracy, and that Muslim men are misogynistic. Within each category, representative polemics and scholarly responses were provided, both to demonstrate how polemical discourse can be discredited by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, and to show how polemics within each theme are similar. The chapter has not been an attempt to exhaustively catalogue contemporary polemical statements or to provide definitive responses. Additionally, it should be noted that the categories are flexible and overlap to a degree, as demonstrated by the similarities between the themes that Muslims are violent and are anti-Judeo-Christian. However, it is hoped that subsequent researchers will group polemical statements according to this taxonomy, in order to better understand their commonalities and more effectively counter them. Future research might include exploring whether other themes should be added to these five or a more in-depth study of a category to create a more comprehensive list of polemics and solid responses to them.

Islamophobia, like racism, is unlikely to ever go away completely, but through endeavors such as these, scholars can work toward lessening its impact.

\textsuperscript{303} Ibid., 94.
Figure 2: "Harem"  

Figure 3: "Husband-Wife Imagined Role Reversal"  


CHAPTER 5
COUNTERING ISLAMOPHOBIA:
A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH TO INTERFAITH DIALOGUE

Introduction

In the previous chapter, a system was proposed for understanding Islamophobic polemics thematically. It was argued that organizing polemical statements thematically rather than examining individual polemics discretely is one way of identifying commonalities within Islamophobic discourse and thus contributing to a fuller understanding of Islamophobia as a whole. Aside from this thematic approach, however, suggestions for lessening Islamophobia's impact have not been explored in the present work. Thus this final chapter will attempt to improve upon current approaches to Muslim-Christian dialogue, by suggesting a specific methodology, as one way to counter Islamophobia.

Islamophobia is not solely the result of tension between Christians and Muslims, and this chapter does not mean to suggest that either all Islamophobes are Christians or that all Muslims harbor anti-Christian sentiments. However, since approximately 78.5% of the US population is at least nominally Christian and Christianity is an integral part of the American cultural landscape, it is logical to suggest that fostering positive relations between American Christians and Muslims can lessen anti-Muslim sentiment in the US.\(^{306}\) Additionally, it should be remembered that interfaith dialogue is not the only approach to countering Islamophobia. Other methodologies, including improvements in secular education and civil rights activism, have also lessened its

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impact. However, a detailed discussion of these methodologies is beyond the scope of this chapter.\footnote{307}

Although recent interfaith dialogue efforts have been successful in many ways, there is still room for improvement if interfaith dialogue is to be optimally effective in combating Islamophobia. Current approaches to interfaith dialogue, although well intentioned, are often inadequately planned and methodologically incomplete. Current research into interfaith dialogue methodologies by scholars such as Jane Smith and Kemal Argon offer ways to more thoroughly plan and appropriately customize interfaith dialogue efforts; these methodologies, as well as suggestions for making them more widely known, will be discussed below. However, the current methodologies are still incomplete. These methods bring interested, willing participants together, but they do not always ensure that participants are adequately educated and emotionally equipped to deal with the potentially complex and deeply personal endeavor which they are undertaking.

To address these problems, current interfaith dialogue efforts, which I will term the "behavioral dimension," should be supplemented with both a cognitive and an affective dimension. This creates the "ABC" (affective, behavioral, and cognitive) approach to effectively engaging with religious others which Alan Godlas has outlined in his undergraduate religion lectures at the University of Georgia.\footnote{308} The cognitive dimension which I will suggest is Godlas' hermeneutical method, religiological analysis. As Godlas' material on religiology is largely unpublished, the present work will include an explanation of what religiology, why it can be a useful tool for interfaith dialogue, and how it can be implemented. The affective methodologies which will be proposed here are based in Emotional Intelligence (EI) research and Emotion Centered Therapy (EFT), which have also been investigated and taught by Dr. Godlas in order to


\footnote{308}{Alan Godlas, "Cultivating Hermeneutical Understanding: A Methodology for Transforming Violence and Creating Understanding through Teaching Religion" (lecture, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, January 2012).}
facilitate dealing with the emotions that occur while attempting to understand the religious "other." Because EFT and EI are newly emerging fields, I will provide an overview of supporting research before suggesting ways in which they can be incorporated into interfaith dialogue efforts as the affective dimension. Together, these three dimensions, behavioral, cognitive, and affective, create a complete approach to interfaith dialogue which will not only strengthen the religious knowledge and self-confidence of participants, but will also help them to re-humanize the "otherness" of their dialogue partners.

Part One: The Behavioral Dimension

Islam's Historical Role in American Interfaith Dialogue

It is commonly held that the American interfaith dialogue movement began with the First Parliament of the World's Religions held in Chicago in 1893. Today, remembering the first PWR evoke mixed feelings; it has been criticized because one of its organizers, Reverend John Henry Barrows, displayed a pronounced bias toward Christianity and had a "civilizing" mission in regard to the other faiths represented. However, the other organizers, Charles Carroll Bonney and Reverend Lloyd Jones, seem to have sincerely wanted to emphasize commonalities among the participating religions and foster mutual understanding. In addition to Christians, delegates included Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists, but Muslim involvement in the first PWR was marginal; the Ottoman sultan refused to send delegates. The only Muslim participant was Mohammed Russell Alexander Webb, an American who had converted to Islam while posted as the US consul general in the Philippines.\(^{309}\)

As Anna Halafoff of Melbourne's Monah University illustrates in her doctoral dissertation "Netpeace: Multifaith Movements and Common Security," subsequent American interfaith endeavors were undertaken in response to the crisis events surrounding World War II. In response to atrocities such as the Holocaust and the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima Americans

strengthened their commitment to the interfaith dialogue movement. Later, the Cold War would prompt new interfaith dialogue endeavors, as Americans looked to cultivate allies against the Soviet bloc. While Muslims participated in these dialogue efforts, they were usually passive participants rather than initiators.

Globally, post-WWII and Cold War-era dialogue efforts were mostly spearheaded by Roman Catholics and Protestants. In 1948, the World Council of Churches (WCC) was established in Geneva, Switzerland; its members include Eastern Orthodox and Protestant Christians. The first organized WCC dialogues took place in 1960 and have since continued around the world, including the United States. For Roman Catholics, the reforms centered around Vatican II (1962-1965) prompted a change in the way that Catholics related to other religions, including Islam. In his "Nostra Aetate" speech, Pope Paul VI expressed "esteem" for Muslims due to their reverence for Jesus as a prophet, high morals, and worship of the one God. After Vatican II, the Secretariat for Non-Christians (now the Pontifical Council for Dialogue) was formed; this council has been the main vehicle through which the Church has acted upon its new position toward Islam by undertaking interfaith dialogue. The Catholic church also formed official guidelines for interfaith dialogue post-Vatican II, which have since been revised numerous times.

American interfaith dialogue efforts have been impacted by these global Christian organizations, and American Muslims have participated in these global initiatives. However dialogue in the U.S. is largely a unique entity, however, responding directly to crisis events and

310 Ibid., 454.


other issues central to the concern of Americans.\footnote{Smith, "Muslims as Partners," 166-167.} In the 1990s, as interfaith dialogue "came of age," initiatives expanded a great deal globally, particularly in the US.\footnote{The Second Parliament of the World's Religions, held in Chicago in 1993, can be understood the "100th birthday" of the multifaith movement. See Halafoff, "Countering Islamophobia," 452.} Because many of the crisis events which prompted interfaith dialogue efforts involved Muslims in some way, they became central actors in American interfaith dialogue efforts for the first time.\footnote{Halafoff, "Countering Islamophobia," 452, 459.}

In her doctoral dissertation, Anne Halafoff interviewed experts in the field of interfaith relations in order to understand how interfaith movements promote peace in contemporary society; study participants confirmed that Muslims were more actively involved in interfaith dialogue efforts at this time. Of Halafoff's study participants, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, is the director of the Peacebuilding and Development Institute at the American University in Washington, D.C. and contributed to the Esposito and Kalin Islamophobia anthology referenced throughout the present work. Abu-Nimer remarked that "'growing tensions between Islamic societies in the Middle East and the USA were becoming apparent in the 1990s, particularly around the time of the first Gulf War. This placed great strain on Muslim-USA relations, yet at the same time created new possibilities for religious and multifaith peacebuilding initiatives.'"\footnote{Ibid., 452-453, 456.}

Similarly, when Muslims were wrongly blamed for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings, American Muslims communities were compelled to become more proactive in interfaith endeavors. Jewish and Christian actors reached out to Muslim communities in a show of solidarity, and new Abrahamic interfaith alliances formed as a result. The three communities were collectively beginning to understand the importance of building strong relationships as a foundation to rely upon during future crises events. This increased Muslim leadership and a
particular emphasis on relations among the Abrahamic faiths were distinguishing aspects of the
American interfaith dialogue movement as the 1990s progressed.\textsuperscript{318}

**Muslim Involvement in Interfaith Dialogue Post-9/11**

The next major crisis event which shifted the focus of the American interfaith dialogue
movement onto Muslims was September 11, 2001.\textsuperscript{319} There were initial fears that 9/11 would
cause a huge setback to the interfaith dialogue movement, but dialogue advocates were able to
turn the tragedy into a positive opportunity. While a minority of Americans lashed out against
Muslims in general in response to 9/11, others realized the importance of coming to know their
now highly-visible neighbors and came to view interfaith dialogue as a viable method for doing
so.\textsuperscript{320}

Before 9/11, interfaith dialogue was on the periphery of the American consciousness, but
the events of 9/11 and afforded it greater credibility and visibility. When President Bush called for
a national day of mourning on September 15, 2001, interfaith ceremonies were held around the
country, putting the movement in the spotlight. Participants in Halafoff’s study recalled the
post-9/11 rise in interest in interfaith dialogue: Reverend Chloe Bryer, Executive Director of the
Interfaith Center of New York, told Halafoff that ""the events of 9/11 put the multifaith movement
on the map in a mainstream way that it hadn't before.""\textsuperscript{321} In addition to the numerous
spontaneous interfaith dialogue initiatives undertaken after 9/11, endeavors were also growing
"increasingly intentional and systematic." Groups hosted educational activities such as mosque
open house days.\textsuperscript{322} Programs occurred at both the local and national level, but were (and
continue to be) particularly visible at the "grassroots, community-based level."\textsuperscript{323} Because of this

\textsuperscript{318} Ibid., 452-457.

\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., 451.

\textsuperscript{320} Halafoff, "Countering Islamophobia," 459-460; Smith, "Muslims as Partners," 176.

\textsuperscript{321} Halafoff, "Countering Islamophobia," 458-459.

\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.," 451-452.

\textsuperscript{323} Halafoff, "Countering Islamophobia," 452; Peter Kirkwood, *The Quiet Revolution: The
Emergence of Interfaith Consciousness* (Sydney: ABC Books, 2007), v-vi.
trend, it is toward these grassroots, local interfaith dialogue endeavors that the methodologies proposed in the current work will be primarily aimed.

Whereas before 9/11 the interfaith dialogue movement was perceived as an "academic exercise" or "spiritual luxury," after 9/11 it has come to be seen as a necessity for achieving various goals. Post-9/11, interfaith groups continue to use their efforts to develop trust, friendship, and understanding among people of different religions, building upon the foundations which were wisely put into place in the 1990s. Although interfaith dialogue efforts have included members of other religions, efforts have been aimed at emphasizing the similarities among the Abrahamic faiths in particular. These friendships are important in helping interfaith dialogue participants avoid the tendency to de-humanize their religious others when crisis situations, such as 9/11, occur.

In addition to promoting friendship among members of different religions, interfaith dialogue (or, in this instance intra-faith dialogue) can also promote unity within the American Muslim community itself, which is important if Muslims are to work together to combat Islamophobia. Various demographic groups exist within the American Muslim community, and these groups, while not necessarily active opposed to one another, are not as united as they might be. Subgroups include, but are not limited to immigrants of various nationalities, African American Muslims, other American converts including Latino and Caucasian Muslims, Shi`ī, women, and youth. Many of these groups are underrepresented in Muslim community activities and thus constitute a relatively untapped resource; this will be addressed further in a later section. Deliberate dialogue between these groups can improve intra-Muslim communication, strengthen the intra-Muslim bond (including acceptance of different communities), and better utilize the

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strengths (including "intellectual and spiritual offerings") of these subgroups to benefit US Muslims in combating Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{327}

Interfaith dialogue groups also work to confirm the positive aspects of Islam, to counter negative stereotypes about Muslims and others, and to condemn discrimination.\textsuperscript{328} This may extend to combating racism in general; African American (Christian and Muslim) participants in particular report that interfaith dialogue emphasizes the commonalities among participants as people of faith rather than emphasizing the dissimilarities between them as people of differing races.\textsuperscript{329}

Just as interfaith dialogue groups work to counter stereotypes about Muslims, they also use their activities to combat Muslim misperceptions of Christians and to portray Christianity in a positive light. Jane Smith explains, "just as many Americans tend to see Muslims in the image of the terrorists being portrayed in the media, so [do] many immigrant Muslims bring with them the picture of the United States as an imperialist and a supporter of dictatorship and oppression in the Muslim world."\textsuperscript{330} A similar advantage of interfaith dialogue is that it can help Muslims better understand and integrate into American culture.\textsuperscript{331} Imam Hamad Chebli of the Islamic Society of Central New Jersey explains that "imams are often called to interact with American Christian culture and society and are ill informed." Smith explains that Chebli attends interfaith dialogue activities because it "makes him a better imam."\textsuperscript{332}

Additionally, interfaith efforts are used as a platform for Christians and other religious groups to show solidarity with moderate American Muslims in condemning acts of religiously

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid., 355, 366.

\textsuperscript{328} Halafoff, "Countering Islamophobia," 458, 463-464; Smith, "Muslims as Partners" 176.

\textsuperscript{329} Smith, "Muslims as Partners," 176.

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{331} Argon, "Strategies," 365.

\textsuperscript{332} Smith, Muslims as Partners," 176.
motivated violence and promoting peace. On an official level, the U.S. government has acknowledged interfaith engagement as a counterterrorism strategy.\(^{333}\)

Lastly, interfaith dialogue extends beyond simply promoting friendship, understanding, and peace. Although interfaith dialogue is typically thought of as being roundtable discussions and educational activities, it can also include volunteer projects in which members of different faiths work together to combat social problems such as homelessness or drug abuse (this will be further discussed in a later section.) In this way, interfaith dialogue participants can make tangible contributions to societal welfare.\(^{334}\)

Post-9/11, the focus of interfaith dialogue has tended to be on the three Abrahamic faiths, although members of other religious groups in the US are by no means excluded.\(^{335}\) Muslims specifically participate in dialogue most often with Christians, but initiatives involving members of other faiths is becoming increasingly popular.\(^{336}\) Youth organizations, which initially begin to develop in the 1990s as a subset of interfaith initiatives, are also increasing in popularity and are viewed as a potential counterterrorism strategy.\(^{337}\)

Today, Muslims continue to become more involved in interfaith dialogue. In his recent survey of American mosques, Ihsan Bagby found that sixty-five percent of survey participants had participated in an interfaith dialogue program and thirty-seven percent had participated in an interfaith social service project.\(^{338}\) National American Muslim organizations are more actively endorsing interfaith dialogue; both the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Islamic


\(^{334}\) Smith, "Muslims as Partners," 176.

\(^{335}\) Halafoff, "Countering Islamophobia," 463.

\(^{336}\) Smith, "Muslims as Partners," 165.


\(^{338}\) Smith, "Muslims as Partners," 167.
Circle of North America (ICNA) officially support interfaith dialogue efforts. As Muslims continue to settle into the American public sphere, it is likely that they will continue to participate in interfaith dialogue initiatives on an even more frequent basis.

Not only have Muslims become more involved in interfaith dialogue post-9/11, they have also taken a greater leadership role, continuing the trend which began in the 1990s. Amir Al-Islam of Medgar Evans College, formerly with the World Conference on Religion and Peace, has stated that Muslim in the West are now taking a major, active role in dialogue and agenda setting. Sulayman Nyang cites, for example, the new trend toward inviting Christians to national Muslim conventions. The Islamic Center of Long Island, the Chautaqua Institution, and the Rumi Forum of Washington D.C. are all examples of Muslim organizations which have official policies in favor of initiating interfaith activities.

However, even after 9/11, Christians are still most often the initiators of interfaith dialogue with Muslims. Zaid H. Bukhari, co-director of Ihsan Bagby's mosque survey project, feels that this is because "most Muslims still consider themselves to be guests in America and that they are therefore in a 'response' rather than an 'initiation' mode." In an interview with Jane Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr elaborated on this, stating that "Muslims are not much interested in initiating religious dialogue because they first want to consolidate their situation as part of the religious mainstream in America. But, at the same time, they are very anxious to participate when invited." Leila Ahmed of Harvard University agrees that since Christians are the majority in America, it is only natural that they are the ones most often extending the information to

339 Ibid., 173.
340 Ibid., 167.
342 Smith, "Muslims as Partners," 174-175.
343 Ibid., 185-186.
344 Ibid., 174.
345 Ibid., 191.
dialogue. Although some Muslims proponents of interfaith dialogue agree that a passively participating in interfaith dialogue is better than isolationism, others look to push the Muslim community to take a more active leadership role. Jane Smith summarizes this sentiment: "Many Muslims feel that until they get their own act together and determine who will be invited, what the agenda will be, and on whose terms, there will always be an imbalance in the conversation." In a later section, ways for Muslims to lead and set the agenda for interfaith dialogue will be considered.

**Current Interfaith Dialogue Methodologies**

Presently, there are a variety of approaches to Christian-Muslim interfaith dialogue; each approach has American Muslim community leaders who advocate it but also has associated shortcomings. The information presented here is based on the work of Jane I. Smith; the names of each dialogue type are her own. Smith's models of dialogue are as follows: Confrontation/Debate, Information-Sharing, Theological Exchange, Ethical Exchange, "Dialogue to Come Closer," Spirituality and Moral Healing, and the Cooperative Model for Addressing Pragmatic Concerns. Additionally, based on her work, I have included Shared Worship and Intra-Muslim Dialogue as subtypes of dialogue.

**The Confrontation/Debate Model**

This method of interfaith dialogue is not a friendly debate, but rather constitutes an attempt to disprove the other side's belief system. Recent Muslim immigrants to the United States have sometimes been subjected to this type of "dialogue," and can be wary of participating in interfaith dialogue because they expect that it might take on this unpleasant format. Smith does not advocate Confrontation/Debate as a viable option for interfaith dialogue, citing the World Council of Churches' denunciation of this type of technique. Fortunately, most Muslims who are

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346 Ibid., 174.

347 Ibid., 168-187
genuinely interested in participating in interfaith dialogue realize that Confrontation/Debate is not appropriate for fostering genuine understanding.\textsuperscript{348}

\textit{The Dialogue as Information-Sharing Model}

Dialogue as Information-Sharing is the most common type of interfaith dialogue. Longtime dialogue participant Sanaullah Kirmani of Towson University calls it "the safest form of 'dialogue.'" Typically, it takes the shape of a single Muslim invitee speaking to a gathering of Christians about the basics of Islam. Muslim converts from Christianity may be invited as presenters because they can speak the "language" of Christianity.

Although Dialogue as Information-Sharing can be an effective way to provide information about Islam to Christians who have little knowledge about Islam, the approach is not without its problems. Not surprisingly, it can be a bit awkward, with one Muslim as the center of attention and possibly wondering why he/she has really been invited. Additionally, the exchange can be a bit superficial and one-sided; the Muslim guest speaker is put in the difficult position of trying to impart vital information about Islam within a short time frame, and the only real two-way exchange may be a short question-and-answer session at the end of the event.

A sub-type within the Dialogue as Information-Sharing model is classroom-based information sharing. Opportunities for this can arise when, for example, the parents of Muslim children enrolled in public schools (or the students themselves) are invited to talk about Islamic holidays as they occur throughout the school year. Opportunities can also present themselves in institutions of higher learning when students enroll in history, political science, or religion classes in which Islam or Muslims are part of the curriculum. Smith relates that Ali Asani of Harvard University "has found himself engaged in serious dialogue with his Muslim and non-Muslim students" and that it has not only been instructive for the non-Muslims in class, but has also "often provided a helpful experience for Muslim students who are struggling to find their identity."\textsuperscript{349} However, the relatively one-sided nature of lecture-style courses creates limitations

\textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 168.

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 168-169.
similar to those which occur when Dialogue as Information-Sharing is conducted outside the classroom.

The Theological Exchange Model

This model is similar to Dialogue as Information-Sharing, but it involves more substantial dialogue about elements of belief within Christianity and Islam. It also takes place on a more long-term basis; participants attend meetings regularly and get to know each other well. Smith indicates that John Borelli, the interreligious director of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, has used this model and found it to be particularly effective. Former ISNA President Muzamil Siddiqi is another advocate of the Theological Exchange Model.

However, Theological Exchange is not a good fit for all dialogue participants. For example, Christians interfaith dialogue participants are, as a whole, more interested in theological discussions than are Muslims. Additionally, Muslims can be hesitant to engage in ongoing theological discussion because they are wary that Christians might try to convert them. Lastly, this model requires that participants have a fairly high level of theological understanding. In his interview with Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr says that Theological Exchange should only be used when appropriate for the group makeup: "those who have theological and metaphysical qualifications should certainly attempt theological conversation. But others should simply settle for respect. It does not help the cause of Muslim-Christian dialogue if the people participating in theological debates are without the qualifications necessary to do so."350

The Ethical Exchange Model

The Ethical Exchange Model is similar to Theological Exchange, but the discussion is instead centered around ethics. The idea is that people can find common ground in a shared concern about ethical issues facing the community, such as drug abuse or gang violence. The group works together on problem-solving based on their shared ethical values. Advocates of this approach include the late Ismail Al-Faruqi, who believed that this was the best way for Muslims and Christians to undertake dialogue together. One potential problem is that it requires substantial

350 Ibid., 169, 192.
agreement on the part of all participants regarding the common problem and method of solving it. This approach is not as popular as the other models, although it is gaining in popularity.\textsuperscript{351}

\textit{The "Dialogue to Come Closer" Model}

This model can be based in a discussion of either ethics or theology, and the goal of participants is to look for similarities or points of agreement between their two religions. According to Sanaullah Kirmani, one positive aspect of "Dialogue to Come Closer" is that it helps "deepen and increase individual faith commitments." Smith reports that it allows Christians and Muslims to learn from and draw closer to one another. Plemon Al-Amin agrees that "Dialogue to Come Closer" is a vital dialogue methodology, stating that most Muslims do not necessarily want to do this type of dialogue, preferring to emphasize their unique identity, but that it is what they need to be doing. In making this statement, Al-Amin hits on one of the potential weaknesses of the model: it makes both Christians and Muslims nervous; they worry that "such conversations may lead to a kind of syncretism" that neither group wants.\textsuperscript{352}

\textit{The Spirituality and Moral Healing Model}

Spirituality and Moral Healing is similar in nature to "Dialogue to Come Closer," but focuses more on the shared pursuit of spiritual growth as a group. Although it is one of the less popular models listed here, a small group of Muslims are deeply interested. Laleh Bakhtiar, translator of \textit{The Sublime Quran}, is one such advocate, and describes it as "developing dialogue in terms of virtues and vices that we all share." Not surprisingly, it shares the same downsides as the "Dialogue to Come Closer" Model; potential participants are nervous about the possible blurring of distinctions between religions. Additionally, it requires that participants begin at the same level of spiritual growth and agree on spiritual issues which they wish to collectively address.\textsuperscript{353}

\textsuperscript{351} Ibid., 170.

\textsuperscript{352} Ibid., 170-171.

\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., 171.
The Cooperative Model for Addressing Pragmatic Concerns

This model places less emphasis on discussion and more on working together on a tangible, mutually interesting project. Liakat Takim of the University of Miami provides the example of a "Canadian venture...that brings people in cold weather off the streets to spend one week sheltered in a mosque, another in a church, another in a synagogue." One strength of this approach is that it appeals to young people, who, as previously mentioned are often underrepresented in interfaith dialogue initiatives. Another strength, according to Rula Abi Saab of the University of Akron, is that it humanizes the religious other, illustrating that all dialogue participants are part of a shared social landscape and face the same problems. However, in order for the Cooperative Model to be viable, participants must select a project that is feasible, mutually interesting, and find a way to incorporate meaningful reflection after the project is completed.354

Shared Worship

Although Smith discusses shared worship activities, she does not formally include them as a separate category of dialogue. They can be considered to be a dialogue activity in their own right, however, or as accompanying the other dialogue types. Shared worship is a complex issue, with arguments in favor of and against it. Most Muslims are opposed to shared worship, due to fears of bida'h or religious syncretism, although some are willing to participate to some degree. When it does happen, shared worship most often includes Christians to observing Muslims in ṣalāt or Muslims observing a Christian worship service. Muslims are also sometimes willing to read from the Qur'an (most commonly Al-Fatiha) or offer a prayer at an interfaith worship service; this most often occurs on college campuses. Some Muslims and Christians feel that "the benefits of a common experience outweigh the risks, while others are concerned that such a 'watered-down' version of the liturgy of any of the participants serves to dilute rather than enrich." The problems with this approach, then are similar to the limitations of the other models which emphasize or try to create commonalities between Christians and Muslims.355

354Ibid., 171-172.
355Ibid., 186-187.
Intra-Muslim Dialogue

Although Smith does not address it, intra-Muslim dialogue can be considered here as a relevant subset of interfaith dialogue, since its potential to combat extremism and foster unity is one possible way of alleviating Islamophobia. Kemal Argon points out in an article on interfaith dialogue methodologies that the above dialogue types can all be used for Muslim-Muslim dialogue as well as Muslim-Christian dialogue. Argon's methodology for utilizing Smith's models effectively will be discussed in a later section.

Problems with Current Interfaith Dialogue Methodologies

In addition to identifying some limitations associated with each of the dialogue types above, Smith also includes an overview of the general challenges that Muslims face when engaging in interfaith dialogue. These will be summarized below, along with notes on how they might be addressed by incorporating the new methodologies which will be suggested in the present work. The problems are as follows: isolationism among Muslims; the debate over whether to allow dawah and evangelism in dialogue; an uneven playing field for Muslims and Christians, the lack of a standard Islamic conceptual framework for dialogue; conflicting agendas among Muslims and Christians; differing ideologies within the two groups; and the underrepresentation of certain demographic subgroups of American Muslims in dialogue efforts.

Isolationism

As Ihsan Bagby's study indicated, many Muslims have actively engaged with their Christian neighbors in interfaith dialogue activities. These Muslims apparently believe that they can retain their distinct religious and cultural identities while participating in American society, as other minority groups have done before them. However, other Muslims, especially those who identify with the Salafi or Wahhabi movements, "are encouraging members of the [American Muslim] community to take an isolationist stand and eschew involvement into in American public life." These individuals decline to participate in dialogue and actively pressure others to do the

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357 Smith, "Muslims as Partners," 166, 172.
same. Smith states that isolationists are concerned about certain elements of American culture and feel that it is dangerous to become "too deeply involved in its ethos." They also fear that if they engage in dialogue, they are somehow being disloyal to Muslims or Islam. This stance is dangerous; refusing to come to better know Christians (and Americans in general) can only perpetuate othering by both groups.

The problem of isolationism is one of the most difficult challenges to address simply via improving current dialogue methodologies. While it is unlikely that doing so will convince dedicated isolationists to participate, it is hoped that the new methodologies to be discussed below will raise the confidence, knowledge, and comfort level of those Muslims who do engage in interfaith dialogue efforts so that they will not be swayed by those who oppose such activities. Additionally, those Muslims who do participate in interfaith dialogue will ideally be a positive force in their community to offset the influence of those who would push American Muslims toward isolationism.

**Dawah and Evangelism**

The questions of whether to allow dialogue participants to engage in *dawah* and evangelism, and what would constitute unacceptable proselytizing, are complex. Muslims are divided on this issue: some feel that if interfaith dialogue is to foster genuine trust, understanding, and friendship then it cannot include either subtle or overt attempts at conversion. Other Muslims feel that in order to engage in sincere, effective dialogue, they must be allowed the freedom to speak about their beliefs with honesty and deep conviction. One of Smith's interviewees, an unnamed imam from Hartford, Connecticut, holds the latter opinion: "If I experience something that I think is good, then it is un-Islamic for me to try not to share it...this is what Islam is. It may be perceived as proselytism, but we must tell you what we believe. God will ask us at the

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358 Ibid., 166.

359 Ibid., 173.
judgment, "Why didn't you say so-and-so when you had the opportunity to do it?" I believe that the same integrity exists for Christians."  

As with the debate over isolationism or integration, disagreements over proselytization are difficult to resolve through adapting dialogue methodologies alone. Decisions about how to define and whether to allow proselytization is perhaps best left up to each dialogue group to resolve for itself, depending on what seems most appropriate for the makeup of that particular group. However, the new dialogue methodologies which will be proposed below will endeavor to make dialogue participants less concerned about conversion attempts. Increasing participants' knowledge about the religions in question will enable them to better evaluate the veracity of their own beliefs and whether to accept those of the other when attempts at conversion do occur. Incorporating emotional intelligence training will boost participants' self-confidence and ability to cope with their emotions, lessening the discomfort caused by any attempts at proselytization which do occur.

It is also relevant to note that according to Smith, the more Muslims participate in interfaith dialogue, the less concerned they tend to be about conversion attempts. This is partly because more experienced participants have seen that conversion is simply not the primary goal of most attendees. Additionally, as they become more experienced interfaith dialogue participants, Muslims will develop the interpersonal skills necessary to appropriately handle conversion attempts.  

An Uneven Playing Field

Another challenge that Muslims face when engaging in interfaith dialogue is their relative inferiority to Christian participants in various areas. First of all, as seen above in the historical overview of interfaith dialogue, Christians have been participating and leading efforts in interfaith dialogue in the United States for decades longer than Muslims have. Thus they are more familiar with the norms of interfaith dialogue than are their Muslim counterparts. Not only are Muslims

360 Ibid.

361Ibid., 178.
relatively new to American interfaith dialogue, they are often new to America altogether. Immigrant Muslims, even community leaders, may be in the process of adjusting to American culture and may not yet be equipped with the self-confidence and cultural savvy to engage in interfaith dialogue on a sophisticated level. Additionally, as interfaith dialogue is a longer-standing and more accepted practice among Christians, they receive more funding for initiating and participating in interfaith dialogue than Muslims do.\textsuperscript{362}

Lastly, Christians participants and Muslim participants may be unequal in terms of their knowledge of the religions in question. Christians have a larger pool of dialogue candidates to choose from and may be able to send representatives who are experts not only in Christianity but also in Islam. Thus the Christian dialogue participants may be better educated about Islam than their Muslim counterparts are about Christianity. In some embarrassing instances, Christian dialogue participants may even be scholars of religion and possess more academic knowledge of Islamic theology or history than the Muslim participants in question.

Fortunately, the question of unequal education can be immediately addressed with the methodologies I will suggest below. As will be seen, Argon's methodology will help dialogue participants carefully plan their efforts so that the embarrassing situation of having academic experts dialoguing with laypeople can be avoided. Additionally, educating dialogue group participants about both Christianity and Islam via religiolological analysis will help put participants on an equal playing field.

\textit{Muslims Lack a "Conceptual Framework"}

Because Muslims are still relative newcomers to the American interfaith dialogue scene and are still participants more often than they are initiators, they lack formal, official guidelines for conducting interfaith initiatives. If a formal agenda for dialogue is to be set in place, Muslims often rely on Christians to do so. Imam Ahmed Chebli states, "Up to today we do not have any by-laws or constitution or guidelines for dialogue. We just need to come together and decide how to talk about this or that. We need to have a structured format and know where we are going."

\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., 177-178.
Imam Ibrahim Negm urges American Muslims to "lay the foundations of dialogue as a discipline -- so that emotions don't take over. We need more intellectual work on the how of it." Muslim Students Association (MSA) President Altaf Husein identifies a potential danger of this lack of structure, worrying that "young Muslims will get discouraged with the dialogue because it is often too free-wheeling with no rules or guidelines."363

In expressing their concerns with this lack of agreed-upon, formal methodologies which Muslims can implement, these community leaders identify the problems which the new methodologies to be proposed below will attempt to address. Implementing Argon's methodology will help Muslims carefully structure dialogue, and emotional intelligence training will help dialogue participants manage the emotions which can arise when engaging in serious discussion of religion in a public space.

Conflicting Agendas

Another challenge to successful interfaith dialogue between Muslims and Christians is that the two groups often have different goals and interests. As mentioned above, many Christians are interested in theological dialogue, while this can be less interesting to Muslims. Since Christians often set the interfaith dialogue agenda and choose the topic, they might inadvertently couch the discussion in Christian terms, choosing topics like salvation or grace which do not have a ready equivalent in Islam. Muslims would sometimes rather talk about current events (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Christians in turn find current events discussions to be too controversial to be appropriate conversational topics for interfaith dialogue. They may have a point; discussions can quickly become uncomfortable when Muslims and Christians do not agree on American foreign policy and/or cannot understand the opposing perspective.364

One way to address the issue of conflicting agendas is to anticipate the problem and carefully plan dialogue activities in a way that will make them relevant to the concerns of both Christian and Muslim participants; as will be seen below, implementing Argon's methodology is

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364 Ibid., 179.
one way to do this. Additionally, education via religiological analysis will help Christian and Muslim dialogue organizers choose future topics which are relevant to both sides, and emotional intelligence training will enable dialogue participants to cope when controversial subjects arise.

**Differing Ideologies**

Differing ideological perspectives among Muslims and Christians can also pose an obstacle to successful dialogue efforts. Dialogue initiators are often Protestants who are significantly more liberal, "both socially and theologically," than their Muslim counterparts. Thus, when delicate issues such as homosexuality or abortion arise, there can be uncomfortable disagreements. In regard to this issue, Plemon Al-Amin suggests that Muslims need to have sufficient education about Islam to understand the "Quranic insistence that all people are free to practice what they believe in their own way." Muslims should be respectful and flexible, without compromising their beliefs, when entering into discussions with people with whom they are not in complete agreement on certain social issues.

Al-Amin's suggestion is in accord with the methodologies which will be suggested below. Dialogue should be carefully planned so that it can be assessed whether divisive issues are appropriate for the current group, and how disagreements will be handled. Dialogue members should have sufficient knowledge about both Christianity and Islam to realize the diversity and tolerance inherent within their own traditions. Lastly, emotional intelligence training will help participants cope with the difficult emotions which controversial topics can evoke.

**Underrepresentation**

A final challenge to effective Muslim participation in interfaith dialogue is that certain subgroups within the American Muslim community are underrepresented in dialogue efforts. Although American Muslim dialogue participants come from a variety of backgrounds, immigrant South Asian Sunni Muslims tend to dominate the interfaith dialogue scene. While this is understandable in part, as South Asian immigrants make up the largest percentage of immigrant Muslims in America, those Muslims who come from other backgrounds can view their

\[365\] Ibid., 180.
dominance as a problem. For example, Arab American Muslim sometimes feel that the "perspectives of Indians and Pakistanis may not reflect their own or those of many other Muslims in the United States."

Aside from South Asians, African Americans make up the largest part of the American Muslim community (30-35%). African American Muslims do play an active role in interfaith dialogue. For example, Imam Warith Deen Mohammed, leader of the American Muslim Society, has successfully encouraged African American Muslims to connect with Christian family members. However, many African American Muslims feel that they are not taken seriously as dialogue participants by either Muslims or non-Muslims, who want to invite "authentic" (read: immigrant) Muslims to their events. Smith explains that "bluntly, [African American Muslims] feel caught among the triple pressures of American racism, lack of appreciation by immigrant brothers and sisters, and American anti-Muslim attitudes."  

Similarly, Shi‘ī feel that their theological perspective and substantial number in the American Muslim population is not adequately represented by their peripheral presence in interfaith dialogue initiatives. When Shi‘ī are invited to interfaith dialogue initiatives, there may be only one Shi‘ah alongside several Sunni Muslims.

Like Shi‘ī, Muslim women in general are very underrepresented in dialogue initiatives. This may not be deliberate exclusion on the part of their Muslim brothers; rather, because of the gender segregated way that mosques are structured, women are often less visible in the community and thus dialogue organizers may not personally know them or think to invite them. Additionally, male dialogue organizers often want to talk about theological or doctrinal matters, while these issues are of less interest to many women, who generally prefer problem-solving activities rather than abstract discussions.  

366 Ibid.  
367 Ibid., 183.  
368 Ibid., 180.  
369 Ibid., 183-184.
Young Muslims are also not as active in interfaith dialogue efforts as they should be.\footnote{370} This concerns Muslim community leaders who realize that it is vital to involve the next generations in their efforts to build a strong relationship with Christians. One reason for the lack of youth participation is that they are not interested in the same issues as the adults who are organizing dialogue activities, so it is not feasible to simply add them to the already existing mix of participants. However, this problem can be addressed by planning youth-focused events via Argon's methodology, to be discussed below. These events should be centered around the types of activities which young Muslims and their Christian counterparts are interested in; these are often community service projects.\footnote{371} Many youth feel that the time for talk has passed, and "it is now time for people of faith to join together in doing community work such as fighting drugs, delinquency, and other social ills."\footnote{372}

As with the issues of isolationism and proselytization, the problem of underrepresentation is complex and cannot be fully addressed simply by altering existing interfaith dialogue methodologies. However, if Muslims are aware of the lack of participation by certain members of their community, they can carefully plan their dialogue efforts to deliberately include these brothers and sisters who are often overlooked. As will be seen, Argon's methodology will assist Muslims in facilitating this deliberate inclusiveness.

Additionally, hosting intra-Muslim dialogue is one way for Muslims to foster community cohesion; this is important because American Muslims can then draw upon the strengths of their diversity in their collective fight against Islamophobia. For example, indigenous converts to Islam may not yet have much formal Islamic education, but they can impart their knowledge of American culture and Christianity. Shi‘ī who have immigrated

\footnote{370} Some promising youth interfaith dialogue organizations do exist, however. One important example is Eboo Patel's Interfaith Youth Corps, founded in 2003. The IFYC focuses on service-based projects, reflecting Smith's assertion that action-based dialogue is popular with young dialogue participants. See "About IFYC", Interfaith Youth Core, http://www.ifyc.org/ (accessed July 26, 2012).

\footnote{371} Ibid., 185.

\footnote{372} Ibid., 172.
from Sunni-majority countries might have wisdom to impart about successfully navigating life as a religious minority, just as some African Americans could teach techniques which were successful during the civil rights movement. Women may be successful in reaching out to their Christian sisters who are interested in similar dialogue topics, as may young Muslims be able to build friendships with Christians their own age.

**Improving Current Interfaith Dialogue Methodologies**

The following section, based upon the work of Kemal Argon, will illustrate how Muslims can address some of the above problems by carefully and deliberately planning and implementing their interfaith dialogue endeavors. In his article, Argon does not propose new interfaith dialogue methodologies to replace those outlined by Smith; rather, he proposes a way of ensuring that whichever methodology is ultimately undertaken will be carefully selected and implemented. Argon perceives that although Muslim interfaith dialogue participants have good intentions, they often choose a methodology or topic at random in response to a powerfully felt but vaguely conceived desire to improve relations with Christians or combat anti-Muslim sentiment. Argon's model ensures that the interfaith dialogue methodology chosen is in response to a well-defined problem and constitutes a viable and appropriate solution.

Simply put, Argon's method for planning and implementing interfaith dialogue activities is based upon an article by Frank Gilmore, which outlines a simple set of six steps designed to focus the planning, implementation, and evaluation of small business endeavors. Argon adapts Gilmore's model to the needs of Muslim groups who are planning projects, including interfaith and intra-Muslim dialogue. As will be seen below, Argon recommends that it be used in conjunction with the dialogue categories which Smith identifies.

A strength of Argon's methodology is that it incorporates both traditional Islamic and contemporary Western scholarship. Muslims participating in interfaith dialogue must present

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Islam in a way that is credible and authentic, but it must do it in a way that is inclusive, effective, and responsive to the contemporary needs of American Muslims and non-Muslims. The traditional Islamic component requires that Muslim dialogue participants be culturally savvy and knowledgable about Islam, which the cognitive methodology of religiological analysis will help to ensure. However, Argon's adaptation of Gilmore is the necessary contemporary component which will enable Muslims to convey this credible knowledge in a way that is appropriate and effective.376

Another selling point of Argon's methodology is that it is appropriate for small Muslim organizations. Although interfaith dialogue happens at a variety of levels, from national to local, small, grassroots interfaith dialogue efforts have been most prevalent post-9/11, and it is for these small, local groups (such as mosques or student organizations) that Argon's methodology, as presented here, is primarily intended. Argon points out that small Muslim groups share fundamental similarities to small businesses. Both have limited and often insufficient time, financial resources, and manpower, and a great deal of demands already being made upon them. It is often not feasible for them to undertake complex or expensive strategies for achieving their goals. Argon's strategy, then, is necessarily simple and inexpensive enough to be viable; it enables Muslim interfaith dialogue planners to efficiently utilize small groups of interested volunteers.377

Specifically, Argon's methodology is meant for Muslims living in a minority situation (which, for the purposes of the current work, means American Muslims), including "leaders, scholars, and activists" who are "responsible for formulating and choosing strategy" (in this instance for interfaith and intra-Muslim dialogue activities). It can either be used by leaders of a centralized Islamic organization or a smaller, independent group (i.e., strategies chosen can either be applied in a centralized way or independently). Ideally, these leaders will include scholars in the community, for reasons which will be explained below. From there, these Muslim community leaders form small groups of volunteers or who are interested in implementing and participating

376 Ibid., 356, 358.
377 Ibid.
in interfaith dialogue activities.\textsuperscript{378} The community in question could be, for example, a community's masjid or a university's Muslim Students Association.

Ideally, these community leaders will include scholars; this is important for both Argon's methodology and the affective and cognitive methodologies which will be proposed below. In the case of Argon's methodology, it is essential to involve scholars from the local Muslim community who are "intellectually and spiritually equipped" to undertake interfaith dialogue, as the process of planning and undertaking interfaith dialogue involves "ongoing scholarly review and strategic integration of religious doctrines" from both traditional and modern Muslim scholarship so that the strengths of both classical and contemporary scholarship can be utilized. Argon states that it is "critical that the Islamic scholarship must be credible" in both interfaith and intra-Muslim dialogue, "representing well and convincingly the positions" of Muslim participants. And, as indicated above, they must also have a solid understanding of "contemporary society and politics."\textsuperscript{379} It is also important that the Muslim community leaders who are planning interfaith dialogue have a solid understanding of the demographics and dynamics of their local community; this will be taken into careful consideration below in step one. Argon's six steps are as follows: recording the current strategy; identifying problems, needs, and concerns; identifying the components of problems, needs, and concerns; formulating solutions and alternatives; evaluating strategic project alternatives; and choosing and applying a new strategy.

\textit{Step One: Recording the Current Strategy}

The first step in Gilmore's six-step process, as presented by Argon, is to "record the current strategy;" community leaders should review "received traditional scholarship" relevant to Muslim-Christian interfaith dialogue, particularly sources utilized by their particular community. Existing strategies can vary depending on "geographic location and origin, intellectual history,

\textsuperscript{378} Ibid., 355, 358, 365.

\textsuperscript{379} Ibid., 357.
and unique individual historicity." For example, the African American Muslim community has its own "history and objectives," separate from those of immigrant Muslims.  

The first step also entails assessing the community's current needs and resources. Dialogue planners must keep in mind that their group exists in relation to an already existing community of Muslims and non-Muslims, and whichever project is ultimately undertaken must be appropriate for and relevant to that particular group. They should also have a realistic expectation of what they can expect from their current Muslim and non-Muslim community in terms of time, manpower, and money. Dialogue planners should consider the following questions regarding both the Muslim and Christian communities with which they will be interacting:

1. What is the community's current organizational goals and purposes?
2. What strategy, if any, does it currently employ for interfaith dialogue?
3. What is the present level of scholarship of community members and leaders?
4. What is the community's current organizational culture and history?

Step Two: Identifying Problems, Needs, and Concerns

In step two, the Muslim community leaders should identify which specific obstacles impede their particular community's interfaith dialogue efforts. Common problems which impede interfaith dialogue efforts include a lack of scholars, intellectuals, or strategists who can lead the community; limited money and manpower; and a lack of unity within the Muslim community.

Step Three: Identifying the Components of Problems, Needs, and Concerns

Step three requires deeper inquiry to fully understand the components of the problems the dialogue planners outlined during step two. The expertise of Islamic scholars who can access both traditional and contemporary scholarship is particularly necessary here. It is also wise for the interfaith dialogue planners to draw upon the expertise of those in the Muslim community who have attempted interfaith dialogue or similar projects in the past; they likely have a detailed idea of what challenges the community faces. Argon suggests that an effective way to access these

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380 Ibid., 358.
381 Ibid., 356-357.
382 Ibid., 361.
383 Ibid., 359.
expert opinions is to host a forum for community leaders in which they can "exchange their observations and reflections formed in experience."\(^{384}\)

*Step Four: Formulating Solutions and Alternatives*

After analyzing obstacles, the group leaders should brainstorm ideas for projects which respond to the real "needs, wants, and hopes" of the community. This necessitates utilizing the accurate understanding of the needs and resources of the existing Muslim and non-Muslim community which was formed during step one. At this point, Argon suggests that rather than attempting to create a project from scratch, the group leaders should review Smith's dialogue types and determine which is the most appropriate; Argon affirms that all of Smith's dialogue types are feasible for small, local groups to implement (with the exception of "Confrontation/Debate", which should be avoided by everyone), although there is no one dialogue type which fits all groups and situations. As indicated in the discussion of the dialogue types above, some of the dialogue types are better for elite groups, while others require less knowledge and training.\(^{385}\) The group should also determine how and to what degree to incorporate the cognitive and affective methodologies which will be described below. At this point, the group should customize the dialogue type which they have chosen, then plan and implement it carefully, keeping the needs, resources and limitations of the community in mind.

One difficulty to this approach which Argon does not address is that Smith's descriptions of the dialogue types is rather general and does not include detailed examples of specific projects which have been implemented; thus interfaith dialogue groups may have trouble envisioning how to carry these types of dialogue out. To counter this difficulty, I would suggest that a nationally-recognized Muslim organization with a heavily-trafficked website, such as the Council for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) or the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) create an online interfaith dialogue activity portfolio, adding the portfolio to its current website. Muslim organizations across the United States would then contribute real-life examples of projects which

\(^{384}\) Ibid., 359-360.

\(^{385}\) Ibid., 360-362.
they implemented (including how they incorporated the cognitive and affective dimensions to be discussed below) and how successful they were, along with a description of their community and any other relevant wisdom which they would like to make available to other Muslims who are undertaking interfaith dialogue efforts. The examples would be organized according to Smith's dialogue types, enabling interfaith dialogue groups to get a vivid idea of which types of projects exist and what might be appropriate for and successful in their own community, based on the endeavors of similar groups. This would be a low cost way to make Muslims aware of the range of options which exist for interfaith dialogue and to create added interest in Muslim-Christian and intra-Muslim dialogue.

*Step Five: Evaluating Strategic Project Alternatives*

Step five entails conducting a regular, ongoing evaluation of the interfaith dialogue methodology which the group has implemented. The dialogue group leaders should take care that the project which they are implementing is still necessary, interesting, and relevant to the community. Additionally, they should evaluate, on an ongoing basis, that the project is appropriate for the current intellectual and spiritual level of the community. Because of the affective and cognitive methodologies which the group should include in their dialogue initiatives, the case may be that the group's level of scholarship and level of friendship with the Christian community increases to the point that a more ambitious project is now possible. Lastly, interfaith dialogue group leaders should determine that the project is still appropriate for the size of the community. Again, this might be a positive change: if the group increases in size, it might be able to expand its efforts outward.386

Step five cannot be undertaken haphazardly, but rather, the dialogue group leaders will need a system of qualitative and quantitative evaluation to ensure that the project is achieving its desired outcome. Argon recommends that the project be evaluated on the basis of Fred R. David's

386 Ibid., 360-361.
understanding of strategic management; thus interfaith dialogue group leaders should learn and implement strategic management principles.\textsuperscript{387}

Essentially, strategic management includes a mix of both informal and formal strategic controls, or tools for evaluation. Examples of informal strategic controls include phone conversations, emails, and face-to-face meetings among dialogue organizers. Formal strategic controls entail "written doctrines and guidelines and budgets; the doctrines and guidelines should, according to Argon, incorporate Islamic scholarship."\textsuperscript{388} Each dialogue group will likely have its own opinion of what are proper objectives and outcomes, based on the teachings of its own respected scholars, but Argon offers examples of well-respected scholars' opinions which might be incorporated into groups' formal strategic controls. Abdul Hakim Murad of Great Britain "provides one example of a qualitative standard and scope for assessment of results," echoing some of the opinions of interfaith dialogue leaders captured by Smith. Murad warns against both "Salafist and modernist agendas." He states that "the new agenda needed by American communities [for interfaith dialogue] need not end up in Islamic liberalism as this would lead to an attenuation of faith, and its resources for dealing with extremism are limited." Rather, "the right approach is to return to the spirit of the [Islamic] tradition and quarry it for resources enabling a capacity for courteous conviviality."\textsuperscript{389}

\textit{Step Six: Choosing and Applying a New Strategy}

Step six essentially entails repeating steps one through four if it is determined in step five that a new strategy is needed. It is likely that projects will need to be evaluated and altered on an ongoing basis to meet the changing needs and abilities of the community it serves. Throughout the process, it is important that dialogue leaders are tenacious in following through until they are


\textsuperscript{389} Argon 365; Abdul Hakim Murad, " Tradition or Extradition? The Threat to Muslim Americans" in \textit{The Empire and the Crescent: Global Implications for a New American Century}, ed. Aftab Ahmad Malik (Bristol, England: Amal Press, 2003), 142-155.
successful in achieving their aim of combatting Islamophobia in their community, and do not let their project become stagnant.

**Part Two: The Cognitive Dimension**

**Introduction**

An important assumption made by both Argon and the author of the present work is that interfaith dialogue will be more effective if participants have a solid understanding of both their own religion and that of their dialogue partner. In most cases, it is likely that dialogue participants will need to learn more about one or both of the religions in question. For this purpose, any effective cognitive method of study, led by a qualified teacher, would suffice. However, I would like to suggest incorporating a specific method, envisioned and currently utilized by Alan Godlas in his religion courses at the University of Georgia: religiological analysis. As I also utilize religiological analysis into my own classroom, the understanding of religiology presented here will be my own, and the activities suggested will be based on projects that have worked well for my own undergraduate religion students.

The following section includes the basic information about religiology that dialogue group leaders will need to master in order to teach religiological analysis to group members and utilize it for activities. It first includes a discussion of the advantages of using religiology to frame cognitive learning; then, an overview of what religiology is, including tips for teaching it based on my own classroom experiences; after that, a selection outlining dialogue activities which incorporate religiological analysis. Lastly, the limits of religiological analysis will be touched upon, including which types of dialogue groups it is best suited for.

**Religiological Analysis: An Overview**

Religiological analysis consists of a set of six questions which one can ask of any complete worldview (including religions) in order to develop either a basic or detailed, thematic understanding of that worldview. Religiological analysis is a worldview-analytical method of study, highlighting beliefs rather than actions, in a way that allows the beliefs to be compared with equivalent ones within other religions. The concept of religiology was first developed by
Alan Godlas at the University of Georgia in 1995 and improved upon on an ongoing basis via using it as a teaching tool for the students in his undergraduate and graduate-level religion courses.

The following presentation of religiology is slightly modified from Godlas' original conception to reflect my understanding and how I have utilized it in my own introductory religion courses (Religion 1001: An Introduction to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) at the University of Georgia from 2010-2012. Thus the following methodology can be geared toward interfaith dialogue participants who do not possess a great deal of academic knowledge about Christianity and Islam, as this demographic is most analogous to the students in my undergraduate courses. As will be illustrated, however it is certainly possible to adapt religiological analysis to fit more advanced dialogue participants.

Religiological analysis is defined as a systematic, coherent, and relatively objective method for understanding and analyzing worldviews which consist of networks of human spheres of belief: particular epistemologies, ontologies, anthropologies, psychologies, teleologies, and methodologies. The term "worldviews" is used in the definition because religiology can be applied not only to the world's major religions, but also other any other worldviews from Marxism to secular humanism to any person's individual viewpoint, someone who does not identify with any particular religion. As the worldviews that the present work is most concerned with are Christianity and Islam, the examples provided below to elucidate each category will be from those particular faiths.

Religiology is considered "coherent" in that when viewed collectively, its six categories form a logical, holistic picture of the fundamental aspects of a religion. For interfaith dialogue

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390 I originally learned the theory and methodology of religiological analysis via Dr. Godlas' lectures at the University of Georgia in the following courses: Islamic Thought in the Caliphal Age (August-December 2009); Introduction to the World's Religions (January-May 2010 and January-May 2012); Islam and its World (January-May 2011); Islamic Literature (January-May 2011). I owe its integration into my teaching methodology to working as an assistant for Dr. Godlas from January-May 2010 and for Dr. Kenneth Honerkamp from August-December 2009; Dr. Honerkamp is a colleague of Dr. Godlas' and incorporates religiological analysis into his own courses.
participants, conducting a religiological analysis of their own religion will help them to become more secure in the coherency of their own beliefs. Alternatively, it could help them to realize that their own worldview is actually not coherent and that they should take steps to correct this. One reason for a worldview being incoherent is that it is a actually a composite of two or more different worldviews, such as modernism and a traditional religious worldview. This can be amended either via learning more about one's own faith and adjusting one's understanding accordingly, or adopting a different faith which feels more coherent.

Religiological analysis is considered systematic in that it uses the same set of questions as a system for examining equivalent aspects of religions. For example, it helps dialogue participants to compare what Christianity and Islam each teach about God, rather than looking at both religions separately from a historical or theological perspective only, leaving students on their own to try to make sense of how particular aspects of the religions they are studying correlate. Religiology provides much-needed structure for dialogue participants' cognitive learning and helps them to feel less overwhelmed by the daunting task of learning about "Christianity" or "Islam." Ultimately, mastering religiological analysis will help dialogue participants deal with information in the modern world; they will have a system in place which they can utilize when encountering information about Christianity, Islam, and other religions outside the relatively safe environment of their dialogue group.

Another advantage of religiological analysis is that it can be used in a relatively objective way. It is commonly understood in Western thought that one must put one's bias aside entirely when in an environment such as a classroom or dialogue group where alternate perspectives must be considered. However, it is not possible, or even desirable, for humans to achieve complete objectivity on a long-term basis. What is called bias is, perhaps, simply one's entire worldview. People are always influenced to some extent by factors such as their cultural, geographical, and temporal contexts and are not machines which can operate independently of these environmental influences. One might be able to put aside one's bias on a short-term basis, but it is unlikely that this can be sustained during a long-term encounter with another viewpoint, such as during an
ongoing interfaith dialogue group. Participants' feelings will eventually emerge, and if not properly channeled, this might happen in an inappropriate way (e.g., passive aggressiveness, exploding, or dropping out of the dialogue group in frustration).

Thus, the best that can be hoped for is that individuals become aware of their bias and circumvent it to the extent possible, moving along the spectrum toward objectivity. It is necessary that dialogue group participants have a methodology which allows them to acknowledge and retain their "biases," or self-identity and worldview. Religiological analysis is one such tool which allows dialogue participants to do this. It asks a neutral set of questions to each religion independently, which helps dialogue participants to avoid the pitfalls of interpreting one religion on the basis of their own religion's terminology or value system. Because participants have the opportunity to perform a religiological analysis of their own worldview as well, they can better understand and be aware of their own bias so that it does not excessively impede their objectivity.

Similar to religiology's relative objectivity being important, the hermeneutical component of religiology is also highly significant. When used religiological analysis is used in a hermeneutical manner (in the sense of Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics) involving both self-analysis as well as investigating the beliefs of the religious other, religiology helps dialogue participants to make sense of their own religious beliefs and also to perceive how the beliefs of the religious other make sense in their own right. If a religiological analysis of only one faith is conducted, the picture provided is incomplete because there is nothing to compare that religion to. If dialogue participants only understand their own religion, they may be inappropriately defensive because the habit of the ego is to respond to different worldviews by pushing them away, thus perpetuating the process of "othering" which interfaith dialogue seeks to put an end to.

The second part of the definition of religiological analysis, that "religiology is the study of networks of human spheres of belief," acknowledges that people possess beliefs on different subjects, such as God or the afterlife, and that each of these categories of belief constitutes its own distinct "sphere." All of these spheres together form a network, which is an individual's
complete worldview or religion. The spheres overlap and influence one another (e.g., one's beliefs about the nature of God impact one's beliefs about what the afterlife is like).

When initially teaching religiological analysis, dialogue group leaders should keep in mind that participants can potentially be overwhelmed by the length of the definition of religiological analysis, as well as the specialized terminology (terms such as epistemology and eschatology), which they have likely never encountered. Thus, before providing the formal definition of religiology and delving into an explanation, dialogue leaders should build participants' self-confidence by illustrating that religiology simply organizes already-familiar concepts in a logical fashion. The lesson can begin with an interactive activity in which the dialogue group leader poses this idea to participants: "One reason why people adhere to any religion is because it answers life's big questions. What are some of the questions which people want their religion to answer?" Participants will likely give responses such as, "Is there a God? Is there life after death? What is the meaning of life? How can I be a good person? How do I know what is true?"

Then, when the dialogue group leader provides a definition of religiology, he/she can reassure the group that the specialized terms are just names for the concepts already discussed. For example, "What is the meaning of life?" corresponds to teleology. Next, the dialogue group leader should move on to a detailed explanation of each category.

Epistemology

Epistemology catalogs a religion's responses to the question "What are the valid sources of knowledge?" Although it is easiest to give dialogue participants only one question to remember, epistemology also encompasses these questions: "What can we use to interpret and better understand that knowledge? What is the hierarchy of validity among acceptable sources of knowledge?"
For Christianity, examples of sources include the Christian Bible or creeds derived from ecumenical councils. Interpretive tools could include the commentary in a "study Bible." The hierarchy of epistemological sources differs among Christian denominations and individual believers; one possibility is that the Christian Bible is at the top of the hierarchy, followed by religious leaders, then finally reason and personal experience. Samples of Islamic epistemological sources include the Qur'an and hadīth. Interpretive tools include tafsīr (Qur'anic commentary) or fatwah (formal legal opinions) issued by religious leaders. In the epistemological hierarchy, Muslims always put the Qur'an at the top, followed by other sources such as the hadīth, 'ijmā', qiyās, etc. Hadīth are ranked according to multiple criteria related to their probable authenticity.

Dialogue group leaders should include an interactive component in the reliiology lecture so that participants feel engaged and interested. Participants can be asked to give examples of answers to the questions from Christianity, Islam, or based on their own personal viewpoints. It is important to remember that goals of interfaith dialogue include to foster a supportive environment for participants to engage in honest self-exploration and to illustrate the diversity within Christianity and Islam, dispelling stereotypes about believers. Thus all answers should be viewed as valid as long as they are appropriate for the category; participants should not feel compelled to give "orthodox" responses to the questions.

When discussing which sources are considered valid and how they are arranged hierarchically, it is useful to remind participants that secular sources may also be included. Most people trust many sources to provide valid knowledge, both religious and secular. However, religious sources may be placed higher in the hierarchy than secular ones. Lastly, because it is impossible to list every single epistemological source for a particular person or religion, it is suitable to name major sources utilized and to indicate genres. For example, it is not necessary for a participant to name every peer-reviewed article he has ever read, but rather to state that in general, he has high regard for peer-reviewed journals as sources of knowledge.

391 Although providing a complete reliiological analysis of each of the major divisions within Christianity and Islam is beyond the scope of the current work, see the appendix for more comprehensive reliiological charts for Christianity and Islam.
Ontology

Ontology organizes a religion's responses to the question, "What is the nature of reality?"

For both Christianity and Islam, the answer to this question is simple but profound: God is the ultimate reality. The question posed by ontology strips away the facade of worldly life and seeks to identify its underlying, true nature. Christians and Muslims both put God at the heart of reality because for them, God is the creator and sustaining force behind the entire universe. In relation to Him, everything else is less real in that it is finite and transient.

Although the degrees of reality could certainly constitute a detailed discussion, it is best to provide a brief, general answer to the ontology question, unless the group is one which is deeply interested in this type of discussion. For a novice group, it is best to instead elaborate upon the nature of reality via ontology's subcategories, which are listed below.

Ontology Subcategory I: Theology

Ontology's first subcategory, theology, organizes a religion's responses to the question, "What is the nature of God?" Christianity, for example, generally replies that God is one Trinitarian being: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For Muslims, God is one and has no son; he is instead known via his ninety-nine descriptive names, such as the Wise, the King, or the Creator.

This question utilizes the terminology "God" because it is easy to understand and will be appropriate for Christian and Muslim interfaith dialogue participants, as both their faiths include a central deity. However, the question could also be phrased in an alternate manner so that it is appropriate for other worldviews, including those which do not profess the existence of a god. (For example, "Do you believe in a higher power and if so, what is the nature of that higher power?") Regardless of how the question is phrased, every dialogue participant has an answer to this question, even if is simply to state that a higher power does not exist and to explain his/her beliefs as to why.

As a potential discussion topic, it can be informative to ask Christians to elaborate on their personal understanding of the Trinity. Because the Trinity can be a difficult topic for
Christians to satisfactorily explain and for Muslims to understand, listening to a range of explanations from Christian participants can be useful for dialogue participants of both faiths.

**Ontology Subcategory II: Cosmology**

Cosmology is concerned with the question "What is the nature of the universe?" To help dialogue participants consider the different facets of their answer, they can be asked to think of places and beings in the universe, as well as whether there is a supernatural as well as a material component to the universe. Christianity and Islam have similar responses to this question, including the current material universe, Heaven, and Hell as places. Beings include God, angels, demons (or *jinn*), Satan (or Iblīs), and humans. In general terms, the current, profane world is considered by members of both faiths to be transient and ultimately less important than the supernatural, eternal component of existence.

**Ontology Subcategory III: Cosmogony**

Cosmogony catalogs responses to the question, "What is the nature of the beginning of the universe?" both Christianity and Islam answer this question in the form of the accounts of God's act of creation found in their respective sacred texts. When teaching cosmogony, it is useful for dialogue group leaders to take into consideration that many people, even religious believers, incorporate modern scientific principles into their answer to this question, in the form of concepts such as the Big Bang or evolution. Some feel that these modern scientific principles undermine traditional creation accounts, while others feel that the scientific and religious accounts can be harmonized. For a dialogue group which can handle this somewhat delicate and controversial topic, science and creation would make for a substantial discussion. Another relevant discussion topic for the group to engage in is the notion of original sin, as the Islamic and Christian creation stories are similar but differ on this one vital point.

**Ontology Subcategory IV: Eschatology**

Eschatology groups answers to the question, "What is the nature of the end times up to and including the afterlife?" Although this question is primarily concerned with the end of the universe in its entirety or the apocalyptic end of the current era, it also includes beliefs about what
happens to individual people when they die. (For example, do they retain their consciousness? Do they exist in an intermediary stage prior to the apocalypse?) For Christianity, answers to this question include a discussion of the Last Days (including key figures such as the Antichrist and the Second Coming of Jesus), Judgment day, Heaven, Hell, and, for Roman Catholicism, Purgatory. The basic aspects of Islam's eschatology are similar, but an additional aspect which Muslims might describe is the time a person spends in his/her individual grave before Judgment Day. Interesting discussion topics for this question would include Muslims' and Christians' respective beliefs about the Antichrist (Al-Dajjāl) and the role of Jesus (ʾĪsā) in the religions' respective eschatological accounts.

**Anthropology**

Anthropology organizes a worldview's answers to the question "What are human nature and identity?" When providing an overview of Christianity and Islam's anthropological beliefs, it is easiest to break down the question into the two subcategories below. It is also useful to note for dialogue participants that this philosophical conception of anthropology is distinct from the way in which the term "anthropology" is typically used as a social science discipline.

**Anthropology Subcategory I: Nature**

Christian views on human nature include the beliefs that humans are beloved children of God, that they are created in the image of God, and that they are inherently sinful. For Muslims, one important focal point is that humans have free will, including the capacity to submit to God or sin. Additionally, humans are inherently monotheistic, but may lose touch with this inherent component of their being (ghaflah).

**Anthropology Subcategory II: Identity**

The second subcategory of anthropology, human identity, seeks to catalog the important identities which people possess. Identities can include separate labels for members and non-members of a religious community, and special classes of people within a religion. Human identities may also include religious and non-religious identities, including nationalities, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, profession, age group, etc.
Christians may define insiders and outsiders in terms of saved/not saved, or classify people as members of the Visible or Invisible Church. Christian identities include denominational affiliations; special classes of Christians include saints, martyrs, monks/nuns, prophets, religious leaders (priests, bishops, etc.), and the Virgin Mary. For Islam, identities delineating believers from non-believers include ahl al-kitāb (People of the Book, including Jews, Christians, and sometimes members of other faiths), mu'minūn (believers), kafirūn (disbelievers), mushrikūn (idolaters), and ḥunafā' (sing.: ḥanīf; generic monotheists). Special classes of religious people include 'awliyā' (sing.: wālī, or "friends" of God, sometimes rendered as saints), religious leaders such as shuyūkh (sing.: shaykh), and prophets ('anbiyā' or rasūl).

**Psychology**

Psychology organizes answers to the question, "What is the nature of human consciousness?" Typically, this is the most difficult questions for new students of religiology to comprehend, so dialogue leaders should not be overly concerned if participants find it challenging at first. As with anthropology, the easiest manner of explaining and organizing the information is to break psychology into two subcategories.

**Psychology Subcategory I: Faculties**

Faculties of consciousness can best be understood as the various mental powers that humans possess. Traditional Christian and Islamic psychology includes the mind, heart, and soul as faculties of consciousness. The conscience may be conceived of as a subcomponent of one of these or as a separate faculty. A potential discussion question for this category is to ask group members of both faiths to discuss how they conceive of these concepts. As group members' understandings of the heart, mind, and soul will likely to be some degree modern concepts, answers provided by Christians and Muslims may be similar.

**Psychology Subcategory II: States**

States of consciousness include both emotional and spiritual states. For Christianity, states before accepting Jesus as one's Lord and savior can include the fear of death, guilt for

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sinning, and the burden of one's own ego. After accepting Jesus, a Christian may feel love for God and fellow man, more freedom from the above restraints, and, as a result, joy.\textsuperscript{393} For Muslims, important spiritual states to cultivate include God-consciousness (\textit{taqwa}) and \textit{islām} (actively surrendering to God's will). Christians and Muslims both seek to cultivate similar states in prayer, including gratitude, thanksgiving, and supplication. For interested groups, one way to facilitate a discussion of states of consciousness may be through the emotion journals, which are discussed below in the selection on emotional intelligence.

\textit{Teleology}

Teleology organizes a religion's responses to the question, "What is the purpose of human life?" Christian responses include to attain salvation and go to Heaven and avoid Hell; to love, serve, and know God; and to serve mankind. For Islam, the central purpose of life is to live in perfect obedience to God's will. This also entails to enter Heaven and avoid Hell, to know God, and to love God. For Sufis, a related purpose is to experience God in this life, before entering the afterlife.

Generally teleology is one of the easier categories for dialogue participants to understand, but some participants may be dismayed to discover that they do not have a well-thought out personal teleology. Prompting serious thought about this question is arguably one of the benefits of engaging in interfaith dialogue in the first place. A question to ask dialogue participants for discussion or personal reflection is, "If you do not have a definitive answer to this question, why do you believe that is? Do you believe that it is important to search for an answer to this question? If so, how can participating in this dialogue group facilitate your search?"

\textit{Methodology}

Methodology is concerned with the question, "How can the purpose of life be achieved?" Christian responses include accepting Jesus Christ as one's savior, spreading the Gospel message, and participating in group worship and private prayer. For Islam, methodologies include believing

\textsuperscript{393} Smith, \textit{World's Religions}, 332-333.
in Islam's basic articles of faith, performing the five pillars, and memorizing and reciting the Qur'an, to name a few methodological aspects.

Ideally, an individual's methodologies should correspond directly to his teleologies. For example, for a Christian whose purpose in life is to go to heaven after death, the primary way of doing so is to accept the sacrifice of Jesus Christ and, secondarily, to engage in good works. However, for individual practitioners of a religion, there might not be such a neat correlation. It can be a source of personal discomfort or even anguish if the methodology a person acts out does not correspond to his/her professed teleology. For example, if a person strongly believes that his/her purpose in life is to teach others about the Gospel message, but he/she does not do so, this could elicit feelings of guilt. Or, if one believes that it is important to adhere to Islam's basic moral restrictions but drinks alcohol, the same feelings of guilt can arise. To provide a more secular example, if one's purpose in life is to help others by becoming a doctor, but one is forced by financial circumstances to drop out of college, this can be a source of personal anguish. As with teleology, then, serious reflection on one's personal methodology can be one important purpose of engaging in interfaith dialogue.

Incorporating Religiological Analysis into Interfaith Dialogue

As indicated above, religiological analysis is not a complete dialogue methodology in its own right, but rather is the cognitive component in the three-faceted approach to interfaith dialogue which the current work advocates and should be utilized in conjunction with one of the existing behavioral dialogue methodologies outlined by Jane Smith, in addition to the affective methodologies outlined in the next section. As with choosing one of Smith's dialogue types to fit the needs and abilities of the particular dialogue group in question, dialogue group leaders can also apply Argon's methodology in customizing religiological analysis to fit the group.

Part One: Teach Religiological Analysis

First, the interfaith dialogue group leader must teach dialogue group participants the basics of religiological analysis. This includes explaining the definition and categories of
religiological analysis outlined above. The simplest way to impart this information is in a series of lectures, incorporating the discussion questions suggested above.

Part Two: Utilize Religiology to Teach Christianity and Islam

Step two involves actively using religiological analysis to teach dialogue group participants about Christianity and Islam. Whatever the aims and desires of an interfaith dialogue group, it is necessary that members have adequate background knowledge of both religions. However, the amount of time and energy that the dialogue group will spend purely in study of the religions in question (such as doing readings or listening to lectures) will vary based on the dialogue group leaders' assessment of the group via Argon's methodology. If group members have little knowledge about a particular religion and a high level of motivation, it will be both possible and necessary to devote a greater amount of time to study. The time spent in study will also vary depending on which of Smith's methodologies the group utilizes as its behavioral component. A group engaging in theological or ethical discussion may be willing to spend more time in study of the religions in question, while a group engaging in service activities will likely prefer brief lessons, perhaps integrated into group reflection on the spiritual significance of the service activity being undertaken.

The way in which religiology can be incorporated into lessons will also vary depending upon the group's makeup. In general, participants will likely want to engage in active dialogue straight away rather than spending a great deal of time on preliminary lessons about Christianity and Islam. For groups such as these, it may be best to combine the cognitive component (lessons framed via religiological analysis) and behavioral component (active dialogue based on one of Jane Smith's methods) into each meeting. For example, if a dialogue group meets for one hour each week, thirty minutes could be utilized for the cognitive component and thirty for active discussion among group members. Some suggestions for incorporating religiological analysis into dialogue activities, which constitutes a blending of cognitive and behavioral methods in one activity, will be given below.
The question also arises of who should teach which religion to whom. The answer to this question will depend on the resources available to the individual dialogue groups; it may be necessary for one knowledgable person to teach both religions. However, if possible, the group can employ a Christian religious leader to teach Christianity (via religiological analysis) and a Muslim religious leader to teach Islam via the same methodology. Each religious leader should keep in mind that he/she is speaking to a mixed audience and thus should explain the religion in a way that is engaging and accurate but avoids proselytization, as though it were an academic setting.

The dialogue group should also determine in to what extent it will utilize religiological analysis to frame lessons. One possibility is to go through each religiological category one by one and teach relevant concepts. This can be advantageous when the dialogue group will be meeting for a limited period of time (i.e., only for one semester or one year) and wishes to receive a broad, comprehensive overview of each religion. For example, if the week's topic is epistemology, then the Christian and Muslim dialogue leaders would convey information about their sacred texts and other epistemological sources during that time frame. A second option is to teach topics as they are more traditionally organized, such as covering a historical time period like the life of the Prophet Muḥammad, and then applying religiological analysis on an ongoing basis to form a picture of how topics ultimately fit together and compare to equivalent topics in other religions.

*Part Three: Utilize Religiology Activities*

Aside from utilizing religiological analysis to frame lectures about Christianity and Islam, it can be incorporated into various dialogue activities. Suggestions for activities are given below, based on those which I have successfully used in my own classroom and have adapted to be appropriate for interfaith dialogue. Dialogue leaders should keep in mind that they may apply Argon's methodology to determine whether they should select one or more of the following activities, further customize them, or create their own.

1. Self-Religiological Interview: One important activity for dialogue group members to complete is a self-religiological interview, writing down their own answers to religiology's
questions. The best time to conduct this interview is just after teaching the basics of conducting a religiological analysis, as it can be used to evaluate whether group members adequately understand reliogology for later use and will also form the dialogue group participant's basis for comparing the information subsequently received about Christianity and Islam to his/her own worldview. Conducting the self-interview can take some time and concentration, so it is best done as homework outside the dialogue group; the completed interview can be brought to the next meeting.

The self-religiological interview involves honestly answering the religiological questions for one's self, based not on what one's religion teaches, but what is true for one personally (there may, of course, not be a discrepancy between the two). Group members should be made to feel that they are in a safe environment where they can give the open, honest answers which are necessary for sincere dialogue and personal growth. The self-religiological analysis is an important activity for self-discovery; although dialogue participants may consider themselves strong believers, the religiological analysis may be the first time they have systematically considered their own beliefs. As previously discussed, thinking about one's faith in an analytical way can be a confidence booster, allowing the group participant to see how his/her beliefs make sense in their own right. It will also help the group participant to have ready responses when asked what he believes. Another possibility is that the self-interview will help the participant identify areas in his/her belief system about which he/she should learn more in order to feel more confident and comfortable. This is a time for dialogue participant to re-evaluate and possibly reformulate aspects of their beliefs. Challenging one's own beliefs for the purpose of strengthening them may be an uncomfortable prospect, but deep self-reflection is vital in becoming a mature, self-secure believer, regardless of which belief system is ultimately settled upon.

The completed self-interviews can also be used for a group discussion activity. Depending on the dialogue group's size, it may be most comfortable to break down into smaller groups of two to five people to facilitate easier discussion. Dialogue group leaders should, of
course, take care to ensure that there are both Christians and Muslims in each discussion group.

Below are some sample questions which can be used for dialogue:

1. Does everyone in your group understand religiology adequately? Now that you have conducted a religiological analysis of yourself, what new questions do you have for your dialogue group leaders about religiology?
2. Was it easy or difficult to conduct your self-interview? Why? Was this surprising to you?
3. How do you think religiology will be helpful for learning about religion in the context of interfaith dialogue? On the other hand, what are its possible limitations?
4. Discuss your responses to the categories; make sure everyone has a chance to speak before moving on to the next category. Ask questions when you would like your dialogue partners to elaborate upon interesting responses, or when you would like him/her to elaborate on something that you do not understand fully.

2. Outside Interviews: After conducting small group discussions, one option is to bring the entire group back together to discuss highlights from their conversations. One way to do this, which will help participants further understand religiological analysis, is to provide a blank religiology chart for the whole group to see (on a whiteboard, chalkboard, etc.) and have volunteers write down responses under the appropriate category.

After dialogue group participants have a solid grounding in religiological analysis via the introductory lecture and conducting their self-interview, they should be ready to complete a second activity, religiological interviews of others outside the dialogue group. Participants should conduct face-to-face interviews of willing individuals, transcribe or record the interviewees' responses, and then bring written accounts of the interviews to the next dialogue group meeting for use in discussion. One challenge to keep in mind is that interviewees will likely not be familiar with the technical terminology (epistemology, ontology, etc.), so dialogue group participants should phrase the questions in terms that are easy to understand. For example, instead of "What are your epistemological sources?" the question might be phrased as "What sources, such as books or people, do you go to for trustworthy information about Christianity? For other areas of life?"

The dialogue group leader should determine how many interviews should be conducted; anywhere from one to three is reasonable, depending on how much time can be devoted to the project. Additionally, parameters should be set for the type of person to be interviewed. E.G., should interviewees only be Muslim or Christian? Should group members interview someone of
their own faith, or from the other religion? Additionally, interviewees should be allowed to remain anonymous, if desired. For this purpose, pseudonyms and general descriptive terms can be utilized, such as "my relative" instead of "my mother."

Group discussions of these interviews can take on a similar format to that used for the self-interview discussions, including small group conversations and a whole-group discussion afterward. The following are suggested discussion questions:

1. Protecting their anonymity if required, describe the person you chose to interview. Age? Religion? Gender? Nationality? Why did you choose this particular person to interview?
2. Now that you have interviewed another person, what new questions do you have about religiological analysis? What is harder to understand than you initially thought? (Participants can make note of anything they would like the dialogue group leaders to clarify).
3. Was interviewing another person easier or more difficult than conducting your self-interview? Why? What aspects did you find to be easier or more difficult?
4. How did you explain the project and phrase the interview questions so that the interviewees could understand them? Can you share any of these and help your discussion group understand religiological analysis better?
5. What differences do your group members see among interviewees based on age, gender, race, etc? Does this contradict any preconceived notions that you had about these groups of people?
6. As in the self-interview discussion, share answers for each category, giving everyone a chance to speak and asking group members to elaborate on responses when desirable.

3. Reading Journals: A third activity, reading journals, facilitates thoughtful discussion about sacred texts utilizing religiological principles. Dialogue group participants write a short journal entry in response to specific questions about a chosen text, and then have small group discussions about what they wrote. This ensures that dialogue group participants have had a chance to think seriously about the texts before engaging in conversation about them. These reading journals can form a regular part of dialogue group meetings; the frequency with which they are employed will depend on what the group is willing to do and how frequently it meets.

To implement reading journals, the dialogue group leader provides passages from a sacred text (the New Testament, Qur'an, etc.), which are relevant to themes the dialogue group is currently discussing. If the passages in question are controversial or commonly misunderstood, the dialogue group leader should be prepared to supply more information and help group members approach the topic in a respectful manner. Group members select a passage from those available for that week and complete their reading journal in response to the following questions:
1. Summarize the passage or, if it is a short quote, explain it in your own words.
2. What is the significance of the passage to the members of the religion currently being studied, either historically or currently?
3. Why is it interesting to you, or how can you relate to it personally? (Answering this question is a good way for group members to find common ground with and foster appreciation for the other religion.)
4. What religiological categories does it correspond to, and why? (This question encourages critical thinking about the text and is a way to practice religiology on an ongoing basis.)

After completing their reading journals, dialogue group members can again engage in small group discussions. Discussion questions are based upon the questions which group members used to prepare their journals and may include:

1. Which passage did you choose to write about? How did you summarize or interpret it? Do group members agree with your interpretation?
2. Why did this particular passage interest you? How can you relate to it personally? Do group members feel the same way?
3. Based on your background knowledge or what you have learned in our dialogue group, what is the historical and/or contemporary significance of the passage?
4. Which religiological category or categories does your passage correspond to, and why? Can group members come up with categories which might fit?
5. Dialogue group leaders may also incorporate questions about the specific passages being discussed to reinforce concepts learned in that week's lesson. Questions asked will depend on the group's level of prior knowledge about the material. For example, if the group has read the Ḥadīth of Gabriel, introductory-level questions might include: What is a ḥadīth, and why are they important in Islam? Were you surprised to learn that the angel Gabriel appears in this ḥadīth? What role does the angel Gabriel play in both Christianity and Islam?

Limitations

Although every interfaith dialogue group should include a cognitive component, religiology itself may not be equally suitable for all groups. Dialogue groups must possess certain characteristics in order for religiology to be optimally effective. First of all, as Argon suggests, the dialogue group must have access to qualified Christian and Muslim religious leaders. They must be qualified to teach their respective religions, knowledgeable about American culture and politics, and possess an adequate understanding of religiological analysis.

Additionally, religiological analysis is likely best suited to dialogue groups which meet for a duration of at least a few weeks and have some time for study outside the dialogue group meetings. An initial time commitment of two to three hours is required to learn religiological analysis in a lecture and discussion-based format, plus any additional time that dialogue participants need for self-study outside the lecture in order to adequately understand the concepts.
involved. Additionally, group members must be willing and able to complete homework outside the dialogue group from time to time.

Religiology can theoretically be tailored to accompany any of Smith's dialogue types, but is better suited to some more than others. Although it could be used for action-based groups which only include a short component of reflection and discussion alongside completing service projects together, this type of group would likely not benefit from religiology as much because they would have less time both to initially learn religiological analysis and to implement it in their activities later. Additionally, religiological analysis prompts serious thought about the religions being studied and necessitates that group members engage in self-reflection. Arguably, these should be primary purposes of any interfaith dialogue group regardless. Nevertheless, religiological analysis would thus not be appropriate for a group which wants to meet on a more casual, social basis.

Assuming that the group possesses the above characteristics, religiology can be tailored to fit either the needs of beginners or those who possess advanced knowledge of the religions in question. The above suggestions for teaching and implementing religiological analysis are adapted for dialogue participants at this knowledge level. However, because religiological analysis simply provides a framework for organizing religious beliefs, dialogue participants can include greater detail and complexity within that framework if they choose to do so. Dialogue participants who have a background in religious studies will have the added advantage of prior familiarity with the associated terminology and will simply need to learn the way in which the terms are understood and utilized in religiology.

Part Three: The Affective Dimension
An Introduction to Emotional Intelligence

In chapter two, it was illustrated that a central mechanism driving Islamophobia is the transformation of Muslims into a religious "other." When Christians, for example, encounter Muslims, one way in which they may respond is by creating psychological distance between themselves and the Muslim "other" in order to preserve their own ego (this may include the
superiority of their culture and correctness of their religious beliefs). Two aspects in conjunction, a lack of understanding and a lack of emotional awareness, perpetuate this decreased objectivity about and prejudice against the other's religion, which is one of the hurdles that interfaith dialogue seeks to overcome.

The lack of understanding which perpetuates the process of othering can be solved in part via providing dialogue participants with more information about the other religion, which is done via religiological analysis or another method of teaching participants about Christianity and Islam. Gaining knowledge about one's own religion and that of the dialogue partner can help decrease anti-Muslim (or anti-Christian) sentiment to some extent, because dialogue participants will almost certainly learn that some of their maladaptive, negative emotions were based upon lacking information or possessing incorrect information about the other.

However, Islamophobia is also perpetuated by an inadequate awareness of one's emotions, including both adaptive and maladaptive emotions. Maladaptive feelings about the religious other can perpetuate the process of psychological distancing (othering or dehumanizing Muslims). Maladaptive emotions which were learned over a long period of time and have become entrenched may not simply go away in the face of better education. Essentially, dialogue participants will need to develop an awareness of the emotions evoked by their interfaith dialogue experiences. They must cultivate the ability to determine whether their emotions are adaptive or maladaptive so that the former can be utilized and the latter transformed.

A psychotherapist and psychologist who specializes in emotions, Leslie Greenberg, explains that adaptive emotions are those which are "enhancing to self or other;" these are "utilized as an informative guide to action." Maladaptive emotions, conversely, are "those old familiar bad feelings that occur repeatedly but do not change by contact with more adaptive

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emotions." and are "destructive to self or other." They are "learned responses that are not appropriate to current situations and thus no longer adaptive; these emotions need to be regulated and transformed." 

Greenberg’s distinction between adaptive and maladaptive emotions illustrates to us that the common misconception about interfaith dialogue seeking to foster unconditional positive regard for the religions in question need not be the case. The methodologies presented here will only seek to transform maladaptive emotions regarding the religions in question, which may or may not be negative ones. Maladaptive emotions are those which constitute an inappropriate response to the person or situation. Thus fear and anger, negative emotions, could either be adaptive or maladaptive. Fear that one's moderate Muslim next-door neighbors are planning a terrorist attack is maladaptive, whereas anger at the actual perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks would be adaptive. The affective methodologies outlined below will not seek to create positive emotional responses to all circumstances, but rather to cultivate adaptive emotions, which constitute appropriate emotional responses to the other religion and its practitioners.

This notion that emotions can be an asset to rational thought is not without controversy. Often, Western thinkers have argued that we should disregard our emotions. Emotional intelligence experts Daisy Grewal and Peter Salovey comment on the debate, stating that "a tension between a positive and negative view of emotions in rational thought dates back centuries to when, for example, the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece regarded the experience of emotion as too self-absorbed to be a useful guide for insight and wisdom….a similar debate still continues in the field of human abilities today." 


397 Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 89.

However, proponents of incorporating emotions into rational thought argue that while maladaptive emotions may indeed interfere with cognition, adaptive emotions are "an invaluable source of information and feedback." Research suggests that we can learn to "decode and use emotional information" which we "notice in ourselves and others" in order to be more successful in our endeavors. Grewal and Salovey argue that "emotions facilitate cognitive activities, such as problem solving, reasoning, decision making, and creative pursuits." For example, the adaptive joy that one feels after working hard and achieving success reinforces the lesson that the hard work was ultimately worth it. Conversely, when one feels adaptive regret after making a poor decision, this unpleasant sensation aids one in learning to make wiser decisions.

Thus, the affective methodologies presented here are designed to assist dialogue participants in recognizing whether their emotions are adaptive or maladaptive and utilizing or transforming them accordingly. These methodologies, diaphragmatic breathing and emotion journals, are derived from Emotion-Focused Therapy (EFT) and customized to be appropriate for an interfaith dialogue setting. Although the techniques presented will perhaps not be as effective as the comprehensive approach offered by an EFT psychotherapist, they will nevertheless be a useful supplement to the behavioral and cognitive dimensions described above.

**Theoretical Background**

Because EFT is a relatively new field, before its methodologies can be utilized here, the argument must first be made that emotion skills are indeed a type of intelligence, distinct from personality, and can thus be deliberately increased. Emotional intelligence experts Daisy Grewal and Peter Salovey are part of a "small but growing minority" of researchers who view "intelligence as composed of multiple and diverse components." These researchers believe that

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399 Grewal and Salovey, "Benefits," 104.

400 Ibid., 107.


emotional intelligence and analytical intelligence are two distinct things. For Grewal and Salovey, emotional intelligence is a "set of skills, rather than relatively fixed personality traits, which by definition are subject to improvement through training and intervention." 

Salovey and his colleague John Mayer were among the first to publish a scientific article on the concept of emotional intelligence. In this early work, they defined it as a human ability centered around "understanding and managing feelings in both the self and the other and the ability to use these feelings as tools to facilitate both thought and action." Further research in neuroscience soon bolstered the credibility of Salovey and Mayer's findings, "demonstrating that emotional responses are most likely integral to even the most 'rational' forms of decision-making." 

Briefly, Salovey and Meyer have concluded that emotional intelligence consists of four branches, or abilities. Being more adept at utilizing these abilities correlates to higher emotional intelligence. The first branch of emotional intelligence is perceiving emotions. This entails being aware of emotions in one's self and in others, including being able to "detect and decipher the emotional messages in facial expressions, vocal tones, postures, and cultural artifacts." In addition, perceiving emotions includes being able to accurately express emotions verbally. The second branch of emotional intelligence is using emotions to facilitate thought. This is the way in which adaptive emotions can enhance cognitive activities, as explained above in the "Introduction to Emotional Intelligence:. The third branch of emotional intelligence is understanding emotions. This extends beyond simply perceiving emotions and includes the abilities to "label complex emotions linguistically" and "recognize the subtle and often complex

403 Ibid., 108.
404 Ibid., 105.
relationships between different emotions." Additionally, understanding emotions entails recognizing the "hierarchical and temporal relationships among emotions;" for example, if a situation which causes annoyance persists, the annoyance can escalate into anger over time.\textsuperscript{407} The fourth branch of emotional intelligence entails managing emotions in the self and others, including the "voluntary activation of both positive and negative emotions."\textsuperscript{408} Not only does managing emotions play a key role in cultivating normal adaptive affect, but some research also suggests that the ability to voluntarily activate adaptive emotions is "the key to explaining and preventing certain psychological disorders" such as clinical depression.\textsuperscript{409}

Testing measures which validate the existence of the four branches of emotional intelligence have been developed. The most up-to-date is the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, or MSCEIT; its predecessor was the Multifactor Emotional intelligence Scale, or MEIS. The MEIS was the "first comprehensive ability-based measure designed specifically for assessing the four-branch model of emotional intelligence." It consists of "12 different tasks ranging from recognizing emotions in faces and music to understanding how emotions are likely to change over time." Over time, scores on the twelve tasks have been shown to be positively correlated, indicating that the test is a valid assessment tool. The MSCEIT is similar to the MEIS in that test takers complete a variety of tasks grouped within the four branches of EI. However, the MSCEIT takes less time to complete and the wording of some questions is improved.

Results from both the MEIS and the MSCEIT enhance the credibility of emotional intelligence. Scores of MEIS test takers increase with age; this is consistent with the notion that


\textsuperscript{408} Ibid., 107. Recall that negative emotions should not be confused with maladaptive emotions; anger is an adaptive response to an injustice, and fear is an adaptive response to an actual threat. The emotions are only maladaptive when inappropriate, such the fear or terrorist attack from moderate Muslims, or anger with all Muslims for a crime committed by a select few.

the emotional abilities tested are indeed a form of intelligence.410 Additionally, MSCEIT results illustrate that it "tests a construct that is different from well-studied measures of personality."411

Results from the MEIS and MSCEIT, as well as from other empirical studies of emotional intelligence, have also illustrated that emotional intelligence is related to "important life outcomes" which are relevant to successful interfaith dialogue. For example, "empirical research using the MSCEIT...and the MEIS" appears to indicate that EI training can help people "develop and sustain" better interpersonal relationships.412 A diary study of German college study corroborated these findings; "participants who scored higher on the MSCEIT were also rated by their friends as more likely to provide emotional support when needed."413 Additionally, people with higher scores on the MEIS and MSCEIT "are less likely to exhibit violent behavior such as bullying."414 Thus, cultivating dialogue participants' emotional intelligence can help them to facilitate and sustain meaningful relationships with each other, in addition to making them less likely to engage in manifestations of Islamophobic behavior, such as bullying.

Because emotional intelligence is a relatively new field, limited methodologies for cultivating it exist. However, Emotion-Focused Therapy, a type of psychotherapy, has a similar theoretical basis to that of emotional intelligence and offers a few affect-centered techniques


that interfaith dialogue group participants will be able to utilize during and between meetings to build their emotional skills.

Essentially, EFT is based on the idea of "accessing and exploring painful emotions, within the context of a secure therapeutic relationship" in order help people overcome their problems.\textsuperscript{415} The goals of EFT are essentially to help patients identify their emotions, determine whether they are adaptive or maladaptive, and utilize or transform the emotions accordingly.\textsuperscript{416} Although an interfaith dialogue group is not equivalent to a secure therapeutic environment, some relevant techniques can still be drawn from EFT and adapted to the needs of dialogue participants.

In EFT, tasks undertaken during and between sessions (the techniques which will be adapted for interfaith dialogue) are ultimately aimed at achieving five goals which EFT researchers Jennifer Ellison and Leslie Greenberg refer to as "principles for enhancing emotion processing" and are similar to the four areas of emotional intelligence. The first goal is to increase awareness of emotions. This does not entail simply thinking about feelings in an abstract way, but actually experiencing them while putting them into words. Increasing awareness of emotions necessitates "approaching, tolerating, and accepting" emotions rather than avoiding them, a process which can be difficult when participants are faced with negative emotions. As Ellison and Greenberg explain, "there is a strong human tendency to avoid or interrupt painful emotions. Normal cognitive processes often deny, distort, or interrupt emotion and transform adaptive but unpleasant emotions into dysfunctional behaviors designed to avoid feeling. Thus, in order to utilize the information an emotion provides, one must be aware of the emotion and tolerate being in contact with it."\textsuperscript{417} As will be seen below in the methodological discussion, emotion journals are one way to increase emotional awareness, and diaphragmatic breathing can be used to help tolerate the emotion perceived.

\textsuperscript{415} Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 88.
\textsuperscript{416} Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 67-68.
\textsuperscript{417} Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 90; Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 69.
The second goal of EFT is emotion expression. This does not entail simply venting, but rather arousing, strongly experiencing, and expressing emotions which are normally suppressed, in addition to actually processing them. In interfaith dialogue, emotion expression will translate to allowing the participants to express, in a structured, thoughtful way (via their emotion journals), the emotions which they would normally be expected to suppress during the dialogue group meeting itself.\footnote{Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 92.}

The third goal of EFT is enhancing emotion regulation; in particular, this includes controlling maladaptive emotions.\footnote{Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 92-93; Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 69.} A primary way to enhance emotion regulation in EFT is through the presence of a safe, validating, supportive therapeutic environment. Of course, this type of environment cannot be guaranteed in an interfaith dialogue group, but group leaders should keep in mind the importance of trying to foster a warm, supportive environment during dialogue group meetings.

Aside from establishing a supportive environment, however, dialogue group members can also improve their emotion regulation skills by keeping emotion journals. For example, emotion journals will help group members to practice "identifying and labeling emotions;" distancing themselves from strong, maladaptive emotions such as "overwhelming shame, despair, hopeless, and/or shaky vulnerability" when appropriate; "allowing and tolerating emotions;" "increasing positive emotions;" and "reducing vulnerability to negative emotions." Greenberg adds that "the ability to observe one's emotions and let them come and go are important processes to help regulate emotional distress."\footnote{Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 92-93.}

The fourth goal of EFT is reflection on emotion. It is related to the first goal, emotional awareness, in that both involve "making meaning of emotion;" goal four builds upon and is a continuation of goal one.\footnote{Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 93; Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 69.} After a participant has put his/her emotions into words, he/she moves

\footnote{418 Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 92.}
\footnote{419 Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 92-93; Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 69.}
\footnote{420 Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 92-93.}
\footnote{421 Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 93; Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 69.}
on to reflect on the meaning of emotion and assimilate the newly discovered meaning into his/her own ongoing self-narrative.\textsuperscript{422} As Greenberg explains, this is important because "what we make of our emotional experience makes us all who we are."\textsuperscript{423} Although emotion journals are not the only way to reflect upon the meaning of one's emotions, they are one effective way of doing so which does not require the aid of a therapist.

The fifth and most important goal of EFT is using maladaptive emotions to transform adaptive emotions.\textsuperscript{424} Greenberg states that "in time, the activation of the more adaptive emotion along with or in response to the maladaptive emotion helps transform the maladaptive emotion." This is not as superficial as simply "trying to look on the bright side," but rather involves deliberately evoking relevant, more adaptive emotions to help undo the maladaptive emotions. For example, helping someone to experience "warmth and affection" can ameliorate anxiety. As with the other steps of EFT, emotion transformation is typically done primarily during therapy, but as will be seen, some of the emotion journal questions (such as those which help people assess their needs and goals) are relevant in helping participants envision alternate, adaptive experiences for themselves.\textsuperscript{425}

\textbf{Incorporating EFT and EI into Interfaith Dialogue}

\textit{Diaphragmatic Breathing Exercises}

Unlike clients in EFT sessions, interfaith dialogue participants will not have many opportunities to discuss their emotions during meetings, as feelings are not the primary topic of discussion in an interfaith dialogue setting. Thus most work done to enhance emotion skills will

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{423} Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 93.
\item \textsuperscript{425} Greenberg, "Clinical Applications," 95-97.
\end{itemize}
have to happen outside group meetings via emotion journals. However, participants will still need tools that they can utilize during dialogue group meetings to cope with strong positive and negative emotions in an appropriate way. Diaphragmatic breathing can be used as a way to "take a time out when too upset." Through strategically using these breathing exercises, dialogue participants can self-soothe and "feel more relaxed, regulated, and available to working with [their] emotional experience."\(^{426}\)

In order to teach dialogue group participants to implement breathing techniques, the dialogue group leader first directs participants to take note of their physical state, particularly their breathing. People often hold their breath when upset, or breath rapidly and shallowly when excited. Participants should practice this awareness regularly so that they will do it automatically when experiencing strong emotions. Once the participant is aware of the rhythm of his breathing in a particular moment of emotional arousal, he can then engage in deep, diaphragmatic breathing in order to self-regulate.

This can initially be practiced as follows: the participant should first make himself comfortable and close his eyes. Next, he should note which areas of his body are particularly tense and relax them. After that, the dialogue participant should focus his attention on his breathing and breathe deeply, in through the nose and out through the mouth. When breathing in, participant should let the air fill his stomach, and let the stomach flatten again when breathing out. After continuing for a short period of time, the dialogue participant then lets his breathing return to a comfortable, relaxed state.\(^{427}\)

After dialogue group members become used to utilizing these breathing techniques by deliberately practicing them inside and outside the dialogue group, they can utilize them to regulate their emotions during dialogue group meetings without needing to be prompted. Of course, it is not always appropriate to stop in the middle of a conversation, close one's eyes, and begin breathing deeply, but diaphragmatic breathing can be used in a more subtle manner when

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\(^{426}\) Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 69, 72.

\(^{427}\) Ibid., 72.
necessary. The practice of becoming aware of and releasing tension in one's body, taking some slow, deep breaths, and returning one's breathing to a normal state, is an easy, discreet way to self-soothe.

Emotion Journals

While diaphragmatic breathing is an effective tool that dialogue group members can use to regulate their emotions during meetings, in order to achieve maximum success, group members will also need to cultivate their emotion skills outside meetings. EFT researchers have found that completing homework outside sessions are useful for three reasons. First, because maladaptive emotions are learned over a long period of time and can become deeply entrenched, completing activities once a week during dialogue group meetings may not be sufficient to transform them into adaptive emotions. Second, completing homework can help to solidify what has been learned in the group meeting. Third, the purpose of emotional intelligence training is not only to make dialogue group meetings run more smoothly, but also to help people perceive and react appropriately to the religious other in the long run. If dialogue participants get into the habit of regularly practicing the emotion skills learned now, they will be more likely to continue using them later in life.428

With the basis for assigning homework established, it should also be understood why emotion journals in particular are appropriate for assisting dialogue participants in developing their emotional intelligence skills. The reasons for assigning emotion journals were mentioned above in the discussion of the five steps of EFT, but it is worthwhile to expand upon these reasons here.

First of all, EFT research suggests that in order for people to experience meaningful change, emotions must not only be aroused, they should also be reflected upon.429 Dialogue sessions will likely evoke emotions related to the religious "other," but they will not give

428 Ibid., 68-69.

participants much of an opportunity to explore and process their emotions. Dialogue participants will likely feel that it is more appropriate to suppress strong emotional reactions in a public setting such as that of the interfaith dialogue group. Thus, participants will need to utilize their emotion journals as a place to reflect upon the emotions that have been aroused during dialogue group meetings.

Second, emotion journals increase participants' awareness of their emotions, including identifying their primary reactions to a situation and whether these emotions are adaptive or maladaptive.430 People may not always be highly aware of their emotions, but emotion journals help them "contact and accept" their emotions by practicing describing them in words.431 This valuable information can then be used for problem-solving, including working toward transforming maladaptive emotions into adaptive ones.432

In addition to helping participants become more aware of their emotions, emotion journals can also help participants to reflect upon them in a meaningful way. As described above in the discussion of the steps of EFT, reflection is related to the first step, awareness, in that both are part of creating meaning from one's emotional experience. Symbolizing one's emotions in words via a journal entry prompts one to reflect on these emotions and go on to "develop new narratives to explain [one's] experience."433 Becoming aware of one's emotions, reflecting upon them, and explaining them "allows transformation of previously held convictions and beliefs into a new understanding of self, others, and situations."434 In the case of interfaith dialogue, this could translate to a new understanding of one's self or the religious "other."

432 Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 25.
434 Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 37.
Although the goals of arousing, describing, and reflecting on emotions described above can be achieved via various EFT techniques, James Pennebaker has conducted research that suggests that the act of writing about emotions itself can have a positive effect on one's physical and emotional wellbeing.\footnote{Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 79; Pennebaker, Opening Up; James W. Pennebaker, Opening Up: The Healing Power of Expressing Emotions (New York: Guilford, 1997).} Specifically, Pennebaker has found that "writing about emotional experience" can produce "positive effects on autonomic nervous system activity, immune functioning, and physical and emotional health." This is because the act of narrating one's "emotional experience allows individuals to organize, structure, and ultimately assimilate both their emotional experiences and the situations that elicit their emotional responses. In addition, symbolizing emotional experiences in words allows people to more readily identify and reflect on their emotional patterns and the triggers that tend to engage them in those patterns."\footnote{Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 79; Pennebaker, Confiding in Others; Pennebaker, Expressing Emotions.}

With this theoretical background in mind, dialogue leaders can teach group members how to utilize emotion journals. First, the leader should know that cultivating the proper mindset is important. If emotion journals are to be completed in a sincere, thoughtful manner, dialogue group members must feel motivated, not pressured or compelled, to complete them. Emotion journals can be proposed as "'experiments,' 'activities,' or 'exercises' to try," rather than as rigidly structured, obligatory assignments.\footnote{Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 70; Leslie S. Greenberg and Jeanne C. Watson, Emotion-Focused Therapy for Depression (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association Press, 2005).} If a group member resists the idea of keeping emotion journals, he should not be forced to do so; it is possible that he is not yet ready to confront his emotions, but will be willing to do so at a later time.\footnote{Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 68-69.}

A related issue is whether or not to keep emotion journals private. While the reading journals outlined above in the cognitive dimension are designed to be shared with other dialogue group members, it is likely best to allow participants to keep their emotion journals private.
Doing so will allow participants to be honest and open in their journals, including negative emotions, rather than feeling compelled to write upbeat things about fellow group members and their experiences with interfaith dialogue. However, it may be useful to devote a short portion of each meeting to general questions and comments related to the emotion journals, so that participants can get suggestions for improving their journaling abilities. This would also keep participants accountable for keeping up with their journal; while the assignment should be optional, even group members who genuinely do want to keep a journal may need encouragement to fit it into their busy schedules.

With the above attitude in mind, the dialogue group leader can provide instructions to group members for completing the journals. (Dialogue group leaders can work with the group to determine how many weekly journals it is realistic for the group to complete.) First, participants must practice emotion awareness. During interfaith dialogue group meetings and while completing outside homework assignments (interviews, readings, reading journals), participants should practice taking note of their emotions so that they can more easily reflect on them later in their journals. One way to facilitate emotion awareness is by making a brief, written notation of emotions experienced during meetings so that they can be written about later. During the same day when the note is made or as soon as possible afterward (so that the emotion is fresh in one's mind), the participant should answer the following questions:439

1. What is your name for the emotion?440
2. Did the emotion have a sudden onset, or is it a more enduring mood? When did it start?
3. How intense is the emotion (from 1 low to 10 high)? Did it change in intensity?
4. What thoughts are associated with your feeling? Are they just related to dialogue group activities (lectures, readings, journals, discussions)? Or are they about something else in the past, present, or future?

439 The instructions for completing the emotion diaries are adapted from a version used by Godlas in his courses, Freshman Emotional Intelligence Seminar and Introduction to the Religions of the World, from January-May 2012. The questions originally come from Ellison and Greenberg, "Experiential Therapy," 70.

440 If dialogue group participants feel that their vocabulary is inadequate for describing emotions, the following website provides emotion word charts: David Straker, "Basic Emotions," Changing Minds, http://changingminds.org/explanations/emotions/basic%20emotions.htm (accessed July 23, 2012).
5. What memories are associated with your feeling? Does this feeling seem to make you want to act or make you feel like doing something or expressing something; or make you want to move closer to or away from something (or study something more or less)? Make an aggressive move? Make a facial expression?
6. Describe what specifically brought on the emotion or mood. Be aware of any shifts in your emotion while you are describing the situation.
7. Would you describe your feeling as negative or positive? Are you comfortable or uncomfortable having it? What is your attitude towards this feeling (e.g., grateful, disgusted, etc.)? Do you want the feeling to last longer or go away?
8. Do you have this feeling often? In what kinds of situations does this feeling occur (both in and out of the dialogue group?) Are such situations similar to or different from the particular point in the lectures, readings, journals or discussions during which you experienced the feeling?
9. What information is the emotion giving you? For example, is it telling you something about yourself or your relationship to the religion you were studying? If so, what is it telling you? Is it telling you something about your progress toward a goal?
10. What does the emotion seem to need you to do? What does it seem to need from you? What does it seem to want you to know?
11. Is there anything else you are feeling underneath the initial emotion?

Limitations

It is hoped that the above techniques of practicing diaphragmatic breathing and keeping emotion diaries will be effective approaches which help group members to effectively cope with the emotional responses that interfaith dialogue can elicit. The above approaches have been suggested because they are fairly simple to understand and do not require a great deal of time or money to complete. Additionally, since they are modern, secular techniques rather than being rooted in a particular religious tradition, they are appropriate for a mixed group of Christians and Muslims.\footnote{441 The world's religious traditions each have their own view of the role that emotion plays in human life and methodologies for cultivating what is today called emotional intelligence. For dialogue groups which are interested in the role that religion plays in Christianity, Islam, and other religions, see John Corrigan, \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).}

However, the affective methodologies listed here are not equally suited to all types of dialogue groups; limitations are similar to those of religiological analysis. First, the group in question will need a teacher who is qualified to relate the EFT methodologies described here. The ideal option is for the group to locate a local EFT specialist who is willing to come in as a guest speaker and discuss the principles of EFT and explain how to carry out the exercises. If this is not
possible, the dialogue group leaders will need to familiarize themselves with the EFT theory and techniques discussed here.

Additionally, although the methodologies presented are inexpensive, the methodologies do require a time commitment and are best suited to groups which meet on an ongoing basis, as they will need to be practiced regularly. Lastly, as with religiological analysis, the affective methodologies presented here assume that the group is serious about committing to interfaith dialogue and is willing to learn and apply a methodology that will perhaps elicit uncomfortable emotions and require that these emotions be confronted. This is a necessary and healthy practice, regardless of whether one is involved in interfaith dialogue or not, but nevertheless may be a deterrent for some people.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that Christian-Muslim interfaith dialogue is one way to combat Islamophobia in America. Although Muslims have become more active and have taken a stronger leadership role in Christian-Muslim interfaith dialogue in the years since 9/11, inadequate planning and knowledge of dialogue options, as well as the incomplete current approach to interfaith dialogue prevent it from being optimally effective as a tool in the fight against Islamophobia.

The current work explored ways that these shortcomings can be overcome. First, it was argued that Muslims can better organize and customize their dialogue efforts by making use of the research of Jane Smith and Kemal Argon. Smith's main contribution to interfaith dialogue is cataloging major dialogue types, including advantages and disadvantages of each one. The main dialogue types which Smith identifies are Confrontation/Debate, Information-Sharing, Theological Exchange, Ethical Exchange, "Dialogue to Come Closer," Spirituality and Moral Healing, Cooperative Model for Addressing Pragmatic Concerns. Additionally, based on her work, I have included Shared Worship and Intra-Muslim Dialogue as subtypes of dialogue.

Kemal Argon's contribution to current dialogue efforts is not a new model for dialogue in its own right, but rather a methodology for strategically planning and implementing dialogue
efforts based on the needs and resources of specific Muslim communities. Gilmore's methodology is designed specifically for small Muslim groups, which have limited time, money, manpower, and other resources. Argon's six steps include 1) recording the current strategy; 2) identifying problems, needs, and concerns; 3) identifying the components of problems, needs, and concerns; 4) formulating solutions and alternatives; 5) evaluating strategic project alternatives; and 6) choosing and applying a new strategy.

In order to make the knowledge of Smith's dialogue types and Argon's planning strategy more widely available to dialogue planners in the American Muslim community, it was suggested that an online portfolio with accounts of real-world dialogue endeavors based on Argon and Smith be created and included in the well-trafficked website of an American Muslim organization, such as that of ISNA or CAIR. Further research should explore the viability of this suggestion and seek to implement it.

It was also argued that interfaith dialogue can only be optimally effective if dialogue participants possess adequate knowledge of the religions in question. Religiological analysis was suggested as an appropriate pedagogical method, as it is geared toward studying religions in a way that is systematic, coherent, and relatively objective. An overview of the six categories within religiological analysis was provided, including epistemology, ontology, anthropopology, psychology, teleology, and methodology. Lastly, suggestions for activities which can be used to incorporate religiological analysis into dialogue activities were provided, including religiological interviews and reading journals.

Lastly, it was argued that in order to be complete, interfaith dialogue should include an affective dimension. It was illustrated that emotional intelligence represents a set of skills separate from personality and analytical intelligence, which can be improved upon in order to have higher satisfaction in one's life endeavors, including interfaith dialogue. Specifically, emotional intelligence training can help people utilize the adaptive emotions and transform the maladaptive emotions in regard to one's self and the religious "other" which arise when engaging in interfaith dialogue. Emotion-Focused Therapy includes methodologies which can be used to
cultivate emotional intelligence; two EFT-based methodologies were adapted for interfaith
dialogue and suggested here: diaphragmatic breathing and emotion journals.

It is hoped that when used in conjunction, these three dimensions -- affective, behavioral,
and cognitive -- present a more holistic and effective approach to interfaith dialogue. Future
research should involve testing these methodologies in real-world interfaith dialogue groups, and
offering suggestions for improvement based on the findings.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The present work has aimed to shed light on the nature of Islamophobia in the post 9/11 United States and offer suggestions for combating it. Many books related to the topic have been published since 2001; these can be organized according to whether they represent open or closed-view scholarship, as defined in the 1997 Runnymede Trust report. However, few of these works seek to comprehensively decipher the mechanisms and themes underlying Islamophobia. When these issues are explored, American Islamophobia emerges as a distinct, contemporary phenomenon with deep historical roots. In the modern United States, Islamophobia is driven by the identity formation process of "othering" and is often exploited for personal gain. One of its various manifestations in society is in polemical discourse about Islam and Muslims. By categorizing such polemics, thematically, they can be understood and countered more effectively than has so far been the case. Christian/Muslim interfaith dialogue can also be useful in reducing Islamophobia, but current approaches are incomplete. They should be adapted to include affective, behavioral, and cognitive methodological components.

In order to begin addressing these points, chapter two offered a system for categorizing major publications relevant to Islamophobia according to whether they represent closed or open-view scholarship, as defined in the 1997 Runnymede Trust report. It was illustrated that open and closed-view authors have different aims and a different understanding of facts regarding Islam and Muslims. Closed and open-view authors agree that "othering" can be an important part of identity formation, but only closed-view authors see it as necessary and inevitable. Open-view authors see ideologies such as clash theory to be inaccurate models of the world and self-fulfilling prophecies. Closed-view authors view clash theory as an accurate, if oversimplified model. Open-view authors see the popular media as exacerbating Islamophobia via inaccurately portraying Islam and Muslims, whereas closed-view authors either defend the accuracy of the media's
portrayal or put moderate Muslims at fault for not being more vocal. Lastly, open-view authors see Islamophobia as a problem which can and should be addressed; closed-view authors perceive anti-Muslim fears and sentiments as a legitimate response to a threat. One similarity, however, which emerges among closed and open-view authors is that both agree anti-Muslim sentiment among Westerners has deep historical roots.

Future research should update this literature review to include additional works, particularly those written from late 2010 to the present, which would allow further themes to emerge. In particular, more closed-view works could be added, and appropriate taxonomies for organizing them should be discussed and refined. In particular, one question that needs further investigation is that the process of understanding and countering polemical statements is what are the advantages and disadvantages of using a thematic approach (such as in chapter four), in contrast to using the sub-groupings that were employed to categorize the the open-view authors (anthologies, works that provide definitions and overview; historical approaches; social, religious, and political topics; psychological perspectives; and solutions)?

Chapter three outlined some of the historical and contemporary factors which make American Islamophobia a distinct phenomenon. The beginnings of "othering" were seen in Europe's earliest encounters with the Muslim world; stereotypes were crystallized during the Crusades. Later, Europe would continue to influence the American mindset toward Islam via shared literature, but separate factors would contribute to a distinctly American Islamophobia. Puritans would conceive of themselves as a chosen people superior to "others," including Muslims; in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the superiority of the U.S. would continue to be justified on the basis of religious and also political ideologies, including millenarianism, Zionism, and Manifest Destiny. Other factors perpetuating "othering" and negatives stereotypes among Americans about Islam would include encounters with Muslims in their own lands, and also domestic art and written works. Contemporary societal factors contributing to Islamophobia were also identified, including the manipulation of Islamophobia for personal gain. Aspects of the contemporary Islamophobic mindset were outlined, elaborating on the open and closed-view
Current manifestations of Islamophobia (such as hate crimes and negative attitudes toward Islam) were identified, and it was illustrated that Islamophobes are a substantial minority within the United States.

Implicit in chapter three was the assumption that Islamophobia in European countries has a different nature; although it shares historical roots with American Islamophobia, it would diverge in after the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because of differing historical factors. Today, European Islamophobia might be different in nature, in that the relatively recent influx of immigrants from Muslim countries poses a perceived challenge to traditionally homogenous societies, whereas America has been a "nation of immigrants" since its birth. However, as these are only speculations, future research could test these hypotheses and compare the fundamental differences and similarities between Islamophobia in the United States as outlined here and one or more European nations.

Chapter four attempted to provide a deeper understanding of one manifestation of Islamophobia, polemical discourse, as a way to provide a foundation for working toward combatting Islamophobia. Specifically, the chapter offered a system for categorizing Islamophobic polemics based on five themes: that Muslims are violent; that they hate Jews and Christians; that they are anti-modern; that they are anti-demographic; and that Muslim men are misogynists. Aside from offering refutations of some individual polemical statements made by authors such as Daniel Pipe and Robert Spencer, chapter four offered a deeper understanding of polemics by highlighting themes within polemical discourse. The themes could be further developed by adding more polemical material to each category; creating a more complete catalog would make similarities among the polemical statements in each category more apparent. A future study could also determine whether five themes are sufficient, or whether more should be added.

Chapter five looked at Muslim-Christian interfaith dialogue as one way to combat Islamophobia in the United States. Although it is encouraging that American Muslims are becoming more actively involved in interfaith dialogue and taking a greater leadership role, it was argued, here, that interfaith dialogue can be rendered more effective by improving upon current
methodologies. Specifically, it was suggested that American Muslims be made more aware of the methodologies (outlined by Jane Smith) and planning techniques (such as that suggested by Kemal Argon) which are already available. One way to do so is to create an online portfolio of real-world dialogue efforts organized around Smith's methodologies; Muslim activists should undertake to make such a website available.

Currently, however, even the best-planned dialogue efforts are incomplete in that they offer a purely behavioral approach to countering Islamophobia. They overlook the need to provide dialogue participants with substantial systematic, coherent, and relatively objective education about Christianity and Islam and to help them overcome the maladaptive emotions that may arise during they course of dialogue. Thus a more holistic approach to Muslim-Christian interfaith dialogue, augmenting current behavioral techniques with cognitive and affective methodologies, was suggested. Although elements of this approach (religio logical analysis and emotion diaries) have been found to be successful in the classroom setting by myself and other instructors at the University of Georgia, the "ABC approach" to interfaith dialogue has never been applied in a real-world setting. Thus future research should involve testing the approach in actual Muslim-Christian dialogue groups and suggesting adaptations to make it an even more effective methodology. With these tools in hand, Muslims and their supporters should feel confident that although Islamophobia may never disappear entirely, its impact on society can be lessened.
REFERENCES


------. "Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy," in Qureshi and Sells, 1-50.


APPENDIX A

SAMPLE CHRISTIANITY RELIGIOLOGY CHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category &amp; Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Epistemology: What are the valid sources of knowledge? | • For Christians in general:  
  • Textual sources  
    • Hebrew Bible + New Testament = Christian Bible  
    • NT includes: Synoptic Gospels, John, Acts, Epistles, Revelation  
    • Ecumenical councils: produced creeds  
    • Example: Nicene Creed  
    • Jesus (is the logos): his teachings and actions  
  • Roman Catholics (RC):  
    • Apocrypha (ex: Gospel of Thomas)  
    • Church as teaching authority (including pope, priests)  
    • Saints (their practice, writings)  
  • Eastern Orthodox (EO):  
    • Collective conscience of church  
    • Saints  
  • Protestants (P):  
    • More emphasized than in EO/RC:  
      • Christian Bible is foremost  
      • Personal faith, reason, experience  
      • Less emphasized than in EO/RC: authority of religious leaders |
| Ontology: What is the nature of reality?     | • God is the ultimate reality                                                                                                           |
| Theology: What is the nature of God?         | • The Trinity: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit                                                                                |
| Cosmology: What is the nature of the universe? | • Spirit realm:  
  • Heaven and hell  
  • RC: Purgatory  
  • Angels, Satan, demons  
  • Profane world (our current existence)  
  • Early Christians: Kingdom of God eminent on earth  
  • (Gnostics: Kingdom of God is already present)  
  • Modern Christians: Kingdom of God in afterlife |
| **Cosmogony: What is the nature of the beginning of the universe?** | • God's act of creation happened in 6 days (metaphorical or literal) + 1 day of rest  
• Adam and Eve: cause of original sin, resulting in the need for redemption via Christ |
| --- | --- |
| **Eschatology: What is the nature of the end times up to and including the hereafter?** | • End times:  
• 2nd coming of Jesus  
• Judgement Day  
• Afterlife: Heaven and Hell  
• RC: Purgatory |
| **Anthropology: What are human nature and identity?** | • **Human nature:**  
• Made in image of God  
• Beloved children of God  
• Born with original sin  
• **Human identity:**  
• Christians:  
  • Members of Visible Church  
  • Part of the mystical body of Christ  
• Pious non-Christians: can be members of Invisible Church  
• Other important Christian IDs:  
  • Apostles  
  • Saints  
  • Mary  
  • Martyrs  
  • Affiliation with Holy Orders  
• Denominational identities (Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, General Baptist, Church of England, etc.) |
| **Psychology: What is the nature of human consciousness?** | • **Faculties of consciousness:**  
• Mind: can understand & interpret epistemological sources  
• Soul: immortal (punished/rewarded in afterlife)  
• Heart: stained w/original sin, can be purified via Jesus  
• Flesh: weak, can be tempted  
• Conscience: serves as a moral compass  
• **States of consciousness:**  
• Before accepting Jesus: fear (of death), guilt (for sin), egotism  
• After accepting Jesus: love (for God & man), joy, freedom from former states |
| **Teleology: What is the purpose of life?** | • Attain salvation & go to Heaven/avoid Hellfire  
• Love, serve, know God  
• Serve mankind  
• Mystics: experience God in this life |
Methodology: How can the purpose of human life be achieved?

| Methodology: How can the purpose of human life be achieved? | • Accept Jesus as your savior  
|---------------|------------------------------|
|               | • (Protestants: justification by faith)  
|               | • Imitate Jesus Christ  
|               | • Learn from epistemological sources  
|               | • Spread the Good News (Great Commission)  
|               | • Protestants: follow Protestant Principle  
|               | • RC/EO: participate in 7 sacraments  
|               | • (All Christians: church activities/rituals)  
|               | • EO:  
|               | • Icon veneration  
|               | • Mystical methodology (e.g., Jesus Prayer) |
## APPENDIX B
### SAMPLE ISLAM RELIGIOLOGY CHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category &amp; Question</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| What are the valid sources of knowledge? | • The Qur'an  
• The ḥadīth (sayings, actions, tacit approvals of the Prophet Muhammad  
  • Sunnis: recorded in 6 canonical collections (Bukhārī, Muslim, etc.)  
  • qiyās (scholars' reasoning by analogy)  
  • 'ijtihād (scholars' independent reasoning)  
  • Sharīʿah law (derived from other epistemological sources)  
  • For Sunni Muslims, via the 4 rulings of the 4 orthodox legal schools: Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, Ḥanbalī; studied via books and/or qualified teachers  
  • Religious leaders/scholars (various titles):  
    • Sunni Muslims: imām (pl.: ‘a’immah), faqīh (pl.: fuqahā’), ‘alīm (pl.: ‘ulamā’), etc.  
    • Shi’ah Muslims: imām (different than the Sunni concept), ayatollah, etc.  
    • Sufi Muslims: shaykh (pl.: shuyūkh)  
    • Personal reason and experience |
| **Ontology**        | God is the ultimate reality |
| What is the nature of reality? |           |
| **Theology**        |           |
| What is the nature of God? | • Allah = The God  
• The central focus of life  
• One/monotheistic (not Trinitarian)  
• Non-anthropomorphic  
• Creator (not physically part of the creation)  
• Spiritually close/accessible  
• Merciful (also wrathful, but mercy outweighs wrath)  
• Has 99 names (attributes) (ex: The King, the Holy, the Maker) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cosmology</th>
<th>Physical world:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of created existence?</td>
<td>• God’s willful creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Real and important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inherently good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Means of salvation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unseen world:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Beings:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Angels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Jinn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Iblīs (Satan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Places: Paradise and Hellfire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmogony</td>
<td>God created the world in six metaphorical days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of the beginning of created existence?</td>
<td>Mankind is not stained with an original sin from Adam and Eve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eschatology</td>
<td>Individual death: questioning, afterlife in the grave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of the end times up to and including</td>
<td>Last Days:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the afterlife?</td>
<td>• Date unknown; preceded by signs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Jesus’ Second Coming (will kill the Dajjāl/Antichrist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Judgment Day (includes resurrection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Afterlife:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Paradise (seven levels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hellfire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>Human nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are human nature and identity?</td>
<td>• fiṭra = disposition, nature (to be monotheistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ghaflah = sin of forgetfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dependent on God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Free will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human identity:</td>
<td>• ḥanīf = generic monotheist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ahl al-kitāb: Jews, Christians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Muslim: Shi`ah, Sunni, Sufi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• kafr = unbeliever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• mushrik = polytheist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Religious leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prophets (Muḥammad = Seal of the Prophets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• shahīd = martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>Faculties of consciousness:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of human consciousness?</td>
<td>• Body and senses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ego-self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Heart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States of consciousness:</td>
<td>• Ideal states toward God:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Thankfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supplication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Praise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Love (also of fellow man)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Active submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• God-conscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Non-ideal states toward God:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Forgetfulness/ignorance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sifnfulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disbelief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Teleology | • Central purpose: to live life according to God’s will  
• This also entails:  
  • To know God  
  • To love God  
  • Enter Paradise and avoid Hell |
|---|---|
| Methodology | • Believe in the articles of faith  
• Learn from and utilize epistemological sources  
  • (follow sharī'ah law)  
• Memorize and recite the Qur'an  
• Voluntary prayer, charity, fasting, pilgrimage  
• Celebrate holidays (‘Eid al-‘Adhā and ‘Eid al-Fiṭr)  
• Avoid prohibited actions (ḥarām)  
• Complete mandatory actions (e.g., food, clothing regulations)  
• Greater and lesser jihād  
• Get married and have believing children  
• Perform purification rituals (wudu, tayammum, ghusl)  
• Execute the five pillars: shahadah, ṣalāt (especially in the masjid), ṣawm, ḥajj, zakāt |