PRESERVATION AND NATURAL DISASTERS

by

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(Under the Direction of

JAMES K. REAP, J.D.)

ABSTRACT

Historic preservation serves as an integral tool in creating and maintaining a community’s sense of place and connection to its past. During times of disaster, a community needs this bond more than ever. By studying current procedures and emergency management standards and by presenting two case studies, this thesis strives to uncover preservation’s role during a natural disaster. Through this research, I learned that historic preservation is not well integrated into emergency management legislation or practice at any level of government. I conclude that historic preservation concerns must be integrated into standard emergency management legislation and land use planning to be an effective agent in recovery.

INDEX WORDS: Natural Disasters, Floods, Emergency Management, Historic Preservation, Georgia, Tropical Storm Alberto, Montezuma, Albany
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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work to any and everyone who has ever been affected by a natural disaster, to the emergency workers and volunteers, and to the countless others who dedicate their lives to the emergency management field.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Natural Disasters and Government Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding Disaster-Mitigation and Preparedness</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Response and Recovery</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Response and Recovery</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Response and Recovery</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where does historic preservation fit in?</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Case Study: Montezuma 1994 floods</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief History</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKenzie Building</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Case Study: Albany a city inundated</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief History</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Disaster .................................................................................................................. 56
Recovery .................................................................................................................. 59
Tift Warehouse .................................................................................................... 62
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 64

5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 68

Summation ............................................................................................................ 68

Recommendations for Federal, State, and Local Government ....................... 72
Recommendations for Stewards of Historic Sites and Private Citizens.......... 77
Further Research ................................................................................................. 79

Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 87

APPENDICES

A Acronym and Abbreviations Chart ................................................................. 93

B Unpublished National Register Nomination, Downtown Albany GA........... 94

C Unpublished FEMA Documents regarding Montezuma ............................... 101

D Unpublished Contract from Tommy McKenzie’s Personal files ................. 128
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Matrix of roles and recommendations for various groups involved in disasters…81
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Phases of Emergency Management: The Disaster Life Cycle</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Flow chart to determine if flood resistance standards apply</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Flow chart to determine if a structure is falls under <em>Flood Resistant Design and Construction</em> standards</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Graphic of the Preparedness Cycle</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Historic image of the 1929 Flood in Montezuma, Georgia</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Graphic of Tropical Storm Alberto’s Path</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Image of flooded Montezuma, GA</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Historic image façade of 115 Cherry Street</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Historic image façade of 115 Cherry Street</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Historic image façade of 115 Cherry Street and Current View</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Image of interior of 115 Cherry Street at 1950 bank opening</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Photo of downtown merchants assisting one another in initial flood evacuation</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aerial Image of flooded Montezuma. McKenzie building circled in red</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Aerial Image of flooded Montezuma. McKenzie building circled in red</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Aerial Image of flooded Montezuma. McKenzie building circled in red</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Progress of downtown streetscaping project. View from 115 Cherry Street</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Current state of McKenzie Building. West elevation detail</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Current state of McKenzie building. Façade close up</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 19: Current state of 115 Cherry Street, the McKenzie Building .....................50

Figure 20: Coffins tethered to a tree to keep them from floating further downstream ....58

Figure 21: Aerial view, Flooded downtown Albany ..........................................................59

Figure 22: Dilapidated house after flood damage in Albany .............................................62
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Finding a succinct definition of a “natural disaster” is a difficult task. One must define these words separately to glean a simple definition. The Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines natural as, “being in accordance with or determined by nature.” Disaster is defined as, “a sudden calamitous event bringing great damage, loss, or destruction.” Bringing these together, one can define a natural disaster as a sudden calamitous event determined by nature. Historic preservation is equally hard to define. Following the same process one can determine a definition of this field of study. Merriam-Webster defines historic as, “… having a great and lasting importance,” and preservation as, “keep[ing] safe from injury, harm, or destruction.” Combining these definitions, historic preservation means to keep safe those things which have a great and lasting importance.

Unfortunately natural disasters are not simple or succinct. Neither is historic preservation. To fully encompass the nature of a natural disaster requires a more complex definition. Mileti defines natural disasters as a part of a cycle between the environment, the community, and the built environment. This definition accounts for not only the natural environment, but also the environment that people build for themselves. This dynamic, during the best of times, is strained by developmental pressures, political issues, private property rights et cetera. As with natural disasters,

historic preservation can also be defined by Mileti’s three part cycle. Preservation is the relationship between the environment, the community, and the built environment. The environment within historic preservation refers to the intangible sense of place historic buildings produce. The community refers not only to the present community that interacts with the resource, but also to the past community that constructed it. The built environment is the place where this resource exists within the ever changing fabric of a place.

When any piece of the cycle changes with either natural disasters or historic preservation, it puts a strain on the others. When the environment fluxes, the temperamental bonds between the parts of this cycle break, and for a period of time things are out of balance. This loss of balance is a natural disaster. When a community no longer sees the value in a historic resource and it is razed, it is a disaster.

During a natural disaster the first effort is, as it should be, human aid. The single most important issue in emergency response is to rescue and save lives. Though, as suggested by Mileti, the built environment cannot be ignored. Trying to rebuild physically and emotionally is the main goal of recovery efforts after an emergency. As a preservationist, it is easy to see a clear connection in recovery efforts and saving historic buildings. Not only are they a physical part of the built environment they are a connection to the past, a tangible piece of the community.

Unfortunately, historic preservation can be viewed as a hindrance; “…after a disaster these resources’ special status as designated landmarks may complicate recovery efforts.”\(^2\) Historic preservation is not a complication; it is an integral tool. The goal of

this thesis is to explain how historic preservation fits into planning for and recovering from a natural disaster. By adopting historic preservation, communities can not only recover from a disaster, but thrive in the aftermath.

When a natural disaster strikes, people feel helpless in their environments, both natural and man-made. Preservation has the ability to rally people and helps rebuild, mentally, the bonds that make a community. It cannot, even in the best of times, be done by one person, government, or nonprofit. This is most true during a natural disaster; working with others is essential. Through collaboration, preservation can stop being a “complication” in the eyes of disaster responders, and can start being an essential tool for rebuilding a community.

Before discussing the benefits of preservation, it is important to understand how the government operates during a natural disaster. This thesis begins by describing the processes that occur on the local, state, and federal level before, during and after a natural disaster. Chapter two explains the events of a disaster and the chain of command responsible for the preparation—with special focus on building codes, response, and recovery efforts. Disasters require cooperation across all levels from local and municipal governments to federally funded agencies and nonprofit groups. This chapter will also discuss where and how historic preservation fits into this process.

Chapter three is a case study discussing these policies in action. In July of 1994, Tropical Storm Alberto traveled from the Gulf of Mexico to the southwestern part of Georgia, southeastern Alabama, and the Florida panhandle. This storm hovered over this area dropping rain for 11 days. By July 14th, 10,000 square miles of Georgia were

underwater. The storm affected hundreds of communities throughout the three states. Of those communities, Montezuma, Georgia was especially devastated. Situated near the Flint River, the town had a history of flooding. No one, however, anticipated the intensity of this storm. By the end of the rain, the entire historic downtown sat below fourteen feet of water. The leaders of this area, as well as state, and local officials embraced historic preservation as a means of rebuilding. This chapter will discuss the success of downtown Montezuma, Georgia as a direct effect of the historic preservation efforts after the Flood of 1994, and highlight the efforts of one affected building owner to restore his business.  

Chapter four is another case study illustrating preservation’s issues during the 1994 Tropical Storm Alberto flooding. On July 7th, following days of constant rain the Flint River surged beyond its banks, affecting many cities along the corridor. Albany, in Dougherty County Georgia, was completely inundated with water. Over 24,000 people were evacuated when the river surged to a record 43.82 feet. The entire campus of Albany State College, now Albany State University, was destroyed, with most of the buildings being under up to 10 feet of water. The current of the river was so hard and the soil of Albany so saturated with water, caskets from the Oakview and Riverside cemeteries were floating downstream. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) agents worked to try to decipher who these people were based on historic records. Over 9,000 Albany residents were displaced by the flood. 2,000 low income homes were completely

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3 Karen Easter and Daryl Barksdale, *After the Flood: Rebuilding Communities Through Historic Preservation*, Historic Preservation Division, Georgia Department of Natural Resources (Atlanta, GA: September 1997), 5-12.
5 Ibid, 28
6 Ibid 29
7 Ibid 33
destroyed. Preservationists faced a lack of political and community will in the restoration of the city’s historic resources, and ethical concerns of rehabilitating in a flood plain. This chapter will also highlight the efforts of a local heritage center as they try to rehabilitate one of their historic buildings.

These particular case studies were chosen for several reasons. Broadly, flooding is the most common kind of natural disaster. This disaster from Tropical Storm Alberto happened seventeen years ago; allowing for a long term perspective that would not be possible for a recent disaster such as Hurricane Katrina. The geographic location of these disasters allowed for easy access to information, and the fact that they resulted from the same storm event suggests that the scale of the required response was commensurate. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Georgia is one of the few states in the U.S. to adopt statewide enabling legislation that requires comprehensive planning at the local level. Since this regulatory framework is already in place, ultimately it allows for easier incorporation of emergency planning into a structured policy document.

The last chapter of this thesis draws conclusions about the state of historic preservation and its incorporation into disaster planning, response, and recovery efforts. It also offers recommendations for how historic preservation should be better incorporated into existing policies. It also offers ideas to those involved with historic resources, whether property owners or members of historic preservation commissions, on how to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. The most important conclusion that can be drawn from this thesis is that historic preservation can help a devastated community. Not only by physically rebuilding or restoring a lost resource, but also by rebuilding the intangible sense of community that resource represents.

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8 Ibid 95.
CHAPTER 2

Natural Disasters and Government Operations

Introduction:

A hazard is an event that has the potential to affect a community; a disaster is when that hazard becomes real. A community’s geographic location, the industries it houses, and its population density can play a part in how a hazard will impact an area. There are two main types of hazards: natural hazards and technological hazards. This thesis will focus solely on natural hazards. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) publication *Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (MHIRA)*, there are 23 types of hazards, ranging from Tropical Cyclones - a natural hazard - to Nuclear Accidents - a technological hazard. This chapter will be a brief narrative of emergency management principles and how, at all levels, the government works to implement these tools to save lives and property.

Preceding Disaster-Mitigation and Preparedness:

The most critical events involving any kind of disaster take place before the threat is realized. As seen in figure 1, the overarching principle in emergency management is mitigation.

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“Mitigation is defined as a sustained action to reduce or eliminate risk to people and property from hazards and their effects.” The “actions”, or tools, of mitigation vary in their severity; it is up to the individual communities to decide which actions are appropriate for their protection. This section will explore the mitigation and preparedness tools available to communities.

The most obvious and necessary tool is hazard identification and mapping. There is no way to protect a location and its populace without knowing what hazards it faces. Advances in geographic information systems (GIS), and federal programs have made this information easier to obtain thus allowing for better community protection.

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National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is an important mitigation tool. In 1968, the NFIP required one of the most rigorous mapping projects ever undertaken by the U.S. Though weak when first created, subsequent disasters have led to reform and changes in the legislation, increasing NFIP power and prominence.\textsuperscript{14} Land use planning, typically occurring at the local level, is a useful mitigation tool. “The strategies for land use planning offer many options for effecting mitigation, including, acquisitions, easements, storm water management, annexation, environmental review, and flood plain management plans.”\textsuperscript{15} Financial incentives, and disincentives, are an emerging tool in mitigation practices. Some local governments have turned to tax increases to pay for mitigation measures, and some federal grant programs are giving local communities the capital to make acquisitions. Grants are also responsible for spurring mitigation funds for community development.\textsuperscript{16} It is important to try to avoid loss of life and property by not building in disaster prone areas in the first place.

The next option for mitigation is very common and wide spread; it is design and construction applications. This tool, in the form of building codes, gives states and local governments the opportunity to require mitigation strategies in new construction and major renovations.\textsuperscript{17}

The building codes concerning flooding adopted and incorporated by the International Building Code (IBC), created by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), are called \textit{Flood Resistant Design and Construction}. These codes are adopted by the state of Georgia as minimum code. These standards are broken down into several

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14] Ibid., 80
\item[15] Ibid., 78
\item[16] Ibid., 79
\end{footnotes}
sections based on the type of floods a structure is likely to encounter based on its location. A structure may fall into one or more of these four areas: Flood Hazard Area, High Risk Flood Hazard Area, Coastal High Hazard Area, and Coastal A Zones. The determination of zones is left to “authority having jurisdiction.”

A flood hazard area is defined as, “1. Those lands within a floodplain subject to a 1% or greater chance of flooding in any year [known as a base flood, or 100 year flood], 2. Those lands designated as a flood hazard area on a community’s flood hazard map, or otherwise legally designated.” This is also referred to as the design flood. A high risk flood hazard area is a, “flood hazards are where one or more of the following hazards are known to occur, alluvial fan flooding, flash floods, mudslides, ice jams, high velocity flows, high velocity wave action, breaking wave heights, greater than or equal to 1.5ft…or erosion.”

The two last areas are determined by the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration via the flood Insurance rate map (FIRM). The coastal high hazard area (CHHA) is an area within the flood hazard area, delineated on the FIRM as a zone A, AE, A1-30, A99, AR, AO, AH, V, VO, VE, or V1-30. It extends from, “offshore to the inland limit of a primary frontal dune along an open coast and any other area that is subject to high velocity wave action from storms or seismic sources.” The coastal A zone (CAZ) is an, “…area within a special flood hazard area, landward of a V zone or landward of an open coast without mapped V Zones. In a [CAZ], the principal source of

19 Ibid. 6.
20 Ibid. 4
21 Ibid. 5
22 Ibid. 3
flooding must be astronomical tides, storm surges, seiches, or tsunamis, not riverine flooding. During base flood conditions, the potential for breaking wave heights shall be greater than or equal to 1.5 ft.”

The location of a structure within one of these zones determines its minimum building standards. The ASCE organized the codes by hazard area. Section one of the *Flood Resistant Design and Construction* are “[g]eneral provisions that apply to all Flood Hazard Areas.” Section two continues with flood hazard areas, section three with high risk flood hazard areas, and section 4 with CHHA and CAZ (see Figure 2). These standards apply to new construction or substantial improvements of existing structures. A substantial improvement is any construction, rehabilitation, or addition to an existing building that exceeds 50% of market value, prior to the improvement. However, there is a caveat for historic buildings (see Figure 3). Historic buildings are exempt from these standards when said implementation would cause a loss of integrity or historic character.

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23 Ibid. 3  
24 Ibid. 2  
25 Ibid. 6
Figure 2: Flow chart to determine if flood resistance standards apply.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{26} American Society of Civil Engineers, \textit{Flood Resistant Design and Construction} (Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2006), 2.
Figure 3: Flow chart to determine if a structure is falls under *Flood Resistant Design and Construction* standards.  

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In section one, the standards dictate elevation and foundation requirements, piers and posts, the use of fill, anchorage and connections, and flood loads in general. Section two expands on section one; giving guidance about specific foundation types, and openings. Section three breaks down requirements for building or improving structures based on the specific hazards faced. No structure may be built near these hazards without protective works to divert water: alluvial fan, flash flood areas, mudslide areas, or erosion-prone areas. Section four gives more stringent rules for CHHAs and CAZs. No use of fill is permitted and foundations must not be slab on grade. There are also specifics about the exact design of and attachment to piles. Sections five-seven give standards for materials, flood-proofing, and utilities respectively. Sections eight and nine give standards for access and ancillary structures. These codes are updated regularly and are the work of several experts in the field of engineering. These codes are our most basic tool for life safety during a natural disaster. They are a silent protector.

The last tool, arguably the most controversial though their usage is widespread, are protective works or structural controls. Through the use of levies, sea walls, jetties, and other like structures, communities hope to protect existing structures. The danger in these lies in the negative impact on the natural environment and the probability of their failure.

Though mitigation measures are the most preferred tool for emergency management, communities still face impediments to their implementation. According to Haddow, those impediments include denial, lack of political will, excessive costs, takings

29 Ibid. 6-27
issues, and mitigation measures that cause a false sense of security. Until a disaster hits, many people live in denial, or are ignorant of the dangers they face. With the attacks of September 11, Hurricane Katrina, and the BP Gulf Oil spill, many communities are now more aware of the risks they face. Unfortunately, the public at large tends to have a type of amnesia about threats once they are out of media coverage; we forget about the risks we still face. This amnesia affects how local politicians approach mitigation measures; if it is not on the minds of their constituents, there is no reason for it being on their agenda. The costs of these measures is also a hindrance. Many of these measures require money that is scarce for many states and local governments. It is hard to convince someone to spend money on a preventative measure when the same money can go towards a project that will have immediate benefits.

There are funding options available to these communities from the federal government. These programs include policies that support mitigation, and financial and technical assistance from FEMA, the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Economic Development Administration (EDA), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and many other departments and agencies of the federal government.31 These federal programs have varying requirements that change as legislation about emergency management evolves. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 200032 amended the federal disaster policy laid out by the Robert T. Stafford Act33. It creates

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planning requirements for State, local, and Indian tribal governments as a condition of mitigation assistance. It also provides for limited funding for creating a mitigation plan.  

Mitigation is the future of emergency management. It will take public awareness of the benefits of these tools to make mitigation a political priority. Mitigation, though, is not the only aspect to consider before a disaster strikes. There is preparedness. Similar to mitigation in that it tries to anticipate the outcome of a disaster and avoid worse case scenarios, it is different in its application. Preparedness involves an attitude of anticipation.

“Preparedness…can best be defined as a state of readiness to respond to a disaster, crisis, or any other type of emergency situation.” Unlike mitigation measures, preparedness is something that individuals, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations can also participate in. It allows a community to have provisions in place to help expedite response and recovery to a disaster. Preparedness can mean many things, but in the terms of emergency management FEMA broke down preparedness into a continuing cycle with a few key actions: plan, organize, train, equip, exercise, evaluate, and improve (see figure 4). Public education and awareness is also a critical part of preparedness.

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Emergency plans are necessary to apply for many aid resources; as a result planning is one of the most important aspects of preparedness. The emergency plan can stand alone, or be included as a part of a comprehensive plan. It should contain response actions, and long term recovery strategies, and allow for practice exercises and training opportunities. The emergency plan should also address evacuation concerns, and consider special populations during times of disaster such as the elderly and handicapped. The plan should also include implementation strategies and a chain of command that establishes order during the emergency. Considerations should also be made for back up measures if personnel are limited.

Another important piece in the planning stage is public awareness. Efforts should be made to educate the public about the risks their community faces and encourage each

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individual to prepare a plan for their family. Unlike mitigation, preparedness is the task of every individual. Non-profits and nongovernmental organizations also play an important role in preparedness by assisting in public awareness projects and training and coordinating emergency volunteers. When hazards become real, it usually is not one, single issue; it is many hazards compounding to create a disaster. A cyclone may cause dam failures. A severe thunderstorm may also cause fires. It is therefore important that these risks be calculated carefully and that a plan is formed to minimize loss of life and damage to property. The preparation for and response to a natural disaster can be broken down by government levels: local, state, and national. The degree of involvement at each level depends on the severity of the disaster.

Planners at the local level can help prior to an event by including the following choices in the historic preservation element of their emergency plans:

1. Provide local public safety officials with maps and floor plans for major historic facilities…
2. Establish lines of communication in advance between local planning and building officials and a designated coordinator for such facilities.
3. Use a through inventory of local historic resources and their vulnerabilities to establish priorities for post-disaster preservation efforts…
4. The historic preservation community can be mobilized by plan to muster second opinions about buildings that might otherwise be deemed appropriate for demolition…
5. Work with the state historic preservation officer (SHPO) and others to provide or identify for the owners of historic buildings training resources and opportunities pertinent to protecting their buildings from the impacts of disasters.
6. Identify, create, and promote the use of financial and technical assistance resources for hazard mitigation and retrofitting for historic resources and, where possible, incorporate suitable historic properties into
local hazard mitigation plans.\textsuperscript{38}

The best recovery and response to a disaster starts with a well thought out plan.

\textbf{Local Response and Recovery:}

Response is the name given to the actions taken directly following a disaster. The first responders are local fire and police agencies. These responders are the obvious first level of government response, “[p]eople expect to see them there and would be distressed if they were not.”\textsuperscript{39} They have several important duties; prior to and during the emergency, they may be responsible for enforcing evacuations and immediate first aid. Police play a vital role in directing traffic and ensuring the protection of the disaster zones. Local fire departments not only put out fires, but also help to rescue victims trapped in debris or other vulnerable situations.\textsuperscript{40} Local jurisdictions should have agreements amongst neighboring communities for help during times of disaster. Even at the local level cooperation is paramount to reduce casualties and property damage.\textsuperscript{41}

Depending on the frequency and the types of disasters faced, some local governments may employ a specific emergency manager. However, in many local jurisdictions no singular emergency manager exists, and it falls into the work program of another local official. Many times this falls to an official in a related emergency field, such as fire chief. Regardless of the capacity of the emergency manager it is their responsibility to coordinate the response efforts, ensuring that resources are deployed

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 24
properly. The job of an emergency manager is made easier if they have created a plan prior to an emergency. Though planners may not have a direct role immediately following a disaster they, “can work to build consensus prior to an event around a vision of the post disaster community that will guide long-term redevelopment.”\textsuperscript{42} The role of the planner is to ensure that the immediate response efforts respect the long term goals the city has agreed upon.

The building code enforcement agencies at the local level have an incredibly important job following a disaster. They determine which buildings are habitable, thus how much long term assistance a community needs. Beyond code enforcement they should be familiar with the requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program and work with State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) to assess damaged historic resources. It is imperative that this survey process begin as soon as possible following the disaster. The Building Officials Association of Florida outlines the basic function of building officials following a disaster as securing damaged areas, answering calls, habitability assessment, inspections, utilities, and permitting/NFIP compliance.\textsuperscript{43} The biggest issue facing building officials in regard to historic resources following a natural disaster is lack of technical expertise. Many officials and building owners are unaware of the particular qualities of historic materials and building techniques and unfortunately, “[r]estorable buildings are torn down.”\textsuperscript{44} Technical assistance in the survey stage is important to save historic resources.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 28-30
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 104
Finally the city manager’s or mayor’s primary function during a natural disaster is as a communicator and coordinator. He should work closely with the heads of all other local agencies to coordinate response efforts. He should act as the main mouthpiece of the community during times of response, as well a liaison with state officials and state representatives to disperse vital necessities and information.

The better the preparedness and planning of a community, the quicker and more efficiently it will respond. The transition from response to recovery is not clear; the response could simply last hours or go on for weeks. The most obvious difference between the two phases of emergency management lies in the goal of the actions taken. The goals of response actions are more focused on immediate need and speed. Actions in recovery focus on the long term needs of a community. Local recovery efforts vary according to the severity of a disaster. They range from mitigation measures such as new building code legislation, to a reevaluation of local emergency plans. Redevelopment agencies within local governments may set new land use regulations because of disaster events; local transportation agencies may develop new plans.

“If there is a common element here, it is the need for someone to be in charge and to establish emergency response and planning for post disaster recovery as governmental priorities.”45 At the local level it is imperative that there be a clear plan for an immediate response to a natural disaster. It is also clear that even at the lowest local level, there is a need for interagency/departmental/office cooperation. Most emergency situations are handled at the local level. If resources at the local level are overwhelmed the local city manager or mayor may request aid from the state government.

State Response and Recovery:

“States do not respond to natural disasters without a request for help from the local (usually county level) jurisdiction.” Each state has a set protocol to respond to natural disasters and it varies according to what types and frequency of disasters a state faces. Most states have some sort of legislation granting powers to a state emergency management head or equivalent role to allocate state emergency agency resources. The emergency manager also oversees the coordination of outside aid to a community. Just as at the local level, “[n]eighboring communities play a key role in providing support through a framework of mutual aid and assistance agreements,” neighboring states also assist with aid such as personnel and equipment. The principles of these agreements are dictated by National Incident Management Systems (NIMS). The state emergency management agency’s relationship with the SHPO will be discussed in a later section.

The governor is in charge of communication and the National Guard. It is important, especially with so many state agencies involved, that there is just one source for accurate information. The National Guard acts separately from any federal military forces that may be assisting with the disaster. The National Guard is specially trained in logistics, decontamination, search and rescue, and is an invaluable asset to a community. When the affected areas move from response to recovery the state’s biggest role comes into play.

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46 Ibid., 33
47 Ibid. 33.
The state is the intermediary for aid and resources from outside agencies, organizations, and the federal government. It is at the state level that a request for a presidential disaster declaration process begins. It is also the responsibility of the state to evaluate itself, both during and after the disaster, to determine its shortcomings and strengths. This evaluation policy is essential in handling the next disaster more efficiently to save more lives and property.

**Federal Response and Recovery:**

Once the local and state governments have exhausted their resources, they may petition the President to declare a disaster. Though it is not required for some aid, a disaster declaration opens the door of funding to the states, which then acts a conduit for the federal funds to local governments, citizens, and private businesses. The President can declare an emergency or a major disaster, this difference depends on severity and opens up different avenues of funding for a community. According to the Stafford Act an,

“Emergency” means any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.\(^{51}\)

And a,

“Major disaster” means any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{52}\) Ibid.
The process for these declarations is the same; it is the FEMA director and ultimately the President that makes the determination of severity. The disaster declaration process is also set out in Stafford Act and clarified through various documents including the National Response Framework.

The local government first responds immediately to a disaster. If the resource at the local jurisdiction is overwhelmed, the city manager or mayor petitions the state government for help. The state government deploys their emergency plan. It utilizes all the resources within its power, as well as from neighboring states. The state surveys the damaged area with regional FEMA officers and other federal officials. It creates a preliminary disaster assessment (PDA). The PDA, “summarizes [the] resulting needs of individuals, businesses, public sector, and community as a whole.” This assessment also looks at factors such as the extent of damage to public utilities, schools, firehouses and police departments, and hospitals. It also factors in the extent of damages to business and individuals, displacement, and the effect of the disaster on the health and safety of the community. This document is reviewed at the regional level by regional FEMA officials then sent onto FEMA headquarters in Washington, D.C., and through the Department of Homeland Security, onto the President.

There are several factors considered in reviewing a governor’s petition for federal aid and assistance. These include, but are not limited to:

- Amount and type of damage (number of homes destroyed or with major damage);

54 Ibid.
• Impact on the infrastructure of affected areas or critical facilities;
• Inminent threats to public health and safety;
• Impacts to essential government services and functions;
• Unique capability of Federal government;
• Dispersion or concentration of damage;
• Level of insurance coverage in place for homeowners and public facilities;
• Assistance available from other sources (Federal, State, local, voluntary organizations);
• State and local resource commitments from previous, undeclared events; and
• Frequency of disaster events over recent time period.55

There are no set statutes or guidelines the president must follow. Though FEMA sets agency guidelines as to what it recommends, the President has sole discretion on the determination of a disaster declaration.

Once a disaster declaration is made the state is eligible for several types of assistance. There are three main categories of assistance, which type a state receives depends on the severity and type of disaster encountered. The aid categories are individual assistance, public assistance, and hazard mitigation assistance.56 Individual assistance is given directly to households and citizens, public assistance is aid given to states and local governments to repair infrastructure, and hazard mitigation is given to communities to undertake projects to prevent or lessen damage from another disaster.57 Other agencies besides FEMA give aid in the form of grants and loans. Entities such as the Small Business Administration (SBA) or the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) give out monies and technical assistance to victims of major natural disasters. Though a Presidential declaration provides the bulk of aid to states, some

57 Ibid.
agencies do not require a declaration to give aid and assistance, “some types of assistance, such as Fire Management Assistance Grants – which provide support to states experiencing severe wildfires – are performed by Federal departments or agencies under their own authorities and do not require Presidential approval.”

**Where does historic preservation fit in?**

The above sections describe how the government, at all levels, operates during a time of national disaster. The system of governmental assistance and aid during an emergency situation is defined by legislation and regulations. The types of aid and assistance depends on how severe and widespread the disaster. The question of this thesis still remains, where does historic preservation fit in? This section will address preservation at the local, state, and federal level, and where, if at all, preservation overlaps with emergency management. Chapter five will give recommendations as to how the relationship between disaster management and historic preservation could be improved.

Historic preservation is a grass roots effort and is not mandated at the local level. In the state of Georgia, the Georgia Historic Preservation Act (GHPA) allows counties and municipalities that set up a preservation ordinance to maintain a historic preservation commission. This commission oversees material changes to the external appearance of designated historic resources or historic districts; owners of buildings protected under local ordinances must receive a certificate of appropriateness from the commission before proceeding with the work. However, local municipalities are exempt from this article; they must just submit their plans and allow forty-five days for the commission to
comment. There are no emergency provisions in the GHPA. The local government is the first response to a natural disaster. After a disaster, health and safety are the first concern. The biggest issue facing local government is working, “…with so much pressure to make quick, unprecedented, judgment calls.” Decisions are made to return to normal as quickly as possible; in the process many historic resources are lost.

Local governments can also enhance preservation efforts by becoming a certified local government (CLG). The requirements to become certified are dictated by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and expanded upon in each state’s own preservation laws. A CLG may help integrate historic preservation into local planning initiatives, opening the door for more state and federal grants and technical assistance. This program allows for a more effective relay of historic preservation funds during a disaster and promotes collaboration between all levels of government in regards to historic preservation. This connection to the state allows local access to historic preservation funds during natural disasters.

Every state and nearly every American territory—besides the Midway Islands—has a state historic preservation officer/office (SHPO). The SHPO is responsible for carrying out the duties set forth in the NHPA. Those duties include:

A) in cooperation with Federal and State agencies, local governments, and private organizations and individuals, direct and conduct a comprehensive statewide survey of historic properties and maintain inventories of such properties;

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(B) identify and nominate eligible properties to the National Register and otherwise administer applications for listing historic properties on the National Register;

(C) prepare and implement a comprehensive statewide historic preservation plan;

(D) administer the State program of Federal assistance for historic preservation within the State;

(E) advise and assist, as appropriate, Federal and State agencies and local governments in carrying out their historic preservation responsibilities;

(F) cooperate with the Secretary, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and other Federal and State agencies, local governments, and organizations and individuals to ensure that historic properties are taken into consideration at all levels of planning and development;

(G) provide public information, education and training, and technical assistance in historic preservation;

(H) cooperate with local governments in the development of local historic preservation programs and assist local governments in becoming certified pursuant to subsection (c);

(I) consult with the appropriate Federal agencies in accordance with this Act on-

   (i) Federal undertakings that may affect historic properties; and

   (ii) the content and sufficiency of any plans developed to protect, manage, or to reduce or mitigate harm to such properties; and

(J) advise and assist in the evaluation of proposals for rehabilitation projects that may qualify for Federal assistance.\(^{61}\)

These directions allow for the state officials to work with other agencies as they see fit to carry our preservation duties. The NHPA encourages interagency cooperation and

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\(^{61}\) The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a to 470w-6, Sec. 101(b) (3)
communication at the state level. There is no explicit emergency provision in the requirements; those listed above are all that is required of the SHPO. Indirectly, all of these requirements can pertain to emergency situations.

The federal government also has legislation guiding its historic preservation practices. The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) is the nation’s guiding legislation on historic preservation. Section 106 within the act requires a review process for any federal undertaking involving a resource on or eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. An undertaking is defined by the NHPA as

- a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including —
- (A) those carried out by or on behalf of the agency;
- (B) those carried out with Federal financial assistance;
- (C) those requiring a Federal permit license, or approval; and
- (D) those subject to State or local regulation administered pursuant to a delegation or approval by a Federal agency.\(^{62}\)

FEMA, since it is a federal agency, triggers the section 106 review process through its granting program. So all of the grant money and assistance given to properties that are at least 50 years old, and carry significance in association, architecture, or data output will trigger a review.

Section 106 review is expanded upon in the Code of Federal Regulations, 36 CFR 800. These regulations set forth specific guidance as to the roles and responsibilities of the federal agency. Since FEMA typically deals with such a large volume of resources in time-sensitive conditions, many states have set up programmatic agreements (PA) with FEMA. The PAs “completely replace” the review process, define scope of work, and

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\(^{62}\) *National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)*, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a to 470w-6, Sec.302:32.
shorten the review time by the State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO). These PAs are signed by FEMA, SHPO, if applicable the Tribal Historic Preservation Office (THPO), the state emergency management office, and the Advisory Council for Historic Preservation (ACHP). FEMA funds typically restore a resource back to its pre-disaster condition. Programmatic allowances permit 95% of projects like these to go without review, giving FEMA and the SHPO time to focus on the 5% that aren’t beneath the PA’s umbrella. Those projects that do not fit into the PA receive a specific memorandum of agreement (MOA) detailing the adverse effects to the resource. Like the PA, signatories will include FEMA, SHPO/THPO, and ACHP. Concurring parties can include the state emergency management agency, the applicant, or other interested parties such as a local historic preservation society.

The main purpose of section 110 of the NHPA is to mandate that Federal Agencies consider historic preservation in their planning, and requires them to use Section 106 review when a property may be adversely affected. In section 110(j), however, under their control the Secretary of the Interior is given the right to waive all or parts of section 110 in the face of a natural disaster, or national security threat.

Preservation can be involved at every level of government. Preservation can also be a consideration at nearly every stage of an emergency, though it is only mandated if federal dollars are used. It is up to local governments and states to make sure preservation is a consideration in emergency planning. Local preservationists and

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64 Ibid.
66 Ibid. 51.
operators of historic sites can and should have their own emergency plans. At the local government level, building inspectors should be aware of any local ordinances or registers of recognized historic districts or individual resources. They need to understand that these resources need to be dealt with differently. Because lack of communication, misunderstandings, and a deficit in public education, many historic resources are in more grave danger due to human choices after disasters than the disasters themselves.67 The following chapters will present case studies examining how two cities utilized historic preservation during disasters, the challenges and the lessons learned.

CHAPTER 3
Case Study: Montezuma 1994 Floods

Brief History:

Montezuma, in Macon County, Georgia was incorporated in 1854 at the intersection of the ever expanding railroad line and the Flint River. This prime location allowed Montezuma to grow and expand as a, “…regional trade center for outlying areas and an interim market for outbound cotton via rail.”\(^{68}\) After the Civil War, Samuel Henry Rumph developed the Elberta peach and refrigerated shipping methods allowing for widespread distribution of the fruit. Thanks to this advancement and the quality of other crops, Montezuma experienced a population boom between the late 1880s and the 1920s. Montezuma has a long history of agriculture, morphing into the frozen foods business. As the years wore on, most people in Montezuma left agriculture behind. Today the majority of the residents are employed in retail.\(^{69}\) Historic preservation was not a main focus of the city. The local historical society sought to purchase the historic train depot; though, they were unsuccessful in raising the funds. Local residents and officials were not aware of the many funding opportunities available through the various state grants.\(^{70}\)

\(^{68}\) Cherie Blizzard and Glen Bennett, 2000 National Register of Historic Places - Nomination Form, Montezuma Historic District, Manuscript on file, Historic Preservation Division of Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Atlanta: 26.


\(^{70}\) Caren Gibbs, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
Being situated adjacent to the Flint River and near many tributaries like Beaver Creek, the town is prone to flooding. There were major floods in 1902, 1929, and 1948 (see Figure 5).

![Historic image of the 1929 flood in Montezuma, Georgia.](image)

The Army Core of Engineers (ACE) constructed a 29 foot levee in 1958 to help curtail the flood waters that had reached the business district in 1948. It was built three feet higher than the record flooding of 26.3 feet in 1929. The floods were minimal, and there was no local flood preparedness program. The only governmental preparedness official was at the county level. The levee was successful in limiting the floods until 1994.

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71 Macon County Historical Museum Archives, Flood Display, scanned August 24, 2010.
72 Caren Gibbs, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
Disaster:
Tropical Storm Alberto made landfall on the Florida’s panhandle near Fort Walton Beach, Florida on July 4, 1994. The winds at that time clocked 65 miles per hour, and had done little damage as it made its way through the Caribbean and into the Gulf of Mexico. The storm moved, north-northeastward; stalling over west Georgia, making a loop, before heading west and dissipating over Alabama 4 days later (See Figure 6).

Figure 6: Graphic of Tropical Storm Alberto’s Path

During that time, Alberto’s rainfall had caused severe flooding covering a total of 900,000 acres in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.\(^75\)

Rain had been falling all holiday weekend prior to Alberto’s arrival and by July 5\(^{th}\) Sheriff Charles Canton and his deputies alerted Macon County Emergency Management Director Gerald Abbott about impending danger to residents near Horse and Toteover Creek. Heavy rain in the days prior caused dams to break, quickly bringing water to dangerously high levels. The emergency workers and sheriff’s deputies began going door to door warning rural residents and evacuating some to safety. By Wednesday, July 6\(^{th}\) the rain continued unabated, causing the first signs of flooding in Montezuma. Bear Creek overflowed its banks and the levee, flooding homes on Railroad Street and moving into downtown Montezuma.\(^76\) On the same day, Governor Zell Miller declared a state of disaster in Georgia.\(^77\) The merchants in the business district worked diligently to evacuate their stores of valuable merchandise before the waters of the Flint River rose to dangerous levels. Law enforcement workers had to ask merchants to stay away from the area for their own safety.\(^78\) The rain did not cease.

Thursday July the 7\(^{th}\) brought about the worst for Montezuma. By then, the downtown district was a, “lake of muddy water” (see Figure 7).\(^79\)


\(^{77}\) Historic Preservation Division, “After the Flood: Rebuilding Communities Through Historic Preservation,” Georgia Department of Natural Resources (1997): 5.


\(^{79}\) Ibid.
More residents of riverside homes were evacuated. There was a devastating fire at the Southern Frozen Food Plant, and residents lost their drinking water. By Friday, the Flint had crested at an unheard of level; no exact measurement was available as the waters raged above the gage. On Saturday July 8th, President Bill Clinton declared Macon County, and fifty-four other counties in Georgia, disaster areas. The American Red Cross, the National Guard, the Mennonite Disaster Service MDS, and local churches were first on the scene with immediate aid to residents.\(^8^1\)

**Recovery:**

City manager, David Peaster, retired military, had experience in disaster management.\(^8^2\) He set up a local task force to assist affected residents and business

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\(^8^0\) Montezuma Downtown Development Authority, Flood Record Folder, scanned August 24, 2010

\(^8^1\) Ibid.

\(^8^2\) Daryl Barksdale, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
owners. The task force was made up of residents not affected by the floods. Caren Allgood (now Gibbs) was volunteered as chairperson of that task force. She was a local business owner and president of the Montezuma historical society. During the clean-up process representatives from SBA, FEMA, and GEMA were there offering low interest loans to the overwhelmed business owners. This task force was critical in assisting the overwhelmed disaster victims seek all available aid.

HPD pulled surveys, which were few and incomplete, and called the Regional Commission (RC). Teams of people made up of representatives from the RCs, HPD, the Georgia Trust, and FEMA went out to do damage assessment. The teams tried talking to property owners, but the owners were very emotional, and the interviews were not productive. The Historic Preservation Division of Georgia’s Department of Natural Resources established contact with preservationists in the southwest region as early as July 7th and began compiling data on historic resources in the area.

The town’s leaders aggressively sought any funding sources to assist residents in the recovery and rebuilding process, though many of the privately owned commercial buildings were not eligible for the typical types of disaster aid. Downtown merchants sought aid from HPD to fill in the gaps left by the federal aid system, “… over 40 of the 57 buildings in the downtown area were determined eligible for grant assistance.”

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83 Caren Gibbs, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
84 Caren Gibbs, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
85 Caren Gibbs, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
86 Daryl Barksdale, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
89 Ibid. 21.
granted a total of $598,435 for façade rehabilitation and structural stabilization.\textsuperscript{90} Work on facade restoration started in August of 1996 and was completed in August 1997.\textsuperscript{91} Spurred by the influx of recovery funds and inspired by preservation efforts, Montezuma took steps to legitimize historic preservation in their community. The city began by enacting an ordinance, and working toward becoming a CLG.\textsuperscript{92} In October of 1998 the city became a full-fledged CLG; “…an Economic Development Authority/Community Development Block grant funded streetscape improvement plans for Montezuma to complement rehabilitation efforts.”\textsuperscript{93} The Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation secured a $100,000 grant to develop long range plans for the city in terms of, “economic development, heritage tourism, and downtown revitalization.”\textsuperscript{94} Though Montezuma had no HPC before the flood, it adopted an ordinance and created a local historic district shortly after the flood.

Most of these rehabilitation recovery efforts were focused on the downtown business district. Several residential properties were affected, particularly those along Railroad Street. FEMA sought a buyout of thirty-four properties for demolition. FEMA determined that though many of these properties were National Register eligible, they needed to be razed as a matter of public safety. Through the use of FEMA grants, and community development block grants (CDBG), two of these properties were relocated.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, 21-22.
\textsuperscript{91} Caren Gibbs, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
\textsuperscript{92} Historic Preservation Division, “After the Flood: Rebuilding Communities Through Historic Preservation,” Georgia Department of Natural Resources (1997): 22
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, 23.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
and the rest of the structures were razed, and the lands were turned over to the city. They built a park in their stead.95

Montezuma was proactive and accommodating to state and federal officials and had a lot of initiative.96 The city eventually hired Caren Gibbs as Flood Grant Coordinator. She helped advance flood recovery and a component of that was historic preservation. The city manager, David Peaster, was a good facilitator. He leveraged attention from the floods for more assistance to the small town.

The McKenzie Building:

A good example of the “typical” experience of an historic resource in Montezuma is the McKenzie building. The original request for this building said this location was the, “…former site of J. M. Brown warehouse on the corner of Cherry Street and West Brook Street.”97 115 Cherry Street, as it is known today, is right off of the main avenue in Montezuma, Dooly Street. It has housed several businesses in is life, from a bank when it was built in 1918 to a lumber company in the 1950s. Since 1972, it has been owned by the McKenzie family and has housed the McKenzie Insurance Agency. The insurance agency kept the historic vault and counters used for the bank since its construction in 1918. Today it also houses a local radio station in the upstairs offices (see figures 8-10).

96 Daryl Barksdale, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.
97 Tommy McKenzie, personal archives. See Appendix D.
Figure 8. Historic image façade of 115 Cherry Street.  

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Montezuma Downtown Development Authority, Photographic Archives.
Figure 9: Historic image of the facade on Cherry Street.  

99 Montezuma Downtown Development Authority, Photographic Archives.
Figure 10: Historic image façade of 115 Cherry Street and Current View

100 Top: Montezuma Downtown Development Authority, Photographic Archives. Bottom: Photo by author September 2011
Wednesday morning, July 6th a flash flood started. Mr. McKenzie walked the levee, and noticed the water was just 18 inches below top and storm grates were expelling water. Concerned, he called the sheriff and was assured the levee would hold. As a precaution, he and his staff moved all of the files and computers on top of the old banking counter (see figure 11). Slurry ponds from up river started the surging that went down to Bear Creek, and the water went over the levee. With his building and property secure, Mr. McKenzie dismissed his staff and began helping other businesses in the downtown (see figure 12).

![Image](image_url)

Figure 11: Image of interior of 115 Cherry Street at 1950 bank opening.\(^{101}\)

\(^{101}\) Montezuma Downtown Development Authority, Photographic Archives.
As the water continued to rise, he realized his business was about to be completely flooded. He was warned about returning to his building on three separate occasions, but went ahead to his offices to remove the files by boat. Later that day he finally moved all of his business files to a family home on higher ground across from city hall. The water was extremely polluted. Water went from 4 feet deep in 115 Cherry Street to 9 ½ feet (See Figures 13-15).

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102 Tommy McKKenzie personal archives.
Figure 13. Aerial Image of flooded Montezuma. McKenzie building circled in red.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{103} Tommy McKenzie personal archives.
Figure 14. Aerial Image of flooded Montezuma. McKenzie building circled in red.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{104} Tommy McKenzie personal archives.
Figure 15. Aerial Image of flooded Montezuma. McKenzie building circled in red.105

Once the water receded, the clean-up began. A team of Menonite Disaster Relief workers showed up at his door and told him to gut his building and remove all of the plaster. He said no three times to the same man and his crew of 11. Finally after consulting an engineer, Mr. McKenzie decided to allow the highly skilled relief workers assist him in gutting the entire first floor of the building. After working with the aid workers, McKenzie took his own crew to assist his neighbors in gutting their buildings. Busses of people came from Atlanta, untrained/unskilled workers, people from banks, everyone showed up to help. However, many of the volunteers were more of burden than

105 Tommy MckKenzie personal archives.
a help, because they had no idea what to do. During the, “…Hot muggy, mud-pit of a July.” Mr. McKenzie helped many of his neighbors.

After a month of running air conditioners, fans, and dehumidifiers in 115 Cherry Street, and checking the residual moisture in the bricks, Mr. McKenzie felt it was time to start rebuilding. He got most of his rebuilding tools/materials from Mennonite Disaster Service. They set up a warehouse in town where much of the donated building materials were allocated. Four months later he moved back into offices. Several people wanted to abandon downtown and move up to Walnut Street, but most recognized the historic value of downtown Montezuma and decided to rebuild. The block grant did a total streetscape (see Figures 16) and rehabilitated the exterior of building.

Figure 16. Progress of downtown streetscaping project. View from 115 Cherry Street.  

Mr. McKenzie had to sign a waiver that he would not make any changes to façade for 5 years. Montezuma, had a, “…brand new town.” Currently the McKenzie building is in good condition with only a few apparent cosmetic updates needed (see Figure 17-19).

106 Tommy McKenzie personal archives.  
107 Entire McKenzie Building Section from Tommy McKenzie, interviewed by author, Montezuma, GA, September 14, 2011.
Figure 17. Current state of McKenzie Building. West elevation detail.\footnote{Photos by author, September 2011}
Figure 18. Current state of McKenzie building. Façade close up.
Figure 19. Current state of 115 Cherry Street, the McKenzie Building.
Conclusion:

Communication and cooperation amongst agencies, the local government, and the people were effective. A big meeting held at city hall shortly after the flooding demonstrated this. Representatives from DCA, GEMA, FEMA, HPD, Georgia Trust, and Montezuma local officials gathered together for an informational meeting for residents. However, residents were faced with a very real mess that required more than just information.

As the waters began to recede Montezuma was faced with a massive clean-up. The first challenge to preservation was access to the resources. The nearly sixty buildings of their historic core sat under as much as fourteen feet of water for 5 days. In a rush to regain control of their lives, property owners and well-meaning volunteers tore out many historic elements, such as plaster walls and wood floor boards. They were unaware that these pieces could be salvaged. Cash flow for businesses was non-existent, in the case of Tommy McKenzie all of his collateral was under water. It is important to recognize the different needs of business owners during times of disaster.

As a result of historic preservation efforts by the business owners, a whole new world of funding opened up for the city. Montezuma started seeking other funds to help with restoration. Through the Economic Development Administration they got a grant, and then used CDGB money as matching funds. The railroad donated the historic depot and received two grants of $612,000 to rehabilitate the depot. Montezuma implemented design guidelines, and now has an active HPC. It sent town representatives to Your

111 Tommy McKenzie, interviewed by author, Montezuma, GA, September 14, 2011.
Town Seminars held by the University of Georgia. It gave planning training to many small towns. The flood and subsequent preservation efforts brought a town back to life.\footnote{Caren Gibbs, interviewed by author via phone, Atlanta, GA, September 30, 2011.}

One of the early challenges for Montezuma, and really, the entirety of Southwest Georgia was the lack of complete, accurate, and up-to-date surveys. It hindered funding and took more time to identify historic resources because the locations were not documented.

Montezuma also illustrates a common problem with disaster relief from the government. Many times small business owners and private property owners fall through the cracks of grant funding. Historic preservation is a highly effective and beneficial way to close those funding shortfalls. It allows monies to be used for various methods of rehabilitation and can be administered by the city itself in the form of block grants.

Today Montezuma’s downtown buildings are continually preserved through efforts from the downtown development authority, facade easements held by the city, and the HPC. Local festivals and businesses still bring people in to the downtown core. In the fiscal year 2010, the city of Montezuma continues streetscape improvements and maintenance of their streetscape, by requesting appropriations through Congress.\footnote{Sanford D, Bishop Jr., “Transportation FY2010 Appropriations Requests,” Sanford D, Bishop Jr., http://bishop.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=271:transportation-fy2010-appropriations-requests&catid=18html (accessed October 20, 2011).}

The flooding of 1994 brought about several positive changes to Montezuma. When the disaster struck, the city manager created a task force of locals to help their neighbors. Networks were established to help people navigate the many funding opportunities available. The city manager also leveraged attention to bring in large grants
to the city through working with state and local officials. Though these experiences were positive for the community, lack of proper technical assistance allowed for repairable historic material to be removed from buildings. Furthermore, after the disaster and the rebirth of downtown, residents became complacent again. Montezuma did not take the opportunity to involve local officials in continued disaster preparedness. Now that the flooding is a distant memory in the minds of residents and local officials, the community may once again be threatened by lack of planning for the disastrous consequences of another flood.
CHAPTER 4

Case Study: Albany a city inundated

**Brief History:**

The land on which Albany sits originally belonged to the Creek Indians. They were expelled in the early 1830s to make way for white expansion. Taking advantage of the newly available land, Merchant Nelson Tift founded Albany on the Flint River in October of 1836. In 1856, Albany was named county seat for Dougherty County, and by 1860 became a prime market for cotton. This market boom was based in part because of its geographical position at the Flint River, and in part because of Tift’s maneuverings to extend the railroad. The majority of the people that lived in Albany during this period were enslaved African-Americans brought in to work on the cotton plantations in Dougherty County; this majority would last until the mid-twentieth century. The town had rapid growth throughout antebellum period, but progress lagged during the Civil War. This area of Georgia saw no direct fighting but suffered the general decline and neglect that faced much of the south during Reconstruction. Fires in the 1870s ravaged the downtown area, destroying much of the building stock from the antebellum period.

The twentieth century saw major changes for Albany. “In 1903 African American educator Joseph Winthrop Holley founded the Albany Bible and Manual

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115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

Training Institute, a private precollegiate school. Eventually the state took over the school and made it a two-year, and eventually a four-year, college. In 1996 it became Albany State University, one of the few historically black institutions in the University System of Georgia.”

Farmers in the region switched from cotton to more profitable crops. The 1930s brought livestock to the area, and a meatpacking facility in 1936. In 1940, a tornado hit the town and destroyed several blocks of commercial district rebuilt on Pine Avenue and Washington Streets. Until the 1940s the majority of the population were African Americans. World War II brought two military airbases. After the war many who trained at these bases came back to the area. The influx of people into the area changed the demographics, and for the first time whites were the majority.

During the Civil Rights Movement the Albany chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) helped to strike oppressive Jim Crow Laws, and increased the number of African American registered voters. Between 1960-1980 the white population plummeted to 8% but still held onto political power.

In the 1970s downtown began to deteriorate, and by the 1980s huge swaths of downtown Albany were razed for “revitalization”. “1990s saw the beginning of a major downtown renovation with the creation of a Flint River Walk, designed to bring

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119 Ibid.
121 Ibid
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid
Albanians back to downtown and to the river responsible for the city's founding.” 126 In 2004 a freshwater Riverquarium opened in a bid to attract visitors. The main attraction in Albany, the river, is also its biggest threat. Being adjacent to the Flint River, Albany is no stranger to floods; major floods hit Albany in 1841 and 1925. But nothing in the city’s past could prepare the residents for the 500 year floods of 1994.

Disaster:

The same storm that hit Montezuma, Tropical Storm Alberto, devastated Albany in the summer of 1994. Albany’s Independence Day festivities were cancelled due to rain, and many people flocked to a chain barbecue restaurant to make up for the homemade barbecue they missed. The Albany Herald warned of the impending tropical storm, the first of the season. The only predisaster mitigation was a levee near Albany State University.127

On July 7th, Dougherty County Administrator Alan Reddish, and other officials, were told that the river would crest at 37 feet, 17 feet above flood stage.128 14,000 Albany residents were warned to evacuate.129 The evacuation was supposed to take place by 6pm. Many residents were obstinate, and decided to stay. When Reddish got a call at 2:30 in the morning about people being evacuated from rooftops, he knew Albany was in trouble, the river had surged to 41 feet. The main thoroughfares into the city, the East-West bridges were closed.130 Emergency management personnel went door to door trying to evacuate people. The Albany police were on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs),

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129 Ibid, 8.
assisting evacuees. Hotels on higher grounds filled quickly. City and county work crews, troops from the Marine Corps Logistics Base, and volunteers began assembling sand bags at the Albany Civic Center; some were used for the facility and others were distributed out.\textsuperscript{131}

By July Friday 8\textsuperscript{th} President Bill Clinton declared Dougherty County a national disaster area.\textsuperscript{132} The Albany Assistant City Manager put a call out for local volunteers, and hundreds of people stepped up. The Flint River rose to 43.3 feet.\textsuperscript{133} “Now a ‘caring army’ was mobilizing Southwest Georgia: 275 DNR officials, 200 state troopers, 2800 members of the Georgia Army and Air National Guard, hundreds of Marines, 16 aircraft, 150 boats, 25 all-terrain vehicles, 278 wheeled vehicles, and 64 engineering vehicles”\textsuperscript{134} The current of the Flint River moved so swiftly, caskets from the low lying cemeteries Oakview and Riverside began floating downstream (see Figure 20).\textsuperscript{135}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid, 21-22.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ibid, 28
\item \textsuperscript{134} Ibid, 27.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid 33
\end{itemize}
By Saturday July 9th 16 shelters for flood evacuees were set up in Dougherty County,\textsuperscript{137} Albany State College was awash, and the Water Gas and Light Commissioner reported that four substations were out and his command center was standing in 5 feet of water.\textsuperscript{138} Helicopters with heat recognition devices helped police prevent looters.\textsuperscript{139} At this point 24,200 people had been evacuated from the Flint River’s rising waters.\textsuperscript{140} Reports were coming in that Sunday July 10th would bring an end to the Flint River’s rising waters, but that point actually came on Monday July 11, at 7:15 AM, the highest

\textsuperscript{136} Thronateeska Heritage Museum Archives, Flood Photos, scanned September 2011.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid 11,
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid 29
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid 37.
\textsuperscript{140} The Albany Herald, Flood of Memories (Albany, Georgia: Broad Street Production Company, 1994), 32.
crest of the Flint hit Albany at 43.82 feet (see Figure 21). It took two days before the water began to subside. 141

Recovery:

By Tuesday July 12th, FEMA opened a disaster assistance center, and when it opened a “flood of humanity” swarmed the facility. Over 1000 people came to begin the process of applying for aid. 143 By July 19th the Flint River finally dropped below flood

141 Ibid, 36-37, 50.
142 Thronateeska Heritage Museum Archives, Flood Photos, scanned September 2011.
143 Ibid, 37, 50.
stage. The damage was terrible. In Dougherty County alone, estimates projected a loss of 500 million dollars in public utilities. 145 14,500 acres of land was submerged. 146 156 sinkholes appeared in Albany. 147 9,200 Albany residents were hit by the flood, 2,000 low income homes were destroyed, it is estimated that 9% of Albany residents were left homeless by the flood. 148

The days during and following the disaster, marines from a nearby base came in five-man teams to help people strip and clean homes and to help organize the “tremendous amounts” of donations. 149 The GBI used an empty marine warehouse to help identify the dozens of bodies that were separated from their caskets. 150 Cemeteries were fixed quickly in comparison with the rest of the city. The city manager acted as a great communicator and handled the position well in dealing with the publicity. 151

Immediately following the disaster building officials worked to get people back in their homes, issue the necessary permits for rebuilding, and worked to determine the extent of damage to some homes for the FEMA buyout program. Politicians focused on returning people to normal as quickly as possible. Building officials worked fifteen hour days, seven days a week for several months following the flooding of 1994. 152 Senior building official Tracy Hester broke down the recovery phase in Albany into three steps. Step one, the first year and a half following the flood nothing large scale was implemented. Building officials worked to get people back into their normal lives. Step

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144 Ibid 75.
145 Ibid 75
146 Ibid 58
147 Ibid 80
148 Ibid 95.
149 Jim Vaught, interview with the author, Albany, GA, August 10, 2011. Jim Vaught was a marine stationed in Albany in 1994. Today he is the Deputy Director of the Dougherty County EMA/911
150 Ibid.
151 Tracy Hester, interview with author, Albany, GA August 10, 2011.
152 Tracy Hester, interview with author, Albany, GA August 10, 2011.
two, a flood of money came in with requirements from the state and federal government to do research, and lastly they started implementing research findings, and arrived at a plan.  

Research is inconclusive as to how many buildings were razed, but large portions of downtown Albany were wiped out, mainly in low income neighborhoods and housing projects (see Figure 22). Four schools in these low income areas were moved out of the flood plain as mandated by FEMA. There was strong opposition in the community to do this; these schools anchored the surrounding neighborhoods. Federal regulations, however, prevented these schools and any public facility to be reconstructed on a known flood plain. People were relocated to safer areas, but neighborhoods were destroyed. Many of the demolished buildings were in poor repair at the onset of the flood, and the disaster damage just exacerbated existing problems.  

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153 Ibid.  
Figure 22. Dilapidated house after flood damage.\textsuperscript{155}

\textbf{Tift Warehouse:}

This theme of long recovery implementation and disasters compounding existing problems is consistent throughout Albany. The Tift Warehouse is one of Albany’s oldest buildings. Built as the original train depot in 1858 by city founder Nelson Tift, its construction guaranteed the extension of the rail line to Albany, and contributed to Albany’s status as a hub of commerce and trade in southwest Georgia.\textsuperscript{156} As rail traffic to Albany began to grow, the building’s original grading began to shift, because of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{155} Thronateeska Heritage Museum Archives, Flood Photos, scanned September 2011.
\end{flushright}
new adjoining tracks, the depot sat in a depression, causing water to pool at its base.\footnote{157 Tommy Greggors, interview with author, Albany, Georgia September 13, 2011.}

In 1910 a larger more substantial depot was built a few hundred yards from this original. In 1913 the original depot was leased to the Tift and Peed Wholesale Grocery Company, later just Tift Grocery, as a warehouse. It served as a warehouse for the grocery company until 1959. For several years after that it was rented to the Crosby Hodges Milling Company as a warehouse.\footnote{158 Eric D. Montgomery, 1978 National Register of Historic Places - Nomination Form, Albany Railroad Depot Historic District, Manuscript on file, Historic Preservation Division of Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Atlanta: 6.} In 1979 it was bought by the Thronateeska Heritage Foundation with plans to rehabilitate the space. The old depot served as storage for the Heritage Foundation for over a decade.\footnote{159 Ibid.} They simply lacked the funds to change its condition or rehabilitate as originally planned.

When the flood hit in 1994, there was no catastrophic damage to the building. The basement level flooded up to the floorboards of the main level. Standing water had inundated the building and sat for over two weeks. What was a bad foundation issue was made worse by the flood. After nearly one hundred years the improper grading had taken its toll to the soft fired, clay bricks and limestone mortar. The foundation was crumbling, and the flood compounded this rising damp issue.

Nothing was done to salvage the building at that time. Again the funds were not there for the building or the Heritage Foundation. In 2002, the new executive director commissioned an engineering firm to examine the building. In their \textit{Structural Conditions Report}, Fletcher Engineering found both rot and termite damage in the interior floor structure and severe deterioration in the bricks in the lower two-six feet of
the building. A new report by the Coastal Heritage Society concurred with the 2002 assessment and surmised further damage is inevitable unless immediate action is taken.\textsuperscript{160}

The first efforts to save this building were made by the volunteer board of directors, but there was still not enough momentum to gain the capital to fully restore it. Tommy Greggors, executive Director of the Thronateeska Heritage Center, tried unsuccessfully to put a referendum on the 2004 SPLOST\textsuperscript{161}, but the project was cut in the end. He tried again with the SPLOST 6 referendum in 2010. This time he got a bare bones amount of $500,000 for basic stabilization. Mr. Greggors hopes that this money will be the spark for private investment.\textsuperscript{162}

**Conclusion:**

Several local initiatives developed in the recovery period, and are still in use today: local CERT teams, Albany-Dougherty search and rescue group, and a local emergency management committee. Prior to the flood, aid from neighboring counties was given based on personal relationships, now there is a 23 county mutual aid agreement in place spearheaded by the regional GEMA office\textsuperscript{163}. The county emergency offices now have a close working relationship with the Red Cross. Currently, all local officials are cross trained in emergency management, but preservationists are not included. Albany has Local Emergency Operations Plan, based on the NIMS system. Given a template by GEMA, it mimics federal and state response protocol.\textsuperscript{164} According to the Mr. Vaught, the best option for historic sites in Albany is to develop an individual disaster and emergency plan.

\textsuperscript{161} SPLOST, or Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax, is a voter-approved, one-percent sales tax.
\textsuperscript{162} Tommy Greggors, interview with author, Albany, Georgia September 13, 2011.
\textsuperscript{163} Jim Vaught, interview with the author, Albany, GA, August 10, 2011.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
Several comprehensive plans were made following the flooding. In 1995 the City of Albany commissioned William-Russell and Johnson, Incorporated Team to create a recovery plan. It is an eight chapter document that breaks the city down by neighborhoods and discusses specific rebuilding and recovery efforts. In 1996, Peter Drey developed the Albany Downtown Riverfront Master Plan. Many of the developments suggested in that plan have not been implemented in the 15 years since the plan was developed. A tax allocation district (TAD)\textsuperscript{165} was developed in 2008 to finally implement many facets of that 15 year-old-plan. The city developed a comprehensive plan in 2000, incorporating bits and pieces of these previous plans, but still no major projects. Prior to the flood there was no unified disaster management plan. The first disaster mitigation plan was approved by GEMA and FEMA in 2004/2005. Now in order to qualify for grant monies, communities must have an approved plan in place. This plan does not contain detailed information about historic resources during disaster situations. Like the higher level plans it simply assigns the function to a body government all natural, cultural, and historic resources.

The biggest obstacle facing preservationists in Albany after the flood is the same problem that faced them before the flood: a lack of community buy-in and investment. The downtown area had been deteriorating since the 1970s, and “revitalization” efforts in the mid-1980s destroyed several historic resources. People were not invested in historic preservation before the flood, and the lack of interest was exacerbated by the destruction after the floods. Although there was no active HPC at the time of the flood, though there

was a historic preservation ordinance in place. However, it was unknown to many residents and not enforced. The HPD gave $136,737 in grant money to Albany compared to the $641,935 Montezuma received. Montezuma also received $100,000 from the Woodruff foundation, bringing its aid total to $741,935. $57,000 of the HPD grant money that went to the Albany area helped to repair the Radium Springs Casino, outside of the main downtown area. Unlike Montezuma, there was not a strong core of downtown merchants and building owners working to get these grants.

Disasters amplify issues that already exist both socially and physically. In Albany many low income areas were already disenfranchised before the flood. These areas were disproportionately affected due to their location, and federal funds were used to relocate many of these displaced people. It also happens structurally, as with the Tift warehouse. An ongoing maintenance issue is magnified by flooding. The recovery process in Albany is still ongoing. Many plans from that post disaster period have yet to be realized. This makes it hard to judge and analyze data when the “process” of recovery is still ongoing.

Thousands of structures were damaged or completely destroyed by the 1994 floods. Unfortunately, many historic cities are, like Albany, built along rivers, in flood plains. Many of our nation’s most prized historic resources are in danger. The other main issue facing Albany, is faced by many cities, is it wise to rebuild after a flood? Preservationists are face with the question of whether it is ethical to insist on rehabilitating a structure that is in constant danger of damage? And if rehabilitation is chosen, does the resource maintain historical integrity if modern mitigation features are used? Many structures

were torn down after the flood in Albany, some of them historic, many of them in low income areas. So is it worth the fight of preservationists to keep these endangered resources when they are too dangerous to live in? Is it feasible or wise to preserve buildings in threatened areas? These questions have no right or wrong answer. They need to be applied to each specific case, and each specific disaster.

Additionally, several plans were created following the disaster of 1994, though many of the ideas and solutions in those plans never came into reality. Planning is an important tool in recovery efforts (also in mitigation and preparedness efforts). However those plans are ineffective without clear and concise work programs. It is necessary to assign a task, its completion date, and anticipated sources of funding.

The flooding of 1994 exacerbated long standing issues in Albany. Historic buildings like the Tift warehouse, and many residential structures were in major disrepair prior to the natural disaster. The subsequent flooding simply made a bad problem worse. Lack of financial support- both prior to and after the disaster - and a paucity of community will will lead to loss and damage to historic resources. However, a positive outcome of the experience were new planning initiatives to better prepare for the future. Today Albany city employees are trained in emergency management principles, creating a large task force of people trained to respond to emergency situations.
CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

Summation:

Mileti defines natural disasters as a part of a cycle between the environment, the community, and the built environment.\textsuperscript{167} This definition accounts for not only the natural environment, but also the environment that people build for themselves. This dynamic, during the best of times, is strained by developmental pressures, political issues, private property rights et cetera. The built environment is a complex web of old and new, regulations and zoning, and private vs. public rights. This section will recap the conclusions made in each previous case study and compare and contrast the experiences of the two cities.

The first issue raised in both Montezuma and Albany was the lack of comprehensive survey information at the time of the disaster. The first duty of the SHPO is to survey the resources of the state. It is made glaringly obvious after a natural disaster if a state has failed to maintain a comprehensive survey. Other agencies, such as FEMA or GEMA, depend upon state offices to relay data. The state of Georgia was able to lean on it RCs and local historic groups to assess data, but not having a complete survey at the state level delays communication between agencies. Every year new resources reach the 50 year milestone, it is imperative that all states make survey a priority in their SHPO.

offices. The second component of this is how the data is collected. In the 21st century paper survey forms are simply outdated and impractical. In the 1990s GIS was in its infancy, now most municipalities and regional commissions have a person responsible to maintain GIS data. Preservationists, at all levels of government, must be aware of the benefits that GIS tracking of cultural resource information can provide. In instances of emergency, when speed of delivery is crucial, GIS information can be shared in a matter of minutes; saving time and resources.

With the level and extent of the damage, HPD worked quickly with the National Park Service, The National Trust for Historic Preservation and the Advisory Council for Historic Preservation to secure funding. The HPD used model PAs developed by the Iowa SHPO from the 1993 Midwest floods. This allowed for streamlined communication between agencies’ at the state level, which allowed Montezuma to quickly begin its recovery process. The state received over $2 million in aid specific for preservation. The response from the region was so overwhelming that they had to have two rounds of applications. The glut of applications required HPD to dedicate a person in the office specifically for disaster work. By providing resources quickly and efficiently with local representatives, HPD was able to make historic preservation a viable recovery option for owners. The population size of Albany could make it harder to replicate a Montezuma model of local coordination. Though, if the city could be subdivided into smaller neighborhoods, each with their own liaisons/task forces, efficiency could be increased.

One of the biggest challenges to preservation are those eager to fix what was wrong. Often times, owners/stewards of historic buildings want to regain normality as soon as possible after a disaster. Unfortunately many historic materials require time and
patience to fix. Plaster is fixable if allowed to air out and dry thoroughly; as are wood floors, and masonry; though, in their rush many are quick to forgo these steps in place of quicker alternatives. This problem has a two-fold solution. The first is quick technical assistance from local preservation groups, and where none exist, the state preservation office needs to make sure it can rise to the challenge of providing quick, accurate, and useful technical assistance. The second step is educating the public prior to a disaster. This may not seem feasible, but it can be if the training is targeted. Certain areas are prone to certain disaster events. People in Montezuma and Albany are likely to get floods. People along the coast are likely to experience hurricanes. A priority of any preservation group should be to determine what types of disasters may occur, by completing a hazards assessment. Once the types of disasters are determined, the group should work towards educating stewards of historic resources on the challenges they will face. Many people live in denial about the dangers they face. It is up to preservationists to train and educate the public on all matters concerning historic preservation.

A detrimental issue facing historic preservation after a natural disaster is absence of community support and/or political will. In Albany, the lack of enforcement of their existing ordinance and the deterioration of downtown illustrated a lack of respect for their historic resources. If the people are not interested in saving their historic and cultural resources on an average day, it will be even more difficult to convince them during the stressed conditions of a natural disaster. In order for preservation to be a truly effective recovery tool, the locals must support the effort. They must want their resources saved. Preservation can fill in that gap. It is the job of the preservationist to be an advocate for resources. If the locals are not behind a preservation project, like the low interest in the
Tift warehouse, the building or structure could fall in into disuse, and become as neglected as it was prior to a disaster. However, if a community has a strong preservation ethic prior to a disaster, they will be more receptive to the benefits of preservation after a natural disaster. The people in Montezuma saw not only the community building benefits of historic preservation, but also the monetary benefits. Preservation has the opportunity to fill in the gaps left by traditional disaster funding.

Albany is now well prepared for another disaster. Several local initiatives developed in the recovery period, and are still in use today: local CERT teams, Albany-Dougherty search and rescue group, and a local emergency management committee. Unfortunately preservationists are not actively engaging themselves with these groups. Preservationists must become proactive in joining disaster preparedness groups, and asking to attend emergency management training. In Montezuma, no such groups exist. With the “completion” of the recovery process, the city has become naïve to the possibility of another disaster. It is important to the safety of these resources that it remain vigilant.

Several comprehensive plans were made following the flooding in Albany, Georgia. It is important that plans have clear goals and work programs for implementation purposes. The plans should be broken up in terms of projects for short term, mid-range, and long term objectives; with enumerated and quantifiable goals. When plans do not contain a mixture of objectives and projects, they can be seen as too lofty or costly to implement, and not be taken on by the city. One good plan is better than several incomplete plans.
Though the scope of this work is very narrow, the issues it raises concerning historic preservation can be broadly applied to most natural disasters and most areas of the United States. Since the inclusion of FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security, and the federally incentivized planning process (no plan, no money), disaster management has become, on a very base level, a one size fits all approach. Though many states go beyond the requirements and focus on disasters that they face most, the basic requirements are the same nationally.

Unfortunately, historic preservation is still viewed as a hindrance by many at the federal level; “...after a disaster these resources’ special status as designated landmarks may complicate recovery efforts.” The best way to make federal officials change their attitude toward preservation during times of disaster is to change their attitude toward preservation overall. Preservation continues to struggle to be recognized as a needed element in the planning processes at all levels of government. In addition to the well-documented intangible values that link preservation to a community’s sense of place, preservation continually generates capital and jobs. It is imperative that the federal government sees the financial incentive that historic preservation can offer both before and after a disaster. Only then will preservation stop being seen as a “hindrance” to progress.

**Recommendations for Federal, State, and Local Government:**

The following recommendations would substantially improve the inclusion and effectiveness of historic preservation in the preparedness, mitigation, response, and

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recovery after a natural disaster. Of the several recommendations outlined in the matrix, a few are critical to the success of historic preservation’s integration into emergency management procedures. The highest priority recommendation is for a complete and accurate survey. It is imperative that local, state, and federal agencies have quick and reliable access to location of valuable historic resources. This need not be done by overburdened local planning and preservation offices. There is a unique opportunity to mobilize local residents to complete these surveys. Residents in historic and genealogical societies already have a vested interest into local history and are invaluable resources. The second highest priority recommendation is creating a standing PA between SHPO and other state and federal agencies. This along with the inventory can hasten response time to a disaster and therefore save historic resources. Lastly, ACHP should join forces with FEMA to create curriculum for emergency management students and historic preservation students. If we can educate future emergency managers in the special treatment of historic resources, and train preservationists in the basics of emergency management, we can change common misconceptions in both fields.

The sections are broken down in the accompanying matrix (Table 1), and are expounded upon in the following sections. These recommendations are based on research and deficits uncovered through the case studies.

**Federal:**

In terms of preparedness, FEMA should create a dedicated pool of resources for the protection of historic properties. All historic properties on or eligible for the National Register should be eligible for this disaster funding. FEMA should join forces with the ACHP to create a curriculum for both preservationists and emergency management
personnel so that integration of preservation and emergency management are taught at the most basic level. Congress should also fully and permanently fund the Historic Preservation Fund. This would allow for more people to obtain grants for their historic properties, decreasing deterioration and neglect, such as with the Tift warehouse in Albany. If a building is better cared for at the time of a disaster, it will cost less money to rehabilitate in the future.

**State:**

In 1993 the Midwest suffered severe flooding. The state SHPOs created PAs with federal agencies, particularly FEMA. During the disaster of 1994 Georgia HPD modeled their PAs after these agreements. The PA was specific to the Tropical Storm Alberto disaster. According to the current environmental review coordinator with HPD, after hurricane Katrina, FEMA entered into standing PAs with Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Georgia has yet to negotiate a standing PA with FEMA. During a disaster, it is important to move quickly. A standing PA would allow for negotiations prior to a disaster when there is more time to think about and work through issues. It would also create a dialogue between agencies and create partnerships prior to a disaster event.

Historic structures surveys should be digitally captured within a GIS database and the SHPO should act as a repository for these digital surveys, so that they might create a clear picture of the state’s resources.

States must strive to integrate best preservation practices into all levels of land-use and emergency planning. Once preservation is entwined with other regulations, it may seem like less of a hindrance to a speedy recovery. It should be a CLG requirement to create an emergency plan specifically for historic resources within its jurisdiction.
SEMs should create a task force for representatives from affected cities, including preservationists to liaise with during times of disaster. That way information can go directly to appropriate people. SHPOs and SEMAs should maintain records as to the success of their grant recipients. They should track building values, business retention/turn over, jobs creation, business types, and local comparison prices. This would not only quantify the actual value of historic preservation, it could assist them in determining eligibility of grants.

The most effective tools for preservation are at the local level, but changes at higher levels could also have an impact. All disaster legislation, both state and federal, should include caveats for historic resources. Historic resources exist in every state, and though the typology varies according to location, there are a few common needs that could save resources from future disasters: It should be required to obtain a historic resources map/inventory for the affected area; it should be required that SHPOs create an emergency plan for the historic resources; and it should be required that the federal government provide special grants specifically to residential historic resources. On the other side, all preservation legislation needs to include disaster planning.

**Local:**

Historic preservation commissions (HPCs) need to be active in creating disaster mitigation plans for historic structures. If an HPC does not exist at a local historic preservation group or nonprofit can manage most aspects of this role. HPCs are the front line of preservation at the local level and have a direct connection with the state and federal level preservation partners. They would be ideal resources to get the proper technical assistance to create these plans. The HPC chair and/or other preservation
professionals should be a designated point of contact in the local chain of command for disaster response. It is important in disaster response for clear leadership. If other agencies within local government had just one main point of contact during a natural disaster it would simplify the process of relaying data.

HPCs should educate building inspectors/code officials prior to disasters on proper treatment of historic resources. The HPC should also encourage owners to know the proper treatment of historic resources during a natural disaster. They should discuss the unique features of historic structures and the particular complications that arise. HPCs should also perform a hazards survey to better understand what hazards resources in their jurisdiction face. HPCs and or local historic preservation groups need to create a hierarchy of important resources so that funds can be directed to the most important of resources. Local preservationists need to also be trained like other public officials.

Communities should undertake detailed surveys of historic resources regularly as a part of mitigation planning including significant landscape features. Historic structures should be identified on critical facilities inventory of local mitigation plans along with schools, hospitals, telecommunications et cetera.

Preservationists must strive to integrate best preservation practices into all levels of land-use and emergency planning. Once preservation is entwined with other regulations, it may seem like less of a hindrance to a speedy recovery. Local city managers and mayors should create task forces of locals to assist residents, giving overwhelmed victims a one stop shop for aid. A local preservation expert, or someone knowledgeable about historic resources, should be on those forces.
Local development authorities, city managers or mayors should maintain records as to the success of their grant recipients. They should track building value, business retention/turn over, jobs creation, business types, local comparison prices. This would not only quantify the actual value of historic preservation, it could assist them in determining eligibility of grants.

If a community does not have an HPC, local preservation groups can take up many of the responsibilities of commissions. They can supply survey information and act as a liaison to the state when determining the extent damages to historic resources. They can also act as a conduit for technical assistance to property owners. Though it is critical they have a plan. It is the job of a historic preservationist to act as representative of the historic resources, to speak for objects that cannot speak for themselves. Preservationists should act as an advocate for the resources at all times, but particularly during times of disaster. It is up to the preservationists to demand a seat at the table; larger agencies will not send an invitation. There needs to be a collective push from the preservation community to be involved in larger policy making decisions. But even more than at a policy level, preservation is grass roots. It does not work if people do not care. Preservationists need to continue to communicate the need for maintaining historic resources. They offer a tangible record of our past, and help guide a community’s future.

**Recommendations for Stewards of Historic Sites and Private Citizens**

Individual preservationists must strive to integrate best preservation practices into all levels of government and keep preservation issues in the public arena. Once preservation is entwined with other regulations, it may seem like less of a hindrance to a speedy recovery. If a residence is a historic home the owners must be aware of special
disaster precautions to avoid doing irreparable damage to the building. The owner should seek the advice of a preservation engineer/architect when making repairs to avoid lasting damage to historical integrity and material integrity of your resource. A historic building owner or steward of a historic site should also seek out creative ways of disaster-proofing your structure. There are many opportunities for regular structures to disaster proof themselves, but historic building owners must be creative in their preparedness measures. Be in contact with local preservation groups/HPCs/SHPOs to seek aid and advice.

Every historic structure should have an emergency plan in case a disaster strikes. Many historic sites are not only valuable in and of themselves, but many act as repositories for antiques, archives, and artifacts. Disasters strike quickly, it is important to know what to do in such a stressful situation. Lastly, individuals and stewards should educate themselves about local rules, regulations, and aid for historic resources. In disaster situations many things are happening at one time, and many offers of aid will be made. It is important to have an understanding prior to a disaster, as to the types of resources available for the structure. Ensuring the site can benefit the most.

Montezuma and Albany can learn from each other’s mistakes, and capitalize on each other’s successes. Today Montezuma could work to train city employees in basic emergency management techniques creating a large group of skilled responders, including members of the HPC. Albany could work to mobilize citizens prior to a disaster by creating neighborhood task forces. Though Albany is much larger than Montezuma, it could use the neighbors helping neighbors model used in Montezuma by breaking down the city into different neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, the catalyst for most mitigation and preparedness projects is a natural disaster. It is not until a threat is realized that many people understand the need for these measures. These recommendations, and any preparedness or disaster mitigation measures, can and should be implemented well before a disaster strikes. Many agencies could easily include historic preservation disaster mitigation and preparedness measures into plans and work programs. SHPO, EPA, State Environmental Protection Agencies, and Regional Commissions could work to address broad disaster issues. After the Tropical Storm Alberto disaster, the Georgia SHPO created reports and plans, and began working on a standing PA with FEMA. As the corporate memory shifted when people retired or left the office, the urgency to continue disaster preparedness work faded. It is important that emergency management principles be thoroughly integrated in the systems of an organization, to prevent the inevitable complacency that occurs as a disaster event passes out of memory. It ultimately should fall on individual preservationists to be the catalyst for these recommendations. Bureaucracy moves slowly when implementing change. Preservation has always been a grass roots initiative, and it will take that same drive to see these recommendations, or any changes implemented.

**Future Research**

There are many avenues regarding the relationship between historic preservation and natural disasters to pursue for further research. A survey of county/state emergency managers could be done to gauge the feelings toward historic preservation. One may also pursue other types of disaster to see if the treatment of historic preservation is different after fires, tornadoes, or earthquakes. Another interesting topic would be to study the possibilities GIS databases offer to historic preservation.
The initial scope of this thesis was to quantify historic preservation as a recovery tool to prove its effectiveness. Unfortunately, micro level data is not kept on communities receiving disaster aid, or historic preservation aid through N.P.S. And the chosen disaster event for this thesis was prior to the widespread usage of computers for records management. Further research should be made into other ways to quantify preservation to categorically prove its usefulness. For a larger paper, one could study several cities in different states or perhaps countries and different disaster types, to prove beyond a doubt that the problems and issues regarding historic preservation are universal.
Table 1. Matrix of roles and recommendations for various groups involved in disasters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Group</th>
<th>Role in disaster and mandated preservation concerns</th>
<th>Recommended Historic Preservation Responsibility</th>
<th>On what level does initiation for recommendation occur?</th>
<th>Where this fits into the disaster life cycle.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private citizen/Stewards of Historic Sites</td>
<td>Follow all directions from safety and emergency personnel</td>
<td>If a residence is a historic home, be aware of special disaster precautions</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow any and all evacuation orders</td>
<td>Seek the advice of a preservation engineer/architect when making repair</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare residence for disaster</td>
<td>Contact local preservation group/HPS/SHP/O to seek aid</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare emergency supply kit</td>
<td>Seek out creative ways of disaster-proofing your structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire and Police</td>
<td>First response</td>
<td>Be aware of local historic resources</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HPCs</th>
<th>Provide local/state government with survey information and data about local resources</th>
<th>Prepare a disaster plan for most valued historic resources</th>
<th>Designate a point of contact for disaster manager</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Preparedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Preservation Groups</td>
<td>Provide local/state government with survey information and data about local resources</td>
<td>Prepare a disaster plan for most valued historic resources</td>
<td>Designate a point of contact for disaster manager</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Act as advocate for historic resources</td>
<td>Educate local building inspectors on proper treatment of historic resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide technical assistance to local officials/citizens in the recovery process</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undertake detailed surveys of historic resources regularly</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation</td>
<td>Provide protection to prevent looting of historic materials</td>
<td>Local Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Local Entity</td>
<td>Phase</td>
<td></td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act as advocate for historic resources officials/citizens in the recovery process</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educate local building inspectors on proper treatment of historic resources</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide technical assistance to local</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform a hazards survey to better understand what hazards resources in their jurisdiction face</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated point of contact in the local chain of command for disaster response</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undertake detailed surveys of historic resources regularly</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create emergency plan</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include historic preservationian on emergency task force</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create task force to include all state holders</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Include provisions for historic resources in emergency plan</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Train city employees in emergency management principles and response protocol</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate relief/recovery actions</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create clear and concise disaster preparedness recovery plans.</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Planners</strong></td>
<td>Create master plan</td>
<td>Include historic preservation in master plan</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure recovery efforts align with overall goals</td>
<td>Include emergency management in master plan</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maintain records as to the success of their grant recipients</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create clear and concise disaster preparedness recovery plans.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Building Code Inspectors</strong></td>
<td>Survey property after disaster</td>
<td>Be aware of local historic resources</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine habitability</td>
<td>Know technical structural issues involving said resources</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Manager/ Mayor</strong></td>
<td>Act as coordinator of information/services</td>
<td>Create task force of locals to assist residents</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that disaster plan is running smoothly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Act as lead</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collect information from affected area</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statewide Preservation Non-Profit</strong></td>
<td>Provide information and training assist in local government certification</td>
<td>Ensure historic preservation is considered at all levels of planning and development</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHPO</th>
<th>Coordinate aid for historic resources.</th>
<th>SHPOs should maintain records as to the success of their grant recipients</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist SHPO with any duties</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure grants from nongovernmental sources for assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide information and training assist in local government certification</td>
<td>Ensure historic preservation is considered at all levels of planning and development</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMA (State Emergency Management Agency)</td>
<td>Coordinate aid for historic resources.</td>
<td>SHPOs should maintain records as to the success of their grant recipients</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain, keep, and pursue accurate surveys.</td>
<td>Require that CLGs prepare a disaster plan.</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare statewide emergency plan Implement Emergency plan</td>
<td>Ensure historic preservation is considered at all levels of disaster planning and mitigation.</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate resources with other states and/or the federal government</td>
<td>Create and maintain a standing PA with state agencies, especially SHPO</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engage SHPO/THPO and other related parties when working with historic resources</td>
<td>SEMAs should create a task force for representatives from affected cities, including preservationists.</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FEMA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Prepare nationwide emergency plan</strong></td>
<td>Lobby to fully, and permanently fund the Historic Preservation Fund</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordinate with SEMAs Implement Plan</strong></td>
<td>FEMA should join forces with the ACHP to create a curriculum for both preservationists and emergency management personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide technical assistance, training, and funding to state and local entities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Complete section 106 review</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage SHPO/THPO and other related parties when working with historic resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Bibliography


Blizzard, Cherie; and Glen Bennett. 2000 National Register of Historic Places - Nomination Form, Montezuma Historic District. Manuscript on file, Historic Preservation Division of Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Atlanta.


Macon County Historical Museum Archives, Flood Display, scanned August 24, 2010.


Montezuma Downtown Development Authority, Flood Record Folder, scanned August 24, 2010.

*National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),* 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a to 470w-6, Sec.302:32.


Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121-5207, and Related Authorities,


# Appendix A

## Acronym Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Army Core of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACHP</td>
<td>Advisory Council for Historic Preservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDBG</td>
<td>Community Development Block Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLG</td>
<td>Certified Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNR</td>
<td>Department of Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>Economic Development Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOIA</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GADNR</td>
<td>Georgia Department of Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPC</td>
<td>Historic Preservation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPD</td>
<td>Historic Preservation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUD</td>
<td>Department of Housing and Urban Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHIRA</td>
<td>Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFIP</td>
<td>National Flood Insurance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHPA</td>
<td>National Historic Preservation Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOAA</td>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Programmatic Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Preliminary Disaster Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Regional Development Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA</td>
<td>Small Business Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHPO</td>
<td>State Historic Preservation Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCC</td>
<td>Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAD</td>
<td>Tax Allocation District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THPO</td>
<td>Tribal Historic Preservation Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B
Unpublished National Register Nomination from the Southwest Regional Commission
Early History of the Albany Region
Southeast Georgia and the Albany area were formerly inhabited by bands of mobile hunter-gathering Paleoindians dating back 12,000 years. Distributions of stone tool artifacts suggest that the Flint River, named for the high quality Flint and Chert found along its shores, was a favored region for these Indians. Flint was very important to these early inhabitants, because it was used to produce tools, including arrow heads and knives that they depended upon for their subsistence.
A dryer and warmer period that occurred about 10,000 years called the Hypsithermal, probably concentrated activity along the Flint, as the first settlements or camps appeared.

An increase in dependency on the Flint River and riverine resources for food evolved during this time and the introduction of pottery, the first known to exist in North America, followed this period. An increase in population densities and sedentism continued through the millennia, but in Late Archaic Period, subsistence was still dependent upon hunting and the collection of wild foods.

It was not until the Mississippian Period (A.D. 800-1450) that large, dense sites appeared, with economies based on agriculture.

Historic Period
Southwest Georgia had a variety of diverse groups concentrated into general territories at the time of European contact. In the 1540s, when the Spanish were exploring the region, the Capachequi were located closest to present-day Albany. After the Spanish under de Soto passed through the Flint River Valley, the valley became abandoned for nearly 200 years.

By the 1670s the Spanish had established a string of missions through the Southeast. By the then Creek confederacy had formed from numerous native groups for their mutual protection against Europeans. Later English influence was felt as traders explored inland from Charleston, and by the early 1800s Euro-American Georgia residents began to pressure the federal government to remove Native Americans from the area. In 1832 the Creeks ceded their lands and forcibly relocated to reservations in Oklahoma.

Establishment of Albany
The west bank of the Flint River near the confluence of Muckalee Creek became popular with farmers as expansion west continued in the early 1800s. In October 1836 businessman Nelson Tift founded Albany on the banks of the Flint River to serve as a market for cotton farmers. Planters and their slaves settled southwest Georgia, and by 1840 the Albany region had attracted so many slaveholding farmers that black slaves outnumbered whites.

By 1860 the population of Albany was around 1,650, and was the marketing center for the wealthiest agricultural region in the country. The Flint River was the main transportation link for Albany. Cotton was shipped south to the city of Apalachicola, and from there to European markets. Between 1828 and 1861 approximately 130 steamboats were active on the Chattahoochee-Flint-Apalachicola waterway.
In 1857 a rail connection to Savannah created a more direct connection to northern and European markets, and Albany would become the rail center of Southwest Georgia with seven railroads operating, and up to 35 trains per day stopping.

Over the next two decades the area's population increased more than fivefold, and a new county—Dougherty—was created in 1853 with Albany as its county seat. Most of the newcomers to Dougherty County were African Americans brought to cultivate its rich cotton lands. In 1860 Albany's 1,618 residents made up barely one-fifth of Dougherty County's population, but the city had become the marketing center for the region's cotton growers. Its growth and vitality were directly related to the cotton market.

In addition to promoting railroads, Nelson Tift secured a state monopoly for ferry and bridge rights across the Flint River at Albany. Tift hired the African American bridge builder Horace King to erect the covered toll bridge and a bridge house, the entrance to the span. The brick bridge house, nearly a century and a half old, still stands on the west bank of the Flint in downtown Albany.

Although a small cadre of middle-class merchants and professional men dominated antebellum Albany's society, politics, and economy, the town remained a frontier community. A third of its population was African American, but almost all were slaves.

Baptist, Methodist, Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Catholic congregations had each built churches on city lots donated by Tift. Both the Baptist and the Episcopal churches had more slave members than whites.

After U.S. President Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860, most Albany whites championed secession, and several Confederate military units were organized. Some of Albany's soldiers fought in the Civil War (1861-65) in battles in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, southwest Georgia itself escaped the ravages of armed conflict. Reconstruction and the end of slavery brought revolutionary changes to the region. In 1867-68 more than 2,400 black men in Albany and Dougherty County registered to vote, and over the next fifteen years they elected three African American legislators to the state legislature. Whites in Albany resisted black enfranchisement through intimidation and voting fraud, and by 1915 they had succeeded in reducing the number of registered black voters in Albany to twenty-eight. Until the 1940s Albany's population was predominantly African American, but the vast majority of blacks did not own property.

During the Civil War, commerce, trade and agriculture slowed, save for the purpose of supplying the Confederate armies. No construction occurred, and the region and city generally experienced a period of economic neglect and decline. Fortunately, however, the Flint River region did not see any direct fighting in the Civil War. The city survived the war intact, but in the 1870s a number of destructive fires destroyed nearly all of the downtown area, many of them believed to be the work of arsonists.
The “Gay 90s” saw many firsts in Albany. Electric illumination first brightened Broad and Washington Streets at the end of the preceding decade in 1889, and by 1892 the streets were labeled to facilitate the establishment of regular mail service that same year. 1892 was also the year when the waterworks were built. In 1896 the Rawlings Theater-Albany’s first theater-opened. In 1898 the first libraries appeared. Unfortunately the 1890s were also the decade when a major flood of the Flint River occurred in 1897 and in 1899 an epidemic of meningitis passed through the region.

Changes in twentieth-century Dougherty County brought significant change to Albany as farmers switched from cotton to more profitable crops. Beginning in the 1890s, farmers began planting pecan trees. In 1922 the Albany District Pecan Exchange completed its factory building and warehouse, and pecans became a major Albany product. Peanuts were another major commercial crop, and shelling and processing plants were built in the city. In the 1930s livestock became important, and in 1936 a large meat-packing plant was built. Meat-processing soon became Albany’s largest industry.

In 1940 the downtown was hit by a tornado that destroyed several blocks of the central commercial district. The areas of Pine Avenue and Washington Streets were particularly hard hit and resulted in an intensive rebuilding program.

World War II (1941-45) had an important impact on Albany. Two airfields were established to train British and American pilots. Many servicemen assigned to Turner Field decided to stay or return to Albany after the war. The large influx of whites into Albany after 1940 altered the city’s population so significantly that for the first time since the 1870s, blacks were a minority. Albany experienced its greatest population growth in the 1940s and 1950s, when its total population almost tripled, to 55,890 in 1960. Although blacks doubled their numbers in Albany during the boom, they could not keep up with the white population, which quadrupled. Between 1960 and 1980, however, the white growth rate plummeted to less than 8 percent, while blacks increased their numbers by 74 percent.

Geographically, the city expanded steadily in modern times. Occupying a little more than one and a half square miles when it was incorporated in 1838, Albany today consists of fifty-seven square miles. In the 1990s the city saw its first overall population decline, from slightly more than 78,000 in 1990 to just under 77,000 in 2000.

The Albany Civil Rights Movement
The key development of the twentieth century was the civil rights movement. The groundwork for organized protest against segregation in Albany was laid with the establishment of a National Association for the Advancement of Colored People chapter in the wake of World War I (1917-18) and its revitalization in the 1940s. In the decade and a half after World War II, local activists sporadically challenged the system of Jim Crow.

In 1961 several Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) workers came to Albany to help organize the black community as it challenged segregation. From the start the SNCC workers faced opposition from conservative blacks as well as from whites. Yet at important moments Albany blacks rose above these divisions, as they did in November 1961 when they
organized the Albany Movement. African Americans had been unsuccessful in their attack on segregation in Albany in 1961-62, but they did increase the number of registered black voters, and in 1963 the city commission struck its Jim Crow ordinances from the books. The Albany Civil Rights Institute, which opened in 1998, commemorates the movement.

Yet whites continued to control local politics through citywide elections for the city commission. In 1975, however, as a result of a federal court order, district elections for the city commission were held, and two African Americans—Mary Young and Robert Montgomery—won. In 1974 John White became the first black to represent Albany in the state legislature in nearly a century. At about the same time blacks were appointed to the Dougherty County school board for the first time.

Albany's mid-twentieth-century population growth extended the city's boundaries and affected affluent neighborhoods near downtown. Business and commercial establishments expanded toward the northwest, and the downtown began to deteriorate. With the opening of the Albany Mall in 1976, long-established firms closed their downtown stores. Mayor James H. Gray Sr. led an effort to revitalize the downtown area by constructing a 10,240-seat civic center and by razing an entire city block in the heart of downtown with plans to rebuild it. His sudden death in 1986 briefly interrupted the Central Square project. Finally, a decade and a half later, much of the block was filled in with a new city-county administration building, a county education administration building, new parking facilities, and a new federal courthouse dedicated to one of Georgia's best known civil rights attorneys, C. B. King. Adjacent to Central Square, a former four-story retail store was renovated to serve as the county's central library, and the dilapidated municipal auditorium, restored at a cost of $4 million, was reopened in 1990 with a concert by Albany native Ray Charles.

Following World War II, several major national firms, including Merck, Firestone, Procter & Gamble, M & M Mars, and Miller Brewing, established manufacturing plants. Together with locally owned Bobs Candies, the world's largest candy-cane maker, they provided thousands of new jobs in Albany. In addition, the U.S. Marine Corps established the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany on the east side of town and became the city's largest single employer. The 1970s, however, saw an economic downturn that began with the closing of the Naval Air Station at Turner Field. Further plant closures in the 1980s contributed to Albany's rising unemployment—the highest of any metropolitan area in the state for several years. The economic decline eased in the late 1980s, and several major industries established new plants in Albany in the 1990s.

Flint River Flooding
The Flint River has played a major role in Albany's history. It was the early major link with the outside world, but it soon demonstrated to Albany residents the power of nature. Major floods hit Albany in 1841 and 1925, but no one was prepared for the 500-year flood that devastated southwest Georgia in the summer of 1994. By the time the Flint River crested at more than forty-three feet in Albany, the worst-hit community, twenty-three square miles of Dougherty County were under water, and 23,000 residents had been forced to evacuate. The cost of damage was reckoned in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
The 1990s saw the beginning of a major downtown renovation with the creation of a Flint River Walk, designed to bring residents back to downtown and to the river responsible for the city's founding. In September 2004 the Flint RiverQuarium, a $30 million freshwater aquarium, opened. The aquarium resembles a "blue hole," that resembles the naturally occurring aquifer spring found in southwest Georgia. Exhibitions focus on the natural habitats of the Flint River, and educational displays explain and promote water conservation.

Many buildings were torn down in downtown in the 1980s to make room for new buildings under Albany's longest serving mayor, James H. Gray. An entire city block was razed in the heart of downtown with plans to rebuild it, but his sudden death in 1986 interrupted the Central Square project. The block remained vacant with the exception of the chamber of commerce building until the early 1990s when two public buildings were constructed. Over the next 10 years another governmental building and two parking structures would be constructed in the central square in an effort to revitalize the downtown area.

Albany Downtown Historic District Area
The Albany Historic District (district) includes commercial and industrial properties located within the downtown area and the residential properties located north and west of the downtown area. The area is bounded roughly by Roosevelt Street to the north, Highland and Whitney Streets to the south, Washington Street and the Flint River to the east, and Madison Street to the west. According to the Dougherty County Tax Assessor's records, the district contains several commercial, institutional and light industrial buildings that date from the late 19th to the mid 20th centuries. A significant number of these properties retain most of their original materials and features. The most commonly noted alterations are the replacement of original windows and storefronts on the commercial buildings, but the alterations generally do not compromise the properties' design integrity.

There are also many non-historic commercial and industrial buildings located throughout the proposed district. However, the downtown area as a whole does retain a large number of intact and significant historic buildings as well as the wide tree-lined streets and medians, all of which continue to provide a sense of the area's history.

Commercial structures predominate in the district, and are typically late 19th to early 20th century one or two story brick structures that share common side walls, and feature store fronts and parapet walls on the façade. Many of these structures also feature simple decorative brickwork or other ornamental features in the cornices.

The proposed district also contains several early 20th century multi-story commercial buildings that were typically used as hotels, office buildings, or department stores. These buildings are typically three to six stories in height, and possess more elaborate ornamentation, particularly in the cornices and around the entrances than the one and two story structures that comprise the commercial blocks. The larger commercial structures are frequently free standing structures with steel frames, and represent the prevailing architectural styles of the early 20th century including Georgian Revival, and Italian Renaissance Revival. The National Register listed Davis Exchange building, constructed between 1919-1921, and the New Albany Hotel, constructed in 1925, are examples of the Georgian Revival style of architecture. The 1924 Rosenberg Brothers Department Store, also listed on the National Register.
Examples of the mid 20th century commercial architecture are also noted within the district. The 1942 Star Theater, located on Pine Avenue, is a good example of the Art Deco style. The district also features a 1930 former gas station constructed in the Art Moderne style, and a 1956 International Style office building.

In addition to commercial buildings, the district contains several high style and architecturally significant late 19th to early 20th century institutional buildings. The National Register listed United States Post Office and Courthouse, constructed between 1910 and 1912, features many of the distinctive elements of the Italian Renaissance Revival style of architecture, including arched openings, and a low-pitched hipped roof with clay tiles and overhanging eaves. The 1906 Carnegie Library of Albany, also listed on the Historic register, is a good example of the Neoclassical Revival style of architecture with its symmetrical façade, Ionic columns, quoined corner pilasters, and decorative keystones. Other high style institutional buildings include the 1896 St Paul Episcopal Church, and the 1912 Gothic Revival style First Baptist Church.

Lastly, the district also contains several late 19th through early 20th century light industrial buildings such as the 1923 Holman Mule Barn, located on West Broad Avenue and warehouses for the storage and processing of pecans, seed and other locally produced crops.

The streets in the district are generally laid out in a grid pattern, and are particularly noteworthy for their width, and for the Live Oak trees that line most of the streets and provide a canopy of green. Broad Avenue is particularly picturesque with its tree-lined median.

Many of the properties in the district retain a high level of integrity and are considered good representative examples of late 19th through early 20th century commercial, institutional and light industrial architecture. The vast majority of the contributing properties in the district are sited in their original locations, and maintain their original designs, building materials, and architectural features. Despite the presence of new commercial and institutional development, the number of contributing structures within the district, combined with the original wide, tree-lined streets and medians, continue to provide a sense of history to the area. Given the presence of such a large number of intact and significant historic properties, the proposed district also clearly possesses integrity in the areas of feeling and association. The district clearly conveys its relationship to the history and development of Albany, Georgia and the surrounding area.
Appendix C: Unpublished FEMA Documents regarding Montezuma
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

July 12, 1995

SUBJECT: Categorical Exclusion for Acquisition of Properties in Montezuma, Georgia, HMGP-1033-012

This Memorandum for the Record is for a proposed acquisition project in the City of Montezuma, Georgia. The community is planning to acquire thirty-four properties in a floodway or 100-year floodplain utilizing section 404 mitigation funding to eliminate future risk of flooding. This project will have minimal or no effect on environmental quality.

The acquired structures will be removed, and the land returned to open space usage; in this case the area will be replanted with native grasses. The community will agree to maintain this area as open space in perpetuity. There are no known impacts to any endangered or threatened species in the area, and no adverse action will take place on any historic structure until the requirements of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act have been completed. Prior to acquisition, the community will ensure that no hazardous materials are present on any of the acquired properties, and that all required federal, state, and local environmental statutes have been complied with.

In compliance with FEMA policy implementing Executive Order 12898, on environmental justice, the socioeconomic conditions relating to this project have been reviewed and it has been found that no disproportionately high and adverse affect on minority or low income populations will result from the proposed project.

Therefore, in accordance with FEMA’s regulations at 44 CFR 10.8 (c) (2) (x), this action is categorically excluded from the need to prepare further environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement.

Kenneth D. Hutchinson
Regional Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Categorical Exclusion for Acquisition of Properties in Montezuma, Georgia, HMGP-1033-012

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Kenneth D. Hutchison
Regional Director
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property Owner</th>
<th>Property Address</th>
<th>Tax Map No</th>
<th>Land Value 1</th>
<th>Improvement Value</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
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<td>433,150</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) (6)
Mr. Glenn C. Woodard  
Federal Coordinating Officer  
Region IV, Federal Emergency Management Agency  
1371 Peachtree Street, NE  
Atlanta, Georgia 30309  

R.R.: Railroad Street Properties, Macon County, Georgia  
KFM4200-003  

Dear Mr. Woodard:

The Historic Preservation Division (HPD) has reviewed the photographs, maps, and Damage Survey Reports (DSRs) for repair to the flood-damaged Railroad Street properties in Macon County, Macon County, Georgia. Our comments are offered to advise the Federal Emergency Management Agency on the effects of this undertaking for compliance with Advisory Council regulations 36 CFR Part 800.

The DSRs submitted for our review included numbers 7984, 7986, 7987, and 7955. However, your letter dated November 28, 1994 referred to numbers 7984, 7986, 7987, and 7955. Because of the similarities between these numbers (with the only difference being an eight rather than a five in the middle digit position), we considered our review on the assumption that this was merely a typographical error, and assumed that the numbers which appear on the DSRs are the correct numbers. For clarity's sake, this letter will refer only to the numbers which appear on the DSRs.

Based on the information provided, it is our opinion that the properties referred to in DSRs 7984, 7986, 7987, and 7955 do not meet the criteria for listing in the National Register of Historic Places; therefore, the proposed activities on these properties will have no impact on historic structural or archaeological resources listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places.

In our opinion, the remaining properties are historic structures which should be considered eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places. Based on the proposed FEMA activities for each property, our determinations of effect are outlined in the paragraphs which follow.

The properties referred to in DSRs 7987, 7957, and 7964 are National Register-eligible properties which have been declared by FEMA as ineligible for FEMA funds for various reasons. Based on this fact, FEMA has determined that the proposed activities will have "an adverse effect" to these properties. However, this determination may have been unnecessary.
Mr. Glenn C. Woodard  
January 4, 1995  
Page Two

no federal funds, permits, or licenses will be granted for these three properties, neither FEMA nor EPP needs to comment on the effects of these activities to them.

The property referred to in DSR #79542 is a National Register-eligible property which, according to the DSR, FEMA will "either demolish or clean and secure." EPP cannot concur with FEMA's determination that this activity will mitigate an adverse effect, and cannot comment on the effects of this undertaking at this time due to insufficient information. In order to make a determination of effect for this property, we will need to review a specific project proposal when it becomes available. If the property is to be cleaned and secured, FEMA will need to forward a detailed work write-up, along with photographs of specific areas to be addressed by project activities. Interior photographs will need to be keyed to a site map, while exterior photographs will need to be keyed to a floor plan of the structure. If the property is slated for demolition, then FEMA will need to inform EPP of this determination. Once we have received this information, we will be able to complete our review for this specific property.

Finally, the properties referred to in DSR #4 79543, 79545, 79547, 79549, 79550, 79551, 79553, 79555, 79556, 79557, 79559, 81129, 81130, and 81131 are National Register-eligible properties which FEMA has slated for demolition. (Please note that our determination of National Register-eligibility for the property addressed in DSR #79551 is not in concurrence with FEMA's determination that this property is ineligible for listing.) EPP concurs with FEMA's determination that the proposed demolition of these properties does not meet the Secretary of Interior's Standards for Rehabilitation, and will constitute an adverse effect as defined in 36 CFR Part 805.5(6). When an adverse effect on a historic property is found, the Federal agency must notify the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and consult with the State Historic Preservation Officer on ways to avoid or reduce adverse effects on historic properties.

If you may be of further assistance, please contact Jeffrey L. Doster, Environmental Review Coordinator, at (404) 526-2640.

Sincerely,

Richard Claus
Deputy State Historic Preservation Officer

R:Comm  
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation  
Karen Forbes, FEMA
December 21, 2001

Georgia Emergency Management Agency
Post Office Box 18055
Atlanta, Georgia 30310-0055

Attention: Terry Lunn

RE: HMGP 1033-0012 Montezuma, City of

Dear Mr. McConnell:

We have received the State’s letter requesting closeout for the referenced project. As indicated, there are no cost overruns or underruns associated with this project. Therefore, the date of your letter will be used as the final claim date for this project.

A) Approved Federal Share Project Cost $ 392,936
B) State Identified Closure Amount $ 392,936
C) Approved Non-Federal Share Project Cost $ 127,646
D) State Identified Non-Federal Share Closure Amount $ 127,646
E) Project Closure Amount (B AND D) $ 510,582

TOTAL OBLIGATION (PROJECT AND ADMINISTRATIVE COST) $ 397,953
TOTAL PROJECT GRANTEE COST $ 3,805
TOTAL PROJECT SUBGRANTEE COST $ 11,212

If you have any questions, please contact Gabriela Vigo at (770) 320-5633.

Sincerely,

Clayton E. Saucier, Chief,
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Branch
Mitigation Division
December 31, 2001

GEORGIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
POST OFFICE BOX 18015
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30316-0033

ATTENTION: TERRY LUNN

RE: MMGP 1033-0012 Moneta, City of

Dear [Name of Recipient]:

We have received the State's letter requesting closeout for the referenced project. As indicated, there are no cost overruns or underruns associated with this project. Therefore, the date of your letter will be used as the final claim date for this project.

A) APPROVED FEDERAL SHARE PROJECT COST $ 382,936
B) STATE IDENTIFIED CLOSURE AMOUNT $ 382,936
C) APPROVED NON-FEDERAL SHARE PROJECT COST $ 127,646
D) STATE IDENTIFIED NON-FEDERAL SHARE CLOSURE AMOUNT $ 127,646
E) PROJECT CLOSURE AMOUNT (B AND D) $ 510,582

TOTAL OBLIGATION (PROJECT AND ADMINISTRATIVE COST) $ 397,953
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If you have any questions, please contact Gabriela Vigo at (770) 220-5633.

Sincerely,

Clayton E. Saunter, Chief,
Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment Branch
Mitigation Division
MEMORANDUM

TO: Terry Lunn
FEMA Hazard Mitigation Officer

FROM: (b)(6) (b)(6)

DATE: April 3, 1995

SUBJECT: Montezuma Application

I am sending you the revised application for Montezuma dated March 27, 1995. Also enclosed please note the additional revision for sections IX. and X. dated March 29, 1995.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.
**APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Bureau/Agency</th>
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<th>12/19/96</th>
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<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
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**City of Montezuma**

908 South Oddy Street
Montezuma, GA 31066

**Employer Identification Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Employer Identification Number</th>
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**Type of Affiliation**

- [ ] Federal
- [ ] Municipal
- [ ] Private
- [ ] Non-Profit
- [ ] Other

**Official Title**

- Mayor
- City Manager
- Other

**Statement of Emergency**

- The Railroad Street Buyout consists of the acquisition and demolition of flood damaged properties in the Railroad Street area of Montezuma, Georgia.

**Emergency Declaration**

- 07/19/95
- 12/19/96

**Emergency Funding**

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<th>Amount</th>
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<td>State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Federal</td>
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**Emergency Declaration of Emergency**

- Approved by Mayor
- Approved by City Manager

**Mayor**

- Preston C. Williams, Jr.
- Telephone number: (912) 472-8144

**Authorized for Local Reproduction**

- F-3
PROJECT APPLICATION

I. OVERALL PROJECT INFORMATION

A. The Railroad Street buyout consists of the acquisition and demolition of flood damaged properties in the Railroad Street area of Montezuma, Georgia.

B. March 27, 1995

C. FEMA1033 DR-GA

D. Revised Submission

E. This is a revised submission.

F. FIPS code- 19352304

II. APPLICANT INFORMATION

A. City of Montezuma

B. City Government

C. [Address]

D. [Address]

E. The City of Montezuma does not have a hazard-mitigation plan.

III. PROJECT LOCATION

A. The project activity is located along Railroad Street/Georgia Highway 224, Saed Road, and Spaulding Road. The project location runs from the center of town northeast for approximately 1/2 mile.
III. PROJECT LOCATION

A. The specific addresses to be bought out are as follows: [redacted]
IV. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED PROJECT

A. 100% of the funds will be expended on damaged structures located in the floodway.

B. 93% to be spent on property buyouts
   7% to be spent on property relocations.

C. The proposed project does not address multiple hazards.
   The only hazard to be addressed is future flooding.

D. The proposed project will remove personal and business property from the floodway. No walled structures will be rebuilt in this area. This removes the chance that the tremendous losses of personal property will occur again. The City of Montezuma will develop a park in the area with open area pavilions. This solution will ensure that should the floods reoccur, the area will receive minimal damage and will not need a Hazard-Mitigation grant or other monies to allow the area to recover.

D. The Hazard - Mitigation grant will be used in conjunction with a Community Development Block Grant to provide replacement housing for homeowners affected by the flooding. The CDBG monies will be used to provide the needed local match of funds.

E. This project reduces future hazards and risks by turning this land over to the city rather than keeping it in the hands of individuals. People become tied to their personal property because of its sentimental value and their financial interests. It is sometimes very difficult to get people to vacate their homes in times of natural disasters. Most people, however, have very little interest in staying in a city park when disaster strikes. The buyout program attempts to not only insure that property will be protected against future floods, but also human lives.

F. No one knows when or even if a flood of this magnitude will occur again. The City cannot afford to let its citizens put themselves and their property at risk again in this area. The City cannot completely protect itself from future flooding. This project allows the city to attack a known hazard area to at least insure that this area will not be negatively impacted by a flood again.

G. The Flood of 1994 devastated Montezuma. The downtown business district was underwater for several days. In the project area, forty-one structures received flood damage. The Flint River levees received severe damage.

H. Before the flood, 120 people lived in this area of Montezuma. Luckily, no lives were lost this time.
However, the only way to ensure that no lives will be lost in the future is to move people out of the floodway.

I. It is not anticipated that there will be any increase in economic development because of this project.

V. COST ESTIMATE AND BUDGET

A. COST BREAKOUT OF THE PROJECT

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<th>Amount</th>
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<td>Architect/engineer design services</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Property Acquisition</td>
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<td>Moving of Structures</td>
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<td>Project Management</td>
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<td>Demolition and Removal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other (contingencies)</td>
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B. PAYMENT BREAKOUT BY SHARE

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Applicant</td>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>$360,598.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>$1,081,792.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
IX. ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

A. Analysis of Environmental Effects

1. Land Use and Socioeconomic Issues
   a. The proposed project is not inconsistent with land use in the area.
   b. The project does not conflict with local zoning ordinances.
   c. Two structures will be relocated due to the proposed project.
   d. The outcome of the proposed project will be a new park that will offer the citizens of Montezuma recreational opportunities that are not currently available.
   e. The proposed project will not have a significant impact on the economic activities of the area.
   f. The proposed project does not require a Coastal Zone Consistency Determination.

2. Air Quality and Water Quality
   a. The proposed project will have no effect on air quality.
   b. The proposed project will not require a Corps of Engineers Section 404 permit.
   c. There will be no modification to stream beds or waterways.

3. Natural Resources
   a. The proposed project will not require the removal of any marine, aquatic, or terrestrial vegetable.
   b. No construction will be required in any marshland or wetland areas.
   c. There are no known rare or endangered species in the area.
   d. The proposed project is not located near a wildlife refuge or wildlife conservation area.

4. Archeological and Historic Resources
The administrator of the proposed project is working with SHPO to minimize effects on historic properties in the area.

B. COORDINATION

All information needed to develop the project and the environmental analysis was provided by the Middle Flint Regional Development Center staff in the Montezuma Comprehensive Plan.

C. The project will not lead to the restoration of wetlands.

D. The City of Montezuma will comply with all applicable environmental requirements prior to, during, and upon completion of the proposed project.

E. The State Historic Preservation Office has been informed of the proposed impact on Historic structures in the project area.

F. The proposed project will not involve any construction in the floodplain area. The Reconnaissance/Review Report is not required.

X. PROJECT COMPLIANCE ASSURANCES

A. Code Compliance

1. All work performed in the project area will be monitored by the Building Inspector of Montezuma to ensure compliance with all applicable codes and standards.

2. The project will not require an exemption from any codes.

B. Location

1. The project is located in the designated disaster area.

2. Not applicable.

C. National Flood Insurance Program

1. The City of Montezuma is a participant in good standing of the NFIP.

2. The city voted to join the NFIP in 1985.

3. The project area is not in a floodplain or floodway as designated on the FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Map.
D. Maintenance

1. The only maintenance costs associated with this project will be upkeep on the new park. The City of Montezuma has the equipment and personnel necessary to perform this maintenance.
City of Montezuma

Macou County, Georgia

---Project Activity Location---

MINORITY DATA

Number of Migrants: 120
Number of Migrants: 114
Percentage of Migrants: 95%

LOW/MOD INCOME PERSONS

Number of Migrants: 120
Number of Low/Moderate Migrants: 113
Percentage of Low/Moderate Migrants: 94%

Number of Units: 39
Number of Units to be Demolished and Cleared: 35

Moved and Rehabilitated

Rehabilitated
### VII. Implementation Schedule of Activities

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<tr>
<td>Environmental process</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFP for park design services</td>
<td>July 1995</td>
<td>August 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Award design contract</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design of park facility</td>
<td>September 1995</td>
<td>January 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design review/approval</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Title Searches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Close-out process</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
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</table>
VIII. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES

The first alternative to the proposed project was to raise the affected houses above the flood level. This would require raising the structures anywhere from 10 to 14 feet. This alternative was rejected for three reasons. First, most of the structures sustained more than 50% of their value in damages. To rebuild these structures would require a complete demolition and rebuild anyway. Secondly, to put most of these structures safely above the flood level requires the first floor to be more than one story above ground level. This is unworkable for several reasons, not the least of which is the lack of accessibility to these structures for people of limited mobility. The final reason for the rejection of this alternative is that the city would be spending funds to move structures above the flood level, but not out of the floodway. The city desires to offer its citizens more protection from future disasters than this.

The second alternative to the proposed project is to do nothing. Under this proposal, the structures could be rebuilt in the same place at the same elevation. The structures and the people within, would be sitting ducks for another natural disaster. Once again, the city has a greater obligation to its residents.

The third possible alternative would be for the city to buy out the damaged structures and build public housing for the affected people on this land. This alternative was also unacceptable because it did nothing to move people out of the floodway.

The decision to move forward with the proposed buyout and relocation is the best possible solution. Under this proposal, the homeowners not only receive compensation for their losses, but also receive aid in rebuilding and/or relocation. All structures and people will be removed from the floodway and possible future hazards.

IX. ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

A. Analysis of Environmental Effects

1. Land Use and Socioeconomic Issues

   a. The proposed project is not inconsistent with land use in the area.

   b. The project does not conflict with local zoning ordinances.
c. Two structures will be relocated due to the proposed project.
d. The outcome of the proposed project will be a new park that will offer the citizens of Montezuma recreational opportunities that are not currently available.
a. The proposed project will not have a significant impact on air quality.
f. The proposed project does not require a Coastal Zone Consistency Determination.

2. Air Quality and Water Quality
   a. The proposed project will have no effect on air quality.
   b. The proposed project will not require a Corps of Engineers Section 404 permit.
   c. There will be no modification to stream beds or waterways.

3. Natural Resources
   a. The proposed project will not require the removal of any marine, aquatic, or terrestrial vegetable.
   b. No construction will be required in any marshland or wetland areas.
   c. There are no known rare or endangered species in the area.
   d. The proposed project is not located near a wildlife refuge or wildlife conservation area.

B. COORDINATION

All information needed to develop the project and the environmental analysis was provided by the Middle Flint Regional Development Center staff.

X. PROJECT COMPLIANCE ASSURANCES

A. Code Compliance
   1. All work performed in the project area will be monitored by the Building Inspector of Montezuma to ensure compliance with all applicable codes and standards.
   2. The project is located in the designated disaster area.
XI. AUTHORIZATION

Signed for the Applicant:

Preston C. Williams, Jr.
Typed Name

Mayor
Title

Preston C. Williams, Jr.
Signature
March 27, 1995
Date

Signed for the State:

Governor's Authorized Representative

Signature
Date
Appendix D: Unpublished Contract from Tommy McKenzie’s Personal files
Georgia, Macon County.

This agreement made and entered into this 9th day of March 1913, between Yancey Hill of the County of Macon, State of Georgia, as party of the first part, and The Bank of Monteuma, a corporation of Monteuma, Georgia, County of Macon, as party of the second part, Witnesseth:

That the party of the first part agrees at once to construct a certain building, which shall be completed and ready for occupancy prior to the 1st of August 1913 unless the construction shall be interfered with by some providential or unavoidable contingency or by the government of the United States; the erection to be according to the plans and specifications which have been prepared and submitted to the party of the second part. The building to be 26 x 70 feet and to be situated on the old J. W. Brown warehouse lot on the corner of Cherry & Westbrook Street, in the City of Monteuma; the building to be completed except that the door and facing to the bank vault shall be furnished by the party of the second part; all other construction to be done by the party of the first part.

That when said building is completed on the 1st of August 1913 the party of the first part agrees to let, rent and lease to the party of the second part for a term of five years the lower story, and in case the building is completed earlier than August 1st, the same is to be taken charge of by the party of the second part immediately upon completion; the same is to be occupied as a bank; the rental for the same shall be $50.00 payable at the end of each month for the full term of five years.
The party of the first part for the mutual considerations herein mentioned agrees and binds himself to give and grant to the party of the second part the exclusive right and option at any time during the life of this lease to buy and become the purchaser and owner of the entire building; both stories, herein referred to at and for the exact purchase price which said building cost, plus $2250.00 for the lot on which it is situated, that is to say, the party of the second part shall have the right and option to buy said building and lot on which it is situated for $2250.00 for the lot and the cost of the building, and the cost of the building for the purposes of this option is to be furnished and agreed on immediately after the completion of the building and a memorandum thereof endorsed on this contract.

In witness whereof the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year above written.

Signed, sealed and delivered in presence of us:

[Signatures]

Chairman;
Organization Committee.

$10,900.00

Building Material

26 x 30 - 2250.00

6240.00

Tt
Georgia, Macon County, May 7, 1913.

The Duly elected directors of The Bank of Montezuma at a meeting in the office of the bank, on the evening of the above date, accepted and approved the within contract existing between Mr. Yancey Hill, and the above mentioned bank, and authorized the same to endorse the same on the back of the contract.

[Signature]

The Bank of Montezuma.