“TO GODS THEY DID NOT KNOW:” ARGUING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION
OF δαιμόνιον IN 1 CORINTHIANS 10:20-21

by

SCOTT KENDRICK BREVARD

(Under the Direction of Wayne Coppins)

Abstract

Because Paul warns his Corinthian audience that food sacrificed to idols has been sacrificed
“to demons and not to God” (1 Cor. 10:20), the natural question arises: what exactly is a demon?
In light of the paucity of its usage in his Undisputed letters, “To Gods They Did Not Know” argues
that rather than the typical attribution of this statement to the same possessive evil spirits at play
in the gospels, Paul’s understanding of the term δαιμόνιον in 1 Corinthians is closer to that used
elsewhere within the Greco-Roman world in describing lesser or intermediary deities/divine
beings. By examining Paul’s metaphysical world within the argument of 1 Cor 8:1-11:1, the
concept of a demon and the semantic range of δαιμόνιον in select documents from 200BCE-200CE,
and principles of lexical semantics such as Illegitimate Totality Transfer and polysemy, this study
determines how the sense of intermediary being fits into the argument of 1 Cor 10:19-22, as well
as the larger argument of 8:1-11:1.

Index Words: New Testament, Pauline Studies, 1 Corinthians, Demons, Word Studies, Lexical
Semantics, Demons in Ancient Literature
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“To Gods They Did Not Know:” Arguing for an Alternate Understanding of Paul’s Conception of δαμόνιον in 1 Corinthians 10:20-21

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“When the Lord restored the fortunes of Zion, we were like those who dream. Then our mouth was filled with laughter, and our tongue with shouts of joy; then it was said among the nations, “The Lord has done great things for them.” The Lord has done great things for us, and we rejoiced. Restore our fortunes, O Lord, like the watercourses in the Negeb. May those who sow in tears reap with shouts of joy. Those who go out weeping, bearing the seed for sowing, shall come home with shouts of joy, carrying their sheaves.”

Psalm 126, NRSV

For Mom and Dad: may all your harvests sown in tears be reaped with shouts of joy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM OF PAULINE DEMONOLOGY

In *The Concept of Anxiety*, written almost 200 years ago, Søren Kierkegaard remarked:

“Because in the course of time the demonic has denoted several
different things, and at last has come to mean almost anything, it
seems best to define the concept a little.”¹

A century later, G.B. Caird, with more attention toward the grand divide between modern readers of the New Testament and its first audiences, penned an attempt to bridge the gap by narrowing in on spiritual powers in the letters of Paul, writing:

“To us the word demon tends to call up a mental picture of a little
black man with horns, barbed tail, and toasting fork, but to the
Greeks it denoted any heavenly mediator between God and man.”²

These authors recognized the difficulty that modern readers have when “calling up,” or rather envisioning, the thought world behind certain ancient terms. Historical and linguistic boundaries separate readers from the original context of these documents and, as Caird’s work alludes, sense-depiction is often a victim of this divide, whether because of outdated terminology or of a change in the senses (or concepts) associated with the term.³ This complexity, especially when

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³ Whether in the triadic relationship of sign, concept, and signified or the trapezium of sign, concept, sense, and signified. For a further clarification see Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, “The Use and Abuse of Word Studies in
approaching the term “demon,” is certainly not limited to modern readers; the complications in understanding “demons” stretches far into the past, particularly, as Kierkegaard notes, because of the rich polyvalence associated with the term. Nowhere is this complication seen more clearly than in the reception of Paul’s usage of the term δαιμόνιον in 1 Cor 10:20-21. While many scholars and readers of the New Testament automatically associate these entities with those found elsewhere in the New Testament, particularly the gospels, it is worth enquiring if this is indeed the sense that Paul has in mind.

To investigate the role that these δαιμόνια play in Paul’s work, several things must be taken into account. First, this thesis works to build a metaphysical framework of entities that appear in the broader argument of 1 Cor 8:1-11:1. This works toward pinpointing how δαιμόνια are associated with other entities that exist or do not exist in the mind of our author, particularly in this section. Next, to gain a broader understanding of δαιμόνια and their place within the historical context of 1 Corinthians (as well as previous historical contexts), attention will be given toward building a semantic range that links the term with a particular sense. The third chapter turns to linguistic methodology and incorporates lexical semantics to gain a clearer sense of how the term δαιμόνιον is used, especially by examining the lexical relationships with other terms in its context. Finally, the fourth chapter returns to the argument of 1 Cor 10:20-21 and attempts to place δαιμόνια into the metaphysical framework. However, in order to see where they fit, it is important to first build such a framework by examining particular entities and the way they play a role in both Paul’s argument and his worldview.

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Theology,” pp. 106-128 in Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1989), 115–118. Their visualization of these two models is helpful in pinpointing which direction a word study is moving. In this particular case, the aim is from the sign (δαιμόνιον) to the concept “demon.”
Paul’s Metaphysical World in 1 Cor 8:1-11:1

In his argument about the eating of sacrificial food in Corinth (1 Cor 8:1-11:1), Paul opens not only a discussion of Corinthian praxis in relation to cultic sacrifices but also a window into his metaphysical world. Within the metaphysical world of this passage, Paul posits the existence (or non-existence?) of many entities, including the appearance of the term δαιμόνιον.

The first step in understanding Paul’s δαιμόνια and how they relate to the world around them is to place them alongside the entities that exist or do not exist within the metaphysical framework envisioned by Paul in 8:1-11:1. To begin, Paul’s metaphysical world is not confined to this particular passage. Entities like Satan (5:5), angels (6:3; 11:10), God (1:4), and spirit (used in many ways – 2:4, 11, 12; 5:3, 5) can all be found throughout the remainder of 1 Corinthians. The variety of this language demonstrates that Paul’s metaphysical world is vast and diverse. Neither is this world unique or limited to 1 Corinthians, shown by the mention in Galatians of στοιχεῖα (4:3, 9). On the other hand, because this study is concerned with the particular meaning of δαιμόνια, it is only necessary to unpack Paul’s metaphysical world as it relates to the appearance of this term. The crux of the term’s sense lies in understanding what Paul’s metaphysical world contributes to the argument “concerning idol sacrifices” (Περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων - 8:1) and “concerning food of the idol sacrifices” (Περὶ τῆς βρωσεως ... τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων - 8:4). Thus, looking at the metaphysical world revealed in 8:1-11:1, attention should be given to several entities, such as idols (εἰδωλόν), gods and lords (θεοὶ πολλοί καὶ κύριοι πολλοί), God the Father.

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4 This is not to imply that entities within the metaphysical world cannot act within the physical world or do not have a “real” existence.
(θεὸς ὁ πατήρ) and lord Jesus Christ (κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός), and to the way that δαιμόνια fit into this world.

**Idols in the World**

First, the appearance of δαιμόνια is contingent upon the topic of εἰδωλόθυτον, which itself is contingent upon an εἰδωλον.\(^6\) Paul’s rhetoric on εἰδωλον begins early in the passage (8:4) with a key mantra of the Corinthians: “We know that there is no idol in the world,” in which he seems to affirm the Corinthians’ slogan of the nonexistence of idols.\(^7\) Perhaps it is necessary to stop and ask what Paul refers to when talking of an εἰδωλον. Moreover, does Paul intend to argue that there is no such thing as an idol in either the physical or metaphysical world? It is difficult to argue that the physical referent—cultic images and statuary of the gods in the Greco-Roman pantheon, likely including heroes and the deities of the Imperial cult\(^8\)—is nonexistent in the physical world. One glance at the records left by Pausanias, Plutarch, and Strabo demonstrate that cultic statuary and imagery were evident, if not ubiquitous, to those living in and traversing through Roman Corinth and its temple precincts.\(^9\) Therefore, a statement about the non-existence of these “idols” seems nonsensical based on the physical world of both Paul and the Corinthians. However, the relationship between a cultic image and its divine presence, a veritable topic of

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\(^6\) εἰδωλον is not an interchangeable term for δαιμόνιον, but it is quite clear that the two terms have some relationship in this overall argument, particularly in 10:19-20.


\(^8\) Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 341-343.

discussion in the ancient world, may explain the necessity of this comment.\textsuperscript{10} Even though many Greco-Roman philosophical traditions argued against subsuming the god into the image, the association of the divine presence with the image seems to have been a real occurrence in Greco-Roman ritual worship.\textsuperscript{11} The tension of arguing against the subsumation of the god into the image while at the same time dealing with the efficacy of such statuary created an environment in which statues, “idols,” and other cultic images were viewed as liminal boundary markers—they existed on the border of the visible and invisible world.\textsuperscript{12} It is probably for this reason that most argue Paul intends to make a statement about the reality (or non-reality) of the entities behind the idol, namely gods, rather than the physical idol itself.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, if Paul’s statement in 8:4 aids in drawing a portrait of his metaphysical world, perhaps we can then say that an εἰδωλον lies within the physical world, but itself does not have any real existence in the metaphysical world.

**Many Gods and Many Lords**

Whereas the εἰδωλον were nonexistent, 8:5 opens a challenging, perhaps contradictory, statement about “many gods and many lords.” Fee and Fitzmyer prefer a reading that adopts “For even if there are so-called gods,” keeping the emphasis on the ‘so called’ (λεγόμενοι) status of the gods.\textsuperscript{14} Fee imagines this to be Paul’s own sentiment and their “so-called” status comes “because they do not have actual existence, certainly not in the form their worshipers believe them to have.”\textsuperscript{15} At one point, he even speculates that Paul may well have intended to finish v. 5


\textsuperscript{11} Nijay K. Gupta, “‘They Are Not Gods!’ Jewish and Christian Idol Polemic and Greco-Roman Use of Cult Statues,” *CBQ* 76 no. 4 (Oct. 2014), 704-719.

\textsuperscript{12} Gupta, “‘They are not gods!’”, 709.

\textsuperscript{13} Fee, *First Epistle*, 409-410; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 340.

\textsuperscript{14} Fee, *First Epistle*, 411; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 341.

\textsuperscript{15} Fee, *First Epistle*, 412.
with something akin to “they do not really have existence.” Similar to Fee, Collins takes Paul’s language as “judgmental” based on the use of “so-called” as an adjective for the gods in v. 5. Perhaps the focus on the “so-called” nature overreaches the term: while the participle can imply a negation of the title or name it describes, it can also be a neutral descriptor in line with the passive voice (cf. John 4:25). Still, Collins goes on to divide the “many gods” and “many lords” by categorizing the former as “natural realities such as the stars, sun, fire, sea, or wind,” whose personifications were worshiped as gods, and the latter as “divinized humans, most probably emperors such as Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus” who demanded worship based on their place in the imperial cult. In a slightly different manner, Fitzmyer argues that Paul’s comment on these other gods “makes a concession for the sake of his argument… Although idols are nonentities, many people subjectively consider them to be really existent.” Still, however, Fitzmyer ultimately comes to a similar conclusion as Fee: “Although it might seem that Paul is thus affirming the existence of such beings, it is really his way of expressing his awareness of a belief in their alleged existence and of worship of them, or perhaps his awareness of the reality of idols that depict them.” Therefore, to Fee, Fitzmyer, and many other scholars, the “many gods and many lords” are absent from Paul’s metaphysical world. Still, diving further into the

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16 “Precisely how Paul intended to conclude the sentence when it began cannot be known,” Fee, First Epistle, 411.  
17 Collins, First Corinthians, 314.  
18 Pace Hays’ claim that “Paul’s use of the dismissive adjective “so-called” shows that he does not believe these figures to be real gods.” Richard Hays, First Corinthians, (Louisville, K.Y.: John Knox Press, 1997), 139. As pointed to above, the participle, used here as an adjective, may not be as “dismissive” in its own right, but rather be used as an objective marker- they are called θεί by some within the world.  
19 Collins, First Corinthians, 314.  
20 Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 341.  
21 Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 342.  
22 Likewise, many others agree on the nonexistent metaphysical reality, at least as real gods, of these two entities, regardless of their physical presence in first century Corinth. See Fee, First Epistle, 413; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 342-43; Hays, First Corinthians, 139; Collins, First Corinthians, 314-15; Conzelmann, I Corinthians, 143.
argument may show that there is some intended metaphysical reality behind these two
designations, particularly when considering their function in Paul’s overall argument.

**One God and One Lord**

Setting aside the “so-called” designation, it seems more clear that Paul includes the
mention of “many gods and many lords” in order to create a contrast with the confession of the
Christian community in Corinth: “but to us one God, the Father… and one Lord, Jesus Christ”
(8:6). The metaphysical reality of these two entities, God the Father as θεός and Jesus Christ as
κύριος, is affirmed, which is rather unsurprising considering the tenets of the Christian faith.

Still, it is important to note that these two beings exist within Paul’s metaphysical world,
particularly because they are affirmed for his community over against the “many gods and many
lords” present in v. 5. If, as Fitzmyer and Fee propose, Paul’s mention of other gods in v. 5 does
not actually place them in his metaphysical world, then the statement of v. 6 reveals that there is
only one God (θεός) that not only exists, but is properly categorized as a θεός. This poetic
formulation precludes the existence of any other being as a θεός, which is for Paul the rightful
spot claimed by the Creator God who is the source of “all things” (τὰ πάντα). The contrast
between the “one God” and the “many gods” lends itself to two alternative interpretations. On
the one hand, the “gods and lords” in the previous verse could be understood to not exist in his
metaphysical world because they are not proper θεοί or κύριοι. On the other hand, it is possible

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23 Hays takes the statement a little harsher than this translation and conflates it closer to the Shema, arguing that
“there is no God but one.” Perhaps, however, Paul includes the δὲλα ἡμῖν in order to soften the blow for these
Corinthian Christians, many of whom were probably Gentiles (with which Hays also agrees, p. 6). Hays, *First
Corinthians*, 169.

24 Debate over whether this is a pre-Pauline formulation or hymn extends beyond this study, but for further
discussion of such a topic, see Collins, *First Corinthians*, 316-17; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 342-46.

25 Several commentators point to how this might recall LXX Ps 95:5, an interesting passage where the gods of the
nations are named as δαιμόνια and are contrasted to ὁ κύριος because of his creative capacity, particularly in creating
the heavens, most likely to be assumed as the dwelling domain of these δαιμόνια. See Fee, *First Epistle*, 521 fn. 592.
that they exist, not as θεοί or κύριοι, but as part of what Paul means by the term δαιμόνια in 1 Cor 10:20-21. In order to see the connections between these entities, an important question must be asked: what exactly does Paul mean by δαιμόνια?

The Problem: The Paucity of Pauline δαιμόνιον-Language

The modern reader might protest that this question has a simple answer since demons, or δαιμόνια, clearly appear in the New Testament as possessive spirits, usually unclean or evil, and requiring exorcism in order to alleviate whatever symptoms these evil spirits entail. This definition does not have to reach far for support from the text; take, for example, the well-known “Legion” pericope (Mark 5:1-20; Luke 8:26-39). This paramount example supports the aforementioned definition and typifies demons for the gospel accounts in a number of ways. First, this pericope includes a “demonic” that has either an unclean spirit(s) (πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον–Mark 5:2; Luke 8:29) or demons (δαιμόνια–Luke 8:27), underlining the interchangeable relationship between these two terms for the gospel writers. Next, the culprit is defined as either “having demons” (ἔχων δαιμόνια–Luke 8:27) or being “demon-possessed” (δαιμονιζόμενον–Mark 5:15), which emphasizes the possessive aspect of these demons. Finally, the encounter between the demoniacs and Jesus results in an exorcism where the unclean spirits/demons are “cast out” or “come out” (ἐξέρχομαι–Luke 8:29; cf. ἐκβάλλω–Matt 17:18-19, Mark 3:15). Many other such examples could fall under this understanding of a δαιμόνιον: the programmatic exorcisms described after Jesus’s healing of

26 While it is true that the masculine δαίμων appears ubiquitously in Greek literature, the diminutive form δαιμόνιον is predominant in the New Testament. In fact, the masculine form only occurs once in the New Testament (Matt 8:31).

27 The Gospel of Matthew redacts the “Legion” pericope into a tale of two demoniacs (δαιμονιζόμενοι) and abridges much of its Markan predecessor. Cf. Matthew 8:28-32.

28 The possession often carries attributes or effects that manifest in a physical nature through the one being possessed. In this pericope nakedness (Luke 8:27; implied by Mark 5:15), supernatural strength (Mark 5:3-4; Luke 8:29), and erratic behavior, such as living among the tombs or self-mutilation (Mark 5:2, 5; Luke 8:27), all characterize the possessive effects of the demon(s)/unclean spirit(s).
Simon’s mother-in-law (Matt 8:16; Mark 1:32-34; Luke 4:41), the debate over whose authority Jesus casts out demons (Luke 11:14-19; Matt 12:22-28; Mark 3:22-27), the Canaanite/Syro-Phoenician woman’s daughter (Matt 15:21-28; Mark 7:24-30), and even those demons\textsuperscript{29} habitually residing in the “fallen Babylon” in Revelation 18:2.\textsuperscript{30} While the use of δαιμόνιον-language mentioned above is undeniably consistent in the gospels, it is unclear whether this sense, even with some minor modification, should be read into every occurrence of the term in the rest of the New Testament, particularly in the Pauline corpus.

It is immediately apparent that δαιμόνιον-language is not nearly as ubiquitous in Paul’s corpus as it is in the gospels. In fact, throughout his undisputed letters the term only appears four times, each in 1 Cor 10:20-21, discussed above.\textsuperscript{31} This odd feature of Pauline literature, namely the lack of δαιμόνιον-language, could be resolved or explained by arguing that Paul does speak of demons but merely uses different terms that evoke the same sense as in the gospels.\textsuperscript{32} While this inclination makes sense, it does not quell the initial difficulty: why would Paul use other terms to invoke the aforementioned concept of demons? Perhaps Paul deviates for stylistic purposes, simply using

\textsuperscript{29} Notice the parallelism and proximity to unclean spirit also occurring here.

\textsuperscript{30} Even outside of the New Testament, demons and evil spirits were active in the worldview of the authors of Qumranic and Apocryphal texts, appearing in texts such as 4Q560 or 1QApGen 20:16-32. Lichtenberger’s study also pulls in a “demonology” of Jesus and the gospels in order to show similar streams of thought within the Early Christian/Second Temple Jewish 1st c. worldviews. Unsurprisingly, Paul’s work, let alone 1 Cor. 10:20-21, is not mentioned in his study. For more on evil spirits and “demons” (Πῆθ) in documents from Qumran, see Hermann Lichtenberger, “Demonology in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament” pp. 267-280 in Text, Thought, and Practice in Qumran and Early Christianity, eds. Ruth A. Clements and Daniel R. Schwartz (Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, M.A.: Brill, 2004), 269-276. For the purposes of this thesis and its focused word study, however, the Aramaic and Hebrew original texts of Lichtenberger’s study do not aid in illuminating the sense depiction of the Greek δαιμόνιον.

\textsuperscript{31} The only other case of δαιμόνιον-language in the entirety of Paul’s corpus is 1 Tim. 4:1, which the NRSV takes as “deceitful spirits and teachings of demons” (πνεύματα πλάνας και διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων). While some, such as Luke Timothy Johnson, have argued for the authenticity of this letter, many have denounced its Pauline authorship. Even if 1 Timothy were considered an authentic letter, the way δαιμόνιον is used in 4:1 differs from 1 Cor. 10:20-21 based on the semantic proximity it has with πνεύμα, which will be touched on in chapter 3.

interchangeable terms to tap into a single idea. While this seems as if a reasonable answer, the situation may be more complex than this; namely, terms like δαιμόνια (1 Cor 10:20-21), στοιχεῖα (Gal 4:3, 9), and πνεύματα (1 Cor 12:10; 14:32) all occur in divergent contexts. This makes it more difficult to conclude that they are interchangeable given that they never “interchange” in any meaningful way, and so Paul’s use of the terms πνεύμα and στοιχεῖα can not illuminate his use of δαιμόνιον. It could be argued instead that the term δαιμόνιον carries a particular sense for Paul, one that is shaped by its own context without assuming the domain deployed in the gospels. Given that the context in which Paul uses the particular term δαιμόνιον is strikingly different from that found in the gospels, this position seems tenable. However, many scholars often include 1 Cor 10:20-21 as an instance of “demons” in which Paul’s understanding matches that found in the gospels, i.e. as a possessive evil spirit. Before proposing an alternative understanding for this term in Paul’s work, it is important to examine the existing consensus.

**The History of Scholarly Agreement on the δαιμόνιον in 1 Cor 10:20-21**

Despite the sense of an intermediary deity displayed throughout Greco-Roman literature and the difference in context between the gospels’ use of δαιμόνιον and Paul’s, a brief look at the secondary literature hints that there is no apparent need to reevaluate the sense of δαιμόνιον in 1 Cor 10:20-21. In fact, the situation seems quite the opposite: there seems to be an overwhelming consensus with how the term is treated in scholarship. Even though each scholar develops a

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33 Cf. Col 2:8, 20.
34 This is discussed in the semantic range below in chapter 2.
35 Although this scholarly agreement is not merely confined to contemporary scholarship, this study narrows its gaze to demonstrate the perceived “problem” of uniformity within several key works of the modern period. Again, as mentioned earlier, this study seeks the relationship between term and sense, particularly because the referent–
certain nuance to their definition, most tend to consciously or unconsciously import the sense of a δαιμόνιον from predecessor texts, such as the gospels or the LXX, rather than examine it on its own right in this particular context.

The agreement on how to read “demons” in 1 Corinthians is evident in recent scholarship. Gordon Fee sees this particular passage as a demonstration that the understanding of idolatry has undergone a “natural development” in which monotheism demanded a contrastive demonology. Fee corroborates this with the context into which Paul is writing, claiming, “Paul’s point is simple: These pagan meals are in fact sacrifices to demons; the worship of demons is involved.” As for what constitutes a “demon,” Fee’s understanding of the sense is not clearly defined, although he does link demons to “beings who were no gods” based on occurrences in the LXX. In a similar way, Anthony Thiselton takes the δαιμόνια here in accord with the prophetic view of Hellenistic Judaism of the non-existence of “false gods.” On the other hand, by also recognizing the apocalyptic view of ethereal powers, he draws a more explicit definition of δαιμόνια by concluding that Paul “is less likely to be thinking of personalized entities than the power of demonic forces which reflect powers of evil greater in collective force than human resources.” Joseph Fitzmyer also gives a more explicit definition of δαιμόνια by tracing the history of the term in relation to Foerster’s work in the Theological Dictionary of the

sacrifices made to the gods of the Corinthian pantheon—holds general consensus within contemporary scholarship. Still, one needs to look no further than the modern standards to see the trend in, more or less, uniform treatment of δαιμόνιον. Cf. Anthony Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, M.I.: W.B. Eerdmans; Carlisle, U.K.: Paternoster Press, 2000); Fee, First Epistle; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians; Collins, First Corinthians, 375-382; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 173; Richard Horsley, 1 Corinthians, Abingdon New Testament Commentaries (Nashville, T.N.: Abingdon Press, 1998); Hays, First Corinthians. 36 “Since there was only one God, such power could not be attributed to a god; hence, the belief arose that idols represented demonic spirits.” Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 521. 37 Ibid. 38 Fee, First Epistle, 520. He gives attention to Deut 32 as well as Ps 96:5 (95:5). 39 Thiselton, The First Epistle, 775.
New Testament, demonstrating how the term develops from “Divine Power” or “inferior divine being” to a “spirit” either good or evil, and finally an “evil spirit.” To this, he concludes, “In this last sense [of δαιμόνιον as “evil spirit, demon”], Paul uses the word here.”

Derek Newton’s study of sacrificial food in Corinth investigates the polyvalence of the terminology in Ancient Israelite, Classical Greek, and Hellenistic Jewish contexts, but he ultimately supports a similar reading of demons. Even when scholars balk at initially relaying the sense that Paul envisions, often their description of these demons falls right into the same problems. Time and time again, the term “demon” is promulgated under the assumption of “evil spirit” without either investigating the polysemy at hand with this term or clearly explicating the semantic decisions leading to the conclusion of this sense of δαιμόνιον.

In order to attempt to recapture the sense of the term δαιμόνιον in its Pauline context and its place in Paul’s metaphysical world of 1 Cor 8:1-11:1, one must first look at the polyvalence of the concept. After seeing the concept in a variety of contexts, we can then attempt to trim down the possible senses of the term within Paul’s world. This creates a starting point for which

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40 Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 393.
41 Newton does, however, grant that the use of δαιμόνια would have created a disconnect between Paul’s understanding and the understanding of his Greco-Roman audience. For Newton’s thorough study on the terminology in its several contexts, cf. Derek Newton, *Deity and Diet: The Dilemma of Sacrificial Food at Corinth*, (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 349-375.
42 Some who are hesitant to translate the term tend to have trouble engaging the δαιμόνιον found here. Peter Gooch claims that the term is “ambiguous in the text” (p. 76) but still retains possessive qualities (p. 56). Others, like Richard Phua, do not take it all the way to the extent of possession but trace the usage in the LXX and believes it is indicative of outside deities, which he then transposes into the spirit world of Paul’s corpus as “evil spirits.” Marion Soards translates the term as “demon” and remarks that the OT context seems to link gods and demons, perhaps even equating the two, but warns readers not too put too much emphasis on the demons within this verse because it is not “possible to understand exactly what Paul believed a demon to be.” Instead, Soards sees Paul “juxtaposing two levels of concern, two loyalties, and two powers,” that is, the power of God and the power of demons. Certainly there are not many like Wendell Willis, who proclaims, “It is not clear precisely what the word δαιμόνιον meant for Paul, and that is not crucial for understanding the function of this passage.” Cf. Marion L. Soards, *1 Corinthians*, New International Biblical Commentary, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 210-211; Peter Gooch, *Dangerous Food*, (Waterloo, Ontario: Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion, 1993), 56; Richard Phua, *Idolatry and Authority* (London, U.K. and New York N.Y.: T&T Clark, 2005), 137-145; Wendell Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10*, (Chico, C.A.: Scholars Press, 1985), 189-190.
senses are available to Paul, which then allows us to move into the process of deciding which sense fits Paul’s Corinthian context. If, as it seems, scholars are treating the term with gospels-colored lenses, an investigation into the semantic range and the lexical relationships may clearly delineate the polyvalent senses of this term.
CHAPTER 2

A TOUR OF DEMONS: THE PRESENCE OF δαιμόνιον-LANGUAGE IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF PAUL’S WORLD

Just as Johann Wettstein proposed in the 18th century, it is still paramount to understand the “opinions, accepted ways of thought, proverbs, symbolic language,” and, in this study, the sense envisioned by a term in order “to get a thorough and complete understanding” of what Paul meant in 1 Cor. 10:20-21.\(^{43}\) Therefore, before investigating how δαιμόνια function in his rhetorical argument, it seems best to look into the term itself and see what it means in an ancient context, particularly in light of the difference in sense depiction mentioned by Caird. To do this, this chapter sketches out a brief history of the concept of a “demon.” This is not meant to be an exhaustive study of every being or term categorically lumped as a “demon,” whether using the term or not, but instead gives a cross-cultural demonstration of how demons (or daimons) have often demonstrated divine qualities or have been portrayed as divinities in a variety of historical contexts. This is then narrowed and followed by a semantic range of the term δαιμόνιον within Paul’s world (200BCE-200CE) to see if this understanding continues to be a viable option in this period. If the understanding of a δαιμόνιον as some form of deified or divine being (lesser or intermediary god status included here) is attested in the wider world, it can plausibly be argued that this may be the sense that Paul intends.

\(^{43}\) J.J. Wettstein, as appears in Klauck, Religious Context, 2.
**The Concept of a “Demon”: Divine Qualities, Intermediary Beings, and Lesser Deities**

The concept of a “demon” has quite a rich history, but this survey only briefly examines a few of the contexts where demons appear. By examining the concept in Ancient Near Eastern and Ancient and Classical Greek contexts, it is clear that one of the possible points on the spectrum of “demons” is a being with divine qualities, whether defined as a lesser deity or behaving in an intermediary role between humans and gods. This is also reflected in the etymology and the development of the term δαιμόνιον as well, although it is not necessarily inherent to the term in all contexts.

For the Ancient Near Eastern portrayal of demons, Anne-Caroline Loisel’s work on the demons of the canonical Akkadian incantation texts defines them as beings that “were created by the gods to be the tools, the weapons and the messengers of the divine anger.” For the appearances within the *Utukkū Lemnātu*, Loisel categorizes these bearers of divine anger as “always furious and savage,” even going so far to say they “are deeply evil by nature.” While they may appear invisible (often recognizable by their voices), the narrative in *Utukkū Lemnātu* XII, 1.1-12 demonstrates how the physical appearance can clarify the divine/intermediary status of these beings. In this particular tablet, the *Utukku*-demon “is like a god” because of its surrounding *melammu*, which is a “supernatural radiance,” neither positive nor negative, which is often reserved for gods. Even though Loisel demonstrates the specific function of these demons, their divine qualities shine through both in the primary text and in her analysis. While they are typically cast in a negative light, hence the “evil” designation, this could be a result of the genre studied: the nature of the incantation texts relies on exorcism.

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46 Ibid.
For ancient Judaism, the Hebrew Bible, and particularly to the translators of the LXX, Dale Martin notes that “demon” can be used as a blanket term to describe a variety of supernatural beings. “Demonic beings” under this umbrella can include “evil angels, various “disease demons,” Lilith, impure “spirits,” and many more.”

Still, among the beings within this category, many still hold divine qualities. By focusing on Hebrew terms that translators chose to render as δαίμων or δαιμόνιον, Martin identifies a number of interesting locations that may illuminate a view of ancient “demonology.” Beginning with רש, found in Deut 32:17, Martin argues that this may have originally been a divine title. For this reason, the term seems likely “to refer to ancient gods of Canaan and other surrounding peoples, who could have viewed them as good powers or gods.”

While this may very well be the expected conclusion from the rest of the verse, especially since the שדים are named as אלהים, it demonstrates a linking of a demon (שדים/דאמון) with gods ( אלהים/θεοί) in the minds of the translators. In a similar manner, Martin points to Isa 65:11 where דְּנֵה, or “Destiny” (NRSV), is translated with δαιμόνιον. Along with מְנַפְּקָה, which is translated with τύχη, Martin argues that the translators chose “two Greek words that also refer both to abstract qualities and the gods of those qualities.”

While Martin’s overall goal is to argue that the tradition of demons as “fallen angels” is a post-Christian development, his treatment of δαιμόνιον-language in the translation of the Hebrew Bible again supports a view of “demons” as deities or beings with divine qualities.

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48 Martin briefly notes that this may have a connection to the Assyrian term šīdu, which referred to the bull statues in Assyrian palaces. Martin, “When Did Angels Become Demons?”, 658. More generally, it probably relates to the sense of šēdu, which the CAD defines as “a spirit or demon representing the individual’s vital force.” Chicago Assyrian Dictionary, § pt. II, vol. 17, 256, second printing 2004 published by the Oriental Institute, Chicago, I.L.
50 Ibid.
While the Ancient Near Eastern and Hebrew Bible contexts are helpful in understanding the concept, the Ancient and Classical Greek contexts are useful in not only showing the concept, but in tracing the term itself. Unsurprisingly, the argument for divine qualities or lesser/intermediary god status continues to thrive in both Greek depictions and definitions of demons. From its early usage in the works of Homer, δαιμόνιον retained ties to the greater δαιμον- family with reference to a form of divine being or deified power.\(^{51}\) Homer’s work goes so far as to link the gods of the Olympian pantheon with daimons (\(\text{Iliad 1.222;6.115;23.595;3.420}\)).\(^{52}\) On the other hand, Walter Burkert warns against portraying the two as interchangeable entities.\(^{53}\) Still, Burkert’s description of demons in Ancient Greece demonstrates their divine nature or qualities: they act as “the veiled countenance of divine activity” and appear to be the “necessary complement to the Homeric view of gods as individuals with personal characteristics.”\(^{54}\) At the same time, however, Burkert alludes to the more impersonal role of daimons: rather than a specific entity, they appear as an “occult power, a force that drives man forward when no agent is present.”\(^{55}\) In the following semantic range, this idea can be seen in translations using “fate” or “heavenly power.” Martin’s note on Isa 65:11 offers a differing possibility, however, as “Destiny” (perhaps also rendered as “the deity” in the semantic range below) could easily have been thought to be a certain being.\(^{56}\)

Within Classical Greece, the understanding of demons, or daimons, continued to develop in a myriad of ways. Perhaps the most famous mention of demons within classical literature is

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51 “When characters in Homer talk about divine interventions, they use not the names of specific deities, which the narrator uses, but indeterminate terms like a god (\(\theta\epsilon\omicron\sigma\)) or divine being (\(\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\).” Price, 1999, 13.
52 Martin, “When Did Angels Become Demons?”, 662 fn. 19.
55 Ibid.
Socrates’ δαιμόνιον, developed in Plato’s *Apology* (40A). This paradigmatic instance enhanced the idea of a “demon” as an intermediary being acting on a personal level, a personalized version of Burkert’s “driving force.” Even more, Socrates is charged with introducing δαιμόνια, which are correlated and conflict with the gods of the state, again depicting these beings as divinities.57 Elsewhere in Plato’s work, Eros, the god of love, is described not as a god, but as a daimon.58 These developments, furthered by Xenocrates’ systemization of demons and gods, show the continuation of the definition and depiction of demons in the classical age, particularly in light of the way they take on divine qualities.59 The (re)definition of daimons continued to spill into the Hellenistic and Roman age as well, particularly seen in Plutarch’s *De facie in orbe lunae* (Mor. 944D), where δαιμόνες appear to be souls that ascend and descend upon the moon,60 and Philo’s *De Gigantibus* (II.6), where angels and daimons are inextricably linked.61 Nevertheless, the understanding of a daimon within Ancient and Classical Greece is heavily linked with divine qualities or lesser/intermediary deities, which is unsurprising based on the etymology of the particular term in question, δαιμόνιον.

This brief sketch of the concept of demons is still fairly limited to δαίμων/δαίμον-centric terminology (outside of the Hebrew and Akkadian terms, of course) and could include many more terms or phrases. However, by further restricting the sense or concept to only the term δαιμόνιον, the sense is refined even more. The term δαιμόνιον appears as the substantivized neuter noun derived from the adjective δαιμόνιος, “divine.”62 Based on the -νιον ending, it seems to be the

60 “Plutarch plainly uses δαιμόνια for intermediary beings, more specifically the evil.” Foerster, *TDNT*, 2:9.
diminutive form of the masculine δαίμων, which may have contributed to the Jewish and Christian preference for this term.\textsuperscript{63} Foerster draws a further separation between the two terms by categorizing δαίμων as “the usual term for the whole field” while asserting that δαιμόνιον is “more limited in time and scope.”\textsuperscript{64} By this he means that δαιμόνιον “denotes that which lies outwith human capacity and is thus to be attributed to the intervention of higher powers, whether for good or evil,” even if the referent is not always “thought of as a true substantive,” such as concepts like “fate.”\textsuperscript{65} Still, for some audiences, the two terms—the masculine and the neuter—could have been used rather interchangeably.\textsuperscript{66} The authors of the New Testament, on the other hand, almost exclusively use the neuter, as the masculine δαίμων only occurs once (Matt 8:31). As mentioned earlier, however, the term is strikingly silent within the work of Paul; still, this does not stop Foerster from finding several resonances of Paul’s thought on demons in places where the term does not appear.\textsuperscript{67} In Foerster’s eyes, the use of demons in the New Testament “stands in succession of the OT,” which focuses heavily on the “hostile spirits” sense and avoids the intermediary sense at play with δαίμων.\textsuperscript{68} With this backdrop in mind, we now turn to the semantic range of δαιμόνιον in the broader world around Paul to see the way the term is used in and around the first century.

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\textsuperscript{63} Martin touches on this and speculates that it could seem to “degrade” the divinity or divine beings referred to with the term. See Martin, “When Did Angels Become Demons?”, 658.

\textsuperscript{64} Foerster, \textit{TDNT}, 2:8.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{66} In reference to Isa 65:11: “Our LXX editions tend to have δαίμων and cite Alexandrinus and Vaticanus as having δαιμόνιον.” Martin, “When Did Angels Become Demons?”, 659 fn. 6.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{TDNT}, 2:16-17.

\textsuperscript{68} “Δαίμων is avoided because it is too closely associated with positive religious elements, whereas δαιμόνιον indicates from the very first the hostile spirits of popular belief.” Foerster, \textit{TDNT}, 2:12; 16.
The Semantic Range of δαιμόνιον from 200 BCE – 200 CE

In light of the variety of concepts within these concepts, and just as Kierkegaard posited, “it seems best to define the concept,” or the sense, for what it would have meant in Paul’s world. Continuing the focus on δαιμόνιον, the senses available in Paul’s world can be seen by examining documents from a similar period and examining how this semantic range depicts the term. On the periphery of Paul’s own context lie authors on the fringes of the 200 BCE – 200 CE timeline. These authors’ works demonstrate the way the term is being used within the broader world when Paul writes his letter, although their chronological separation from Paul’s letter (let alone the prominence of the work and the geographic location of the work) make it difficult to determine a direct influence on either Paul or his audience. While the authors who come chronologically after Paul certainly do not have an influence on his writing, they may demonstrate continuity in the usage of the term and add further evidence to how the term is used within this period of history.

On the early side of the timeline, authors and works such as Diodorus Siculus, Polybius, and Tobit all include appearances of δαιμόνια. Multiple senses can be seen in these works, especially those matching up with the earlier sense of “fate,” “heaven,” or the more general understanding of happenstance (Polyb. 1:84; 12:12b; 27:8; Diod. Sic. 11:24). However, this does not exclude the divine sense demonstrated above, which still appears quite frequently. These authors use δαιμόνιον-language to refer to the “the wrath of the gods” (νεμεσήσαι τὸ δαιμόνιον—Polyb. 12:23; Diod. Sic. 13:13), beings that cause earthquakes (Diod. Sic. 11:45) or enact
punishment due to swearing false oaths in temple precincts (Diod. Sic. 11:89). As for Tobit, the term does seem to convey the conventional understanding of an “evil spirit,” particularly highlighting the possessive aspect. This sense is aided by the fact that the chief “demon,” Asmodeus, displays peculiar qualities: he uses the inhabited party as his weapon (3:8-9 demonstrates the dual-agency where the demon assumes responsibility for the negative actions done through the host), he is further described with the adjective “wicked” (‘Ασμοδαίος τὸ πονηρὸν δαιμόνιον–3:8, 17; compare with Raphael the “good angel” –ἄγγελος γὰρ ἄγαθος–in 5:22), and he later exorcised through a certain formula of burnt offering (6:8; 8:2-3).

Furthermore, the two terms, “demon” and “evil spirit,” are linked in 6:8, which clearly help readers see these two entities in the same, or at least a similar, light. Even though some of the language around Asmodeus sounds more ambiguous than its sense would imply (the binding language in 8:3), it is an instance of the “evil spirit” sense at play in the pre-Pauline world.

On the latter side of the timeline, the term appears in authors and works including Pausanias, Lucian, and The Testament of Solomon. In the former two authors’ works, the term is relatively rare, occurring just a handful of times, even in Lucian’s massive repertoire. As seen

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69 Diodorus Siculus also uses the term in reference to the downfall of the Phocian commanders’ wives in which he pairs the δαιμόνιον, “the deity” who is besmirched by the Phocian’s actions at Delphi, with the retributive actions done “by the gods” (ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν), creating an interesting relationship between the affronted and the retributive parties. (Diod. Sic. 16:64)

70 Various attempts have placed the work in a number of centuries B.C.E., but it is fairly plausible that it dates to the late 3rd – early 2nd c. B.C.E. For more, see Carey A. Moore, Tobit, Anchor Bible Commentary Series 40A, (New York, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1996).

71 Most would date the work somewhere between the second and fifth c. C.E., making it plausible that this work fits within the 200 B.C.E. – 200 C.E. time range. McCown believes the work to be earlier than medieval, citing both the Testament’s divergence from early medieval traditions of Solomon’s capitulation to lust as a result of demonic activity, as well as its appearance in The Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila. McCown ultimately dates the work between 100-400 C.E. contra Fleck. Over a half century later, Whittaker presented the range of dates in a similar fashion, demonstrating how the debate was still quite open, but tended toward the range in view of McCown and Conybeare (who dated the work to 100 C.E.). For more, see Chester Charlton McCown, “The Testament of Solomon: Edited from Manuscripts at Mount Athos, Bologna, Holkham Hall, Jerusalem, London, Milan, Paris and Vienna” (PhD diss., The University of Chicago, 1922): 77; 105-108; M. Whittaker, “The Testament of Solomon” in The Apocryphal Old Testament. ed. by H.F.D. Sparks (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1984): 733-736.
in their BCE counterparts, the term can still be used with the sense of “fate” (Paus. 8:33; 9:37). Still, a divine being or “deity” could be just as much in view (Paus. 2:33; Luc. Symp. 48).

The Testament of Solomon demonstrates a different view of δαιμόνια, perhaps one that lines up more with the “possessive evil spirits” envisioned in the New Testament. Still, a number of interesting linguistic and literary features draw special attention to the way these demons appear in the Testament. First, δαιμόνια appear as interchangeable with the masculine δαίμονες. Functionally, the two terms describe the same entities and the author shows no apparent preference for either term, as both appear ubiquitously throughout the Testament (1:2; 2:6-7, 9; 3:6). Next, these demons are characterized as gendered (1:7), with personal names (1:2; 3:1; 4:2; 5:2), specific utilities or functions (2:2-3; 4:7), and origins as either heavenly angels or the offspring of angels (2:4; 4:2). Not only this, but these demons are also described in quite physical ways and do not depend on any human for physical agency, as the case seems to be in the gospel accounts (Mark 5:1-20; Luke 8:26-39) and Tobit. Solomon’s magical ring is thrown “at the demon’s chest” (1:9, 11) and Asmodeus is ordered to be flogged (5:6). The most physical characterization of a “demon,” however, is Onoskelis, who appears “very beautiful in form, and had the body of a fair-skinned woman, but the shanks of a mule” (4:2-3). Even though she claims to be “a spirit in bodily form” (4:4 - πνεῦμα σεσωματοποιημένον), like Asmodeus, she is commanded to be “hit” (4:11). Overall, the characterization of these demons in the Testament of Solomon does not clearly define these beings as “deities” or “divinities,” but it certainly

73 Ibid.
indicates that the later fringes of this timeline demonstrates an advanced, complex portrayal of δαιμόνια that act as evil spirits with both positive and negative physical and divine qualities.\textsuperscript{74}

While the instances on the periphery of the timeline are helpful, the use of δαιμόνιον-language within the first century takes up a more prominent role because of its placement in proximity to Paul’s usage. While direct influence still cannot be proven, these works provide a more concentrated view of the semantic range available within the world in which Paul is writing. By focusing attention on authors such as Josephus, Plutarch, and the authors of the New Testament, one can see the usage of the term in proximity to Paul.

While Plutarch’s concept of a demon was touched on earlier, his use of δαιμόνιον-language, which seems to be interchangeable with δαίμονες (Plut. De def. or. 20), further explicates the role of intermediary beings or “demigods.” For Plutarch, δαιμόνια have “human emotions and godlike power” (De def. or. 13) and also serve as the protectors of oracles, whose efficacy depends upon their presence (De def. or. 15). Likewise, they serve as agents of punishment for certain transgressions (Plut. Num. 22), which magnifies their intermediary status.

Josephus’ work, perhaps unsurprisingly, mirrors the conventionally Jewish (and early Christian) sense of “possessive evil spirit.” He envisions δαιμόνια as evil, inhabiting spirits in retelling Saul’s affliction by demons (Ant. 6:166), which David’s therapeutic singing and harp-playing were able to quell (Ant. 6:168). Solomon, too, was reported to have the ability to heal

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\textsuperscript{74} At one point Asmodeus warns Solomon that the demon and his cohort will one day “have free range over mankind, that they may worship us as gods” (5:5 - σέβομαι ἡμᾶς ὡς θεοὺς). Even if the meaning of σέβομαι here could be rendered as “feared” or “revered,” the behavior planned by Asmodeus and his fellow demons demonstrates how their aim is to achieve god-like status in the eyes of humankind, either reaping the personal gain of that “reverence” or succeeding in efforts to deceive humans. While this could be an argument in favor of the plausibility that demons were conceived in this way in Paul’s day, it is important to keep in mind the overlap that the physical and spiritual characterizations have here, and to realize that the depiction of δαίμονια in the Testament already ebbs closely to divine beings with the capabilities of possessive spirits (the issue at stake in this thesis), rather than vice versa.
evil spirits and those possessed by them (Ant. 8:45). Likewise, Josephus comments on a contemporary exorcist, Eleazar, and his reported healing powers (Ant. 8:46-48). Not only this, but demons also appear in the description of the Baaras root, a magical root plant whose perilous side effects are only countered by its exorcising properties (War 7:178-185). In this passage Josephus elaborates on his definition of δαιμόνια by indicating they are evil spirits with malevolent intent—they possess the living and kill them (War 7:185).

On the other hand, Josephus demonstrates the complexity and polyvalence of the term’s sense in the same ways as many of the other authors in this time period. As demonstrated elsewhere, δαιμόνιον-language once again exemplifies a sense of “fate” or “divine providence” (AJ. 13:314; 16:76; BJ 1:82, 613; 2:457; 4:622; 7:82). In instances rendered as “the Deity” (BJ 1:69 in reference to John Hyrcanus’ special knowledge), “Divine impulse” (BJ 6:501 on Titus’ decision to return to Vespasian in Caesarea), or “divine fury” (BJ 6:252 for the reasoning of a soldier setting fire to the temple), Josephus demonstrates δαιμόνιον-language taking on a “divine”/deified sense. Added to this, and already visible, is the adjectival sense used quite frequently to be “divine” rather than the expected negatively charged “demonic” (compared to usage in the New Testament—cf. Jas 3:15). This is clear in a particularly interesting case in War 5:377 where it appears that Josephus describes either the divine works (“prodigious works” according to Whiston’s translation) done by the Jewish progenitors or, quite possibly more interesting, if these ἔργα δαιμόνια are done for the patriarchs by God. Finally, in using the term in an argument against Athenian greatness, he recalls that it was Socrates’ insistence of being inspired by a “certain daimon” (τι δαιμόνιον αὐτῷ σημαίνειν), not for threatening sacrilege against the

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75 This may be an underlying tradition in Josephus’ day, or this may have been picked up and furthered by the author of The Testament of Solomon.
temples or entering allegiances with Athens’ enemies, that lead to his death (Ap. 2:263). In the same way as Plato and Xenophon before him, Josephus’ use of δαιμόνιον-language, both in this instance and elsewhere, retains the sense of some kind of deity or divine being, which demonstrates how his usage of the term is not confined to a single sense, namely that of an “evil possessive spirit.”

Finally, the term appears in a myriad of ways in the New Testament, many of which have already been touched upon in the introduction. Categorizing these works together may seem a misstep, but in no way is it the intention of this author to imply that these texts were the work of one author or canonically collected in the period at hand, as the true nature of the canonical process is certainly far more complicated. Likewise, the dating process of the NT texts is a topic that far exceeds this study, but certainly those texts that fit within the first century proximity of Paul’s work aid in seeing the semantic range of δαιμόνια at this time. In the gospels, δαιμόνιον is used interchangeably and synonymously with unclean spirit—πνεύμα ἁκάθαρτον—in a number of places, most notably in the Syro-Phoenician woman’s petition to Jesus in Mark 7:25-26 (cf. Luke 8:2). Elsewhere, the terms are often used in conjunction, such as the “demonic spirits” in Rev 16:14 (πνεύματα δαιμονίων) or Luke 8:33 (πνεύμα δαιμονίου). The term also appears once in the Disputed/Pseudo-Pauline letters (1 Tim 4:1) alongside “deceitful spirits” (πνεύματι πλάνοις καὶ διδασκαλίαις δαίμονίων). Although δαιμόνιον does not always appear directly in the vicinity of

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76 While he brushes through the perceived threat against the “law of the gods” (νόμους...περὶ θεῶν), Josephus does not ignore the political and anti-religious claims also lobbied against Socrates (2:264). However, his interjection of whether Socrates’ claims were serious or joking (διαπαίζων—2:263) does not seem to take a definitive position on the existence of the δαίμων and should not necessarily be read in such a manner.

77 The dates of New Testament texts, like many other ancient texts, vary in both historical placement and scholarly opinion, truly captivating the sentiment that “dating is hard.” The purpose of this thesis, on the other hand, is not to engage in the longstanding conversation(s).

78 Further discussion of the usages in the “gospel-domain” occurs in Chapter 3.

79 See fn. 31.
πνεῦμα, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of appearances link these two concepts—demons and unclean or evil spirits—together. It is perhaps only Acts 17, a rare occurrence of δαίμονον rendered as “deities” (Acts 17:18–19 Ἠν τῶν δαίμονών—“foreign deities”), that breaks the continuity of the sense associated with the term and is far more likely to retain the idea of intermediary or lesser deities.\(^80\) Still, it is easy to see that the “evil” or “unclean spirit” sense is prominent in these later first century texts, adding to the semantic range developed in this study.

**Conclusion**

By examining the larger concept behind the term in a few of its historical contexts and then restricting the concept to what is in view with the single term δαίμονον, this chapter has demonstrated the complicated nature of demons/daimons. On top of this, in order to understand the term in Paul’s work, this chapter has first presented a semantic range that aids in recapturing the senses available in Paul’s broader world. This does not imply that Paul is aware of or influenced by any or all of these texts, but this semantic range does demonstrate how several senses of δαίμονον seem to be viable options within the time of Paul’s writing. At its most complex, δαίμονα take on a variety of functions, characterizations, and defining factors; at its simplest, however, the semantic range narrows to three alternate terms: “fate,” “deity,” and “evil spirit.” It seems unlikely that Paul’s usage meant to convey the impersonal sense of “fate” as it does not match the context, which therefore limits the sense to either a “lesser/intermediary deity” or an “evil spirit.”\(^81\)

Now that these two possible senses have been distinguished, the

\(^80\) Pace Foerster’s claim that this sense is nonexistent in the New Testament, Foerster, *TDNT*, 2:16.

\(^81\) In discussing organizing terms by sense, Nida and Louw offer simple, yet wise, advice: that readers “adopt no more meanings than are completely necessary.” For the present study, the impersonal sense of “fate” or “happenstance,” if not regarded as a personal deity (a la Martin’s note on Isa 65:11), should be excluded when narrowing down the available and likely meanings in Paul’s letter. Cf. Eugene Nida and Johannes Louw, *Lexical Semantics of the Greek New Testament* (Atlanta, G.A.: Scholars Press, 1992), 42.
following chapter will further differentiate between the available senses; this, in turn, will provide the basis for concluding in favor of a lesser deity/intermediary being.
CHAPTER 3
ARGUING FOR AN ALTERNATE UNDERSTANDING OF \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \omicron \omicron \iota \alpha \) THROUGH
LEXICAL SEMANTICS

Working from the two likely possibilities of \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \omicron \omicron \iota \alpha \), the reader is left to wonder which best fits Paul’s usage. As shown, many have reached the conclusion that these are evil demonic forces or spirits, a sense found within the proposed semantic range. But does this sense fit coherently within the context of 1 Corinthians? One approach to finding out is to examine the lexical semantics of the term and look at the proximal relationships it has with other terms in its context. By focusing on Illegitimate Totality Transfer and polysemy, as well as Eugene Nida and Johannes Louw’s work on semantic domains and analyzing lexemes with multiple meanings, the two available senses of \( \delta \alpha \iota \mu \omicron \omicron \iota \alpha \) can be further separated in order to allow readers to make a more informed and intentional choice of the sense Paul intends.

**Illegitimate Totality Transfer**

James Barr’s seminal *The Basics of Biblical Semantics* launched an attack on late 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\)c. “inner lexicography” (in the form of Gerhard Kittel’s *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*) and pushed for the advancement and modernization of biblical studies and linguistics.\(^{82}\) While an entire article could be devoted to Barr and his impact on the field, one of the biggest contributions Barr made was identifying certain principles of the *TDNT* that breached the boundaries of formal linguistics or semantic studies. Among these infelicities is “Illegitimate

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Totality Transfer,” or the perceived trend in extrapolating a totalized meaning from a single appearance of a term. For Barr, this occurs “when the meaning of a word (understood as the total series of relations in which it is used in the literature) is read into a particular case as its sense and implication there.”83 In other words, illegitimate totality transfer becomes a simplistic amalgam or an all-inclusive meaning of a word applied to one instance, a practice that attempts to broaden the context of the word by reading it in light of a common, holistic meaning. Barr points to ἐκκλησία as an example, where there are many possible senses in the text (as the “Body of Christ,” as the “Bride of Christ,” as the “first instalment [sic] of the Kingdom of God”), but where the meaning in each context has its own nuances and are not easily amalgamated and shifted to every other instance of the word.84

For a δαιμόνιον-related example, let us apply illegitimate totality transfer to Acts 17:18. In this case, a totalized meaning of δαιμόνιον would push one to conclude that Epicurean and Stoic philosophers understood Jesus and the resurrection as possessive, evil demonic spirits that require exorcism (from Jesus or his disciples?) in order to alleviate their malevolent afflictions. While this gives major attention to the characteristics of δαιμόνια in the gospels, it could be added that these philosophers also understood Jesus and the resurrection to shudder at the fact that God is one (Jas 2:19), to have certain harmful teachings (1 Tim 4:1), and to serve as agents who will assemble worldwide armies for a great apocalyptic battle (Rev 16:14). This totalized reading makes no sense, and for good reason, since it would be hard to imagine that Paul’s Athenian preaching could be construed in such an absurd manner! The totality of the term simply does not fit into the context, but instead has been transferred based on how it has appeared in

83 Ibid., 218.
84 Ibid.
outside, and oftentimes irrelevant, contexts. While illegitimate totality transfer may not occur in such a disastrous manner in 1 Cor 10:20, resonances of this principle may lie behind the manner in which some scholars’ treat the term, particularly in importing definitions from outside contexts. However, as we saw in the absurd totality transfer in Acts 17:18, importing the sense or transferring meaning does not always account for the context or a variable meaning of a term. Instead, some terms may necessitate careful treatment because their separate contexts actually develop separate meanings.

Polysemy

At its core, polysemy argues that certain words (lexemes) have multiple senses or meanings and should be treated differently depending on their contexts. Based on the semantic range displayed above, as well as entries in lexicographical standards (LSJ, BDAG, and L&N) and the aforementioned absurdity of transferring almost any of the other senses into Acts 17:18, δαυμόνων would naturally fit this designation. Although it may seem to be a primary step, the multiple senses of this word are not always highlighted when making a decision on how it should be read in 1 Corinthians. While the recognition of polysemy is the first step in identifying which sense should be assigned to the lexeme, the rest of this procedure need not be a blind process.

Certain steps can be taken in order to identify a particular sense. Louw and Nida urge readers to search for clues “in the verbal context, in general background information known to the reader about the subject matter, in what is known about an author’s typical way of writing, and in what can be learned in a dictionary or encyclopedia.”

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87 Louw and Nida, *Lexical Semantics*, 36.
the meaning or sense in this passage. The verbal context demands significant attention and will be dealt with at the end. Starting with general background knowledge, what can be known about Paul’s intended sense of δαιμόνιον? As discussed in the introduction, modern sense depictions may carry a variety of elements that were not accessible in previous millennia; therefore, readers should be wary of bringing in their background knowledge. Even assuming a standard definition of δαιμόνια in the New Testament runs the risk of discarding or missing the outlier appearance in Acts 17. As for the author’s typical writing style, not much needs to be said about Paul uses the term in question—the introductory discussion of the paucity of δαιμόνια language demonstrates that we do not have a way to gauge Paul’s usage of this word elsewhere in either 1 Corinthians or his undisputed letters. We move then to dictionary or encyclopedia articles, which leave readers with the same basic possibilities as sketched out in the semantic range and still no clear method to choose Paul’s intended sense. In light of this, Louw and Nida remark:

“But some people may very well question the whole idea of trying to set up different meanings of words. Why not be satisfied with a list of glosses which one can employ whenever the context seems to imply one or another? But this does not resolve significant differences of opinion about the meanings in specific contexts nor does it help in seeing how various sets of particular meanings of a term cluster in different ways. These bundles of glosses reflect important relations which need to be investigated if one is to avoid naïve judgments and misleading conclusions about different meanings of the same lexeme.”

88 Louw and Nida, Lexical Semantics, 43.
In returning to the verbal context, one important way to distinguish between the alternative senses of a polysemous term is to examine the lexeme in its context and notice the relationships (or lack thereof) it has with certain other terms in its proximity. Analyzing these proximal lexical relationships leads to building a family or domain of terms that link to a particular sense. For the sake of simplicity, the following study categorizes δαιμόνια into a gospel-domain (“evil spirit”) and an Acts 17-domain (“intermediary deity”) in order to see how the sense is shaped by such proximal lexical relationships. After these two families are analyzed, the discussion will be brought back to 1 Cor 10:20-21 in order to put it into one of these domains based on its lexical context.

The Gospel Domain

The contexts in which δαιμόνια appear in the gospel domain present a number of significant lexical relationships, the first and most important of which is its proximity to some form of πνεῦμα. Because πνεῦμα is polysemous itself, it is important to note that even without the inclusion of other senses such as “holy spirit,” “breath,” or “wind,” πνεῦμα, more than any other term in the gospel domain family, demonstrates the semantic valence of “evil spirit” for δαιμόνιον. When charged with an adjective (particularly ἀκάθαρτον, πονηρός, δαιμόνιον), πνεῦμα becomes an interchangeable lexical unit to δαιμόνιον. For the gospel-domain, this is embodied

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89 Although acknowledging that it is possible for “a/the concept…to be present in a given passage where the…word group does not appear,” Coppins rightly determines that “a detailed examination of those passages in which the…word group appears represents the best first step in the larger task of defining, explicating and interpreting the concept(s)” in question. See Wayne Coppins, The Interpretation of Freedom in the Letters of Paul (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 50. While this thesis is not the place for a comprehensive and detailed examination of every occurrence of δαιμόνια in the New Testament, several passages have been included to draw distinction between the ways the term is used.


91 The modifying adjective appears alongside πνεῦμα in almost every occurrence that it features in a proximal relationship with δαιμόνιον, detailing how πνεῦμα generally in and of itself does not contain the same nuance
by the Syro-Phoenician woman’s request in Mark 7:24-30. The situation in v. 25 reveals that she has a daughter with an unclean spirit (ἤς ἐἶχεν τὸ θυγάτριον αὐτῆς πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον), with no mention of the “demon” lexeme. However, her petition to Jesus in v.26 asks him to cast out the “demon” (τὸ δαίμόνιον ἐκβάλῃ). The proximity of these two lexical units (πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον and δαίμόνιον) and their similar function in the pericope signify to readers that even if these should have two separate translations (“evil spirit” and “demon”), the author intends them to be read with the same sense and same referent in mind. In a similar fashion is Luke 4:33-36. In v. 33, Jesus’ teaching in a Capernaum synagogue is interrupted by a man with “a spirit of an unclean demon” (ἔχων πνεῦμα δαίμονιον ἀκαθάρτου). A few verses later, after Jesus has expelled the demon (τὸ δαίμόνιον—v. 35), the crowd is amazed and marvels at the fact that Jesus can “command unclean spirits” (ἐπιτάσσει τοῖς ἀκαθάρτοις πνεύμασιν—v. 36), again showing how the separate lexical units can be taken to refer to the same sense and referent. While the use of the correlated πνεῦμα language does not need to be directly juxtaposed with δαίμονιον, its appearance within the general context of these passages suffices to demonstrate that the use of δαίμονιον language intends an evil possessive spirit in the gospels.

In addition to πνεῦμα, another set of terms within this gospel domain family can be seen through the use of particular action words. Clearly containing the same δαίμον stem, the passive verb δαίμονιζομαι (Matt 15:22; Mark 5:15) signals that the possession of a δαίμόνιον is in view.92

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92 Although middle/passive in form, the agency of the verb is placed upon the δαίμόνιον as it possesses or controls the host. Because the subject being acted upon, it seems best to designate the term as a true passive. Cf. Matt 9:32-34; Mark 1:32-34. The participle can also be used a substantive even when δαίμονιον is not used in the passage, as in Mark 5:15-18.
Additionally, the verb ἔχω, at least in reference to δαιμόνιον-language (Mark 1:32; Luke 4:33; 7:33; John 7:20), refers to the having or holding of an evil spirit or δαιμόνιον. While these two lexemes connect to δαιμόνιον to show the possessive function of the entity, other verbs, like ἐκβάλλω (Matt 7:22; Luke 9:40) and ἐξέρχομαι (Matt 17:18; Mark 7:30), as well as ἐπιτάσσω (Luke 4:36) and θεραπεύω (Mark 1:34), signify actions that remove the threat of the δαιμόνιον.

Overall, this set of related family terms, particularly when in the context of δαιμόνιον-language, continues to characterize the term with possessive qualities.²³

It is important to note that these terms typically appear, as this family’s title indicates, in the gospel accounts when in relation to δαιμόνια. That is not to say that they can not appear outside of δαιμόνιον-language, as many of the terms are polysemous (πνεῦμα, ἔχω, ἐκβάλλω) or are at least not confined in referring to demons (as if demons are the only entities that can be commanded– ἐπιτάσσω). On the other hand, the appearance of these terms signal a particular usage of δαιμόνιον that must account for these proximal and contextual lexical relationships. This underlines the necessity of examining the term in its context, of particular importance because a separate context with different proximal lexical relationships may not lead to the same understanding of δαιμόνιον.

The Acts 17 Domain

As the absurd application of illegitimate totality transfer demonstrated earlier, a certain level of caution is necessary when determining the sense of a word. Transferring the sense

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²³ Perhaps the concept or sense of this family can also be developed independently of the appearance of δαιμόνιον-language. In Acts 16:16-18, Paul encounters a young girl ἔχουσαν πνεῦμα πύθωνα (v. 16) which he eventually commands–παραγγέλλω–to come out of her–ἐξελθεῖν (v.18). This passage ties a modified form of πνεῦμα together with the action signaling possession (ἔχω) and, later, a command (similar to ἐπιτάσσω) for the removal of the spirit with similar exorcism language (ἐξελθεῖν) as used in the occurrences of δαιμόνια.
conveyed from other contexts can quickly and easily lead to a “fish out of water” scenario where the sense of a term is an alien in its new home. To truly find the sense of a term, as worked out in the previous domain family, we must recognize what lexemes fit into particular domain families by “recognizing bundles of contexts and determining what a particular lexeme contributes to the meaning of such contexts.”

As the only context with an agreement upon a different sense of δαιμόνιον, Paul’s visit to Athens (Acts 17:14–34) provides an opportunity to examine and build an alternate domain family for the sense of a lesser, intermediary deity.

When the term δαιμόνιον occurs in the mouths of certain Stoic and Epicurean philosophers (Acts 17:18), what do they mean? There are two veritable ways to find out. The first, as sketched above, is to create a domain family based on the context. In doing so, several terms arise in the proximity that give significant clues as to which sense is envisioned here in Acts 17. The first term connected to the δαιμόνια is the modifying adjective ξένος. Unseen in the gospel domain’s lexical relationships, this gives the δαιμόνια the characterization of foreign or unknown, which may draw a connection to the claim against Socrates that was mentioned in the semantic range. If intended, this resonance aids the depiction of an intermediary deity. Perhaps the entire phrase τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἔπικουρείων καὶ Στοϊκῶν φιλοσόφων (v. 18) serves as a lens through which to view δαιμόνιον, as it introduces the sense and concept as to a particular group, which again may aid the Socrates connection. Another lexical relationship in the proximity of

94 Louw and Nida, *Lexical Semantics*, 43.
96 This word is quite rare in its own appearance in the New Testament, as even the substantive form only appears 11 times with the range of meanings from “stranger” to “host.” Cf. L&N I.171; W.F. Moulton et al., *Moulton and Geden concordance to the Greek New Testament*, (London; New York, N.Y.: T & T Clark, 2002), p. 725.
this passage is the focus on ἅθεός language, particularly in relation to his speech concerning the Ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ (v. 23). This nearby occurrence of ἅθεός language shows it as a conversation topic in this context, particularly in light of the mention of δεισιδαιμονεστέρου (v. 22)—fear of the gods—which puts the idea of “gods” in the forefront of this passage. In connection with these terms is a set of important terms (at least in drawing connections to 1 Cor 8:1-11:1) such as κατείδωλον (v. 16), σεβάσματα (v. 23) and βωμόν (v. 23). These connections with Greco-Roman cultic worship may not have a strong lexical relationship with δαιμόνιον, but their appearance in context is certainly interesting in tailoring its sense to fit within cultic worship. ⁹⁷ Finally, the entire appearance of δαιμόνιον-language relies upon Paul’s preaching concerning τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, which means that the sense depicted by the term must compare with an understanding of Jesus (and the resurrection, interestingly enough) as a divine, intermediary being. ⁹⁸ Even though Paul’s speech may curtail this understanding by alluding to Jesus as a just man (ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ἐν ἀνδρὶ—17:31), it is not difficult to conceive that the early Christian kerygma of Jesus, whether for the author of Acts or Paul himself (as we will see), may have held a comparable Christology. ⁹⁹

The second way of capturing the sense of a δαιμόνιον in it’s Acts 17 context, however, is to notice the lack of certain terms, particularly terms from the gospel domain family. The biggest takeaway of this second style of approach is its illumination of the absence of paradigmatic terms (or their senses) from the gospel domain. Terms such as πνεῦμα (which occurs in v. 16 but in

⁹⁷ The situation of idolatry in v. 16 may even have impacted the content of Paul’s preaching in vv. 17-18, as it certainly appears in his speech in vv. 22-31.
⁹⁸ See Barrett, Acts, 833.
reference to Paul’s distress), ἔξερχομαι (which occurs in v. 33 but in reference to Paul leaving the Areopagus), and πονηρός (which occurs in v. 5 but in reference to certain men in the marketplace of Thessalonica) all occur in variable ways from their appearance in the gospel domain. This further demonstrates that an understanding of δαιμόνια as evil spirits in Acts 17 is not tenable based on both the lexical relationships to terms that appear in this context (ξένος, θεός), as well as the lack of relationships with lexemes that characterize the evil spirits of the gospel domain (πνεύμα, ἐκβάλλω, δαιμονίζομαι).

The 1 Corinthians Domain

Turning back to the passage in question, we can now approach Paul’s usage of δαιμόνιον-language in 1 Cor 10:20-21 with a method that accounts for the polysemy of the term and seeks to understand it in its context. Let us begin by examining the lexical relationships that do appear in the text. Following this, we can analyze which relationships are absent in an effort to sharpen the argument that the gospel domain is not in view.

The δαιμόνιον-language in 1 Cor 10:20-21 is reinforced by a variety of lexical relationships to terms that have been seen in the previous domain. The phrase δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ (v. 20) puts the δαιμόνια in the context of θεός language, even if the two are defined over against each other.\textsuperscript{100} Also similar to the Acts 17 domain are certain terms that resonate within a context of cultic worship, such as εἰδωλόν (v. 19), κοινωνοὺς (v. 20), and the ποτήριον and τραπέζης of these δαιμόνια (v. 21). Finally, the juxtaposition between the δαιμόνια and the κυρίος

\textsuperscript{100} The reading here is debated, where some choose “to demons and not to God” while others prefer “to demons and not to a god.” The θεός language provides a contextual lens which allows the conversation to still be on the nature of these δαιμόνια—in either case, they are substantively defined not as θεός but as δαιμόνια.
again compares (or contrasts) these entities with Paul’s view of Jesus, which perhaps relates to the similar phenomenon in Acts 17.

More helpful, however, is examining the language that does not occur here and the lack of connections this passage has with the gospel domain. There is no mention of any form of πνεῦμα, adjectively modified or unmodified, in this context. This is an important point to raise, as the δαιμόνιον-language that envisions an evil spirit often occurs in conjunction with some form of πνεῦμα, if not consistently and contextually interchangeable with it. Furthermore, there are no action verbs that denote the possessive qualities inherent to these entities in the gospel domain such as δαιμονίζομαι or ἔχω, or the action verbs necessary to alleviate a possessive threat, such as ἐκβάλλω, ἐξέρχομαι, ἐπιτάσσω, and θεραπεύω. By examining the absence of these paradigmatic markers for δαιμόνιον as an “evil spirit,” it is clear to see that the appearance of the δαιμόνια here in 1 Cor 10:20-21 have very little resemblance, at least on the basis of contextual lexical relationships, to those that appear as evil spirits in the gospel domain.

**Conclusion**

Whereas the history of scholarship tilts either explicitly or implicitly toward the notion that Paul’s “demons” are of similar quality (evil spirits, possessive evil spirits) to the demons appearing in the gospels, a semantic approach demonstrates that this sense is mistaken. Whether intentional or unintentional, the sense-depiction that scholars promulgate borders ever so closely to illegitimate totality transfer, where the understanding of δαιμόνιον-language lies not in the context of 1 Cor 10:20-21, but is transferred from other contexts and harmonized into how the term fits within Paul’s letter. By focusing on polysemy and building separate domains based on the contextual appearance of this term with other lexical relationships to the terms around it, it becomes more clear to see that Paul is doing something different with δαιμόνιον-language than
the gospel domain. Therefore, this chapter, through the use of methods and theories put forth by Barr, Cotterell and Turner, and Nida and Louw, finds that there is a legitimate manner in which to divide the two senses found in the semantic range above. It is not necessary for the reader to be left to “pick and choose” which sense seems appropriate based on the context, as forming contextual lexical relationships and “recognizing bundles of contexts” may help to sharpen the divide between polysemous terms. Whereas the two glosses resulting from the semantic range seemed to have equal footing, the semantic divide between an evil spirit and an intermediary deity allows for a “parting of the ways” between these senses and urges readers to find that Paul’s usage matches much closer to the intermediary deity. So what does this alternative sense mean in the context of 1 Cor 10:20-21? The next step is to return to the passage and see how the sense of an intermediary deity fits into Paul’s argument.
CHAPTER 4

THE PLACE OF δαιμόνια IN THE METAPHYSICAL WORLD OF 1 COR 8:1-11:1

The semantic range illuminated two prominent senses that could be used for δαιμόνια-language in the first century: an intermediary deity or an evil spirit. After highlighting polysemy and the dangers of illegitimate totality transfer, these senses were further separated by examining the contexts in which δαιμόνια-language appears. Careful attention to these contexts demonstrate how certain lexical relationships develop with the surrounding terms, which places the term in question into a domain family (the Acts 17 domain rather than the gospel domain). Based on these domains and the lexical relationships demonstrated in these separate contexts, it is easier to determine that the sense of an intermediary deity is in view for Paul. However, this does not fully answer our earlier question: what exactly does Paul mean by δαιμόνια? We have recaptured the sense envisioned by the term, but in order to recapture what it means in the context of his argument, we must return to Paul’s metaphysical world to see how this worldview shapes his rhetoric.

Composition of 1 Cor 8:1-11:1

Before diving back into Paul’s world, it is necessary to discuss the complications surrounding the composition of this passage. The rendering of Paul’s metaphysical world based on a literary argument of 8:1-11:1 relies on this passage to adequately reflect an un-interpolated, uninterrupted view held by Paul (at least for the purposes of his argument). However, many have questioned whether this is even possible, arguing over whether 8:1-11:1 is a unified whole or if it
contains a number of epistolary transactions.\textsuperscript{101} A brief recap of this discussion proves that this passage is united and that reading 10:20-21 into the broader context of 8:1-11:1 does, in fact, accord with Paul’s overall inclinations on idol sacrifices.

Debates over the composition of 8:1-11:1 rest upon several perceived points of contention. As Conzelmann notes, outlining the flow of the argument in this passage reveals several separate topics discussed: chapter 8 focuses on εἰδωλόθυτα, chapter 9 discusses apostolic ἐξουσία, 10:1-22 turns to εἰδωλολατρία, while 10:23-11:1 “links up” with the opening topic in 8:1-13.\textsuperscript{102} He heightens the disunity by demonstrating how Paul’s argument throughout this passage “appears to vacillate:” 8:1-13 and 10:23-11:1 seem to concede the non-existent, non-hazardous argument of the “strong” while arguing that withholding from sacrificial food should be on the basis of the conscience of the “weak,” whereas 10:1-22 argues in favor of the “weak” that “eating is dangerous.”\textsuperscript{103} On top of this, Conzelmann points to the harsh intersections of these separate topics, noting that each transition does not easily flow together. Finally, like many others, he points to chapter 9, which he says “creates the impression of an interruption.”\textsuperscript{104}

Ultimately, however, these arguments against a unified passage can be countered in a number of ways. Tomson argues for the integrity of the passage via an inclusio with the key words συνείδησις and εἰδωλόθυτα, as well as the recurring of the word “all” and the overall movement towards the example of Christ.\textsuperscript{105} Conzelmann draws out a connection to a similar

\textsuperscript{101} Fitzmyer’s overview of 1 Corinthians composition theories presents those who believe the letter to be a compilation of 2+ letters (J. Weiss, Schmithals, Sellin), those who see it as a single letter written over a period of time (de Boer), and those who see it as a unified letter (Barrett, Conzelmann, Fee, Kümmel, Marxsen, Murphy-O’Connor), including Hurd’s 4-stage origin of the letter. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 49-53.

\textsuperscript{102} Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 137.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. Cf. Hays, First Corinthians, 135.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid. This “might appear as an intrusion,” so Soards, 1 Corinthians, 182, or what “constitutes as a digression,” so Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 353.

rhetorical argument by paralleling this passage to Rom 14:1-15:13.\textsuperscript{106} Fee argues that the transition to chapter 9 actually begins with the shift to first-person language in 8:13, which allows him to launch into an “impassioned defense of his actions.”\textsuperscript{107} Collins, arguing against the 10:1-22 interpolation hypothesis from Cope, appeals to the manuscript tradition in order to argue for the unity of the overall passage.\textsuperscript{108} Finally, Hays (and Fee) point to 8:10 as a crux of this argument, stressing that the “key to following Paul’s argument is to recognize that he is primarily addressing the problem of sacrificial food consumed \textit{in the temple of the pagan god} (8:10; 10:14, 21).”\textsuperscript{109} This would presumably explain why his argument in 10:23-11:1 carries a similar permissibility as that of 8:1-13 even in light of the staunch prohibitions launched in 10:14-22: this action no longer occurs inside a temple precinct but rather takes place at meat markets and private residences. In a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons, many tend to agree that this passage is a unified, coherent argument that is penned by Paul, making it easier to fit \textit{δαιμόνια} into the metaphysical world depicted throughout the entirety of 8:1-11:1.

**The Place of \textit{δαιμόνια} in Paul’s Metaphysical World**

As covered earlier in this study, up to this point in Paul’s argument of 1 Cor 8:1-11:1, his metaphysical world seems dominated by God as \textit{θεός} and Christ Jesus as \textit{κυρίος} (8:6), with the remainder of the world quite empty. He has seemingly negated the existence of idols (\textit{εἴδωλον}) and, if Fee et al. are right about his view of the \textit{θεοί} in 8:5, it seems that these \textit{θεοί}, “so-called” or

\textsuperscript{106} Conzelmann, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 137.
\textsuperscript{107} Fee, \textit{First Epistle}, 435. He argues that chapter 9 is integral to the overall argument and that Paul’s claim to apostleship and authority are under attack, probably from statements and attitudes made in the Corinthians’ earlier letter. Cf. Fee, \textit{First Epistle}, 394-400; 433-35. Horsley, too, finds that “chapter 9 is an autobiographical illustration of the principle set forth in 8:13.” Horsley, 1998, 124.
\textsuperscript{108} Collins, \textit{First Corinthians}, 307.
\textsuperscript{109} Hays, \textit{First Corinthians}, 135 [his emphasis]; Fee, \textit{First Epistle}, 425-427.
otherwise, have no existence in Paul’s metaphysical world either. It is at this point that Paul places δαιμόνια both in his rhetorical argument and his metaphysical world.

Beginning with 10:19, Paul recaps his warning against idolatry (which begins at least explicitly at 10:14, but permeates all of 10:1-22) by asking rhetorical questions in three parts. Many focus on the force of v. 19 as setting up Paul’s proclamation in v. 20 and translate the passage in a similar force to the NRSV: “What do I imply then? That food sacrificed to idols is anything, or that an idol is anything?” These rhetorical questions, although not outright rejecting the existence of the subjects, seem to push for a negative answer (of course not!), which many see supported by the ἀλλα (ἀλλ’) in v.20. It seems that most critical discussions around v.19 focus on the textual omission of the latter portion of the verse in later manuscripts, which forces some into a discussion of homoeoteleuton. Outside of this, however, there is a relative silence and swiftness in moving on from this verse. Before moving on from this verse, though, perhaps it is necessary to ask whose questions these are: where the ὧτι has often indicated (with overwhelming reception) that Paul is quoting an earlier correspondence with the Corinthians (cf.

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110 Although two questions, the second question truly consists of two parts: a) idol sacrifices and b) idols. Paul’s following statements answer both of these questions, while v.22 reflects the opening question of v.19.
111 “Even though this and the following rhetorical question are not introduced by mé, his questions expect a negative answer.” Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 393. Cf. Fee, First Epistle, 520; Collins, First Corinthians, 380.
112 For more on this, see Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 172; Fee, First Epistle, 510 fn. 543;
113 Most, if not all, do not engage a discussion based on the indefinite pronouns in these final two rhetorical questions. Based on the diacritical marks, the logical assumption is that the τί here is an indefinite pronoun that appears before the enclitic linking verb εἰμι, which explains the appearance of the accent. There is a seemingly universal agreement upon this, as commentators and translators alike prefer a reading akin to “that an idol sacrifice is something or that an idol is something?” Keeping in mind that the diacritical marks are added later, however, this could be a further series of questions if these are indeed interrogative pronouns rather than indefinites taking an accent based on the enclitic. One could argue that the syntactical positioning of τί, which typically appears at the beginning of questions, aids in the argument for an indefinite rather than an interrogative. Here, of course, τί follows either εἰδωλίζεται or εἰδωλον, so its position does seem to indicate that it is an indefinite pronoun. Again, however, exceptions such as Mark 8:29 (Ὑμεῖς δὲ τίνα με λέγετε εἶναι) and John 1:19 (Σὺ τίς εἶ;) demonstrate how the interrogative’s placement might align with the way used in 1 Cor 10:19. If this is the case, rather than asking a rhetorical question, v. 19 could be asking the question with the expectation that Paul would answer such a question: what is an idol sacrifice? And what is an idol? The argument from Paul’s syntax is much harder, as he seems fairly consistent within this passage on the placement of the interrogative, but the question of whether an indefinite or an interrogative pronoun still might have some minor importance here.
8:1, 4), most see v. 19 as a series of Paul’s own rhetorical questions.\textsuperscript{114} However, these phrases could just as easily have been raised by his audience in their letter to him.\textsuperscript{115} Perhaps, then, an alternative rendering of this verse could read: “What am I saying? ‘Is an idol sacrifice something (of value)’ or ‘is an idol something (of value)’?”\textsuperscript{116} If these are Corinthian claims or questions, it would seem that Paul raises them in order to set up the proceeding verses to answer and define what these entities are, particularly if Paul is quoting the Corinthians’ own slogans. In either case, it seems clear that v. 20 comes in response to these questions, whether Paul’s or the Corinthians’, and intends to answer by declaring the object of such sacrifices: δαιμονίως καὶ οὐ θεῷ.

As mentioned earlier, many see the opening of v. 20 as an adversative answer to the questions that Paul has raised in v. 19 (cf. fn. 111). This urges readers to maintain a view of the εἰδωλόθυτον or the εἴδωλον as non-existent realities in Paul’s metaphysical world, which is already supported by the sketch done in chapter 1. Although they may be non-existent in his metaphysical world, it seems clear that Paul is building up to the existence of something, either behind or instead of the εἰδωλόθυτον or the εἴδωλον: for Fee, Paul is not denying any supernatural reality behind these entities but is rather restating the danger, because in reality, “idols represented demonic spirits”; for Fitzmyer, Paul’s concession of a “demonic reality of such

\textsuperscript{114} On 8:4, “Again Paul quotes two sayings being used as slogans by the Corinthian Christians who “possess knowledge.” Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 340. For 8:1, Thiselton builds off of Hurd’s compilation of commentators who also agree that Paul begins with a Corinthian slogan, Thiselton, The First Epistle, 620. So also, Fee, First Epistle, 408; Hays, First Corinthians, 138. Most of these commentators take Paul’s questions in 10:19 to be his own, often arguing that Paul realizes the difficulty in his argument and asks these rhetorical questions to reach his conclusion, so Hays, First Corinthians, 168-169; Fee, First Epistle, 519-520; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 392-393; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 172-173; Collins, First Corinthians, 313.

\textsuperscript{115} The fact that ὅτι can also be used pleonastically to introduce a quote (LSJ “ὅτι” II.2) could also imply that these are questions that were asked in the Corinthians’ letter. In any case, whether the words are Paul’s or the Corinthians’, the function of these quotes builds to Paul’s proclamation in v. 20.

\textsuperscript{116} Is this a question on the existential reality of the εἰδωλόθυτον or the εἴδωλον, or is it of their status or value?
eating” is due in part to the “subjective conviction” of the participant in such sacrifices; and for Collins, the nonexistence of the idol does not imply that sacrificial food is “without taint.” Conzelmann takes this even further, stating, “The expression is not meant in a metaphysical sense, but anthropologically: “by nature” they are not gods.” Still, although these commentators (and more) agree that there is something that exists in Paul’s metaphysical world, they take these entities to be evil spirits, demons in a conventional sense. On the contrary, as we have argued up to this point, the δαιμόνια are not evil spirits but are instead intermediary deities. Conzelmann is right to point to their nature, but his conclusion could be read another way: these δαιμόνια are not θεοὶ in their substantial nature because, for Paul, there is only one θεός. Therefore, these δαιμόνια cannot exist as classified θεοὶ and instead are by necessity a category of lesser θεοὶ, making them intermediary deities.

Thus far, δαιμόνια exist as real entities in Paul’s metaphysical world. Following up his conversation in 10:14-19, Paul begins to either reassign their metaphysical reality or relay their true metaphysical reality in 10:20-21. Whereas the εἰδωλόθυτον and the εἰδωλόν may not have metaphysical significance on their own and are thus permissible based on 8:1-13, their existence in the metaphysical world is now subsumed by different entities. The εἰδωλόθυτον’s non-existence is transferred to the metaphysical reality of the ποτήριον δαιμονίων and τράπεζας δαιμονίων (10:21); the εἰδωλόν’s non-existence is transferred to the metaphysical reality of δαιμόνια. The τράπεζα and the ποτήριον become an extension of the δαιμόνια in the metaphysical (and perhaps physical?) world, and the δαιμόνια exist in place of the εἰδωλόν. Therefore, Paul has begun to answer the three questions asked in v. 19 in chiastic format. Is an εἰδωλόν “something?”

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117 Fee, First Epistle, 520-21; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 392-93; Collins, First Corinthians, 318.
118 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 173.
It is not an εἴδωλον, but a δαιμόνιον. Is εἴδωλόθυτον “something?” It is not εἴδωλόθυτον, but a ποτήριον δαιμονίων and τραπέζης δαιμονίων. But what do these entities do to warrant his strong opposition at the end of v.20? The answer is sketched out in vv. 21-22 with their function.

Paul’s problem with the δαιμόνια lies in the juxtaposition that he draws between them and Christ: they are fundamentally incompatible due to both the exclusive nature of κοινωνία (10:21) and the Christian confession (8:6). Before asking why these δαιμόνια are excluded, a look at the metaphysical world that we have built and the literary argument here reveal a closer understanding of the nature and function of these entities. Whereas the many gods/lords are contrasted to the one God/Lord in 8:5-6, so here too is there a contrast between many (the plural of δαιμόνιον) and one (Christ). In the same way that the “many” of 8:5 exist to reaffirm the confession of 8:6, so here too do the δαιμόνια exist to affirm the exclusive partnership with Christ. That these two passages can be read together is fairly clear: there is a similar rhetorical purpose taking place in juxtaposing a set of entities against each other. However, in 8:5-6 the juxtaposition takes place of entities with explicitly parallel designations: θεός to θεοί, κύριος to κύριοι. Does this then mean that 10:20-21 should be read as parallel designations? If so, the supposed function of δαιμόνια and Christ are more than comparable, they are congruent; they exist as intermediary beings or deities, that is, until Paul steps in. On the contrary, the confession of 8:6 affirms that there is only one intermediary κύριος to the one θεός; therefore, the function of the other intermediaries is null and void. For Paul, any κοινωνία with Christ leads to κοινωνία with “the Father,” the rightful deserving sacrificial recipient in his mind. As a result, δαιμόνια do

119 On this incompatibility, see Fee, First Epistle, 521; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 394; Thiselton, The First Epistle, 775-777; Collins, First Corinthians, 381; Soards, I Corinthians, 211; Hays, First Corinthians, 170.
not provide access to the θεός and, thus, any κοινωνία with such intermediaries ends with the δαιμόνιον itself. Based on this model, the real argument against the sense of “intermediaries” is that they have no entity to which they function as intermediaries! In Paul’s argument, the Lord Jesus Christ has taken the place of any and all intermediaries and demands exclusive participation through the Christ-channel in order to have κοινωνία with the Father. The final repercussions of this model are revealed in returning to his first question in v. 19.

Paul finally reaches the answer to his first question in v. 22 via another rhetorical question. Whereas “So what do I imply?” (v. 19) pulled together 10:14-19, the questions asked here in v. 22 beckon the conclusion of the entirety of vv. 19-22. “Or should we provoke the Lord to jealousy?” demonstrates the outcome of such participation in the cultic sacrifices to the δαιμόνια. Because they are excluded from functioning in an intermediary capacity to the one θεός, the result of any sacrifice leaves them as the recipients, which Conzelmann notes, “make the demons into gods.”

If this is the result of such sacrifices, the repercussions of this result are fairly clear: the participation in a cultic meal to any intermediary being other than Christ is ineffective in reaching the Father and inherently regards the δαιμόνιον as a θεός, which, as v. 22 rhetorically implies, provokes the only true θεός to jealousy (παραζηλόω).

The further repercussions of this provocation have already been supplied in 10:1-13 and end in destruction, just as it did for certain Israelites in the wilderness (10:5, 8-10).

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120 Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 173. He also sees this bringing “the participant into bondage to them” based on an instance in Eus. *Praep. eu.* 4.23 where the deity enters into a partaking celebrant. Cf. fn. 37. For the Pauline passage, this conversation will occur in the conclusion.

121 The connections with LXX Deut 32 throughout this passage have not gone unnoticed, and indeed further build the case that the sense of a δαιμόνιον fits as an intermediary or lesser deity as the δαιμόνια there (Deut 32:17) are also named “gods [the ancestors] did not know.” For more on Paul’s use of Deut 32, see Brian S. Rosner, “Deuteronomy in 1 and 2 Corinthians” in *Deuteronomy in the New Testament*, eds. Steve Moyise and Maarten J. J. Menken (New York, N.Y.: T & T Clark, 2007): 118-35.
**Conclusion**

To conclude in classic Pauline style: “so what do I imply?” For Paul, “demons” are real entities that exist in his metaphysical world as divulged in the broader argument of 8:1-11:1. While he may seem to affirm the existence of “many gods and many lords,” it is likely that these entities, along with the idols that either house or represent them, do not exist in Paul’s metaphysical world. Rather, the “gods” of Greco-Roman cultic worship are denigrated or demoted and the recipients of such sacrifices are given a new identity as “daimonia.” Where most have taken this to mean that Paul reassigns the status of a god into a demonic evil spirit, this syllogism (gods are demons, demons are evil spirits) is not necessarily warranted based on both the argument of 8:1-11:1 and the underlying semantics in the use of δαιμόνιον-language. Instead, the sacrificial food (meat or otherwise) is offered not to a, or coincidentally θεός, as there is only one being that exists in this capacity and that being is “the Father” (8:6). Rather, because the contextual lexical relationships render the sense of an evil, possessive spirit unlikely, this language instead implies that a lesser deity, an intermediary being with divine qualities, is receiving the sacrifice. These intermediaries do not have a legitimate connection to the θεός, a connection which exists only through the exclusive association (κοινωνία) with Christ and is available through the channel of the table and cup of the Lord. Whereas Christ and the δαιμόνια

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122 Their status does not need to be neutral; in fact, the entire character of these proclamations and warnings seem polemical, especially in conjunction with the exclusive nature of 10:21. Still, the polemic does not lead to the conclusion that they are evil spirits.

are placed in juxtaposition, their functions seem strikingly similar barring the big exception: the ceiling for the δαιμόνια in Paul’s argument and metaphysical world end with themselves, whereas Christ has the exclusive connection to the Father. Therefore, failure to adhere to the Christ-channel puts the Corinthians in association with the intermediaries (δαιμόνια) rather than the Father and, as 10:22’s rhetorical question implies, “provokes” the only valid recipient of such sacrifice, the θεός, to “jealousy,” the repercussions of which have been outlined for his audience in 10:1-13. In replacing the sense of the δαιμόνιον-language to meet what has been argued via the semantic range and lexical relationships, the understanding of a δαιμόνιον as an intermediary deity, rather than an evil possessive spirit, provides an even more adequate picture of how the argument in 10:19-22 fits into Paul’s metaphysical world.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND BROADER HORIZONS

Like many other studies, there are certain implications that can be gleaned from the work done here. While at its core this thesis is a word study, larger questions loom around Paul’s understanding of δαιμόνια. If they are not intermediaries but are instead evil, possessive spirits, is it implied that possession is at stake in eating the sacrificial food? This entire premise would rely on an understanding of cultic meals where celebrants ingest the recipient of the sacrifice, putatively in this case a demonic spirit. Furthermore, if this is the case, does the contrast between the τράπεζα and ποτήριον of the Lord and those of “demons” imply a possessive function for drinking and partaking in the Christian rites as well? Willis notes that this understanding is “mistaken. Neither in the pagan cult meals, nor certainly in the Jewish ones, do participants eat their god.”

If Willis is right, the hazard of eating sacrificial meals does not lie in possession, even if Paul has in mind the conventional understanding of demons as possessive spirits. This is further affirmed by the fact that Paul envisions the consequence of eating, drinking, and partnership as inciting God to “jealousy” (10:22) rather than the possession of the body. Even more, the lack of any exorcism language, which could be expected if Paul was worried about any of the members falling victim to such demons, further bolsters the claim that he has another type

125 This would then reflect onto the same way onto the cup and table of Christ. “Paul does not refer here to a direct sharing in Christ’s metaphysical being, much less in his physical or glorified flesh.” Witherington, Conflict and Community, 226.
of metaphysical being in mind, namely an intermediary deity. Finally, if possessive spirits and possession are the danger inherent in the idolatry discussed in this passage (10:14-22), it would amplify the difficulty of fitting this passage into Paul’s overall argument, particularly in 8:1-13 and 10:23-11:1, where there is no danger for the partakers of the meal but rather only for the consciences of the “weak” believers who see them. It would also require his understanding of the possessive threat to lose efficacy based on the spatial location (as noted by Hays and Fee), which appears to have been mere meters away.\footnote{126}

If δαιμόνια are instead divine intermediaries, even if their role is downplayed in favor of the “One God, One Lord” model, how does this view fit into monotheism in the first century? Does an acknowledgement of the metaphysical reality of other gods (via not only understanding δαιμόνια this way, but 1 Cor. 8:5 as well) fit harmoniously into both the Hellenistic model of monotheism and Paul’s own writing? Here the issue becomes slightly more complicated. The usual assumption and/or argument is that Hellenistic Judaism delegitimizes the existence of other deities in favor of maintaining monotheism.\footnote{127} However, within the broader worldview, monolatry, henotheism, and the backdrop of ancient Israelite religion demonstrate a complex history of acknowledging the existence of other deities.\footnote{128} Paul’s view of δαιμόνια could help

\footnote{126} See Fitzmyer, \textit{First Corinthians}, 26 fig. 2 and Murphy-O’Connor, \textit{St. Paul’s Corinth}, 24-25 fig. 5. 
\footnote{127} In reference to 8:4—“The two propositions [the two slogans quoted in v.4] together form a strong affirmation of monotheism over against every form of polytheism or henotheism.” Fee, \textit{First Epistle}, 409. Cf. Thiselton, \textit{The First Epistle}, 775. 
\footnote{128} For more on the various forms of monotheism or polytheism that linger in the background of ancient and Second Temple Judaism, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, \textit{From the Maccabees to the Mishnah} (Louisville, K.Y.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2014), 80-85; Hurtado, 1998. 
\footnote{129} While it may be possible that a form of Hellenistic syncretistic monotheism attempted to incorporate all deities, beings, and powers under the umbrella of the one ἡεός, it seems unlikely that this reflects Paul’s mindset, or, as Willis’ work claims, that we are able to identify this influence within the Corinthians’ argument. At the least, if Paul declares the existence of δαιμόνια as separate beings that are incompatible with Christ, it would seem counterintuitive to have them all equally related under a ἡεός-umbrella. For more, see Willis, \textit{Idol Meat}, 213.
open a window into a different understanding of Second Temple/early Christian monotheism (or binitarianism). If, as it seems in his argument here, the δαιμόνια in 1 Cor. 8:1-11:1 are understood as “lesser deities,” this could further cut against the grain of monotheism and pushes more toward henotheism.

Even though this study focuses on one particular word used in a tiny passage of Paul’s overall corpus, it has hopefully aided the field of New Testament studies by providing a tangible example of how to examine and argue for an alternate understanding of a polysemous term. It also seeks to aid an understanding of Paul’s metaphysical, or spirit, world, especially in understanding where δαιμόνια fit. Still, this thesis hopes to encourage further questions that lie on the horizon: is there an inherent judgment about the efficacy of these sacrificial meals? Or, if thinking through reception history, how would Paul’s Corinthian audience receive this response? Would the echoes of Deut 32 LXX shine through the complexities of this term? And what other terms with “consensus” on their senses need revisiting based on their contextual appearances? These questions, as well as many more in the distance, forge a future path forward for this study.

At the beginning of this study we opened a window into Paul’s metaphysical world in order to attempt to recapture the sense of his δαιμόνιον-language. Noting the paucity of δαιμόνιον-language in his letters, we traversed through the semantic range of contemporary ancient authors to discover two separate senses of δαιμόνιον. We then applied linguistic theories to develop semantic domain families for each sense, demonstrating how it is possible to find an exacting definition through contextual lexical relationships. Finally, we returned to 1 Cor 8:1-11:1 and demonstrated how the sense of an intermediary being still fits within Paul’s metaphysical world and the argument in 10:19-22. While the sense depictions by Caird, Kierkegaard, and others may imply that δαιμόνιον is a term that means “all things to all people,” it is unlikely that the linguistic,
historical, and literary methods involved in refurbishing Paul’s sense of the word would agree. On the other hand, those that stand in agreement on how the term should be read as an evil spirit, even with nuance, tend to argue that the term means one thing to all people. Rather than intending the sense of an evil, demonic, possessive spirit found elsewhere in the New Testament, Paul uses δαίμονον-language to mean a form of intermediary deity in competition against and incompatible with Christ, who stands in the gap between the Father and the Corinthians as the one true δαίμονον.
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