

SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE:
PROPINQUITY, FRATERNITY, AND THE PRESIDENT-DCI RELATIONSHIP

by

LT COL JAMES B. BORDERS, USAF

(Under the Direction of Loch K. Johnson)

ABSTRACT

Intelligence support is crucial to the development of good foreign policy. Considerable research within the field of intelligence studies focuses on intelligence processes, but this dissertation focuses on the interaction between the president and his chief intelligence advisor. The overlap of the president's decision cycle and the intelligence cycle is the point where the relationship between these two individuals can have a significant effect upon the level of intelligence success they can experience. I hypothesize that the likelihood of intelligence success is improved when the president and chief of intelligence have a positive relationship, meet frequently, and the intelligence chief does not engage in the active advocacy of policy options. These hypotheses are tested in four case studies that review the interaction between a president and his chief of intelligence. I conclude that the relationship between these two individuals can explain the degree of intelligence success achieved by the pairing.

INDEX WORDS: Intelligence, President, U. S. Foreign Policy, Central Intelligence Agency

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DEDICATION

A friend loves at all times, And a brother is born for adversity. (Proverbs 17:17). This is dedicated to my dear friends, my loving family, and the lady who is both, my loving wife, Martha. As pleased as I was to find that I was totally prepared for ninety percent of this program, I was blessed beyond measure by the encouragement provided by friends and family members and the faith they displayed in my ability to complete this task. My parents and my wife were always sound counsel and were instrumental in the editing process of this document, and my wife and children, Elizabeth, Andrew, and John, gave their constant love and support.

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GLOSSARY

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

APNSA Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

BND *Bundesnachrichtendienst* – German Federal Intelligence Service

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

COMINT Communications Intelligence

CTC Counterterrorism Center

DCI Director of Central Intelligence

DDCI Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DDCI/CM Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management

DI Directorate of Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DNI Director of National Intelligence

DO Directorate of Operations

DOE Department of Energy

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

EO Executive Order

EOP Executive Office of the President

EXCOMM Executive Committee

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

GAO General Accounting Office

GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence

GRU *Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye* – Russian military intelligence directorate

HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IC Intelligence Community

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research

IOB Intelligence Oversight Board

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

JMIP Joint Military Intelligence Program

KGB *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* – Soviet Committee on State Security

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence

MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile

MOSSAD *HaMossad leModi'in uleTafkidim Meyuchadim* – Israel's Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations

NCTC National Counter Terrorism Center

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program

NGIC National Ground Intelligence Center

NIC National Intelligence Council

NIE National Intelligence Estimate

NIO National Intelligence Officer

NIP National Intelligence Program

NIPE National Intelligence Programs Evaluation

NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency

NSAM National Security Action Memorandum

NSC National Security Council

NSDD National Security Decision Directive

NSPG National Security Planning Group

ODNI Officer of the Director of National Intelligence

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence

OODA Observe-Orient-Decide-Act

OSS Office of Strategic Services

PDB Presidential Daily Brief

PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate

SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TECHINT Technical Intelligence

TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I considered it very important to this country to have a well organized intelligence system, both in the present and in the future.¹

President Harry S. Truman

1.1 Statement of the Puzzle

A thorough study of the U.S. foreign policy process should include the contributions of the intelligence community (IC); however, as a colloquial expression within the military intelligence community admonishes, “there are no intelligence successes, only operational successes and intelligence failures.” The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the other fifteen agencies of the U.S. intelligence community often serve as quiet participants, working behind the scenes of successful foreign policies where their contributions go practically unmentioned by diplomats, the news media, and historians. Unfortunately, on many occasions these same agencies have also distracted and, in some instances, misdirected the very leaders they have sought to advise, through embarrassingly public incidents such as the Iran-Contra affair in the mid-1980s. These failures by the intelligence community garner the majority of public attention to intelligence matters, but it is the effect of successes in analytical intelligence and undisclosed covert actions that leave a largely unmeasured mark on international relations. What can a president do to improve the likelihood of intelligence success? To answer this question, it is important to understand what factors help to determine whether intelligence succeeds or fails; one of the most critical factors is the relationship of the president and his head of intelligence.

¹ "Our First Line of Defense," Presidential Reflections on Intelligence. Washington DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996, p. 13.

1.1.1 The Intelligence Community

The conglomeration of agencies and missions that compose the intelligence community perform three basic functions: first, the collection and analysis of information (particularly information that target countries desire to keep private); second, the conduct of covert actions to achieve policy objectives while disguising the participation of the U.S. government; and third, the conduct of counterintelligence to protect the United States' own private information and police the U.S. intelligence community.² The work and the functions of the intelligence community is the subject of a relatively new field of academic research known as intelligence studies. This dissertation will concentrate, primarily, within the area of intelligence collection and analysis and, secondarily, upon covert action. The third function, counterintelligence, is equally critical to national security, but is generally more of an internal function to the intelligence community and rarely is intended to inform or affect the promulgation of U.S. foreign policy in the same manner that analytical intelligence products do or enact policy as a covert action does.

Within the collection and analysis portion of the intelligence field, the intelligence cycle has become the standard depiction of the basic processes. (See Figure 1.1) Many intelligence agencies and numerous scholars in the field of intelligence studies use this model or variations of it. Although some scholars, such as Arthur Hulnick, debate the clean linear relationship between the phases of the intelligence cycle, there is a general consensus that this representation includes

² James Fearon defines a country's private information as "their military capabilities and willingness to fight that other states do not know." This information is held as private because "in bargaining situations they can have incentives to misrepresent such private information in order to gain a better deal." Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49.3 (1995): p. 381.




Figure 1.1: The Intelligence Process³

³ United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Public Affairs Office. *A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence Gaining Knowledge and Foreknowledge of the World Around Us*. Washington, D.C.; Springfield, VA : National Technical Information Service: The Office; Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., distributor, 1999, p. viii.

most of the major elements of the collection and analysis process.⁴ What is less studied, however, is how the intelligence cycle interacts with another important cycle, the decision cycle of national leaders, particularly the president. This intersection includes the most important phases of the intelligence cycle, where finished intelligence products are delivered to the president and new guidance is provided as the president is formulating grand strategy and developing supporting foreign policies.

1.1.2 The Model for Decision-Making

The role of grand strategy, according to Liddell Hart, is to “co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation... towards the attainment of the political object.”⁵ The development of a grand strategy and the policies that support it involve key decisions being made by a state’s leadership. There are a wide variety of ways to model how policies are derived and decisions are made. Decision-making models exist for military, political, and business leaders and range from simple rational decision processes to more complex models. Rational decision cycles could involve “inputs from the environment, situation assessment, course of action choice (planning) with prediction, action, and feedback of results.”⁶ A highly appropriate model for examining presidential foreign policy decisions would be a “command decision cycle.” The president is a commander with a wide array of assets relevant to any decision and an equally extensive quantity of interests to consider in selecting potential courses of action. An appropriate decision-making model will also account for the fact that decisions are not made in a vacuum, but in an

⁴ Hulnick, Arthur S. "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle." Intelligence and National Security 21 (2006): 959-79.

⁵ Liddell Hart, Basil Henry. *Strategy*. 2d rev ed. New York: Praeger, 1967, p. 322.

⁶ Hiniker, Paul J. *A Model of Command and Control Processes for JWARS: Test Results from Controlled Experiments and Simulation Runs*. Falls Church, VA: Defense Information Systems Agency, Technical Integration Services Directorate, 2002. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA467636>.

international environment that will also shape the process. The predominant view within international relations theory is that the international environment is chaotic and anarchical.

Realism advocates that this anarchic international environment is caused by the lack of a sovereign authority that can impose international order and ensure that all states fulfill their promises and commitments.⁷ Because of this anarchy, there is a high degree of uncertainty that exists. Uncertainty is a destabilizing factor because “states must worry that others will seek to take advantage of them.”⁸ Obtaining information is a natural reaction to uncertainty and reliable information thus has the potential to become a panacea for uncertainty. Can a state gather the quantity and quality of information needed to reduce uncertainty? “Realism assumes that information about the intentions of other states is pertinent, but of poor quality. States must therefore assume the worst, and thus behave in a defensive, wary manner.”⁹ Meanwhile, institutional theory counters realism with the idea that while anarchy may exist, there can also be cooperation under anarchy.¹⁰ Institutionalists ascribe the role of improving the availability and reliability of information to institutions. They believe that “states will take steps to improve the informational environment under these conditions, especially if scarcity of information is impeding the attainment of substantial mutual gains from cooperation.”¹¹ Institutional solutions improve a state’s access to the previously private information of other states, but at the cost of sharing that state’s own private information. If a state can reliably acquire accurate information

⁷ Jervis, Robert. "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate." *Progress in International Relations Theory*. Eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003. 277-309, p. 280.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 281.

⁹ Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. "Institutional Theory as a Research Program." *Progress in International Relations Theory*. Eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003. 71-108, p. 79.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 75.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 80.

through means that do not require giving up its own private information, certainly that would be preferable, and that is a primary function for the intelligence community.

The use of intelligence is, therefore, an attractive means of reducing uncertainty as leaders develop courses of action to solve the problems they face. Whether depicting the steps involved in planning a military engagement or conducting an economic treaty negotiation, a decision-making model should incorporate the use of intelligence to reduce uncertainty. To be more specific, a decision-making model should incorporate a decision-maker who is attempting to minimize three types of uncertainty. First, he needs to reduce uncertainty about the size, condition, and location of his own assets. Second, he must gain a better understanding of those same factors with regard to his opponents. Third, he needs to gain the best possible understanding of the likely outcomes of his proposed courses of action.¹² Successful intelligence reduces this uncertainty. It is extremely important to note that the intelligence community only attempts to reduce uncertainty about the opponents' assets, intentions, and likely reactions; information on the decision-maker's own assets is normally the responsibility of other organizations (*exempli gratia*: Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Homeland Security).

While there exists a large variety of theories that describe and define the decision cycles of individuals and organizations, it is most appropriate in this instance to use one that was designed with the intent of capturing the thought process of a strategist. John Boyd's Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop, often referred to as the OODA Loop, provides a succinct model

¹² Hiniker, Paul J. *A Model of Command and Control Processes for JWARS: Test Results from Controlled Experiments and Simulation Runs*. Falls Church, VA: Defense Information Systems Agency, Technical Integration Services Directorate, 2002. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA467636>.

through which we can understand how a decision cycle interacts with the intelligence cycle.¹³

Boyd's OODA Loop is particularly appropriate for this study because it is built with the benefit of a comprehensive study of well-known strategists such as Sun Tzu, von Clausewitz, and Jomini.¹⁴

The "Observe" phase describes when a situation is first detected. It includes the process of gathering information about ourselves, our situation, and all relevant players. The intelligence community would contribute to increasing understanding and decreasing uncertainty with regard to a situation and potential opponents. The "Orient" phase is defined by an exercise of analysis and assessment. Intelligence products supporting the orientation phase include long-range analysis, assessments of enemy intentions, and probable enemy responses to potential U.S. courses of action. A properly oriented decision-maker should then be prepared to decide upon a course of action and then act on the decision. These later phases are still supported by current intelligence and other intelligence products, but at the level of the grand strategist they require far less intelligence support than the Observe and Orient phases.

The OODA Loop is not a comprehensive model. The process of observation, for example, should be continuous. A linear model such as this, however, has the advantage of showing all of the necessary steps in a visual manner. The OODA Loop also incorporates the element of time. According to Boyd, a state should endeavor to "operate inside" its opponents OODA loop in order to ensnare them "in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic chaos ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot cope

¹³ Boyd, John R. *An Organic Design for Command and Control*. Unpublished Lecture Notes ed., 1987, p. 7.

¹⁴ U.S. Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6: Command and Control*. Ed. U.S. Marine Corps. Washington D.C.: United States Government, 1996, p. 63.




Figure 1.2: Integration of the Boyd's OODA Loop and the Intelligence Process.

with events/efforts as they unfold.”¹⁵ The most important portions of the OODA Loop for this study are where the OODA Loop overlaps with the intelligence cycle. A depiction of this interaction is provided in Figure 1.2 and a more detailed representation of the OODA Loop is in Appendix C.

1.1.3 The President and the DCI

As discussed, finished intelligence products provide the decision-maker information during the observation phase, and assist with the decision-maker’s orientation. These interactions lead to decisions and offer guidance for the collection and analysis of more intelligence. The intelligence community and the policy realm of the U.S. government are staffed by thousands of personnel at multiple levels of authority; however, there are two offices that ultimately represent and are responsible for these two communities: The president and the Director of National Intelligence or DNI (before 2005 it was the Director of Central Intelligence, or DCI).¹⁶ This dissertation will focus on how these two offices and the relationship they have with each other affects the success of the intelligence community in supporting the creation of U.S. foreign policy. An analysis of the interaction between these two offices requires an understanding of both offices, their goals, and, most importantly, the people who occupy the office at the time.

¹⁵ Boyd, p. 7.

¹⁶ The position of DCI was created as part of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 80-235, Cong., 61 Stat. 496, 50 U.S.C. ch.15). Although the position was commonly understood to have responsibility over both the CIA and the broader intelligence community, the DCI position was never truly given the authority necessary to carry out that responsibility. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (Public Law 108-458, 50 U.S.C. 401 note) created the position of DNI; this legislation separated the responsibilities of directing the CIA and directing the intelligence community. Although the title of the position has changed and the responsibilities have been divided, the nature of the relationship between the president and the nation’s senior intelligence officer is just as vital.

1.1.3.1 The President

Studies of the U.S. presidency are most often divided into research about the institution of the president and analyses of individual presidents. Both methodologies are relevant to the study of the interaction between the president and the intelligence community. The existence of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) can have great effect upon the DCI's ability to interact with his primary customer, the President, due to the imposed bureaucracy and of power politics such as the quest to exert dominance over U.S. foreign policy by individuals like Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski. Additionally, the EOP and the use of a national security team can permit the president to distance himself from certain actions. For example, President Dwight Eisenhower was the architect of foreign policy during his administration including the use of covert actions, but he was able to avoid direct public association with many of the covert actions that took place during his administration. It was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, DCI Allen Dulles who publicly took on the mantle of Cold War Warriors while Eisenhower was able to distance himself from many policy decisions.¹⁷ Christopher Andrew notes "the most covert part of Eisenhower's covert actions was his own responsibility for them."¹⁸ This example of the relationship between the EOP and the intelligence community predated the modern Congressional oversight structure and would be harder to repeat today.

Eisenhower perceived an advantage due to the lack of Congressional involvement in matters of intelligence. When a joint committee to oversee the clandestine services was proposed, Eisenhower was unequivocal, stating "this kind of bill would be passed over my dead

¹⁷ Andrew, Christopher M. *For the President's Eyes Only : Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*. 1 HarperPerennial ed. New York: HarperPerennial, 1996; 1995, p. 202.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

body.”¹⁹ Under such conditions, the institutional presidency and the EOP are critical to understanding the nature of the relationship between the president and the intelligence community. Presidents are more than institutions, they are individuals too; this impacts not only the manner in which they wish to receive intelligence (such as the format, the frequency, and the fidelity of the intelligence), but also the way they relate to the individual responsible for providing it.

Since President Harry Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, nearly half of succeeding presidents having taken the opportunity to appoint a DCI or DNI of their own choosing. Some may have viewed this as a political necessity, but for many the choice to retain or dismiss the incumbent DCI/DNI was a matter of personal preference. Beyond the selection of a DCI/DNI, once in office, the structure of the president’s staff, access to his daily schedule, and the personalities of the individuals that make up the foreign policy team all affect the frequency of president/DCI interaction and the role that the DCI is to play.

Another important rift within the field of presidential studies centers upon the validity of Richard Neustadt’s assertion that “presidential power is the power to persuade.”²⁰ Neustadt builds his case beginning with discussion of “the separateness of institutions and the sharing [as opposed to division] of powers” prescribed by the U.S. Constitution.²¹ Since the President’s prescribed powers are few and Congress possesses a check against his enumerated powers, the president’s real power rests in his use of the bully pulpit to convince voters and congressmen alike of the validity of his positions and programs. Conversely, William Howell argues that modern presidents “unilaterally impose their will on the American public” through the use of

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 212.

²⁰ Neustadt, Richard E. *Presidential Power, the Politics of Leadership*. New York: Wiley, 1960, p. 10.

²¹ Neustadt, p. 34.

tools such as executive orders, national security directives, and signing statements.²² The processes and products of the intelligence community support both sides of this debate. Presidents use analytical intelligence products as they attempt to influence Congress, the public, and foreign governments (*id est*. the reconnaissance photos of the Soviet missiles in Cuba presented by Adlai Stevenson in front of the United Nations Security Council on 23 October, 1962).²³ Covert actions, meanwhile, support the argument that the unilateral powers are more influential. The passage of the Hughes-Ryan Act and the creation of formal Congressional oversight committees were both intended as checks on unilateral action by the president, but loopholes in the notification process continue to be used by the president.²⁴ While there remains a debate between studying the individual and the institution of the presidency, and disagreement over the predominance of the persuasive or the unilateral powers of the presidency, both sides of these debates inform this study. The case studies that will be used later in this dissertation will draw from all these approaches as they develop a better understanding of the relationship between the president and his DNI or DCI.

1.1.3.2 The DCI/DNI

Neither the position of DCI, nor the individuals who have held that office have been ignored by historians and political scientists, but they are the subjects of far less theoretical analysis than presidents. Former DCI Stansfield Turner describes five primary functions of the DCI as: 1) espionage and covert action; 2) serving as the president's intelligence advisor; 3)

²² Howell, William G. *Power without Persuasion : The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 3.

²³ Kennedy, Robert F. *Thirteen Days; a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 1st ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969, p. 75.

²⁴ The Hughes-Ryan Act (50 U.S.C. 403) was passed in 1974 and required the notification of eight House and Senate committees in advance of covert actions. The Intelligence Accountability Act of 1980 reduced the required notification to the HPSCI and SSCI. Smist, pp.119-120.

reviewing analysis and estimates; 4) managing the intelligence community; and 5) shepherding new techniques of intelligence into being as technology makes them available.²⁵ While this list of responsibilities helps us understand the DCI better, in order to evaluate the DCI we need a standard by which we can gauge his accomplishments. It is impossible to create an exhaustive list of factors by which to assess the achievements of a DCI, but David S. Robarge provides five measures of success that we can adapt to begin an evaluation; they are as follows:

- Having an impact on foreign policy;
- Maintaining or rebuilding good relations with the president and Congress;
- Retaining or expanding budget and personnel resources;
- Raising the CIA's standing in the Intelligence Community and with the public, and
- Inspiring the Agency workforce and instituting durable internal changes.²⁶

The sixty-three years that have elapsed since the National Security Act of 1947 have produced twenty-four DCI/DNIs and thirty president/DCI and president/DNI dyads (pairings of a single president with a single DCI/DNI – see Appendix B). Moving beyond a mere list of responsibilities as defined by Turner, Robarge's five measures of success provide a means of starting to evaluate the performance of a DCI and permit the development of categories of DCI. Robarge takes this next step by classifying five different typologies of DCIs: administrator-custodian, intelligence operator, manager-reformer/insider, manager-reformer/outsider and restorer.²⁷ This lays the foundation for more interesting and valuable analysis of the DCI

²⁵ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 72.

²⁶ Robarge, David S. "Leadership in an Intelligence Organization: The Directors of Central Intelligence and the CIA." *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. Ed. Loch K. Johnson. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010, 485-501, p. 499.

²⁷ Robarge, pp. 491-493.

position. Robarge's research shows that "*Republicans* have appointed or retained *all* of the categories and *all* of the Agency insiders. *Democrats* have appointed or retained *only* administrators and manager-reformers and with one exception (Johnson/Helms) have *never* chosen or kept on an insider."²⁸ This is important because it begins to evaluate the president/DCI dyad, instead of assessing them as individuals. To gain a greater understanding of this relationship this research will build upon the existing literature in the areas of grand strategy and intelligence studies. The goal is to forge a better understanding of how the president's relationship with his DNI/DCI affects the level of intelligence success is achieved by that dyad.

1.2 Literature Review

Isaac Newton spoke of seeing farther by standing on the shoulders of giants; the cumulative stature of three fields of literature gives this research that ability as well. The writings of the masters of grand strategy are informative for understanding the role that intelligence must play from the perspective of the decision-maker. If intelligence does not support the requirements of the decision-maker then it is of little value at the strategic level. Scholarship from the field of intelligence studies directs and guides the assessment of intelligence processes and, combined with the needs of grand strategists, provides a measuring stick by which we can assess the success of intelligence. Finally, a wealth of first hand accounts, memoirs, and scholarly biographies facilitate case studies that test the theories developed here in the crucible of history.

1.2.1 Grand Strategy Literature

The role of intelligence in grand strategy has been recognized since at least the era of the Chinese theorist Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu's contributions were developed within a far smaller area of

²⁸ Robarge, pp. 496-497.

operations than the global wars that are fought today, but he addresses a wide range of power projection options available to a leader.²⁹ Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri Jomini, contemporaries of one another in the 1800s, address the role of intelligence in grand strategy from a more modern perspective, but also from a more military-centric viewpoint. These classic theorists of grand strategy remain central to all modern debates over strategy and each addresses the role of intelligence. Their insights will be used to develop a theory for using intelligence in the formulation of grand strategy and foreign policy.

Also essential to building a theory of intelligence in grand strategy are Sherman Kent, Willmoore Kendall, and others who have added to the rich debate over the proper role for the intelligence community with regard to the policy realm. Both academics and intelligence leaders have entered the fray. Former DCI Robert Gates contributes to this discussion in his memoirs.³⁰ Additionally, Jack Davis provides an excellent comparison of the two sides of a famous debate about the proper role of intelligence.³¹ From this literature, I develop a spectrum that runs from active participation in the policy process to complete isolation of the intelligence community and the DNI or DCI from policy-makers. This spectrum provides an important point of comparison as part of the operational code for each of the four dyads examined here.

1.2.2 Intelligence Studies Literature

Another key contributor to the development of a general theory for intelligence in grand strategy for this paper is Mark Lowenthal, with his concept of a semi-permeable wall separating policy-makers and the intelligence community. According to Lowenthal, “the distinction between policy and intelligence is to see them as two spheres of government activity that are

²⁹ Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War*. New York: Oxford UP, 1971.

³⁰ Gates, Robert Michael. *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

³¹ Davis, Jack. "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949." *Studies in Intelligence* 36 (1992): 91-103.

separated by a semi-permeable membrane. The membrane is semi-permeable because policy-makers can and do cross over into the intelligence sphere, but intelligence officials cannot cross over into the policy sphere.”³² (See Figure 1.3) Essential to the understanding of this model is knowing the types of information that can pass through the semi-permeable wall. Lowenthal’s model focuses on policy and guidance, not intelligence. The reality, however, is that this model represents an ideal relationship, a utopia that is seldom completely achieved in the real world.

The separation of these two realms by a “wall” is consistent with the position advocated by Sherman Kent. First, the policy-maker can, and on some occasions should, cross into the intelligence realm with guidance and the formulation of requirements. Second, and conversely, the intelligence community only should pass intelligence, and not policy recommendations, into the realm of policy creation. Lowenthal’s model and Kent’s ideal relationship between analysts and policy-makers, however, does not always resemble reality, where the semi-permeable wall becomes more like a line painted on the floor. This line only serves as a barrier to those who wish to follow the rules and is ignored by some of the participants in the process. On October 20, 1962, at a meeting of the Executive Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis, DCI John McCone “stated his opposition to an air strike, but admitted that in his view a blockade was not enough. He argued that we should institute the blockade and tell the Russians that if the missiles were not dismantled within seventy-two hours, the United States would destroy the missiles by air attack.”³³ These are not analytical positions, nor are they an intelligence assessment of the

³² Lowenthal, p. 5.

³³ "Cuban Missile Crisis: EXCOMM Meeting Transcripts." John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 12 Nov. 2009 <http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc_excomm_meetings.html>.




Figure 1.3: Lowenthal's Semi-Permeable Wall³⁴

³⁴ *Ibid.*

likely outcomes of certain policy scenarios; they show DCI McCone crossing the line and advocating specific policy options. Likewise, DCI William Casey practiced frequent disregard for the existence of a line separating policy-maker and intelligence analyst. When President Reagan offered Casey the position of DCI, Casey replied, “If I do take it, I expect to be in on policy. I’d give you the intelligence straight. I wouldn’t bend it to fit the policy. But I expect to be part of the foreign policy team.”³⁵ Lowenthal’s ideal model, therefore, is important for understanding one view of how the relationship between analysts and policy-makers is intended to work, but not necessarily how it actually functions. Intelligence plays a critical role in the area of foreign policy through its influential support of policy-makers, which is why it is vital to understand whether a DNI/DCI is fulfilling his designated role as envisioned by Kent and Lowenthal, or whether he has become a policy player in Kendall’s terms.

The intelligence studies literature is a rapidly growing area that is addressing many of the broader issues relevant to the intelligence community. Gill, Marrin and Phythian (2009) attempt to inform the discussion of generalized intelligence theory through their edited volume, *Intelligence Theory*, but no single theory emerges to carry forward our discussion.³⁶ Richard K. Betts presents an analysis of attitudes that affect the functionality of intelligence in his book *Enemies of Intelligence* (2007).³⁷ The focus of this work is on a wider spectrum of actors than this research will focus on for this analysis but, notably, he cites the need for an educated consumer. Betts assigns the majority of intelligence failures to decision-makers who consume

³⁵ Persico, Joseph E. *Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey From the OSS to the CIA*. New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 1991, p. 203.

³⁶ Gill, Peter, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian. *Intelligence Theory : Key Questions and Debates*. London ; New York: Routledge, 2009.

³⁷ Betts, Richard K. *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security*. New York: Columbia UP, 2007.

intelligence products. He states that “policy premises constrict perception, and administrative workloads constrain reflection.”³⁸ Christopher Andrew also provides valuable insight into the relationships between presidents and their DCIs in his book, but he falls short of analyzing the factors that shaped the relationships between these two key actors; nor does he establish any predictions that can be applied to future relationships between the president and his DNI.³⁹ Similarly, Douglas Gharhoff’s analysis of the DCI as a leader of the intelligence community provides a useful historical record to draw upon, but it does not analyze the nature of the president-DCI relationship.⁴⁰ Historical documentation of the lives, actions, and decision of DCIs and presidents build the foundation needed for assessment of each actor’s operational code. By using classical theories of intelligence to assess the results of the interaction between presidents and their DCIs, we will be able to evaluate the level of intelligence support they received in a manner that can be applied to future president-DNI relationships.

1.2.3 I Was There - Memoirs and Biographies

The development of the case studies, particularly the development of an operational code, will rely on primary sources to the greatest extent possible. Many of the DCIs have published autobiographical accounts of their tenures in charge of the intelligence community. Literature on most presidents exists in great volume, including autobiographies, scholarly biographies, and numerous public statements and documents. Additionally, many other firsthand accounts will be used, such as those of national security advisors, secretaries of state, and other key advisors in the realms of foreign policy and intelligence.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.19.

³⁹ Andrew, Christopher. For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: Harper Perennial, 1996.

⁴⁰ Garthoff, Douglas F. Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community: 1946–2005. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005.

1.3 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation will begin by establishing the tools of this study; these tools consist of the terms, the categories of characterization, and the standards of measurement needed to evaluate the dyad and its level of intelligence success. Additionally, I will develop three hypotheses that describe the relationship between the characterization of the dyad and the level of intelligence success that dyad received. Next, archival research will be used to conduct case studies of four dyads. Each case study will conclude with an evaluation using the tools developed previously in order to characterize the nature of the president/DCI relationship and assess the level of intelligence success achieved by that dyad. Finally, an assessment of the accuracy of the three hypotheses will be conducted. The grey, upper band of Figure 1.4 shows the source materials that are foundational to this study. The blue, middle band displays the tools developed and studies that are to be conducted and evaluated using those tools. Finally, the red, lower band represents the final evaluation of the hypotheses' abilities to explain the results of the case study evaluations.

1.3.1 The Toolbox

Chapter Two will begin with the development of a theory of intelligence in grand strategy. The writings of masters of grand strategies, with the consideration of classic intelligence theorists as well, will be used to create five principles of intelligence from grand strategy—these principles will serve as a general theory of intelligence. This theory of intelligence, in conjunction with the scholarship already existing and available from the field of intelligence studies, will be used to develop two other important items. The first tool is a standard for evaluating the success of intelligence within a dyad. The second tool is a set of




Figure 1.4: Flow Diagram of this Dissertation

three hypotheses on the relationship between the level of intelligence success and the nature of the relationship.

Before the analytical tools can be developed an understanding of how intelligence should be employed must be derived. Is there a general theory of intelligence? David Kahn begins his essay entitled “An Historical Theory of Intelligence” by declaring that no theory of intelligence has been advanced.⁴¹ This represents an important gap within the field of intelligence studies. Literature within the field has grown considerably in the last decade, but while the issue of a general theory of intelligence has been repeatedly addressed, it has not been resolved in modern literature. The masters of grand strategy, however, certainly understood and incorporated intelligence into their work, and from their principles I develop a usable model for intelligence. The function of intelligence in grand strategy has been extolled by theorists from the Napoleonic era, such as Clausewitz and Jomini, to as far back as Sun Tzu (an ancient Chinese strategist who wrote during the Classical Period of China, 551-249 B.C.). The role of the intelligence community in the modern foreign policy process has been further debated by Sherman Kent and Willmoore Kendall, among others; the crux of this debate is the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers and concern about the politicization of intelligence.⁴²

The first tool derived from this theory is one to evaluate if a dyad succeeded in the area of intelligence. The role of the intelligence community, according to the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, is to “tell

⁴¹ Kahn, David. "An Historical Theory of Intelligence," *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates*. Eds. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian. New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 4.

⁴² Davis, Jack. "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," *Studies in Intelligence* 36 (1992), pp. 91-103.

policymakers what they know, what they don't know, what they think, and why.”⁴³ Successful intelligence will be defined as possessing five basic qualities: it should be accurate, timely, relevant, and actionable—plus it must actually be used. Timely intelligence is provided to the decision-maker in sufficient time to be part of the observation and orientation phases of his OODA Loop so that it can inform his or her decision-making. Relevant intelligence is information that is germane to the priorities of the decision-maker. Irrelevant intelligence not only wastes the time of the consumer, but it can diminish the role of the intelligence community in the decision-making process. Actionable intelligence, as described by Mark Lowenthal, is “intelligence with which [policymakers] can ‘do something.’”⁴⁴ Finally, intelligence that is ignored can hardly be viewed as successful. The significance of these measures of performance of intelligence will be demonstrated using the standards established by classical grand strategists (to be described in Chapter 2) and will result in an assessment of: “Poor,” “Acceptable,” or “Good.”

How does the president/DCI relationship relate to the level of intelligence success they experience? The second tool demonstrates the importance of this relationship. The three hypotheses constructed in Chapter Two will describe how the independent variables found in the president/DCI relationship affect the dependent variable - the success of intelligence support receive by the president. Having developed the tools and the hypotheses of this research it will then be time to explain how they will be used.

⁴³ The WMD Commission. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States. Washington D.C.: United States Government, 2005.
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/wmd_report.pdf

⁴⁴ Lowenthal, Mark M. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. New York: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2003, p.188.

1.3.2 How it Works

Chapter Three will proceed by explaining, with greater precision, the selection and ordering of dyads for use as case studies, the methodologies that will be used in the case studies, and the hypotheses. The five principals of intelligence in grand strategy and measures of success developed to evaluate if intelligence within a dyad was successful that were developed in Chapter Two are important tools in the testing of the three hypotheses. In addition to these tools there is one more critical tool that needs to be explained, the intelligence operational code. An operational code methodology will be used to define the attitudes and the relationship of four presidents with a DCI who served under them. Chapter Three will explain how the operational code is constructed and how it will be used to evaluate each member of a dyad. This chapter will also explain the way knowledge gained through developing the intelligence operational code is evaluated to test the three hypotheses.

1.3.3 The Dyads

Chapters Four through Seven will be case studies of president/DCI dyads. If each pairing of a president and a DCI or DNI represents a single dyad, then, to date, 30 dyads have existed with a mean duration of 761 days. This dissertation examines four dyads for study, using criteria discussed before. Each selected dyad represents a different president–DCI relationship that I assess through the use of an operational code methodology. This methodology will provide, first, a qualitative assessment of each man’s belief system (no woman has yet served as DNI or DCI) to explain the decisions he made and, second, an assessment of each president-DCI relationship. These qualitative assessments will be drawn from archival research, the writings and statements of the subjects themselves, and firsthand accounts.

The first case study (Chapter 3) will examine President Jimmy Carter and DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner. Carter's decision to replace George H. W. Bush as DCI marks the precedent for making the position a political appointee; yet hand-selecting Turner to be his spymaster did not ensure a strong relationship between the two. The second case study (Chapter 4) will examine President Ronald Reagan and DCI William Casey. This dyad is unique in that Casey is the first DCI to be given Cabinet-level status. The third case study (Chapter 5) will examine President John F. Kennedy and DCI John McCone. McCone was President Kennedy's second DCI and one can acquire a unique perspective on their relationship through National Security Council (NSC) and Executive Committee (EXCOMM) transcripts from the Cuban Missile Crisis. The final case study (Chapter 6) examines the relationship between President George W. Bush and DCI George Tenet. Three out of four of these dyads have the duration that placed them in the upper quartile of all president–DCI dyads, and the Kennedy–McCone dyad is just 37 days below the mean of all president–DCI dyads. Furthermore, these dyads present opportunities where the literature provides the greatest amount of insight as to the nature of the individuals, their relationship, and the intelligence provided.

Each case study will conclude with an analysis and assessment of the dyad using the tools and methodologies described in Chapters Two and Three. The intelligence operational code developed for the members of each dyad will assist in placing the dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix, these tools characterize the independent variables found in the president/DCI relationship. The level of intelligence success achieved by the dyad will be assessed using the measures of success generated from the five principles of intelligence in grand strategy. No single case study is sufficient to prove the hypotheses correct, but each one will be assessed as to whether or not it supports or fails to support the three hypotheses.

1.3.4 What have we learned?

Chapter Eight will analyze the cumulative results of the four case studies and assess the utility of the three hypotheses. By reviewing the success of intelligence based upon the president/DCI relationship in four different dyads, the three hypotheses can be more rigorously tested. If the hypotheses can explain the level of intelligence success in the dyads that were studied in this research, then the insight gained can be applied to future president/DNI relations. Is there a benefit to a president selecting a DNI with whom he has an existing and trusting relationship? Does the DNI need to have unimpeded access to the president in order to ensure that relevant intelligence products reach him in a timely manner? Must the DCI maintain a strict, legalistic separation from the perception of policy preference out of concern for being seen as a policy advocate? The most important contribution of this research to the field of intelligence studies is a better understanding of the importance of the president/DCI relationship to the level of intelligence success.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN GRAND STRATEGY

Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.¹

Sun Tzu

This chapter will establish a theory for the use of intelligence in the form of five principles of intelligence in grand strategy. Once established that theory will be used to develop tools needed for the evaluation of the president/DCI relationship in the four selected case studies and to evaluate the degree of intelligence success of each dyad. These tools facilitate the comparison of different president/DCI relationships. Ultimately, this chapter will present three hypotheses concerning the effect of the president/DCI relationship upon the degree of intelligence success by that dyad.

To establish a baseline for the use of intelligence in foreign policy, I will first examine how both theorists of grand strategy and pioneers of modern intelligence analysis propose that intelligence should be used. Carl Von Clausewitz, Antoine Henri Jomini, and Sun Tzu are recognized, first and foremost, as military strategists, but their principles are widely applicable to the broader category of grand strategy. For example, centers of gravity and decisive points exist not just on the battlefield, but within any area of power (*exempli gratia*: military, political, economic). Superiority in numbers may appear to be highly applicable as a military concept, but diplomatic alliances gain strength with numbers and economic policy is stronger with larger reserves or greater available resources. Twentieth century intelligence analysts Sherman Kent

¹ Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War*. New York: Oxford UP, 1971, p.13.

and Willmoore Kendall further refine our discussion to specifically examine the proper role of intelligence in the modern era. Specifically, they examine the role intelligence community members should (or should not) play in the creation of policy. A detailed look at the work of these masters of grand strategy and intelligence analysis will yield many principles to apply in assessing how effectively intelligence supports the development of grand strategy and foreign policy.

2.1 Employment of Intelligence by Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu

2.1.1 Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)

Clausewitz is considered a pre-eminent military strategist, but he is rarely portrayed as an advocate of intelligence. This is, in part, because only a single chapter of his classic work, *On War*, discusses intelligence directly, and that chapter is both short and highly critical. Most intelligence, in the words of Clausewitz, “is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies.”² This statement clearly shows intelligence contributing to the fog and friction of war instead of relieving it, so what contribution can we hope to find from Clausewitz on the proper role of intelligence in grand strategy? First, we will look at exactly what component of intelligence Clausewitz was speaking of in the passage cited above. Then we will develop a new perspective from which to view Clausewitz’s definition of the role of intelligence through an in-depth look at how intelligence can support his primary principles for warfare.

A deeper look at Clausewitz’s views on intelligence begins with the simple issue of the definitions of “information” and “intelligence.” In his chapter entitled “Intelligence in War,” Clausewitz refers to information that arrives during a battle. The information is confused and even contradictory. This type of battlefield information does not, in most cases, meet the modern

² Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. New York: Princeton UP, 1989, p. 117.

threshold of intelligence, and when it does, it exists at the tactical level, not what is necessary for grand strategy. Today, the U.S. Department of Defense's authoritative document on intelligence is *Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence*.³ In this publication information is not equivalent to intelligence. Instead, "information on its own is a fact or a series of facts that may be of utility to the commander, but when related to other information already known about the operational environment and considered in the light of past experience regarding an adversary, it gives rise to a new set of facts, which may be termed "intelligence."⁴ Figure 2.1 is adapted from a figure in the Department of Defense's Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0) and provides a visual representation of how information (such as an opponent's private information as discussed by James Fearon in "Rationalist Explanations for War") is continually focused by the "lenses" of the different succeeding phases of the intelligence cycle (see Figure 2.1) The subject of Clausewitz's condemnation in his chapter on intelligence fails to meet modern definitions of intelligence; furthermore, it is also questionable if that is the term he even used.

In his essay "Clausewitz's Contempt for Intelligence," Victor M. Rosello writes that "the term *Nachrichten* is a focal point of debate because it may be translated variously as 'intelligence,' 'information,' 'reports,' or even 'news.'"⁵ Rosello argues that while the 1984 translation of *On War* by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (which translates the word as "intelligence") is the most accepted, the 1909 and 1943 translations use the word "information."⁶ Rosello concludes that the relevant chapter from Clausewitz is discussing information, or raw intelligence, not intelligence as the term is commonly understood. At most, this information

³ United States of America. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence*, 22 June 2007, p. i.

⁴ *Ibid.* Page I-1.

⁵ George, Roger Z. *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2005, p. 17.

⁶ *Ibid.*




Figure 2.1 Information Focused Through the Lenses of Intelligence⁷
(As adapted from JP 2-0)

⁷ Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government, 2007, p. I-2.

might be classified as tactical intelligence, not for use in developing grand strategy or foreign policy. This re-opens the question of how Clausewitz deals with intelligence as part of forming grand strategy.

If Book One, Chapter Six of *On War* is not our guide to what Clausewitz thinks of intelligence, then where do we find it? The path to the answer begins with an understanding of the level of war that grand strategy deals with. Strategy centers upon goals that far exceed what can usually be gained or lost on any single battlefield. At the heart of strategy lie long-term objectives and a vision of the future. The U.S. intelligence community envisions its function as requirements driven, meaning that the impetus behind intelligence operations and analysis should be requirements generated by the president and others responsible for building U.S. grand strategy.⁸ Unfortunately for the intelligence community, senior leadership (such as the president) does not always take the time to provide detailed guidance. In place of specific top-driven requirements, the intelligence community can turn to official statements of U.S. goals and strategies, such as the *National Security Strategy*.⁹ This document outlines general strategies that require specific intelligence to support them. Similarly, I will examine key elements of strategy from *On War* to determine how intelligence should inform the decision-maker according to Clausewitz.

One of the most basic elements of strategy covered in *On War* is superiority in numbers. Clausewitz calls this “the most common element in victory.”¹⁰ To determine if one possesses superiority of numbers, it is vital that one know the strength of the opposing force. Using multi-

⁸ *A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, p. 1.

⁹ United States Government. *National Security Strategy*. Washington D.C.: United States Government, 2010.

¹⁰ Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. New York: Princeton UP, 1989, p. 194.

source intelligence to determine an opponent's size, location, and intent is as useful for political and economic issues and the development of foreign policy as it is for military strategy. To improve intelligence products, however, collection should be focused on a few important targets identified by the decision-maker. This allows the intelligence community to provide timely and accurate intelligence that informs the president sufficiently for him to bring a preponderance of resources to bear at the critical moment.

With or without the benefit of superior numbers, the commander can attain "relative superiority" by attacking his opponent at "the decisive point."¹¹ In a military situation, a decisive point might be a weak point in the opponent's defenses, but in political terms it could be exploiting political or ethnic division within the target state. In economic encounters it could mean awareness of shortages or dependencies upon key raw materials. A modern example can be drawn from the War on Terror. Because al Qaeda is a non-state entity, it does not occupy a sovereign territory that can be delineated in an atlas of political geography. This makes identifying a decisive point more difficult than when the opponent is a nation-state. Terrorist leaders, facilitators, and operatives, however, still must occupy physical space to organize, train, and equip. Furthermore, to some degree, all terrorism is state-sponsored since all terrorists exist with the support or at least the acquiescence of a state, unless the state has lost total control of a region -- examples of such a situation would include a failed state like Somalia or a state whose borders encompass a largely autonomous region such as Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).¹² States targeted by terrorism frequently blame and punish sponsor states

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 196.

¹² Even in these cases, an argument can be made regarding the state support for terrorism based upon the level of effort the state government makes to regain control of area.

for acts of terrorism because those states have more identifiable decisive points.¹³ When intelligence can identify a decisive point specific to the terrorist organization instead of the host nation, then a more effective strategy can be developed.

Once a decisive point has been identified, Clausewitz recommends attacking at that point with a superior force using the element of surprise.¹⁴ Successfully employing surprise (political, military, or economic) depends largely on operational matters, such as maneuver and security, but intelligence is critical to knowing if surprise can be achieved. Although a romanticized notion of cunning on the part of the decision-maker could also be credited with successful implementation of these concepts, Clausewitz seems to take a dim view of this notion as he contends that “an accurate and penetrating understanding is a more useful and essential asset for the commander than any gift for cunning.”¹⁵ The accurate and penetrating understanding that he refers to is well-analyzed intelligence. Another application of intelligence that seems to be strongly evident in Clausewitz’s theory is the concept of centers of gravity.

If the principle of a decisive point or the element of surprise seems to lend itself more to a military strategy than the broader concept of grand strategy, the concept of centers of gravity delivers us to this broader plane. Equally applicable to military, economic, and even political systems, centers of gravity provide a highly valuable target. Clausewitz expounds that “one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything

¹³ Nacos, Brigitte Lebens. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding Threats and Responses in the Post-9/11 World (Penguin Academics Series) (Penguin Academics). New York: Longman, 2005, p. 107.

¹⁴ Clausewitz, p. 198.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 203.

depends. This is the point against which all our energies should be directed.”¹⁶ The center of gravity could still be a single point, but more likely is not.

Paul M. Clark’s target-centered approach to intelligence corrects the notion of a target being an individual, a single vehicle, or building; instead, intelligence “starts by thinking about the target as a system.”¹⁷ This target system possesses a structure, a function, and a process, and if the analyst understands those three aspects of the system, then the center of gravity will be readily identified. To return to the previous example of the current war on terrorism, key centers of gravity were identified and prosecuted with some notable success; terrorist finances were targeted around the world and communications were disrupted to the point of driving terrorists to use human couriers. Good intelligence that is properly utilized guides decisions and informs policy. The importance of intelligence is evident through many of the central elements of Clausewitz’s *On War*; according to theory, strategic interests identified by the decision-maker should guide intelligence collection, and intelligence products should inform the further development of strategy and foreign policy. This requires good interaction between national decision-makers and the intelligence community, this is promoted by salient intelligence products and proper decision-maker guidance. It is important to understand, however, that some forms of intelligence are more useful for formulating (and advocating) policy than others.

From the CIA’s *President’s Daily Brief* (PDB) to the smallest military intelligence unit daily G2 briefing, a news-like summary of current events with classified material scattered through it is given the title “current intelligence.” Arthur Hulnick describes the ubiquity of current intelligence among all forms of intelligence provided in the modern era. Although this

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 595.

¹⁷ Clark, Robert M. Intelligence Analysis: A Target-centric Approach. New York: CQ P, 2004, p. 21.

form of intelligence may have the greatest appeal among modern strategists, it has far less utility. As Hulnick puts it: “Current intelligence hardly ever leads to policy decisions, and is not meant to do so.”¹⁸ Strategic analysis and warning intelligence combine raw intelligence with in-depth knowledge of a target and assessment of a predictive nature. Current intelligence bears closer resemblance to the battlefield information that Clausewitz disparages in his chapter on intelligence than to the information he calls upon a strategist to command. Conversely, solid strategic intelligence provides exactly the information required to reduce the four elements that “make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance.”¹⁹ Figure 2.2 depicts the information environment. The circle encompasses the entire information sphere of which intelligence is only a portion. Within the pyramid that represents intelligence, there is an ascending level of intelligence from tactical to strategic. At the tactical level there is a great dependence upon raw intelligence and very little analysis. As you ascend the intelligence pyramid you can see that analysis takes on a growing role and dependence on unanalyzed intelligence dwindles. Current intelligence is rarely in the upper third of the pyramid, instead strategic level documents such as a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) are exactly the type of intelligence product that should inform foreign policy. Having established the importance of intelligence in implementing Clausewitz’s theories, what role would Clausewitz advocate for intelligence in the formulation of grand strategy?

If war is “an act of policy” or more particularly “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means,” then intelligence supports the means.²⁰ Intelligence supports other forms of hard power in very similar ways. More specifically, leaders’ goals are based upon

¹⁸ Hulnick, p. 965.

¹⁹ Clausewitz, p. 104.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 87.



Figure 2.2 The Intelligence Pyramid

needs and desires. The power that is asserted to achieve those goals could be war, economics, or even culture; but it is the selection and joining of the means and methods of achieving those goals that defines a strategy. Clausewitz focuses on this strategic level of methods (predominantly war in his writings) as the means of achieving goals. Intelligence does not set the goals, nor does it select the means or strategy. Instead, it assists in the selection of a strategy and the implementation of that strategy by informing the decision-maker. Much like the role of the DNI with respect to the National Security Council, intelligence is a crucial advisor, but still only an advisor.

2.1.2 Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869)

Antoine Henri Jomini was a Swiss-born veteran of the Napoleonic armies. His interests and, therefore, his writings, centered largely upon the commander. John Shy defines the difference between Clausewitz and Jomini as follows: “Clausewitz approached war as a complex totality, seeing it in what may be called tragic terms, always threatening to escape human control” while Jomini “saw war largely in personal, heroic terms, controlled by the masterful commander.”²¹ Jomini’s chapter on intelligence, found in a section entitled “Logistics,” takes not only a more appreciative view of intelligence than Clausewitz, but it assesses its importance in view of strategic planning, not the conduct of a battle.

According to Jomini, “one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so

²¹ Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. New York: Princeton UP, 1986, p. 158.

it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility.”²² Formulating a strategy, consequently, requires knowledge of the enemy. Intelligence, according to Jomini, occupies a position of “highest importance.”²³ Jomini realizes, however, that it is impossible to gain perfect knowledge of the enemy and his movements and intentions. He further argues that “as it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of the principles of the art.”²⁴ Perfect intelligence is an elusive expectation. The intelligence a commander can gain may have great influence on his strategy, but strategy is not built around intelligence. Strategy is built around the principles of war, and war is merely a tool that is used to obtain the goals of the state, as Jomini discusses in his first chapter. This speaks clearly against substituting strategy with reaction and knee-jerk response to intelligence reports.

To further our development of the base of knowledge concerning the proper role of intelligence in grand strategy, there is another critical interaction between decision-makers and the intelligence community that must be discussed. If the intelligence community is so divorced from the policy process that it is unaware of the primary strategic concerns of the decision-maker, then its products are unlikely to provide relevant value. Equally valid, however, is the concern that the intelligence community becomes so involved in the development of policy that it compromises the independence of analysis in the intelligence product. This deliberation will be further addressed as we examine the writings of Sun Tzu and review the critical elements of the Kent-Kendall debate.

²² Jomini, Antoine H. *Art of War*. Trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1862, p. 245.

²³ Jomini, p. 245.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 250.

2.1.3 Sun Tzu (circa 544-496 BC)

Like Clausewitz, Sun Tzu takes a very tactical approach to intelligence, but unlike the Prussian theorist (in the most prevalent translation), Sun Tzu considers intelligence to be vital. In chapter thirteen, “Employment of Secret Agents,” he states “what is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situations.”²⁵ The chapter deals strictly with what we now call HUMINT, since that was the only means of intelligence available to Sun Tzu. His spies collected information such as communications, the physical environment or lay of the land, and the size and disposition of enemy forces -- information that is still essential today but now collected by multiple means (such as imagery intelligence [IMINT] and signals intelligence [SIGINT] in addition to HUMINT). Similar to our study of Clausewitz, though, we must dig into the central elements of his strategy to find a theory of intelligence in grand strategy.

Applying Sun Tzu’s theories to the concept of grand strategy requires little translation; most of the principles apply quite directly. The first four principles in his section on offensive strategy are to take the state intact instead of ruining it, to capture the opposing army instead of destroying it, to subdue the enemy without fighting, and to attack the enemy’s strategy.²⁶ This is not a simplistic military strategy of blunt force; it requires considerable knowledge of enemy strengths and stratagem, an understanding of the intervening terrain, and an understanding of other key areas such as economics, culture, and diplomacy. President Bill Clinton recognized this is still true in the modern era when he stated “unique intelligence makes it less likely that our forces will be sent into battle, less likely that American lives will have to [be] put at risk. It gives

²⁵ Tzu, p.145.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 77.

us a chance to prevent crises instead of forcing us to manage them.”²⁷ Sun Tzu, in his chapter on estimates, establishes that “all warfare is based on deception.”²⁸ This makes the acquisition of intelligence both more crucial and more challenging since one must not only employ but also overcome deception. Sun Tzu concludes his chapter on offensive strategy with the oft quoted, “Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal.”²⁹ Even a cursory look at Sun Tzu’s theories establishes the importance of intelligence, but how does this help us with the relationship that should exist between the intelligence community and the policy-makers who construct grand strategy?

Sun Tzu is extremely clear about the role of the decision-maker. A general, he states, should possess the qualities of “wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness.”³⁰ Furthermore, there is a clear delineation of duties. Sun Tzu writes “by doctrine I mean organization, control, assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, regulation of supply routes, and the provision of principal items used by the army.”³¹ We can, therefore, see an emphasis on a strict adherence to assigned roles and duties. This is consistent with the exclusion of those gathering intelligence from offering policy recommendations. Intelligence gatherers are not tasked to create strategy, nor do they have sufficient perspective of the information sphere to develop good strategy (know your enemy and know yourself). Instead, at the end of the chapter

²⁷ "Our First Line of Defense," p. 57.

²⁸ Tzu, p. 66.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 84.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 65.

³¹ *Ibid*.

the onus of strategy is placed squarely on the commander, by whose estimates “the outcome will be clearly apparent.”³²

The modern embodiment of the intelligence function in the general staff system that exists in the military and is, to a large degree, reproduced within the federal government through the president’s Cabinet, is an entire directorate or division dedicated to intelligence. In the days of Clausewitz, “the task of the general staff was the provision of military leaders with a scientific training, men who combined thorough specialist knowledge with independence of mind and character.”³³ The modern version of this staff system now includes a portion of the staff that is dedicated to the gathering of intelligence. In the Soviet model this intelligence function also included internal intelligence, designed to ensure the loyalties of the state’s own citizens. This task must be viewed as a KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* – Committee on State Security) failure since its own members were part of the 1991 coup attempt.³⁴ Internal security was not the only example of failure by the KGB, whose leadership was part of the Politburo and therefore part of the policy process. In December of 1979 Soviet intelligence reports on the status of operations in Afghanistan reached the extreme of politicization, when the KGB falsified reports to Leonid Brezhnev in order to gain his endorsement of its proposed strategy.³⁵ Fear of similar sorts of abuse in the United States has led to considerable debate over the relationship between policy-makers and the intelligence community, epitomized by the Kent-Kendall debate.

³² *Ibid*, p. 71.

³³ Goerlitz, Walter. History of The German General Staff 1657-1945. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1961, p. 53.

³⁴ Lowenthal, p. 243.

³⁵ Andrew, Christopher M. Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. New York: Basic Books, 1999, p. 403.

2.2 Debate of the Role of the Intelligence Community by Kent and Kendall

The modern debate on the use of intelligence in developing U.S. strategy is characterized by the use of the term “politicization.” An intelligence community that religiously observes a separation from the policy-makers is more likely to remain free from efforts to politicize the results of intelligence analysis. Similar to the rule of propinquity, however, separation from the policy process can potentially mean both a loss of influence over policy and a loss of relevance.³⁶ Two intelligence theorists that represent the opposing sides of the modern debate on the role of intelligence in policy-making are Sherman Kent and Willmoore Kendall.

2.2.1 Sherman Kent (1903-1986)

Sherman Kent’s book, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, has been hailed as the most influential book of its day in the field of U.S. intelligence analysis.³⁷ Kent was a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a forerunner of the CIA, and one of the most eminent leaders of the CIA during its formative years. Kent believed that the role of intelligence was to inform policy; he was concerned that the objectivity of intelligence analysis would suffer if distance was not maintained between intelligence analysts and policy-makers.³⁸ This “wall” was not intended to be opaque, though. Kent understood that “one of the most continuously vexing problems in the administration of intelligence is deciding which particular subjects shall be watched, reported upon, or made the object of descriptive or speculative research.”³⁹ To solve the dilemma of combining analytical independence with a relevant and useful product, Kent

³⁶ Levite, Ariel. *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises*. New York: Columbia UP, 1987, p. 16.

³⁷ Davis, p. 91.

³⁸ Ameringer, Charles D. *U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History*. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 397.

³⁹ Kent, Sherman. *Strategic Intelligence For American World Policy*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. P, 1949, p. 9.

urged analysts to “obtain ‘guidance’ from policy-makers.”⁴⁰ The degree of separation between analyst and policy-maker was not universally accepted by other members of the intelligence community.

2.2.2 Willmoore Kendall (1909-1968)

Willmoore Kendall saw the intelligence community serving in a much more integrated fashion with those creating strategy. Kendall believed that Kent’s model took a detached and academic view of intelligence that emphasized prediction to eliminate surprise; an example of what intelligence analysts might produce would be an assessment that “General DeGaulle will come to power this day.”⁴¹ Kendall advocated a role for intelligence that did not “stop short at the 3-mile limit,” but provided top-level policy-makers the information he believed they needed. These intelligence assessments might read, “The following factors, which can be influenced in such and such a fashion by action from outside, will determine whether, and if so, when, General DeGaulle will come to power.”⁴² The relationship that Kendall promoted called for intelligence officials to have expertise in the current state of U.S. domestic policy in order to provide “politically responsible” analysis.⁴³ As Deputy Director for Intelligence, Robert Gates supported a position closer to that of Kendall’s. Gates argued “CIA analysts knew how every government in the world worked – except their own.”⁴⁴ A greater understanding of the current policy debates does not require analysts to get involved in policy formulation, merely that an analyst be aware of the issues their primary customers were dealing with. The issues articulated by Kent, Kendall,

⁴⁰ Davis, p. 91.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 95-96.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 96.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 97.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 99.

and Gates are as relevant today as when they were first made and the debate continues to affect the methodology and products of intelligence in support of U.S. grand strategy.

The positions of Kent and Kendall do not present black and white options for a blueprint of the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers. Both positions understand that intelligence assessments must have utility to policy-makers if they hope to inform the strategy process. Likewise, neither school of thought proposes that the intelligence community become policy advocates. Some aspects of the debate have been affected by outside forces. The movement of the CIA headquarters from the District to its Langley, Virginia facility and the growth of a larger, more specialized staff has helped to establish a degree of separation – the law of propinquity strikes again.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the growth of intelligence technology has enabled policy-makers to have far greater access to more unanalyzed intelligence. A live video feed from an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), an unannotated piece of imagery, or a raw SIGINT intercept can be very misleading to an inexperienced intelligence consumer. Furthermore, the freedom of an individual president to reorganize the national security team to meet his own decision-making style has allowed intelligence leaders to have a seat at the policy-making table and the opportunity not simply to advise but potentially to have a partisan role in the production of grand strategy. This was clearly the case when Ronald Reagan offered William Casey the DCI position and stated, “I want you to know that I’m giving the job cabinet rank.”⁴⁶ Chapter Five will examine how this may have politicized the intelligence process. Conversely, Jimmy Carter demonstrated that he did not want a DCI with such a high level of policy input when he

⁴⁵ Davis, p. 98.

⁴⁶ Persico, p. 203.

refused to invite DCI Stansfield Turner to join a weekly breakfast to discuss foreign policy matters.⁴⁷ This high wall of separation will be analyzed in Chapter Four.

2.3 Five Principles of Intelligence in Grand Strategy

This section will review some of the tenets that can be derived from the writings of classic strategists on the importance and role of intelligence in developing strategy. Together, these principles compose a theory on the role of intelligence in grand strategy. (See Table 2.1) These principles establish guidelines for not only the conduct of intelligence, but its role within the broader information sphere that decision-makers traverse during the Observe and Orient phases of the OODA Loop.

2.3.1 Accurate, Reliable, and Timely

First, those developing grand strategy need access to *accurate and reliable intelligence provided in a timely manner*. The three important components of this principle are accuracy, reliability, and timeliness. Accuracy in intelligence collected and accuracy in analysis are separate, but equally important problems, and both are critical to the credibility of intelligence. Accuracy of intelligence collected means that the data collected is correct and precise enough to meet the needs of the consumer. Collectors must be mindful of attempts at denial and deception - *maskirovka*.⁴⁸ Human agents can be doubled or turned, imagery will encounter camouflage and concealment, and SIGINT can fall victim to false signals or encryption. Furthermore, accurate

⁴⁷ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century. New York: Collier Books, 1990, pp. 67-69.

⁴⁸ *Maskirovka* is a Russian term commonly used to refer to denial and deception programs. It is more accurately described as “a set of processes designed to mislead, confuse, and interfere with accurate data collection regarding all areas of Soviet plans, objectives, and strengths or weaknesses.” It incorporates a multitude of means including: “camouflage, concealment, deception, imitation, disinformation, secrecy, security, feints, diversions, and simulation.” Smith, Charles L. "Soviet Maskirovka." *Airpower Journal* II.1 (1988).

Table 2.1 Principles of Intelligence in Grand Strategy

Five Principles of Intelligence in Grand Strategy
1. Accurate and reliable intelligence must be available in a timely manner for the development of effective grand strategy.
2. Guidance from the decision-maker to intelligence officers is crucial to focusing intelligence assets. The capability to collect and analyze intelligence is a limited commodity; therefore it must be efficiently managed.
3. Intelligence does not provide the complete picture necessary for developing grand strategy. Intelligence is vital for understanding the capabilities and (possibly to a lesser extent) the intentions of one's opponent, but it cannot properly inform the decision-maker of his own capabilities.
4. Grand strategy should never be driven by intelligence. Instead, intelligence should inform the policy development process.
5. Intelligence must demonstrate salience to the decision-maker but avoid becoming politicized. The intelligence community must produce products that are relevant to the needs and interests of its primary consumers to ensure they do not risk being ignored or abandoned, but assessments must always remain unquestionably objective.

does not only mean correct, it also means that the information meets a certain degree of detail or fidelity. Finer degrees of accuracy are constantly required. In the case of advance weapon systems, the greater capability must be supported by higher fidelity information. This is seen in the planning process for future TECHINT collection systems; future intelligence collection architectures must be built to meet the requirements of future weapon systems that may not even exist in prototype-form yet. A further example of the growing need of higher fidelity intelligence is seen in the increased use of special operations forces during the surge in Iraq and as part of the current strategy in Afghanistan.⁴⁹ Special operations require a very high level of detail in intelligence support to enable the units to conduct fast, surprise assaults on new locations.

Accuracy in analysis can be even more challenging. Two intelligence analysts presented with the same information could reach separate conclusions. Modern analysts use the term “multi-source” to describe the process of using multiple sources of intelligence in order to improve accuracy in their analysis; this is not a new technique. Jomini, for example, recommends increasing accuracy “by multiplying the means of obtaining information.”⁵⁰ The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) process and the Team A/Team B approach are just a couple of the analytical methods that have been tried to produce a more comprehensive assessment, but both have, at times resulted in merely confusing consumers by highlighting the level of disagreement within the analytical community.

Reliability is not merely a synonym of accuracy; instead, it infers that the intelligence can be counted upon and that the potential exists to continue to supply similar information in the future. Jomini, urged decision-makers to establish “a well-arranged system of espionage” as his

⁴⁹ Woodward, Bob. *Obama's Wars*. 1st ed. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, p. 274.

⁵⁰ Jomini, p. 250.

first recommendation, a clear emphasis of the importance of establishing reliable sources of intelligence.⁵¹ Reliable intelligence is equally important for analysts and consumers. Analysts use past reporting accuracy to establish the reliability of an intelligence source, particularly when dealing with HUMINT sources. The importance of reliability to consumers was demonstrated in the Cuban Missile Crisis with the IMINT collect by the U-2.⁵² U-2 collection was a critical part of the intelligence flow during the crisis, but in the earliest phase it was not always reliable. Despite having noted a build-up of Soviet weapons in Cuba, poor weather and a transfer of the program from the CIA to the U.S. Air Force meant that no missions were flown from 6 August 1962 until 29 August 1962. A similar period of inactivity occurred again in September, and regular flights that reliably provided updates did not commence until after the 14 October 1962 flight that discovered the Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM). The reduced availability of U-2 derived IMINT in August and September raise interesting academic questions about how things would have happened if the U-2 had been reliable in those months.

The final component of this principal, timeliness, is also a critical commodity for intelligence. Intelligence is often highly perishable. For example, there are numerous examples of important intelligence being delivered in an untimely manner in the failure of the U.S. military to be prepared for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Tight security procedures surrounded knowledge of the decryption of the Japanese diplomatic code (known as J-19) and the Japanese

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 246.

⁵² The U-2 is a high altitude (>75,000 feet) reconnaissance aircraft designed by Lockheed that first flew in 1955. It was designed as a classified project by the CIA to provide IMINT of denied area targets such as targets deep within the Soviet Union. Modern iterations of the aircraft add radar imagery to the original optical imagery or a SIGINT suite. Eden, pp. 256-261.

naval code (known as Purple).⁵³ This meant that very few people were aware of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor; further, it made General George Marshall (Army Chief of Staff) wary of informing Major General Walter Short (Army commander in Hawaii) using the “scrambler” (encrypted telephone). Instead he chose to pass along the warning by message (a more secure, but slower means), causing the intelligence to arrive after the attack had started.⁵⁴ SIGINT collected against the Japanese was accurate and reliable, but not timely. Therefore, it was useless. Accuracy, reliability, and timeliness are three conditions that are necessary for intelligence to be useful to grand strategists, but it is not all that our study of grand strategy reveals about intelligence.

2.3.2 Focusing Intelligence

Grand strategists agree that intelligence, like all elements of strategy and power, must be coordinated. *Guidance from the decision-maker to intelligence officers is crucial to focusing intelligence assets. The capability to collect and analyze intelligence is a limited commodity; therefore it must be efficiently managed.* The intelligence community is a large, amorphous bureaucracy, but it is finite. Only so many satellites, aircraft, and other intelligence sensors can be fielded. Only so many linguists and analysts can be kept on staff. Only so many spies can be infiltrated. A decision of how to employ these limited assets will be made, the question is, whose guidance will be used? This, in part, is what leads Hulnick to conclude that “intelligence managers, and not policy officials, are the real drivers of the intelligence collection process.”⁵⁵

A large bureaucracy, such as the intelligence community generates inertia; analysts and

⁵³ Prange, Gordon William, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. *At Dawn we Slept : The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981, p. 357.

⁵⁴ Bamford, James. *The Puzzle Palace : A Report on America's most Secret Agency*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex ; New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1983; 1982, p. 61.

⁵⁵ Hulnick, Arthur S. "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle." *Intelligence and National Security* 21.6 (2006): 959. Web. September 14, 2010, p. 961.

managers of different collection disciplines are perfectly capable of generating their own intelligence requirements. This is grossly inefficient, however, since it creates intelligence that is of little or no use to the decision-maker or strategist. Furthermore, this intelligence that is of low interest to the primary consumers is being collected or produced at the expense of intelligence that the strategist needs to make a more fully informed decision on a higher priority policy issues. Intelligence must be focused through guidance from the decision-makers so that limited collection and analysis resources are not spread too thin across the myriad potential targets. This is consistent with Clausewitz's writings on the issue of unity of command, and unity of effort.

If guidance does not start from the top and then clearly get communicated down to all other levels then work will proceed at divergent or cross purposes.

No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.⁵⁶

The more explicitly the decision-maker defines his guidance, the more the various competing elements within the intelligence community will refer to that guidance as they resolve disputes over potential courses of action in collecting and analyzing intelligence. Good guidance should result in economy of force and proper implementation of mass by focusing all necessary intelligence assets against those of the opponent's target systems that are relevant to achieving

⁵⁶ Clausewitz, p. 579.

the decision-maker's strategic objectives.⁵⁷ Additionally, by clearly defining areas of interest the decision-maker should reduce the amount of irrelevant intelligence that is produced and therefore reduce elements that Clausewitz refers to as the fog and the friction of war.

2.3.3 Knowing your enemy.

Third, *Intelligence does not provide the complete picture necessary for developing grand strategy. Intelligence is vital for understanding the capabilities and (to a lesser extent) the intentions of one's opponent, but it cannot properly inform the decision-maker of his own capabilities.* Grand strategy requires knowledge of a vast array of information. This is not an easy task, and realizing this Jomini notes that the decision-maker need not be a "a man of vast erudition," but instead suggests he needs to be well supported, saying "a well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of organizations."⁵⁸ The majority of this staff will be dedicated to reducing uncertainty regarding the decision-makers own assets, but a portion (the intelligence community) should be dedicated to understanding the enemy.

To properly employ this principle is to embody both conditions of Sun Tzu's adage "know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered."⁵⁹ The information available to the intelligence community is generally insufficient for properly assessing their own country's assets and resources to the degree that other domestic institutions can. Likewise, domestic policy oriented elements of the government are poorly informed to analyze foreign capabilities, and are more susceptible to errors such as "mirror-imaging." Mirror-imaging occurs when "a leader, a high-level group, or even citizenry of one country assume that others are just like them, and thus fail to fully understand the differing motives and incentives that may drive

⁵⁷ Jomini, p.162.

⁵⁸ Jomini, pp. 51-51.

⁵⁹ Sun Tzu, p. 129.

others to behave in different ways.”⁶⁰ Walter Laqueur suggests that U.S. policy mistakes concerning the 1979 Iranian revolution are an example of mirror-imaging.⁶¹ Decision-makers and policy advisors in the U.S. severely underestimated the cultural force of an Islamic-fundamentalist revolution, because it was commonly accepted within the Western world that the days of theocracy were past.⁶² It is vital that a leader develop a full picture by getting the right information from the right sources.

2.3.4 Planning Versus Reacting

The fourth principle is that *grand strategy should never be driven by intelligence*. *Instead, intelligence should inform the policy development process*. Grand strategy must be built around a goal or what Clausewitz terms as an “aim,” and engagements and campaigns are actions within a strategy that are designed to meet that aim.⁶³ Intelligence should influence the means selected to achieve desired ends, and intelligence can be used to refine the aim, but intelligence should never determine the ends—when that occurs you have reaction instead of planned action. Even in a defensive strategy, intelligence might help to determine the best and the most likely alternatives between different possible end-states, but it should not determine strategy.

Some members of Congress in 1956, notably Senator Stuart Symington (D–Missouri), provide an excellent example of policy being driven by intelligence. Symington, a former

⁶⁰ Bar-Joseph, Uri, and Rose McDermott. "The Intelligence Analysis Crisis." *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. Ed. Loch K. Johnson. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University, 2010. 359-374, p. 362.

⁶¹ Laqueur, Walter. *The Uses and Limits of Intelligence*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1993; 1985.

⁶² Although not near the same scope and scale as the role of the Iranian revolution, it is ironic to note that Carter had raised his own religious faith as a central campaign issue, marking a change in the way U.S. presidential candidates approached religious issues. Furthermore, this era of U.S. politics marked the founding of the Religious Right as a political force. Balmer, Randall Herbert. *God in the White House : A History : How Faith Shaped the Presidency from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush*. 1st ed. New York: HarperOne, 2008, pp. 79-107.

⁶³ Clausewitz, p. 177.

Secretary of the Air Force and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, had presidential aspirations of his own and, therefore, would be interested in intelligence that supported a shortcoming in the incumbent presidential administration.⁶⁴ U-2 and SR-71 IMINT provided evidence to show that the Soviets were not capable of deploying an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force that posed a significant threat to the U.S.⁶⁵ This imagery was highly classified and compartmentalized and, therefore, inaccessible to most Air Force analysts.⁶⁶ A leaked intelligence assessment by the U.S. Air Force without benefit of the IMINT suggested that a missile gap existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and this inspired many in Congress, including Senator Symington, to adopt a policy advocating increased ICBM production. The missile gap would go on to become a major election issue for the Democrats in the election of 1960, gaining political capital by raising public concern for U.S. national security. This illustrates why U.S. aims and objectives should be established separate from intelligence reports that can often lead to reactionary policies.

2.3.5 Relevant, but not Politicized

A fifth principal that can be drawn from these grand strategists is that *intelligence must demonstrate salience to the decision-maker but avoid becoming politicized. The intelligence community must produce products that are relevant to the needs and interests of its primary consumers to ensure they do not risk being ignored or abandoned, but assessments must always remain unquestionably objective.* Intelligence that does not demonstrate salience can lose some

⁶⁴ Srodes, James. *Allen Dulles : Master of Spies*. Washington, DC; Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub.; Distributed to the trade by National Book Network, 1999, p. 498.

⁶⁵ Grose, Peter. *Gentleman Spy : The Life of Allen Dulles*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994, pp. 473-474.

⁶⁶ Classifications are broad categories of access based upon a security clearance, however, further compartmentalization of a program limits access based upon a strict “need to know.” Lowenthal p. 116.

of its influence in the politically-charged policy arena. During the observe and orient phases of a senior decision-maker's OODA Loop there are a wealth of competing interests vying for his attention. Both Kent and Kendall recognized this, but their solutions create the opposing sides of that debate. Kent sums up the essence of this principle when he states "intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgment."⁶⁷ If this standard is properly adhered to, it should avoid the greatest concern of Kendall who feared that a strict separation from the policy process would result in "intelligence reports that *never, never* take cognizance of United States policies alternative to the ones actual [*sic*] in effect."⁶⁸

Politicized intelligence has played an influential role in some of the United States' most controversial military actions. The use of a German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) HUMINT source known as Curve Ball as part of the case for going to war in Iraq in 2003 will be discussed in a later case-study (see Chapter 7).⁶⁹ An even more egregious case helped to justify the Vietnam war. In 1964 the NSA delivered President Johnson a raw SIGINT intercept of a North Vietnamese naval communiqué that read: "SACRIFICED TWO SHIPS AND ALL THE REST ARE OKAY."⁷⁰ This, if accurate, could have been evidence of a second attack of U.S. naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. The incident, and the intelligence that corroborated it, were used to justify the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in Congress, that gave President Johnson a virtual blank-check for waging war in Southeast Asia.⁷¹ The issue of politicization arises because:

⁶⁷ Davis, p. 93.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 96.

⁶⁹ Tenet, p. 375.

⁷⁰ Weiner, p. 242.

⁷¹ Rudalevige, Andrew. *The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power After Watergate*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005, pp. 76-77.

upon review [by NSA] the message actually read: “WE SACRIFICED TWO COMRADES BUT ALL ARE BRAVE.” The message must have been composed either immediately before or at the moment when the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy* opened fire on August 4. It was not about what happened that night. It was about the first clash, two nights earlier, on August 2.⁷²

The decision by the NSA not to rectify this situation once they had improperly translated the communiqué might be considered a sin of omission, but the NSA’s own internal review of the incident released in 2005 implicated intelligence officers in a cover-up, “a conscious effort ensued to demonstrate that the attack occurred... an active effort to make the SIGINT fit the claim of what happened during the evening of 4 August in the Gulf of Tonkin.”⁷³ Further, the report stated that intelligence “was deliberately skewed to support the notion that there had been an attack” and that they had “rationalized the contradictory evidence away.”⁷⁴ The real penalty for politicizing intelligence is far more than the reputation of the intelligence community, or even the construction of faulty policy, it is the lives of Americans who serve their country.

2.4 Application of the Principles of Intelligence in Grand Strategy

Collectively, the five principles of intelligence in grand strategy above provide a theory of intelligence, but theory does not solve the problems encountered by the intelligence community or the decision-maker.

“Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to

⁷² Weiner, p. 242.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 242-243.

educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield.”⁷⁵

The five principles are not the tools of this research, but they are the basic pillars upon which are constructed the tools necessary to assess the decision-maker/intelligence community relationship. The five principles derived from our study of the classic theorists must be used to construct tools to evaluate the processes within the current structures of the executive and legislative branches of government. In this structure, foreign intelligence falls under the direction of the DNI, the formulation of foreign policy and grand strategy largely within the membership of the National Security Council (NSC), and appropriate oversight is the responsibility of the House and Senate committees on foreign affairs and on intelligence. The first and third principles, the vital need for accurate, reliable and timely strategic intelligence and the concert of additional information that is required when constructing grand strategy, are strong points of the NSC. The second principle shows that the two cycles (the OODA Loop and the intelligence process) do not accidentally overlap, but are actually symbiotic. The fourth and fifth points, that intelligence should not determine strategic goals and that intelligence must maintain relevance to the strategists and policy-makers, are united by the issue of politicization and the relationship between the president and the DCI/DNI. Clearly, each of the aforementioned government entities has an important role in this process.

In *Federalist 23*, Alexander Hamilton asks, “Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as that body to which the guardianship of the public defence, as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided—which, as the center of information,

⁷⁵ Clausewitz, p.141.

will best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten?"⁷⁶ National security is not the sole aim of U.S. grand strategy, but it is a necessary component of any U.S. grand strategy. By 1947 the U.S. grand strategy process had outgrown President Truman's Cabinet, which, while well informed, was too large a group and represented too many diverse interests.⁷⁷ Thus the NSC was created as part of the National Security Act of 1947. The long-standing tradition of including the Secretary of the Treasury, begun by Truman in 1949, meant that this body combined the senior policy-makers for the traditional forms of hard power (economics and military power) and the nation's chief diplomat, the Secretary of State.⁷⁸ Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu all outlined a requirement for strategic intelligence in developing strategy, and mirroring this need, the leader of the intelligence community is one of the two statutory advisors to the NSC.⁷⁹ The NSC also provides an excellent venue for senior strategists to present their requirements to the intelligence community, thereby ensuring they provide direction to this critical arm and that the products returned to them meet their information needs. This relationship, when properly maintained, meets Lowenthal's model of a semi-permeable wall between intelligence producers and consumers and, just as the theorists prescribe, uses intelligence as part of the calculus for grand strategy, not as a force that determines national goals.

Awareness of the dangers of politicization is imperative to meeting the appropriate role of intelligence. As discussed, recent administrations have brought intelligence into a more policy-oriented role and have at times disrupted the intelligence process. In addition to Reagan's

⁷⁶ Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Bantam Classics, 1982, p.114.

⁷⁷ Inderfurth, Karl F., and Loch K. Johnson, eds. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council. New York: Oxford UP, 2004, p. 7.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 26.

⁷⁹ The other advisor formally named is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

decision to make the DCI a Cabinet-level post, President Bill Clinton took the unprecedented step of giving the CIA a diplomatic role in the Mid-East peace process when he placed DCI George Tenet in charge of security aspects of the new Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Tenet was reluctant to assume this role: “This new plan called for taking on a quasi-diplomatic role in what was largely a political process, and initially that struck me as inappropriate for someone in my position.”⁸⁰ As shown by our theorists, this breaks down the assigned roles and corrupts the strategy process. No organizational structure can prevent this from occurring. To the contrary, the Kent-Kendall debate indicates that this is likely to remain a natural hazard. The solution, therefore, is discipline and oversight. Discipline of the kind that Sun Tzu asserts in the role of the general and careful and vigilant oversight of the relationship by Congress.

2.4.1 Judging Intelligence Successes

One important tool for this study is the criteria that will be used to determine whether each dyad is successful in their application of intelligence. The criteria are grounded in the five principles of intelligence in grand strategy. Each criterion is designed to be parsimonious and generalized so that it can be used across any possible dyad. Dyads will differ in the personnel who compose them, the threats they perceive, and alternative courses of action available to them. Personnel changes for the dyads relate to the individuals filling the positions of president and DCI/DNI. Other positions that are exogenous to the dyad such as the Secretary of State or the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs affect the success of intelligence, but their influence is relevant to this study in the manner it helps to shape the president/DCI relationship. Threats to the United States during the existence of the position of DCI/DNI (a time period that runs from 1947 to present day) range from a massive nuclear exchange that

⁸⁰ Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm: The CIA During America's Time of Crisis. New York: Harper Perennial, 2008, p. 55.

wrecks near total devastation upon the U.S., to cyber attacks that cause no physical harm, but could play havoc with the U.S. economy and public utilities such as power and communications. Threats during this period emanated from massive conventional nation-states such as the Soviet Union and from relatively small ethnic or religious-based terrorist organizations. The courses of action available to each dyad varied based upon which international actors the U.S. was interacting with, the accepted international norms of the day, and the resources available to them (to include massive growth in technology throughout the time period in question). Successful intelligence within a dyad will be assessed to have occurred when, on average, it demonstrates five basic qualities: intelligence within the dyad should be accurate, timely, relevant, and actionable—plus it must actually be used.

2.4.1.1 Accuracy

Accuracy, as a measure of intelligence success, is defined in the same manner it was in section 2.3.1 as part of the first principal of intelligence. A dyad shall be assessed as having accurate intelligence based upon the majority of the intelligence that was presented to the president was correct (as opposed to false), and met the necessary level of detail. Accuracy in major issues will be given greater consideration than accuracy in minor issues. Statements by the president concerning his impression of the quality of accuracy of intelligence will be important. Statements at formal functions will be of less value than private remarks or comments in accounts such as memoirs.

2.4.1.2 Timeliness

Timeliness, as a measure of intelligence success, is also defined in the same manner that it was in Section 2.3.1. Timeliness is expected to be influenced in many cases by the degree of freedom of access the DCI has to the president. A DCI with poor access, however, can still

achieve a favorable score in this area if his intelligence still reaches the president in time to properly inform the policy process.

2.4.1.3 Relevance

Intelligence has succeeded in being relevant when it is reporting on areas that policy-makers are concerned with or when it alerts policy-makers to areas that they need to be concerned with. This criterion is developed from the fifth principle of intelligence in grand strategy, which is discussed in section 2.3.5. Lack of relevance in intelligence products can be a symptom of a lack of guidance from the policy-maker, therefore this criterion is dependent upon both members of the dyad. Unlike the previous criteria, certain areas are not given greater weight. Instead, the relevance of all work is equally important, since even if intelligence is accurate and timely, if it does not meet a real or perceived need of policy-maker then it may very well serve as a distraction or hinder the speedy creation of policy by overwhelming the decision-makers.

2.4.1.4 Actionable

Intelligence was defined as being actionable in section 1.3.1 when the decision-maker could do something with it. This is a characteristic that is more prevalent in strategic assessments vice tactical or “current” intelligence. Current intelligence reports are frequently based upon a snapshot in time. Current intelligence assessments might be based upon multiple sources of information, such as a satellite image and a corroborating signals intercept, but are often single source. They frequently fail to reduce the decision-makers level of uncertainty about the opposition’s intention or aim and their degree of commitment to that aim. Strategic assessments, sometimes characterized as “long-range intelligence,” focus on the goals of the opposition, their capability of achieving that goal, and their level of commitment. James J. Wirtz

sets actionable intelligence as being an opposing school of thought to Kent's detachment of the intelligence from policy-making. He states "To produce actionable intelligence, analysts have to maintain close working relationships with policymakers, literally looking into the policymakers' inboxes to make sure finished intelligence addresses important policy issues of the day."⁸¹ This conclusion, however, incorrectly confuses the process of creating the intelligence product with the assessment of whether the finished intelligence can be acted upon which is what this research must assess.

2.4.1.5 Was it Used?

Intelligence can meet all other criteria and still fail if it never sees the light of day outside a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). What the intelligence community knew and when has been the subject of investigations after every intelligence failure. From Pearl Harbor, through 9/11, to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the "Christmas Bomber," investigators have searched for answers to why the right people were not made aware of information regarding the threat. Furthermore, being seen or heard is not sufficient. The 9/11 Commission records that former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke reported in an e-mail on 15 September, 2001 to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other domestic agencies had been made aware of the intelligence community assessment that a major al Qaeda attack was coming, but released no new security directives related to airport security checkpoints or security aboard the aircraft themselves.⁸² Proper warning by the intelligence community is not simply publishing the report, but making sure that the intelligence

⁸¹ Wirtz, James J. "The American Approach to Intelligence Studies." *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*. Ed. Loch K. Johnson. 1st ed. London ; New York: Routledge, 2007. 28-38, p. 34.

⁸² National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. New York: Barnes & Noble Publishing, Inc, 2004, p. 264.

is considered. Ensuring that intelligence has informed the policy process does not require that the intelligence community advocate a specific policy.

2.4.2 Hypotheses

The array of scholarly literature from the fields of intelligence studies, grand strategy, and presidential studies form the foundational knowledge upon which the principles of intelligence in grand strategy were constructed. Using that theory of intelligence, this research then advances three hypotheses. They are designed to describe the causal relationship that key factors of the president/DCI relationship have with the dependent variable of successful intelligence. The three hypotheses are as follows (see Table 2.2).

2.4.2.1 H1

First, *the nature of the personal relationship between the DCI and the president will strongly determine the quality of intelligence report received by the president.* DCIs should be trusted advisors to the president but should not be part of the inner circle for creating policy. A now familiar example of one end of this spectrum is President Reagan and DCI Casey. Casey's position as a member of Reagan's Cabinet facilitated his personal desire to be part of the policy formation process and called into question his willingness provide the type of impartial assessment that intelligence support to grand strategy requires. Reagan acknowledges this in his diary entry concerning the appointment of Casey's successor, William Webster. Reagan states, "[Webster] requested that he not be made a Cab. Member as Dir. of CIA. I'd done that with Bill C. and found out he shouldn't be in the Cabinet so we had no problem with Bill W's request."⁸³ President Richard Nixon and DCI Richard Helms exemplify the other end of the spectrum of president-DCI relationships. In his first post-election

⁸³ Reagan, Ronald W. The Reagan Diaries. Ed. Douglas Brinkley. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Table 2.2 Statement of Hypotheses

Hypotheses
<i>H1</i> - The nature of the personal relationship between the DCI and the president will strongly determine the quality of intelligence report received by the president.
<i>H2</i> - The frequency of interaction between the DCI and the president will have a positive relationship with the quality of intelligence the president receives.
<i>H3</i> - DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives.

meeting with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Nixon “denounced the CIA as a group of ‘Ivy League liberals’ who ‘had always opposed him politically.’”⁸⁴ Helms, as noted by historian Christopher Andrew, “increasingly distrusted the president personally.”⁸⁵ Somewhere between these two extremes exists a position where the DCI is trusted sufficiently to be brought into most major policy discussions, but he can remain professionally bound to comment on policy without taking sides.

2.4.2.2 H2

Second, *the frequency of interaction between the president and the DCI has a positive relationship with the quality of intelligence the president receives.* DCIs with no interaction with the president will not receive sufficient guidance to properly support the president’s intelligence requirements. Further, they may also have difficulty persuading the president of the importance of their warning if they cannot gain access to him when necessary. The extremes of this dynamic are displayed by the relationships that Presidents Truman and Eisenhower had with the National Security Council (NSC), to which the DCI was an advisor. After the inaugural meetings of the NSC, Truman decided “that he would rarely attend.”⁸⁶ His lack of attendance may have helped demonstrate his intent that the NSC not be a policy-making body, but it is also likely to have decreased his preparedness for the onset of the Korean War. Conversely, Eisenhower institutionalized a system that made the NSC, to include the DCI, an integral part of the national security policy process.⁸⁷ Frequent meetings do not, on their own, assure that quality intelligence will be produced, but it increases the likelihood that the DCI, as the leader of the

⁸⁴ Andrew. Page 350.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Page 351.

⁸⁶ Inderfurth and Johnson. Page 27.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* Page 41.

intelligence community, will understand the requirements and interests of the president and have the opportunity to inform the policy process. A lack of interaction between the president and DCI, meanwhile, makes it very difficult for the DCI to interpret the president's intelligence requirements.

2.4.2.3 H3

Finally, despite the most sincere intentions, taking a position in a policy discussion will have the perception, and often the reality, of affecting the intelligence analysis that is produced. Therefore, *DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives.* Such partisan involvement in policy formulation clearly violates Lowenthal's model of a semi-permeable wall, restricting the intelligence community from passing policy recommendations to the intelligence consumer (see Figure 1). DCI Bill Casey clearly crossed the line many times, such as his pressing of President Reagan to support a \$19 million covert operation he had developed to counter the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.⁸⁸ The opposing model is proposed by Sherman Kent who believed in a high degree of separation between intelligence analyst and policy-maker. His recommendation pre-dates but is in harmony with the Lowenthal model for the role of intelligence. Kent believed that "getting too close to policy would undercut the whole purpose of such an effort."⁸⁹ This is also a very fine line to delineate; Henry Kissinger notes "since decisions turn on the perception of the consequences of action, the CIA assessment can almost amount to a policy recommendation."⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Andrew. Page 462.

⁸⁹ Davis. Page 93.

⁹⁰ Kissinger, Henry. *White House Years*. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979, p. 37.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES

For too long the role of strategic intelligence in world affairs has stood in the shadows of traditional research on international relations.¹

Loch K. Johnson

All three hypotheses developed in the previous chapter are united by the idea that individuals make a difference. The construction of an intelligence operational code for each member of four dyads will help us to understand decision-makers through their own words and actions. This chapter will begin by reviewing the four dyads selected for case-study in order to explain the reason for their selection, and the logic behind the order in which they are presented. Next, is a review of the procedure for reviewing each case, which will be guided by the intelligence process. After that, the operational code methodology will be explained. Finally, I will describe how President/DCI relationships will be categorized using the President/DCI relationship matrix.

3.1 Selection and Ordering of Case Studies

The first criterion in selecting cases was to create a sample of dyads that provided diversity among the independent variables. H1 deals with the quality of the relationship between the president and the DCI; therefore, the sample of dyads should include dyads that had both good relationships and poor ones. H2 focuses upon the frequency with which the president and DCI met. Dyads selected for this sample range from daily President/DCI meetings to interaction that occurred both infrequently, and irregularly. H3 concerns whether the DCI advocated policy

¹ Johnson, Loch K. "Sketches for a Theory of Strategic Intelligence." Intelligence Theory: Key Debates and Questions (Studies in Intelligence). New York: Routledge, 2008. 33-53. Page 33.

or only informed the policy process. It is important to emphasize that a DCI could advocate a policy without politicizing intelligence, but he may have difficulty escaping the perception of politicization.

The creation of an intelligence operational code requires a large quantity of material for research. Scholarship available on presidents is usually fairly voluminous; scholarship available for most DCIs is considerably less, and records on the interaction between the two often includes a significant amount of classified material. Therefore, one quality of a dyad that contributes to its usefulness as a case study is the duration of the dyad. An additional quality is the amount of time that has passed since that dyad has ended: the longer it has been since the completion of that dyad, the greater the opportunity the official material has been declassified and released to the public.

My primary research materials are memoirs, speeches, transcripts of meetings, and other first-hand accounts. Secondly, I have relied upon scholarly biographies, and the literature of the field of intelligence studies, national security, presidential studies, U.S. History, and other related fields. Three out of four of the presidents in the dyads selected have written their memoirs, and personal diary entries for two out of four presidents have also been published. Two out of four DCIs from the selected dyads have also published their memoirs, and a detailed, scholarly biography exists on the third. Additionally, as mentioned in the literature review, the works of Christopher Andrew and Stansfield Turner provided an excellent starting point for both members of each of the dyads.

3.1.1 Case Study I: President Carter and DCI Turner

The Carter/Turner dyad serves as an excellent starting point for this research. Carter had clearly indicated a high level of interest in the intelligence community during his presidential

campaign. Furthermore, he set new precedent by removing the incumbent DCI, George H. W. Bush, and selecting Turner as his hand-picked leader to accomplish his goals within the intelligence community. In fact, the Carter/Turner dyad is one of only two that covers virtually an entire presidential administration.² Additionally, there are numerous significant events that occurred during this dyad that assist in our ability to assess and develop the intelligence operational code of both members and to assess the overall level of intelligent success (*exempli gratia*, negotiating the SALT II treaty, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the overthrow of the Shah in Iran).

Carter and Turner's memoirs both depict Turner as initially reluctant, but ultimately willing appointee to a position for which Carter had big plans. Carter understood from the outset, that he had laid a difficult road for Turner to follow. In a March 9, 1977 diary entry, Carter records "I think they're going to resent Stan Turner's strength and also my own inclination that Stan be the boss of the nine different agencies that comprise the intelligence community."³ This dyad combines an extended duration with a president who was interested in intelligence and broke tradition to personally select a DCI to, as Carter described, "reorganize completely the confused intelligence community" make the Carter/Turner dyad ideal to be the first case study.⁴

3.1.2 Case Study II: President Reagan and DCI Casey

The selection and prioritization of the Reagan/Casey dyad as the second case study was based upon three factors. First, important similarities exist between this dyad and the Carter/Turner dyad; namely that Casey and Turner were both the first (and in the case of Turner

² The other dyad that last for almost the entire administration was President Dwight Eisenhower and DCI Allen Dulles.

³ Carter, Jimmy, *White House Diary*. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010, p.32.

⁴ *Ibid.*

the only) appointment each president made to the position and they were of lengthy durations. The mean duration of a president/DCI dyad is 762 days, the Carter/Turner dyad was the fourth longest lasting 1,414 days and the Reagan/Casey dyad was the second longest lasting 2,193 days (See Appendix B). The longevity of the dyad assists in developing an accurate intelligence operational code for both Reagan and Casey.

Second, there are important differences between the ways the role of the DCI was envisioned that serve to contrast two distinct types of president/DCI relationship. President Carter envisioned the DCI as the manager of the entire intelligence community, but he never intended for the DCI to serve in a policymaking role and, in fact, Turner was often excluded from policymaking sessions. Casey was never as concerned about his role as manager of the intelligence community, but he was given Cabinet-level status and has even been accused of running his own foreign-policy as if serving as a shadow Secretary of State.⁵

Third, since the DCI's role was so significantly and philosophically altered between two chronologically adjacent dyads, there is merit in reviewing the cases in that order. For example, the intelligence community leadership battled Turner, who was viewed as an outsider, as he attempted to expand the DCI's span of control. Casey, conversely, was seen as more of one of their own by the CIA, and did little to challenge the autonomy of the other intelligence agencies. Because the Carter/Turner and Reagan/Casey dyads are chronologically adjacent but philosophically distant, they should serve as excellent examples for demonstrating and evaluating two key types of President/DCI relationships.

⁵ Persico, Joseph E. *Casey : From the OSS to the CIA*. New York: Penguin Books, 1991; 1990, p. 414.

3.1.3 Case Study III: President Kennedy and DCI McCone

The Kennedy/McCone dyad is the shortest in duration of the four being studied, but at 724 days it is very close to the median. Kennedy helped to establish the tradition of keeping the DCI beyond the typical political spoils by retaining Eisenhower's DCI, Allen Dulles, but after the debacle at the Bay of Pigs, Dulles was asked to resign.⁶ The Kennedy/McCone dyad is also the only one of the four being studied in which neither the president nor the DCI have published memoirs. This dyad also includes, however, one of the most thoroughly researched events in U.S. history - the Cuban Missile Crisis. This single event provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the interaction between president and DCI, since the transcripts of the NSC and EXCOMM meetings during that event have been declassified and released.

McCone's appointment had a political flavor to it (McCone was a prominent conservative Republican and the administration needed such credentials to appear strong in the national security arena) but he also seems to have been a perfect match for the changes that Kennedy wanted to make within the intelligence community.⁷ McCone had no formal intelligence experience, but was a very successful business leader and had strong national security credentials having held positions in the Department of Defense and headed the Atomic Energy Commission for President Dwight Eisenhower.⁸ Kennedy wanted to strengthen the role of the DCI within the intelligence community and McCone was exactly the kind of strong leader to take on that task. Furthermore, McCone's predecessor, Dulles, was an OSS veteran and with a traditional approach

⁶ Andrew, p. 266.

⁷ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 41.

⁸ Helms, Richard, and William Hood. *A Look Over My Shoulder : A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 2003, p. 191.

to intelligence, where as McCone came to the CIA with a desire to “enhance the nation’s capabilities by applying modern science and technology to intelligence.”⁹

This dyad features a mid-term appointment to the position of DCI, therefore, the selection is made after the president has more experience with the intelligence community and after the national security team is already established. At face value, that should mean that the president can make a better selection based upon his personal experience. Additionally, in McCone, Kennedy selected a DCI whose strengths matched well against his primary goal for the intelligence community. The largest negative that the dyad had to overcome was the after effects of the total failure of the Bay of Pigs incident (codenamed Operation ZAPATA). Christopher Andrew records that after that debacle, “Kennedy placed less trust in the intelligence professionals and more in the opinions of his main personal advisors.”¹⁰ The Kennedy/McCone dyad enhances this study by bringing further variety to the types of possible president/DCI relationships.

3.1.4 Case Study IV: President Bush and DCI Tenet

The final case-study is the most recent of those selected. The Bush-Tenet dyad represents the only “holdover” dyad among the four being studied. Tenet was appointed to the position of DCI by President Clinton in 1997 when it was obvious that Anthony Lake was not going to survive the confirmation process.¹¹ Tenet split his seven year tenure evenly between Presidents Clinton and Bush, with the Bush/Tenet dyad lasting the 1268 days (the sixth longest).¹² President George W. Bush elected to retain Tenet in that position after a positive

⁹ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 41.

¹⁰ Andrew, p. 266.

¹¹ Tenet, pp. 3-7.

¹² The Clinton/Tenet dyad lasted 1290 days, the fifth longest of all president/DCI dyads.

interaction with him during the campaign and at the recommendation of his father, President and former DCI George H. W. Bush.¹³

The Bush/Tenet relationship was not the close friendship that Regan/Casey enjoyed, however, Tenet clearly had access to the inner circle of the national security team that Turner did not. One of the primary goals of this case-study will be to determine Tenet's role with regard to policy decisions. Did he inform policy, advocate policy options, or, as some have accused, was the intelligence process so politicized that analysis was skewed to support existing administration policies.¹⁴ Due to the high level of interest in what the intelligence community knew concerning the al Qaeda attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the state of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, an unusual amount of intelligence has been declassified in a relatively short amount of time. Additionally, both members of the dyad and several of the primary actors from the remainder of the national security team have published their memoirs.

Public interest and partisan speculation of politicization aside, this case-study represents an important variant of the president/DCI relationship. As a "hold-over" DCI Tenet should be far less likely to become politicized. Additionally, only in the Carter/Turner dyad do we see the kind of exogenous power to affect intelligence that is exhibited by members of the Bush national security team, particularly what was, at the time, a growing intelligence capability within the Department of Defense.¹⁵

¹³ Bush, George W. *Decision Points*. 1st ed. New York; Enfield: Crown; Publishers Group UK distributor, 2010, p. 84.

¹⁴ Pfiffner, James P., and Mark Phythian. *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq : British and American Perspectives*. 1 North American ed. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008, p. 74.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 32-33.

3.2 The Intelligence Process as a Guide

To gain a better understanding of both members of the dyad it is useful to examine not only how they interact with one another, but how they interact with the greater bureaucracies they represent, the Executive Office of the President and the intelligence community. This can be done by analyzing how the president and the DCI interact with the intelligence community through the different phases of the intelligence process. Using the intelligence process as a guide to president/DCI interaction is also highly relevant to evaluating how much influence the president could hold over the intelligence community. The intelligence process is a cyclic model, which is frequently referred to as the “intelligence cycle” as displayed in Figure 1.1, but not all depictions of the intelligence cycle are the same. The simplest depiction of the intelligence cycle is from the CIA and incorporates five phases: Planning and Direction/Needs, Collection, Processing and Exploitation, Analysis and Production, and Dissemination.¹⁶ Feedback is recognized as being integral to the process, but the CIA does not incorporate it into the model, as do Lowenthal, Hulnick, and other students of the intelligence discipline.¹⁷ The Department of Defense modifies the intelligence cycle model to incorporate evaluation and feedback throughout the process and uses “mission” as the hub of the cycle (Figure 3.1). These are important additions to the model used by the CIA and DNI since, in reality, the cycle does not run in a linear, iterative fashion but is both simultaneous and perpetual. The hub of the wheel will always be related to what are perceived as the greatest national security and foreign policy needs, and these perceived needs will change. During the period of the Carter/Turner dyad, Carter

¹⁶ A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence. Washington DC: Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency. Page 1.

¹⁷ Lowenthal. Page 41.



Figure 3.1 The Department of Defense Intelligence Process¹⁸

¹⁸ Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government, 2007. Web. Page I-7.

asserted human rights as the hub and, of course, the Soviet Union always loomed largely in the forefront of everyone's concerns. During the Bush/Tenet dyad the hub became global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The hub is generally the central pillar of U.S. foreign policy; as such, this issue helps to define both the mission that the cycle revolves around and this, in turn, influences the methods of collection that were used to obtain the required information.

Each case study evaluates the statements and actions of the president through each phase of the intelligence cycle and with regard to covert actions and foreign policy. Next, the lessons learned from this evaluation are used to develop the president's intelligence operational code. After this the procedure is repeated for DCI and the intelligence operational codes of both men are displayed together. These codes are then used to place the dyad on the president and DCI relationship matrix (to be discussed in section 3.4). To understand the effects of each relationship an evaluation of the intelligence success within each dyad is then conducted based upon the criteria established in section 2.4. Finally, the association between the category of president/DCI relationship and level of intelligence success will be reviewed to determine if they support or reject the three hypotheses.

3.3 The Operational Code

The primary methodology used in the qualitative assessments of the presidents (John Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush) and their DCIs (John McCone, Stansfield Turner, William Casey, and George Tenet) will be the development of an intelligence operational code for each. This operational code establishes parameters that define the expected

decision process of the subject.¹⁹ Specifically, the code is designed to reflect the views and philosophies of the subjects during their time of service. Understanding the subjects' views and philosophies provides insight into their "'fundamental assumptions' about the nature of politics."²⁰ Understanding these assumptions about the rules and principles that do, or are perceived to, govern domestic and international politics will facilitate the evaluation of the relationship between the president and the DCI. Various aspects of the code are determined by the individual's history, their public statements, and the statements of those who worked with them and observed them during the time in question. Public statements and writings from after their term in office are evaluated with discernment since they may not have reflected the individual's actual views during their tenure in office. Additionally, the code encompasses diverse aspects of the subjects' philosophical outlooks. The factors within the code are listed in Table 3.1 and are broken into four general fields: 1) intelligence oversight; 2) intelligence community organization and leadership; 3) intelligence community operations as a function of U.S. foreign policy, and 4) the nature of politics and historical developments. Each of the four fields has two specified areas that it examines. These areas are defined by a broader philosophical question and then one or two more specific instrumental questions serve to focus the evaluation.

3.3.1 Intelligence Oversight

The first general area within the operational code is intelligence oversight. This deals with matters of accountability by the intelligence community to the executive and legislative branches of government. Executive orders and formal legislation both play a critical role in

¹⁹ Hermann, Margaret G., and Thomas W. Milburn, eds. Psychological Examination of Political Leaders. New York: Free P, 1977. Page 81.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

Table 3.1 Operational Code Factors

Intelligence Oversight
<p>1. <i>The Executive Role in Oversight</i></p> <p>Philosophical: Should the intelligence community conduct operations based on their perceptions of the desires of the president (providing him with plausible deniability), or only on his explicit direction?</p> <p>Instrumental: Should the president be fully informed of the nature of all intelligence community operations?</p> <p>Instrumental: The president must be explicit in his guidance.</p>
<p>2. <i>The Legislative Role in Oversight</i></p> <p>Philosophical: When and to what degree should Congress be informed of intelligence activities? Which members of Congress should be informed?</p> <p>Instrumental: What portion, if any, of Congress should be briefed on covert operations prior to the commencement of operations?</p>
Intelligence Community Organization and Leadership
<p>3. <i>Role of the DCI</i></p> <p>Philosophical: Does the Intelligence Community require strong central management, or does having multiple, competing sources of intelligence provide better support to the president?</p> <p>Instrumental: Does the president support operational and budgetary authority for the DCI/DNI over the entire intelligence community?</p>
<p>4. <i>Role of the Intelligence Community in Developing Policy</i></p> <p>Philosophical: Should policy relevance be sacrificed to retain professional objectivity?</p> <p>Instrumental: Should intelligence analysts advocate a policy position versus informing policy-makers while remaining policy neutral?</p>

Intelligence Community Operations as a Function of U.S. Foreign Policy

5. Morality of Intelligence Operations

Philosophical: Are there limits within which the U.S. Intelligence Community must operate when gathering foreign intelligence outside the United States?

Instrumental: Is there an emphasis on technical intelligence solutions to avoid the complications and potential immoralities of human intelligence collection?

Instrumental: Can the intelligence community conduct business with people known to have violated human rights in order to ascertain intelligence?

6. Role of Covert Actions in Achieving Foreign Policy Goals

Philosophical: Can covert actions serve as a valid means to achieve desired U.S. policy goals?

Instrumental: Are covert actions used as preferred option of implementing foreign policy or as first aid on failing foreign policies?

Nature of Politics and Historical Developments

7. Politics

Philosophical: Does harmony or conflict characterize the political universe?

Instrumental: What is the best approach for selecting political goals (moralist-ideological versus pragmatic-problem solving)?

8. Opponents and Allies

Philosophical: What is the fundamental nature of one's opponent's character (zero-sum versus cooperative bargaining)? What is the fundamental character of one's allies (*Id Est*, is collective action vital or should one pursue goals autonomously?)?

Instrumental: What is the best way to deal with opponents and allies? Should one emphasize foreign affairs or domestic affairs when determining goal-selection priorities?

developing this assessment. Most important is the attitude of the president and DCI towards the idea of oversight.

3.3.1.1 The Executive Role in Oversight

In Federalist 64, John Jay recognized the need of the executive to manage intelligence, with regard to foreign policy. He foresaw that some information might not be confided to the entire Senate, even though the Senate was vested with the power to advise and consent on foreign treaties. He therefore states that the president “will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest.”¹ Can it be assumed that with the ability comes the responsibility to provide oversight of the actions of the intelligence community? The majority of the intelligence community serves the president as members of the functional staff of his primary advisors. Prior to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the DCI himself, and the CIA as an organization were unique, in that they were the only intelligence agency that reported directly to the president. Today, the CIA remains outside any cabinet level department of the executive branch, but must submit to the community management of the DNI. This factor of the operational code deals with the degree of detail and control the executive should exercise in tasking the intelligence community and ensuring that their operations do not exceed any direction or mandate they have been given. Specifically, should the intelligence community conduct operations based on their perceptions of the desires of the president (providing him with plausible deniability), or only on his explicit direction? A tangible test for this factor is whether the members of the dyad believe that the president needs to be fully informed of the nature of all intelligence community operations, and whether the president must

¹ Jay, John. "The Federalist no. 64: Jay ." *The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay*. Ed. Garry Wills. Toronto ; New York: Bantam Books, 1788. 325-330, p. 327.

be explicit in his guidance to the intelligence community or if stating a general desired end state is sufficient to authorize operations. The spectrum that the dyad member will be placed on runs from minimal oversight in order to provide the president plausible deniability to one of full executive oversight where the president must not only be aware of all actions, but authorize them in a legal manner.

3.3.1.2 The Legislative Role in Oversight

The Congress has responsibility to exercise oversight, and generally conducts this oversight in association with their responsibility to authorize and fund government programs, but the level of attention that they give to oversight varies and is often dependent upon the level of public interest in a given area. Congressional oversight of intelligence is an area of intelligence studies that David Barrett, Loch Johnson, Frank Smist and others have devoted considerable scholarship towards. The increased attention given this issue since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent U.S. actions has been driven, at least in part, by “growing recognition among the public and legislators that security and intelligence agencies not only protect but can also threaten democracy.”² For this factor the case study will be used to demonstrate when and to what degree the members of the dyad believe that Congress should be informed of intelligence activities and which members of Congress should be informed. A tangible example of this would be, what portion, if any, of Congress do members of the dyad believe should be briefed on covert operations prior to the commencement of operations? The spectrum that the dyad member will be placed on runs from denying Congress access to any information that could damage operations if leaked, to providing Congress a full accounting of intelligence activities.

3.3.2 Intelligence Community Organization and Leadership

² Born, H., Loch K. Johnson, and I. Leigh. *Who's Watching the Spies? : Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability*. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, p. 4.

The second area deals with the organization and leadership of the intelligence community and the role the subject believed the intelligence community should play in the formation of policy. This is a broad area that speaks to both the internal organization of the intelligence community and its external role. These two questions are common themes within the field of intelligence studies and can operate independent from each other; a desire to expand the ability of the DCI to manage the entire intelligence community does not necessarily have an effect on their views of the role of intelligence in the foreign policy process.

3.3.2.1 The Role of the DCI

The philosophical question being pursued in this question is whether the intelligence community requires strong central management, or whether having multiple, competing sources of intelligence provides better support to the president. The role of the DCI as a community manager has swung like a pendulum from the creation of the position in 1947 until it was replaced with the position of DNI in 2004.³ Presidents who desired a stronger community role for the DCI emphasized leadership skills in the qualities of their appointees. The combination of the president's stated desire and a strong DCI has proved to be insufficient to effect change support for a strong role for the DCI. Support must be given in the form of law. DCI Turner's authority was challenged at President Carter's first meeting with the leadership of the intelligence community. Lieutenant General Sam Wilson, USA, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated he was glad to welcome Turner as the "titular head" of the intelligence community and Carter rebuked him saying that his intention "was not to see Turner be a titular head."⁴ Dyads that were committed to increasing the DCI's community role demonstrated this through executive orders and other documents that officially gave the DCI the

³ Based upon the National Security Act of 1947 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

⁴ Carter, White House Diary, p. 32.

president's authority to act. No president has fully wrested control of Department of Defense intelligence assets from the Department of Defense, and even the most committed presidents found themselves swayed in key decisions such as final budget decisions by their Secretary of Defense. A tangible test for this factor is if the president supports operational and budgetary authority for the DCI/DNI over the entire intelligence community. The spectrum each member of a dyad will be placed on for this factor runs from believing in a weak community role for the DCI to advocating true centralized control of the intelligence community.

3.3.2.2 The Role of the Intelligence Community in Developing Policy

This factor is essentially an assessment of the dyad's position in the Kent-Kendall debate that was discussed in section 2.2. The central question is whether some degree of policy relevance would need to be sacrificed to retain professional objectivity? Some dyads took the position that a strict wall was necessary, while other dyads believed that greater interaction between analyst and consumer could increase the relevance of intelligence products without sacrificing objectivity. The test for this factor is whether intelligence analysts should advocate a policy position versus informing policy-makers while remaining policy neutral? The politicization of intelligence is not simply a choice of process, it is something that must be actively guarded against at all times if an analyst desires to avoid advocating policy. Jack Davis elucidates this point, stating "knowledge of what a president or his congressional opposition wants can subtly influence the analytic process, and this accommodation in evaluating incomplete and ambiguous information in part can explain estimative malfunctions by experienced analysts."⁵ The spectrum for this function of the code runs from the unabashed

⁵ Davis, Jack, "Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts." *Analyzing Intelligence : Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*. Eds. Roger Z. George, James B. Bruce, and Georgetown

policy advocate to the belief that the intelligence analysis process must always be policy neutral, both in perception and in fact.

3.3.3 Intelligence Community Operations as a Function of U.S. Foreign Policy

The third area centers on how the intelligence community operates as part of the greater foreign policy team. This includes both the methods of intelligence collection employed by the community and the role covert actions were assigned in meeting foreign policy goals. This area moves beyond the procedural role of intelligence in foreign policy that is assessed in the previous section. This section addresses not the efficacy, but the ethics of employing the intelligence community in matters of foreign policy.

3.3.3.1 The Morality of Intelligence Operations

Are there limits within which the U.S. intelligence community must operate when gathering foreign intelligence outside the United States? The Carter administration provides an excellent example of a president who was a ravenous consumer of information, but was uncomfortable with some of the means used to gather the information. Why did the Carter administration view the increasing abilities of technical intelligence collection methods with great approval?⁶ These TECHINT sources afforded an administration that had declared its dedication to human rights with an opportunity to eschew what they viewed as some of the more distasteful aspects of HUMINT.⁷ Determining if there is an emphasis on technical intelligence solutions to avoid the complications and potential immoralities of human intelligence collection can assess this factor of the operational code. An additional check would be whether the intelligence community conducts business with people known to have violated human rights in

University. Center for Peace and Security Studies. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, 2008. 157-170, p. 157.

⁶ Andrew, p. 429.

⁷ Helgerson, p. 118.

order to ascertain intelligence. The spectrum for this factor runs from total freedom of operations for those collecting foreign intelligence to the prioritization of human rights in all cases placing heavy restrictions upon those gathering intelligence.

3.3.3.2 The Role of Covert Operations in Achieving Foreign Policy

Can covert operations serve as a valid means to achieve desired U.S. policy goals? If the acceptability of certain methods of intelligence collection were troublesome for some dyads, the role of covert actions was even more so for some; yet for others they offered a middle road.

President Richard Nixon framed the role of covert actions in this way:

Overt economic or military aid is sometimes enough to achieve our goals. Only a direct military intervention can do so in others. But between the two lives a vast area where the United States must be able to undertake covert actions. Without this capability, we will be unable to protect important U.S. interests.⁸

An examination of a dyad should reveal if covert actions were used as a preferred method of implementing foreign policy or as first aid on failing foreign policies. This factor, in some cases, changed over the course of a dyad as the president became more familiar with the costs and benefits of covert actions and as he experienced more foreign policy challenges. The spectrum for this dyad runs from believing that covert actions are unacceptable and interfere with the diplomatic process, to believing that covert actions are an acceptable tool in U.S. diplomacy.

3.3.4 Nature of Politics and Historical Developments

The fourth and final area assesses the individual's overall philosophy of how the international system works. This section draws directly from the questions used by Professor

⁸ Daugherty, William J. *Executive Secrets : Covert Action and the Presidency*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006; 2004, p. 9.

Loch Johnson in the operational code he constructed in his analysis of Senator Frank Church.⁹ Although these questions are less specific to intelligence issues than political issues, they are highly instructive about assessing the character of an individual and about factors that affect the President/DCI relationship.

3.3.4.1 The Nature of Politics

Gathering and exchanging information can be a highly politicized process, particularly at the level of the president's foreign policy team. An individual's outlook and expectation regarding the process should affect the relationship they have with others involved in the process. Does harmony or conflict characterize the political universe? To assess this for an individual in the dyad one can examine what the subject believes is the best approach for selecting political goals (moralist-ideological versus pragmatic-problem solving)? The spectrum for this factor ranges from the nature of politics being one of conflict to being one of harmony.

3.3.4.2 Opponents and Allies

What is the fundamental nature of one's opponent's character (zero-sum versus cooperative bargaining)? What is the fundamental character of one's allies (*Id Est*, is collective action vital or should one pursue goals autonomously)? These questions are important to the internal process of creating foreign policy, and the external issue of conducting foreign policy. Considering what the members of the dyad believe is the best way to deal with opponents and allies applies to dealings with nation-states and other federal agencies/departments or other branches of government. Furthermore, do the members of the dyad believe that one should emphasize foreign affairs or domestic affairs when determining goal-selection priorities? The

⁹ Johnson, Loch K. "Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behavior: Senator Frank Church at Midcareer." Psychological Examination of Political Leaders. New York: Free P, 1977. 80-119. Pages 87-88.

spectrum for this factor ranges from approaching bargaining situations with an attitude of collective bargaining to assuming that the interaction will be a zero-sum game.

3.4 Categorizing the President/DCI Relationship

Once a case study has been completed and intelligence operational codes have been developed, the dyad can be categorized as following one of four general models for the president/DCI relationship. These four models are broad categorizations, not tailored descriptions. These categories are useful for understanding the nature of the relationship and will later be used to demonstrate what type of dyad is more likely to produce successful intelligence. The horizontal axis is a spectrum of how frequently and under what conditions the president and DCI met. A poor relationship is characterized at one end of the spectrum by a president that met infrequently or only in formal settings. The vertical axis measures whether the DCI follows a Kent-model and only informs policy decisions or whether he takes an active role in the creation of policy. (See Figure 3.2.)

3.4.1 The Professor

A professor meets frequently with his students to impart relevant information. The information that is being presented is intended to prepare the students, but is not intended to advocate certain positions or choices in decisions the student will have to make. Similarly, a dyad in this quadrant of the chart meets regularly, but the DCI passes information to inform policy, but does not attempt to advocate a policy option. This is the ideal type of DCI according to the Lowenthal and Kent models since the DCI has the maximum opportunity to inform policy and provide good guidance and feedback on intelligence products, but he does not cross the line into policy making which could cause intelligence to be perceived as politicized in order to support a preferred policy. Sidney Souers, the DCI for the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) – a

Personal Relationship of President and DCI

Amiable with
Frequent Meetings

Professional with
only Structured Meetings

Professional and Policy
Relationship of President and DCI

Strict Separation from
the Policy Process

Integral to the
Policy Process

<p>Professor</p> <p>Meetings with student come frequently, but the intention is to inform rather than persuade. Material that is presented is relevant to the student and prepares the student, but does not intentionally advocate certain choices.</p>	<p>Librarian</p> <p>Meets with student only occasionally when student has a specific need. Has access to a wide variety of information and provides it without commentary or recommendation.</p>
<p>Coach</p> <p>Meets with student frequently, and intends to both inform and direct plays based upon knowledge of his team and the opponent. Not an impartial observer, but a leading member of the team.</p>	<p>Chaplain</p> <p>Meets with student on a regular but less frequent basis. The chaplain has information to pass on to the student but also wants to convince the student to adopt certain views or policies.</p>

Figure 3.2 President-DCI Relationship Matrix

forerunner of the CIA, had such a relationship with President Harry Truman. “Souers was a Democratic Party stalwart from Missouri, a wealthy businessman who made his money in life insurance and Piggly Wiggly shops.”¹⁰ Souers’ lack of policy advocacy was assisted by the mutually agreed upon short term he would serve in the position and by the troubles he had organizing the community, but he certainly qualifies as someone who had a personnel connection with the White House, but was not attempting to take a personal role in crafting policy.

3.4.2 Librarian

The second kind of relationship is the “Librarian.” In this type of relationship the DCI is a source of information, but they only pass along the information when they are called upon. There is little option for personal contact, and little desire for policy influence; the relationship is one of information support as called upon. A dyad falling in this category is one in which the DCI does not enjoy a close personal relationship with the President. The DCI can not “just pick up the phone” to talk to the president, but instead, his access is strictly controlled by another individual such as the chief of staff or the national security advisor or possibly by the president himself. Additionally, the “Librarian” strictly observes the Lowenthal’s wall separating intelligence and policy-making. The lack of a close personal relationship could be due to animosity between the president and the DCI, it could be the effect of a strict staff structure, or the lack of personal connection could simply be because the president and DCI have no relationship outside of their professional positions.

President Bill Clinton and DCI James Woolsey might typify this type of relationship. Douglas Garthoff, speaking of Woolsey, stated “he did not enjoy a relationship of trust and

¹⁰ Wiener, p. 13.

mutual confidence with the President he served, Bill Clinton.”¹¹ This is an understatement. Clinton had not planned a close relationship with his DCI; Woolsey was selected after only one meeting, the decision was based on both his intellect and the fact that he was sufficiently well-liked by Republicans that it was believed he would not require a difficult and lengthy confirmation process.¹² Not only did Woolsey not influence policy, he was kept at such length from Clinton that when a suicidal pilot flew a Cessna 150 into the White House lawn,¹³ there were jocular rumors that it was Woolsey trying to get in to see the president.¹⁴ This type of relationship decreases the likelihood of the intelligence community being able to influence policy decisions in a negative way by advocating a particular policy position, however, it also decreases their ability to influence policy decisions in a positive way by informing the decision-makers of relevant intelligence and receiving good feedback.

3.4.3 The Coach

The third category is the Coach. A coach meets frequently with his students and intends to both inform them and direct plays based upon his knowledge of his own team and of the opponent. He is not an impartial observer, but a leading member of the team. In this relationship the DCI has the ability to talk with the president whenever he needs to and is an integral part of the foreign policy team. Coaches usually enjoyed a relationship with the president they serve before they assumed office and are able to capitalize upon that pre-existing relationship. William Casey earned Ronald Reagan’s trust as his campaign manager during the

¹¹ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 221.

¹² Turner, Stansfield. *Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence*. New York: Hyperion, 2006, p. 225.

¹³ "Pilot in Crash seen as a Suicide." *The New York Times, The New York Times Archives*. <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/15/us/pilot-in-crash-seen-as-a-suicide.html>, 15 September 1994

¹⁴ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p 226.

1980 presidential campaign; this dyad will be discussed in chapter five. In his biography of DCI Casey, Joseph Persico gives examples of Casey's ability to pick up the phone and talk to President Reagan whenever he needed to.¹⁵ Another candidate for the insider category is DCI Allen Dulles who was able to influence policy with intelligence and implement policy with covert operations. Most important was his access to Eisenhower. Although Eisenhower's national security structure was large and highly organized, it was in small informal meetings with close advisers that important decisions were made.¹⁶ This is where Dulles had his greatest opportunity for influence.

3.4.4 The Chaplain

The most challenging relationship type is the "Chaplain." The chaplain meets with student at regular intervals, but far less frequently than the Professor or the Coach. In many cases it is the student who determines the frequency of the interaction. The chaplain has information to impart, but he also wants to convince the student to adopt a certain point of view or policy. In this type of relationship the DCI does not have access, but he does desire to influence policy, therefore, he must work hard to persuade consumers (particularly the president) on the value of his intelligence products. Intelligence products produced in this dyad will not necessarily be supportive of any policy option preferred by the DCI, the president, or Congress, but the DCI may use relevant products to advocate his preferred policy option. Intelligence reports that run counter to a preferred policy will rarely be well-received, and therefore require at least some degree of salesmanship. Unfortunately for the DCI in "Chaplain" type dyad, he does

¹⁵ Persico, Joseph E. Casey : From the OSS to the CIA. New York: Penguin Books, 1991; 1990.

¹⁶ Greenstein, Fred, and Richard Immerman. "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy." *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*. Eds. Karl Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson. New York: Oxford, 2004. 46-52, p. 47.

not have a close relationship with the president and, therefore, is unlikely to have frequent opportunities to state his case.

3.4.5 Expectations

The expectation would be, therefore, that the level of intelligence success would improve as one moved from right to left on the horizontal axis from Librarian and Chaplain to Professor and Coach, if all other variables were held constant. The vertical scale is more difficult to make a similar prediction on. If all DCIs were equally willing to assert the relevance of intelligence in the foreign policy process, then movement up the vertical axis away from playing an active role in policy making and towards informing policy should improve the level of intelligence success. It is logical to assume, however, that DCIs who are unwilling to advocate particular policy options have a greater possibility of being too removed from the policy process altogether, which would also have a negative effect on intelligence success.

3.5 Grading Intelligence Success

After the intelligence operational code for each dyad has been constructed and the dyad has been placed on the president/DCI Relationship Matrix, the criteria from Section 2.4.1 will be used to assess the level of success for that dyad. Each dyad will receive a grade of poor, acceptable, or good for each of the five criteria and then a summary grade will be given (See Table 3.2). The score defines the dependent variable (success of intelligence in a dyad). The summary score is not an average result. While the five areas assessed for intelligence success can be judged independent of one another, the failure of any one of them could result in a summary score of poor. Rather than viewing the areas of intelligence success as a series of tests from which an average grade can be determined, it is more appropriate to consider each area as a single link in a chain. The chain is only as strong as the weakest link. Accurate, timely,

Table 3.2 Example Table of Dyad's Success in Intelligence

Area of Intelligence Success	Grade
Accuracy	Poor
Timeliness	Acceptable
Relevance	Good
Actionable	Good
Was the Intelligence Used	Poor
Summary Score	Poor


actionable intelligence is a waste of effort if it is not relevant to the decision-maker's needs (See Figure 3.3). Likewise, intelligence can be accurate, delivered at the right time, be relevant and actionable, but if it goes unheeded then it can still result in an intelligence failure for the dyad.

Furthermore, the scores for each area are a composite grade assigned for the entire tenure of the dyad. A score may trend higher or lower over the time period evaluated, but the final score for each area is the evaluation of the overall level of success in that area. Each dyad may vary as to which area carries the greatest weight. When events and issues cause one area to grow or be reduced in significance, the relevant factors will be identified in that case study.

3.6 Evaluating the Hypotheses

The final step in each case study will be to evaluate the three hypotheses put forward in Section 2.4.2, in light of the knowledge gained from the case study. No single case study can validate a hypothesis, but the conclusion of each case study will include an evaluation of whether the evidence from that dyad “advances” or “diminishes” the hypotheses. A third verdict that could be given is that there is “insufficient evidence” to make a determination about one of the hypotheses. (See Table 3.3) After all four case studies have been completed, Chapter 8 will summarize what we have learned about the hypotheses.

INTELLIGENCE SUCCESS



INTELLIGENCE FAILURE



Figure 3.3 Chain Model of Intelligence Success

Table 3.3 Example Table of Hypotheses Evaluation

Hypothesis	Verdict of Evidence from the Dyad
H1 - The Nature of the President/DCI Relationship	Supports
H2 - The Frequency of President/DCI Interaction	Supports
H3 - The DCI Advocates Particular Policy Options	Insufficient Evidence

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY: PRESIDENT CARTER AND DCI TURNER

*It is essential that I and those who aid me in the formulation of our Nation's foreign policy make our decisions on the basis of accurate information about the capabilities and intentions of other countries and of forces that shape world events.*¹

President Jimmy Carter

I've seen at first hand in a very vivid way the deep hurt that has come to this country in the aftermath of Vietnam and Cambodia, Chile and Pakistan, and Angola and Watergate, the CIA revelations."²

President Jimmy Carter

In the selection and ordering of case studies, the Carter-Turner dyad stands out as a case with tremendous face value as being a productive relationship. President Carter clearly indicated his interest in the CIA during his presidential campaign. In Turner, Carter selected a college classmate as the DCI who shared his strong convictions in the importance of human rights and truth. The Carter-Turner dyad is the fourth longest dyad (measured in days, see Appendix B) and is also one of the only ones to last for an entire presidential administration. For these reasons one could assume considerable positive interaction between the president and the DCI. The Carter-Turner dyad, however, is also known for significant intelligence failures on the issues of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Also highly relevant to this case study is the unique perspective that Carter brought to foreign policy; "as a born-again Christian, Carter saw a link between his own religious beliefs and upholding human rights

¹ "Our First Line of Defense," p. 44.

² "CPD: 1976 Debate Transcript." Commission on Presidential Debates. 29 Oct. 2009
<<http://www.debates.org/pages/trans76b.html>>.

around the world.”³ While all three of the other presidents I will study were outspoken in one manner or another with regard to their Christian faith, it is a very relevant aspect of the Carter/Turner dyad because Carter himself set forth his religious convictions as his guiding principle in the foreign policy realm. This chapter will develop an intelligence operational code for both Carter and Turner and assess the level of intelligence success for this dyad. Additionally, this case study will establish the pattern for the three subsequent case studies.

4.1 President James E. Carter (39th President, 1977-1980)

The man from Plains, Georgia, came to the White House after one of the darkest eras in the history of the intelligence community. The Church and Pike Committees marked a low point in the history of the intelligence community for many, but the establishment of permanent legislative oversight is evidence that the incidents brought about some positive change. It would be up to the new president to institutionalize these changes within the executive branch. To examine the president-DCI relationship during the Carter Administration, I begin by looking at Carter’s initial interactions with the intelligence community. These first interactions give important glimpses into Carter’s beliefs and prejudices concerning intelligence. Next, I examine Carter’s interaction with the intelligence community using the intelligence cycle as a model. By examining Carter’s actions and statements concerning intelligence using the intelligence cycle, we can consider his attitudes and behaviors over his entire administration concerning specific areas and missions of the community. Next, I examine Carter’s overall attitude towards politics and foreign policy before discussing the operational code that I developed based upon this research. Having completed an in-depth look at Carter, I then use the same technique to develop an intelligence operational code for Turner. Finally, the dyad is assessed for placement on the

³ Kaufman, Scott. *Plans Unraveled : The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008, p. 13.

president-DCI relationship matrix (Figure 3.1) and to evaluate the intelligence success of the dyad.

4.1.1 Carter's Early Dealings with the Intelligence Community

The ascendancy of Jimmy Carter to the presidency came amid a variety of factors that were new to a U.S. presidential race. The openness with which Carter discussed the centrality of a personal relationship with Jesus Christ and his faith brought the evangelical lexicon to the forefront of the race to the White House. Carter described his Baptist faith as being “at the core of my existence.”⁴ This core, therefore, is important for Carter in the development of foreign policy goals and the means by which he would attempt to attain these goals. Carter’s faith, however, was not the only recurring theme to his campaign.

Four policy shortfalls were mentioned repeatedly through the campaign, and always together: Vietnam, Cambodia, Watergate, and the actions of the CIA. Notably, popular belief was that the CIA was not only one of the four, but bore some degree of responsibility in the other three. These issues, his campaign espoused, constituted a national black eye, a scourge that needed to be addressed by a man of integrity, a man who was untainted by the sins of the previous administrations. Carter promoted himself and his platform of human rights as the answer to these national disgraces.⁵ As a result of this strong campaign rhetoric, Robert Gates (DCI 1991-1993) described a popular sentiment within the CIA that held that Carter was “suspicious and distrustful of the CIA.”⁶ He and his administration were viewed by many at the Agency as having “campaigned against the CIA, and accepting at face value allegations of

⁴ Carter, Jimmy. *Personal Beliefs of Jimmy Carter*. New York: Three Rivers P, 2002, p. 16.

⁵ Stuckey, Mary E. *Jimmy Carter: Human Rights, and the National Agenda*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M UP, 2008, p. 53.

⁶ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, p. 136.

‘CIA’s role in plotting murder and other crimes.’”⁷ The CIA’s first direct dealings with Carter provided many indicators of the relationship he would forge with the intelligence community.

In June of 1976 presidential candidate Jimmy Carter requested intelligence briefings. This was notable to those in the intelligence community because, while the CIA had been briefing presidential candidates since 1952, it was the first time a candidate had requested access to such information before gaining his party’s nomination.⁸ This could be seen as an early indicator of the value that Carter placed on intelligence products or as a means of scrutinizing an intelligence community that he planned to rein in. A series of briefings took place at Carter’s home in Plains, Georgia, with the first occurring on 28 July 1976. Although Carter had refused to speculate publicly on whether he would retain George H. W. Bush as DCI, he did not drift far from his campaign rhetoric of sweeping change from politics as usual. Bush’s appointment as DCI had been widely decried as a political appointment since he had little to no intelligence experience but had significant political credentials as the former chairman of the Republican National Committee. Turner, in his book *Burn Before Reading*, advances the theory that Bush was given the job to keep him out of the elections since Ford’s chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld “saw Bush a rival for either the Republican nomination for the vice presidency or the presidency.”⁹ On the day before the first CIA briefing, Carter told the media that “his choice for CIA head would be a person ‘with stature with the American people, whose integrity was beyond doubt and with some analytic ability.’”¹⁰ This made Carter’s initial nomination of Theodore

⁷ Gates, p. 136.

⁸ Helgerson, John Lebens. *Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1992*. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996, p. 105.

⁹ Turner, Stansfield. *Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence*. New York: Hyperion, 2006, p. 154.

¹⁰ Helgerson, p.108.

Sorenson as the DCI a puzzling choice, since Sorenson played a very political role within the administration of President John F. Kennedy.

After those early meetings, Carter was described by the CIA analysts who briefed him as being a “very careful and interested listener and an active participant during these briefings.”¹¹ His greatest interests lay in matters of Soviet strategic capabilities, and the level of detail with which Carter questioned the briefers led DCI Bush to bring eight additional analysts with him for the second session on 12 August 1976.¹² Carter also displayed considerable interest in the more technological forms of intelligence collection. Although the briefings proceeded with great interest on the part of Carter and his staff, the reality of politics was not abandoned. When the CIA analysts were given a tour of Carter’s campaign headquarters preceding the second briefing, Jimmy Carter’s mother, Lillian Carter, exclaimed to the visiting CIA analysts that “Jimmy was going to clear the government of all vestiges of Republicans, including CIA Director Bush.”¹³ Clearly, politics would be an issue in Carter’s approach to the CIA.

There is no evidence that Carter politicized the substantive information he was provided in those intelligence briefings, but the CIA remained a campaign issue for him. During the 23 September debate in Philadelphia, Carter criticized that “There has been too much government secrecy and not uh - not enough respect for the personal privacy of American citizens.”¹⁴ In the 6 October presidential debate held in San Francisco, the only debate to focus specifically on foreign affairs and national security issues, Carter mentioned the CIA twice, including the statement “I’ve traveled the past 21 months among the people of this country. I’ve talked to

¹¹ Helgerson, p.108..

¹² *Ibid*, p. 110.

¹³ *Ibid*.

¹⁴ "CPD: 1976 Debate Transcript." Commission on Presidential Debates. 29 Oct. 2009
<<http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=september-23-1976-debate-transcript> >.

them and I've listened. And I've seen at first hand in a very vivid way the deep hurt that's come to this country in the aftermath of Vietnam and Cambodia, Chile, and Pakistan, and Angola, and Watergate, CIA revelations."¹⁵ The CIA was to remain a campaign issue for Carter throughout the 1976 elections, even after Carter received unprecedented support from the Agency and after Mondale (who served on the Church Committee) provided Carter and Bush his unsolicited opinion that the "CIA had reformed itself completely over the last two years," a metamorphosis which he found to be remarkable.¹⁶

Two key aspects of this time period are indicative of the relationship that Carter continued to have with the intelligence community – his adverseness to certain intelligence tactics, and his insatiable appetite for detailed information. When, after the elections, DCI Bush briefed then President-elect Carter on several of the more sensitive CIA programs, he was surprised by the lack of comments and questions he received and noted that Carter "seemed a little impatient, he didn't say much but seemed to be a little turned off. He tended to moralize."¹⁷ The accuracy of Bush's assessment is borne out by Carter's ordering the end of some of those programs immediately after taking office. While Bush did recall Carter as "all concentration, soaking up data," he said that Carter always kept his guard up and that he felt "that beneath his surface cool, he harbored a deep antipathy to the CIA."¹⁸ During Carter's period as President-elect, the intelligence community began to customize the *President's Daily Brief* for him. Changes made to suit Carter's information style included more background information, more biographical information on world leaders, and wider margins in which he wrote notes to both

¹⁵ "CPD: 1976 Debate Transcript." Commission on Presidential Debates. 29 Oct. 2009
<<http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-6-1976-debate-transcript>>.

¹⁶ Helgerson, p. 111.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 117-118.

¹⁸ Andrew, p. 426.

the intelligence analysts and to members of the National Security Council (NSC) staff.¹⁹ These changes show the high level of interest Carter had in intelligence analysis, particularly when it provided insight into how to deal with foreign leaders. Furthermore, through margin notes and other forms of feedback Carter was actively involved in guiding the intelligence community by identifying items of interest, tailoring the analysis of intelligence through discussion with the analysts, and the format of the distributed finished intelligence product. These were not the only things we can observe from Carter's first interaction with the intelligence community.

Carter's first meeting with Admiral Turner is also informative as to the attention that Carter gave the intelligence community and on his desire to effect change in that community. Although Carter had little previous interaction with the intelligence community as the governor of Georgia, he displayed a detailed understanding of the role the DCI played in organizing the community. Carter also demonstrated an understanding of the inherent conflict that the DCI endured due to a lack of authority to back up his community management responsibilities. When Turner, also a newcomer to the intelligence community, raised concerns about whether the DCI was truly invested with sufficient power to effect the necessary changes, Carter replied, "if that proves to be the case, I will change the rules."²⁰ Turner further noted, after his first meeting with the President, "that Jimmy Carter had immersed himself so deeply in studying the role of the DCI showed me how important defining the authority of the DCI was to him."²¹ In summarizing Carter's official remarks made upon the day Turner took the oath of office as DCI, Turner stated

¹⁹ Helgerson, p.123.

²⁰ Turner, Stansfield. *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*. New York, NY: Perennial Library, 1986, p. 18.

²¹ Turner, Stansfield. *Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence*. New York: Hyperion, 2006, p. 159.

that Carter “stressed his commitment to the legality and propriety of intelligence activities.”²²

Carter can be seen throughout his earliest encounters with the intelligence community as a leader who valued intelligence products, but one who was guided by the values from his vaunted Baptist faith that would occasionally run contrary to stereotypical intelligence methods.

4.1.2 The Intelligence Process

The intelligence process (shown in Figure 1.1) will serve as the guide for this case study of the Carter/Turner dyad (as described in section 3.2). While the intelligence process serves as a commonality among all four dyads being examined, each dyad can make certain adaptations. Specifically, in the Carter/Turner dyad a significant portion of the mission or the hub of the wheel (shown in Figure 3.1) was human rights. Such a significant change to the mission affected not only the types of information collected, but the means by which it could be collected and the types of support covert operations that could be conducted.

4.1.2.1 Planning and Direction

The planning and direction phase is the most critical phase in this process. If the decision-maker fails to define his requirements, then it is unlikely that the final intelligence products will be useful to him. Many accounts of the Carter/Turner relationship (including Turner’s own memoirs) point out that the President and DCI met twice a week at the beginning of the Carter Administration. These meetings often became tutorials as Turner explained aspects of the intelligence process.²³ What is less reported is the role that National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski played in managing that relationship. Brzezinski insisted that he alone should present Carter’s morning intelligence briefing. When Turner challenged Brzezinski by pointing out that he (Turner) was the senior intelligence officer for the United States, Brzezinski

²² Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 35.

²³ Andrew, p. 429.

had the daily intelligence briefing removed from the President's schedule and replaced with a national security briefing."²⁴ As time went on, Carter reduced his meetings with Turner to once every two weeks.²⁵ Turner was not to enjoy unfettered access to the president. Equally instructive is the fact that Turner was only once invited to attend the important breakfast meetings with the other key members of the NSC.²⁶ This led Robert Gates to describe the Carter/Turner relationship as "curious and ambivalent."²⁷ Furthermore, according to Brzezinski, Turner was never given the opportunity to meet with President Carter without the National Security Advisor being present. According to Brzezinski, during the Carter administration, "the CIA was effectively supervised by the NSC."²⁸

4.1.2.2 Collection

In an incredible piece of irony, on the first full day of the Carter Administration, acting DCI Henry Knoche delivered the first pictures taken by the new KH-11 satellite (then code-named Kennan).²⁹ Satellite-based imagery intelligence (IMINT) was a primary tool for observing denied areas. Much of the United States' ability to guarantee Soviet compliance with strategic agreements was based upon space-based IMINT. The problem, however, was that while IMINT acquired by air-breathing systems such as the U-2 were available for exploitation immediately after the mission was flown, satellite imagery had a potentially significant delay before the processing and exploitation phase could begin. When a roll of film was completed, a

²⁴ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1985, p. 64.

²⁵ Andrew, p. 430.

²⁶ Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, pp. 68-69.

²⁷ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*. Page 141. Gates goes on to describe both the high praise Carter heaped upon Turner and Carter's continued decisions to exclude Turner from important meetings.

²⁸ Andrew, p. 430.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 427.

bucket with the film in it had to be ejected from the satellite, deorbited, collected by an aircraft during re-entry, and then finally developed and analyzed. The system allowed the U.S. to see places it otherwise could not go, but it was not timely. KH-11 satellites revolutionized this process by taking an electro-optical picture that could be digitally downloaded to a ground station. This meant that IMINT could be viewed in real-time and the satellite would not be limited by the amount of film it carried.³⁰ Today IMINT is merged with cartographic products and other layers of geospatial information and is designated as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). New IMINT technology combined with new innovations in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) arena were very impressive to Carter and Turner and presented them a method of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collection far less sordid than many aspects of HUMINT missions. According to historian Christopher Andrew, both Carter and Turner “regarded what Turner called ‘the traditional human spy’ as largely outmoded.”³¹ TECHINT provided a cleaner means by which intelligence could be collected without old-fashioned cloak-and-dagger methods.

Turner remains sensitive to accusations of favoring technical means too heavily over HUMINT. Robert Gates described the non-technical side of the CIA at the end of the Carter administration as being in poor condition. “Our paramilitary capability was clinically dead. What covert action we did carry out was super-cautious and lacked any imagination.”³² In response to my interview question about a preference for TECHINT over HUMINT, however, Turner stated:

³⁰ "KH-11 KENNAN." [GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information](http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/kh-11.htm). 24 Apr. 2007. 30 Oct. 2009 <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/kh-11.htm>>.

³¹ Andrew, p. 429.

³² Persico, p. 213.

There was not a significant change in the emphasis on human and technical intelligence under President Carter, as you might suggest, and is often assumed. I believe the only important changes were greater emphasis on ensuring that the rewards from each type of intelligence gathering were worth the risks involved and the growth of technical collection capabilities, *exempli gratia*, more types of satellite sensors with greater capabilities.³³

Regardless of whether the overall ratio of TECHINT to HUMINT collection was substantially altered, or simply brought into balance with new technologies, the innovations within the technical means of collections were useful in offsetting the loss of HUMINT collection programs such as those that DCI Bush had briefed him on and which were subsequently terminated at the beginning of the Carter Administration.³⁴

4.1.2.3 Processing and Exploitation

The processing and exploitation of intelligence is described in *A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence* as "conversion of large amounts of data to a form suitable for the production of finished intelligence."³⁵ This part of the process has become increasingly susceptible to interference, as technology has permitted real-time data to be presented to decision-makers. In 1976, however, there were considerably fewer opportunities for a decision-maker, to include the President, to interject himself. During the Carter Administration, this phase of the intelligence cycle was, therefore, more impervious to politicization than other phases. Carter's greatest influence on this phase of the process was to give the DCI greater power to control the entire intelligence community. This power was greater than any previous DCI had possessed, but it

³³ Turner, Stansfield. "Turner Interview - Author's interview with former DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner." E-mail interview. 27 July 2009.

³⁴ Helgerson, p. 118.

³⁵ *A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence*, p. 1.

was still far short of what was necessary to manage those portions of the intelligence community that resided within the Department of Defense.

4.1.2.4 Analysis and Production

The Analysis and Production phase is potentially more vulnerable to politicization than any other phase of the intelligence cycle. Furthermore, that politicization can come from many places. Analysts desirous of the approval of their political leadership can be unconsciously swayed or purposefully pressured in their analysis of facts to reach an assessment that supports or undermines a particular policy option. Decision-makers can also use the power and prestige of their position to influence the direction and conclusion of the analysts in order to build support for a policy position. Carter's notes in the PDB certainly informed the analysts where Carter's interests centered, and this guided the areas of concentration for future products, but there is no evidence that this was an attempt to influence how analysts assessed raw intelligence.

As already noted, one early request from Carter was for more biographical information on world leaders. This great emphasis in the individual displays a belief on behalf of Carter that it was an understanding of his counterparts that would ultimately enable diplomacy. Carter might view states as the primary unit in the international system, but it would be individuals with whom Carter would have to conduct diplomacy. He immersed himself in CIA psychological studies of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in advance of Middle East peace talks at Camp David.³⁶ Prior to ascending to the presidency Carter had "no strong feelings about the Arab countries" and had never met a Middle Eastern leader.³⁷ In his memoirs, Carter cites the importance of the extensive studying of information about Sadat as leading to the Egyptian president becoming the man "whom I would come to admire more

³⁶ Andrew, p. 437.

³⁷ Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, p. 282.

than any other leader.”³⁸ This incident demonstrates Carter’s emphasis on human rights and his focus on the individual over the issue. Carter provided direction on both the subject of the intelligence products and the format of the final product. Equally vital, while Carter provided extensive feedback, he apparently did not influence the analytical assessment within the intelligence he received—a critical provision for receiving good intelligence.

4.1.2.5 Dissemination

Delivering final intelligence products to the consumers who requested or needed them may seem like the simplest phase of the intelligence cycle, but issues such as the classification of intelligence data can greatly complicate the process. The inclusion or exclusion of individuals from access to critical intelligence based upon “need to know” is one of the quickest ways the dissemination process can become politicized. Carter’s exclusion of DCI Turner from the NSC breakfast meetings is important for understanding the relationship between the President and his DCI. This restriction did not exclude Carter from the intelligence, and, as already noted, Carter provided good written feedback in the *President’s Daily Brief*. Turner, however, was not part of the discussion of policy that the intelligence community was supposed to influence and, therefore, missed opportunities for intelligence to assist in the observation and orientation phases of the president’s decision cycle.

4.1.3 Covert Actions

Covert actions are not part of the intelligence cycle, but it has always been attributed to the intelligence community. DCI Turner describes covert operations as “separate from intelligence – the collecting and evaluating of information about foreign countries – but it has always been

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 289.

assigned to the CIA to perform.”³⁹ The National Security Act of 1947 defines covert action as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”⁴⁰ Within the realm of covert actions there is a differentiation between “covert operations” and “clandestine operations.” The Department of Defense’s Joint Publication 1-02, delineates the difference between covert and clandestine as: “A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.”⁴¹

The use of covert actions is an informative issue when evaluating President Carter’s attitude towards the intelligence community. Covert actions present a particular problem for presidents such as Carter who campaign for office on a human rights platform, because, according to its detractors, “interfering in another country’s politics undermines our own moral standards of decency, openness, and honesty; and that we have no right to impose our will on the affairs of others, because that is a totalitarian practice, not a democratic one.”⁴² Carter demonstrated a willingness to live up to this high standard when he rejected calls from Turner and Brzezinski to support a military coup against the Ayatollah Khomeini, calling the proposal “historically and morally wrong.”⁴³

Carter’s key advisors were divided on the issue of covert operations. Turner favored covert action as a capability, but upon assuming the directorship found that “in 1977 the covert

³⁹ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 75.

⁴⁰ United States Government. "National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 495) as Amended." (1949). Section 503 (e), pp. 58-59.

⁴¹ Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government, 2001, p. 112.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 85.

⁴³ Andrew, p. 442.

action cupboard was bare and sentiment within the CIA itself was against stocking it.”⁴⁴

Secretary of State Vance was “unenthusiastic about almost all covert actions and firmly opposed to all paramilitary ones.”⁴⁵ During Vance’s confirmation testimony to Congress, he presented the “threshold doctrine,” which advocated, “covert action should be not outlawed, but only undertaken in extreme circumstances, when ‘absolutely necessary.’”⁴⁶ The decision to go forward with Operation EAGLE CLAW (the rescue of American hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran) was the decisive event that led to his decision to resign.⁴⁷ In fact, it is notable that Carter’s decision to go forward with the operation was made at a special meeting of the NSC that was held while Vance was out of the capital on vacation.⁴⁸ In general terms, Brzezinski “did not share [Vance’s] strong inclination to impose very strict restrictions on CIA activities.”⁴⁹ Concerning covert operations, Brzezinski was instead “concerned about revitalizing the Agency’s capacity for activity abroad.”⁵⁰ Turner states in his memoirs that Brzezinski “held unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved by covert action, especially after what was by then a considerable period of inactivity.”⁵¹ Facing a divided group of advisors, Carter would have to be responsible for defining the role of covert operations within a foreign policy that was built around human rights.

Covert operations are more frequently considered when traditional diplomacy is failing and the decision-makers want to avoid large-scale military action. The desire to curtail “dirty

⁴⁴ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 84.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 88.

⁴⁶ Godson, Roy. *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence*. New York: Transaction, 2000, p. 52.

⁴⁷ Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, p. 523.

⁴⁸ Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, p. 492.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 35.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

⁵¹ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 88.

tricks” was described as “pronounced” by Gregory Treverton in his assessment of the early Carter years, but Treverton believes policy failures in Iran and Afghanistan led to a change in heart.⁵² “Thus it was,” according to Turner, “that the Carter administration, despite its dedication to human rights and its considerable reservations about the morality of covert actions, turned easily and quickly to covert devices to respond to some of these despotic acts.”⁵³ Covert operations were not, however, commenced without restraint. Turner stated, “I knew that if some action blew up in our face, I had to be able to stand up to the President and say, ‘Yes, I took that action because I thought it was in the best interest of our country.’ I know that while intelligence can be a murky business, there were levels of mendacity we should not go below.”⁵⁴ Turner believed that Carter’s faith was apparent in the guidelines he continued to provide for covert operations: “You knew that ethical standards were there and could not be ignored. I once suggested doing something that would have been considered underhanded if disclosed. The President’s response was, ‘You know, Stan, we couldn’t do that.’”⁵⁵

Carter advocated that nations would eventually “obey the Biblical injunction to ‘follow after the things which make for peace.’”⁵⁶ Despite this belief, in many cases, such as that of the American hostages in Tehran, Carter was eventually forced to conclude, “We could no longer afford to depend on diplomacy.”⁵⁷ Therefore, examining the decision process for authorizing covert operations becomes critical to establishing the depth of effect that Carter’s religious

⁵² Treverton, Gregory F., *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World*. New York: Basic Books, 1989, p. 13.

⁵³ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 87.

⁵⁴ Turner, Stansfield. "Turner Interview - Author's interview with former DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner." 27 July 2009.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Smith, Gary Scott. *Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington to George W. Bush*. New York: Oxford UP, USA, 2006, p. 305.

⁵⁷ Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, p. 523.

convictions shaped his leadership of the intelligence community. The chronology of major presidential findings for covert actions supports a hypothesis of a change in philosophy by President Carter.

According to Robert Gates, the Carter Administration started quickly with covert actions targeted against the Soviet Union, but by mid-1979 they were applying covert action solutions to problems throughout the Third World.⁵⁸ In 1979 Carter approved covert efforts in Grenada, Afghanistan (nearly six months before the Soviet invasion), Yemen, and a broad finding that authorized CIA covert operations “to counter the Soviets and Cubans throughout Latin America.”⁵⁹ One result was that Carter and Turner were pressuring the CIA to do more than they wanted, or were able to do. Regarding operations in Afghanistan, Turner stated, “We couldn’t get them interested in this. I was mad. I wanted to show we could react.”⁶⁰ President Carter did increase the quantity and range of covert operations over the course of his administration, but the ultimate target rarely changed. Most operations remained consistent with the goal of countering Soviet aggression and expansion.

One of the more successful initiatives the CIA was directed to undertake by the Carter administration was the publishing of *samizdat*, underground Soviet literature produced by dissidents.⁶¹ The CIA assisted in publishing efforts of Russian exiles in Western Europe and elsewhere as part of a propaganda that is probably under-credited in its contribution to fomenting the public unrest that would ultimately be the demise of the Soviet government. Findings were

⁵⁸ Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, p. 142.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 143-151.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 142.

⁶¹ Prados, John. *Safe for Democracy : The Secret Wars of the CIA*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 462.

also approved at that time for operations in Grenada, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.⁶²

Many of these operations were pushed forward at the initiative of Brzezinski who seemed most willing to unleash what Senator Frank Church had once termed the “rogue elephant.”

Those inside and outside the CIA are in agreement that while Carter was not averse to using some forms of covert operations at the start of his term as President, he markedly increased the quantity of covert operations being conducted and the number of locations where those operations took place.⁶³ Evaluating Carter’s approach to covert operations tells us much about how his emphasis on human rights and his religious faith affected his management of the intelligence community. The overall increase in the quantity of covert operations is not the most important part of the story - it is more important to assess what the CIA did (or did not do), not where or how often. To focus only on the questions of where the operations were conducted and how many operations were approved could easily lead one to conclude that when faced with the pressures of office and the failure of his chosen policies, Carter was willing to resort to covert operations. Instead, what is significant is that the focus of those operations did not change and the restrictions to ensure that basic human rights were still a primary pillar of U.S. foreign policy were not ignored. With the exception of the two operations to rescue U.S. hostages from Iran,⁶⁴ checking the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union was the primary goal of most covert operations findings signed by President Carter. There were objections to the new scope of covert operations at the CIA, but then-future DCI Robert Gates attributes this to the fact that the

⁶² Prados, *Safe for Democracy*, p. 493.

⁶³ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, pp. 87-89.

⁶⁴ The Department of Defense-led special operations mission to rescue the hostages in Iran is commonly referred to as Desert One. This is actually the name of the location where the accident occurred, and the proper name for the operation is EAGLE CLAW. The CIA also ran a successful operation to exfiltrate four embassy staff members and two spouses who had taken refuge in the Canadian embassy in Tehran; this mission is commonly referred to as the Canadian Caper.

Agency's "covert action capability had been weakened significantly *before* the Carter administration by decisions and events of the preceding four years."⁶⁵

Important to this assessment of the interaction between Carter and the intelligence community is the manner in which Carter chose to control covert action. Carter's Executive Order 12036 entrusted "full responsibility" for the collection, production, and dissemination of U.S. foreign intelligence to the DCI, and the DCI was to serve as the chair of the NSC's Policy Review Committee; however, he did not have the responsibility for recommending "covert action in support of US foreign-policy objectives."⁶⁶ That authority was given to the Special Coordination Committee, which was headed by the National Security Advisor. This division of authority reduced the power of the DCI, but it showed deference to the Congressional oversight committees who desired to avoid a recurrence of abusive CIA programs such as those investigated by the Church committee. Carter's willingness to work with the committees, however, was limited by his belief that they could not keep a secret. Regarding covert actions, Carter noted in his diary on December 21, 1979 that "I had instructed Zbig to keep Congress out of the decision-making process on findings I issue for covert operations around the world. This is none of their business; they are to be informed, not consulted."⁶⁷

4.1.4 Carter and Foreign Policy

Carter asserts, "As president, I tried to make human rights a core value of my administration. This emphasis was derived from my experience growing up in the South, and from the guilt I shared with others over the way we deprived our black neighbors of their human

⁶⁵ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, pp. 87-89.

⁶⁶ Ameringer, pp. 358-360.

⁶⁷ Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 380.

rights.”⁶⁸ From its roots in the civil right movement, Carter’s dedication to human rights was demonstrated repeatedly, occasionally to the point of sacrificing political and diplomatic opportunity to preserve these standards. Similarly, President Carter advocated that an American foreign policy that was unswerving in its commitment to human rights would “earn the approbation and trust of the world.”⁶⁹ He acknowledged, though, “our country paid a price for its emphasis on human rights.”⁷⁰ Countries whose human rights records came under the careful scrutiny of the U.S. were unappreciative of such attention, furthermore, they were quick to point fingers at the record of the United States, particularly the all too public record of the CIA, which had recently been the subject of two very high profile Congressional investigations.

Among those closest to the President in the realm of foreign policy was Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who noted:

Carter’s personal philosophy was the point of departure for the foreign policy priorities of the new administration. He came to the Presidency with a determination to make U.S. foreign policy more humane and moral. In part because of his religious feelings, in part because it was useful in the campaign, he went on the record not only in rejecting the ‘Lone Ranger’ style of the preceding Administration but in criticizing it for an excessive preoccupation with practicing balance-of-power politics. I know that he genuinely believed that as President he could shape a more decent world.”⁷¹

⁶⁸ Carter, *Personal Beliefs of Jimmy Carter*, pp. 123-124.

⁶⁹ Stuckey, *Jimmy Carter: Human Rights, and the National Agenda*, p. 60.

⁷⁰ Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, p. 155.

⁷¹ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1985, p. 48.

As a result, while scholars debate whether the Carter Administration ever developed a coherent foreign policy, there is general agreement as to the existence of a consistent level of principle that guided foreign policy decisions.⁷²

4.1.5 Operational Code for Jimmy Carter

The intelligence operational code developed for President Carter (see Figure 4.1), based upon the above observations, provides a composite picture that is useful for predicting Carter's interaction with the intelligence community and the type of support he should receive. Like other aspects of his presidency, Carter desired to direct more than delegate. Carter's penchant for micromanaging issues is well documented. Members of the U.S. Secret Service noted that he would take over aspects of managing the Executive Mansion (including repairing a grate) and wanted to personally approve anyone using the White House tennis courts.⁷³ On the axis for cooperation with Congress he does not score as high, but he supported Congress's legislative oversight role. His initial meetings with DCI Turner would have placed him at the extreme point of supporting full control of the entire intelligence community by the DCI. A review of his subsequent decisions, however, shows that his actions fell short on this point, particularly with regard to the Department of Defense. Possibly by organizational construct on the part of Carter, and certainly through the willful actions of National Security Advisor Brzezinski, DCI Turner did not possess a policy-making role in the Carter Administration.

Also, keeping with the Lowenthal model, Carter did influence the intelligence process as human rights policy did affect intelligence collection operations with regard to Carter's desire to uphold human rights standards, but Carter did not solicit policy input from the intelligence

⁷² Smith, *Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington to George W. Bush*, p. 323.

⁷³ Kessler, Ronald. *In the President's Secret Service : Behind the Scenes with Agents in the Line of Fire and the Presidents they Protect*. 1st ed. New York: Crown Publishers, 2009, p. 73.




Figure 4.1 An Intelligence Operational Code For President Jimmy Carter

community. Notably, while the desire for protecting human rights doubtlessly precluded some covert actions, it did nothing to curb his administration's desire to rely upon covert actions when conventional diplomacy failed. An even more apparent contradiction has been noted in Carter's willingness to withhold information from Congress. Despite the fact that it was Congress who provided the accountability that reined in the CIA in the mid-1970's, Carter showed little inclination to involve them when he could avoid it. In a diary entry on November 28, 1979, Carter writes about how he hoped to keep an agreement with the Peoples Republic of China about an electronic monitoring post in Western China in verbal form instead of written so he did not have "to reveal details to the Congress and therefore to the public."⁷⁴ In a postscript he indicates that he feared the likelihood of the information being leaked to the public by Congress, though eventually decided to inform the Chairmen of the HPSCI and SSCI .

Finally, Carter, whether guided by his faith or lack of experience above the level of state government, seemed to be the perpetual optimist in his dealings with both foreign governments and the U.S. Congress, he frequently ran into obstacles when dealing with either area. These obstacles increased the potential role for the intelligence community.

4.2 DCI Stansfield Turner (12th DCI, 1977-1981)

Admiral Stansfield Turner epitomized much of what Carter had extolled to the American people during his presidential campaign. Carter talked about the black eye the United States had received due to CIA operations at home and abroad and a need to fix this national disgrace. For Turner "serving the truth was a guideline that affected [his] management actions as well as his substantive duties."⁷⁵ Douglas Garthoff described Turner as not only "honest" but also "on

⁷⁴ Carter, White House Diary, p. 374.

⁷⁵ Garthoff. Douglas, p. 134.

occasion moralistic.”⁷⁶ Turner was a graduate of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis (a classmate of Carter, but not a close acquaintance), who had risen from ensign to the rank of admiral. His experience with intelligence, however, was as a consumer, not a producer, and he “viewed intelligence performance from the perspective of efficiency and effectiveness.”⁷⁷ Turner was actually Carter’s third choice to become DCI (Thomas Hughes had twice declined the position, and Theodore Sorensen could not be confirmed)⁷⁸ but he would seem to have been a good match for Carter since both men believed even a spy agency had to be operated honestly. During his confirmation hearings in the United States Senate, Turner noted that “intelligence agencies, like all arms of government, must reflect the mores of the nation and abide by its laws.”⁷⁹ A strong moral compass, however, was not the only thing Turner would bring to Langley.

Turner’s approach to his new duties was much more akin to that of a captain taking command of a ship, rather than that of a director assuming leadership of a large federal bureaucracy. He found the CIA’s management techniques to be deficient and brought in associates from the Navy who often had the adverse effect of insulating him from CIA personnel with whom he should have been interacting.⁸⁰ Like many new military commanders, Turner tried to learn and understand the procedures of his new command, and then sought to challenge old paradigms. Rather than seek the wisdom of experienced CIA personnel, he often preferred to develop and implement his own solutions.⁸¹ Using the intelligence process as a guide for

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Ameringer. p. 358.

⁷⁸ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 132.

⁷⁹ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*. p. 26.

⁸⁰ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 133.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 134.

reviewing Turner's tenure at CIA and developing his intelligence operational code, we can see that he affected many areas of the agency and the intelligence community.

4.2.1 The Intelligence Process

Beyond instilling a sense of integrity in CIA operations and modernizing its management, several other goals stand out during Turner's tenure. From the beginning, he had a great desire to strengthen the DCI's role as the leader of the entire intelligence community, and to develop a stronger TECHINT capability. Turner's ability to serve as the president's intelligence advisor was also defined by several other strong personalities on Carter's national security/foreign-policy team.

4.2.1.1 Planning and Direction

If there was a single area of the intelligence community that Turner set out to remake, it was the role of the DCI as the intelligence community's manager. This single issue highlighted Turner's initial discussion with Carter when he was at first offered the directorship, and Carter had pledged to support him, promising that if the DCI's existing authority was not sufficient that he would "change the rules" to give him the authority he needed.⁸² Turner's quest to fulfill this goal was perceived by some as power grabbing.⁸³ The fragmented U.S. intelligence community is not a design that anyone would set out to construct, but it has continued to exist, in part, because parent organizations (such as the State Department, Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy) feel they must retain their own intelligence capabilities in order to meet their own unique intelligence requirements. Each fears that more centralized control will result in their agency's intelligence requirements being given such low priority that they will not be fulfilled in

⁸² Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*. p. 18.

⁸³ Holt, Pat M. *Secret Intelligence and Public Policy : A Dilemma of Democracy*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1995. p. 196.

a timely manner—if at all. Furthermore, if an agency were to lose its intelligence mission, it would result in the loss of intelligence funding. Without a doubt, the greatest consumer of intelligence funds and the producer of the greatest quantity of intelligence products is the Department of Defense. In Turner’s attempt to establish his role as the manager of the entire intelligence community, he set his sights on two of the Defense Department’s primary intelligence organizations, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).⁸⁴ Secretary of Defense Harold Brown resisted this significant transfer of power, and while Turner continued to strive for an increased role in community management throughout his tenure, it was this battle that established his limits. Turner notes that “I had boldly requested full management and operating authority over all of the agencies operated by the Department of Defense for collecting national intelligence, most specifically the NSA. This [Carter] would not grant.”⁸⁵ It was not the only battle he would lose.

One particularly critical aspect of community management that eluded Turner was budget authority. It is the president, after all, that submits a budget to Congress; therefore, Defense Secretary Brown simply appealed any disagreements he had with Turner directly to the president who often adopted Brown’s view.⁸⁶ Brown further reduced Turner’s authority in the intelligence budgetary process by creating the Tactical Intelligence And Related Activities (TIARA) budget aggregation.⁸⁷ By removing certain programs from the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Department of Defense effectively removed them from community coordination. At the end of his tenure, Turner noted, “Twice in the early weeks of your Administration you urged me to be ‘bold’ in designing a proposed reorganization of the Intelligence Community. I was,

⁸⁴ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 135.

⁸⁵ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 262.

⁸⁶ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 144.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 145.

You, in turn, were not when the final decision was made on the new Executive Order.”⁸⁸ Even without the full support of President Carter and the ability to control the entire intelligence budget, Turner persisted in his pursuit of a new model for community management.

Turner believed that he could organize his control of the intelligence community by creating “Vice Presidents” over four basic functions of intelligence. Those functions were resource management, collection, analysis, and support.⁸⁹ While Turner created new ways to plan and direct the intelligence community, his new leadership made its largest contribution not in community management, but in the size of the community. Garthoff notes that the new positions “required considerable enlargement of the DCI’s staff capabilities.”⁹⁰ He further quotes former DDI Edward Proctor as saying “it was a disaster... The staff generated a lot of paperwork without improving collection tasking. It was like the ant sitting on the log as it is being propelled down the river thinking he is piloting the log.”⁹¹ If, however, Turner expended his greatest efforts in the area of community management, he is probably most renowned for the outcome of his attention to the area of intelligence collection.

4.2.1.2 Collection

Turner would not be the last DCI to become caught up in the debate regarding the attributes of TECHINT versus HUMINT, but that debate forms a significant portion of his legacy. Scott Kaufman’s assessment that Turner “placed his faith on technology rather than humans to gather intelligence” is common.⁹² Turner’s preference for TECHINT was aided by the technological innovations of his day. These systems were expensive to build and often required

⁸⁸ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 147.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 137.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 139-140.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 142.

⁹² Kaufman. Page 156.

extensive development time to procure, but once created they could be targeted against any country or people group. A human collection asset trained in the language and culture of one region is not easily re-targeted to a new region. Quality satellites and other systems that could gain strategic intelligence required strong advocacy because of their great expense, and this was a mission that Turner embraced. Advocates of HUMINT assert that while technical forms of intelligence can determine basic facts (such as enemy orders of battle), they cannot determine an adversary's plans or intentions. Voicing disagreement on this point, Turner states that "reading in other countries messages through electronic intercepts or listening to its leaders talk to each other through a concealed microphone can reveal intentions often with greater accuracy than an agent's reporting."⁹³ Furthermore, technical intelligence collectors can be re-targeted against a new adversary in short order, whereas humans cannot be trained or sources recruited in such short order. Turner advocates a symbiotic system where HUMINT verifies information gained through technical means or fills in gaps where possible.⁹⁴ This perceived preference for technical solutions over human espionage was only the beginning of the tension that was to exist between Turner and his Directorate of Operations (DO).

Upon assuming his position as DCI, Turner inherited a recommendation for a reduction in force of 1350 positions over a five-year period. Turner's predecessor, George H. W. Bush, had chosen not to act upon the recommendation. Turner decided instead to eliminate only 820 positions but in a two-year period. The abolishment of these 820 positions became one of the most controversial aspects of Turner's tenure. John Ranelagh describes the event as an attempt by Turner to ruthlessly disband the clandestine service.⁹⁵ Some press reporting erroneously

⁹³ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 207.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Ranelagh, p. 636.

indicated that up to 2000 people were summarily fired. Turner's own recounting of the incident stated that "the actual number of people fired was seventeen. An additional 147 were forced to retire early...the remaining positions were vacated by normal attrition or by transfer of people to other branches in the agency."⁹⁶ While Ranelagh may have overstated the severity of the dismissals, Garthoff points out that he eliminated jobs more quickly than the planners at CIA had recommended, and Turner himself has expressed regret at the manner in which the dismissals were transmitted.⁹⁷ Most important for this research is the animosity that grew between Turner and those serving in the DO. The environment that resulted was one that would make it difficult for Turner to institute new programs directed by the president. It is noteworthy, that far from trying to disband clandestine services, Turner actually advocated that other government agencies should be required to create positions overseas that would provide official cover for officers of the CIA.⁹⁸

4.2.1.3 Processing and Exploitation

Turner's effect upon the processing and exploitation cycle was most significantly seen in the push towards technical means of collection. These systems offer more automated intelligence processing when compared with data from a human source that can usually not report instantaneously. Ironically, the processing and exploitation cycle affected Turner's ability to lead the community. The DCI should serve as the president's primary intelligence advisor. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his role as National Security Advisor, had access to a wide variety of raw intelligence from technical sources as soon as the speedy processing and exploitation took place. This allowed him to interrupt the cycle, conduct his own analysis, and provide his assessments to

⁹⁶ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 197.

⁹⁷ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 133.

⁹⁸ Holt, p. 75.

President Carter while effectively cutting Turner out of the loop. This not only endangered the role of the DCI, but also the oversight responsibilities of Congress. Since Congress does not confirm nor oversee the National Security Advisor there is increased potential for the intelligence process to grow outside the purview of the oversight committees.⁹⁹ This short-circuiting of the intelligence process also had the effect of increasing the use of technical sources and limiting the employment of intelligence gained through HUMINT. Analyst and consumer feedback is an extremely important part of the HUMINT process and under these circumstances the president could not readily supply feedback on intelligence that he was never exposed to.

4.2.1.4 Analysis and Production

William Kvetkas, chief budget officer for the intelligence community staff, singled out analysis as an area where Turner had made a particularly significant contribution.¹⁰⁰ Turner would approve “anything requested for analysis” and was not disengaged when it came to the substance of their work.¹⁰¹ Robert Gates, who would later serve as the head of the Directorate of Intelligence and then as DCI, credited Turner with paying more attention to analysts than any other DCI.¹⁰² Turner increased the power of the chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), giving that position greater authority over NIC analysts and creating a system that was hailed by experts as being vastly superior to what had existed before.¹⁰³ While Gates states that Turner “listened to [analysts]” and “for the most part deferred to them,” Turner was not passive in the process.¹⁰⁴ He developed his own approach for constructing the annual estimate of Soviet offensive strategic nuclear weapons, and was less willing to allow conclusions to be watered

⁹⁹ Ranelagh, p. 645.

¹⁰⁰ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 142.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Gates, p. 201.

¹⁰³ Kessler, p. 122.

¹⁰⁴ Gates, pp. 201-202.

down in the consensus-building process.¹⁰⁵ As has been observed in other areas of his leadership, Turner believed in putting forth his own solutions to many analytic issues.

True to his character, Turner's earliest interactions with the Directorate of Intelligence were blunt. He asked them "why the products of the community—and in particular the CIA—are shallower, more wrong, much less relevant than consumers need and can reasonably expect."¹⁰⁶

Turner also pushed the analysts in order to increase the relevance of their work; in a 1983 interview he explained:

They were doing analysis on one thing while the policymakers wanted to know about something else. I used to have trouble with that. I would say I needed some analysis by tomorrow afternoon and they would say, 'but we'll have some new information next week. Can't it wait?' and I would then have to say, 'I don't care. The President has to make a decision the day after tomorrow. I don't care what you're going to have next week. After the train has left the station is no time to give the conductor your itinerary!'¹⁰⁷

Turner also followed in the mode of DCI John McCone in his willingness to assert his personal analysis when it was at odds with those of the rest of the community.¹⁰⁸ Analysis was, therefore, a critical intelligence component for Turner, and it was one that he had a decided impact upon. As previously discussed, one of the most important issues involving intelligence analysis is politicization. On this score, Turner receives mixed results.

In a 1986 article in the *Washington Post*, Turner assails the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for what he perceives as its unwillingness to publish assessments that do not support

¹⁰⁵ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 142.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 133.

¹⁰⁷ Ranelagh, p. 642.

¹⁰⁸ Kessler, p. 131.

Department of Defense policies. Because intelligence assessments are a critical item of consideration when the Department of Defense goes before Congress requesting funding for a new military program, there is tremendous pressure on the DIA not to produce intelligence that is at odds with the program the Pentagon is putting forth. To state that no threat exists or that a different threat is of higher priority could scuttle years of development and procurement efforts. Turner states that “the DIA, let alone the service intelligence organizations, simply cannot rise above the parochialism of the military services.”¹⁰⁹ He goes on to compare and contrast this with in 1978 report he oversaw at CIA on the survivability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal after a Soviet surprise attack. The study concluded that the remaining U.S. nuclear forces would be more than sufficient to retaliate against all urban areas of the Soviet Union. Since the report did not support the need for the MX missile program, the Pentagon rejected the report while never debating its substance. “For the next three years the DIA argued over and over that the CIA’s analytic technique was invalid. They never said why. Rather, they fell back on the argument that the CIA was operating in an area that should be reserved to the military, hardly a meaningful way to judge whether or not the analysis was beneficial to the country.”¹¹⁰ He added that a further danger that such politicized analysis brings about is that it forces other agencies (such as CIA and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research [INR]) to “overcompensate in their work for what they anticipate the DIA’s bias will be.”¹¹¹ Judged by his own criteria, Turner is inconsistent in his performance of analysis of Iran.

Iran would prove to be one of the most critical issues for the CIA during Turner’s tenure; the events that unfolded there would also prove to be some of the most significant events for the

¹⁰⁹ The Pentagon's Intelligence Mess." *Washington Post*, sec. D: 1. Jan 12, 1986. Web. 10/20/2010, p. D2.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

Carter administration and the 1980 election. In 1977 the Carter administration proposed selling AWACS aircraft to Iran.¹¹² When the sale encountered difficulty in the Senate, Sen. Robert Byrd and others relied upon statements by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the CIA. In this case, Turner was willing to produce an un-politicized analysis of the situation which senators used to bolster their objections to the sale of AWACS based upon, in part, Turner's conclusion that there was a "danger of such a sophisticated system possibly falling into Soviet hands."¹¹³ Turner and the CIA conducted their analysis in a manner that is entirely fitting standards set forth by Sherman Kent. The analysis that was provided was timely (it was provided in time to be included in the debate), it was relevant (it addressed the issue being debated), and it provided a frank assessment rather than one that simply supported White House policy. The same could not be said for analysis of the political situation in Tehran.

Harry Howe Ransom advances the hypothesis that "intelligent systems tend to report what they think the political leadership wants to hear, and whatever is reported, leaders often take actions without regard for the intelligence reports."¹¹⁴ James Bill, in his assessment of U.S. Iranian relations at this time, claims that intelligence community assessments of the situation in Iran "clearly confirmed" Ransom's hypothesis.¹¹⁵ A 1975 intelligence estimate produced by the

¹¹² According to *The Encyclopedia of Modern Military Aircraft*: "Using the airframe of the Boeing 707-320 airliner and a massive payload of radar and electronics sensors, the E-3 AWACS is a flying headquarters for C3 (command, control, communications and intelligence), employed near a combat zone to monitor aircraft and missiles and to direct friendly warplanes." Eden, Paul, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Modern Military Aircraft*. London: Amber Books, Ltd., 2004, p. 94.

¹¹³ Bill, James A. *The Eagle and the Lion : The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, p. 229.

¹¹⁴ Ransom, Harry Howe. Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies. *The American Political Science Review* 74.1 (1980): 141,141-148. *JSTOR*. Web. 10/21/10. Page 147.

¹¹⁵ Bill, p. 418.

State Department INR, stated that “prominent in the opposition are the religious leaders.”¹¹⁶ This assessment gave particular attention to the “growing link between the religious leaders and the secular intelligentsia.”¹¹⁷ A CIA report issued on September 1, 1978, assessed that “the regime had a better than even chance of surviving the present difficulties, and the Shah will probably be able to maintain his position through the early 1980s.”¹¹⁸ Scott Kaufman and others have assessed this intelligence failure as having been caused by Turner’s focus on technical sources of intelligence, but it is important to note that many in the Carter administration made assessments and established policies based upon the administration’s support for the Shah. Turner himself notes that “U.S. policy in that area of the world was so dependent on the Shah that it was all too easy for us to assume that he would do what was necessary to play the role we had in mind for him.”¹¹⁹ This situation does not represent a case of the intelligence community blatantly changing its assessment in order to support an existing administration policy, but it is clearly an example of an intelligence failure that is due, at least in part, to the fact that the CIA could not rise above common paradigms and conduct their analysis based upon facts that could have been available to them. Turner’s own final assessment on this matter was summed up in five words: “We were just plain asleep.”¹²⁰

The CIA’s failure to provide proper warning on the situation in Afghanistan is also significant enough to be reviewed. The CIA monitored the build-up of Soviet forces throughout the fall and winter of 1979, but continually failed to assess its purpose. On 14 September the CIA assessed that the growing military presence might be a sign that the Soviets might introduce their

¹¹⁶ Bill, pp. 407-408.

¹¹⁷ Bill, p. 408.

¹¹⁸ Kaufman, p. 156.

¹¹⁹ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 115.

¹²⁰ Weiner, p. 371.

own forces “bit-by-bit,” but by 28 September they had talked themselves out of this assessment and said that Moscow would not invade.¹²¹ On 17 December, with 5,000 Soviet troops at Bagram Air Base, the CIA would not predict an invasion and on 19 December they stated that the Soviets did not intend to attack.¹²² Three days later NSA reported in a flash message that 100,000 Soviet troops were taking control of Afghanistan.¹²³ The CIA had failed to prepare the president for this at every opportunity they were given. Since IMINT and other sources of intelligence had provided all the information necessary to make the correct assessment this clearly must be viewed as a failure in analysis.

4.2.1.5 Dissemination

The most important means of intelligence dissemination for this case study are the briefings that Turner provided to Carter. These briefings represented an opportunity for both men to emphasize what they felt were the most important issues of the day. For the president, such briefings are the best opportunity to provide feedback and guidance directly to the head of the intelligence community. For the DCI, the sessions permitted him to gain clarification on guidance where necessary, to stress what he believed were the most critical products and analyses, and to improve his understanding of how he could ensure that intelligence products are relevant to the policy issues of the day. At the beginning of the Carter administration, the president requested two to three thirty minute briefings a week.¹²⁴ By all accounts the briefings were rarely one-on-one opportunities. Turner states that Vice President Mondale and National Security Advisor Brzezinski “usually joined us.”¹²⁵ Turner also notes that it was his prerogative to meet

¹²¹ Weiner, p. 366.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ Weiner, p. 367.

¹²⁴ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 128.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

one-on-one with the president whenever he wanted to,¹²⁶ but as described earlier, Brzezinski states that he held the CIA and the DCI under “very strict control.”¹²⁷ The National Security Advisor states that the DCI had “relatively limited access to the president.”¹²⁸ Furthermore, he explains that Turner’s twice a week meetings were eventually reduced to about twice a month and that “he had throughout the four years practically no one-on-one meetings with the president.”¹²⁹ Even more informative about the nature of Carter and Turner’s relationship is Brzezinski’s claim that he would meet with Turner to discuss “the most sensitive internal CIA matters” and that he would then pass information along to the president as he deemed it relevant.¹³⁰ All of this indicates that an individual exogenous to the dyad exerted considerable control and influence upon the relationship.

The presidential briefing process illuminates an additional aspect of Turner’s intelligence operational code. Turner states that he spent “ten to twelve hours in preparing for each 30 minute session” with the president.¹³¹ Since Turner had no prior experience in the intelligence field, it seems probable that these long preparation times were particularly necessary during the early part of the administration, when the briefings were occurring twice a week. If this is correct then the DCI, who is actively running both the CIA as an agency and managing the entire intelligence community, was dedicating what amounts to two to three standard workdays in preparation for two 30 minute sessions with the president. This would certainly indicate that he deemed the sessions extremely important. How did Carter feel about the briefings? According to Robert

¹²⁶ Ranelagh, p. 650.

¹²⁷ Brzezinski, *Power and Policy*, p. 72.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 129.

Gates, Carter found the DCI's briefings boring."¹³² On several occasions, Brzezinski tried to get Turner included in the Friday morning foreign policy breakfast. Gates reports that "Carter turned him down—on one occasion firmly telling him to drop the subject."¹³³ Clearly, the DCI's ability to inform the president and influence the policy process through substantive intelligence products was severely limited.

4.2.2 Covert Actions

The Covert Actions subsection of section 4.1 in this chapter detailed the juxtaposition created by the Carter-Turner dyad as they desired openness and truth from the CIA, but displayed a growing penchant for covert actions as the administration experienced mounting foreign policy challenges. Nevertheless, it is beneficial to our understanding of Turner's intelligence operational code to consider what he had to deal with in terms of covert action capabilities at CIA, and also how he personally intended to remain true to the moral code that he desired to instill in all CIA operations. Turner describes the covert action mission at CIA as essentially broken in 1977.¹³⁴ One of the first challenges to rebuilding any such capability was to ensure proper funding. In an examination of the percentage of the CIA's annual budget that is dedicated to covert actions, Loch Johnson estimates that in 1977 and 1978, covert actions represented only five percent of the total CIA budget, the lowest percentage in the history of the agency.¹³⁵ By the conclusion of the Carter administration, Johnson estimates that figure had doubled to ten percent of the total budget, but that is considerably less than the more than twenty percent it would reach during the Reagan administration and nowhere close to the nearly sixty percent of the total budget Johnson estimates

¹³² Gates, p. 141.

¹³³ Brzezinski, *Power and Policy*, p. 68. Gates, pp. 141-142.

¹³⁴ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 85.

¹³⁵ "Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 33.1 (1989): 81,81-109. *JSTOR*, pp. 87-88.

was being spent on covert action during the administrations of Presidents Johnson and Nixon.¹³⁶

While Turner did not have the freedom to reallocate the intelligence budget in whatever manner he saw fit, there is no evidence that he made a significant effort to amend this problem.

Beyond funding issues, Carter and Turner had to determine how to operate a covert action mission in an ethical manner. Turner argued “everything that might be done in secret had to be unembarrassing.”¹³⁷ The final judgment seems to have rested in Turner’s interpretation of the court of public morals. Turner asserted “overseers should be so convinced of the importance of the actions that they would accept any criticism that might develop if the covert actions did become public, and could construct a convincing defense of their decisions.”¹³⁸ Carter’s Executive Order (EO) 12036 directed intelligence operators to gather their information by the “least intrusive means possible.” Charles Ameringer interprets this to mean “in the choices of methods, the ‘potential impact’ on private citizens took precedence over ‘operational effectiveness.’”¹³⁹ Therefore, Turner inherited the CIA at a time when the covert action capability was at low ebb, but he was unwilling to increase funding and simultaneously applying greater restrictions on their operating principles.

The other significant issue regarding covert action that should be addressed from Turner’s perspective is his attitude towards Congressional oversight. A *prima facie* argument can be made that any administration that is committed to the principles of human rights and truth would obviously be supportive, and in fact welcoming, of Congressional oversight. Indeed, Carter supported Turner’s belief that “if we want good intelligence in the long run, our only option is to

¹³⁶ "Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 33.1 (1989): 81,81-109. *JSTOR*, pp. 87-88.

¹³⁷ Ranelagh, p. 646.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Ameringer, p. 362.

make oversight work.”¹⁴⁰ Turner, along with the president and vice president, not only desired to make intelligence oversight by Congress work, they wanted it to work better. They therefore advocated the creation of a House intelligence committee similar to the one that had already been created in the Senate.¹⁴¹ Desiring a function to work more efficiently, however, does not always indicate that one appreciates the value of that function. Frank Smist summarizes Turner’s attitude towards Congressional oversight as believing that it was “a necessary evil that he could turn to his advantage.”¹⁴² Smist defines what he believes Turner’s attitude was in what he designates as the “Turner Thesis.”

The Carter foreign-policy team was divided on the issue of Congressional oversight of intelligence (as they were on many issues). National Security Advisor Brzezinski believed that congressional oversight was not needed and that it was a danger to the administration’s national security actions.¹⁴³ Secretary of State Vance saw oversight as necessary and good, stating “Congress should be informed of the whole range of intelligence matters.”¹⁴⁴ The Turner Thesis takes an interesting middle ground to the polar positions of Brzezinski and Vance. Turner believed “Congressional oversight gives a lot of power to the DCI. With this oversight process I have a way of getting off the hook. I’d like to do this, but I have these committees to report to.”¹⁴⁵ One of Turner’s aides elaborated:

Admiral Turner felt it was important to share information and responsibility with Congress. Then when something was blown or a disaster occurred, this would shut

¹⁴⁰ Andrew, p. 433.

¹⁴¹ Smist, Frank John. *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994*. 2nd ed. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994, p. 214.

¹⁴² *Ibid*, p. 239.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 110.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 111.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

them up entirely and immediately. They can't say anything. If other committees raise questions you tell the intelligence committee to get the other guys in order. It's a very effective tactic.

Turner's attitude towards Congress, and the intelligence oversight committees in particular, was one that sought to use the system to his own advantage. It is important to review how Turner did this in practice.

While Turner had advocated the creation of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), on his very first covert action briefing to the HPSCI he attempted to prevent the recording of a verbatim record of the proceedings of a concern that it would become a security risk. Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) challenged this idea and defended the right of Congress to keep exact records of the proceedings to support their oversight duties.¹⁴⁶ In his memoirs, Turner relates how he felt deceitful after he had briefed Congress on a single budget item that was actually two separate projects. Therefore, he explained the existence of the second project in a closed (secret) session of the committee, but informed the congressmen that he was unable to provide them the details of the project. During the Iranian hostage crisis, Turner chose to notify Congress of CIA covert activities after completion of the operations. The first mission was to exfiltrate the "Canadian Six," a highly successful operation.¹⁴⁷ Later, the CIA also participated in a reconnaissance mission or "exploratory flight" in preparation for Operation EAGLE CLAW; in this case Turner waited after the conclusion of the military operation so as not

¹⁴⁶ Johnson, "Action and Accountability." p. 98.

¹⁴⁷ When Iranian students overtook the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, there were four embassy personnel and two spouses that were able to escape and eventually take refuge in the official residences of two senior officials from the Canadian Embassy. An authoritative account of the mission to rescue them can be found in Antonio Mendez's *The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA*.

to reveal either mission (the exploratory mission or the military mission).¹⁴⁸ Turner noted of Congress: that “They were not happy, but were understanding.”¹⁴⁹ But being understanding does not mean that Congress agreed with the decision. In an interview with Frank Smist, Senator Birch Bayh (D–Indiana), stated “If oversight is to function better, you first need it to function [at all].” Even considering these incidents, Turner could still be considered one of the more supportive DCIs with regard to Congressional oversight. There is, however, one other precedent he established that is worthy of considering before rendering a final judgment.

Turner describes with seeming satisfaction the time he took a covert action finding “privately” to Senator Inouye (D–Hawaii) to inform him of an operation that he did not want to take to the entire committee due to security concerns. “I was, in effect, asking Dan Inouye to take it on his shoulders for his entire committee.” Senator Inouye’s response was to consent as long as the ranking minority member, Sen. Barry Goldwater (R–Arizona), was informed as well. The long-term result of this precedent was the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, which established the so-called “Gang of Eight.” Under this statute, “the intelligence committees’ leadership, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, were to be provided prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs if the President determined that limited access to such programs was essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests.”¹⁵⁰ While “Gang of Eight” notifications have gained statutory protection, the increasing practice of “Gang of Four” notifications has not. While the Turner Thesis has not been

¹⁴⁸ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 179.

¹⁴⁹ Snider, L. Britt, and Center for the Study of Intelligence. The Agency and the Hill : CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, p. 283.

¹⁵⁰ Cumming, Alfred. "Gang of Four" Congressional Intelligence Notifications. R40698 Vol. Washington D.C.: Congressional research Service, 2010, p. 5.

embraced by all of Turner's successors, the limited notification of Turner's "Gang of Two" precedent has certainly been eagerly adopted by many of them.

4.2.3 Foreign Policy

Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and National Security Advisor Brzezinski were Carter's three formal foreign-policy advisers. Vice President Mondale and Hamilton Jordan (personal assistant to the president) also held considerable influence in this area. From this list, two observations need to be noted. First, between the five principal foreign-policy advisers there were at least four different philosophies and agendas. Second, DCI Turner was not one of the advisers, and as a result, he was often shut out from the process or caught in the crossfire. In his assessment of the Carter foreign-policy process, Alexander Moens is unequivocal in his conclusion that there is no evidence that Stansfield Turner served as a close advisor to the president.¹⁵¹ This is particularly significant in Moens' research because his primary thesis is one of multiple advocacy in which he attempts to demonstrate how a group of policy advisers are to "act as competing advocates for their policy positions."¹⁵² This is not to say that intelligence was not utilized; as previously noted, Brzezinski in particular was effective at limiting the DCI's access to the president, but was a major consumer of intelligence.

One particularly poignant example of Turner's exclusion from the policy process occurred on October 21, 1979, when the Carter administration chose to admit the Shah of Iran into the United States. In May of 1979 a group of Iranian communists had attempted to take over the United States Embassy in Tehran. In October the CIA's Iran branch chief at Langley had assured members at the Tehran station by telling them "don't worry about another embassy attack, the

¹⁵¹ Moens, Alexander. *Foreign Policy Under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision Making*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 46.

¹⁵² Moens, p. 1.

only thing that could trigger an attack would be if the Shah was let into the United States—and no one in this town is stupid enough to do that.”¹⁵³ When Carter made his decision, the CIA had not been consulted and had not had the opportunity to provide intelligence support for this important policy decision. It is possible that sage advice from analysts experienced with the region could have prevented the seizure of fifty-three hostages, an event that certainly contributed to Carter’s loss in the 1980 presidential election.

Having determined that Turner rarely had the opportunity to contribute to the policy process, the other significant question to be resolved is how he contributed when he did get the opportunity. Did he honor Lowenthal’s semi-permeable wall? One of the best opportunities we have to observe this aspect of Turner is his role in the negotiation of the SALT II treaty. On this occasion, Turner clearly advocated certain policy positions; especially with regard to the encryption of telemetry data on Soviet Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM).¹⁵⁴ In fact, Vance implies that Turner held significant demands on this issue that were difficult to incorporate into the background agreements for the talks without revealing the intelligence methods used by the CIA.¹⁵⁵ Given the opportunity, Turner exhibited a willingness to cross the line into policy making.

4.2.4 Operational Code for Stansfield Turner

The fact that Stansfield Turner’s operational code is similar to President Carter’s is no surprise, since Carter would naturally be inclined to select someone who would share his own vision for the intelligence community (See Figure 4.2). Turner, for example, writes that “our

¹⁵³ Weiner, p. 371.

¹⁵⁴ Prados, John. "Central Intelligence and the Arms Race." *Intelligence: Policy & Process*. Eds. Alfred C. Maurer, Marion David Tunstall, and James M. Keagle. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, p. 324.

¹⁵⁵ Vance, Cyrus R. *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 111-112.

insistence that intelligence analysis be totally divorced from policy considerations is one of the great strengths of our system and one of our advantages over the KGB. It is, of course, a disservice to the nation if intelligence is warped to tell the policy-makers what they want to hear.”¹⁵⁶ Yet, Turner did not always back up his rhetoric with supporting actions. The most noticeable differences from Carter’s operational code come in the areas of the role of the DCI, the nature of politics, and his view of opponents and allies. Turner fought harder than any other DCI for control of the entire intelligence community. Douglas F. Garthoff begins his review of Turner’s tenure by stating that his efforts resulted in “a tumultuous period of bureaucratic conflict that revealed the limits of what an ambitious and energetic DCI could achieve.”¹⁵⁷ Turner’s outlook on politics and foreign relations seems to be far less optimistic than Carter’s even though they shared a similar moral vision for U.S. foreign policy. The multitude of internal changes to the CIA and the intelligence community at-large that were initiated by Turner are the subject of many of the histories of his tenure. His constant struggle for authority within the intelligence community, particularly with the Defense Department, was not atypical of his prior naval career and contributed to his more adversarial view of the nature of politics.

4.3 Assessment of the Carter/Turner Dyad

Assessing the Carter/Turner dyad will begin with placing the dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix as shown in Figure 3.1. Next, the intelligence success of the dyad will be assessed based upon the five principles of intelligence in grand strategy that was developed from reviewing the work of master grand strategists and intelligence analysts (see Figure 2.1).

¹⁵⁶ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 121.

¹⁵⁷ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 131.




Figure 4.2. An Intelligence Operational Code for Carter and Turner

Finally, the effect of the President/DCI relationship upon the level of intelligence success will be assessed and compared with the three hypotheses listed in Table 3.2.

4.3.1 The President/DCI Relationship Matrix

Placing the Carter/Turner dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix (See Figure 4.3) is relatively straightforward. The horizontal axis depicts a spectrum of the personal relationship between the President and the DCI. The left extreme in the spectrum would be a warm personal relationship in which the DCI has the ability to talk directly with the president whenever he perceives the need. The right end of the spectrum illustrates a relationship that could be described as cool and, at best, professional. In this type of relationship the President and DCI have direct contact only at certain formal meetings and the DCI is dependent upon someone exogenous to the president/DCI relationship to grant his access to the president. I have placed the Carter/Turner dyad three-quarters of the way towards the right end of the spectrum. While the two were classmates at the U.S. Naval Academy, they did not know each other well then and their only subsequent meetings before 1977 (a class reunion at Annapolis in 1971, a speaking engagement at the Naval War College in 1974, and in the Governor's office in Atlanta six months later) were brief and professional.¹⁵⁸ Upon assuming their duties in 1977, as described earlier, their relationship was strictly professional and National Security Advisor Brzezinski controlled their interaction.

The vertical axis of the matrix depicts politicization. At the upper end of this spectrum is a DCI who strictly observes Lowenthal's semi-permeable wall and adheres to the principles that Sherman Kent promoted about informing the policy process instead of becoming actively

¹⁵⁸ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, p. 14.




Figure 4.3. Carter/Turner Dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix.

engaged in influencing and advocating policy. At the lower end of this spectrum a DCI is not only integral to the policy process, but his policy role threatens the integrity and impartiality of the intelligence analysis he presents. I have placed the Carter/Turner dyad a quarter of the way down from the upper end of the spectrum. This quadrant of the matrix is designated as a “Librarian” type dyad. As in most dyads, Carter and Turner both claimed that they would avoid any policy role for the DCI. This case study demonstrates that Turner had little opportunity to advocate policy even if he had so desired. Turner’s role in the negotiations, however, demonstrates that given the opportunity and the cause to fight for, he was quite willing to cross the line and strongly advocate a policy position.

4.3.2 The Intelligence Success of the Dyad

Analyzing the intelligence success of this dyad must be done by looking not only at major events, but also at day-to-day intelligence support.

4.3.2.1 Accuracy

The first criterion of successful intelligence support to the president is that the intelligence provided must be accurate. Batting .500 may be noteworthy in baseball, but the expectation is far higher for the intelligence community. Perfection is the expectation of some with regard to the intelligence community, but that level of achievement is obviously unattainable. Accuracy must be judged over the long term and must include both tactical (current) intelligence and strategic (long range) assessments. A score of “good” on accuracy need not indicate that there was never a mistake or oversight, but it should imply that preventable mistakes were avoided.

On the positive side for the Carter/Turner dyad, biographic information on key diplomats and world leaders contributed to the greatest successes of the Carter administration, particularly

the Camp David Accords. This demonstrates that the information was largely correct and at the appropriate level of detail. The praise Turner garnered from Gates and others for his interaction and support of the analysts is another positive aspect of dyad. Interaction with the analysts general promotes better products and better understanding of the products. There are, however, other areas that must be considered as well.

Politicization of intelligence is not the same as accuracy, but it is relevant to the discussion of accuracy since a DCI who advocates a policy position may be perceived as not providing a full or accurate assessment if it might hurt his position to do so. Turner shows an understanding of this issue as he writes:

Frequently I was forced to draw the difficult line between being the President's intelligence adviser and being an adviser on policy matters. As I have noted, if intelligence is to be kept free from policy influence, the DCI should not take sides on policy issues. That was sometimes very difficult for me, having come from a career of involvement in governmental policy-making.¹⁵⁹

Carter's stump speeches from the presidential campaign showed that he too saw the need to distance intelligence services from policy-making. As previously discussed, however, while this was not a rampant problem within this dyad, Turner was willing to cross the line under the right circumstances (such as the SALT treaty). With regard to politicization, the level of intelligence accuracy seems to be acceptable, but there are other incidents that are of greater concern in this dyad.

The failures to predict the fall of the Shah or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represent repeated failures, not single event failures. Initial reports of a Soviet build-up of forces or the

¹⁵⁹ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy*, p. 132.

growing sway held by clerics in Iran among the dissidents could be misinterpreted, but the CIA's assessments did not even change as the events broke out.¹⁶⁰ Regarding Afghanistan, Weiner quotes CIA analyst Doug MacEachin as saying that "The U.S. could make a lot of noise from the stands, but could not have much impact on the playing field."¹⁶¹ This is where intelligence success should be assessed; Carter did not receive accurate intelligence and he voiced his frustration with regards to the Iranian situation when, at Brzezinski's recommendation he sent a note stating, "I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."¹⁶² Turner's account of this incident further illustrates the lack of communication occurring within the dyad, as he records that "just a week earlier, in a private conversation, he had told me that I was doing a fine job and that he wanted me to stay in it a long time."¹⁶³ Carter was not receiving the intelligence he needed, and he was not communicating well with his DCI, which invariably leads to poor guidance. Accuracy for this dyad was poor

4.3.2.2 Timeliness

The second criterion for intelligence success is timeliness. Although Turner's access to President Carter was highly controlled by Brzezinski and some others, analysis did continue to flow. Carter's daily national security brief and other weekly foreign policy breakfasts were forums where intelligence was presented and considered during the formulation of policy. Additionally, the time that Turner spent preparing for the briefings he did give to Carter ensured that they were comprehensive and timely. It is noteworthy that the previously discussed failures by the intelligence community to predict the downfall of the Shah of Iran or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not suffer from being untimely, they were just incorrect. Support from the

¹⁶⁰ Weiner, p. 367.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 367.

¹⁶³ Turner, *Secrets and Democracy*, pp. 113-114.

covert actions side of the intelligence community was initially slow when Carter wanted to begin a propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union, but by the time of Operation EAGLE CLAW (to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran) the CIA was providing extremely timely intelligence and covert action support to the Department of Defense assets preparing for the rescue mission. Timeliness in the Carter/Turner dyad was good.

4.3.2.3 Relevance

The relevance of the intelligence products that Carter received was a decreasing commodity throughout the dyad. Initially, briefings by Turner on intelligence systems and capabilities seemed to have been well-received and were relevant to two leaders with little experience in the intelligence field. As time went on, however, these briefings became “boring” to the president and their loss of relevance is evidenced by their greatly reduced presence on President Carter’s schedule. Additionally, the focus on TECHINT collection methods failed to produce some of the types of intelligence that HUMINT sources might have been able to supply with regard to the situations in Afghanistan and Iran. Therefore, relevance was reduced because the wrong type of information was being gathered. Intelligence within the dyad was, therefore, acceptable overall, but decreased notably throughout the dyad by failing to adapt to the changing foreign policy environment. Greater access to the president might have assisted Turner in diagnosing and addressing this problem; instead he became dependent on others. In his memoirs Turner notes that with the exception of truly critical reports, he was “dependent on the intelligence selling itself to the National Security Adviser and his staff so that they would send it to the President.”¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy*, p. 133.

4.3.2.4 Actionability

Problems with accuracy had clear implications for actionability in the dyad. While intelligence can be accurate but not actionable, it is more difficult for intelligence to be inaccurate and remain actionable in any useful sense. Furthermore, while briefings on intelligence capabilities are good for educating consumers (which is important for many reasons including future intelligence guidance), they do not supply actionable intelligence. To some degree, however, actionability is a factor of the needs and habits of the consumer. The biographical intelligence that the CIA supplied was of great use to Carter in his diplomatic engagements and was vital to some of his greatest successes, such as the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. Those documents might not have been considered actionable in some dyads, but they served an important need in this one. Therefore, the overall level of actionable intelligence success was acceptable, but not good.

4.3.2.5 Was it Used?

Carter was, by most accounts, an insatiable reader and a great consumer of intelligence. Carter's penchant for information was noted by DCI Bush before the election of 1976, and remained unabated throughout his presidency. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that he ignored any substantial intelligence that was presented to him that might have prevented the greatest diplomatic failures of his presidency. "It is essential," Carter stated, "that I and those who aid me in the formulation of our Nation's foreign policy make our decisions on the basis of accurate information about the capabilities and intentions of other countries and of forces that shape world events."¹⁶⁵ Carter could have done many things to improve his intelligence success

¹⁶⁵ "Our First Line of Defense." p. 44.

level, but it is evident that he did use the intelligence he received. The intelligence success level for using intelligence is good.

4.3.2.6 The Intelligence Success of the Dyad was Poor

The final assessment for intelligence success of the Carter/Turner dyad is that it was poor (See Table 4.1). Failures in accuracy were pronounced and the growing weakness of the relevance of intelligence throughout the administration was also a decisive factor in the overall evaluation. Forces outside the dyad, such as National Security Advisor Brzezinski, certainly played a role in the ultimate result, but the strength of the exogenous powers could have been mitigated by improving the president/DCI relationship.

Major intelligence failures were accompanied by attempts to reform the community that were not given sufficient support so that they upset the apple cart without being able to establish a new working system. Furthermore, new forms of intelligence collection systems were embraced at the expense of more traditional methods, and sometimes with vigor as it was seen as a way to promote goals of human rights. It is important, therefore, to understand how this lack of intelligence success reflects the influence of the president/DCI relationship as described in the three hypotheses.

4.3.3 The Effect of the President/DCI Relationship - Testing the Hypotheses

Assessing how the intelligence support provided to the president was affected by the president/DCI relationship is a more complex analysis combining an understanding of Carter and Turner's individual intelligence operational codes with the placement of the Carter/Turner dyad on the president/DCI relationship matrix. H1 states: *The nature of the personal relationship between the DCI and the president will strongly determine the quality of intelligence reports received by the president.* When comparing the intelligence operational code for Carter and

Table 4.1 Table of Carter/Turner Dyad's Success in Intelligence

Area of Intelligence Success	Grade
Accuracy	Poor
Timeliness	Acceptable
Relevance	Acceptable
Actionable	Acceptable
Was the Intelligence Used	Good
Summary Score	Poor

Note - As discussed in Sections 3.5, the Summary Score is not an average of the component scores. A single poor grade may be sufficient to cause a Summary Score of Poor if the cause is of sufficient significance.

Turner we see that they are very close in many areas. There is a noticeable difference in the area “Role of the DCI.” These scores represent an appraisal of the entire administration. It is fair to assume that Turner believed them to be matched in this area at the time of their initial meeting and was later disappointed in the lack of support he received. The most significant differences are found in the areas of the “Nature of Politics” and “Opponents and Allies.” Both Carter and Turner exhibited a dedication to a moral code, but Turner exhibited more pragmatism in his problem solving (which was often accompanied by an uncompromising commitment to solutions of his own devise). Carter’s belief in his own ability to conduct diplomacy with anyone served him well in the Camp David Accords and helped to guide the creation of intelligence products that were of greater use to him, but those same characteristics did not serve him well in his interactions with the Soviets. Furthermore, it left him unable or unwilling to effectively manage the disagreement between his senior foreign policy advisors. As a result, instead of having a system of multiple advocacy, he created a highly political environment that left Turner caught between the more powerful players in this policy arena. The relationship between Carter and Turner was courteous, but relatively shallow and often controlled by outsiders. H1 is not disproved, because the poor intelligence success level was influenced by many of the same problems.

H2 states: *The frequency of interaction between the DCI and the president will have a positive relationship with the quality of intelligence the president receives.* Carter and Turner’s meetings began at a frequency of twice a week. This is a modest level of interaction compared to DCIs who had daily access to a president as they or their proxy delivered the PDB. From this modest level the frequency steadily decreased to twice a month and, equally importantly, the DCI was excluded from more important meetings that developed such as the Friday morning

breakfast. Furthermore, it was in the latter half of the Carter administration, as meetings were decreasing, that the greatest intelligence failures occurred. H2 is not disproved because as the frequency of meeting decreased, so did the quality of intelligence.

H3 states: *DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives.* The best example of Turner's taking an active role in the policy process is during the negotiation of the SALT II treaty. Since there are few incidents to examine of Turner's crossing the line into the realm of policy advocacy this case does not provide strong support for H3, but it also fails to reject H3.

The Carter/Turner case study shows the inaccuracy of certain face value characteristics such as the value of a handpicked DCI and the existence of a long dyad (measured by duration in days) as indicators of the quality of intelligence the president will receive. Further, the results of the case study (measured by the intelligence operational code, the president/DCI relationship matrix, and the five principles of intelligence in grand strategy) do not disprove any of the hypotheses and support H1 and H2 (See Table 4.2). The three remaining case studies were selected help to encompass the diverse variety of president/DCI relationships.

Table 4.2 Table of Carter/Turner Dyad's Hypotheses Evaluation

Hypothesis	Verdict of Evidence from the Dyad
H1 - The Nature of the President/DCI Relationship	Supports
H2 - The Frequency of President/DCI Interaction	Supports
H3 - The DCI Advocates Particular Policy Options	Fails to Reject

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY: PRESIDENT REAGAN AND DCI CASEY

*Our liberty, our way of life, requires eternal vigilance. The United States cannot survive in the modern world without a vigorous intelligence agency, capable of acting swiftly and in secret.*¹
Ronald Reagan

The Reagan/Casey dyad presents an overwhelming quantity of potential research material and a very different variety of dyad to examine. The great quantity of material is due, in part, to the high profile nature of the DCI in this dyad, the dynamic concluding acts of the Cold War, and the Iran-Contra affair. The nature of the relationship in this dyad stands in sharp contrast to its predecessor; Carter and Turner were long time acquaintances, but were never close personally. The relationship between Ronald Reagan and William Casey began in May of 1979, less than two years before they would become, respectively, president and DCI, but it was a very close relationship.² The dyad is also of great interest to this research because by invitation, by force, and sometimes by subversion, Casey was integral to many aspects of policy-making in the Reagan administration.

Reagan came to office with a campaign slogan of “Let’s make America great again,” and America’s strength was to be an important component in his foreign policy. Reagan saw an expansive Soviet Union that “was extending its tentacles deep into Central America and Africa” and believed the U.S. was in danger of falling behind the Soviets militarily.³ In William Casey he found a man who possessed strong conservative ideals, had earned his fortune as a successful

¹ "Our First Line of Defense." Page 49.

² Persico, Joseph E. *Casey : From the OSS to the CIA*. New York: Penguin Books, 1991; 1990, p. 173.

³ Reagan, Ronald. *An American Life*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990, p. 217.

businessman, was experienced with intelligence and who he believed could restore the morale and the potency of the CIA. Simultaneously, others saw him as highly political, willing to politicize intelligence and to pursue his own foreign policy goals. Former president Ford said, “I was absolutely surprised when President Reagan selected Casey...he was not qualified to be the head of the CIA.”⁴ George H.W. Bush, who was Ford’s own DCI, agreed, stating “Casey was an inappropriate choice.”⁵ Possibly John Bross, who worked with him both in the OSS and at CIA, understood both sides as he described Casey as “capable of great kindness and great ruthlessness.”⁶

In examining the Reagan/Casey dyad a few important issues must be placed within the proper context for this case study. Casey was the first DCI to serve as a member of the cabinet. Since the intelligence community must be concerned with even the perception of politicization, this is an important issue. Casey’s official position within the administration must, however, be viewed within the context of how the administration functioned. A staffer on the SSCI at the time noted that “Reagan likes to deal with the principals in cabinet. This is the ultimate cabinet administration, in fact.”⁷ Could Casey have served Reagan’s intelligence needs as well without being a member of the cabinet? Is there conclusive evidence that Casey did politicize intelligence analysis in order to provide support for his preferred policy positions? Casey’s access to Reagan and his position of influence among the senior policy-making members of the Reagan Administration clearly had both positive and negative results. What this case study will evaluate is the effect it had upon the quality of intelligence that Reagan received.

⁴ Weiner, p. 376.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Persico, p. 208.

⁷ Ranelagh, p. 687.

The Iran-Contra affair is the second issue that must be framed in the proper context from the beginning of this study. Covert actions are highly relevant to this case study for many reasons, but the quality of intelligence is the central issue being studied. As Stansfield Turner points out, “Casey’s machinations in Central America were covert actions only by definition. That is, they were actions by an intelligence organization to make things happen, not collect intelligence.”⁸ The failures of the NSC and the role of Casey in the transfer of profits from the sale of arms in Iran to finance the Contras are relevant in the evaluation of the intelligence support to the president, but they are not the central issue.

Finally, it is important to realize that the degree of Casey’s influence was not static. The six-year tenure of this dyad (the second longest of all president/DCI dyads after the Eisenhower/Dulles dyad⁹), included the tenure of two different Secretaries of State, four national security advisors, and a myriad of issues that would take the Reagan Administration from the rhetoric of facing an “Evil Empire” to the START treaty negotiations. Robert Gates, who served as Casey’s head of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and later as his Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) noted:

I always believed that Bill Casey’s closeness to Ronald Reagan was exaggerated. I think the relationship was closest in the first months of the administration while there was still a genuine sense of gratitude on Reagan’s part for Casey’s successful management of the presidential campaign. They continued to talk about politics and appointments during that early period. Over time, however, the contacts grew less frequent and were focused more on foreign-policy issues rather

⁸ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 203.

⁹ The Reagan/Casey dyad lasted 2193 days, compared to the Eisenhower/Dulles dyad that lasted 2886 days.

than political or personal matters. He could always get in to see the president when he wanted to, and could reach him on the phone, but he did so less and less as time passed.¹⁰

Understanding the effect of this change in influence on the quality of intelligence provided will also be important in developing an overall assessment.

5.1 President Ronald W. Reagan (40th President, 1981-1989)

As in the 1976 election, the intelligence community was featured prominently in the challenger's campaign rhetoric; the tenor of the debate, however, had changed considerably. In 1976 Carter talked about gaining tight control over an intelligence community that had given the nation a black eye. In 1980, Ronald Reagan vowed to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities to support a stronger American role in the world.¹¹ The promise of a renewed CIA was certainly present within the agency itself; DCI Turner described the hope within CIA that Reagan would win the election as "palpable."¹² Reagan clearly demonstrated a confidence in the intelligence community that had not been present in 1976, but that did not mean that he had complete faith in the members of the Agency. Ranelagh reports that DCI Casey was commissioned to "make the CIA more enthusiastic and less bureaucratic," demonstrating a concern on Reagan's behalf that "the Agency was bureaucratic and unenthusiastic about everything except itself."¹³ Reagan demonstrated no concern that the CIA might operate like "a rogue elephant," but he displayed concern over its willingness to step up to perform the mission he wanted it to perform. Reagan brought to the White House a change in attitude regarding how to use the CIA. He would also depart significantly from his predecessor as a customer of the intelligence community.

¹⁰ Gates, p. 218.

¹¹ Garthoff, Douglas p. 151.

¹² Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, pp. 191–192.

¹³ Ranelagh, p. 706.

Reagan represented a very different form of information consumer than Carter. When Reagan served as Governor of California his staff routine was to review single-page “mini-memos.” These were designed by then-cabinet secretary William Clark to efficiently present important issues. They related facts, discussion, and staff recommendations in a manner that made the most effective use of his Executive’s time. Critics, however, heralded them as a sign that Reagan was “mini-minded” and it was a characterization that has been popularized by others.¹⁴ Once in the White House, the one-page summaries were left behind, but Reagan continued to expect his staff directors and senior advisors (such as James Baker and Edwin Meese) to perform vetting and editing functions. This was to the chagrin of cabinet officers such as Secretary of State Al Haig, who felt that such interceding staff members played too great of a role in the administration and referred to them as “a bunch of second-rate hambones.”¹⁵ The CIA analysts who briefed the President-elect, however, found him to be an “an avid reader on all subjects.”¹⁶ A president’s span of responsibility is too great to allow him to serve as an expert in all areas in which he is required to make decisions. Carter dealt with certain issues in very great detail and was prone to micromanaging processes; President Reagan had a different style of leadership and of consuming information.

It was noted by Casper Weinberger, who had worked with Reagan since 1965, that the President “enjoyed and benefited from quiet, civilized debates and discussions,” and that he

¹⁴ Kengor, Paul, and Patricia Clark Doerner. *The Judge : William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top Hand*. San Francisco, Calif.: Ignatius Press, 2007, pp. 62-64.

¹⁵ Baker, James Addison, and Steve Fiffer. *Work Hard, Study-- and Keep Out of Politics! : Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2006, p. 141.

¹⁶ Helgerson, p. 138

“liked the cut, thrust and parry of oral presentation and oral argument.”¹⁷ It is, perhaps, more appropriate to note that he “valued receiving information directly from individuals that he knew personally and with whom he was comfortable.”¹⁸ In this sort of environment it was crucial that the DCI be considered part of the inner circle if intelligence was going to have the desired effect upon policy; however, an influential role does not necessitate a policy role for the DCI.

Casey’s access to the inner-circles of decision-makers would be unprecedented. John Prados notes “no director of central intelligence—except George J. Tenet in later years—ever spent more time with the president than Casey. Ronald Reagan saw his DCI as a loyal, tough, and competent advisor and an effective agent.”¹⁹ Again, the question arises as to whether this close relationship could have been conducted without crossing Lowenthal’s wall separating informing policy and advocating policy.

5.1.1 Reagan’s Early Dealings with the Intelligence Community

Ronald Reagan had been part of the eight-person commission created by President Ford in January 1975 and led by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller to investigate allegations concerning the domestic activities of the CIA.²⁰ The commission, according to then Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld, was intended to head off the Congressional investigations into the CIA.²¹ Reagan attended only ten of the twenty-six meetings held by the commission, but came to the conclusion that the problems that occurred were those of flawed individuals, not a corrupt agency. He publicly defended the CIA, stating, “in any bureaucracy of about sixteen thousand

¹⁷ Weinberger, Caspar W. *Fighting for Peace : Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*. New York, NY: Warner Books, 1990, pp. 27-28.

¹⁸ Helgerson, p. 141.

¹⁹ Prados, p. 493.

²⁰ Weiner, pp. 338-339.

²¹ *Ibid.*

people there are going to be individuals who make mistakes and do things they shouldn't do."²²
His first experiences as a CIA customer would not come until 1980.

Reagan had only one CIA briefing prior to winning the 1980 presidential election, but after the election his consumption of intelligence increased at a steady rate.²³ The person most responsible for Reagan's introduction to the world of intelligence was his Vice-President, George H. W. Bush (who had served as DCI from January 30, 1976 to January 20, 1977). Bush, as discussed in the previous chapter, had personally overseen President Carter's introduction to the intelligence community and while Carter "showed no reaction when he was informed of the agency's sensitive programs; Reagan, on the other hand, supported them all enthusiastically."²⁴

Reagan had initially been apprehensive about holding the briefings out of concern that the outgoing administration, particularly Carter's Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), Zbigniew Brzezinski, would try to use the briefings as an opportunity to convince Reagan to continue certain Carter administration policies.²⁵ Bush, however, understood the value of intelligence and believed Reagan would benefit greatly from the experience of reading the PDB with a CIA briefer present to explain and enhance the information presented.²⁶ On these same grounds, Bush also intervened when Richard Allen (who served as Reagan's first APNSA) tried to interpose himself into the flow of intelligence. Allen wanted the PDB to be provided to him first, and then he would deliver the briefing to Reagan, but Bush ensured that direct interaction between the President and CIA briefers was maintained.²⁷ Equally

²² Woodward, Bob, *Veil : The Secret Wars of the CIA*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, p. 32.

²³ Helgerson, p. 129.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 136.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 137.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 137.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 139.

important to Reagan's future relationship with the CIA were Bush's efforts to continue Reagan's access to the PDB as he left Washington DC and returned to California for the majority of the remaining transition period.

At Bush's recommendation, Reagan's transition team requested that the President-elect continue to receive the PDB for the remainder of the transition.²⁸ These briefings were accomplished without the involvement of DCI Turner and with little involvement of anyone in the Carter administration.²⁹ The morning briefings provided the Agency members unprecedented access to the president; not only had the CIA never had such unfettered access to a president-elect, but no other federal agency or department had this opportunity. Briefers Richard Kerr and Peter Davis described Reagan as "a studious reader, going over each item deliberately and with considerable concentration."³⁰ Further, despite their concerns that Reagan might have firmly entrenched views on some subjects, they found that "he showed no impatience or disdain with analysis that presented a different view."³¹ The end result, according to historian John L. Helgerson, was that during the time period from election day to inauguration day, Reagan received intelligence "significantly greater in volume and detail" than had been presented to President-elect Carter four years previously.³² Additionally, Kerr and Davis were "convinced that this two-month period of private briefings gave the new administration a degree of confidence in the ability and loyalty of the CIA."³³ Furthermore, important early assessments of Reagan as an intelligence consumer were being made.

²⁸ Kerr, Richard J., and Peter Dixon Davis. "Ronald Reagan and the *President's Daily Brief*." *Studies in Intelligence* Winter (1998-1999): 51-6, p. 53.

²⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 54-55.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 54.

³¹ *Ibid*.

³² Helgerson, p. 138.

³³ Kerr and Davis, p. 55.

Early impressions of President Reagan as an intelligence customer were largely positive. Briefers noted that his questions pursued the key points of the presentation as opposed to pursuing ideological issues.³⁴ CIA assistant National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Middle East Martha Neff Kessler reported that in her meeting with Reagan his questions “reflected considerable knowledge. He was by no means a right-wing ideologue as the press charged. He was very current and extremely alert.”³⁵ CIA briefer Douglas Diamond reported that he “found Reagan a friendly and interested recipient who raised a number of factual questions.”³⁶

During the 1980 presidential campaign Reagan promised to “unleash” the CIA.³⁷ Believing that in the wake of the Congressional investigations of the mid-seventies the intelligence community had been too heavily restricted, the Republican platform had specifically called for improving covert action capabilities.³⁸ Covert action, however, was not the only area of concern; the Reagan administration also was concerned that the CIA had become “too partisan under Turner in its analytical support for the view that the Soviets were prepared to deal honestly.”³⁹ As a result, there was no doubt in Reagan’s mind that he intended to replace DCI Turner, stating, “I disagreed so completely with everything that President Carter was doing that we thought a change was needed.”⁴⁰

A change in leadership was the first step, but more was required to back up campaign promises; Reagan quickly took action upon assuming office. On Monday, January 26, 1981, Reagan noted in his diary that at a meeting on terrorism with heads of FBI, Secret Service, CIA,

³⁴ Kerr and Davis, p. 130.

³⁵ Helgerson, p. 133.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 134.

³⁷ Andrew, p. 459.

³⁸ Peterzell, Jay. *Reagan's Secret Wars*. 108 Vol. Washington, DC: Center for National Security Studies, 1984, p. 2.

³⁹ Ranelagh, p. 658.

⁴⁰ Helgerson, p. 135.

the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others and had ordered they be given back their ability to function.⁴¹ This is not to say that all restrictions were removed; there were still important standards that Reagan believed needed to be maintained, restrictions such as those against murder and assassination. He upheld this conviction even when it interfered with other desires. One of the issues over which Reagan agonized the greatest during the course of his presidency was the plight of Americans held hostage by terrorists. Gates describes how Reagan, obsessed with liberating the hostages, put considerable pressure on DCI Casey to locate them.⁴² Reagan realized, however, that his own restrictions to uphold human rights played a handicapping role. In his autobiography, Reagan notes, "...early in my administration I signed an order prohibiting direct or indirect involvement in murder during covert operations. This was one reason why the CIA had difficulty infiltrating terrorist groups—many of which require new members, as a show of loyalty, to assassinate an enemy of the organization."⁴³ Reagan displayed great satisfaction with the early direction of Casey and the intelligence community, recording in his diary less than three months after taking office "I believe we are getting back on track with the proper approach to 'intelligence' under Bill Casey."⁴⁴

Two years into this dyad's relationship Reagan's assessment had not diminished. He summarized his appraisal of the intelligence community by showing faith not only in the institution, but also in Casey personally. He recorded in his diary on February 3, 1983, "We've made great progress in reestablishing the CIA's effectiveness under Bill Casey."⁴⁵ Ronald Reagan entered office with little practical experience with intelligence, but with considerable

⁴¹ Reagan, Ronald, and Douglas Brinkley. *The Reagan Diaries*. New York: HarperCollins, 2007, p. 1.

⁴² Gates, p. 397.

⁴³ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 492.

⁴⁴ Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, p. 7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 129.

expectations of how it could support and advance his desired foreign policy. Additionally, he was a man who put great trust in his senior advisors. In William Casey he had a DCI who had experience with intelligence collection and analysis and who understood the potential values of covert action, but also a man who was driven to succeed. The next section will look at how Reagan specifically viewed and affected the intelligence process as president.

5.1.2 Reagan and the Intelligence Process

One of the primary early goals of the Carter/Turner dyad had been to establish strong central control of the intelligence community by the DCI. The organization and power structure of the intelligence community was never an emphasis of the Reagan/Casey dyad; instead, Reagan was more interested in results. If Casey had desired to build an empire and claim for himself the community leadership role that Turner had so diligently pursued, it is likely that Reagan would have provided support in important instances when Carter had been unwilling.⁴⁶ Instead, Casey quickly achieved one his primary goals; aided by his close personal relationship with Reagan and by virtue of his cabinet-level status, he was able to reestablish the DCI as the president's chief intelligence adviser.⁴⁷

One of Reagan's earliest formal entrances into the management of the intelligence process was the issuing of Executive Order 12333 on 4 December, 1981. Instead of serving to reorganize the intelligence community, it helped "to signal a more active and effective role for intelligence."⁴⁸ In addition to establishing a more positive tone for the oversight of the intelligence community, it redefined the restrictions upon domestic intelligence collection. Section 2.3 (b) provides for the collection of intelligence within the U.S. by "other authorized

⁴⁶ Ranelagh, p. 671.

⁴⁷ Andrew, p. 460.

⁴⁸ Garthoff, Douglas p. 155.

agencies of the Intelligence Community” (in addition to the FBI) when “significant foreign intelligence is sought.”⁴⁹ Reagan’s style of management for the intelligence community was to provide direction and support without defining its exact methods or managing its bureaucratic structure.

5.1.2.1 Planning and Direction

President Carter’s notes and comments on the PDB had provided feedback to the intelligence community during a time period when the DCI had decisively less personal contact with the president. President Reagan did not continue this practice, though, and thus the analysts lost one avenue of direct feedback.⁵⁰ Robert Gates described the Reagan NSC as “weak and often incompetent.”⁵¹ Thus, the most formal method of tasking the intelligence community was not an effective tool during the Reagan administration for providing planning and direction.⁵² The intelligence community did not, however, suffer from lack of guidance. Bill Casey was, perhaps, more a part of the senior-most decision-makers than any of his predecessors. Furthermore, as a full member of the Cabinet, he was not just present when policy was discussed, he was integral to the policy discussion. The DCI was completely aware of the president’s concerns and interests, but the question arises as to whether Reagan’s habit of dealing directly with his principals facilitated the production of good intelligence.

One naysayer was Bernard McMahon, staff director of the SSCI, who pointed out: “The DCI was running a service organization, and to have a service guy equal to the customers is not how these things are supposed to work. If your laundry man has an equal voice with you, and you don’t like the way your laundry is being done, and it’s your opinion against his, you’ll

⁴⁹ EO 12333, Section 2.3 (b), p. 211.

⁵⁰ Helgerson, p. 141.

⁵¹ Gates, p. 284.

⁵² *Ibid*

continue to get it the way he thinks it ought to be done.”⁵³ Secretary of State George Shultz saw the problem as arising from Casey’s desire to remain integral to the development of foreign policy. As he testified before Congress, Schultz explained that “the battle to get intelligence separated from policy and control over the policy was very much in play and the Director of Central Intelligence wanted to keep himself very heavily involved in this policy which he had been involved in apparently all along.”⁵⁴ Clearly, some perceived a problem with Casey’s role. Reagan, however, never agreed with the assessment.

In 1987, President Reagan talked with Bob Gates about Gates’ nomination to succeed Casey as DCI (the nomination was later withdrawn); Reagan told Gates how he appreciated the direct interaction with Casey on intelligence issues.⁵⁵ Consistent with the president’s style of leadership and information consumption in other areas, he enjoyed interacting with trusted assistants. To organize his national security process Reagan established the National Security Planning Group (NSPG). This element of the NSC provided the more informal interaction with the Cabinet members that Reagan preferred and it became “the principal forum within the Reagan Administration for national security decision making.”⁵⁶ In this forum, Reagan’s guidance of the intelligence process was like that provided in all other areas – it was general, overarching guidance, not down in the weeds management. Further, the guidance was to come more frequently through interaction with trusted subordinates than formal feedback or clearly defined written direction. A further example of how Reagan intended to guide the intelligence process is found in EO 12333, which assigns the DCI the responsibility of establishing

⁵³ Ranelagh, p. 677.

⁵⁴ Shultz, George Pratt. *Turmoil and Triumph : My Years as Secretary of State*. New York: Scribner's ; Toronto; New York: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993, p. 915.

⁵⁵ Gates, p. 414.

⁵⁶ Inderfurth and Johnson, pp. 75-76.

“mechanisms which translate national foreign intelligence objectives and priorities approved by the NSC into specific guidance for the Intelligence Community.”⁵⁷ The DCI, who was part of the NSPG and was, therefore, familiar with Reagan’s objectives and priorities, was to develop specific guidance for the intelligence community.

5.1.2.2 Collection

President Reagan did not share President Carter’s fascination with cutting edge TECHINT, nor DCI Casey’s preference for HUMINT, but this did not mean that he did not value the information they provided. Reagan had been impressed by the number of ongoing HUMINT programs when he was briefed prior to his inauguration,⁵⁸ but he was equally impressed with IMINT when he was first given satellite images of Rancho del Cielo⁵⁹ (his California ranch) as examples of the quality attainable; in those images he was able to identify El Alamein and No Strings (his and Nancy Reagan’s horses) grazing in the field.⁶⁰ All areas of intelligence collection saw great increases during his administration. Reagan gives credit to Casey for the increasing intelligence collection, particularly in the Middle East, but increased relations with Israel and other non-communist nations in areas of high interest to the Soviet Union were consistent with and supported by Reagan’s foreign policy.⁶¹ Christopher Andrew points out that Reagan does not mention that increases in intelligence collection were partly due to collaboration with the Israelis, but such collaboration should not be perceived as reducing the magnitude of the accomplishment. With Reagan’s knowledge Casey also expanded the CIA’s collaboration with

⁵⁷ EO 12333 1.5 (m), p

⁵⁸ Helgerson, p. 135.

⁵⁹ Ironically, such an image of private U.S. property would almost certainly be illegal under Reagan’s EO 12333, Section 2.3 since it does not comply with any of the listed exceptions.

⁶⁰ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 490.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 281.

business and academia to gain information; these previously underutilized resources would become important contributors of information and analysis.⁶²

Reagan found SIGINT particularly useful in strengthening international opinion for U.S. actions and issues. On September 5, 1983, Reagan publicly played a recording “of conversations between Soviet ground controllers and the pilots of Soviet interceptor aircraft as they zeroed in on Korean Airlines Flight 007.”⁶³ In this way, Reagan garnered support for the U.S. position on this issue but at the expense of revealing much about U.S. SIGINT capabilities. Similarly, in explaining to the world his justification for the Operation EL DORADO CANYON air attack on Libya, Reagan made reference to SIGINT intercepts. He assured allies and enemies alike that “our evidence is direct; is precise; it is irrefutable period.”⁶⁴ In the aftermath of this event he became the first president to visit NSA’s headquarters at Fort Meade, MD. During that visit he told the members of the agency that “the simple truth is: without you, I could not do my job.”⁶⁵

Reagan fulfilled his campaign promises to unleash the intelligence agencies. In the area of intelligence collection this amounted to budget increases, the easing of some restrictions on activities, and supplying a leader he believed shared his vision. Reagan also learned the challenges faced in intelligence collection. In his memoirs he notes, “Yet, as good as our space-age technology was; as great an intelligence service as the CIA became under Bill Casey; as powerful as America was militarily, I learned, as had President Carter, how helpless the head of

⁶² Gates, p. 200.

⁶³ Wirtz, James J. "The American Approach to Intelligence Studies." *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*. Ed. Loch K. Johnson. 1st ed. London ; New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 30.

⁶⁴ Andrew, p. 484.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

the most powerful nation on earth can feel when it comes to the seemingly simple task of trying to find and bring home an American citizen held against his will in a distant land.”⁶⁶

5.1.2.3 Processing and Exploitation

As discussed previously, involvement in this area by decision-makers is usually a negative. When a decision-maker interrupts the intelligence cycle at this point there is a great risk of misinterpreting the raw intelligence. Beyond the obvious dangers of acting on a single-source of intelligence, information at this point in the process has not been vetted for reliability. Although the growth of technology permitted Reagan to access information more readily at this point in the process than his predecessors, there is no evidence that he did so. Reagan’s habit of allowing processes to function without his micromanagement seems to have had a positive effect in this area.

This is not to say that early intelligence was never misleading. During the KAL 007 shoot-down incident, the early conclusion arrived at by the CIA and by the cabinet members who listened to the SIGINT intercepts was that the Soviets had intentionally shot down a civilian airliner (a Boeing 747). Further analysis by the CIA led them to the conclusion that “throughout most of the incident the Soviets had thought they were tracking a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance plane.”⁶⁷ This is an excellent example of Clausewitz’s assertion about battlefield intelligence that contributes to the fog of war.⁶⁸ Notably, however, Casey and the CIA were very quick to

⁶⁶ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 491.

⁶⁷ Gates, pp. 267-269. The COBRA BALL reconnaissance aircraft that had left the area more than an hour previously is built on a Boeing 707 platform so it had the general shape of many civilian airliners of the day, but is still distinctly different in shape from a Boeing 747. The Cobra Ball had been in the area of the Kamchatka Peninsula to monitor an expected Soviet ICBM test. Secretary of State Shultz greeted the change in assessment by the CIA with great pessimism; he was suspicious of the new reports and remarked that the CIA “have no compunctions about fooling you.”

⁶⁸ Clausewitz, p. 117.

update their assessments as new information became available and an accurate picture was available inside a twenty-four hour period.⁶⁹ This represents a tremendous improvement in quality of intelligence over what was observed in the Carter/Turner dyad when CIA analysts were slow to admit to unfolding events in Iran that ran counter to CIA assessments.

5.1.2.4 Analysis and Production

Anecdotes on Reagan's interest in reading intelligence reports during his time in office seem to outnumber factual accounts. Christopher Andrew reports, "Knowing his dislike for lengthy documents, agency analysts usually limited themselves to 150 word main stories, set out in two columns (headlines on the left, text on the right), with a few shorter pieces and the occasional anecdote."⁷⁰ The conclusion that Reagan could not or would not read longer reports, however, are at odds with the statements of those Agency personnel who provided his intelligence briefings. Again we see the relevance of leadership styles. Reagan was not a micro-manager as Carter had been prone to being on some issues. Instead, Reagan preferred placing trusted individuals in charge of different processes and allowing them to do their jobs. The same process seems to be true for intelligence reporting, with process owners such as the DCI and the APNSA (six people would fill that position during Reagan's two terms) selected the information they believed to be most pertinent.

5.1.2.5 Dissemination

Dissemination of intelligence has two key characteristics – who receives the information and how they receive it (the means or medium by which the information is conveyed). Upon inauguration, Reagan extended access to the PDB to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

⁶⁹ Gates, p. 267.

⁷⁰ Andrew, p. 460.

Defense and the APNSA.⁷¹ While leaks on policy issues plagued the administration, the security of the PDB was maintained. President George H.W. Bush reflected on that time period: “I hope the record will show that we protected the PDB from wide distribution and from careless handling.”⁷² During the Reagan administration the CIA expanded the use of video briefings which had been initiated during the Carter administration. “Before most of his major foreign visits he watched videos that combined intelligence assessments with film of people he would be meeting and places he would be visiting.”⁷³ In summary, Reagan demonstrated good security of intelligence products even when his administration suffered many problems with leaks in other areas. His increased use of videos for intelligence briefings can be seen as embracing new capabilities that fit his style of information consumption, a former actor’s preference for film shorts, or as the CIA’s attempting to reach a non-reader, but they unarguably show Reagan’s continued interest in being a consumer of intelligence.

5.1.3 Reagan and Covert Actions

President Reagan favored the use of covert actions. His intentions are evidenced through Executive Orders (EO), National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), and the findings for covert action that he issued. Reagan backed up his call for more covert operations with budgetary support; the result was that by 1984 there had been a 500% increase in operations when compared with 1980, the last year of the Carter/Turner dyad.⁷⁴ Reagan believed that the spread of communism had to be stopped.⁷⁵ His foreign policy took an orchestrated approach that

⁷¹ Kerr and Davis, p. 56.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Andrew, p. 460.

⁷⁴ Prados, John. "Central Intelligence and the Arms Race." *Intelligence: Policy & Process*. Eds. Alfred C. Maurer, Marion David Tunstall, and James M. Keagle. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, p. 504.

⁷⁵ Persico, p. 361.

used many different instruments. Some were traditional, and some, like covert actions, were less conventional.

On the conventional side, Reagan was willing to begin talks with the Soviet Union when many of his cabinet members disagreed, and he was willing to use the overt strength of the military in places like Grenada and Libya where his predecessors had not during *Détente*. Covert actions, however, provide a unique middle ground between slow diplomatic processes and provocative large-scale military actions. In military doctrine, special operations are a force multiplier; they are an asset that “significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.”⁷⁶ Covert actions promise the potential for similar efficiency in the policy sphere. Covert actions potentially offer a low cost means of achieving significant foreign policy goals in comparatively shorter time frames than economic or diplomatic methods. Further, they do so with a precipitously lower risk of provoking retaliation than a conventional military action. For these reasons and more, they often present an attractive option, and it was said of Reagan that he was “the Will Rogers of intelligence—he never met a covert operation he didn’t like.”⁷⁷

Section 1.8 (e) of EO 12333 made “special activities” (covert actions) the exclusive purview of the CIA “unless the president determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.”⁷⁸ With the exception of wartime operations by the Department of Defense, the CIA would be Reagan’s tool for covert actions. With the help of Congressman Charlie Wilson, the budget for CIA operations in Afghanistan alone reached \$100 million,

⁷⁶ JP 1-02, p. 142.

⁷⁷ Persico, p. 361.

⁷⁸ EO 12333, p. 206.

surpassing all other operations since the conclusion of the Vietnam War.⁷⁹ The total scope of covert actions was enormous, with greater than fifty operations being conducted by 1984. Notably, half those operations were in South America.⁸⁰ As they frequently were on many foreign policy issues, Reagan's cabinet was divided on the topic of covert operations.

One cabinet member who was not an advocate of covert actions was Al Haig, Reagan's first Secretary of State. Haig states in his memoirs that he warned of the "dangers and limitations to using covert action as a substitute for open foreign policy."⁸¹ This criticism is ironic when examining one of the greatest curiosities of the operations in Nicaragua; much of the "covert" support being conducted there was done in a rather blatantly overt manner. There are additional dangers in such extensive use of covert actions, however – dangers that go beyond the diplomatic impact of mission failure. Such operations require careful control and oversight in order to avoid exceeding their mandate.

Reagan's preferred use of the NSPG extended to the management of covert actions. This meant "the president himself sat on the ultimate covert action decision body for the first time, eliminating the Special Group as a screen. In Reagan's day many decisions were made right in the Situation Room, at the NSPG table."⁸² The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) had been reinstated by Reagan and Casey, and while they should also have provided oversight, there should be limits on such expectations. John Prados notes that the PFIAB seemed to have taken little interest in covert actions.⁸³ To the extent that Prados is referring specifically to the Iran-Contra affair, it is unlikely that even a hyper-vigilant PFIAB would have noted the

⁷⁹ Peterell, p. 11.

⁸⁰ Prados, p. 504.

⁸¹ Haig, Alexander Meigs, and Charles McCarry. *Inner Circles : How America Changed the World : A Memoir*. New York, NY: Warner Books, 1992, p. 549.

⁸² Prados, p. 496.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

operation since the transfer of funds which violated the Boland Amendment⁸⁴ were run from the NSC which is not under the purview of the PFIAB since it is not an intelligence agency.

The origins of what became the Iran-Contra Affair were relatively unassuming in manner. Reagan notes in his memoirs:

Bill Casey and others at the CIA drafted a plan to meet the Communist threat in Central America through a covert program that, over the next few months, would provide for the support of anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans who would try to halt the flow of Soviet-made arms from Cuba to Nicaragua and El Salvador. These men, just a few in the beginning, were the nucleus of Nicaragua's Contra freedom fighters. A month later, after we went over the program in more detail, I formally approved the plan, hoping that it would halt the advance of Communism seven hundred miles from our border. Only time would tell."⁸⁵

Haig opposed Casey's suggestions for Nicaragua vigorously. "It won't be effective because you won't be able to do enough and it won't work because it will be exposed and discredited," he informed Casey.⁸⁶ Opposition was also prevalent in Congress and despite the urges of Casey for the president to make a public appeal on this issue, a campaign to gain popular support was never launched. Instead, Reagan relied upon strong allies in Congress to protect the program. In a November 17, 1983, diary entry Reagan notes that at the behest of Casey he called upon Senator

⁸⁴ Edward Boland (D-MA) introduced an amendment to the intelligence act in 1982 that restricted the Department of Defense or the CIA from taking any action "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua." A year later a second Boland amendment that would terminate all military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels passed the House of Representative, but not the Senate. That amendment was subsequently passed in December 1984 as part of the 1985 budget, cutting off all military aid to the Contras. Persico, pp. 302, 335-337, and 407.

⁸⁵ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 300.

⁸⁶ Haig, *Inner Circles*, p. 549.

Ted Stevens (R-AK) to “fight to the death” to preserve the covert aid for Nicaragua.⁸⁷ While Stevens won that battle for Reagan, pressure (in the form of legislation and budget cuts) from Congress to abandon the Contras continued to rise.

As Congress strangled the Contra operation with successive amendments restricting funding and activity, one of the greatest shortfalls of the Reagan administration’s covert action process occurred. Robert McFarlane, Reagan’s third APNSA, was told by the president, “I want you to do whatever you have to do to help these people keep body and soul together. Do everything you can.”⁸⁸ That broad and unqualified statement and a lack of oversight over the methods the NSC would employ to fulfill the president’s direction put support for the Contras on a collision course with an unrelated operation in the Middle East.

Reagan’s preoccupation with the liberation of American hostages being held by radical Islamic terrorists led to more than one unconventional decision. Unable to locate the hostages, Casey had gained the approval of President Reagan to kidnap assassin and Hezbollah chieftain Imad Mughniyah.⁸⁹ When this failed, the prospect of working with so-called “moderates” within the Iranian government became an option. “Reagan then agreed ‘warts and all’ the Iranian moderates were America’s best hope for the release of the hostages.”⁹⁰ This would ultimately lead to the sale of U.S.-produced weapons to Iran. Members of the NSC then used a diversion of profits from those sales to support the Contras. In his memoirs, Reagan relates his perspective:

McFarlane, Poindexter, Casey, and I presume, North knew how deeply I felt about the need for the Contras survival as a Democratic resistance force in

⁸⁷ Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, p. 198.

⁸⁸ McFarlane, Robert C., and Zofia Smardz. *Special Trust*. New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994, p. 68.

⁸⁹ Weiner, p. 397.

⁹⁰ Noonan, Peggy. *When Character was King : A Story of Ronald Reagan*. New York: Viking, 2001, p. 269.

Nicaragua. They also knew how frustrated I was over my battles with Congress. Perhaps that knowledge, along with their own belief in the importance of the Contra survival, their adherence to the code that absolute secrecy is necessary to intelligence operations, and the belief that the NSC was exempt from the Boland Amendment, led them to support the Contras secretly and saw no reason to report this to me.⁹¹

The result was a significant scandal that, if it did not threaten to bring down the administration, it at least besmirched its legacy. Reagan's personal style of leadership, which placed considerable faith and trust in key individuals to run their various areas, was certainly a contributor to the failure.

Other covert operations achieved better outcomes. One of the earliest areas of high interest for the Reagan administration was Poland. Operations there were carefully constructed to avoid any possibility of tainting the Solidarity movement as a CIA effort. William J. Clarke noted that "the president and Casey and I discussed the situation on the ground in Poland constantly: covert operations; who was doing what, where, why and how; and chances of success."⁹² Issues in Poland also gained prominence within the PDB and led to a unique triple alliance between Washington, London, and the Vatican.⁹³ Operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world would also achieve success against a Soviet Union that Reagan believed was dangerous but had over-reached.

⁹¹ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 487.

⁹² Andrew, p. 469.

⁹³ O'Sullivan, John. *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister : Three Who Changed the World*. Washington, DC; Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub.; Distributed to the trade by National Book Network, 2006, p. 182.

Reagan's attitude concerning Congressional oversight was not flippant, but it seems to have held a secondary status to the success of the mission. After Senator Barry Goldwater (R - AZ) complained about the manner in which Casey had informed (or had hidden his informing) of Congress of the CIA's mining of Nicaraguan harbors, Reagan seems to have been less concerned with the lack of respect shown to the SSCI, and more concerned with the effect of Congress' failure to support anti-Communist forces in Central America.⁹⁴ Reagan notes in his diary on Tuesday, April 10, 1984, that a restriction of funds to the Contras would "bring joy to the Soviets & Cubans."⁹⁵ He did not believe that the policies being carried out in Central America should be seen as his policies, but instead were the policy of the Congress that had limited and restricted his intended policies and actions.

Reagan's willingness to embrace covert action as a means to achieve a desired end was not born out of the same frustration that drove Carter to covert actions. Instead, Reagan displayed a willingness to engage the Soviets on all fronts. Covert action was used in concert with other tools, and it was preferred on issues and in areas where diplomacy was ineffective and overt force was impracticable. The locations where covert actions were employed were places where the Soviets were seen as already engaged and making headway. Covert action, however, was only a small part of the intelligence community's contribution to foreign affairs.

⁹⁴ CIA officer Dewey Clarridge oversaw an operation to deploy what were intended to be "firecracker" mines, intended to scare off shipping instead of destroy it. Since the Contras had no experience with such weapons, this became a CIA run operation. The operation was briefed in detail to the HPSCI on 31 January, 1984. On 8 March, 1984 it was briefed to the SSCI, but it was not presented in detail. The information was subsequently provided to the committee again on 13 March, and to the staff on 2 April, but on 5 April several senators were still surprised to find out that the operation had been conducted by the CIA and not the Contras. Gates, pp. 306-307.

⁹⁵ Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, p. 231

5.1.4 Reagan and Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of an administration is the battlefield upon which the president-DCI relationship must prove itself. In the case of the Reagan-Casey dyad, the metaphor of a battlefield is more accurate than in some other administrations, due to the contentiousness of the foreign policy debate. Therefore, the importance of quality intelligence was greater, particularly considering the strong policy role that Casey assumed. To the Soviet Union, however, the Reagan administration appeared to be quite unified. The strong language of the early days of Reagan's first term led to a dangerous change in the Soviet assessment of the new administration. Anti-Soviet talk that had initially been dismissed as strong campaign rhetoric turned to spawning fear and paranoia amongst the Soviet hierarchy (a trait that is recurrent in Russian history).⁹⁶ This, in turn, led to the implementation of "RYAN," a Soviet program to gather intelligence on U.S. preparations for what the Soviets believed was an imminent attack.⁹⁷ The danger of a misunderstanding was exacerbated by the highly fractious natures of Reagan's foreign policy team. Reagan's first Chief of Staff, James Baker, referred to the national security process as a "slugfest" for dominance within the system. Those outside the White House were concerned about the power of the "troika" (Jim Baker, Mike Deaver, and Ed Meese) that, they feared, controlled access to Reagan. Meanwhile, neither Alexander Haig nor George Shultz could maintain a working relationship with Bill Casey and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger without the peace-making efforts of Reagan.⁹⁸

Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, was described by Weinberger as being "constitutionally unable to present an argument without an enormous amount of passion and

⁹⁶ Andrew, p. 463.

⁹⁷ Gates, p. 70. "RYAN" was the Russian acronym for "Nuclear Missile Attack."

⁹⁸ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 477.

intensity, heavily overlaid with a deep suspicion of the competence and motives of anyone who did not share his opinions.”⁹⁹ This extended to President Reagan who noted that Haig “didn’t want to carry out the president’s foreign policy; he wanted to formulate and carry it out himself.”¹⁰⁰ Haig and Casey did not engage in the same level of hostilities that Shultz and Casey would later share, but Haig clearly had concerns about a DCI who was part of the policy team. Haig believed that the intelligence chief should be “simply a purveyor of facts” and “not even be in the cabinet,” though he knew that Casey “wasn’t going to be content unless he was in the thick of it.”¹⁰¹

Haig’s successor, George Shultz, would serve as the loudest critic of both Casey and the CIA within the administration. It is important to note that in the long run it would be Shultz whose views were closest to Reagan’s and for that reason Shultz would supplant Casey as the primary influence on Reagan on issues dealing with the Soviet Union; Robert Gates noted “Casey and Weinberger both became increasingly irrelevant.”¹⁰² Shultz criticized both the foreign policy role that Casey played and the actions of the CIA, calling Casey and the Agency “as independent as a hog on ice,” and claiming that they “could be as confident as they were wrong.”¹⁰³ Intelligence, however, remained relevant.

Intelligence played an important and usually objective role in the Reagan foreign policy debates. The CIA played a critical role in keeping the president advised on the situation in Poland, through sources such as Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski and through an exchange of

⁹⁹ Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 29.

¹⁰⁰ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 270.

¹⁰¹ Persico, p. 306.

¹⁰² Andrew, p. 478.

¹⁰³ Shultz, p. 84.

information with the Vatican.”¹⁰⁴ Intelligence would play a major part in convincing Reagan to abandon his “Evil-Empire” rhetoric towards the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ Intelligence would not only guide policy, but it provided Reagan the evidence he needed in the court of world public opinion as he dealt with rogue leaders such as Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi.¹⁰⁶ To Casey’s disappointment, CIA analysts could not back up Haig’s assertions that the Soviets were the major force behind international terrorism.¹⁰⁷ Most importantly, there were no intelligence failures along the lines of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution that occurred during the Carter administration.

While the Iran-Contra affair grabbed headlines and notoriety, the debate over Soviet objectives and intentions is a far better proving ground for the quality and objectivity of intelligence analysis. From the beginning of the administration the intelligence community, including the CIA, confidently reported the economic woes of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁸ The speed at which the economic troubles would take effect was more difficult to determine. The key judgments from a 1982 CIA assessment titled *Soviet Society in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects*, began in this way:

Both Western observers and Soviet officials recognize that the Soviet Union now faces a wide array of social, economic, and political ills including a general social malaise, ethnic tensions, consumer frustrations, and political dissent. Precisely how these internal problems will ultimately challenge and affect the regime,

¹⁰⁴ Weinberger, Caspar W. *Fighting for Peace : Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*. New York, NY: Warner Books, 1990, p. 279.

¹⁰⁵ Andrew, p. 494.

¹⁰⁶ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 281.

¹⁰⁷ Gates, p. 205. Andrew records that National Security Advisor Richard Allen stated that Reagan and the Pope had developed “one of the greatest secret alliances of all time,” but Gates denies that there was an “alliance.” Andrew, p. 469.

¹⁰⁸ Andrew, p. 494.

however, is open to debate and considerable uncertainty. Some observers believe that the regime will have little trouble coping with the negative mood among the populace. Others believe that economic mismanagement will aggravate internal problems and ultimately erode the regime's credibility, increasing the long-term prospects for fundamental political change.¹⁰⁹

Additionally, while intelligence reports on the Soviet economic situation may have appeared positive from the perspective of U.S. policymakers, Soviet actions in Europe and throughout the Third World were the reality the Reagan administration had to deal with.

As Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin discuss KGB operations and Soviet foreign policy in the Third World, they quote Nikolai Leonov, head of KGB intelligence assessment. Leonov explains, "We were guided by the idea that the destiny of world confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, between Capitalism and Socialism, would be resolved in the Third World. This was the basic premise."¹¹⁰ Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger noted the huge expansion the Soviet made at the former U.S. base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam as evidence of Soviet intentions. Weinberger went on to say "the Soviets were plainly arming in preparing for aggressive action. If you move out with forward 'defenses' so far that on one side you encompass, for example, most of the Pacific, or a good bit of Europe on the other side, then you are clearly not simply trying to protect your border."¹¹¹ The ascension of Gorbachev produced a change in the rhetoric flowing from the Kremlin, but the hard-line anti-Soviets in the Reagan administration required proof that these changes included implementing new policies,

¹⁰⁹ Haines, Gerald K., and Robert E. Leggett, eds. *CIA's Analysis Fo the Soviet Union: 1947-1991*. Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001, p. 108.

¹¹⁰ Andrew, Christopher M., and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World was Going our Way : The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*. New York: Basic Books, 2005, pp. 9-10.

¹¹¹ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, pp. 281-282.

not simply new rhetoric. It was within this environment that the CIA assessments on the Soviet Union were received.

The lack of a Soviet understanding of how to deal with their own economic troubles contributed to the challenges to the intelligence community. If the Soviets did not know what was going to happen next, no amount of SIGINT reporting could reveal a plan that they had not constructed. The knowledge of hindsight gives intelligence reporting on the collapse of the Soviet Union a very conservative appearance, but the CIA had been accused of being too willing to accept Soviet statements about coming honestly to the bargaining table during the transition. Adding to the challenges of CIA analysts was the fact that Reagan chose not to share his personal correspondences with Gorbachev.¹¹² Furthermore, while the CIA assessed the potential for negotiations with the Soviets, it was also reporting on their exploits throughout the world; accurate reporting of KGB activities at the time did not lend themselves easily to supporting assessments of positive changes in Soviet diplomacy.¹¹³ Analysis of more tangible issues such as military readiness, technological abilities, and Kremlin succession were simpler issues to address. Casey accurately predicted the succession of Andropov as Brezhnev's immediate successor and Gorbachev as the rising future leader of consequence.¹¹⁴ Intelligence in this era was not infallible by any means though, and nowhere was its shortfall more perilous than its understanding of the Soviet fear of an attack initiated by Reagan.

Soviet concern about a U.S. attack (which had caused the Soviets to launch the aforementioned operation RYAN) was far greater than anyone in the intelligence community or the Reagan administration realized. This paranoia culminated during a U.S. strategic exercise

¹¹² Gates, p. 340.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p. 378.

¹¹⁴ Andrew, p. 469.

named ABLE ARCHER. The CIA recognized and briefed the increased levels of Soviet military readiness, but the Agency did not fully comprehend the high level of concern on the part of the Soviet leadership.¹¹⁵ Robert Gates and others involved with assessing the Soviet Union in that era remain unsure to this day how close the world came to a superpower confrontation as the Soviets feared the exercise was actually the preliminary movements to a first strike.¹¹⁶

In summary, intelligence as a product and the DCI as an individual were both integral to Ronald Reagan in the development of foreign policy. Reagan fell victim to no major surprises due to intelligence failures as his predecessor had. Intelligence aided Reagan in more aggressively engaging the Soviets diplomatically, economically, and militarily around the world. The attention Casey brought to KGB activities in the Third World resulted in the Reagan Doctrine.¹¹⁷ Intelligence on Poland guided a policy that would eventually see the dismantlement of the Eastern Bloc. Reliable assessments of Soviet military strength were indispensable at the initiation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations. While intelligence proved ineffective at finding American hostages held by terrorists, it was successful in providing evidence against sponsors of terrorism such as Libya and in defining the extent and limitations of Soviet involvement in terrorism.¹¹⁸ The CIA had correctly identified the danger to the Marines in Lebanon and predicted the fall of the Marcos regime in the Philippines. Reagan pronounced a faith in the capabilities of the intelligence community from the start of his administration, and the community quickly proved the confidence he placed in them was well founded. Furthermore, he kept faith in their assessments even during the darkest days of the Iran-Contra affair.

¹¹⁵ Gates, pp. 271-272.

¹¹⁶ Andrew, Christopher M., and Vasili Mitrokhin. *The Sword and the Shield : The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*. Pbk ed. New York: Basic Books, 2001, pp. 9-10.

¹¹⁷ Gates, p. 256.

¹¹⁸ Persico, pp. 286-287.

5.1.5 Operational Code for Reagan

Unlike Carter's Intelligence Operational Code, many parts of Reagan's Intelligence Operational Code (see Figure 5.1) are developed from patterns of behavior in the absence of formal statements. Nowhere is this truer than in the area of intelligence oversight. Reagan's direct involvement in NSPG discussions concerning covert actions demonstrated a willingness to forsake an important degree of plausible deniability in order to be the decision-maker. Reagan, however, was not a micro-manager and was less likely to dig deeply into the specifics of how a policy was carried out. The most critical aspect of his oversight methodology was the selection of loyal and trusted individuals for senior positions. Reagan held them accountable to himself but left them to run their policy areas in their own ways. The relatively neutral placement on the executive oversight spectrum reflects this desire to be involved but not to micromanage.

Reagan's attitude toward Congressional oversight is also rarely directly stated. Reagan's covert action finding that stated "I direct the Director of Central Intelligence not to brief the Congress of the United States..."¹¹⁹ stands clearly against Congressional oversight, but it is the exception to an otherwise nearly vacant record on the subject and is consistent with Carter's decision to keep Congress uninformed about Operation EAGLE CLAW. Reagan was more concerned with attempts by the Congress to reshape or curtail his foreign policies than he was about monitoring the legislative oversight process. While Reagan could certainly express concern over the danger of leaks, he could hardly deny that his own cabinet had a larger problem with leaks than the Congress. Ultimately, Reagan was less concerned about informing or

¹¹⁹ Persico, p. 472.

denying information to Congress than he was about ensuring that his programs survived intact. Since Congressional oversight works best when it is an active process, Reagan is placed closer to the “Denied Access to Information” end of the scale, but not significantly far from center.

Regarding the role of the DCI, Reagan intended William Casey to run the intelligence community as DCI. Unlike Carter, Reagan made little attempt to understand the complexity of the intelligence community and relied upon Casey to tell him what support a DCI required. Reagan’s faith and loyalty to Casey would likely have led him to support strong centralized control of the intelligence community by the DCI if Casey had desired it, but Casey never asked Reagan for the kind of changes that Turner had requested. Keeping with his habit of allowing key subordinates to run their own areas, Reagan made no noticeable effort to alter the status quo within the intelligence community; as a result, Reagan is placed in the center of the spectrum to show a relatively neutral position.

Regarding the role of intelligence in policy formulation, by the end of Casey’s tenure as DCI, Reagan’s diary entries demonstrate recognition of a need to separate the presentation of intelligence and the advocating of policy.¹²⁰ It is important to note, however, that Reagan’s relationship with interim DCI Robert Gates and with Casey’s eventual successor, William Webster, was different than his relationship with Casey. Reagan took policy advice from Casey not because he was the DCI, but because he was Bill Casey, who had so successfully managed his 1980 presidential campaign. Therefore, Reagan is placed on the “Policy Advocate” end of the scale, because he was willing to allow it to happen, but closer to the center than the extreme because this willingness was more based upon the individual than the position, as demonstrated through his relationship with Gates and Webster.

¹²⁰ Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, p. 485.

Reagan used EO 12333 to reemphasize the restrictions on murder and assassination that had been put in place by President Ford. Although, he realized that these restrictions were an impediment to infiltrating the terrorist organizations that were holding American hostages in the Middle East, he was still unwilling to cross that line. Reagan did not, however, demonstrate the same compunctions against HUMINT programs that Carter had demonstrated at his initial briefings. Again, Reagan scores close to the middle of the spectrum but errs to the side of “Freedom of Operations” over “Universal Human Rights.”

Reagan’s campaign promises to “unleash” the CIA demonstrate an early appreciation for the potential benefits of covert action.¹²¹ Covert action was used not only to battle the Soviets in the Third World but in Europe as well. It was not the centerpiece of Reagan’s foreign policy, but it was an important part of it. Like a knight on a chess board, it gives the decision-maker the ability to leap certain obstacles and occasionally can become an early end-game maneuver. Reagan is placed close to the extreme of viewing covert actions as a “Tool of U.S. Diplomacy.”

Reagan’s willingness to step up and engage the Soviets around the world demonstrates an aggressive foreign policy that did not shrink from conflict. Likewise, the policy process he built around him was one that encouraged aggressive debate rather than consensus building. He was, however, quite willing to bargain with his adversaries. His decisions to go forward with talks with the Soviets against the advice of his DCI and Secretary of Defense show that he would bargain rather than the brinkmanship of a zero-sum game.

¹²¹ Andrew, p. 459.

5.2 DCI William J. Casey (13th DCI, 1981-1987)

William Casey was sworn in as the thirteenth DCI on January 28th, 1981. Casey was the oldest man to hold the job, the wealthiest, and the first to hold cabinet rank.¹²² He loved history and read voraciously. Stanley Sporkin, who worked for Casey at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and later at the CIA as general counsel, said that Casey was “the brightest person I ever met.”¹²³ Sporkin went on to describe him as having a photographic memory and have a low tolerance of fools and of long meetings.¹²⁴ Casey put in long hours at any job. Herbert Meyer, his special assistant, described his work habits as DCI as being ten to twelve hour days in the week with a couple of additional hours of reading at night, plus a half day on Saturday.¹²⁵

During World War Two, Casey had served in the OSS; after the war, he earned his fortune in investments and authoring books on, amongst other things, tax loopholes.¹²⁶ Casey’s success in business and particularly within the area of tax loopholes may be one of the most telling aspects of his personality. It demonstrates a competitive character, a willingness to take on certain risks, and a belief that anything is legal unless it is specifically illegal. Historian Christopher Andrew notes that Casey “had a natural tendency to bend intelligence rules as far as they would go.”¹²⁷ Casey served publicly during the Nixon administration on the SEC and in the state department, and while those periods were not without controversy, they recorded significant

¹²² Persico, p. 210.

¹²³ Kessler, Ronald, *Inside the CIA : Revealing the Secrets of the World's most Powerful Spy Agency*. New York: Pocket Books, 1992, p 137.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹²⁶ Persico, p. 91.

¹²⁷ Andrew, p. 459.

accomplishments.¹²⁸ Casey stepped into Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign as campaign manager, after Reagan's disastrous showing in the Iowa caucus.¹²⁹ After guiding Reagan's campaign to a victorious conclusion Casey had hoped to be rewarded with the position of Secretary of State, but he was willing to accept the position of DCI with an understanding that he would still be involved in formulating foreign policy as a full member of the cabinet.¹³⁰

Casper Weinberger describes Casey as a "practical and persistent man and one who was very loyal to the President."¹³¹ This falls short of portraying the passion Casey brought to the job. Herbert Meyer believes that considerable insight into Casey's character can be found in his public speeches. Among those insights he finds "a constant effort to inform the public of the true nature of the intelligence mission."¹³² It is important to temper Meyer's statement with the observation that Casey's idea of informing the public, or anyone else, had very strict limits. Informing the public of the threats America faced and how the CIA faithfully and patriotically protected our citizenry did not extend to permitting outside oversight of how the Agency conducted its business (this will be further addressed later). Returning to Meyer's point, repeated in Casey's messages can be found a sentiment that well describes Casey's tenure as DCI: "It is easy and costly and painful to be misunderstood, but it's more costly and painful to misunderstand the kind of world in which we have to operate. And we have not understood it as well as we must."¹³³ Casey could brush off considerable unfavorable press or a scolding from

¹²⁸ Persico, pp. 152-153.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, pp.177-180.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 203.

¹³¹ Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, p. 27.

¹³² Casey, William J., Herbert E. Meyer, and Mark B. Liedl. *Scouting the Future : The Public Speeches of William J. Casey*. Washington, D.C.; New York, NY: Regnery Gateway; Distributed by Kampmann, 1989, p. xiii.

¹³³ Casey and Meyer, p. 100.

Congress when he believed he was serving a greater good. In one of his last speeches, Casey quoted President Theodore Roosevelt:

Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than to take rank with those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the gray twilight that knows not victory nor defeat.¹³⁴

Joseph Persico's biography of Casey is filled with examples of his being willing to dare what many would have considered fraught with risk.

In professional and in personal choices, Casey frequently stepped beyond the comfort zone of others to reach for things that many probably considered unattainable. Casey often considered risk to be part of doing business; it was a lesson forged out of the challenges he faced in World War Two and from his business experience. Once installed as DCI, he saw new challenges. He saw an intelligence service that "had been diminished by the loss of 50 percent of its people and 40 percent of its funding during the 1970s."¹³⁵

5.2.1 Casey's Early Dealings with the Intelligence Community

Casey's time in the OSS was a monumental period in his life. The trust and respect between Casey and William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan was key in Casey's success in World War Two and in the rest of Casey's life. Donovan promoted Casey to head Secret Intelligence (SI) for the OSS in London in December, 1944.¹³⁶ Casey was able to complete a task that British intelligence said could not be done – the successful penetration of the Third Reich in

¹³⁴ Casey and Meyer, p. 296. This same quote was by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick to eulogize Casey.

¹³⁵ Casey and Meyer, p. 10.

¹³⁶ Persico, p. 69.

Germany.¹³⁷ In this experience he discovered both a mentor and personal talent. Donovan's own history is replete with examples of pushing limits to complete the mission and serve what he felt was a greater good. Casey's accomplishments led him to realize "that given a mission, he knew how to marshal the personnel, the organization, the technology and hardware. He could mobilize people, command their loyalties, inspire them and stretch them."¹³⁸

Between the conclusion of World War Two and his appointment as DCI, Casey retained some contact with the intelligence community and tremendous interest in foreign affairs. In 1975, as part of the Murphy Commission on "The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy," Casey had examined the organization of the intelligence community in general, and the CIA in specific.¹³⁹ Casey maintained contact with fellow OSS veterans, and in 1976 he was made part of the PFIAB, serving a relatively short term until President Carter disbanded the board in 1977. Casey did not engage directly with the CIA throughout the early CIA briefings to President Reagan, and initially assured DCI Turner that he was not seeking his position (which is accurate inasmuch as Casey still coveted the position of Secretary of State).¹⁴⁰ The Reagan administration's transition team for the CIA descended upon the headquarters at Langley with vigor. "The fundamental problem confronting American security," the transition team reported, "is the current dangerous condition of the Central Intelligence Agency of national intelligence collection generally."¹⁴¹ Change was in the air, however, and the team's final report was total condemnation of the CIA during the Carter/Turner tenure and called for the Agency to be dismantled. Casey, instead, disbanded the transition team, which surely met with the approval

¹³⁷ Persico, pp. 67-81.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 83.

¹³⁹ Ranelagh, p. 671.

¹⁴⁰ Helgeson, p. 135.

¹⁴¹ Ranelagh, p. 660.

of those in the CIA. DCI Turner had described the transition team “to be as unbalanced, opinionated, and unwilling to listen as any group I have ever encountered.”¹⁴² What the transition team had made clear was that the Reagan administration desired the CIA to be revitalized with boldness.

5.2.2 Casey and the Intelligence Process

Casey believed American intelligence had two primary purposes. The first was to “avert war by alerting our leaders to any military dangers to our national security,” and the second was “to help the President and his top advisers frame sound policies needed to retain American strength against a myriad of political, economic, and even technological threats.”¹⁴³ Therefore, his highest duty as DCI was to “produce solid and perceptive national intelligence estimates relevant to the issues with which the President and the National Security Council need to concern themselves.”¹⁴⁴

Casey quickly divided the duties of DCI with his deputy, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, in such a way as to make obvious where his interests and concerns lay. Inman states, “Casey told me very directly that he did not want to be the traditional Director of Central Intelligence. He did want to be the President’s intelligence officer and he was going to run the clandestine service of the CIA.”¹⁴⁵ Ironically, Casey would far exceed any claim DCI Turner might have made to be the head of the entire intelligence community through the loyalty he garnered from the other members. This loyalty came from his habits of “soliciting their opinions, hearing their gripes,” and “fighting for their budgets.”¹⁴⁶ Casey did not try to manage their fiefdoms. Instead he

¹⁴² Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 192.

¹⁴³ Casey and Meyer, p. 128.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 42.

¹⁴⁵ Weiner, p. 378.

¹⁴⁶ Persico, p. 509.

supported them. In an interview for *USA Today* in 1983, Casey said there was very little tension between the intelligence agencies and that the intelligence community's members worked together with greater cooperation than before.¹⁴⁷ An important contributor to the improved state of the intelligence community was the regular interaction Casey had with many other key members, such as his weekly breakfasts with Secretary of Defense Weinberger.¹⁴⁸ Casey did not, however, win over all parts of the community. Regular meetings with the Secretary of State were less frequent with Alexander Haig, and they diminished almost entirely during the tenure of George Shultz.¹⁴⁹

Casey took great pride in the ways that he incorporated both the business community and academia into the intelligence process. Tapping both the extensive sources and considerable experience of those communities improved both the collection and analysis of intelligence to support the decision-makers.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, business contacts provided “independent channels the administration (or he) could use to contact foreign leaders . . . unreachable through official means.”¹⁵¹ Casey maintained an extensive public speaking schedule because he believed “the backing and understanding of the American people are going to be needed to sustain and build on the progress we have made.”¹⁵² His willingness to enlighten the public on intelligence matters had very clear limits, though. He frequently quoted George Washington as saying “the necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy success depends in most enterprises of this kind, and for want of it they are generally

¹⁴⁷ Garthoff, Douglas p. 160.

¹⁴⁸ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, p. 296.

¹⁴⁹ Gharthoff, Douglas p. 153.

¹⁵⁰ Casey and Meyer, p. 32.

¹⁵¹ Gates, p. 212.

¹⁵² Casey and Meyer, pp. 27–28.

defeated.”¹⁵³ During Casey’s tenure, the CIA would serve as an overt symbol of power and force in foreign policy, while its means and methods usually remained covert and clandestine.

Casey was a student of history. The lessons learned from history could not only enhance analysis but could shape intelligence collection and even covert actions. CIA analysts who, at Casey’s behest, reviewed past CIA analytical failures discovered that “virtually every time our estimates were off-base, it was because we’d made a single-scenario forecast.”¹⁵⁴ Learning from history was a means to avoid repeating past mistakes, and “to Casey it was forgivable to make a mistake provided one learned why and never made it again.”¹⁵⁵ Casey drew upon his personal experiences in World War Two and the events of the Carter/Turner dyad for powerful examples and important lessons relevant to the intelligence process.

5.2.2.1 Planning and Direction

As discussed in the development of Reagan’s Intelligence Operational Code, Reagan’s style of leadership emphasized strong goals that he desired agencies to direct their energies towards, but he left the specifics of implementation to the discretion of carefully selected cabinet members. Similarly, Casey’s direction of the intelligence community lacked the micromanagement that was prevalent during the Carter/Turner dyad. Instead, Casey worked to maintain a unity of effort and an economy of force necessary to promote efficiency and coordination within the intelligence community. Garthoff notes that Casey “expected agencies other than CIA to pitch in, indicated he valued their contributions, and through force of personality imposed his leadership on a community generally pleased to be led and supported by a vocal and strong advocate of intelligence who demanded no major changes in the way they ran

¹⁵³ Casey and Meyer, p. 30.

¹⁵⁴ Persico, p. 221.

¹⁵⁵ Casey and Meyer, p. 213.

their own bailiwicks.”¹⁵⁶ Turner’s separate collection and resource management staffs were quickly eliminated in favor of a single Intelligence Community Staff, which Casey met with on a weekly basis.¹⁵⁷

The absence of formal intelligence guidance from the President to the intelligence community would have been a severe problem for this dyad if it had not been for the strong informal connection between Reagan and Casey. Casey’s presence in the cabinet and the NSPG ensured that he was aware of the items of greatest importance to the key foreign policy makers. This serves as an example of how each dyad must be viewed within its own context, since Casey’s membership on the cabinet may well have been a necessity within the Reagan foreign policy process. Casey’s dialogue with the President was not restricted to intelligence matters either. DDCI Inman reported that Casey sent Reagan memos on a daily basis, but many of them “were political advice—who to appoint as ambassadors, where to go, what to do, all that sort of stuff.”¹⁵⁸ Methods of guidance for the planning and direction of the intelligence process was severely changed during the Reagan/Casey dyad from that of its predecessor; these changes made the process less formal, but they improved the functioning of some important parts of the community.

5.2.2.2 Collection

Stansfield Turner characterizes Bill Casey of being focused on espionage and covert action and generally disinterested in TECHINT.¹⁵⁹ This charge, which is echoed by others, is difficult to substantiate. Casey certainly believed that HUMINT provided insight that was

¹⁵⁶ Garthoff, Douglas pp. 159-160.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 160-161. Casey’s IC Staff meetings were held on Thursday mornings and were initially run by John Koehler.

¹⁵⁸ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 196.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*.

difficult to obtain from a photograph; he told a group of businessmen, “Facts can confuse. The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words.”¹⁶⁰ Describing the shortcomings of a means of collection should not be mistaken for ignorance or a lack of appreciation of that discipline. Casey worked with DDCI Inman and Secretary of Defense Weinberger to develop a five-year plan that would rebuild the intelligence community’s technical and human collection programs.¹⁶¹ The CIA’s budget increased greatly, surpassing the 3 billion dollar level, with additional intelligence funding hidden within the defense budget that exceeded \$30 billion.¹⁶² The funds that Casey procured for the TECHINT programs dwarfed the HUMINT budget and Casey was proud of the capabilities that were being developed, telling the Mid-America Club in Chicago that the intelligence community would be “receiving four times as many photos, signals, and reports in four to five years as we’re receiving now.”¹⁶³ The HUMINT program would also grow, with the clandestine service gaining approximately two thousand new officers.¹⁶⁴

In addition to overseeing the development of TECHINT and HUMINT disciplines, Casey was concerned with the security of his product (intelligence) and his people. One of the highest priority issues for Casey was fulfilled in the passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. This bill made it a crime to identify or disclose information that would identify a covert agent,¹⁶⁵ and its relatively easy passage demonstrated the strong support that could be found for

¹⁶⁰ Persico, p. 220.

¹⁶¹ Gates, p. 220.

¹⁶² Weiner, p. 381.

¹⁶³ Casey and Meyer, p. 60. This speech was given on April 4, 1984.

¹⁶⁴ Weiner, p. 381.

¹⁶⁵ Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982: National Security Act of 1947, TITLE VI— Protection Of Certain National Security Information Protection Of Identities Of Certain United States Undercover Intelligence Officers, Agents, Informants, And Sources, SEC. 601. [50 U.S.C. 421] (a). This act was passed by a vote of eighty-one to four on June 10, 1982.

the intelligence services in the Senate.¹⁶⁶ This legislation, accompanied by exemptions from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), helped protect classified information that could reveal sources and methods of intelligence collection and endanger members of the intelligence community.

Finally, Casey considerably expanded the exchange of information with foreign intelligence services. The Israeli MOSSAD was one of Casey's first international contacts. Casey was initially interested in information gained from Jews in Poland;¹⁶⁷ later, the Israelis were extremely helpful in Libya,¹⁶⁸ and Israel was one of the CIA's only sources of information from inside Iran.¹⁶⁹ Relations with the British remained quite strong, not just in the traditional area of SIGINT, but in HUMINT as well, as demonstrated by access to information provided by the KGB defector Vladimir Kuzichkin.¹⁷⁰ One of the most unusual partnerships among Casey's international alliances was the Vatican. Casey made many trips to the Vatican to exchange information on the situation in Poland, trips that included private audiences with Pope John Paul II himself.¹⁷¹

5.2.2.3 Processing and Exploitation

The explosion in technology that was going on in the 1980s did not go unnoticed by Casey. He saw the need to continue to improve TECHINT collection just as he saw the necessity for rebuilding the HUMINT capabilities. As an experienced HUMINT officer he understood the need to process information before allowing it to be included in the analytical debate. This phase

¹⁶⁶ Smist, Frank John, and Frank John Smist. *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994*. 2nd ed. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994, p. 128.

¹⁶⁷ Persico, p. 236.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 498.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 368.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p. 301.

¹⁷¹ O'Sullivan, p. 177.

of the intelligence cycle, however, was not one that received an inordinate degree of attention from Casey. Furthermore, the increase in technical forms of intelligence probably made this phase more transparent as Casey dealt increasingly with the product and not the process of this phase.

5.2.2.4 Analysis and Production

Since Bill Casey espoused that the primary purposes of intelligence were to “avert war by alerting our leaders to any military dangers” and to “help the President and his top advisors frame sound policies needed to retain American strength against a myriad of political, economic, and even technological threats to this country,” analysis logically was a critical phase.¹⁷² He called intelligence the “indispensable tool” in the development of foreign policy.¹⁷³ He embraced the Kendall school of thought with a great emphasis on relevance. In his own words he believed that

Analysis, and its assessment and National Intelligence Estimates, is the bottom line of the intelligence process. Intelligence analysis must be linked to the policy process. It must answer a question the policymakers have asked, are about to ask, or should have asked. Poorly drawn or incomplete analysis is a disservice to the policymaker and an unforgivable waste of an erroneously complex and costly collection system. Collection, after all, is only facts, and just as houses are made of stone, so collection is made of facts. But a pile of stones is not a house, and a collection of facts is not intelligence. It is analysis and assessment that make it

¹⁷² Casey and Meyer, p. 128.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

intelligence. My highest responsibility is to produce sound national intelligence estimates on issues relevant to our national security.”¹⁷⁴

Although he placed intelligence as a critical component in the foreign policy process, Casey also had no delusions about its lack of perfection as a tool.

Casey understood that intelligence would fail sometimes, most likely in cases where it was attempting to be predictive. The multiple source intelligence process employed by U.S. intelligence analysts ensure more accurate intelligence on the military and economic capabilities of a target nation, but prediction is more difficult. As Casey himself pointed out, even in ideal circumstances when access to the inner circles of power are possible, intelligence cannot know the decisions foreign leaders will make when those foreign leaders do not yet know themselves.¹⁷⁵ Some consumers, however, expect perfection, to which Casey replies “much of the criticism is based on unrealistic expectations of what an intelligence service can do.”¹⁷⁶ In the best of scenarios intelligence will always be incorrect on its most dire predictions because it will lead decision-makers to take action and prevent that circumstance from occurring. More realistic, however, is the realization there will always be a variety of probable outcomes that need to be prepared for; therefore, Casey prescribed that “a policy to deal with a future that cannot be precisely foreseen must be sufficiently broad and flexible to provide for a range of concrete possibilities.”¹⁷⁷ How should intelligence support such policies?

Intelligence estimates, Casey believed, must avoid the trap of developing a single consensus answer that is built upon “a middle ground or weasel words to conceal

¹⁷⁴ Casey and Meyer, p. 48.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p.18.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 49.

disagreement.”¹⁷⁸ Instead, the policy-maker should be given the larger picture of probable outcomes. Casey advocated that “policymakers can easily sort through a wide range of opinions. But, they cannot consider views and opinions they do not receive.”¹⁷⁹ Casey approached analysis with greater resolve than any other area of the intelligence process. He did this through opening up the estimate process to give greater voice to dissenting opinions, by reorganizing the analysts into geographic regions, and by creating analytical centers that studied issues such as terrorism in a manner that integrated all available information.

Casey’s goal for the estimate process was to make it more cooperative so that any significant view that could be substantiated could be represented; he felt the real value in the process was in allowing differences to emerge.¹⁸⁰ Two years into his tenure Casey boasted that “NIE’s had improved as a result of better community-wide participation.”¹⁸¹ More participation was not built watering down the strength of the conclusions. Bill Casey was not a man without his own opinions. Bob Gates described him as “something of a bully, and dismissed those who were intimidated or afraid to argue with him,” but he went on to note that Casey was “not dogmatic,” and that he was open to changing his mind when presented with a good argument with sound evidence.¹⁸² The important factor was Casey’s willingness to listen to arguments when they were contrary to a position that he was advocating.

Since Casey was determined to play a policy-making role in the Reagan administration, charges and perceptions of politicizing intelligence at this particular point in the process were inevitable. One of the more notorious examples that reached the public eye concerned an

¹⁷⁸ Casey, The State of Intelligence, p. 3.

¹⁷⁹ Casey and Meyer, p. 19.

¹⁸⁰ Ranelagh, p. 686.

¹⁸¹ Garthoff, Douglas p. 160.

¹⁸² Gates, p. 218

estimate built under the management of John R. Horton, NIO for Latin America. On 28 September, 1984, the *Washington Post* reported that Casey had rewritten the estimate because he “wanted a hard-line approach that said that the Mexican government would move to the left and become destabilized.”¹⁸³ Casey undoubtedly preferred the hard-line approach in the published product, but he did not author it; in fact, what he did was return the estimate to the original draft as it had been written by one of Horton’s associates.¹⁸⁴ Even some of Casey’s critics were quick to defend Casey on this charge. DDCI Inman stated, “The charge that he twisted intelligence reports to fit his politics or the administration policy is pure bunk. He was not guilty of that.”¹⁸⁵ Robert Gates was also intimately familiar with Casey’s involvement in the analytical process and supported Inman’s view. “The documentary record shows that the Directorate of Intelligence during this period preserved its objectivity and its integrity. We were honest, even if we were not always right.”¹⁸⁶

There were additional factors that explained Casey’s attitudes towards his analysts’ written estimates. Casey had extensive writing experience and had authored books on subjects from history to the tax code; therefore, he had a strong writing style. Casey’s predecessor, Stansfield Turner noted that “a lot of Casey’s reputation for politicizing intelligence came from his habit of wordsmithing.” Casey was perfectly willing to reject an estimate with which he agreed because they were poorly written.¹⁸⁷ Also important to note is that Casey was willing to forward estimates he disagreed with in principle while attaching a note that declared his

¹⁸³ Kessler, *Inside the CIA*, p. 141

¹⁸⁴ Persico, p. 388.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 389.

¹⁸⁶ Gates, p. 333.

¹⁸⁷ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 198.

disapproval.¹⁸⁸ This action does not, however, qualify as politicizing intelligence since there is a clear and distinct differentiation between the analysts' assessments and Casey's opinion. A further cause of the perception that intelligence corresponded conspicuously closely to policy is that Casey was part of the inner circle, and as a policy insider Casey knew which issues were most relevant to policy-makers at any given period and could direct the focus of analytical work to meet their customers needs.¹⁸⁹ So long as conclusions were not altered, this should be seen as a positive development since it increases the utility of intelligence and therefore contributes to intelligence success. Casey's changes in the analytical process were not limited to the drafting of the final report; he changed the environment within which intelligence was analyzed.

Organizational changes are frequent in government bureaucracies after changes in leadership, but they frequently yield few tangible results; Casey made overdue changes that helped to develop more integrated assessments. The Directorate of Intelligence was organized by discipline, yet their primary products were geographical. Casey changed this. Casey also established intelligence centers "in which, for the first time, analysts and operations officers worked side by side, together with representatives of NSA and other sections of the intelligence community."¹⁹⁰ These centers were dedicated to high priority issues such as terrorism, insurgency and instability, and Technology Transfer.¹⁹¹ The results were palpable to those in the intelligence community. Speaking of the Counterterrorism Center CTC, senior DO officer Charles Cogan stated "the improvement in the quality of finished intelligence was quickly noticeable, as was the agency's overall ability to respond to and disrupt terrorist planning."¹⁹²

¹⁸⁸ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 198.

¹⁸⁹ Ranelagh, p. 688.

¹⁹⁰ Andrew, p. 483.

¹⁹¹ Casey and Meyer, p. 153.

¹⁹² Andrew, p. 483. See Appendix F for information on the CTC.

Casey achieved notable results in his efforts to improve the analytical process, but regardless of the merit of these improvements, some of his efforts were lost in the allegations of politicization. Key customers, such as Secretary of State George Shultz, who also had to debate Casey over foreign policy positions, could not help but question the objectivity of Casey and the CIA on policy issues.¹⁹³ Ronald Reagan never expressed such concerns, and while the tension within his foreign policy team was a detriment to him, the source of that strain went beyond the relationship between Casey and Shultz. The Reagan/Casey dyad produced improved analysis that was not always correct but had no significant failures. Accurate, well written intelligence is of little value, however, unless it gets into the right hands.

5.2.2.5 Dissemination

In the spring of 1981 Casey told John McMahon, then running the DI, “We’ve got to get our product on the table at the White House and at the NSC and the Pentagon. That way we force the policymakers to push it aside if they don’t like it. But at least they can’t ignore us.”¹⁹⁴ The intelligence analyst’s job is not done when the assessment is sent to the printer’s office; the intelligence analyst must ensure that the relevant decision-makers know that the assessment exists and how they can get it. Timeliness is also critical. Intelligence is a highly perishable item and even getting the right information to the right person does not matter if the information is late. Casey put this idea more succinctly: “Intelligence a day late isn’t worth a damn!”¹⁹⁵

Casey’s eagerness to market his products had clear limits. DDCI Inman wanted Vice-President Bush to take part in his installation ceremony at Langley, but Casey objected,

¹⁹³ Shultz, p. 490.

¹⁹⁴ Persico, p. 283.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

exclaiming, “George Bush isn’t welcome out here.”¹⁹⁶ Christopher Andrew suggests that this was because Casey saw the former DCI as a potential rival,¹⁹⁷ but Casey had shown considerable antipathy towards Bush at least since the 1980 presidential campaign. Regardless of the source of the problem, Bush would not be one of Casey’s primary intelligence customers. Casey’s greatest antipathy, however, was reserved for Congress.

If the President was willing to allow Casey to run the CIA his own way, Congress was far more wary, and not without reason. The relationship that developed was one devoid of trust. One member of the HPSCI remarked about how they had to ask precisely the right question in order to get the right answer.¹⁹⁸ This is a fair assessment of Casey’s willingness to give Congress access to intelligence processes. While this fact was most prominent on issues dealing with covert actions, it applied to intelligence as well since Casey believed that the Congress leaked information like a sieve. Casey observed, “Secrecy is a problem for democracy. We sustain a lot of damage. But what is one to do? Resist it? Where we really have a problem is with the congressional staffs, not subject to the security standards we require, seeking sensitive information.”¹⁹⁹ Casey’s attitude towards Congress would serve as a weak point and ultimately a source of his greatest failure in his tenure as DCI.

5.2.3 Casey and Covert Actions

If President Reagan desired to “unleash” the CIA then there would have been few more eager or more experienced individuals to oversee that job than Bill Casey. Casey’s accomplishments as part of the OSS in World War Two were remarkable, even to the British intelligence services that traditionally looked down upon their American counter parts as being

¹⁹⁶ Persico, p. 222.

¹⁹⁷ Andrew, p. 460.

¹⁹⁸ Persico, p. 297.

¹⁹⁹ Ranelagh, p. 675.

inexperienced in the craft. By showing that the American intelligence service had reached a stage of maturity, Casey had not only fulfilled the dream of his mentor, William J. Donovan, but he had proven that Donovan's faith in him was well placed.²⁰⁰ As DCI, Casey held "a strong desire to have covert action be a key instrument of U.S. policy" and earn the appreciation of another boss in the process.²⁰¹

Ronald Reagan credited Casey with many successes, including preventing a Communist victory in El Salvador,²⁰² uncovering Soviet arms transfers to Libya, and the extent to which Libya supported terrorists throughout the Middle East.²⁰³ Covert action is a controversial tool in foreign policy, and part of the price for Casey's success was the friction it caused in the cabinet. Reagan noted that while some, like Bill Clark and Ed Meese, supported Casey and his covert actions, Bill Shultz believed Casey "was overly inclined to take risks and was, in effect, making foreign policy on his own without input from the State Department."²⁰⁴ Yet, covert actions would continue to be an important part supporting anti-communist forces throughout the world. Casey's first proposal to the NSPG in March of 1981 included covert action in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Grenada, Iran, Laos, and Nicaragua and would be an important part of what became the Reagan Doctrine.²⁰⁵

Casey also understood that covert operations needed to be part of a larger effort. One example of a success in this area was the effort to deny the Soviet Union access to American technology. Part of the KGB's directorate for science and technology was designated "Line X," and this group was responsible for acquiring a wide array of U.S. technology from the most

²⁰⁰ Persico, p. 83.

²⁰¹ Garthoff, Douglas p. 160.

²⁰² Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 477.

²⁰³ *Ibid*, p. 281.

²⁰⁴ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 477.

²⁰⁵ Persico, p. 264.

mundane to the most sophisticated.²⁰⁶ Line X's actions were brought to the attention of Reagan and Casey by French President Mitterrand based upon intelligence gained from Colonel Vladimir Vetrov, a KGB defector the French intelligence service was running.²⁰⁷ Richard Allen described Casey's response as "brilliant."²⁰⁸ In public speeches, Casey talked about the need to "sensitize and protect our scientists, engineers, and sales forces against technology pickpockets, dummy customers, and forged papers used to funnel sensitive equipment and knowledge behind the iron curtain."²⁰⁹ Analytically, he established the Technology Transfer Center, which, like the Counterterrorism Center, brought analysts and intelligence from across all relevant disciplines and all related agencies of the intelligence community.²¹⁰ In policy discussions Casey assumed an unyielding position; he was adamant that all efforts be made to restrict technology transfer. In a 6 July, 1981, East-West Trade Controls meeting he vociferously pointed out that

"it is a mistake to help the Soviets by exporting to them items they need. There is a greater negative impact from the exports than positive economic value to us as an export. We should be concerned not only about technology, but about products. We should go as close to option three [the strictest of three proposed options being discussed] as our allies will allow."²¹¹

Finally, covert actions were incorporated into this operation both to combat Soviet efforts and to exploit the weakness to which it drew attention.

²⁰⁶ Weiner, p. 386.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 385.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁰⁹ Casey and Meyer, p. 52.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*.

²¹¹ Saltoun-Ebin, Jason, ed. *The Reagan Files: The Untold Story of Reagan's Top-Secret Efforts to Win the Cold War*. CreateSpace, 2010, p. 33.

Richard Allen described the general scope of the covert actions: “We started in motion feeding the Soviets bad technology, bad computer technology, bad oil drilling technology. We fed them a whole lot, let them steal stuff that they were happy to get.”²¹² The operation permitted Soviet spies to gain access to “technological Trojan horses” that were eagerly incorporated into Soviet weapon systems, space systems, industrial plants and more.²¹³ In one of the more frequently cited incidents, the KGB procured software from a Canadian company to control pressure gauges in an important oil pipeline. The doctored software worked well for months and then sent pressure in the line soaring, creating a massive and costly explosion.²¹⁴ This effort demonstrates the effectiveness that was obtained by some of Casey’s covert actions. It was an effort that advanced U.S. foreign policy goals and was dependent upon the support of successful intelligence. Unfortunately, not all of Casey’s operations would be like this.

Covert actions in Central America seemed to break all the rules and precedents Casey followed in every other area. Ronald Reagan placed great importance on events in Central America. On 26 June, 1983 Reagan met with Bill Clark and Bill Casey and recorded in his diary:

We’re losing if we don’t do something drastic. Those in Cong. who are dribbling out about ¼ of what we ask for & need could be playing politics. They’d like to give enough money to keep us in the game but El Salvador bleeds to death. Then they call it my plan & it lost Central Am. We have to take this to the people &

²¹² Weiner, p 386.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

make them see what's going on. If the Soviets win in Central Am. we lose in Geneva & every place else.²¹⁵

The absence of any notable effort to follow through on the idea of taking this to the American people meant that Congress remained unmoved. Covert action became the best available means of enacting U.S. policy goals and the CIA and NSC became the primary institutions involved. Throughout the CIA and NSC involvement in Central America, the DI found little hope of success for the Contras,²¹⁶ but Casey threw his normal cautions to the wind. Robert Gates noted that “in virtually every covert action other than Central America, Casey was reasonably prudent—often even cautious—grumpily content to work through channels,”²¹⁷ but in Central America he would be reckless. What made a bad situation worse was the downward spiral caused by Casey's relations with Congress.

According to Gates, “Casey was guilty of contempt of Congress from the day he was sworn in as DCI.”²¹⁸ Gates continues,

He had zero patience for what he saw as congressional meddling and operations, and was especially intemperate when he thought Congress was micromanaging. He resented the time he had to spend stroking various members of Congress, time he spent testifying in briefings, and even the time others of us spent testifying. Casey was convinced that the Congress couldn't keep a secret and leaked all the time.²¹⁹

²¹⁵ Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, pp. 162-163.

²¹⁶ Gates, p. 296.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Everyone close to Casey understood this. APNSA Robert McFarlane espoused that Casey “was notoriously contemptuous of Congress and really had no interest in telling it anything more than he had to in order to keep from being locked up.”²²⁰ Marine Lt Col and NSC staff member Oliver North also noted the degree of Casey’s disdain for the Congress:

He loathed what Congress had become, and believes that the sport of preference on Capitol Hill was exposing covert operations. He hated testifying before the Congressional oversight committees, where he was expected to reveal the intimate details of a covert operation merely to satisfy what he called their “prurient interests.” In the belief that members of Congress couldn’t be trusted to keep secrets, he told them as little as possible.²²¹

While leaks did occur in Congress, Casey’s perception demonstrated a bias that only exacerbated the already poor relationship. DDCI John McMahon said, “I witnessed more leaks coming out of the administration than out of Congress. I thought Congress was always fairly responsible.”²²² Casey’s own words are most telling, he is quoted directly by Loch Johnson as declaring “The business of Congress is to stay out of my business!”²²³ The downward spiral continued.

Frustrated, in large measure, with Casey’s lack of forthrightness, the Congress would eventually cut funding to the Contras and restrict the CIA from seeking outside support for them. The mining of harbors in Nicaragua and Casey’s highly understated attempt at informing the SSCI about the operation are prime examples of how Casey’s handling of the situation alienated even his greatest allies in Congress; the event led Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) to publicly

²²⁰ McFarlane, p. 283.

²²¹ North, Oliver, and William Novak. *Under Fire : An American Story*. 1st ed. New York, NY; Grand Rapids, Mich.: HarperCollins Publishers; Zondervan, 1991, p. 184.

²²² Kessler, *Inside the CIA*, p. 297.

²²³ Johnson, *America’s Secret Power*, p. 223.

rebuke Casey, unceremoniously noting, “I am pissed off!”²²⁴ Soon after this point the operation moved off the books and was continued by the NSC who believed that they were unencumbered by the Boland Amendments since they were not, strictly speaking, an intelligence agency. Casey’s stroke on 15 December, 1986, and his subsequent death have left many questions unanswered. Most importantly, how much did Casey know about the funding of the Contras from profits of arms sales to the Iranians? The sale of arms to Iran had been another operation that Casey had advocated for, he endorsed a plan that suggested support for supposed “moderates” in Iran might curry favor that could assist in freeing hostages held by Middle Eastern terrorist groups.²²⁵

What is important for this research is how covert actions affected the Reagan/Casey dyad and what influence, if any, it had on the success of intelligence. Pressure from Reagan to find American hostages and the failure of intelligence to fulfill that demand clearly drove the perceived need for the arms sales to Iran.²²⁶ The Iranian arms sale was potentially further hurt by Casey’s failure to properly warn the NSC staffers that the CIA had put out a burn notice on one of their primary contacts, Manucher Ghorbanifar.²²⁷ These incidents, however, had limited impact on intelligence success. The exposition of what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair impugned the reputation of the Reagan administration and led to threats of charges of impeachment, but as Reagan’s Chief of Staff, Donald Regan, notes, it did not diminish the “genuine affection” between Reagan and Casey (although it sent Nancy Reagan into a frantic drive to rid the administration of Bill Casey)²²⁸. Covert operations throughout the world meant

²²⁴ Andrew, p. 478.

²²⁵ Gates, p. 401.

²²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 397

²²⁷ McFarlane, p. 29.

²²⁸ Regan, pp. 65-66.

increased presence abroad and a greater flow of information from the countries that were of greatest concern to the administration. These factors should only have improved the quality of intelligence the president was receiving. Furthermore, the zeal for operations in Central America had not led to any documented politicizing of intelligence from the DI or other analytical portions of the intelligence community.

Perhaps the most important consideration is that the energy with which Casey advocated his preferred policies for these regions did appreciable damage to the perception of intelligence as a neutral supplier of information for some members of the cabinet, most notably George Shultz. Once again, however, they did not have this effect on Ronald Reagan. Equally as dangerous, Casey's attempts to deny Congress information concerning covert operations clearly damaged relations between portions of the Reagan administration and Congress, but funding for intelligence continued to be increased at historic rates. The violation of the Boland Amendments and the undermining of Congressional oversight are clearly a disconcerting legacy from Bill Casey's tenure, but they did not measurably impact the quality of intelligence that the President received.

5.2.4 Casey and Foreign Policy

After being denied his desire to become Secretary of State, Casey accepted the position of DCI. There was a mutual understanding that Casey's role included being part of the policy making process.²²⁹ As discussed, Casey's level of interest was greatest at the start of the administration but diminished somewhat throughout his tenure. There are a variety of reasons for this change, but one of the most basic causes was a recognition by Reagan that Secretary of State George Shultz was more representative of his view and goals than Casey, Weinberger, or

²²⁹ Persico, p. 203.

any of the several individuals that held the post of national security advisor. The attributes most notable for this factor of the dyad include Casey's active advocacy of policy positions, Casey's hard-line view of the Soviet Union, Casey's recognition of the changes in the geo-political world environment to include the rise of terrorism, and Casey's interest in fighting the Soviet Union in the Third World (particularly in Central America).

When Reagan offered Casey the DCI position, Casey replied, "If I do take it, I expect to be in on policy. I'd give you the intelligence straight. I wouldn't bend it to fit the policy. But I expect to be part of the foreign policy team."²³⁰ Reagan responded "Bill, I wouldn't have it any other way. If it wasn't for you, I wouldn't be in the hot seat."²³¹ A review of NSC meeting minutes shows that Casey frequently presented intelligence and was unabashed about advocating a particular policy position, but that advocating a policy position was normally done after, not during, the initial intelligence presentation. This separation is insufficient to eliminate the perception that Casey could be shaping intelligence to support a desired policy, but such a conclusion is not consistent with the observations of those who worked closest with Casey. They have stated that Casey never crossed the line of politicizing intelligence to fit a desired policy option.

Regardless of whether intelligence was politicized or not, Casey's actions added to the confusion of voices in the Reagan foreign policy process. To Secretary of State George Shultz, Casey's actions seemed to have a "nearly incessant free-lance style."²³² Shultz believed that while he and the State Department were pursuing approved administration policy, Casey's agenda served a different set of policy goals and that Casey was able to use the CIA as "his

²³⁰ Persico, p. 203.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² Shultz, p. 659.

platform and his source of influence.”²³³ The ultimate decision-maker is always the president, but Reagan was often the peacemaker too. Several of Reagan’s diary entries record attempts to resolve disputes between the two (or three since Weinberger and Shultz also had an equally uneasy relationship). Casey won some battles, such as convincing Reagan not to go along with a Shultz-backed peace plan for Nicaragua in October, 1984,²³⁴ but ultimately he lost when he suggested to Reagan that Shultz be fired, telling him, “You need a new pitcher,” and suggesting Shultz be replaced with Jeane Kirkpatrick.²³⁵ Reagan chose to stay with Shultz, and Casey’s influence relative to Shultz would dwindle.

The predominant issue of the day was be the Soviet Union. If the U.S.S.R. was not directly being discussed then the issue was frequently related to stopping the spread of Communism or a conflict that involved one of the Soviet’s surrogates in the Third World. Casey’s desired policies with regard to the Soviet Union were predictably hard-line. In a discussion of East-West trade controls and a Soviet oil pipeline to bring fuel from Siberia to Europe in 1981, he proposed forcing U.S. allies to abide by a hard-line U.S. position. Casey stated, “We have the right to tell our allies they should not put in the pipeline if they expect us to defend them.”²³⁶ In preparing for arms negotiations with the Soviets, Casey always wanted to negotiate from a position of strength and considered the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to be off the table.²³⁷ Notably, he continued to forward DI products that regularly assessed the Soviet Union as neither the confident and unchanging nation that Casey believed it to be, nor desirous

²³³ Shultz, p. 1113.

²³⁴ Persico, pp. 412-414.

²³⁵ Shultz, p. 837.

²³⁶ Saltoun-Ebin, p. 39.

²³⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 183 and 301.

of change as Shultz saw it developing into under Gorbachev.²³⁸ Casey's hard-line attitude on the Soviet Union did not give him tunnel vision as he astutely noticed important changes occurring in the world.

In an address to the John Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Casey gave a perceptive assessment of the years to come. "The number of players has proliferated, issues have become bewilderingly complex, the pace of change and technological advance almost overwhelming, and the world much smaller and far more interdependent. And this, in turn, has revolutionized the world of intelligence."²³⁹ In another speech it was clear that chief among the "growing number of players" were terrorists who had "obliterated the distinction between peace and war," and for whom "U.S. facilities, emissaries, and personnel here and around the world are a major target."²⁴⁰ International terrorism, Casey recognized, constituted "a growing challenge for our intelligence capabilities."²⁴¹ Casey accurately foresaw that terrorism represented a growing threat that would consume many of Casey's successors in the Post-Cold War era, but in Casey's day the Soviet Union was still the primary adversary. Fear of nuclear confrontation guided the rules engagement between the two superpowers.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was described as "a cautious man who opposed any serious confrontation with the United States."²⁴² This attitude was not applicable to Soviet policy in the Third World. These were regions in which Gromyko was uninterested and would rarely even visit. Instead, the Soviets maintained a forward policy in the Third World which was

²³⁸ Gates, pp. 381-382.

²³⁹ Casey and Meyer, p. 34.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 57.

²⁴¹ *Ibid*.

²⁴² Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 10.

under the domain of the KGB led by Yuri Andropov.²⁴³ This is the battlefield where Casey would engage his nemesis. Beyond the storied espionage in the Eastern Block, Casey engaged this forward Soviet policy in the Near East, in Africa, and with the greatest passion in Central America. This engagement was an important part of the Reagan administration's intention "to support people fighting for their freedom against Communism wherever they were," known as the Reagan Doctrine.²⁴⁴ Notably, Casey and Shultz were in full agreement on this doctrine, though they would argue over the means of its implementation in many parts of the world.²⁴⁵

5.2.5 Operational Code for Casey

Despite the fact that Reagan/Casey dyad was a close relationship, Casey's intelligence operational code (see Figure 5.2) has one important contrasting factor from that of Reagan. On the topic of oversight of intelligence Reagan did not herald the importance of an open and accountable intelligence community as Carter had, but when one compares their actions they are remarkably similar. Casey, on the other hand, was adamant concerning the ability of the president to act in the manner he saw best for the country. He was equally convinced of the necessity of minimizing Congress' access to information concerning covert operations. His stubborn opposition to the HPSCI and SSCI represented a significant failure in his duties and one that would play a part in nearly every major negative incident during his tenure as DCI.

Neither Casey nor Reagan advocated a strong central role for the DCI over the entire intelligence community. The formal gains in that area by Casey's predecessor Stansfield Turner were lost. Reagan, however, used Casey as his single gateway into the intelligence community, and Casey gained the confidence and support of the majority of the intelligence community's

²⁴³ Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 11.

²⁴⁴ Reagan, *An American Life*, p. 552.

²⁴⁵ Shultz, p. 525.




Figure 5.2. An Intelligence Operational Code for Reagan and Casey

leadership by publicizing more alternative viewpoints in analytical products and by loyal advocacy for the needs of the other agencies. Casey's actions and the confidence placed in him by others in the community could be assessed as supporting a stronger role for the DCI, but he never asked for that kind of power. He did not restructure the intelligence community to support that type of role for the DCI, and he did not interfere with how agency heads ran their own bailiwicks.

Casey also insisted that analysts needed to be writing assessments on issues that were relevant to policy makers. This is precisely the model espoused by Kendall. Beyond the Kendall model, and as has been thoroughly presented in this case study, Casey insisted upon having a personal role in the promulgation of policy, and Reagan welcomed that input. Casey did not believe that intelligence estimates should advocate policy options. Casey did not even formally advocate that a DCI should be a proponent of policies, only that he should be. The operational code shows Casey far to the "Policy Advocate" end of the spectrum, but this is because this factor measures both the role of intelligence and the DCI.

Casey's angst in sending OSS operatives deep behind German lines was not eased with age. The personal responsibility that others believed Casey felt for the loss of Beirut Chief of Station William Buckley is proof that Casey never regarded his people as fodder for the cannon.²⁴⁶ Casey also never tried to fight the prohibition against political assassination, although he did not extend that courtesy to terrorist leaders. Casey was more prone to side with freedom of operations than Reagan was, but both men clearly had limits they would not exceed. Casey's position on the spectrum is more extreme than Reagan's but does not ignore the value of a basic level of human rights.

²⁴⁶ Persico, p. 370.

Casey believed that covert actions were a tool of diplomacy just as Clausewitz looked upon war as “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.”²⁴⁷ Casey can be credited with rebuilding the clandestine arm of the CIA in budget, manpower, and mission. As Casey grew this capability he used it, and while the failures in Central America were monumental, the successes in places like Poland and Afghanistan would be key contributors to the down fall of the Soviet Union. Casey is closely matched with Reagan in this factor.

Casey’s biographer Joseph Persico describes three basic convictions Casey held: “first, the world was a hostile place; secondly, the Soviet Union was virtually the root of all evil; and thirdly, that whatever is good in the world happens when America is strong, resolute, and purposeful—the bad occurs when America is weak.”²⁴⁸ In his business dealings and his politics there was rarely an issue of animosity or vendetta; it was simply about winning or the principle of the issue. Casey fought expensive legal matters over relatively small amounts of money for a man of his means. Casey became embroiled in an argument with a writer he was working with over a bill the writer was charging. The writer was shocked by the intensity that Casey pursued the issue of a few thousand dollars, and noted, “Winning was what counted. Winning meant everything to him. Bill saw money and power as a zero-sum game.”²⁴⁹ Like Reagan, Casey saw politics as a game consumed with conflict, but unlike Reagan, Casey did not look to bargain, he played to win.

5.3 Assessment of the Reagan/Casey Dyad

Assessing the Reagan/Casey dyad will begin with placing the dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix as shown in Figure 3.1. Next, the intelligence success of the dyad will be

²⁴⁷ Clausewitz, p. 87.

²⁴⁸ Persico, p. 217.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 427.

assessed based upon the five principles of intelligence in grand strategy that was developed from reviewing the work of master grand strategists and intelligence analysts (see Figure 2.1).

Finally, the effect of the President/DCI relationship upon the level of intelligence success will be assessed and compared with the three hypotheses listed in Table 3.2.

5.3.1 The President/DCI Relationship Matrix

Placing the Reagan/Casey dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix (See Figure 5.3) is based upon the same measures as were used in the Carter/Turner dyad. The horizontal axis depicts a spectrum of the personal relationship between the President and the DCI. The left extreme in the spectrum would be a warm personal relationship in which the DCI has the ability to talk directly with the president whenever he perceives the need. The right end of the spectrum illustrates a relationship that could be described as cool and, at best, professional. In this type of relationship the President and DCI have direct contact only at certain formal meetings and the DCI is dependent upon someone exogenous to the president/DCI relationship to grant his access to the president. The Reagan/Casey dyad is placed strongly on the “Amiable with Frequent Meetings” end of the spectrum. Casey’s relationship with Reagan was not as long-standing as that of many of Reagan’s other key aides such as Casper Weinberger, Richard Clark, or Ed Meese, but at times it was just as strong. What Casey lacked in duration of relationship, he made up for easily through his loyalty and hard work during the 1980 campaign. The result was a relationship that gave Casey unprecedented access for a DCI. Casey was a member of the inner circle of the foreign policy team. Casey’s access was not completely unfettered and he often used key members of the White House staff to ensure that his written products made it to the President, but he also had the ability to call Reagan on key issues as well. Although Casey’s




Figure 5.3. Reagan/Casey Dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix.

influence waned in the latter days of his tenure, his access to the president did not decrease appreciably, nor did the confidence Reagan placed in him.

The vertical axis of the matrix depicts politicization. At the upper end of this spectrum is a DCI who strictly observes Lowenthal's semi-permeable wall and adheres to the principles that Sherman Kent promoted about informing the policy process instead of becoming actively engaged in influencing and advocating policy. At the lower end of this spectrum a DCI is not only integral to the policy process, but his policy role threatens the integrity and impartiality of the intelligence analysis he presents. The Reagan/Casey dyad is placed three quarters of the way down from the upper end of the spectrum. This quadrant of the matrix is designated as the "Coach" type dyad. This dyad is unique in that Casey's role was understood from the beginning to include policy. Casey publicly acknowledged the importance of ensuring that intelligence products were neutral tools of the policy process, and key intelligence personnel who worked closely with Casey believe that he would not have "cooked the books" by allowing a desired policy to shape the conclusions of an intelligence assessment. Rivals in the foreign policy process, most particularly Secretary of State Shultz, were adamant that Casey's strong advocacy of particular policy options prevented him from serving as an honest broker of information. Since Reagan had full faith in Casey's objectivity, the impact of Casey's policy role on the intelligence success of the Reagan/Casey dyad comes in the friction it created in the foreign policy process with which Reagan would have to operate.

5.3.2 The Intelligence Success of the Dyad

Like the Carter/Turner dyad, the intelligence success of the Reagan/Casey dyad must be determined based upon a mixture of performance in major events and in day-to-day intelligence reporting. It is also worthy of reiteration that the Iran-Contra affair is a covert action, not

intelligence. This assessment does not need to make a determination of the exact role Casey played in the affair; it must only consider the effect that affair had on the quality of intelligence provided to the president.

5.3.2.1 Accuracy

Intelligence success during the Reagan/Casey dyad was acceptable. Unlike the Carter/Turner dyad, the Reagan/Casey dyad suffered no significant intelligence failures. The intelligence community underestimated the rate of collapse of the Soviet Union, but they accurately portrayed the current state of the U.S.S.R., the sequence of succession after the death of Brezhnev, and made the policy-making community more aware of significant Soviet activity in the Third World that the Secretary of State was more willing to ignore. On the other hand, the intelligence community was handicapped by a lack of access to Reagan's personal correspondence with Gorbachev and by the fact that Gorbachev and the rest of the senior Soviet leadership were largely unsure where domestic and economic issues in the Soviet Union were going themselves.

Intelligence was also unable to provide the fidelity of information necessary to rescue Americans being held hostage by terrorists in the Middle East. This inability caused the administration to try, unsuccessfully, to deal with so-called "moderate" elements of the Iranian government. A key reason for this failure was that the intelligence community was organized, trained and equipped to target the Soviet Union and their key allies, not small cellular organizations like a terrorist group. Many intelligence successes occurred that helped the administration succeed in important situations such as Poland, Korea, the Philippines, and Libya. On the whole the dyad's intelligence success level was quite acceptable and very good in many areas.

5.3.2.2 Timeliness

The Reagan/Casey dyad was successful at providing timely intelligence. Early in his tenure as DCI, Casey related a story to his senior analysts about Bedel Smith when he first took over the job. President Truman was about to leave for his meeting at Wake Island with Douglas MacArthur and wanted estimates on certain subjects. From his office at the Pentagon, having not even moved into the DCI's office yet, Smith goaded CIA analysts into meeting an overnight suspense – Truman had the estimates in hand when he flew out the next morning.²⁵⁰ This was Casey's attitude too. Information that was late was irrelevant and he ensured that analysis was both timely and relevant.

5.3.2.3 Relevance

Casey's position in the inner circle of foreign policy aided in making intelligence highly relevant. The dyad is scored as "good" in relevance. Casey's access alone was not sufficient to maintain a high degree of relevance. Casey also pushed analysts to be aware of current issues. Looking back upon intelligence support throughout his administration, Ronald Reagan noted, "I thought we received all the intelligence we needed to make decisions."²⁵¹

5.3.2.4 Actionability

The intelligence community consistently provided intelligence that facilitated the enactment of many important aspects of U.S. policy. CIA reporting on the Soviet Union's intentions may have sparked debate from the State Department, but reporting on their capabilities was critical and far less controversial in preparation for arms control negotiations. This not only enabled U.S. actions around the world, but in incidents like the U.S. raid on Libya and the Soviet

²⁵⁰ Persico, p. 294.

²⁵¹ Helgerson, p. 141.

shoot-down of Flight KAL-007, intelligence was made public to garner international support for U.S. efforts. There were, however, some failures.

As mentioned in the discussion of intelligence accuracy, the intelligence community was unable to develop accurate and actionable intelligence on U.S. hostages in the Middle East. As discussed in this case study, it is extremely difficult to gather detailed intelligence on a terrorist group given the nature of the organization, the mission the CIA was trained and equipped to perform, and some of the legal restrictions placed on intelligence operations. Regardless of these difficulties, the failure to obtain the requested information led to poor policy decisions for which the administration had to answer for. Since the failures were a decided minority, the actionability for this dyad is rated as “acceptable.”

5.3.2.5 Was it Used?

Intelligence was unquestionably put to great use by the Reagan administration. Intelligence guided negotiations, was a factor in the creation and implementation of policy, and even became an important contributor to the international discourse on issues. The chain diagram used in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.3) portrays the way these factors of intelligence success are linked together. The relevance and timeliness of intelligence during this dyad increased the utility of these estimates, and it was the strength of the relationship in the Reagan/Casey dyad that gave Casey the access necessary to guide the intelligence community to create more useful products.

5.3.2.6 The Intelligence Success of the Reagan/Casey Dyad was Acceptable

Overall the Reagan/Casey dyad achieved an acceptable level of intelligence success. Failures in the area of Middle East terrorism contribute to this dyad failing to achieve a “good”

Table 5.1 Table of Reagan/Casey Dyad’s Success in Intelligence

Area of Intelligence Success	Grade
Accuracy	Acceptable
Timeliness	Good
Relevance	Good
Actionable	Acceptable
Was the Intelligence Used	Good
Summary Score	Acceptable

Note - As discussed in Section 3.5, the Summary Score is not an average of the component scores. A single poor grade may be sufficient to cause a Summary Score of Poor if the cause is of sufficient significance.

level of success, but the primary cause is the perception some key individuals had that Casey was not being honest in his presentation of the intelligence. Casey's role as a policy-maker may not have been an issue for President Reagan, but it was for others. Casey, with great personal discipline, could have been part of the inner circle of foreign policy making without taking positions on the policies discussed. This would have been challenging, but it was possible. In some ways, the perception that Casey presented a skewed view of the available intelligence was more important than the reality of whether he did or not. George Shultz not only debated Casey in open meetings but also told President Reagan in private that he had been "seriously misled" by erroneous reporting.²⁵² Yet, the President would say in retrospect that he believed he was fully supported by the intelligence community during his presidency.

5.3.3 The Effect of the President/DCI Relationship - Testing the Hypotheses

H1 states: *The nature of the personal relationship between the DCI and the president will strongly determine the quality of intelligence reports received by the president.* Reagan and Casey's intelligence operational code place them on the same half of the spectrum for every factor except "Opponents and Allies." This general agreement on the role of intelligence and the nature of the environment in which they were operating supports H1. Furthermore, the fact that in each of those cases Casey is closer to the extreme view and Reagan is closer to the median of the spectrum works well for a relationship where the president is defining the mission and the DCI is executing within the president's parameters. The single area of disagreement also has important explanatory value for this case. Casey's zeal for the operations in Central America is logical for someone with a "zero-sum" mentality. Despite the unlikelihood of the Contras ever achieving victory, defeat was unacceptable. Reagan's guidance to keep the Contras together

²⁵² Shultz, p. 851.

“body and soul,” certainly could have been sufficient for Casey to go forward with whatever part he played in the Iran-Contra affair.²⁵³ The close relationship between Reagan and Casey and the acceptable level of intelligence success support H1. Additionally, the fact that one of the administration’s greatest failures is closely related to the single area of disagreement in the intelligence code of Reagan and Casey also supports this hypothesis since the greatest trouble occurred where the relationship was weakest. This case study supports H1.

H2 states: *The frequency of interaction between the DCI and the president will have a positive relationship with the quality of intelligence the president receives.* No previous or subsequent DCI had the kind of access to the president that Casey did with Reagan. Furthermore, this stands in direct contrast to the previous administration where Brzezinski claimed that Turner never saw Carter on his own.²⁵⁴ Casey’s access to Reagan facilitated improved relevance in the estimates and increased use of intelligence in policy debates. The Reagan/Casey case study supports H2.

H3 states: *DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives.* Charges of politicization of intelligence were common by those outside the intelligence community who opposed Casey, but denied by supporters and critics alike who had the best access to the intelligence products in question. As discussed in this case study, Casey’s editorial style offended some even though he did not change the substantive conclusions. Additionally, Casey was praised by many members of the intelligence community for including alternate assessments when those assessments could be supported. Casey actions, however, clearly lent themselves to the perception that some intelligence was politicized, and

²⁵³ McFarlane, p. 68.

²⁵⁴ Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 72-73.

even the perception of politicization is always costly. For the purposes of this research it a conclusion must be reached about how Casey's policy-making activity effected the success of intelligence provided to President Reagan.

Reagan never voices any dissatisfaction in the intelligence he receives with the exception of the absence of reporting on American hostages in the Middle East. Reagan does, however, mention in his diary on several occasions that he was forced to settle differences between Shultz and Casey. These differences clearly arise from Casey's active role in policy issues.

Additionally, although Casey should not shoulder carry an excessive portion of the blame for the resignation of Al Haig from the cabinet, the grounds for his departure from the administration were similar to the complaints of George Shultz. From the start of the Reagan administration (inauguration day itself), Al Haig had pushed the president to make the Secretary of State the sole voice of the president's foreign policy. Shultz never made demands to this degree, but both men were vexed by Casey's action as a "shadow secretary of state."²⁵⁵ If Casey had been part of the cabinet but restrained from taking policy positions, his intelligence would have been more widely accepted and Reagan could have expected at least a somewhat more harmonious foreign policy team. Instead, Casey's active role in policy advocacy diminished the use of intelligence for some key members of the foreign policy team, and the definition for successful intelligence in this research includes an assessment of whether the intelligence was used. Therefore, what could have been a grade of "good" in overall intelligence success was degraded to "acceptable" because of the perception (accurate or not) of politicization as seen by some members of the foreign policy team. The Reagan/Casey dyad supports H3.

²⁵⁵ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 190.

The Reagan/Casey case study supports all three hypotheses. Furthermore, it demonstrates the value gained by a trusting relationship between the members of the dyad. Not only is intelligence more likely to be used, the intelligence becomes more relevant to the policy-maker and therefore more successful. The next case study, Kennedy/McCone, presents yet another variation in this relationship and a further test of the hypotheses

Table 5.2 Table of Reagan/Casey Dyad's Hypotheses Evaluation

Hypothesis	Verdict of Evidence from the Dyad
H1 - The Nature of the President/DCI Relationship	Supports
H2 - The Frequency of President/DCI Interaction	Supports
H3 - The DCI Advocates Particular Policy Options	Supports

CHAPTER 6

CASE STUDY: PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND DCI McCONE

Photography of 14 October 1962 has disclosed two areas in the Sierra del Rosario mountains about 50 n.m. west southwest of Havana which appear to contain Soviet MRBMs in the early stages of deployment.¹

CIA Memorandum, Probable Soviet MRBM Sites in Cuba.
16 October 1962

President John F. Kennedy and DCI John McCone combine to form a dyad that lasted 724 days and included one of the most dangerous events of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis.² This dyad is unlike the Carter/Turner and Reagan/Casey dyads because it did not commence at the start of the president's administration, the president and DCI had no prior relationship, and DCI McCone was intentionally selected from the opposing political party. Kennedy was a New England liberal and McCone a California Republican. Both were devout Catholics, but came from very different backgrounds. Most relevant for this research, Kennedy and McCone shared a vision for a strong DCI, but they differed in their areas of emphasis within the intelligence community.

Important considerations for this dyad include an understanding of the preceding dyad and the role of the Cuban Missile Crisis. At the commencement of the Kennedy/McCone dyad the majority of Kennedy's intelligence experience came as part of his relationship with DCI Allen

¹ McAuliffe, Mary S. *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962*. History Staff. Washington, DC: History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, 1992, p. 139.

² Kennedy selected McCone to become the sixth DCI, replacing Allen Dulles. McCone was sworn in as DCI on 29 November, 1961, and the dyad ended on 22 November, 1963, when Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, TX.

Dulles.³ Kennedy's initial exposure to intelligence and the significance of the Bay of Pigs incident will both be important for developing Kennedy's Intelligence Operational Code. The Cuban Missile Crisis is by far the most significant intelligence event of the Kennedy/McCone dyad and benefits this case study greatly because of the extensive scholarship that exists on this incident. Like the Reagan/Casey case study and the Iran-Contra Affair, however, it is important to ensure that the Kennedy/McCone dyad is assessed based upon its entire history, not just thirteen days.

6.1 President John F. Kennedy (35th President, 1961-1963)

John F. Kennedy was elected to the presidency in 1960. His campaign emphasized strengthening national security, countering the Soviet Union, and establishing more aggressive policies towards Cuba. Upon taking office, Kennedy's first impressions of the CIA were eye opening and largely positive; he remarked to APNSA McGeorge Bundy "By gosh, I don't care what it is, but if I need some material fast or an idea fast, CIA is the place I have to go. The State Department takes four or five days to answer a simple yes or no."⁴ Then, just eighty-seven days into his presidency, Kennedy was faced with one of the greatest covert operations debacles of all time, Operation ZAPATA – the CIA-supported invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

6.1.1 Kennedy's Early Dealings with the Intelligence Community

John F. Kennedy's first exposure to the intelligence community came as a junior naval officer assigned to the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in Suitland, Maryland.⁵ Kennedy's intelligence career lasted four months; he found his intelligence

³ The Kennedy/Dulles dyad lasted 313 days.

⁴ Wyden, Peter. *Bay of Pigs : The Untold Story*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, p. 95.

⁵ Dallek, Robert. *An Unfinished Life : John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963*. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 2003, p. 83.

work to be uninteresting and the Navy became concerned over a relationship he was having with a journalist who had gained privileged access to high-ranking Nazi officials, to include Adolph Hitler. This resulted in a quick transfer to Charleston, South Carolina in January, 1942, where he was given a desk job.⁶ After six months in Charleston, and a recurrence of his back problems, Kennedy was approved for sea duty and embarked on the path that would lead him to become a PT commander.⁷ This would, in turn, lead to the PT-109 incident what would land Kennedy on the front page of U.S. papers with titles such as “KENNEDY’S SON IS HERO IN THE PACIFIC.”⁸

During Kennedy’s time in the U.S. Senate, he had relatively few dealings with the intelligence community. Most notably, he was one of twenty-seven senators who voted to support the Mansfield Amendment.⁹ Had it gained passage, that legislation would have created a joint committee in Congress for the purpose of overseeing intelligence activities. Later, as a presidential candidate, Kennedy’s access to intelligence would be far greater than most of his predecessors. President Eisenhower was supportive of supplying Kennedy with intelligence briefings. Presented with an opportunity to make a good impression on his potential new boss, DCI Allen Dulles chose to conduct those briefings personally.¹⁰

⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 83-84. Kennedy remarked afterward to a reporter, “They shagged my ass down to South Carolina because I was going around with a Scandinavian blonde, and they thought she was a spy!”

⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 84-90. Patrol-torpedo “PT” Commander positions were highly sought after (1,024 applicants for 50 positions) and it is unlikely that Kennedy could have been selected without the influence of his father.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 98. Headline from the *Boston Globe*.

⁹ Barrett, p. 233.

¹⁰ Helgerson, p. 47.

Kennedy used information from those briefings and from presentations Dulles made to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to great effect in his presidential campaign. In the third Kennedy-Nixon debate Kennedy even quoted Dulles directly concerning the relative economic and military growth of the Soviet Union compared to the U.S.¹¹ His goal was to portray the Eisenhower-Nixon administration's policies as being unresponsive to this danger despite the fact that these exact issues headed the CIA's intelligence production priorities.¹² The intelligence community was also dragged into one of the more significant controversies of the presidential campaign when the issue of U.S. policy towards Cuba came to the forefront.

On the day before the fourth Kennedy-Nixon debate, a Kennedy campaign press release stated, "We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro."¹³ Kennedy's opponent, Vice-President Richard Nixon, was certain that this statement was made with knowledge that such a plan was already in existence. "I know that Kennedy had received a CIA briefing on the administration's Cuban policy," records Nixon, "and assumed that he knew, as I did, that a plan to aid the Cuban exiles was already under way on a top-secret basis. His statement jeopardized the project, which could succeed only if it were supported and implemented secretly."¹⁴ Faced with this dilemma, Nixon chose to take an opposing stance in the debate:

I think that Senator Kennedy's policies and recommendations for the handling of the Castro regime are probably the most dangers- dangerously irresponsible

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 48.

¹² *Ibid*.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 49.

¹⁴ Nixon, Richard M. *RN, the Memoirs of Richard Nixon*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978, p. 220.

recommendations that he's made during the course of this campaign. In effect, what Senator Kennedy recommends is that the United States government should give help to the exiles and to those within Cuba who oppose the Castro regime - provided they are anti-Batista.¹⁵

Nixon would never be convinced that Kennedy had not used knowledge of intelligence in the campaign, and Dulles was obliged to prove he had not “cooked the books for the election.”¹⁶ To use intelligence in such a manner is relevant to the understanding of Kennedy’s view of politics and therefore bears some additional consideration.

Historian John Helgerson rests much of his argument against Kennedy having been given knowledge of Operation ZAPATA on the fact that Dulles’ notes and memorandums do not mention briefing that specific item prior to the election. Furthermore, a note from Dulles to General Maxwell Taylor indicates that the purpose of a mid-November briefing Dulles gave to President-elect Kennedy was to acquaint him with the operation. Conversely, Kennedy advisor and speechwriter Richard Goodwin states clearly that “Kennedy was careful to strike from my drafts any implication that we would act forcibly to overthrow Castro,” adding, “The reasons for Kennedy’s caution were more than political. As a presidential candidate, he had received secret briefings by the CIA, some of which revealed that we were training a force of Cuban exiles for a possible invasion of the Cuban mainland.”¹⁷ Conflicting reports make it difficult to render a

¹⁵ Commission on Presidential Debates. "October 21, 1960 Debate Transcript: The Fourth Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate." Web. <<http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-21-1960-debate-transcript>>.

¹⁶ Helgerson, p. 58.

¹⁷ Goodwin, Richard N. *Remembering America : A Voice from the Sixties*. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1988, p. 125.

judgment as to when Kennedy knew about Operation ZAPATA . Earlier statements on other issues clearly demonstrate a willingness to use intelligence-related information when he could further his campaign, but not a willingness to endanger U.S. personnel or operations for political gain.

Another intelligence-related campaign issue was what became known as the “missile gap.” A report by a civilian group led by H. Rowan Gaither publicized a CIA estimate that by 1960 the Soviet Union could possess 100 ICBMs with megaton warheads.¹⁸ Even more alarming was an Air Force estimate that assessed that number could actually be as high as 1,100 by 1961.¹⁹ No member of the U.S. Senate can be more closely attached to the missile gap issue than Stuart Symington (D-MO), but none was able to capitalize on the issue better than Kennedy.²⁰ Highly classified IMINT revealed only 50 ICBMs in 1960 and CIA economic estimates of the Soviet defense industry assessed that the Russians could produce no more than 50 missiles per year, but the CIA was a victim of its own secrecy.²¹ DCI Dulles and the Agency were unable to effectively assist President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon in public with perceptions that the Soviets would surpass the U.S. in ICBM forces, because the primary sources and methods used to collect that data, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, were classified. Ironically, Kennedy and Johnson both inquired about preparations for a follow-on system to the U-2, but Dulles was unwilling to share information about more advanced aircraft or the reconnaissance satellite system

¹⁸ Jefferys-Jones, p. 110.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Barrett, pp. 301-302.

²¹ Jefferys-Jones, Rhodri. *The CIA and American Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 110.

that was being tested at that time.²² After winning the 1960 presidential election, Kennedy was briefed by Eisenhower on the intelligence community in general and IMINT in particular.²³ To Kennedy's great surprise, no missile gap existed. Kennedy was not the only one in the new administration surprised by this revelation. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara estimated that he spent 20 percent of his first month looking at intelligence reports and IMINT products only to conclude that if a missile gap did exist then it was in our favor.²⁴ More pressing intelligence issues; however, loomed on the near horizon for Kennedy as well.

On 27 January 1961, the CIA's Board of National Estimates, under the direction of Sherman Kent, produced a memorandum entitled "Is Time on Our Side in Cuba?"²⁵ The report concluded, "Castro's position in Cuba is likely to grow stronger rather than weaker as time goes on."²⁶ The Kennedy Administration was left with two important decisions: First, should the U.S. expedite planning for an intervention or to abandon any intention to take direct action.²⁷ Second, if the U.S. was going to intervene, should it do so with the open use of the U.S. military or through covert actions?²⁸ The Kennedy Administration and the CIA went forward with a plan to support approximately 1500 Cuban exiles, known as "Brigade 2506." They would be armed with rifles and tanks, supplied by ships, and supported with air strikes.²⁹ Furthermore, DCI Dulles and CIA Director of Plans, Bissell, expected Brigade 2506 to be augmented by over 2,500

²² Helgerson, p. 55.

²³ Andrew, p. 258.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Wyden, p. 93.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Cabell, Charles P., Jr. *A Man of Intelligence: Memoirs of War, Peace, and the CIA*. Ed. Charles P. Jr Cabell. Colorado Springs, CO: Impavide Publications, 1997, p. 359.

²⁹ Ranelagh, p. 360.

resistance members and 20,000 anti-Castro sympathizers.³⁰ DDCI Charles Cabell claims that Kennedy's eleventh hour decision to further limit air strikes, which had already been cut to two-thirds of what was called for in the original plan, was the doom of Brigade 2506.³¹ Since the attacking Cubans never got off the beaches there was never a popular uprising and the entire operation failed.

Publicly, Kennedy assumed responsibility for the failure; in private, his confidence in the CIA, and in particular its leadership, was badly shaken. Arthur Schlesinger quotes Kennedy as saying "If someone comes in to tell me this or that about the minimum wage bill, I have no hesitation in overruling them. But you always assume that the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals."³² Kennedy's special counsel, Theodore Sorenson records more scornful remarks: "How could I have been so far off base? All my life I've known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?"³³ The Kennedy/Dulles dyad ended with Kennedy's attitude of dissatisfaction that had immediate implications for the ability of the intelligence community to be a positive force within the Kennedy Administration.

Two notable outcomes from the Bay of Pigs incident were the President's attitudes toward Cuba and the CIA. Kennedy had called for an increased aggressiveness in policies towards Cuba during his 1960 presidential campaign, but after the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, the removal of Castro seemed to become a fixation. The President's brother, Attorney General Robert

³⁰ Dallek, p. 361.

³¹ Cabell, p. 365.

³² Schlesinger, Arthur M. *A Thousand Days; John F. Kennedy in the White House*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 234.

³³ Sorenson, Theodore C. *Kennedy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1965, p. 309.

Kennedy, was adamant that the end of Castro's regime was "the top priority of the United States Government – all else is secondary."³⁴ As a result, covert actions became a major factor in the Kennedy Administration and had tremendous implications for the entire intelligence community more than a decade later during the investigations of the Church Committee. While Kennedy's animosity towards Castro waxed, his confidence in the CIA waned.

Dulles continued to present traditional estimates to the President through the remainder of his term as DCI, but the President's military aide, Brigadier General Chester Clifton, informed the CIA that they would need to come up with a new way of presenting information.³⁵ The solution devised by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence was the *President's Intelligence Checklist*. The prototype of this document "was a small book of seven pages, measuring 8-1/2 by 8 inches, that contained 14 items of two sentences each with a half-dozen longer notes and a few maps."³⁶ This document, the forerunner of the PDB, was quickly recognized as a success due to the President's requests for background information on items, and Kennedy's instructions that were clearly based on the contents of the *Checklist*.³⁷ The remainder of the task of rebuilding the relationship between the White House and the CIA would fall to Dulles' successor, John McCone.

6.1.2 The Intelligence Process

Like Presidents Carter and Reagan, Kennedy came to the White House with very little intelligence experience. His interest in covert operations and his belief that the Soviets had

³⁴ Dallek, p. 467.

³⁵ Helgerson, pp. 66-67.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 67.

³⁷ *Ibid*.

become skilled practitioners of subversive warfare had led him to read the works of Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, but he demonstrated less interest in the analytical side of the intelligence community.³⁸ This accounts, to a reasonable degree, for Kennedy's desire for a strong DCI who could oversee the entire intelligence community, funneling all information to Kennedy and implementing Kennedy's intelligence requirements across the entire community.

6.1.2.1 Planning and Direction

Kennedy's 16 January, 1962, memorandum to John McCone is the clearest declaration that any president has issued for a DCI with the central authority necessary to manage the intelligence community as a whole. The memo designates him as the "government's principal foreign intelligence officer," and gives him responsibility for the "coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort." Furthermore, Kennedy gives the DCI the authority necessary to "assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of *intelligence from all sources* [emphasis added] and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients as appropriate."³⁹ The strict compartmentalization of the intelligence disciplines has always served as one of the primary forces that keeps the intelligence community divided. Cross-discipline authority is, therefore, extremely important to strong central control of the community.

Additionally, in two places in the memorandum Kennedy makes it clear that the DCI's peers were not the heads of the other portions of the intelligence community, but their bosses, the cabinet-level secretaries and agency directors. First, Kennedy states that the DCI is to "work

³⁸ Andrew, p. 258.

³⁹ Kennedy, John F. *Memorandum from President Kennedy to Director of Central Intelligence McCone*. Ed. Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Memo to Intelligence Community on the role of the DCI Vol. <http://cryptome.org/cia-origin.htm#12>., 1962.

closely with the heads of all departments and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field.”⁴⁰ Later he reiterates that as DCI, McCone is to work “with the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned,” and that he should “maintain a continuing review of the programs and activities of all U.S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness and to avoiding undesirable duplication.”⁴¹ Such broad authority was discussed but never implemented within the Carter/Turner dyad and was largely assumed but never articulated in the Reagan/Casey dyad. By implementing a strong DCI, Kennedy can be seen as continuing or furthering the policies of the Eisenhower/Dulles dyad, but he broke new ground in formalizing this relationship.

Beyond granting McCone broad powers to control the intelligence community, Kennedy also provided specific guidance to the intelligence community when he required support on key areas of policy. One of the first such pieces of instruction McCone received was to find a way to “pierce the Berlin Wall.”⁴² As previously discussed, Cuba was always a top priority for both intelligence and covert action. When it came to implementing his anti-Castro policies, the President had delegated the job of “dealing with the CIA” to his brother, Robert.⁴³ The Attorney General passionately exclaimed to the CIA, “Let’s get the hell on with it. The president wants some action, right now.”⁴⁴ One of the most curious pieces of direction given during the Kennedy/McCone dyad was a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) regarding

⁴⁰ Kennedy, *Memorandum from President Kennedy to Director of Central Intelligence McCone*.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Weiner, p. 183.

⁴³ Powers, Thomas. *The Man Who Kept the Secrets : Richard Helms & the CIA*. 1st ed. New York: Knopf, 1979, p. 167.

⁴⁴ Weiner, p. 185.

British Guiana. Fear that an independent British Guiana under the leadership of Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan would lead to another Marxist-Leninist government in the Western hemisphere led to considerable momentum in the Kennedy Administration to get rid of Jagan.⁴⁵ NSAM Number 135 was signed by Kennedy personally on 8 March, 1962 (see Appendix D) and specifically directed that no action was to be taken with regard to “our policy toward British Guiana and the Jagan government.”⁴⁶ NSAM’s were normally signed by APNSA Bundy and contained orders for actions to be taken. Kennedy must have possessed major concerns that significant action would have been taken if he believed such an official direction for non-action bearing his signature was necessary.

Feedback is one of the most important aspects of the Intelligence Cycle. Current intelligence analysts who worked on the *Checklist* were delighted to receive regular feedback from Kennedy in the form of exchanges that addressed both the quality of the product and the substantive issues of its content.⁴⁷ Kennedy also received feedback on intelligence issues; he had reincarnated the board of consultants that Eisenhower had established in 1956 as the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in order to monitor the intelligence community. The early PFIAB was much more prolific than its successors, creating 170 formal recommendations.

⁴⁵ Prados, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁶ *National Security Action Memorandum Number 135: British Guiana, March 3, 1962*. Ed. Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. The Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Action Vol. Boston, Massachusetts: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 1962.

⁴⁷ Andrew, p. 266.

Kennedy called the PFIAB the most useful of all his advisory boards and accepted 125 of those recommendations (two recommendations were rejected and the rest deferred).⁴⁸

Overall, Kennedy demonstrated three important attributes in this phase of the intelligence cycle. First, Kennedy gave McCone the broad authority necessary to complete the mission Kennedy had assigned him. Second, Kennedy provided specific guidance on matters that he wanted in detail. This is a critical interaction in order for the intelligence community to succeed in being relevant. Finally, he provided direct feedback to analysts on the products he received.

6.1.2.2 Collection

Kennedy's most significant influence upon the intelligence collection process came in September 1962 when he restricted U-2 reconnaissance flights from passing over Cuba. The decision came after two important events. First, an SA-2 surface-to-air missile⁴⁹ (SAM) site was discovered in Cuba when film from a 29 August U-2 flight was processed.⁵⁰ The SA-2 was the same weapon system that had brought down the U-2 flown by Gary Powers on 1 May, 1960, while flying 70,500 feet above Russia.⁵¹ The second event was the downing of a U-2 over China

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 272.

⁴⁹ Developed in the mid-1950s, the V-750 *Dvina* was the first effective Soviet surface-to-air missile. The Soviets used it to shoot down Gary Powers' U-2 over the USSR in 1960 and Maj. Rudolph Anderson's U-2 over Cuba in 1962. The missile was better known by the NATO designation SA-2 Guideline. The Soviets began exporting it to many countries worldwide in 1960, with many remaining in use into the 21st century. TECHNICAL NOTES: Range: Minimum 5 miles; maximum effective range about 19 miles; maximum slant range 27 miles; Ceiling: Up to 60,000 ft.; Warhead: 288-lb. blast-fragmentation; Speed: Mach 3.5 Source: <http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=334>

⁵⁰ Weiner, p. 194.

⁵¹ Pedlow, Gregory W., Donald E. Welzenbach, and Center for the Study of Intelligence. *The CIA and the U-2 Program 1954-1974*. Washington, D.C. :Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence; Springfield, VA: Documents Expediting DOC EX Project, ANA Division/Government Section, Library of Congress distributor; National Technical Information Service NTIS distributor, 1998, p. 176.

on 9 September, 1962.⁵² The result was a considerable rise in concern about the vulnerability of the U-2 flights and the potential that a shoot-down would result in a diplomatic incident or worse. Kennedy's restriction was issued on 11 September, 1962, just four days prior to the arrival of the first Soviet MRBM on a cargo vessel at Mariel Harbor, Cuba.⁵³ The implications of the resulting gap in IMINT can be exaggerated; continued U-2 missions during this time period would not necessarily have resulted in an earlier discovery of Soviet actions. Later discussions in this case study will address this specific issue.

Throughout his tenure as president, Kennedy displayed a preference for IMINT over SIGINT. This could largely be due to the strong role IMINT played in disproving the missile gap and in discovering and monitoring the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁵⁴ More important for his role as president, however, is that these preferences did create a noticeable bias in the funding for the respective agencies; the NSA maintained a budget that was twice that of the CIA.⁵⁵ Daily reviews of the aerial photography would be the hallmark of intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but Kennedy was well aware of the contributions made by other collection disciplines. HUMINT from within Cuba and the Soviet Union made important contributions to the processing and evaluation of other forms of intelligence, and the President personally ordered the repositioning of a seaborne electronic intelligence (ELINT) vessel to reduce its vulnerability to

⁵² Weiner, p. 194.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁵⁴ Andrew, pp. 258-259.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 260.

Cuban fire.⁵⁶ Neither the successes or failures of the Kennedy Administration should be portrayed as turning on a bias towards a single intelligence collection discipline.

Kennedy was also willing to reveal some of the technical abilities of the U.S. intelligence collection capabilities to make a point. Just as Reagan would later use highly classified SIGINT to garner international support for operations against Libya, so Kennedy would use IMINT to prove his case in international forums. Not only was U-2 imagery used in the United Nations by Adlai Stevenson, but imagery was also aired on BBC television. While the protection of sources and methods is a crucial part of maintaining successful intelligence, the publication of intelligence products was also a critical part of achieving U.S. policy goals in both these incidents. Prior to going public with the images, Kennedy had dispatched diplomatic teams to London, Bonn, Paris and Ottawa with copies of the IMINT to solidify allied support during the looming crisis. Christopher Andrew remarks, “No previous president had made such dramatic use of peacetime intelligence for the purposes of Allied diplomacy.”⁵⁷

6.1.2.3 Processing and Exploitation

Imagery analysis has been described by expert practitioners as both an art and a science. Reading out raw IMINT involves both a trained eye and a thorough understanding of the things one might be looking at. Imagery analysts, or “squints,” as they are sometimes referred to, become intimately familiar with important targets so they will notice even the smallest changes when they occur. While IMINT would be a regular feature of the Cuban Missile Crisis, analysts such as Arthur Lundahl, head of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) during

⁵⁶ Kennedy, Robert F., p. 86; Andrew, p. 90.

⁵⁷ Andrew, p. 293.

the Cuban Missile Crisis, were always there to explain the imagery to policy-makers. Robert Kennedy notes that the early images of the first evidence of Soviet MRBM sites appeared to the President and the rest of the EXCOMM members to be “no more than the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a house.”⁵⁸ Beyond understanding the art and science of imagery analysis, it was important that the EXCOMM members understood the magnitude of the task that NPIC was undertaking.

On 18 October, 1960, while briefing President Kennedy, McCone emphasized the challenges they faced in analyzing the film from the U-2 missions. McCone explained that the six missions created 28,000 linear feet of film and that “when this is enlarged, it means the Center has to examine a strip of film 100 miles long, 20 feet wide.”⁵⁹ Processing and exploitation of IMINT was further hampered at the time by cloud cover since it was rare for an island the size of Cuba to be totally devoid of clouds. Throughout his administration, Kennedy grew in his awareness of not only the importance but also the challenges of the processing and exploitation phase of the intelligence cycle; he took few actions that had a notable effect on this portion of the cycle, however.

6.1.2.4 Analysis and Production

Kennedy’s most significant contribution to the analytical phase of the intelligence process was the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at the recommendation of the

⁵⁸ Kennedy, Robert F., p. 24.

⁵⁹ May, Ernest R., and Philip Zelikow. *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 122.

PFIAB.⁶⁰ The goal was to prevent the intelligence arms of the separate military services from acting separately in order to avoid duplicating efforts and wasting resources.⁶¹ DIA incorporates all phases of the intelligence process for the Department of Defense, but the creation of DIA provided the services a more unified, and therefore a more influential voice within the analytical phase of the intelligence process.

6.1.2.5 Dissemination

On 26 January, 1961, President Kennedy visited the CIA headquarters at 2430 E Street in Washington D.C.⁶² While DCI Dulles had two and a half hours of briefings planned for the President, Kennedy became engrossed in an historical display that included a letter from General George Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton that was on loan from Harvard's Houghton Library.⁶³ The letter, written in July 1777, included a passage where Washington offered the following timeless advice: "The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged—All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated...."⁶⁴ Kennedy was already frustrated with press leaks from within his new administration and Kennedy hailed these words as "a continuing reminder of the role of

⁶⁰ Andrew, p. 272. The creation of DIA was approved by President Kennedy on 1 October, 1961.

⁶¹ Defense Intelligence Agency. <http://www.dia.mil/history/features/cuban-missile-crisis/>

⁶² The current CIA Headquarters at Langley, VA, was not officially dedicated until 28 November 1961. Source: www.cia.gov

⁶³ Helgerson, pp. 64-65.

⁶⁴ Helgerson, p. 65.

intelligence in national policy.’⁶⁵ Undistributed intelligence can never succeed, but dissemination must be controlled.

As the *President’s Intelligence Checklist* gained influence with President Kennedy, demand for access to the publication grew within the upper echelons of the Administration. Kennedy, however, demonstrated restraint in the dissemination of this product. Six months after publication began he relented only so much as to allow the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense daily access to the document.⁶⁶ This established the precedent of highly limited distribution that has been maintained from that time until the modern PDB.

Despite Kennedy’s support for the Mansfield Amendment while in the U.S. Senate, his administration showed no more proclivity to consult with Congress on intelligence issues than any of its predecessors. On 22 October, 1963, Congressional leaders were given a brief intelligence presentation by McCone and Lundahl as Kennedy announced his intention to order a naval blockade.⁶⁷ Senators Richard B. Russell (D-GA) and J. William Fulbright (D-AR) led a hawkish response by the legislators who advocated a military response with consideration given to the idea of issuing a warning.⁶⁸ Therefore, on 23 October, 1963, the Cuban Missile Crisis had finally reached a stage where Kennedy felt the need to provide congressional leaders with an intelligence briefing on the situation. More than a week after the initial IMINT had revealed the MRBM sites, McCone was finally dispatched to provide key members of Congress with the

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁶⁷ Andrew, p. 294.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 293-294.

intelligence necessary to bring them around to Kennedy's perspective.⁶⁹ This does not constitute politicized intelligence since the information was not changed to support a desired policy. It could be considered politicized dissemination, though, since some degree of the information available was only provided when it was necessary to gain support for policies, but "need to know" has always been the mantra for the operational security of intelligence.

6.1.3 Covert Actions

Stansfield Turner describes Kennedy as being fascinated with the "romance and excitement of secrecy, espionage, and covert action."⁷⁰ Although Secretary of State Dean Rusk referred to these operations as "a series of pointless 'dirty tricks,'" that didn't stop Kennedy from taking on one unusual scheme after another.⁷¹ In each of the first two years of Kennedy's administration, the annual total of covert operations exceeded any year in the Eisenhower/Dulles dyad for a total of 550 approved projects. Operation ZAPATA may have been one of the greatest (meaning most publicized) CIA covert action failures, but it had little effect on Kennedy's penchant for such operations. He accused the Soviet Union of a "monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence," and promised to redouble his own efforts in that regard.⁷² Furthermore, failure in Cuba only increased his desire to see Castro

⁶⁹ May and Zelikow, pp. 290-291. The Congressmen identified as needing to be briefed included: Congressman Gerald Ford (R-MI), Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), Congressman Clarence Cannon (D-MO), and Congressman George H. Mahon (D-TX).

⁷⁰ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 91.

⁷¹ Rusk, Dean, Richard Rusk, and Daniel S. Papp. *As I Saw it*. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1990, p. 242.

⁷² Jeffreys-Jones, p. 129.

removed. Historian Jeffreys-Jones describes Kennedy's desire to be rid of Castro as "an obsession."⁷³

DCI McCone placed Richard Helms (who would become the eighth DCI in 1966) in charge of the CIA Cuba operations, to include all CIA portions of Operation MONGOOSE, the government-wide plan for actions against Cuba.⁷⁴ In giving Helms his charge, McCone

emphasized Kennedy's determination "to be rid of Castro and the Castro regime."⁷⁵

MONGOOSE was headed by Robert Kennedy, whom Stansfield Turner described as being "rabid" about the plot.⁷⁶ After a dissatisfactory annual review of the operation, Robert Kennedy announced a daily 9:30 AM meeting of the senior representatives involved in the operation.⁷⁷

While they never succeeded, they were undeniably persistent; in the early 1960s Castro's security forces prevented thirty-two assassination plots.⁷⁸

Cuba was the focal point of many covert actions, but not all. Covert action was not just a tool of revenge against Castro, but a fully embraced measure to enact U.S. Foreign Policy. When a board of inquiry led by General Maxwell Taylor reported to President Kennedy on their findings regarding Operation ZAPATA, the conclusion was not to cease covert actions, but to improve them.⁷⁹ The report concluded, "Paramilitary operations such as ZAPATA (the Bay of Pigs invasion) are a form of Cold War action in which the country must be prepared to engage."⁸⁰

⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 130-131.

⁷⁴ Helms, Richard, and William Hood. *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 2003, p. 197.

⁷⁵ Helms, p. 196.

⁷⁶ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 98.

⁷⁷ Helms, p. 207.

⁷⁸ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 98.

⁷⁹ Jeffreys-Jones, p. 129.

⁸⁰ Jeffreys-Jones, p. 129.

President Kennedy approved a plan to drop hundreds of Chinese Nationalist soldiers into Communist China, an operation that DCI McCone considered dubious.⁸¹ Richard Helms expressed pessimism about a plan the President had authorized for a coup attempt against Haitian dictator François “Papa Doc” Duvalier.⁸² Kennedy authorized a \$2 million plan that would eventually bring down Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana.⁸³ Furthermore, on 15 August, 1962, Kennedy received from McCone a new CIA doctrine on counterinsurgency and a list of covert operations that were taking place in eleven additional nations: Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Iran, Pakistan, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela.⁸⁴ Covert actions, however, were not limited to overseas.

The Kennedy Administration and the CIA were both concerned about articles published in the *New York Times* by Hanson Baldwin. The articles repeated the conclusions of a recent NIE on Soviet ICBMs and indicated a leak. In violation of the CIA’s charter, Kennedy ordered a wiretap on Baldwin, four other reporters, and their sources in an operation that ran from 1962-1965.⁸⁵ DCI McCone, who freely expressed reservations about other covert operations, was in agreement with establishing this operation, which set a precedent for future domestic spying by the CIA.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Weiner, p. 190.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁸⁴ Weiner, p. 192-193.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 193-194.

6.1.4 Kennedy and Foreign Policy

Like many new presidential administrations, President Kennedy and his staff came to Washington to enact change and found that their first challenge was from within the very bureaucracy that they intended to use to implement change. Kennedy's appreciation for covert actions did not keep him from trying to implement policy through the Department of State. In an attempt to better equip U.S. ambassadors around the world with the best information available, Kennedy directed that the ambassador was "in full charge of all activities and agencies of the U.S. government in that country."⁸⁷ This included full access to all communications, including those of the CIA.⁸⁸ Despite this consolidation of authority, the Department of State continued to frustrate the President with their glacial pace, making CIA analyses and covert actions seem like an attractive and timely alternative in many cases.

When DCI McCone informed the President that Castro's Communist control in Cuba would soon be strong enough that military intervention would be necessary to remove him, Kennedy was indignant. Helms reports that as far as Kennedy was concerned, "It was up to the CIA-sponsored sabotage and propaganda operations, and the indigenous Cuban resistance forces, to inspire open revolt."⁸⁹ The selection of covert action alternatives to overt diplomacy or military action was not a choice that pleased key members of Kennedy's foreign policy team. For example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were concerned by the possible consequences of direct action in Cuba. Both men feared Soviet retaliations in the diplomatically fragile West Berlin or in Turkey where U.S. Jupiter missiles

⁸⁷ Rusk, p. 528.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Helms, p. 211.

were deployed to target Russian cities.⁹⁰ Foreign policy process difficulties were further compounded by Kennedy's preference for informal methods.

The highly institutionalized NSC system put in place by President Eisenhower is described by Fred Greenstein and Richard Immerman as facilitating "a well-informed, rigorously analytical national security team, which contributed to the coherence of the administration's policies."⁹¹ Kennedy abandoned many of the features of the modern, institutionalized presidency, such as weekly cabinet meetings and using the NSC to make "group decisions like corporate boards of directors."⁹² Instead, he preferred informal, ad hoc meetings or to place a trusted lieutenant in a strategic position to oversee a matter. On matters of national security Kennedy preferred to talk, first hand, with subject experts, calling lower-level department members directly.⁹³ He relied on his cabinet officers as individuals, but not as a corporate body.⁹⁴ As a result, NSC meetings tended to be smaller (believing that large meetings were less flexible, less secret, and less hard-hitting), and the major decisions that were made were largely ones that had been brokered beforehand.⁹⁵ Where strategic planning had once ruled a structured national security process, crises management and an emphasis on day-to-day operations now were its hallmarks.⁹⁶ Informality was now the "process."

⁹⁰ Helms, p. 211.

⁹¹ Greenstein, Fred, and Richard Immerman. "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy." *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*. Eds. Karl Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson. New York: Oxford, 2004. 46-52, p. 51.

⁹² Sorenson, p. 281.

⁹³ *Ibid*, p. 282.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 283.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 282-284.

⁹⁶ Inderfurth and Johnson, p. 64.

Not only was official business conducted informally, but some important diplomacy was as well. Robert Kennedy used Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet intelligence officer, as a back channel to the Kremlin. Despite warnings to Robert Kennedy from the CIA, FBI, and many key members of his national security team that Bolshakov was a KGB officer using him to deceive the President, he continued his frequent meetings.⁹⁷ Without larger meetings where truly alternative opinions could be raised and discussed, Kennedy was fed the pros and cons of Operation ZAPATA by the very people who had planned it. Kennedy's lament concerning following the advice of experts can be better understood with the knowledge that the full NSC rarely met and when it did they did not debate the substantive issues. Back channel diplomacy was costly, too, and it undercut the authority that he had pledged to give the State Department. President Kennedy had more control over the foreign policy process than Carter and Reagan would maintain during their administrations, but this came at the cost of losing the collective wisdom of the membership of the NSC.

6.1.5 Intelligence Operational Code for John Kennedy

President Kennedy's Intelligence Operational Code (see Figure 6.1) portrays more extreme positions than we saw in Carter's or Reagan's intelligence operational codes. Kennedy's position on oversight is one of the more challenging ones to define. At the beginning of his administration Kennedy clearly took on a strong executive oversight role. This is demonstrated in both his policy procedure and his public action. By eliminating most of the NSC functions and working directly with Agency personnel, he left very little room for plausible deniability. Indeed, when Operation ZAPATA became a public disaster he famously shouldered the public

⁹⁷ Andrew, pp. 278-279.




Figure 6.1. An Intelligence Operational Code for President Kennedy

blame, declaring himself to be “the responsible officer in government.”⁹⁸ Learning from this experience, however, Kennedy distanced himself from the direct tasking of many intelligence operations and covert actions. This is evidenced by many of the testimonies given in the Church Committee hearings, where officials were positive they were carrying out the President’s will, but could not directly attribute much of the direction to Kennedy. His place on the spectrum is on the “Plausible Deniability” end of the spectrum, which reflects where Kennedy was during the Kennedy/McCone dyad.

Kennedy’s support for the Mansfield Amendment sets a high bar for Congressional oversight early in his political career, but it is not met subsequently. Unfortunately that bar was never met again during his tenure. Even in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy was extremely selective about which Congressmen he informed and how much he revealed. Kennedy’s placement soundly on the “Denied Access to Information” side of the Legislative Oversight spectrum depicts a president who strongly heeded George Washington’s advice on keeping secrets.

Kennedy’s 16 January 1962 memorandum concerning the role of the DCI demonstrates strong support for centralized control of the intelligence community. The authority granted to DCI McCone by President Kennedy exceeds the formal actions of Carter and Reagan in the two previous case studies and places Kennedy at the “Centralized Control by the DCI” end of the spectrum. Kennedy’s actions also show an appreciation for the inclusion of intelligence into the policy process, but, he does not intentionally prescribe a policy role for intelligence. Therefore,

⁹⁸ Andrew, p. 265.

Kennedy is situated closer to the center of the “Intelligence Role in Policy Formulation” spectrum.

Kennedy speechwriter and biographer Ted Sorenson describes Kennedy as having no doubt in either “the necessity or legitimacy of ‘dirty tricks,’” but he believed that such actions should be conducted “within the framework of his foreign policy, consistent with his democratic objectives.”⁹⁹ Kennedy’s actions show that his strong rhetoric for the freedoms of the individual and for democracy would not prevent him from engaging the intelligence community in human intelligence collection and covert actions around the globe. His use of the CIA in particular and the efforts of Operation MONGOOSE demonstrate that he supported freedom of operations over concern for universal human rights. Furthermore, the memoirs of each of his foreign policy team members record his penchant for using covert operations as a tool of U.S. diplomacy. This is not to say that he acted without conscience. Dean Rusk records that on 24 August, 1963, President Kennedy approved a cable that supported a coup against South Vietnam’s prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem.¹⁰⁰ Historian Rhodri Jefferys-Jones records that even though Kennedy had “authorized and encouraged” Diem’s removal, DCI McCone had twice vetoed plans to assassinate Diem.¹⁰¹ When the coup took place on 1 November, 1963, it was South Vietnamese who murdered Diem, not the CIA. News of Diem’s death arrived at the White House via flash message; General Maxwell Taylor gives the most well known account of Kennedy’s reaction:

The news was that Diem and Nhu were both dead, and the coup leaders were claiming their deaths to be a suicide. Kennedy leaped to his feet and rushed from

⁹⁹ Sorenson, p. 631.

¹⁰⁰ Rusk, pp. 437-438.

¹⁰¹ Jeffreys-Jones, p. 138.

the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face which I had never seen before. He had always insisted that Diem must never suffer more than exile and had been led to believe or had persuaded himself that a change in government could be carried out without bloodshed.¹⁰²

Diem's death demonstrates the costs that covert action can entail and the deep personal regret that Kennedy felt at witnessing some of its immediate consequences.¹⁰³ Kennedy's Intelligence Operational Code for the Morality of Intelligence Operations places him decidedly on the side of Freedom of Operations as opposed to Universal Human Rights. For Covert Operations, Kennedy is at the extreme end of the spectrum, believing it to be an acceptable tool of U.S. diplomacy.

President Kennedy viewed the political environment as one of conflict, and his interaction with opponents and with allies demonstrated a zero-sum game mentality rather than one of cooperative bargaining. Ted Sorenson writes that during the 1960 presidential campaign Kennedy stated, with regard to the vice presidency, "Once you say you're going to settle for second, that's what happens to you in life."¹⁰⁴ Sorenson goes on to note that "Kennedy never settled for second if first was available."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Taylor, Maxwell D. *Swords and Plowshares*. 1st ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972, p. 301.

¹⁰³ Taylor, p. 302. Taylor goes on to write that the responsibility Kennedy and the rest of the cabinet felt "extends beyond the death of Diem—so bitterly regretted by President Kennedy—to the prolongation of the war and to the increased American involvement of later years, which were among the consequences of the events of this autumn of disaster."

¹⁰⁴ Sorenson, p.13.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

6.2 DCI John A. McCone (6th DCI, 1961-1965)

Kennedy first offered the position of DCI to General Maxwell Taylor who declined, and he eventually settled on John McCone.¹⁰⁶ McCone had been a critic of Kennedy's attempts to reach agreement with the Soviets, but he had met with Kennedy and produced a report for him after the Soviets had broken the nuclear test ban moratorium.¹⁰⁷ Richard Helms described John McCone as having "a matchless grip of organizational efficiency and managerial responsibility."¹⁰⁸ McCone had succeeded in both private business and in government service. He was a self-made millionaire, an engineer, an entrepreneur, and CEO of a shipping company.¹⁰⁹ In government he had served as Under Secretary of the Air Force for President Truman and as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for President Eisenhower.¹¹⁰

McCone was described as "dour and formal," but he earned the respect of the members of the Agency.¹¹¹ Stansfield Turner notes, "Those in the CIA who briefed the DCI had been accustomed to dealing with a distracted and scattered Allen Dulles. They were put under a spell by McCone's penetrating stare and dedicated focus. They invariably remembered McCone's 'steely blue eyes,' which, however, were actually dark brown."¹¹² McCone contrasted with Kennedy not only in his politics but in his focus within the intelligence community. The Kennedy/Dulles dyad was notable for the passion that both men had for espionage and covert

¹⁰⁶ Sorenson, pp. 630-631.

¹⁰⁷ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p 92.

¹⁰⁸ Helms, p. 248.

¹⁰⁹ Prados, p. 293.

¹¹⁰ Sorenson, p. 631.

¹¹¹ Srodes, James. *Allen Dulles : Master of Spies*. Washington, DC; Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub.; Distributed to the trade by National Book Network, 1999, p. 549.

¹¹² Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 94.

action, but McCone had greater interest in research and analysis as well as improving the Agency's technology.¹¹³ He told Kennedy that the CIA could not continue to be seen as "a 'cloak and dagger' outfit...designed to overthrow governments, assassinate heads of state, involve itself in political affairs of foreign states."¹¹⁴ Instead he insisted that the CIA's singular responsibility under law was to assemble, analyze, and evaluate all available intelligence and report it to the White House.

6.2.1 Early Experience with Intelligence

McCone had many strong qualifications for becoming DCI, but those did not include experience with intelligence. A European station chief was caught off-guard when the new DCI, while touring with outgoing DCI Dulles, asked him, "What, exactly, is a double agent?"¹¹⁵ Access to the president is the mark of importance for any administration position and Kennedy made it known that McCone had a standing weekly meeting with him. For McCone, this level of access seemed appropriate as he intended to play an active role in foreign policy. "Mine is not a policy job," McCone said, "but when asked I'll give my opinion."¹¹⁶ McCone, in fact, saw the role of the DCI in foreign policy as being both integral and active and was never shy about advancing his own opinion.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Colby, William Egan, and Peter Forbath. *Honorable Men : My Life in the CIA*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978, p. 186.

¹¹⁴ Weiner, p. 182.

¹¹⁵ Grose, Peter. *Gentleman Spy : The Life of Allen Dulles*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994, p. 535.

¹¹⁶ Powers, p. 206.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

6.2.2 The Intelligence Process

John McCone welcomed the role as the leader of the entire intelligence community. In less than two months after he assumed the position of DCI, Kennedy had issued his letter making him the nation's principal intelligence officer.¹¹⁸ McCone would initially split his time so that only 20 percent of it was on CIA matters, while 80 percent dealt with intelligence community business.¹¹⁹ As the President and his brother continued to increase the level of covert actions being conducted, McCone's allocation had to change so that eventually he was spending 90 percent of his time on "clandestine affairs."¹²⁰ McCone was far more willing than Kennedy to delegate Agency duties to his deputy, but as a strong leader and manager he could not give up the responsibilities as the Director of the CIA. McCone said, "There are some people that claim that it's impossible for a person to wear two hats like that, but I did my best."¹²¹

6.2.2.1 Planning and Direction

John McCone ensured that he was the face of the intelligence community to the White House and that he had the authority to direct the community as necessary. Helms recalls that "McCone handled all significant relations with the White House, Bob Kennedy, Congress, State, and the Pentagon."¹²² He strengthened his control of the intelligence community by establishing National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) Staff to exercise control over one of the most critical areas of power within any bureaucracy, the budget.¹²³ With the budget under central

¹¹⁸ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 41.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 42.

¹²⁰ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, pp. 98-99.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, p. 96.

¹²² Helms, p. 251.

¹²³ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 44.

control he then had the ability to evaluate intelligence programs from a community wide perspective in order to promote efficiency. His new program allowed him to: 1) to combat the rising costs of intelligence, 2) to understand what all the programs actually did, and 3) to set priorities given by policy-makers as guidance and then relate programs to objectives.¹²⁴ Critically, with all of this community coordination he did not attempt to micromanage the way intelligence community members conducted their operations.¹²⁵

6.2.2.2 Collection

DCI McCone is credited with greatly advancing the technological intelligence capabilities of the Agency. He did not desire to decrease the HUMINT capabilities of the Agency, but he understood that new technologies had the potential to provide the means to collect intelligence from vast denied areas within the Soviet Union.¹²⁶ Space technology and other advanced collection techniques became the domain of a new Directorate for Science and Technology.¹²⁷

McCone achieved notable success within the HUMINT field as well. As previously discussed, Cuba was always a high priority, and while the President was never content with the continued failures of covert actions, he acknowledged “a noticeable improvement...in the collection of intelligence.”¹²⁸ McCone was not timid about demanding a maximum effort from his officers either. William Colby, who headed the Agency’s Far East Division, presented a plan to distribute dangerous duties in Vietnam across a wider pool of officers using a rotation system, to which McCone replied, “Mr. Colby, the President believes that Vietnam is the most important

¹²⁴ Garthoff, Douglas, pp. 44-46.

¹²⁵ Prados, p. 296.

¹²⁶ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 43.

¹²⁷ Colby, p. 186.

¹²⁸ Helms, p. 207.

task this nation faces, and wants our very best men assigned there. You will assign the best and most qualified men we have and keep them there and I do not want to hear any more talk of sharing duty with less qualified ones.”¹²⁹

One of McCone’s most famous operational contributions to the area of collections was his insistence on the resumption of U-2 flights over Cuba in October, 1962. He was convinced that Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba were “a probability rather than a mere possibility.”¹³⁰ By 5 October McCone’s advocacy for the flights turned into an argument with APNSA Bundy. “Bundy scoffed, saying he was convinced that there was no threat—and if one existed, the CIA could not find it.”¹³¹ Further resistance to reinstating the potentially provocative flights arose from within the administration when Bobby Kennedy received a message from Krushchev through Bolshakov, his KGB back channel to the Kremlin, stating, “The weapons that the USSR is sending to Cuba will only be of a defensive character.”¹³² HUMINT reports of a possible MRBM site at San Cristobal finally tipped the evidence in favor of McCone; the President approved the resumption of U-2 flights on 9 October and weather permitted the first flight to occur on 14 October.¹³³

DCI McCone can be rightfully credited as making his most significant contributions to the collection phase in the area of TECHINT, but these contributions did not come at the expense of HUMINT. Furthermore, despite not knowing what a double agent was, McCone demonstrated a fierce dedication to ensuring that the best people and the best systems were collecting the best

¹²⁹ Colby, p. 229.

¹³⁰ Dalleck, p. 543.

¹³¹ Weiner, p. 196.

¹³² Dalleck, p. 543.

¹³³ *Ibid*, p. 543.

information possible. From Saigon to Havana, from sugar fields to 74,000 feet (operating altitude of the U-2), McCone was willing to push to get decision makers the intelligence he believed they needed to do the job.

6.2.2.3 Processing and Exploitation

McCone made a considerable contribution to this phase of intelligence through the increase in TECHINT capability he championed. Processing and exploitation would grow in importance as part of the intelligence cycle because of the massive amounts of data that technical intelligence sources could collect and the amount of time that would be necessary to process so much data. This was exemplified by the sheer quantity of U-2 film that had to be exploited after a mission.¹³⁴ The imagery evaluation during the Cuban Missile Crisis, however, also demonstrates how TECHINT and HUMINT are not just complimentary, but symbiotic. Proper evaluation of the capabilities of new missiles in Cuba was only possible with benefit of the information obtained through Oleg Penkovsky.¹³⁵ Penkovsky was a colonel in Soviet military intelligence (GRU) who provided thousands of pages of documents to the West.¹³⁶ Without his help the CIA would not have been able to accurately inform the President of the capabilities of the missiles in Cuba.¹³⁷

6.2.2.4 Analysis and Production

McCone's greatest interest was in the area of analysis. DDI Ray Cline believed that McCone could absorb more from a complex briefing than any other senior official he had ever

¹³⁴ May and Zelikow, p. 122.

¹³⁵ Helms, p. 216.

¹³⁶ Jeffreys-Jones, p. 114. Colonel Penkovsky, code named HERO, was arrested by the Soviets in the fall of 1962 and was therefore unavailable during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the information he had already provided was critical to the CIA throughout the crisis.

¹³⁷ Helms, p. 216.

worked with.¹³⁸ This skill, however, did not lead to larger, more complex reports. McCone told the analysts, “I don’t want you to write any long reports. In this organization it seems that every time I ask for something I get a forty-two-page report with twelve annexes.”¹³⁹ Large reports frequently go unread by policy-makers and if the primary customer does not use the product than it is pointless to produce it. McCone worked to bring analysts in direct contact with policy issues that the White House was facing to increase relevance and use of the information.¹⁴⁰ He was able to guide the analytical process to create assessments on more relevant issues because of the way he pushed himself into the Oval Office and made himself part of the policy process.¹⁴¹

McCone considered the NIE system to be bigger than he was as DCI.¹⁴² He would pour over estimates in great detail, he would critique and debate with analysts to win them to his own assessment, but he would not change the analysis and conclusions.¹⁴³ McCone would not change an assessment, but that did not mean that he had to agree with it or recommend it to the President. In McCone’s most famous moment during the Cuban Missile Crises he stood in opposition to the CIA estimate on Cuba that ruled out the likelihood of the Soviets placing nuclear missiles on the island.¹⁴⁴ While he was technically correct in this assessment, his reasoning was totally flawed. McCone was sure that the deployment of the SA-2, the Soviet’s

¹³⁸ Andrew, p. 271.

¹³⁹ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 96.

¹⁴⁰ Colby, p. 186.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 186-187.

¹⁴² Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 96.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. *Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 5.

most advanced surface -to-air missile system, away from airfields indicated that they were there to protect offensive missile systems. The SA-2, however, had been deployed in similar fashion in Egypt, Syria, and Indonesia without nuclear missiles being introduced into any of those countries.¹⁴⁵ Chronologically, the Kremlin's decision to deploy SA-2 missiles to Cuba was made in April of 1962, a full month before the deployment of nuclear missiles was even discussed and decided upon.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, the concealment of the unloading activity by the Soviets would not have been unusual for any military equipment they were bringing into Cuba.¹⁴⁷ From the Soviet perspective, it would be far better for the U.S. not to be aware of any weapon system, offensive or defensive, until it had achieved full operational capability. McCone deserves accolades for improvements he made to the analytical process at the CIA, but his most famous piece of personal analysis can be summed up well by saying he was absolutely right for all the wrong reasons.

6.2.2.5 Dissemination

William Colby records how McCone created a special assessment on the situation in Vietnam by bringing back many "old Vietnam hands" who had moved on to other assignments.¹⁴⁸ The officers were to re-engage old contacts and generally work outside the current reporting system to develop a more accurate assessment of the situation. While Colby was originally pessimistic that the assessment would generate any additional value, he learned an important

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 5.

¹⁴⁶ Garthoff, Raymond L. *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Rev ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989, p. 22.

¹⁴⁷ Blight and Welch, p. 5.

¹⁴⁸ Colby, p. 222.

lesson that, “part of the job of intelligence assessment is getting its results read.”¹⁴⁹ Through persistence and determination McCone achieved the status for which the DCI position had been created; for, he was the President’s single voice for all American intelligence.¹⁵⁰

6.2.3 Covert Actions

John McCone’s interest in collection and analysis may have complemented Kennedy’s zest for covert action, but it made their relationship uneasy. McCone was concerned by the attention and resources given to Operation MONGOOSE; furthermore, he told Secretary of Defense McNamara that the possible assassination of Castro should not be condoned.¹⁵¹ Clandestine operations not only grew to consume the majority of the DCI’s time, but the DO was consuming sixty percent of the CIA budget, with a substantial portion of that going towards Cuban operations.¹⁵² McCone was not optimistic that MONGOOSE could achieve any real success and had little direct involvement in the operation, having delegated responsibility to Helms.¹⁵³ As a result, McCone fell out of the loop on projects such as RIFLE, the hiring of a contract killer to assassinate Castro.¹⁵⁴ Tim Weiner notes that Helms decided not to tell McCone because he felt “the director would have the strongest religious, legal, and political objections.”¹⁵⁵ Thomas Powers allows that Helms did tell McCone about the assassinations in the summer of 1963 but that McCone would later not admit to having been told.¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁹ Colby, p. 222.

¹⁵⁰ Weiner, p. 205.

¹⁵¹ Turner, *Burn Before Reading*, p. 94.

¹⁵² Prados, p. 297.

¹⁵³ Andrew, p. 281.

¹⁵⁴ Weiner, p. 187.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ Powers, p. 150.

Amongst the dirty tricks and the operational failures, Helms maintained one clear advantage over his predecessor, Bissell; Helms kept MONGOOSE out of the newspapers.¹⁵⁷ It would be more than ten years before many of the operations being conducted would come to light, at which point neither of the Kennedy brothers would be around to testify about them, having tragically fallen victim to assassination attempts themselves. For McCone, covert actions may have been a side show and a distraction to the goals he wanted to concentrate on, but it was one in which he had to involve himself because it was one that the President wanted to play.

6.2.4 Foreign Policy

According to Richard Helms, McCone “considered the role of the DCI to fall within the circle of policymaking, and took an active role in both the Kennedy and early Johnson eras.”¹⁵⁸ Another future DCI, William Colby, observed that McCone “pushed his way into the President’s office” to ensure that he was part of the policy process.”¹⁵⁹ McCone clearly fell on the Kendall side of the Kent-Kendall debate, seeing his role as equal in importance to that of the Secretary of State.¹⁶⁰ Leaving the neutrality of being a facilitator and a provider of intelligence to become deeply involved in the foreign policy issues did come with certain risks.

McCone agreed with Kennedy on the importance of Cuba—he saw it as a key to all of Latin America—but there were also some important differences in their policy ideas. Two examples stand out from the rest. McCone disagreed with the President’s policies in Vietnam. He voiced

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 167.

¹⁵⁸ Helms, p. 306.

¹⁵⁹ Colby, p. 373.

¹⁶⁰ Powers, p. 206.

concern that “a little effort by the North Vietnamese” could upset the entire training mission.¹⁶¹ He agreed with General Maxwell Taylor that U.S. policy in Saigon was drifting, and when debate rose about supporting a coup against Prime Minister Diem he strenuously argued that there was “no remaining prospect of plausible denial” of American support for the coup.¹⁶² McCone would infuriate members of the foreign policy team asking, “Who is the alternative?” and

We’ve examined this question very carefully and we can’t identify anybody else who could hold the country together. Diem may be a sonofabitch, but he’s *our* sonofabitch. Do you know of anybody? Have you got a name? Come on now, who?¹⁶³

This challenge to those appointed to create policy demonstrated the forceful manner McCone used, but it was not the only way he endangered his position.

The second example of falling on the wrong side of the President actually stems from McCone’s greatest victory, correctly prognosticating the Soviet missile deployment to Cuba. McCone had stood alone, predicting the Soviet actions correctly when no other senior official or intelligence analyst would agree with him. McCone’s willingness to inform others of this accomplishment is assessed by many to have caused his fall from favor. McCone’s testimony to the PFIAB about the “photo gap” (which was eliminated only after his persistent advocacy) found its way into the Washington Post on 4 March, 1963.¹⁶⁴ APNSA Bundy told a CIA

¹⁶¹ Goldstein, p. 83.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁶³ Powers, p. 207.

¹⁶⁴ Weiner, p. 207.

official, “I’m so tired of listening to McCone say he was right I never want to hear it again.”¹⁶⁵

Robert Kennedy believed the leak was intentional to wound the administration; the President agreed, noting, “Yeah, he’s a real bastard, that John McCone.”¹⁶⁶ McCone’s access to the President was largely cut off from that point on, leaving him frustrated and outside the policy circle.

6.2.4 Intelligence Operational Code for John McCone

The Intelligence Operational Code for McCone (see Figure 6.2) is very similar to Kennedy’s with the notable exceptions of the role of intelligence in policy making and the role of covert operations. McCone is largely neutral on the issue of executive oversight of intelligence. He believed that items such as political assassination should not be discussed in front of the president, which would lean him towards plausible deniability, but he also believed that the idea itself is abhorrent so there is little to keep from the president. Given McCone’s lack of involvement in Operation MONGOOSE, the President may have known more about covert actions in Cuba than the DCI did. McCone scores evenly with Kennedy on legislative oversight, having made little impact in that area.

McCone and Kennedy were unified with the desire for a strong central role for the DCI, with Kennedy fulfilling McCone’s request for a formal statement of McCone’s position. The DCI’s role as a policy maker was not a shared vision. McCone’s more aggressive view of his role in the policy process was apparent to his contemporaries. Kennedy’s exact preference for the role of the DCI was less obvious, but it was less of a role than McCone had in mind, particularly

¹⁶⁵ Powers, p. 205.

¹⁶⁶ Weiner, p. 207.




Figure 6.2. An Intelligence Operational Code for Kennedy and McCone

after the Cuban Missile Crisis. McCone occupies an extreme position on this spectrum, while Kennedy is far more centrist.

McCone may have been slightly more concerned about universal human rights than Kennedy, based on their reactions to political assassinations, but the members of the dyad are relatively close on this factor. Covert operations, conversely, is the second area of great difference. The Kennedys' both showed a passion to use covert actions to bring about policy objectives that would be otherwise difficult or costly to obtain, while McCone generally showed considerably more caution and skepticism about the odds of success.

Finally, McCone and Kennedy seemed to have a relatively similar view of the nature of politics and interactions with opponents and allies. Kennedy put more faith in trusted lieutenants to carry out his programs, whereas McCone was more process oriented. Both were willing to delegate authority but not responsibility in most cases.

6.3 Assessment of the Kennedy/McCone Dyad

The challenge of assessing the Kennedy/McCone dyad is that it combines both critical successes and historical failures. Furthermore, the dyad pairs two individuals who have conflicting characteristics. Kennedy and McCone were both successful men; they shared a common religion and a common desire to be leaders in the development of foreign policy. They differed greatly, however, in politics, style of leadership, and methods of implementing foreign policy. This section will place the Kennedy/McCone dyad on the President/DCI relationship matrix, evaluate the level of intelligence success achieved by the dyad, and compare the results to the hypotheses being tested.

6.3.1 The President/DCI Relationship Matrix

Placing the Kennedy/McCone dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix (See Figure 6.3) is based upon the same measures as were used in the previous case studies. The horizontal axis depicts a spectrum of the personal relationship between the President and the DCI. The left extreme in the spectrum represents a warm personal relationship in which the DCI has the ability to talk directly with the president whenever he perceives the need. The right end of the spectrum illustrates a relationship that could be described as cool and, at best, professional. In this type of relationship the President and DCI have direct contact only at certain formal meetings and the DCI is dependent upon someone exogenous to the president/DCI relationship to grant his access to the president. McCone was never a natural part of the inner circle in the Kennedy Administration. In the beginning of the McCone's tenure there was a deliberate effort to demonstrate his access to the president but, as discussed, the dyad changed from regular weekly meetings to a situation where McCone's access was largely cut off from personal access to the President. Instead, his access to the John Kennedy came through Bobby Kennedy.¹⁶⁷ As a result, the relationship is placed closer to the center of the spectrum because it is more amiable and facilitated more frequent meetings than the Carter/Turner dyad. It would be McCone's determination that intelligence products be seen by policy-makers that ensured that intelligence was not filtered, even when he personally had trouble gaining access to the Oval Office. Therefore, the Kennedy/McCone dyad falls on the right half of the spectrum; it is a relationship that ultimately is more frequently metered by official duties and scheduled meetings than it is by personal connection. This is a critical factor in an administration such as Kennedy's, where ad hoc meetings and informal discussions are the forums in which key decisions are made.

¹⁶⁷ Powers, p. 206.




Figure 6.3. Kennedy/McCone Dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix.

The vertical axis of the matrix depicts politicization. At the upper end of this spectrum is a DCI who strictly observes Lowenthal's semi-permeable wall and adheres to the principles that Sherman Kent promoted about informing the policy process instead of becoming actively engaged in influencing and advocating policy. At the lower end of this spectrum a DCI is not only integral to the policy process, but his policy role threatens the integrity and impartiality of the intelligence analysis he presents. The Kennedy/McCone dyad is placed in the lower half of the spectrum due to McCone's determination to play an active role in the creation of foreign policy. This quadrant of the matrix is designated as the "Chaplain" type dyad. Being an active part of the policy process is a challenge for a DCI who is not part of the administration's inner circle. McCone's policy role does not move him as close to the end of the spectrum as Casey's did because McCone's policy role was never formalized in the same way. Reagan made Casey part of the cabinet and told Casey he would have a policy role, but no such arrangement ever existed in the Kennedy/McCone dyad. Furthermore, if it had, it would have meant little since Kennedy did not use his cabinet in the actual decision-making process.

This position on the matrix demonstrates a third category of President/DCI relationship. The "Salesman" is a category that is typified by a DCI who is an outsider to the administration's senior members, but is still able to advocate and influence policy. Like the "Insider," the Salesman runs the risk of being perceived as altering intelligence to support his own position, but he has the added challenge of not having a regular seat at the table. Next we will examine the level of intelligence success the Kennedy/McCone dyad was able to achieve.

6.3.2 The Intelligence Success of the Dyad

As in the previous dyads that have been examined, the intelligence success of the Kennedy/McCone dyad must be determined based upon a mixture of performance in major

events and in day-to-day intelligence reporting. As previously discussed, the perfect prediction of events is impossible, so, some failures are going to occur. Additionally, in evaluating the intelligence community assessments of the day it is necessary to bear in mind what information it was even possible to know at the point in time being evaluated. For example, if the decision to deploy missiles to Cuba was made in May and June of 1962, then only access to the Kremlin's innermost circles could have provided intelligence that the deployment would occur before summer of that year.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, once a decision was made to deploy the missiles, the method of deployment was done so as to minimize warning to the U.S. Khrushchev notes, "We installed the missiles above ground because underground sites would have required too much time to build. We wanted to hurry because we expected there was not much time before the Americans repeated their invasion. When they returned they would invade with forces that Castro could not withstand."¹⁶⁹ This further narrowed the window of possible time in which the intelligence community could have possibly detected the movement of the missiles. Even the fact that Soviet cargo vessels with large hatches were en route to Cuba, but were riding high in the water (indicating potentially large, but comparatively light cargo), is the type of fact that stands out in retrospect, with full knowledge of hindsight.¹⁷⁰ If these factors are combined with weather issues that prevented U-2 flights, it becomes questionable as to how much earlier it would have been possible for the intelligence community to obtain intelligence on the Soviet missiles.¹⁷¹ The intelligence community, however, does not employ thousands of analysts just to

¹⁶⁸ Garthoff, Raymond, p. 21.

¹⁶⁹ Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, Jerrold L. Schechter, and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov. *Khrushchev Remembers : The Glasnost Tapes*. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990, p. 171.

¹⁷⁰ Garthoff, Raymond, p. 23.

¹⁷¹ Pedlow, Gregory W., Donald E. Welzenbach, and Center for the Study of Intelligence. *The CIA and the U-2 Program 1954-1974*. Washington, D.C. :Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence; Springfield, VA: Documents Expediting DOC EX

collate and report empirical facts derived from the collection process. The assessment of those facts includes preparing policy-makers for possible courses of action.

For U.S. policy-makers to have effectively deterred the Soviet deployment of the missiles would have required action on the part of the U.S. prior to the Kremlin's decision in spring of 1962.¹⁷² This would mean that the intelligence warning of Soviet concern over a U.S. invasion of Cuba and potential Soviet willingness to deploy military forces and equipment (of any type) to stop such an invasion would have had to have been considered and disseminated. This possibility, if considered, was never presented. Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis itself this possible motivation for Soviet action was not presented to policy makers. On 17 October 1962, intelligence assessments given to McCone in preparation for an EXCOMM meeting included this possible motivation for the Soviet missile deployment, but the only motivation briefed by McCone was "to enhance Soviet strike capability against the United States."¹⁷³ Enemy courses of action not presented are unlikely to be considered and discussed. Consequently, the intelligence community should not be held accountable for information it could not have acquired; instead it should be evaluated on relevant possibilities that it failed to bring before policy-makers.

6.3.2.1 Accuracy

Having the advantage of a historical perspective tells us much about what happened during the Kennedy/McCone dyad, but this perspective can also hinder our evaluation since we are aware of everything that was missed. Few other moments of history have been evaluated with the scrutiny that has been given to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Using the scholarship available to

Project, ANA Division/Government Section, Library of Congress distributor; National Technical Information Service NTIS distributor, 1998, p. 209.

¹⁷² Garthoff, Raymond, p. 21.

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 25.

us today, we know that the Soviet military force in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis was 41,902, as compared with the 6,000 to 8,000 that were briefed to EXCOMM on 20 October 1962,¹⁷⁴ and the 10,000 that the CIA estimated to be there on 22 October 1962.¹⁷⁵ Further, we know that in addition to the 60 nuclear warheads delivered for the IRBMs and MRBMs, there were approximately 100 tactical nuclear weapons the intelligence community failed to discover in Cuba.¹⁷⁶ Even some data available within the CIA was not making its way to EXCOMM. When McCone told EXCOMM the first missiles could be operational within one to two weeks, technical experts at CIA were estimating that it would only be a matter of days.¹⁷⁷ When McCone reported on 20 October that the first eight launchers had attained limited operational readiness, a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) disseminated the same day assessed that two regiments, sixteen launchers, “must be considered operational by now.”¹⁷⁸ If the CIA had been advocating an invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces, these oversights could have been disastrous.

To the credit of the intelligence community and to McCone, the intelligence community was up front about what information they had and what they were not able to confirm. At the 20 October 1962 EXCOMM meeting McCone “acknowledged that we did not know positively that nuclear warheads for the missiles deployed had actually arrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of storage places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not have

¹⁷⁴ May and Zelikow, p. 195.

¹⁷⁵ Garthoff, Raymond, pp. 28-29.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 29. Specifically, “80 for the unidentified 16 tactical cruise missile launchers, 12 for the six *Luna* rocket launchers, six bombs for a special squadron of the Il-28 bombers, and possibly four to six nuclear naval mines.”

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 27.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 27.

been sent to Cuba.”¹⁷⁹ While a lack of knowledge is not an intelligence success, leaving policy-makers unaware of the shortcomings of the intelligence picture gives a false impression of the accuracy of intelligence and can result in an intelligence failure.

Most importantly, McCone and the intelligence community were able to provide the President and EXCOMM the information they needed most at the moment they needed it. Despite Soviet attempts to hide the deployment of the missiles, the CIA located the missile sites before they were operational. By 20 October 1962, less than a week after the first missile site had been imaged, NPIC IMINT analysts were confident that they had discovered all the missile sites. They had achieved coverage of 95 percent of the island, and were convinced that the remaining five percent of the island had terrain that was unsuitable for the missiles.¹⁸⁰ Without the assurance that they could target all the missile sites, air strikes would not have been an option available to the President, and the EXCOMM members would have felt even more confined in the choices available to them. After this particular briefing, “the President was on his feet the moment Lundahl finished. He crossed the room directly toward Lundahl and said, ‘I want to extend to your organization my gratitude for a job very well done.’”¹⁸¹

Expanding our evaluation to the entire duration of the Kennedy/McCone dyad demonstrates a similar finding. Using the benefit of history there are many shortcomings that can be documented in the estimates that were produced during this dyad, but the intelligence community and McCone produced a good track record for providing the information that was needed in time for consideration in the policy debate. McCone’s willingness to go against his

¹⁷⁹ May and Zelikow, p. 198.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 192.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 192.

own agency's estimate (even if his logic was faulty) ultimately provided the proof necessary to convince the world of what the Soviets were attempting. McCone's stubborn arguments against deposing Prime Minister Diem without a known quantity as a replacement similarly forced policy-makers to consider alternatives even if they did not act on his advice. The intelligence community produced acceptable results in the Kennedy/McCone dyad.

6.3.2.2 Timeliness

The amount of warning given in the Cuban Missile Crisis was not extensive, but it was sufficient to give the President the options of a naval blockade or air strikes on the missile sites. When Kennedy asked his advisors what they should say to those whose reaction to the blockade was to ask why they had not instituted a blockade in July, Sorenson and Ball replied that they had not instituted a blockade then because they did not know about the missiles then. This simplistic point should not be dismissed too easily. A careful review of collection capabilities at that time and when intelligence services could have potentially have discovered this information shows that there were few opportunities for the DCI to gain evidence to support his assessment before the first SIGINT intercepts tipped off the critical need for the resumption of U-2 flights.¹⁸² Furthermore, the rate at which intelligence was collected and processed, particularly IMINT, was absolutely outstanding and enabled the members of EXCOMM to debate policy options in an informed manner. The Kennedy/McCone dyad achieved excellent timeliness throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis once the missiles were discovered, and they were generally able to maintain an acceptable level of timeliness throughout the tenure of the dyad.

¹⁸² Bamford, p. 276. U.S. Navy SIGINT vessels *U.S.S. Oxford* and *U.S.S. Muller* patrolled off the coast of Cuba, and one of these vessels was the first to pick up indications that the Soviet Union was installing offensive missiles in Cuba.

6.3.2.3 Relevance

The Kennedy/McCone dyad benefits from McCone's involvement in the policy process in much the same way that the Reagan/Casey dyad did. Because McCone had forced his way into policy discussions, he knew what the relative issues were and made sure that analysts supported those issues. Furthermore, by trying to reduce the size of estimates, he increased the likelihood that the decision-makers would take the time to read them. Relevance was a stated goal of McCone's and the dyad achieved that goal to good effect.

6.3.2.4 Actionability

It is difficult to separate the characteristics of actionability and timeliness in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Quite often it was the timeliness of the information that made it actionable. However, the ability that IMINT gave Kennedy to take his case to his allies and to the United Nations gave new meaning to actionability in his day. The dyad achieved good actionability.

6.3.2.5 Was it Used?

Intelligence became more essential in the Kennedy White House than it had during the Eisenhower Administration because there was less strategic planning and more crisis management. Intelligence was able to keep up with many of the developing situations through a policy process that resulted in very fast OODA loops with very short periods to orient the decision maker. Intelligence was also used more because McCone worked hard to make sure it was heard or read; in fact, it was virtually forced upon policy-makers. In the early days of the Cuban Missile Crisis General Maxwell Taylor commented, "I'm impressed with how our minds have changed on this

in 24 hours based upon this last intelligence.”¹⁸³ Intelligence was used to a great degree in the Kennedy/McCone dyad.

6.3.2.6 The Intelligence Success of the Dyad was Acceptable

A considerable number of shortcomings exist within the Kennedy/McCone dyad that can be pointed out with accuracy, but many require knowledge that would not have been available at the time. To hold the intelligence community accountable for information that was not available or not attainable at the time is to take the reality of their actions out of context. The operational failures and moral shortcomings of the covert actions that were undertaken as part of Operation MONGOOSE are similar to the Iran-Contra Affair. They are extremely useful in developing the Intelligence Operational Code for the members of the dyad, but are less relevant to assessing the performance of intelligence. The fact that this is a summary appraisal also means that the overall picture must be assessed, and in this regard the intelligence community achieved acceptable results (See Table 6.1).

6.3.3 The Effect of the President/DCI Relationship – Testing the Hypotheses

H1 states: *The nature of the personal relationship between the DCI and the president will strongly determine the quality of intelligence reports received by the president.* This factor changed in a negative manner through the tenure of this dyad. Initially, Kennedy and McCone had weekly meetings giving McCone good access to the President, and when combined with McCone’s forcefulness a higher quality of intelligence resulted compared to after the Cuban Missile Crisis when McCone lost access to the Oval Office. The conflicting political views of the President and the DCI were relatively inconsequential when access was maintained, but this

¹⁸³ May and Zelikow, p. 156.

Table 6.1 Table of Kennedy/McCone Dyad’s Success in Intelligence

Area of Intelligence Success	Grade
Accuracy	Acceptable
Timeliness	Good
Relevance	Good
Actionable	Acceptable
Was the Intelligence Used	Acceptable
Summary Score	Acceptable

Note - As discussed in Section 3.5, the Summary Score is not an average of the component scores. A single poor grade may be sufficient to cause a Summary Score of Poor if the cause is of sufficient significance.

became a liability as distance grew between them. This case study shows that the Kennedy/McCone dyad supports H1.

H2 states: *The frequency of interaction between the DCI and the president will have a positive relationship with the quality of intelligence the president receives.* The increased relevance of intelligence achieved by McCone in the early part of his tenure as DCI is attributed by many to be a result of McCone's access to Kennedy's informal meetings. It was in these sessions that foreign policy was determined and it was the experience of these meetings that allowed McCone to guide the intelligence community to develop priorities that met the President's needs. This does not mean that McCone needed to be a policy advocate at these meetings to gather the required insight. This insight could have been gained just as well if he only presented intelligence without taking a position. This case study shows that the Kennedy/McCone dyad supports H2.

H3 states: *DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives.* McCone's policy advocacy role did not generate the same level of protest that was observed in the Reagan/Casey dyad. McCone's vehement anti-communist views and fears that he opposed academic freedom contributed to a prolonged debate among senior officials of the Kennedy Administration about his appointment, but Theodore Sorenson concludes that these concerns proved to be unfounded.¹⁸⁴ After the Cuban Missile Crisis, McCone's habit of pointing out that he was the only one who called the issue correctly generated animosity within the cabinet, including suspicions that he was trying to make others look bad. While a neutral purveyor of facts might be unappreciated for saying "I told you so,"

¹⁸⁴ Sorenson, p. 631.

McCone's active involvement in the policy process contributed to making such comments more offensive. This caused McCone to lose his access to the most important foreign policy discussions, the informal ones that mattered most in the Kennedy administration, and therefore caused the influence of intelligence to decrease. The Kennedy/McCone dyad does not provide as dramatic an example of H3 as the Reagan/Casey dyad did, but it does support H3.

The Kennedy/McCone case study supports all three hypotheses. Additionally, it demonstrates how the study of dyads needs to be conducted within the context of the knowledge available at the time. The final case study, Bush/Tenet, contains important variations in the president/DCI relationship that are unique from those presented so far.

Table 6.2 Table of Kennedy/McCone Dyad's Hypotheses Evaluation

Hypothesis	Verdict of Evidence from the Dyad
H1 - The Nature of the President/DCI Relationship	Supports
H2 - The Frequency of President/DCI Interaction	Supports
H3 - The DCI Advocates Particular Policy Options	Supports

CHAPTER 7

CASE STUDY: PRESIDENT BUSH AND DCI TENET

Mr. President, the vice president wants to make a speech about Iraq and al-Qa'ida that goes way beyond what the intelligence shows. We cannot support the speech and it should not be given.¹

George Tenet

President George W. Bush was inaugurated as president on 20 January 2001 as the forty-third president of the United States. In a departure from precedent, Bush chose to retain the incumbent DCI, George Tenet.² President Bill Clinton had appointed Tenet as DCI on 7 July 1997 and, at the completion of Tenet's tenure, he would be the second longest serving DCI (seven years) after Allen Dulles (eight years and nine months). The Bush/Tenet dyad is the sixth longest dyad at 1268 days and encompasses some of the most significant intelligence events since the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Bush/Tenet dyad would be forced to deal with an incredibly divergent and expansive set of requirements for intelligence. The proliferation of missile technology had placed the United States and its allies at greater risk than ever before of coming under an attack by missiles other

¹ Tenet, p. 341.

² Since the creation of the DCI position in 1947, only two DCI's had previously been retained through a change of administration that was caused by an election. John F. Kennedy retained Allen Dulles in 1961, and Richard Nixon retained Richard Helms in 1968. Those elections also involved a change in the party that controlled the White House. Two other presidents retained the incumbent DCI upon succeeding to the White House under more turbulent conditions. Lyndon Johnson retained John McCone after Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, and Gerald Ford retained William Colby when Nixon resigned in 1974.

than the Soviet Union's. A National Missile Defense (NMD) system uses highly advanced technology and requires extremely timely and very precise intelligence data to operate. Additionally, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) also requires a considerable array of technical sensors to monitor and discover the various components and products of WMD programs. Furthermore, the Department of Defense's munitions had also come to depend upon great quantities of high precision intelligence. In 1991, during Operation DESERT STORM, ten percent of U.S. weapons were precision guided. By 2001, that percentage had grown to seventy percent, furthering the demand for accurate, detailed, technical intelligence.³ Meanwhile, the continued growth of international terrorism placed increasing demands for HUMINT.

In the Cold War the intelligence community discovered that HUMINT had considerable difficulty penetrating the vast expanse of the Soviet Union. TECHINT rose as the solution to that shortcoming, providing considerable data at lower personal risk to intelligence collectors (though at an increased cost). Terrorist organizations, however, do not have large garrisoned locations to image, nor do they emit massive quantities of signals to be analyzed. The burden of determining the terrorist objectives and methods fell increasingly to a HUMINT system that "had been decimated in the 1990s through shifted priorities following the end of the Cold War."⁴ Adding to these difficulties was the fact that HUMINT, as a collection tool, is not easy to refocus on a new target. Many of the skills required, such as foreign languages, knowledge of

³ Rumsfeld, Donald. *Known and Unknown : A Memoir*. New York: Sentinel, 2011, p. 297 and 427n.

⁴ Myers, Richard B., and Malcolm McConnell. *Eyes on the Horizon : Serving on the Frontlines of National Security*. 1st ed. New York: Threshold, 2009, p. 240.

local culture, and development of personal contacts, are specific to a geographic region. An IMINT satellite can provide intelligence from the Balkans as easily as it can from the Horn of Africa. IMINT analysts will not initially be as familiar with the target, but they do not face as steep of a learning curve as an officer from the clandestine services must when making the same geographic leap.

Furthermore, terrorist infrastructures and activities reach across geopolitical lines, crossing borders wherever expedient with no regard for jurisdiction. The U.S. intelligence community would be required to deal with both an increasing number of foreign intelligence services, and a growing number of domestic agencies as well. The governing body of national security law in the United States was created to maintain the delicate balance between security and liberty.⁵ Walls were constructed to provide limitations on the powers that provide for the common defense in order to protect civil rights. After 9/11, these walls came to be seen by many as barriers that impeded public safety and prevented the transfer of intelligence information. For example, in 2001, the intelligence community believed that a major terrorist attack on the United States was coming and had alerted relevant agencies within the government of this general threat. The intelligence community, however, had no authority to compel the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to take any action. Therefore, in the summer of 2001, the FAA had taken no steps to increase security at airport checkpoints or on board aircraft.⁶ Equally as critical, specific intelligence generated by domestic law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, could not

⁵ Baker, James E. *In the Common Defense : National Security Law for Perilous Times*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 1.

⁶ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. New York: Barnes & Noble Publishing, Inc, 2004, p. 264.

be shared with foreign intelligence agencies, such as the CIA or DIA, without considerable, time-consuming legal oversight.

The result of these factors was that the intelligence community had a growing community of consumers whose needs were increasingly diversified and complex. They needed their intelligence in a more timely manner, and to a higher degree of precision, from the entire spectrum of intelligence collection disciplines. Greater synergy between government agencies would be essential, and changes in national security law would be necessary. The attacks of 11 September 2001 would bring this battle to the United States, leading President Bush to note that “putting America on a war footing was one of the most important decisions of my presidency.”⁷

7.1 President George W. Bush (43rd President, 2001-2009)

Like three of his four immediate predecessors, George W. Bush came to the presidency after serving as a state governor (Texas, 1995 to 2000). Bush’s military experience consisted of service in the Texas and Alabama Air National Guard as a fighter pilot.⁸ Therefore, his greatest exposure to intelligence prior to the presidency was probably secondhand through his father, George H. W. Bush, who served as DCI under President Ford from 1976-1977. The intelligence community was not a prominent issue in the 2000 presidential campaign and was not mentioned in any of the three debates that were held between Bush and his opponent, the incumbent Vice President, Al Gore.

While issues such as “compassionate conservatism” and a “social security lock-box” gained more attention in the campaign, important statements were made during the 2000 election about

⁷ Bush, George W. *Decision Points*. 1st ed. New York; Enfield: Crown; Publishers Group UK distributor, 2010, p. 154.

⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 16-19.

national security and the future of intelligence. In a September 1999 speech at the Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, Bush discussed the need for a stronger intelligence community:

We will defend the American homeland by strengthening our intelligence community – focusing on human intelligence and the early detection of terrorist operations both here and abroad. And when direct threats to America are discovered, I know that the best defense can be a strong and swift offense – including the use of Special Operations Forces and long-range strike capabilities.⁹

This combination of information and mobility stand out later in the same speech when he stated, “Power is increasingly defined, not by mass or size, but by mobility and swiftness. Influence is measured in information, safety is gained in stealth, and force is projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons.”¹⁰ Although a relatively minor address compared to later speeches he would make, this speech gained the attention of many, including future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Richard B. Myers, USAF.¹¹

More notable among his campaign statements about foreign policy was when Bush took exception to the Clinton-Gore Administration’s penchant for national building. In a debate with Vice President Gore on 3 October 2000, Bush stated:

I would take the use of force very seriously. I would be guarded in my approach.

I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we commit our troops. The vice president and I have a

⁹ Bush, George W. "A Period of Consequences." *The Citadel*. 9/23 1999. Web. <http://www.citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html>.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Myers, pp. 119-120.

disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place.¹²

The idea of fighting and winning a war to prevent war would evolve into the Bush doctrine of preemption, alternatively called “anticipatory self-defense.” Bush’s first Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, explains the justification for this doctrine as follows:

In the twenty-first century, the idea that countries could be left alone unless and until they actually launched an aggressive war had to have exceptions. The lethality of modern weapons and the stated intent of terrorists to use them made it difficult to sustain that traditional view. Regimes with records of aggression and dishonesty, and which had or were working toward WMD capabilities, could inflict far more massive damage than ever before.¹³

A doctrine of preemption would depend, necessarily, upon a robust intelligence capability, since preemptive action is based on what the opposing nation is assessed to be about to do, not what they have done. This dependence on intelligence leaves a foreign policy based on preemption vulnerable to violating the fourth principle of intelligence in grand strategy (first defined in Figure 2.1), allowing intelligence to guide strategy instead of just informing the development of strategy.

¹² Bush, George W. "Transcript, The First Gore-Bush Presidential Debate." *Commission on Presidential Debates*. 2000. Web. <<http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-3-2000-transcript>>.

¹³ Rumsfeld, p. 423,

Furthermore, preemption is not just dependent upon secret intelligence, but public intelligence as information would have to be released to the public in order to build a public case for preemptive action. Glenn Hastedt classifies the public release of intelligence based upon whether the release is contested and whether it is an episodic leak or a sustained leak.¹⁴ In the case of the WMD in Iraq, what was intended to be a “Promotional” leak (uncontested and episodic) at the United Nations, became a “Warring” leak (contested and sustained) as investigations into the Bush Administration’s case for war gained public notoriety.¹⁵

Bush’s interaction with his senior advisors was built upon trust and a commonality of vision. Bush desired cabinet members who shared his philosophies and policies.¹⁶ In NSC meetings he reserved his own opinions and views until after discussion had occurred and then gave guidance with “confidence and authority.”¹⁷ Whereas much of Bush’s national security team was assembled from prominent Republicans (Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell) or loyal campaign staff (Condoleezza Rice), Bush took a different approach for the position of DCI.

7.1.1 Bush’s Early Dealings with the Intelligence Community

CIA briefings for President-elect Bush and his transition team began in late September 2000. This is slightly later than would otherwise have occurred, but before he was officially

¹⁴ Hastedt, Glenn. "Public Intelligence." *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies*. Eds. Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz. Third ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 177-189, p. 178.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 178-181.

¹⁶ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 90.

¹⁷ Rumsfeld, p. 319.

declared the election's winner due to the election issues in Florida. After one of those early briefings he commented, "Well, I assume I will start seeing the good stuff when I become president."¹⁸ Since Bush was already receiving the PDB, Tenet noted, "It was clear that if he were certified the winner, this son of a former president and DCI was going to pay very close attention to our business."¹⁹ After a few weeks of receiving intelligence briefings from the CIA, President-elect Bush met DCI Tenet and was favorably impressed.²⁰ Bush explains that he choose to retain Tenet because it "would send a message of continuity and show that I considered the Agency beyond the reach of politics."²¹

Although Tenet remained DCI in 2000, the Bush/Tenet relationship would be notably different than the Clinton/Tenet dyad in important ways. During the Clinton/Tenet dyad, the DCI was a member of the President's cabinet. Tenet states that he could gain access to the Oval Office whenever he wanted, but not on a regular basis.²² The DCI would not be part of Bush's cabinet, but this loss of status was, paradoxically, accompanied by a tremendous increase in access. Bush requested that Tenet be present for the President's morning intelligence briefing, giving the DCI daily access to the Oval Office.²³ Tenet had the ideal access to the President for the dyad to succeed; what remained to be determined was what intelligence he had to offer.

¹⁸ Tenet, pp. 136.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 136

²⁰ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 84.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Tenet, p. 136.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

Donald Rumsfeld characterizes the intelligence community Bush inherited in 2000 as being in a state of atrophy.²⁴ The Agency had lost ten percent of its budget in the 1990s and turmoil in leadership had prevented progress; from 1987 to 2000 there had been six DCIs and seven directors of DIA.²⁵ On 5 November 1998 Tenet had written President Clinton saying that the intelligence community required a massive infusion of funds to be prepared to combat al Qaeda.²⁶ Tenet requested “roughly \$2 billion more per year for the intelligence budget above the existing FY-2000-2005 budget”; as with earlier requests he had submitted, he received only a small part of that.²⁷ In his memoirs Tenet summarizes the state of the intelligence community in the late 90s as follows:

You can't toss spies at al-Qa'ida when you don't have them, especially when you lack the recruiting and training infrastructure to get them and grow them. You don't simply tell the NSA to give you more signals intelligence when their capabilities are crumbling and they are “going deaf”—unable to monitor critical voice communications. Nor could you ignore the need to replace costly, aging satellites without which the country would lose much of its reconnaissance capability, essentially “going blind.” The fact is that by the mid- to late 1990s American intelligence was in Chapter 11, and neither Congress nor the executive branch did much about it.²⁸

The CIA's attempts at direct action against Osama Bin Laden were also obstructed by the Clinton Administration policies. Attorney General Janet Reno “made it clear to [Tenet] and to

²⁴ Rumsfeld, p 286.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 281.

²⁶ Tenet, p. 117.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 177.

²⁸ Tenet, pp. 108-109.

Geoff O'Connell, the then head of the CTC [Counterterrorism Center], that she would view an attempt simply to kill Bin Laden as illegal.”²⁹ Even before September 11th, 2001, the Bush Administration clearly needed to improve the troubled state of the intelligence community.

7.1.2 The Intelligence Process

The Bush/Tenet dyad begins in good form. The Administration had a relatively harmonious foreign policy team, although differences of view between Secretary of State Colin Powell and the rest of the NSC would grow during Bush's first term. A positive relationship existed between the President and DCI, including almost daily meetings with one another, and a high degree of trust resulted. Among the three presidents previously presented in this research, President Bush's situation relative to the intelligence community at the time he entered office was closest to that of Reagan's. Bush was the Republican governor of a western state taking over from a Democratic governor of a southern state. Both Reagan and Bush believed that the intelligence community had been under-funded and underutilized by their predecessors and neither had any formal experience with intelligence prior to their initial briefings by the CIA. Neither dyad began with a detailed plan of how to change the intelligence community. Both offered good access to the president for the DCI. The most important differences were that Reagan selected a highly trusted insider to serve as DCI instead of staying with the incumbent, and the existing threat of the Cold War was publicly recognized, whereas the threat of terrorism to the United States still had not gained the same level of national prominence despite the attacks on Khobar Towers (25 June 1996), the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (7 August 1998) and the *U.S.S. Cole* (12 October 2000).

²⁹ Tenet, pp. 109-110.

As with previous case studies in this research, the evaluation of this dyad will be based upon the entire tenure of the dyad, not just a single action. Two seminal events, however, will be mentioned frequently. First, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are a watershed event in the dyad's approach to the intelligence cycle. Fundamental changes in nearly every phase of the intelligence cycle occurred because of the failure of the intelligence community to predict the attacks. Additionally, the intelligence community had to be refocused to support the new War on Terror. Second, the application of the Bush doctrine of preemption to the situation in Iraq was based upon several factors, including the incorrect assessment of a robust and advanced WMD program in Iraq. These two events are not the only intelligence events that are relevant to the Bush/Tenet dyad, but, they do provide considerable insight into the intelligence cycle and the president/DCI relationship.

7.1.2.1 Planning and Direction

At the beginning of his administration, Bush took a very broad view of national security. His National Security Presidential Directive 1 gave the following definition of national security:

National security includes the defense of the United States of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interests around the globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in the world economy.³⁰

This broad definition set the tone for the areas of interest that the intelligence community needed to be prepared to support, but it did not provide the specific guidance needed to produce relevant intelligence. Therefore, the intelligence community used other opportunities to receive feedback

³⁰ Baker, James E., p. 106.

and direction directly from President Bush. The CIA briefed him six mornings a week, with a written brief provided on Sunday. After the 9/11 attacks the daily briefings included what was referred to as the “Threat Matrix,” which summarized the potential attacks on the U.S. homeland that the intelligence community was currently monitoring.³¹ As previously discussed, in addition to the CIA briefer, the DCI was present for the President’s daily intelligence briefing.³² This interaction allowed the DCI to improve the relevance of the PDB and formal estimates and made him intimately familiar with the President’s areas of concern.

With passion that surpassed President Kennedy’s pursuit of Fidel Castro, after 9/11 President Bush was committed to preventing further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Attorney General John Ashcroft records how Bush’s charge during an NSC meeting at the White House on 12 September 2001 affected him personally.

President Bush abruptly stopped, turned, and looked toward me. “Don’t ever let this happen again,” the president said. Whether he intended the remark for anyone else in the room at the time I don’t know. But I took it personally. *Never again. Don’t let this happen again.* Those words became my guidepost for the next four years. From that moment forward, I devoted myself to an intense, sometimes secret war with a mission that many people thought was impossible: stopping terrorists from attacking again on American soil.³³

Commitment and devotion are admirable attitudes, but for the purpose of this research it is

³¹ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 153.

³² Tenet, p. 137.

³³ Ashcroft, John D. *Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice*. 1st ed. New York: Center Street, 2006, p. 130.

important to consider how those attitudes affect the perceptions of the members of the dyad and the people they direct in the intelligence process.

One of the greatest challenges that intelligence analysts who are specialists in a particular area or issue have to face are the preconceived notions of a customer (particularly a president) about analyst's area of specialty. President Reagan, for example, held strong pro-Israel beliefs and after receiving a briefing from the CIA on the subtleties and divisions between the various Palestinian groups he remarked, "But they are all terrorists aren't they?"³⁴ The danger for the intelligence community is when these preconceived notions guide intelligence tasking. In the case of the 9/11 attacks, counterterrorism czar Richard A. Clarke records that on 12 September 2001, President Bush ordered the intelligence community to investigate the role of Saddam Hussein in the attacks, despite evidence that the attacks were the work of al Qaeda and no linkage of state sponsorship had been found between al Qaeda and Iraq.³⁵ Bush's fixation on Iraq would have a deep impact on the intelligence success of this dyad.

The most problematic part of the focus upon Iraq was the developing attitude in the White House and the analytical community about WMD in Iraq. The Silberman-Robb Commission found that "analysts effectively shifted the burden of proof, requiring proof that Iraq did *not* have active WMD programs rather than requiring affirmative proof of their existence."³⁶ As the Commission's report points out, the Bush Administration's policy that it was the responsibility of Iraq to prove that they did not have WMD was appropriate, but in putting the question to the intelligence community it needed to be stated as an objective goal. Instead of proving a negative,

³⁴ Helgerson, p. 139.

³⁵ Clarke, p. 32.

³⁶ WMD Commission Report, p. 168.

that Iraq did not have WMD, the intelligence community should have been trying to provide definitive proof that they possessed WMD.³⁷ The attitude of certainty that Iraq possessed WMD cannot be attributed solely to the White House though; the same attitude of certainty was prevalent throughout the U.S. intelligence community and around the world, in numerous foreign intelligence services and among government leaders. Not only did staunch U.S. allies such as Britain, Australia, Spain, Italy, and Poland agree that Iraq had an active WMD program, but Russia, China, Germany, and France concurred in the likelihood of the assessment, even as they opposed U.S. military action.³⁸ Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak personally warned the Commander, U.S. Central Command, General Tommy Franks that Iraq possessed biological weapons and would use them on American troops.³⁹ The substantial point here is that, had the President challenged the intelligence community to prove the existence of Iraq's WMD program, it would have placed greater pressure on them to discuss the thin evidence upon which their conclusion was based.

7.1.2.2 Collection

The Bush/Tenet dyad faced at least three problems in the collection phase of the intelligence cycle. First, the U.S. had fallen into an over-reliance on TECHINT collection such as is performed by reconnaissance aircraft and satellites.⁴⁰ Second, there was a growing requirement

³⁷ WMD Commission Report, pp. 168-169.

³⁸ Rumsfeld, p. 434.

³⁹ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 247, and Rumsfeld, p. 435. Neither Bush nor Rumsfeld make a distinction as to whether Mubarak was referring to tactical or strategic biological weapons. Since both record that Mubarak stated that the target would be U.S. troops and not a large civilian populace, it could be assumed that Mubarak believed the biological agent had been weaponized for tactical use, not strategic.

⁴⁰ Rumsfeld, p. 464.

for guidance and policies on the detention and interrogation of captured terrorists. Finally, there was a need to update laws concerning the legal monitoring of domestic communications and exchange of information between the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies.

Technical forms of intelligence collection require constant research to maintain advantage over their targets. Moore's law states that computer processing power will double approximately every 18 months. The expansion of commercial imagery capabilities demonstrates this principal. The industry now allows any individual with a credit card and Internet access to acquire imagery from a space-based system in a timely manner and with greater definition than was available to superpower nations just twenty years ago. GeoEye Incorporated sets the industry standard by offering customers 16-inch resolution in a timely manner.⁴¹ The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) have labored to ensure that intelligence community capabilities are greater, providing analysts with unprecedented access to information that has a geo-physical component. Radar imagery provides an all weather capability, infrared imagery provides a night-time capability, but the problem remains that not everything that must be known can be seen.

TECHINT made significant contributions during the Cold War and continued to be a critical asset in opening days of the War on Terror, but CJCS General Myers notes, "Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups were not as vulnerable to this type of intelligence collection. The critical information lay in their minds."⁴² SIGINT can reveal the content of communications and provide some of these important details, but experience and leaks about U.S. intelligence community

⁴¹ Shalal-Esa, Andrea. "GeoEye launches high-resolution satellite." Reuters. 9/6 2008. Web. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/06/us-geoeye-idUSN0633403420080906?sp=true>>.

⁴² Myers, p. 199.

SIGINT capabilities have helped terrorists improve their communications security. This illustrates the growing need for HUMINT that the Bush/Tenet dyad faced at the opening of the War on Terror.

The second problem, the emerging need for more guidance and policy on the detention and interrogation of captured terrorists, would be one in which Bush would have to take an active role. Questions quickly arose as to the legal status of prisoners, where to keep them, and what restrictions the CIA and Department of Defense had when interrogating them. The question of legal status hinged largely upon the detainee's status in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

Since al Qaeda is not a state, it could not be a party to a treaty or convention. During the Cold War, President Reagan had stood firmly against expanding the Geneva Conventions to include irregular combatants, an opinion endorsed at the time by the *New York Times* editorial board.⁴³ Eric Holder, a Clinton Administration Department of Justice member and President Obama's Attorney General, stated in 2002 that he believed that terrorists, such as those from al Qaeda, were not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention.⁴⁴ That same year, William Taft IV, legal adviser to the Secretary of State, told White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales that there was agreement that neither al Qaeda members nor Taliban soldiers were POWs. Based on this decision Secretary of State Powell gave a written opinion that, "members of al Qaeda as a group, and the Taliban individually or as a group are not entitled to Prisoner of War status under the Convention."⁴⁵ CJCS General Myers, however, urged the President apply the conditions of

⁴³ Rumsfeld, p. 561.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 561n.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 563.

the Geneva Conventions to Taliban soldiers anyway.⁴⁶ In a memorandum dated 7 February 2002, Bush ultimately issued guidance that stated that he accepted the opinion of the Justice Department that the Geneva Conventions did not apply and that members of Al Qaeda and Taliban soldiers were unlawful combatants. His guidance, however, specified, “As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.”⁴⁷

As the number of detainees grew, it was clear that the military had neither the personnel nor the facilities to properly hold them in Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld advocated making the facilities the responsibility of the new Afghan government or of a new U.S. federal agency, but neither suggestion was approved and the Department of Defense retained responsibility for all but the most senior of detainees.⁴⁸ Three qualifications were prominent. The military needed the location of the prison to be outside of the Middle East to prevent attacks to free the detainees; lawyers throughout the executive branch recommended that the facility be outside the territory of the United States to prevent legal complications, and the location needed to be under the control of the United States military.⁴⁹ Rumsfeld described the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba as being “the least worst place,” since it was outside of sovereign U.S. territory, far away from the Middle East, and under the complete control of the U.S. Armed

⁴⁶ Rumsfeld, p. 563.

⁴⁷ Bush, George W. "Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees." 6/17/2002 2002. Web. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf>>.

⁴⁸ Rumsfeld, pp. 565-566.

⁴⁹ Meyer, pp. 199-200.

Forces.⁵⁰ Initial temporary facilities were replaced in a few months with modern facilities that were regularly inspected by the International Committee of the Red Cross, members of Congress, and journalists.⁵¹

While most of the “where” question regarding terrorists were answered with the establishment of the facility at Guantánamo Bay, a portion were re-located through the process of rendition. Rendition is not a new tool; it has been used for some time and by many countries, but the U.S. has increased its use of renditions since the start of the War on Terror.⁵² Renditions are used “to transport terrorist suspects from the country where they were captured to their home country or to other countries where they can be questioned, held, or brought to justice.”⁵³ DCI Tenet testified there had been at least seventy renditions prior to 9/11.⁵⁴ Previous renditions involved notable terrorists including Ramzi Youssef, mastermind of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, and Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal,” whose rendition to France from the Sudan was upheld by the European Commission of Human Rights. The use of secret prisons and extraordinary renditions are facts that have often been mixed with exaggeration and conjecture. What is evident is that holding suspects in compliant nations such as Poland allowed the CIA greater freedom of operations for interrogation methods not approved by the Department of Defense.⁵⁵ Also, accusations of extraordinary rendition are

⁵⁰ Rumsfeld, p. 566.

⁵¹ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 166.

⁵² Baker, James E., p. 166.

⁵³ Rice, Condoleezza, Secretary's Statement on Alleged U.S. Detention or Transportation of Terrorist Suspects, p. 5.

⁵⁴ Baker, James E., p. 166.

⁵⁵ Jeffery-Jones, Rhodri, "The Rise and Fall of the CIA." *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. Ed. Loch K. Johnson. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 122-137, p. 135.

illustrated by the indictment of twenty-five CIA employees for the kidnapping of a radical imam.⁵⁶ Since extraordinary rendition relies upon secrecy so that information gained can be used without the targeted organization knowing it has been compromised, it is very difficult to accurately assess the level of success of this program.⁵⁷

On 28 March 2002, Tenet informed the President that Abu Zubaydah, a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden, had been captured.⁵⁸ As the highest-ranking al Qaeda member captured to date, he represented a tremendous potential source of information, but the interrogation of other detainees had produced little information up to that point.⁵⁹ CIA officers drew up a list of enhanced interrogation techniques that differed from the ones that had failed to induce Abu Zubaydah to share information and presented it to the Department of Justice, who approved the enhanced methods as being in compliance “with the Constitution and all applicable laws, including those that ban torture.”⁶⁰ President Bush reviewed the list and eliminated two methods that he believed to be too harsh, even if they had been determined to be legal—waterboarding was not eliminated from the list.⁶¹ Next, the CIA briefed the chairmen and ranking members of the HPSCI and SSCI who raised no objections.⁶² The process had been established with legal and legislative oversight.

⁵⁶ Fisher, Ian, and Elisabetta Povoledo. "Italy Seeks Indictments of C.I.A. Operatives in Egyptian's Abduction." *New York Times* 12/6/2006 2006. Web. 2/23/2011 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/06/world/europe/06italy.html>>.

⁵⁷ Weaver, William G., and Robert M. Pallito. "Extraordinary Rendition." *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. Ed. Loch K. Johnson. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 328-339, p. 338.

⁵⁸ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 168.

⁵⁹ Tenet, p. 241.

⁶⁰ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 169.

⁶¹ Bush, *Decision Points*, Waterboarding is described as “a process of simulated drowning,” and Bush notes that “medical experts assured the CIA that it did no lasting harm.”

⁶² Tenet, p. 242.

Tenet states, “The most aggressive interrogation techniques conducted by CIA personnel were applied to only a handful of the worst terrorists on the planet, including people who had planned the 9/11 attacks and who, among other things, were responsible for journalist Daniel Pearl’s death.”⁶³ He further imparts that the interrogations were conducted in accordance with the established procedures and provided information that prevented terrorist attacks “in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia.”⁶⁴ General Myers notes that military interrogation methods never permitted waterboarding, and that military interrogators who were involved in detainee abuse were subject to disciplinary action.⁶⁵ The inexcusable abuses by U.S. soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were not part of an interrogation to gain information, but the acts of “pornographic self-indulgence” by individuals and should not be considered part of an intelligence program.⁶⁶

Moore's law states that the speed of computers, as measured by the number of transistors that can be placed on a single chip will double every year or two.⁶⁷ Therefore, the constant growth of technology means that technical forms of intelligence collection and processing must continuously improve or risk obsolescence. Just as Moore’s law and the development of TECHINT poses difficulties for the intelligence community, advances in the telecommunications industry presented a challenge to national security law. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) had been passed in 1978 in the wake of the Church and Pike Committee hearings and

⁶³ Tenet, p. 242.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Myers, p. 201.

⁶⁶ Rumsfeld, p. 545.

⁶⁷ Mollick, Ethan. "Establishing Moore's Law." IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 28.3 (2006): 62-75, p 62.

represented a compromise between the branches of government to oversee electronic foreign intelligence surveillance (wiretaps on spies and terrorists).⁶⁸ Telecommunications, however, has changed. In 1978 over ninety percent of American homes had a telephone.⁶⁹ These phones were landlines, usually with one phone number per household; mobile telephones were in the experimental stage and the Internet had not been invented. In 2010, nearly a quarter of U.S. homes had reportedly abandoned landlines in favor of cell phones.⁷⁰ This transition was well underway in 2001 and the Bush Administration needed a law that addressed surveillance issues concerning mobile phones, the Internet, and other telecommunications methods.

Furthermore, legal barriers prevented effective defense of the homeland. The 9/11 Commission reported that “the government’s ability to collect intelligence inside the United States, and the sharing of such information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities was not a priority before 9/11.”⁷¹ The solution was the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act, commonly shortened to PATRIOT Act).⁷² This bill eliminated many of the walls between intelligence and law enforcement, addressed technology issues by providing tools such as roving warrants, and provided access to the business records of suspected terrorists.⁷³ Richard Betts points out, “In 2002 a special federal appeals court ruled that the USA

⁶⁸ Baker, James E., pp. 78-80.

⁶⁹ Putnam, Robert D., *Bowling Alone*, p. 167.

⁷⁰ Fox, Maggie. "Nearly a quarter of U.S. homes only use cellphones." *Reuters*. 5/12/2010. Web. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/12/us-cellphones-usa-idUSTRE64B6F620100512>>.

⁷¹ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 328.

⁷² The bill passed by a margin of 98 to 1 in the Senate and 357 to 66 in the House and was signed by the President on 26 October 2001. Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 161.

⁷³ Bush, *Decision Points*, pp. 160-161.

PATRIOT Act had eliminated the wall, and that it had never been necessary.”⁷⁴ In a related argument, the WMD Commission argued, “Many rules and regulations governing the Intelligence Community have existed for decades with little thought given to the legal basis for the rules, or whether circumstances have changed the rules’ applicability. Under such circumstances, it is unsurprising that legal “myths” have evolved.”⁷⁵ Regardless of whether the wall was real or perceived, the Bush Administration effectively altered the intelligence collection environment through legislative changes.

The Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), however, was not a legislative change, it was an executive action. Warrant less electronic surveillance was established for situations that met the standards of FISA, but the program did not include the same process for approval.⁷⁶ Essentially, President Bush used wartime authority (granted by Congressional resolution) to authorize surveillance of the enemy—a process the White House counsel and the Justice Department had assessed to be legal.⁷⁷ Furthermore, Bush states, “We considered going to Congress to get legislation, but key members from both parties who received highly classified briefings on the program agreed that the surveillance was necessary and that a legislative debate was not possible without exposing our methods to the enemy.”⁷⁸ The nature of modern communications and the War on Terror made timeliness an indispensable factor in order for intelligence collection to occur and be actionable. This ran against the essential structure of the FISA process in which warrants required a low burden of proof, but a very high level of coordination and approval (the high level

⁷⁴ Betts, p. 172.

⁷⁵ WMD Commission Report, p. 335. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_chapter6.pdf

⁷⁶ Baker, James E., p. 88.

⁷⁷ Bush, *Decision Points*, pp. 163-164.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 164.

of coordination meant it could not always be timely enough). Whether FISA could have been adapted as quickly as the PATRIOT Act was created to meet the needs that TSP was fulfilling is difficult to determine, but by 2006 FISA revisions had been made and included liability protection for the telecommunications companies that would have to work for the government.

George W. Bush made significant changes to the collection phase of the intelligence process during the Bush/Tenet dyad. Policy decisions and executive orders made fundamental changes in the way intelligence would be collected. Bush's decisions were not part of a planned agenda, but some action was required to deal with the circumstances of the War on Terror. Most fundamental changes that were made were generally approved by both legal counsel and by bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate, but other decisions, such as TSP, were made so with only consultation with ranking Congressmen of both parties. The new policies were not used by the Administration to advance partisan positions or track political enemies; however, some policies did suffer from abuse at the hands of individuals who took advantage of both the responsibility and authority they had been given.

7.1.2.3 Processing and Exploitation

Changes in laws that governed the separation of foreign intelligence and law enforcement data did not destroy the separate information stovepipes through which the collected data was processed. Even in fusion centers such as the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)⁷⁹ the FBI and CIA received data for analysis on systems that were not compatible with one another, and, therefore, this disrupted the fusion of the analysis process. The introduction of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) such as the Predator also greatly altered the processing

⁷⁹ TTIC would become the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC).

and exploitation phase of the intelligence process. Since the collection platform was also the strike platform, processing and exploitation had to be near instantaneous for commanders and their legal advisors to make an informed decision on whether or not to prosecute a potential target.⁸⁰

7.1.2.4 Analysis and Production

The attitude of certainty with which President Bush and many members of his administration approached the issue of WMD in Iraq was discussed in Section 7.1.2.1, Planning and Direction. This position affected every phase of the intelligence process, but its effect was most noticeable in the area of analysis and production. Every presidential administration has felt the weight of responsibility placed upon it to protect the United States, but few have felt it as strongly as those who led at a time when the U.S. was attacked. Incidents such as Pearl Harbor and 9/11 endangered the pledge of those administrations to “provide for the common defense” and thereby necessitated changes. In November 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney directed the CIA to treat low-probability threats as certainties.⁸¹ Commitment to taking every threat seriously did not require analysts to skew their assessments, but it furthered an environment where that could happen and created an attitude that Ron Suskind labeled as “the one percent doctrine.”⁸² This attitude was most noticeable in the concern over a growing WMD threat in Iraq.

It is difficult to gauge the degree to which the analytical community’s confidence in the

⁸⁰ Rumsfeld, p. 387.

⁸¹ Goldsmith, Jack L. *The Terror Presidency : Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration*. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 75.

⁸² *Ibid*, p. 75.

existence of a WMD program in Iraq was imbued by the Bush Administration instead of its being an attitude that was already prevalent. In the minds of analysts, knowledge of past Iraqi WMD programs was coupled with new intelligence that resulted from the fact that Saddam Hussein desired to create the appearance of an ongoing program.⁸³ These two factors alone are sufficiently substantial to have skewed the analysts' attitudes. When the entrenched attitudes of the Bush Administration were added to this, mistakes occurred. The WMD Commission noted that analysts' confidence in their conclusion about an Iraqi nuclear program caused analysts to fail to pursue easily obtainable data about high-strength aluminum tubes that would have indicated conventional weapons applications.⁸⁴ The report faults this same confidence as causing their lack of skepticism concerning the information on Iraq's biological warfare program provided by a German HUMINT asset codenamed CURVEBALL.⁸⁵ Information from this source concerning mobile biological production chambers would be highly influential in the intelligence community's assessment of WMD in Iraq. CURVEBALL's reports would be instrumental in developing the Iraq NIE and in Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations in February 2003, in which he took the U.S. case for WMD in Iraq before the world.⁸⁶

Most concerning are accusations of cherry-picking intelligence that supported administration policy. DCI Tenet accuses a Department of Defense working group run by Doug Feith of sifting through raw intelligence and finding "little nuggets that supported their beliefs" and then seizing on those to make their arguments without understanding how those nuggets

⁸³ WMD Commission Report, p. 155.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 68.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 90.

⁸⁶ Tenet, p. 328.

might be part of “a larger picture they were missing.”⁸⁷ The NIO in charge of the Near East, Paul Pillar is more accusatory. Pillar saw Feith as a “zealot” and referred to Feith’s assessments as “a deliberate effort to try to stitch things together to try to make a case;” Pillar adds, “It had nothing to do with intelligence analysis as I understood it.”⁸⁸ In rebuttal to these accusations, Feith insists his group did not distort intelligence, and that the while the CIA believed many of his sources were “unconfirmed,” they would not call any source that supported their position “unconfirmed.”⁸⁹ Competing analysis has been held forth as a primary argument against the creation of a strong central authority within the intelligence community, but in this case, Feith’s team further entrenched preconceived attitudes in the administration. The preparation of Powell’s speech to the United Nations is a prime example of the problems this information would later cause.

Powell sought the CIA’s assistance in developing the speech and spent four days at their Langley, Virginia, headquarters personally reviewing the intelligence supporting the address.⁹⁰ Tenet’s description of that process involves a considerable effort by the CIA and State Department to eliminate bad intelligence, most of which had been inserted by Vice President Cheney’s staff.⁹¹ Advising the administration on the veracity of pieces of intelligence is entirely consistent with the scope and mission of the intelligence community. The CIA, however, also became involved in writing portions of the speech. Tenet describes CIA authorship of a speech

⁸⁷ Tenet, p. 347.

⁸⁸ Isikoff, Michael, and David Corn. *Hubris : The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War*. 1st ed. New York: Crown Publishers, 2006, p. 114.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 114.

⁹⁰ Bush, *Decision Points*, pp. 244-245.

⁹¹ Tenet, pp. 372-374.

for policy-makers as “practically inappropriate.”⁹² His decision to go forward with such an act was summed up well when he told Phil Mudd, Deputy Chief of the Counterterrorism Center, that “if we don’t do it, the White House will cram some crap in here that we will never live down.”⁹³ White House involvement, in this case, referred to the Vice President and his staff.

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Bush doctrine of preemption required considerable support from the intelligence community. DCI Tenet quotes one senior CIA analyst as saying:

Intelligence is central to the Bush Administration. Every single day it was the discipline around which they started their day. And after 9/11, the first attack on American soil of any magnitude in sixty years, they were in fear. In fairness to them, people do not understand how [expletive deleted] dangerous we thought it was. The absence of solid information on additional threats was terrifying.⁹⁴

Vice President Cheney took great personal interest in intelligence, particularly as it related to an Iraq-al Qaeda connection and the Iraq WMD question, and he visited the CIA headquarters several times to discuss the supporting data. DCI Tenet found Cheney and his assistant Scooter Libby to be smart, tough, and with a full command of the data involved; their knowledge of the

details of some of the intelligence exceeded that of the CIA analytic managers who were briefing
⁹⁵it.

⁹² Tenet, p. 374. The CIA assistance in preparing a White House speech is not unusual. Tenet’s concern in this instance could be associated with concern about the CIA’s role in policy making.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Tenet, p. 342.

Some senior analysts took the intense questioning as appropriate of policy-makers who were trying to make sure that analysts considered options that had important policy implications.⁹⁶ Others saw it as the politicization of intelligence, “undermining the objectivity and professionalism of the intelligence process.”⁹⁷ It is evident that in the preparation of the U.N. speech, the CIA resisted using certain sources of intelligence and certain analyses based upon their evaluation of the information, and that they were prepared to defend their conclusions. It is also evident that despite their skepticism on some key pieces of intelligence regarding Iraq, the CIA still did not fully evaluate other portions of the intelligence data that supported conclusions with which they agreed. Furthermore, they made little or no attempt to alert the President or the Congress of the softness of the intelligence used in the October 2002 NIE.⁹⁸ Failure of the CIA to correct the record would be a reoccurring problem between the Agency and intelligence consumers, to include the White House.

One theory is that having regularly and vigorously debated with Cheney and others about the veracity of some elements they found highly objectionable, the CIA was more willing to permit other elements in the spirit of analytical compromise. Another theory is that Tenet so desired to please the President that he was willing to overlook the weakness of the intelligence in

⁹⁵ Tenet, p. 343.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 344.

⁹⁷ Pfiffner, James P., "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?" *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq : British and American Perspectives*. Eds. James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian. 1 North American ed. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. 59-84, p. 75.

⁹⁸ Johnson, Loch K. "The Iraq War and Intelligence Oversight." *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq : British and American Perspectives*. Eds. James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian. 1 North American ed. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. 172-190, p. 181

order to support the administration's policy. This theory would also lend itself to Tenet's ignoring attempts by the administration to cherry-pick intelligence that sustained their policies. Key for this research is that even if the administration made no attempt to politicize or cherry-pick the intelligence used to justify the invasion of Iraq, the CIA's intense advocacy of their own assessment still resulted in an effect upon the final analytical product, where weak intelligence went unchallenged by analysts who should have known better.

7.1.2.5 Dissemination

Dissemination issues within the Bush Administration were relatively minor compared to the changes and effects seen in other areas of the intelligence process. Vice President Cheney and his staff played a noticeably larger role in the intelligence process than their predecessors, but the vice presidents in the previous dyads in this research all had a similar access to the information. The unusually high degree of Cheney's involvement is underscored by his visits to the CIA to discuss the intelligence assessments. Ray McGovern, a CIA analyst from 1964 to 1990, claimed that he had never seen a vice president come to the CIA headquarters for a working visit.⁹⁹

Advanced data processing equipment continued to increase both the speed and breadth of access analysts across the intelligence community had to raw intelligence during this time period. Furthermore, a new classification for HUMINT was added to the categories of information classified as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). This identified personnel who possessed a need to use HUMINT reporting and allowed them to have improved access to the intelligence while maintaining operational security over source information.

7.1.3 Covert Actions

⁹⁹ Pfiffner, p. 75.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq incorporated covert actions, special operations, and overt military actions into an operational/theater-level plan. The effects of precision air attacks and highly mobile ground forces were integrated with the operations of local militias that were initially contacted and coordinated through CIA officers in the field. Furthermore, the liaison work of the CIA language specialists and military forward air controllers facilitated the employment of both surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and close air support by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).¹⁰⁰ The synergy of operations between the CIA and the Department of Defense was unprecedented in the 54-year history of these organizations. Besides success on the traditional battlefield, General Myers credits the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to “increased cooperation...between the Pentagon and the CIA.”¹⁰¹ Rumsfeld also credits a close working relationship between himself and Tenet as being integral to the success achieved in Afghanistan. The start of the War on Terror also gave the CIA other responsibilities.

President Bush records that at a meeting at Camp David four days after the 9/11 attacks he approved a CIA plan that granted the Agency greater authority for covert actions, “including permission for the CIA to kill or capture al Qaeda operatives without asking for [the president to] sign-off each time.”¹⁰² This action demonstrates the requirement for increased timeliness in decision-making when using advanced systems such as an armed Predator UAV, but how did this affect oversight? Tim Weiner describes these new authorities as setting “no limits on what the agency could do. It was the foundation for a system of secret prisons where CIA officers and

¹⁰⁰ Meyers, p. 213.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 214.

¹⁰² Bush, p. 186.

contractors used techniques that included torture.”¹⁰³ Clearly the policy did not allow for legislative or presidential oversight of the process from the time a target was acquired to the time the trigger was pulled. This is similar to policy-making and oversight before sending a covert action team into the field where it may not be able to make further communication. The lack of oversight is somewhat exaggerated by Weiner since oversight does occur with promulgation of the overall policy, not with each individual action of the team (or weapon system). Furthermore, Weiner is inconsistent in his presentation of DCI Tenet. Just two pages earlier Weiner notes that Tenet opposed the launching of a remote-control assassination on its own authority and that the idea appalled him.¹⁰⁴

Covert actions were used effectively by the Bush/Tenet dyad and helped many of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy goals to come to fruition. Like each of our other dyads, however, covert action failures came at a high cost. Revelations of CIA “secret prisons” combined with photos of the military abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib were severely detrimental to the Bush Administration both domestically and abroad. Like Kennedy, Carter, and Reagan, President Bush learned how quickly covert action victories are forgotten, and how long-standing the stain of covert action failures can be.

7.1.4 Bush and Foreign Policy

John Dumbrell describes the first eight months of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy as being characterized by “narrow interests-based realism.”¹⁰⁵ Bush was willing to abrogate

¹⁰³ Weiner, p. 481.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 479.

¹⁰⁵ Dumbrell, John, "Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq." *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives*. Eds. James P. Pfiffner and

treaties that limited the United States without sufficient benefit, but he also demonstrated considerable pragmatism in dealing with China after the downing of a U.S. Reconnaissance EP-3.¹⁰⁶ The terrorist attacks on 9/11 changed the perspective of the United States on many issues. Among those changes, according to critics of the administration such as Senator Joe Biden (D-DE), was the capturing of the heart and mind of President Bush by neoconservatives who began “controlling the foreign policy agenda.” A neoconservative agenda for invading Iraq would include the establishment of a democracy in the Middle East, the protection of American geopolitical interests, and the advancement of American values.¹⁰⁷ The argument concerning a neoconservative driven agenda proceeds with the idea that the politicization of intelligence “became a vital part of the developing momentum for war.”¹⁰⁸

Undoubtedly intelligence was widely used to justify the war in Iraq. Evidence since the war with Iraq has clearly demonstrated that some of the intelligence reports were in error. Further, this case study has already discussed the predilection of the Bush Administration and the intelligence community to believe that Iraq possessed WMD, an assessment that was shared by numerous foreign intelligence agencies and heads of state worldwide. In assessing the role that intelligence played in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy process, it is vital to understand what it briefed the President. An August 2002 briefing by DDCI John McLaughlin to the NSC presented the following conclusions. First, Iraq had reconstituted its facilities for biological and chemical weapons. Second, 3,200 tons of Iraq’s chemical weapons remained unaccounted for.

Mark Phythian. 1 North American ed. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. 19-39, p. 29.

¹⁰⁶ Dumbrell, John, p. 29.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 33.

Third, Iraq had a mobile biological warfare program and multiple means of delivery, to include UAVs. Fourth, many of Saddam Hussein's nuclear weaponry experts had been retained since the Gulf War. Finally, ongoing construction and work on fissile material could enable Iraq to have a nuclear weapon within a year.¹⁰⁹ Rumsfeld records that few qualifiers were presented with this intelligence.¹¹⁰ If this is what the CIA contributed internally to the foreign policy discussion, then there was little need for the Administration to pressure the intelligence community to selectively concentrate on intelligence that supported the case for war. In the next section this research will address how the CIA contributed to building the public case for war.

7.1.5 Intelligence Operational Code for George W. Bush

The Intelligence Operational Code for President Bush (See Figure 7.1) shows more median positions regarding the management of the intelligence community, and more extreme positions regarding the use of intelligence and the political environment in which the intelligence would be used. President Bush left the active engagement with raw intelligence to others in his administration, but daily briefings and regular interactions with the DCI demonstrate a tendency toward executive oversight and away from plausible deniability. Concerning matters of the highest security concern, legislative oversight seems to have been frequently conducted by briefing the senior members of the committee, instead of the intelligence committees as a whole. For this reason Bush is ranked slightly towards the information denial end of the spectrum, but not significantly. Many in Congress have since shown that they might have preferred not knowing of these incidents. Claims in 2009 by Congresswoman Pelosi that she was not

¹⁰⁹ Rumsfeld, p. 433.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 433.

informed of CIA interrogation techniques were quickly proven false when CIA Director Leon Panetta released documents showing that she was made aware of the enhanced interrogation techniques (including waterboarding) in 2002.¹¹¹

Bush made no concerted effort to centralize the intelligence community under the DCI during the Bush/Tenet dyad, although he later signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that consolidated intelligence community leadership within the DNI position (at least in name). During the Bush/Tenet dyad he supported Tenet's assumption of a strong administrative role for the DCI, but, like the majority of his predecessors, Bush did little to assist the DCI in gaining control over the portion of the intelligence that resides within the Department of Defense. His position on the Role of the DCI spectrum tends towards more centralized control, but not to an extreme degree.

Bush removed the DCI from the cabinet (a position it had held during the latter half of the Clinton Administration), but he gave the DCI unprecedented access to the Oval Office. He did not advocate a strong policy role for the DCI, but he did give intelligence a pivotal role in the foreign policy role. Therefore, Bush's placement on the policy advocate side of the spectrum reflects the heavy role intelligence played in the formulation and justification of policy, not a desire to use Tenet in the manner that President Reagan used DCI Casey as part of the foreign policy team.

The Bush/Tenet dyad involved itself in none of the covert antics seen in the Kennedy/McCone dyad. Bush's positions with regard to the morality of intelligence operations

¹¹¹ Associated Press. "Pelosi Draws CIA Response Over Waterboarding Dispute." *USA Today* 5/15/2009 2009. Web. 3/2/2011 <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-05-15-pelosi-waterboarding-gop_N.htm>.

and the role of covert actions in diplomacy demonstrate support for greater freedom of operations for intelligence and the use of covert operations to attain diplomatic goals. His authorization of enhanced interrogation techniques move him away from the universal human rights end of the spectrum, but Bush demonstrates firm resolution to draw a line between interrogation and torture.

Finally, Bush's view of the political environment in which he operated illustrates a perception that the nature of politics is one of conflict, and that dealings with opponents and allies are a zero-sum interaction. Bush formed an extremely close bond with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom and the leaders of several other key nations in the war on terror and the coalition assembled for the invasion of Iraq consisted of 49 countries.¹¹² Therefore, accusations of his preference for unilateral actions must be tempered with an honest appraisal of the strong alliances he forged in a challenging world political environment where allies of the United States quickly became the targets of terrorism.

7.2 DCI George J. Tenet (18th DCI, 1997-2004)

After Anthony Lake withdrew his nomination for DCI, George Tenet, who was DDCI and had been serving as acting DCI since the departure of John Deutch, was President Clinton's second choice. Tenet's seven-year tenure as DCI came after a rapid succession of DCIs had left the intelligence community with little leadership and diminished resources. After being retained by the newly elected President Bush in 2000, Tenet was one of the few senior members of the Bush Administration who began 2001 with a conviction that a growing tidal wave of terrorism

¹¹² Myers, p. 240.

would soon reach the shores of the United States.¹¹³ Described as high-strung, focused, and as a talented briefer, Tenet earned the trust of President Bush.¹¹⁴ Tenet also possessed a volatile side, a temper that he had learned to control and the habits of a workaholic that no doubt contributed to the heart attack he had while serving as the NSC intelligence staff director.¹¹⁵ Tenet describes himself as blunt, rarely given to subtlety, and his passion for both ideals comes out in his memoirs.¹¹⁶

7.2.1 Early Experience with Intelligence

Tenet had served as a staffer on the SSCI, and then as the NSC staff officer in charge of intelligence for two years at the beginning of the Clinton Administration before becoming DDCI. On assuming the directorship, the need to rebuild morale and capabilities were monumental tasks, though other concerns quickly grew. Like some of his predecessors, Tenet quickly moved to demonstrate leadership of the entire intelligence community, but unlike previous DCIs, Tenet did not request additional authorities from the president to do so.¹¹⁷ Tenet wanted to “build a greater sense of community *within* the Intelligence Community,” by improving its culture of collaboration.¹¹⁸ Congressional efforts to add a new level of community management in the form of a DDCI for community management and three new assistant DCIs was an unwelcomed outside attempt by the SSCI to solve some of the community leadership concerns. Tenet

¹¹³ Tenet, p. *xxi*.

¹¹⁴ Woodward, Bob. *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 68.

¹¹⁵ Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, pp 1-2.

¹¹⁶ Tenet, p. 348

¹¹⁷ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 276.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 258.

surmised that the result of the new positions would be to create an additional level of bureaucracy without providing any additional authority.¹¹⁹

Failure to detect Indian preparations to test a nuclear device on 11 May 1998 was widely viewed as a CIA mistake, but one key cause of the failure lay in the revealing of sources and methods. In 1995 the Clinton Administration had intervened in an earlier attempt by the Indian government to test a nuclear device, but in doing so the U.S. had made use of the intelligence that had revealed the test preparations.¹²⁰ Using this information, in 1998 the Indian government knew what the U.S. would be looking for and that they needed to limit knowledge of the upcoming detonation. This revelation of intelligence sources and methods enabled the managers of the Indian nuclear program to use effective denial and deception techniques.

While the CIA's allocation of resources in the 1990s had demonstrated a lack of concern about terrorism, the same could not be said for Tenet. Counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke describes Tenet as having a personal fixation on al Qaeda.¹²¹ In December 1998, four months after al Qaeda attacked U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Tenet directed his senior subordinates to "redouble" their efforts against Osama bin Laden: "We are at war, and I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community."¹²² Such strong words are indicative of a thorough understanding of the growing threat terrorism represented to the U.S. . If the Tenet's concern was so great, however, it is surprising that they were used in a memorandum that was distributed only within the CIA, and not to a larger audience. Putting the

¹¹⁹ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 259.

¹²⁰ Tenet, p. 45.

¹²¹ Clarke, Richard A. *Against all Enemies : Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press, 2004, p. 210.

¹²² Garthoff, Douglas, p. 258.

rest of the intelligence community on notice would have seemed like logical step, as would alerting domestic law enforcement agencies.

Tenet's desire to stop Osama bin Laden did not, however, impair his assessment of the quality of intelligence. On three occasions between 1998 and 1999 (during the Clinton/Tenet dyad), intelligence on bin Laden supplied his current location, thereby providing the opportunity to fire missiles at him. Twice Tenet recommended against commencing the attack because the intelligence came from a single source with inconsistent accuracy, and on the third occasion Tenet and Richard Clarke determined there was too great a risk of civilian casualties including, possibly, "a falcon hunting party from friendly Arab state."¹²³ These incidents demonstrate Tenet possessed the ability and willingness to stand up for the integrity the intelligence process, even when it meant missing an opportunity to achieve one of the President's important foreign policy goals. In Tenet's own words:

My job was to lay down what we know, accurately and objectively. I tried to do so, without a trace of advocacy. My own frustration was that as much as we all wanted Bin Laden dead, we didn't have enough information to give policy makers the confidence they required to pull the trigger.¹²⁴

This is important because critics of Tenet, such as Tim Weiner, describe him as having an "all-consuming desire to please his superiors," and fault that characteristic as the underlying reason he allowed the intelligence on Iraq's WMD to be politicized.

¹²³ Clarke, p. 200.

¹²⁴ Tenet, p. 112.

Other high profile mistakes by the Agency that occurred during the Clinton/Tenet dyad dragged the Agency into the spotlight. Most notable among these was the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which President Clinton described as the worst political setback of the conflict in the Balkans.¹²⁵ Although several fail-safes in the U.S. European Command's targeting procedures should have caught this mistake, the error originated from incorrect coordinates from the CIA. Two attempts by a CIA officer to correct the erroneous coordinates failed and the mistake cost the lives of three people and injured more than twenty more.¹²⁶ Tenet weathered the firestorm that ensued and kept his position, but in his memoirs he notes that on the eve of operations in Iraq in 2003 the Chinese intelligence service sent the CIA the coordinates for their embassy in Baghdad to ensure it was not accidentally targeted.¹²⁷

Tenet's experience as a SSCI staffer and as a NSC member gave him a unique and specialized background for the position of DCI. Clearly his loyalty and dedication to duty were beneficial to him as his career advanced, but there is little indication that a desire to be "one of the boys," as Richard Betts describes it, overrode his professionalism.¹²⁸ Tenet's two primary goals at the start of the Bush/Tenet dyad seemed to be the continued development of the intelligence community and his personal war on terrorism.

¹²⁵ Clinton, p. 854.

¹²⁶ Tenet, pp. 46-48.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 49.

¹²⁸ Betts, p. 139.

7.2.2 The Intelligence Process

Despite the attention that Tenet gave to the intelligence community and the appointment of a DDCI for community management (DDCI/CM)¹²⁹, the 9/11 commission found that “while Tenet was clearly the leader of the CIA, the intelligence community’s confederated structure left open the question of who really was in charge of the entire U.S. intelligence effort.”¹³⁰ Tenet’s difficulties were similar to other DCIs who did not have sufficient authority within the community, and these are illustrated by his efforts concerning the Counterterrorism Center (CTC). When Tenet wanted to increase the staff of the CTC that DCI Casey had instituted, he ran into resistance from the other intelligence community members who were unwilling to supply more manpower. The one manpower pool the DCI has complete authority over is the CIA, so that is where the additional personnel eventually came from. This, ironically, led to complaints that the CIA was disproportionately represented at the CTC.

7.2.2.1 Planning and Direction

Tenet’s access to President Bush did not help him as both the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense gradually took on a greater role in the area of intelligence. Perceiving that the intelligence community in general, and the CIA in particular, opposed the conclusion that there was a strong connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith created the Office of Special Plans (OSP). OSP was intended to be a source of alternative analysis, but it quickly became a stovepipe for information that did more harm than

¹²⁹ Garthoff, Douglas, p. 260.

¹³⁰ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 93.

good.¹³¹ OSP's extensive use of information from sources within the Iraqi National Congress, headed by Ahmad Chalabi, gave their analysis a biased perspective; furthermore, a lack of willingness to share the information meant that CIA never vetted any of the information even though it was being reported to the White House.¹³²

Despite the fact that the Pentagon's Inspector General called Feith's actions "inappropriate," he persisted.¹³³ His products fully supported the supposed link between Iraq and al Qaeda that the Administration so desperately wanted to hear about. It was only later that Tenet found out how widely throughout the NSC Feith had presented his information. After a briefing by the OSP team on 15 August 2002, Tenet ordered the Director of DIA, Vice Admiral Jacoby, USN, to stop releasing the intelligence directly to policy-makers and to bring it into the community's analytical process so it could be appropriately evaluated, but this did not happen.¹³⁴ Responsibility for OSP's actions can be spread quite liberally among many individuals, but this is a prime example of a point at which the DCI should have been able to authoritatively call upon a Department of Defense intelligence organization to maintain community standards. Furthermore, Tenet gives no indication that he tried to counter the effects of these briefings in his daily meetings with the President. Since Tenet clearly disagreed with the assessment and believed the intelligence to be erroneous, he should have addressed the issue to the NSC, the President, or even the intelligence oversight committees in Congress.

¹³¹ Pfiffner, James P. "Decisionmaking, Intelligence, and the Iraq War." *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq : British and American Perspectives*. Eds. James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian. 1 North American ed. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. 213-232, pp. 221-222.

¹³² *Ibid* pp. 221-222.

¹³³ Tenet, p. 348.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*.

7.2.2.2 Collection

The HUMINT capability that Tenet inherited when he became DCI was broken. In the 1990s the intelligence community's workforce had been slashed by 25%, and the CIA tried to absorb a major portion of that cut by stopping all recruiting.¹³⁵ In the summer of 1995 the training program for future members of the clandestine service graduated a total of twelve people. Simultaneously, al Qaeda was training thousands of potential terrorists in places such as Afghanistan and the Sudan.¹³⁶ By 2001 Tenet had increased the number of trainee to more than 120; a notable increase, but one that was still insufficient.¹³⁷ Despite his continued efforts to improve upon this collection capability, the Silberman-Robb Commission Report specifically cited the Agency for "poor tradecraft."¹³⁸ General Myers noted, "The shortage of good human intelligence plagued us not only from the start of the war in Iraq, but also throughout the first several years of the Global War on Terror... The challenge to get reliable intelligence on Iraq persisted until I retired."¹³⁹ Relations with foreign intelligence services became more important that ever since the CIA did not have a robust capability of its own to unleash against al Qaeda.

CURVEBALL was the codename for an Iraqi chemical engineer who claimed to have knowledge of an Iraqi biological warfare program located in mobile laboratories.¹⁴⁰ He had become a refugee and gained German immigration papers by providing information to the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Through the BND, 112 reports were generated that would

¹³⁵ Tenet, p. 14.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 14.

¹³⁷ Woodward, *Bush at War*, p. 3.

¹³⁸ WMD Commission Report, p. 81.

¹³⁹ Meyers, p. 240.

¹⁴⁰ Tenet, p. 375.

come to form the analytic foundation of the case for WMD in Iraq.¹⁴¹ The CIA failures in this incident show a cumulative effect. Despite years of working the Iraq issue the CIA did not have a reliable source of information within the appropriate directorates of the Iraqi government to determine the existence of a WMD program. The CIA had a shortage of clandestine officers to develop such assets and was not training a sufficient quantity of new officers. The CIA put considerable emphasis on reporting from CURVEBALL despite the fact that the BND would not allow the CIA to have access to him. The CIA's assessment for WMD in Iraq relied heavily on just this single source.¹⁴² The CIA did not make intelligence consumers aware of the thin evidence (single source reporting) for their conclusions; instead they stated that they had high confidence in their conclusions. Even when CURVEBALL was known to be a fabricator, the intelligence community did not correct their reporting to policy-makers.

The intelligence community can be forgiven for failing to penetrate a hard target. The intelligence community is at the mercy of the President and the Congress for resources, and therefore cannot be held accountable for a lack of resources if they have kept their executive and legislative masters aware of the capabilities that would be lost at a reduced level of funding. What makes CURVEBALL a prime example of a failure in intelligence collection is the lack of vetting of the information and the fact that the CIA proclaimed total confidence in their assessment when they should have made intelligence consumers aware of the insufficient quantity of evidence to support their conclusion.

¹⁴¹ Gill , Peter, and Mark Phythian. *Intelligence in an Insecure World*. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006, p. 131.

¹⁴² WMD Commission Report, p. 80.

7.2.2.3 Processing and Exploitation

The increasing demands of the processing and exploitation phase during this dyad are symptomatic of the increasing and diversifying demands of the intelligence community. Predator and other UAVs quickly proved their worth in the Global War on Terror, but they were a limited asset whose use had to be divided between the CIA and the Department of Defense.¹⁴³

Processing and exploiting full motion video requires different skills than traditional IMINT and, therefore, created training demands. If a UAV encountered a target of interest it might not make it to additional targets it was supposed to image and therefore, collection assets had to be rescheduled to service priority targets.

Effective SIGINT and HUMINT programs require language skills to process information once it is collected. At the start of the campaign in Afghanistan there were few intelligence analysts that spoke any of the four major Afghan languages (another 30 minor languages are cited in the CIA World Factbook).¹⁴⁴ Standard training at the Defense Language Institute for military linguists is a year-long course, but that assumes that a course has already been established for the desired language. The SIGINT processing and exploitation phase also resembles trying to find the proverbial needle in the haystack. Vast quantities of signals are collected and stored but the process of data mining to find actionable intelligence is a massive undertaking.¹⁴⁵

The intelligence community continues to maintain functional stovepipes. Information collected by a particular collection discipline is often unavailable to the remainder of the

¹⁴³ Rumsfeld, p. 389.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 370.

¹⁴⁵ Myers, p. 159.

community unless it is released in a formal product.¹⁴⁶ Some level of operational security is necessary for any collection discipline, but HUMINT reporting from CIA regarding WMD in Iraq was released in such a way that analysts were unaware that the information was actually from the same source.¹⁴⁷ This could mislead intelligence analysts into thinking that information has been independently verified by multiple sources when it has not.

7.2.2.4 Analysis and Production

Many of the shortfalls of the analysis process have already been brought out. Four aspects of this deserve additional attention at this point. First, the NIE process minimized objections raised by elements of the intelligence community who were speaking in their areas of expertise. Second, the analytical process layered assessments in such a way that while the conclusions built upon one another, the lack of available evidence did not. Third, while intelligence efforts concerning Iraq's WMD program consumed considerable attention, assessments of post-war Iraq were insufficient and did not prepare the military for the insurgency that followed. Finally, new institutions were created to begin to connect foreign and domestic streams of intelligence.

At the request of the SSCI, the CIA began "a crash project to produce a NIE" on Iraq's WMD program in September 2002.¹⁴⁸ The fact that this NIE would be completed on an abbreviated timeline was a poor start to the process. A NIE is the most authoritative document that the intelligence community produces and is supposed to represent "the considered opinion of the entire intelligence community."¹⁴⁹ It is rare for the various elements of the intelligence

¹⁴⁶ WMD Commission Report, p. 177.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 178.

¹⁴⁸ Tenet, pp. 321-322.

¹⁴⁹ Lowentahl, p. 49.

community to be in complete agreement on the details of an assessment, but the process makes provision for appropriately highlighting alternative views. In the case of the October 2002 NIE, two significant objections were raised that warrant discussion. The CIA assessed that “Baghdad...is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.”¹⁵⁰ The Air Force disagreed. The UAVs, according to Robert S. Boyd, senior intelligence analyst for the Air Force, were designed like a reconnaissance aircraft; they were not configured to carry chemical or biological warfare agents.¹⁵¹ The CIA analysts held to their original assessment, and the Air Force’s alternative assessment was relegated to several lines below.

Even more important to the October 2002 NIE was the assessed status of the Iraqi nuclear program. The Iraqi government was found to be seeking sixty thousand high strength aluminum tubes that they claimed were to be used in Lebanon to make race car components.¹⁵² From this point forward, many accounts of the assessment of aluminum tubes seem to be rather selectively presented. According to James Pfiffner, the NIE presented the tubes as being acquired to construct centrifuges capable of producing enriched uranium while noting the objections of the Department of Energy (DOE). Pfiffner then extensively notes the objections of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), who believed that the tubes were unsuitable for centrifuges and were more likely rocket fuselages. Pfiffner further notes that the experts from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s centrifuge physics department did not believe

¹⁵⁰ Pfiffner, “Did President Bush mislead his country?” pp. 73-74.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 74.

¹⁵² Tenet, p. 324.

the tubes could be used for centrifuges and that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was in agreement.¹⁵³

Tenet's account of the assessment states that all agencies believed that the tubes *could* be used for centrifuge rotors and that a group of experts at Oak Ridge National Laboratory believed that the tubes were better suited for that purpose than anything else. Tenet allows that a DOE representative assessed that they were probably not part of a nuclear program, but that this individual was not an expert and that he was not able to explain his agency's view in a convincing manner. Tenet also briefly mentions the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) saying they believed that it was highly unlikely the tubes were meant for rockets.¹⁵⁴

The WMD Commission Report took a third approach that falls somewhere between Pfiffner and Tenet. They first cite NGIC as concluding that although use as rocket fuselages could not be ruled out, they believed them to be a poor choice and therefore it was a highly unlikely that was their intended purpose. The commission then cites the DOE and IAEA conclusions, which were almost totally opposite to those of NGIC. DOE believed that the tubes were unsuited for use in a centrifuge but were more likely intended to be part of Iraq's Nasser 81 millimeter Multiple Rocket Launcher program. The WMD Commission points out that the CIA did cite the DOE objections in the NIE, but also that interagency consensus was that the tubes *could* be used in a centrifuge. Furthermore, the WMD Commission point out that at the time this

¹⁵³ Pfiffner, "Did President Bush Mislead his country", pp. 67-69.

¹⁵⁴ Tenet, pp. 324-325.

assessment was being conducted there was increased Iraqi interest in procuring dual-use items that would have been consistent with the renewing of a centrifuge program.¹⁵⁵

A review of these three assessments clearly demonstrates the complexity of the issue. Both NGIC and DOE believed it was highly unlikely that the tubes would be used in the area for which they possessed the greatest expertise. Pfiffner's assessment is uneven without the presentation of the NGIC assessment. Tenet's retelling of the events recalls a different conclusion from Oak Ridge National Laboratory and demonstrates the importance that individuals can play in the process through the poor advocacy of the DOE representative. The WMD Commission goes on to condemn the intelligence community for poor analytical tradecraft based on the conclusion that it was CIA and DIA's confidence in their own assessments that discouraged them from further technical assessment that "would have pointed them in the direction of conventional weapons applications."¹⁵⁶ This same confidence could also have affected the CIA analysts' perceptions of Iraq's resurgent interest in dual-use technology.

Greater voice should have been given to the dissenting opinions of the Air Force (on the UAV issue) and the DOE (regarding the aluminum tubes) in developing the assessments included in the October 2002 NIE. Minority opinions and alternative assessments were incorporated into the document, but the lack of prominence means that few who read the estimate noticed the objections of these agencies even though they were commenting upon issues for which they were the subject matter experts. Additionally, the use of a poorly supported conclusion (that the

¹⁵⁵ WMD Commission Report, pp. 55-56

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 66-68.

tubes indicated a centrifuge program) to then conclude that interest in dual-use technology must be for a nuclear program is an example of another analytical shortfall: layering.

The second major analytical issue that needs to be addressed is the cumulative effect of weakly supported assessments. The poor conclusions of the October 2002 NIE had a snowball effect that would be invisible to the intelligence consumer that was not familiar with the supporting intelligence. The WMD Commission report states, “Analysis of Iraqi weapons programs was also flawed by ‘layering,’ with one individual assessment forming the basis for additional, broader assessments that did not carry forward the uncertainties underlying each ‘layer.’”¹⁵⁷ The effects of layering were not only misleading to intelligence consumers but to other analysts as well. The WMD Commission also reports that a senior chemical weapons (CW) analyst related that he and other analysts had “been ‘drifting’ in the direction of concluding that Iraq did *not* have much of a CW program. The appearance of CURVEBALL’s reporting on BW [biological weapons], however, “pushed [CW analysts] the other way.”¹⁵⁸ The logic was that if Iraq was willing to proceed with a BW program then why not a CW program? Layering, therefore, not only affected analysis occurring in a sequential manner (nuclear centrifuges and then dual-use technology), but had a ripple effect that skewed the analysis of what should have been parallel assessments, the assessment of BW and CW programs.

The third analytical issue that needs to be addressed is the failure to dedicate sufficient analytical effort to assessing the post-war environment in Iraq to provide warning of the potential for massive insurgency that took place. Rumsfeld states “This intelligence failure on the

¹⁵⁷ WMD Commission Report, p. 172.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 174.

existence and capabilities of the Fedayeen and foreign jihadists to wage an asymmetric war against our troops posed daunting consequences for the coalition effort.”¹⁵⁹ Rumsfeld refers to this shortfall as the most serious failure of the war and elaborates:

Our intelligence community lacked an appreciation for the Baathist regime’s ability to finance, command, and control an insurgency after Saddam’s overthrow. They repeatedly asserted that ideological conflicts between the secular Baathists and the jihadist religious extremists of al-Qaida precluded strategic cooperation between them—yet such cooperation became the heart and soul of the insurgency.¹⁶⁰

It is impossible to determine if greater analytical effort would have produced better results, or if the groupthink that dominated WMD assessments would have been pervasive in this area as well, but the negative policy results of this failure are apparent. President Bush notes that instead of preparing to meet the insurgency, U.S. forces were drawn down from 192,000 to 109,000 with the forces that remained in Iraq focused on training the new Iraqi military instead of pursuing insurgents while the movement was still in its nascent stages.¹⁶¹ While current intelligence remains a demanding and much sought after intelligence product, long range assessments are where the greatest contributions can be made to foreign policy. Additionally, even if long range assessments had not predicted the insurgency, discussion of the possibility (even as a worse case scenario) could have increased vigilance for such a development.

The final analytical issue that is worth noting is a positive result of the Bush/Tenet dyad.

¹⁵⁹ Rumsfeld, p. 464.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 520-521.

¹⁶¹ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 268.

One of the more common criticisms of the intelligence community was a failure to “connect the dots.” One problem was that the dots were split between the domestic and the foreign threat picture. The 9/11 Commission noted the following:

The September 11 attacks fell into the void between the foreign and domestic threats. The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats to U.S. interests there. The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of a domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States. No one was looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets. The threat that was coming was not from sleeper cells. It was foreign—but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the United States.¹⁶²

The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 brought all the domestic “dots” under the purview of a single department of government, but it was the creation of TTIC that brought the “dots” together under a single roof. TTIC (now NCTC) is not the model of seamless integration, but it makes tremendous strides towards developing a threat picture from all relevant streams of intelligence. Agencies maintain separate SCIFs and separate computer databases for intelligence, but they work in close proximity and have the ability to reach back deep into their own agencies. Within a few steps of the watch floor, both foreign and domestic intelligence officers stand ready to contribute intelligence to form a common operating picture that would not have been possible previously. NCTC and the myriad of other centers established for the integration of foreign and domestic intelligence (as well as first responders), cannot be given sole credit for the absence of a significant foreign terrorist attack on the U.S. soil since 9/11, but

¹⁶² 9/11 Commission Report, p. 263.

they make a significant contribution to that remarkable record.

7.2.2.5 Dissemination

Two aspects of Tenet's role in the dissemination of intelligence are worthy of further consideration. First, it is prudent to consider the role the PDB played in shaping the attitudes of the President on the issues of terrorism and of WMD in Iraq. Second, Tenet's interaction with the SSCI and HPSCI merits discussion. In previous case studies I have examined legislative oversight with the topic of covert actions, because the greatest abuses of legislative oversight have been connected with covert actions instead of intelligence collection and analysis. For the Bush/Tenet dyad, the dissemination phase presents a more relevant picture of the status and attitude towards legislative oversight during this dyad.

The Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) consisted of the leaders of each of the government's organizations that dealt with counterterrorism and security. In July 2001, counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke convened a meeting of the CSG in which both the FBI and CIA briefed indicators of a major al Qaeda attack—their intelligence did not reveal the time or place of the attack, but it strongly indicated that an attack would take place.¹⁶³ Clarke states that he told the CSG, “Cancel summer vacations, schedule overtime, have your terrorist reaction teams on alert to move fast.”¹⁶⁴ The most senior member of government that Clarke credits with

a grasp of the significance was Tenet, who was equally convinced that an attack was coming and

¹⁶³ Clarke, p. 236.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

felt obliged to make sure that proper warning was given.¹⁶⁵

Intelligence products compete for the attention of their readers just like traditional mass media. Subject lines and titles that do not provoke interest will decrease the chances intelligence consumers will read the document. Furthermore, executive summaries are too brief to properly discuss alternative views and confidence levels; instead, they strive to deliver the major points in a concise manner. The format of the PDB which Tenet provided the President on a daily basis consisted of short current intelligence “articles” that had little room for discussion of what the WMD Commission referred to as “doubt and nuance.”¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, the repetition of issues in current intelligence products can generate a false sense of confirmation that strategic assessments should be able to overcome. Without knowing what other intelligence was shared with the President, it is impossible to determine how intelligence affected his perspective on issues, but it is clear that on its own, the PDB could create a skewed strategic picture due to its abbreviated discussions of the issue of the day.

Considerable attention has been given to the 6 August 2001 PDB which was titled “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in U.S.” and that discussed terrorist hijackings just over a month prior to the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report, however, showed that the most recent piece of intelligence referred to by date in the 6 August 2001 PDB was from 1999.¹⁶⁷ If newer more actionable intelligence was available then it was not specified in the PDB. The report on its own presented the possibility of a dangerous event, but as a daily product repeating similar threats

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 235.

¹⁶⁶ WMD Commission Report, p. 50.

¹⁶⁷ 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 261-262.

using older data there was nothing remarkable to cause a sudden change in policy or action.

PDBs leading up to the war in Iraq exhibited the same shortcomings and worse. The WMD Commission concluded, “The President’s Daily Brief likely conveyed a greater sense of certainty about analytic judgments than warranted.”¹⁶⁸ The report continued as follows:

The PDBs often failed to explain, or even signal, the uncertainties underlying their judgments. Information from a known fabricator was used in PDBs, despite the publication of a fabrication notice on that source months earlier... The PDBs attributed information to multiple sources without making it clear that the information rested very heavily on only one of those sources. And the title of PDB articles were sometimes more alarmist than the text would support.¹⁶⁹

For a dyad to enjoy intelligence success, there must be a balance in the reporting to ensure that the president kept abreast of current events, is able to put those events in the proper strategic context, and is aware of how both current and strategic intelligence relates to desired U.S. foreign policy. Tenet was able to maintain a steady drum beat of the dangers of terrorism before 9/11 through numerous PDB articles, but it is unclear if that mantra became easier to ignore because of its repetition, or because of its lack of actionability.

If Tenet shared intelligence with too much repetition to the President, he did not duplicate that mistake with Congress. Congress might have hoped that a former SSCI staff member would have greater appreciation for the role of legislative oversight of intelligence, but this was not the case. Loch Johnson writes that in the aftermath of 9/11, Tenet withheld access to basic

¹⁶⁸ WMD Commission Report, p. 181.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

intelligence documents related to the attacks and refused to declassify documents that Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) believed were important for the public record.¹⁷⁰ He further records that Tenet would, at the last minute, refuse to allow scheduled intelligence officers to speak before the intelligence oversight committee and even cancelled his own appearance.¹⁷¹ Such actions not only established poor relations between Congress and the intelligence community, but they also reflected poorly upon the President himself. Graham would referred to Tenet’s behavior as “obstructionism” and “unacceptable,” and many Congressmen from both parties who were traditionally strong supporters of the intelligence community developed a more adversarial attitude toward it during the Bush/Tenet dyad.¹⁷²

7.2.3 Covert Actions

The synergy ultimately achieved by CIA teams and military special operations forces in Afghanistan has already been discussed, but some additional details are relevant in the review Tenet’s role in covert actions. President Bush records that by late September the CIA teams (plural) had entered Afghanistan and linked up with the Northern Alliance.¹⁷³ Rumsfeld, however, writes that by mid-October only one CIA team had connected with the Northern Alliance on the ground, and that this was slowing the start of the military campaign.¹⁷⁴ Combined operations will always create a certain degree of conflict between the leadership of the various elements involved. Rumsfeld worried that the CIA was too closely aligned with Pakistan and the

¹⁷⁰ Johnson, “Congress, the Iraq war, and intelligence oversight,” p. 186.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 197.

¹⁷⁴ Rumsfeld, p. 391.

southern tribes in Afghanistan,¹⁷⁵ but Tenet writes that there was considerable internal division at the CIA over merits of both the southern tribes and the Northern Alliance.¹⁷⁶ The military also pushed for control over all forces in Afghanistan, including CIA teams.¹⁷⁷ Ultimately, the plan would work as originally conceived, with CIA teams dominating the initial phases and the military gradually assuming a larger role.¹⁷⁸ These difficulties also illustrate the challenges that occur when a support agency takes on an operational role. As the President's principal intelligence advisor, Tenet would normally only supply information; now he was essentially the commander of a paramilitary force inside a war zone.

7.2.4 Foreign Policy

Unlike DCIs Casey and McCone, Tenet rarely approached his role within the foreign policy team as that of a policy-maker. If Tenet had an agenda of his own, it was to awaken the government to the dangers of al Qaeda. This concern permeated the PDB and regular meetings with key members of the Administration such as the Secretary of Defense.¹⁷⁹ Tenet and Rumsfeld began, at the very start of the administration, to discuss more effective strategies with which to combat terrorism.¹⁸⁰ By the end of the first year they were executing strategies.

It is doubtful that Tenet ever sought the limelight, but he was certainly in the public eye more than most DCIs. In 1998, during the Clinton/Tenet dyad, Tenet and the CIA had taken the unusual position of being the guarantor of the Wye River Memorandum between Israel and the

¹⁷⁵ Rumsfeld, p. 376.

¹⁷⁶ Tenet, pp. 216-219.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 215-216.

¹⁷⁸ Myers, p. 170.

¹⁷⁹ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 208.

¹⁸⁰ Rumsfeld, p. 341.

Palestinian Authority.¹⁸¹ Tenet had worked with both sides in the talks and had promised the CIA's assistance in the implementation of the accord.¹⁸² His role, in Clinton's mind, was integral to the process.¹⁸³ Such a role was unprecedented for the Agency, but did not mark a change in Tenet's attitude towards the DCI's role in policy matters. Mistakes also kept the DCI in the public eye, but he weathered each in turn.

7.2.5 Intelligence Operational Code for George Tenet

The Intelligence Operational Code for George Tenet (see Figure 7.2) is similar to that of President Bush in all areas except the final two categories, which deal with their perspectives on the nature of politics and relations with opponents and allies. Tenet demonstrated a tendency towards full executive oversight. He kept President Bush informed of espionage and covert actions and took his directions directly from the President. Tenet also presented the president plans for operations such as the capture or assassination of al Qaeda leaders or the interrogation methods for prisoners, and took the President's orders as authoritative guidance.

Tenet was not as supportive of legislative oversight. Unlike his predecessors who have been evaluated in the three previous case studies, Tenet's tendency towards the "deny access" end of the spectrum was not based upon hiding covert operations, but intelligence. Loch Johnson describes his attitude as stonewalling and slow rolling.¹⁸⁴ Beyond Tenet's initial conflict with the SSCI concerning a handful of community management positions (the DDCI/CM and three ADCIs), there is not a clear explanation for this attitude.

¹⁸¹ Tenet, pp. 64-65.

¹⁸² Clinton, Bill. *My Life*. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 818.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, p. 818.

¹⁸⁴ Johnson, "The Iraq war and intelligence oversight," p. 186.




Figure 7.2 . An Intelligence Operational Code for Bush and Tenet.

Tenet's words and his early actions show that he desired to serve as the leader of the entire intelligence community, although he was often ineffective in this role. He sought no additional authority over the intelligence community from either president he served, and he was unlikely to have gotten broad authority over the Department of Defense agencies from either of them. Ultimately, both the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission found fault with his results in the area of community leadership, but he maintained it as his goal throughout his tenure.

Tenet did not bring a foreign policy agenda to the Bush Administration; he desired to play a support role except in those situations like Afghanistan where he was asked to take on operational responsibilities. His place on this spectrum is closer to neutral than that of President Bush, but erring slightly to the side of taking a policy role because of his defiant insistence that key members of the Bush Administration understand the warnings coming from the intelligence community about terrorism. This makes it all the more puzzling that he did not assume a stronger posture against assessments from the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans when it drew a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda with which he clearly disagreed. This may indicate insecurities in the President/DCI relationship. Charges that he presented the President or the public with conclusions he knew were false concerning WMD in Iraq are inflated. Tenet and the rest of the intelligence community believed that Iraq was sustaining active chemical and biological weapons programs and was reinitiating a nuclear program. In this assessment Tenet and the rest of the community were inaccurate, not dishonest. To whatever degree he understood the poor quality of the intelligence his estimates were built upon, he still did not doubt the conclusion.

Tenet emphasized getting the job done, and his use of enhanced interrogation methods and paramilitary teams demonstrated that obtaining the right results were important. Tenet was quick

to note, however, that the harshest methods of interrogation were legal and were reserved for those few terrorists that were considered the most dangerous and who had the greatest intelligence potential. Like Bush, his operational code shows him on the “freedom of operations” side of the spectrum for the morality of intelligence operations spectrum, and at the “tool of U.S. diplomacy” end of the spectrum for covert operations.

Tenet differed from Bush in his perception of the political environment. He believed there was a degree of harmony that could be obtained in political situations and he was willing to cooperate and bargain with both allies and opponents to a greater degree than President Bush. Such an outlook does not necessarily indicate that he was willing to bend on issues that he knew were wrong or compromise on essential truths, but this outlook could lead him to avoid those issues if he believed that the issue did not change the ultimate outcome. Tenet describes his attitude towards others as one of inclusiveness. “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.”¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, Tenet’s political background is one of legislative and staff work, not executive experience, and these are areas where compromise can be a more valuable skill than decisiveness.

7.3 Assessment of the Bush/Tenet Dyad

The Bush/Tenet dyad occurs at a remarkable point in the development of intelligence support. Advanced weapons systems and the evolving understanding of the information sphere caused continually greater demands upon the intelligence community. Simultaneously, watershed events in the world political environment such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks drove an entirely different requirement, one that relied upon HUMINT in order to reach targets that were less

¹⁸⁵ Tenet, p. 12.

vulnerable to current forms of technical collection. Further challenges arose from the fact that the pieces to the intelligence puzzle were scattered between the intelligence community and the even more loosely bound and widely varied group of domestic agencies that contributed to the then ill-defined mission of homeland defense. In such an environment, intelligence success was a challenge to achieve. Ultimately, however, it was inaccuracies in assessments caused by poor tradecraft that played the greatest factor in the failure of this dyad, inaccuracies that arose when confidence in conclusions superseded confidence in the available intelligence.

7.3.1 The President/DCI Relationship Matrix

Placing the Bush/Tenet dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix (See Figure 7.3) is based upon the same measures as were used in the previous case studies. The horizontal axis depicts a spectrum of the personal relationship between the President and the DCI. The left extreme in the spectrum represents a warm personal relationship in which the DCI has the ability to talk directly with the president whenever he perceives the need. The right end of the spectrum illustrates a relationship that could be described as cool and, at best, professional. In this type of relationship the president and DCI have direct contact only at certain formal meetings and the DCI is dependent upon someone exogenous to the president/DCI relationship to grant his access to the president. Bush and Tenet did not know one another until after Bush had won the 2000 presidential election. Their relationship grew quickly and permitted the DCI daily access to the President. Tenet was not an inner circle member in a policy making sense, but he had access and he held the confidence of the President and other important members of the NSC. The relationship between Bush and Tenet is not as strong as that of Reagan and Casey. Tenet may have had more consistent access to Bush than Casey did with Reagan, but Casey had the ability to access Reagan whenever he needed to and on a much wider range of issues. The Bush/Tenet




Figure 7.3 Bush/Tenet Dyad on the President/DCI Relationship Matrix.

dyad is placed just to the left of center on the spectrum because of the daily access that Tenet had. This is noticeably different, however, than the close relationship of the Reagan/Casey dyad.

The vertical axis of the matrix depicts politicization. At the upper end of this spectrum is a DCI who strictly observes Lowenthal's semi-permeable wall and adheres to the principles that Sherman Kent promoted about informing the policy process instead of becoming actively engaged in influencing and advocating policy. At the lower end of this spectrum a DCI is not only integral to the policy process, but his policy role threatens the integrity and impartiality of the intelligence analysis he presents. The Bush/Tenet dyad is designated as a "Professor" type dyad. It is placed near the center of the spectrum, but in the upper half, indicating that while Tenet desperately worked to inform policy, he did not advocate a particular policy position. This is a crucial distinction that requires emphasis.

Tenet did not bring a personal foreign policy agenda to the Bush foreign policy team. Unlike DCIs Casey and McCone he did not have personal policy preferences that he advocated. Tenet did select intelligence articles that would emphasize to the president the nature of the terrorist threat prior to the 9/11 attacks when terrorism was not at the forefront of the Bush Administration's concerns. That, however, is not the same as advocating a particular policy option. Intelligence has not fulfilled its mission to warn policy-makers when an estimate is written or an assessment has been briefed; the mission has been fulfilled when the policy-maker understands the nature of the threat and the level of confidence that the intelligence community has in the information supporting that assessment. The Bush/Tenet dyad remains close to the center of this spectrum because of the tendency of both members of the dyad to allow conclusions regarding intelligence assessments to drive the process.

7.3.2 The Intelligence Success of the Dyad

The Bush/Tenet dyad's scores are highly inconsistent across the areas measured in this research. Predictably, certain intelligence disciplines accomplished their most relevant missions in the areas of information they are strongest but performed poorly in others. For example, IMINT, communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT) provided unprecedented accuracy and timeliness in developing a picture of the battlefield during the invasion of Iraq. GEOINT allowed air power to use smart weapons to close caves and tunnels in Afghanistan, denying their use to al Qaeda and the Taliban after those same caves had facilitated years of resistance by the mujahideen against the occupying Soviet forces. Intelligence also played a critical role in preventing a thus far unaccounted number of terrorist attempts to attack the U.S. after 11 September 2001. As always, however, intelligence will not be remembered for the quantity of its successes, but the significance of its failures.

7.3.2.1 Accuracy

The Bush/Tenet dyad scores poor in accuracy, but not necessarily for the popularly held or obvious reasons. It is difficult to say whether the attacks of 9/11 could have been detected with specific enough detail to prevent them. Furthermore, the U.S. intelligence community was in the majority among the world's leading foreign intelligence services in its conclusion that Iraq probably did have an active WMD program. The dyad could have survived these events with acceptable success if that were the extent of the mistakes. The Bush/Tenet dyad scores poorly in accuracy because it did not properly convey the lack of strength in evidence that its conclusions rested upon, and because its numerous errors caused the Administration to stumble at some of its most significant hurdles.

Rumsfeld notes, “What was unique about Iraq was that the intelligence community reported near total confidence in their conclusions.”¹⁸⁶ The WMD Commission’s overall finding states the following:

The Intelligence Community’s performance in assessing Iraq’s pre-war weapons of mass destruction programs was a major intelligence failure. The failure was not merely that the Intelligence Community’s assessments were wrong. There were also serious shortcomings in the way these assessments were made and communicated to policymakers.¹⁸⁷

The greatest of these shortcomings was to not make clear that evidence for an existing program was weak. Because the Administration and the intelligence community strongly held the belief that a WMD program existed they essentially created a situation where an analyst would be forced to prove that it did not. This would be difficult under the best of circumstances, but, as the WMD Commission points out, “When someone acts like he is hiding something, it is hard to entertain the conclusion that he really has nothing to hide.”¹⁸⁸ President Bush notes that in Saddam Hussein’s debriefing with the FBI, he explained that “he was more worried about looking weak to Iran than being removed by the coalition. He never thought the United States would follow through on our promises to disarm him by force.”¹⁸⁹

There was also some legitimate evidence of activity by the Iraqis that added to the fog of war. David Kay briefed Congress in 2003 that “Iraq’s WMD programs spanned more than two

¹⁸⁶ Rumsfeld, p. 432.

¹⁸⁷ WMD Commission Report, p. 46.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p. 155.

¹⁸⁹ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 269.

decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.”¹⁹⁰ But Kay found no stockpiles of WMD. U.S. forces did find evidence of terrorist CW activities. Rumsfeld reports in his memoirs that when U.S. forces seized a suspected CW site in Khurmil, Iraq, there were clear traces of cyanide, ricin, and potassium chloride present along with the equipment and manuals necessary to produce the deadly toxins.¹⁹¹ The facility was run by Ansar al-Islam, a Sunni extremist group with ties to al Qaeda member Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.¹⁹² These factors and more make the intelligence community’s conclusions understandable, but they do not explain its poor analytical tradecraft.

Accuracy was poor because Tenet and others did not make clear that the evidence was weak. Processes like layering hid the way one poorly-evidenced conclusion depended upon another. Additionally, the repetition of WMD-themed articles from the same source in the PDB gave the president and others false confidence that the intelligence was better supported than it really was. Bob Woodward deserves more credit for the relevance of Tenet’s “slam-dunk” comment than Tenet does.¹⁹³ The briefing during which the comment was made was conducted to discuss how intelligence might be presented as evidence to the rest of the world. Tenet accuses Woodward of embellishing his gesticulations and taking the comments out of context.¹⁹⁴ To be fair to Woodward, the comments are presented within the context of a CIA presentation about taking the WMD debate to the public, but the reaction of senior policy-makers could easily be

¹⁹⁰ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 262.

¹⁹¹ Rumsfeld, p. 448.

¹⁹² *Ibid.* p. 446.

¹⁹³ Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, p. 249.

¹⁹⁴ Tenet, p. 362.

assumed to be about the accuracy of the WMD assessment instead of the quality of the presentation. Most important in considering the importance of Tenet's comment is the fact that the President and the intelligence community had already reached their conclusion that the WMD program existed.¹⁹⁵ What is important is that the same confidence in the conclusion was present from start to end in the intelligence process and was undeterred by a lack of supporting evidence.

The second factor in the poor accuracy of the dyad, the numerous errors that caused the Administration to stumble at some of its most significant hurdles, views intelligence failures not just from a quantitative perspective, but by the significance of the event. In addition to the WMD question, and the failure to more aggressively debunk assertions of a strong Iraq-al Qaeda connection, the intelligence was wrong about the start and the conclusion of the war in Iraq. The attack on Dora Farms was an attempt to kill Saddam Hussein at the very outset of the war using two F-117 Nighthawks¹⁹⁶ to attack a bunker at a complex outside of Baghdad where Saddam was expected to be.¹⁹⁷ The information, from an agent network codenamed ROCKSTAR, was assessed as reliable.¹⁹⁸ The attack would preempt the planned start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, but the opportunity to decapitate the Iraqi military at the start of the war was too tempting. The mechanics of the attack went off perfectly and the target was destroyed, but

¹⁹⁵ Tenet, p. 359, and Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 242.

¹⁹⁶ The F-117 is the first operational warplane to employ low observable, or stealth, technology to reduce its vulnerability to radar detection. The F-117 is not intended for air-to-air combat. Its purpose is to deliver ordinance in a dense threat environment against targets of extremely high value. Eden, Paul, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Modern Military Aircraft*, p. 244.

¹⁹⁷ Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 254.

¹⁹⁸ Myers, pp. 235-237.

Saddam, it turned out, was not there. Rumsfeld writes, “This first salvo in the war with Iraq foreshadowed the various intelligence failures that would later come to light.”¹⁹⁹

Other critical failures included the assessment that the Iraqi military would remain intact after the war to help secure and reconstruct the country,²⁰⁰ that the infrastructure of the country (such as public utilities) was in a supportable state,²⁰¹ and that an insurgency movement was unlikely.²⁰² The failure on each of these issues contributed to decisions about the size and variety of forces that would be necessary after the war in Iraq. American success on the traditional battlefield was won with considerable contributions by the intelligence community, but at the grand strategy level the intelligence community supplied decision-makers with inaccurate intelligence at critical moments.

7.3.2.2 Timeliness

The timeliness of inaccurate intelligence is almost irrelevant and the quest for timeliness might have contributed to inaccuracy. The October 2002 NIE was produced with great timeliness, but it could be argued that longer analysis *might* have allowed analysts to discover some of the inherent shortcomings of the evidence on which the assessment was built. The timeliness of the intelligence supporting the most technical aspects of military operations during the Bush/Tenet dyad was good. The intense information requirements of precision munitions and special operations forces were met, and the progress of a missile defense program was only possible because information could be supplied in near real time to its various components.

¹⁹⁹ Rumsfeld, p. 460.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 517.

²⁰¹ Myers, p. 242.

²⁰² Bush, *Decision Points*, p. 268, and Rumsfeld, p. 520.

Unfortunately, intelligence on the intentions of our adversaries was late arriving when it was available. This keeps the timeliness score for this dyad at “acceptable” where it otherwise could have been higher.

7.3.2.3 Relevance

The frequent interaction between the President and DCI in the Bush/Tenet dyad made intelligence quite relevant. Additionally, the relevance of intelligence can be viewed very differently with the advantage of hindsight. In this case, hindsight quickly assures us that the intelligence community’s general warning for an undetermined terrorist action against a U.S. target in the summer of 2001 was highly relevant.²⁰³ Even intelligence failures were supported by highly relevant information. The CIA managed to develop the capability to intercept the communications of Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate that was responsible for concealing Iraq’s military intentions and capabilities.²⁰⁴ The fact that the communications did not reveal evidence of a WMD program may have seemed like a failure to some at the time, but displays its true relevance now. The importance of viewing intelligence within the context of the time it was presented is just as critical here as it is throughout this research, but in the case of assessing relevance, hindsight is valuable too. Intelligence in the Bush/Tenet dyad is assessed to have good relevance.

7.3.2.4 Actionability

Actionability for this dyad is assessed as poor. The difficulty of gaining information on a small, cellular organization, such as a terrorist group, should not be underestimated, but this

²⁰³ Clarke, p. 207.

²⁰⁴ Weiner, pp. 488-489.

research must assess the actionability of the intelligence that was presented. Without an idea of the scope, direction, or goal of the potential terrorist attacks in the summer of 2001, the White House would have had to put the entire nation on alert in order to be prepared for all the possible terrorist scenarios. The upgraded security necessary to disrupt a largely undefined attack may have appeared to have been somewhat of a pyrrhic victory, for it would have been highly costly, largely unpopular, and achieving a high level of disruption in society where there was little apparent threat to the average citizen. Al Qaeda would have achieved some of its goals without having taken any real action. Intelligence in the Iraq war produces a mixed record of actionability and that does not improve the score for actionability.

7.3.2.5 Was it Used?

The intelligence was unquestionably acted upon. The strategy of preemption was dependent upon intelligence, and intelligence was central in most debates about the war in Iraq. Intelligence was also used before 9/11 in many ways that would become useful during the Global War on Terror. The restructuring of the U.S. military to create lighter, faster units and to make greater use of special operations forces was both driven by intelligence and dependent on intelligence. The Bush/Tenet dyad is assessed as good in this category.

7.3.2.6 The Intelligence Success of the Dyad was Poor

The overall level of intelligence success for the Bush/Tenet Dyad was poor (See Table 7.1). Intelligence was rarely so essential to an Administration as it was during this dyad, but in the most critical moments there were tragic instances of intelligence failure. It is important to note that the grades for the different sections of intelligence success are widely varied. Two goods, two poors, and an acceptable show that a diverse community was doing a lot of things well even

Table 7.1 Table of Bush/Tenet Dyad's Success in Intelligence

Area of Intelligence Success	Grade
Accuracy	Poor
Timeliness	Acceptable
Relevance	Good
Actionable	Poor
Was the Intelligence Used	Good
Summary Score	Poor

Note - As discussed in Section 3.5, the Summary Score is not an average of the component scores. A single poor grade may be sufficient to cause a Summary Score of Poor if the cause is of sufficient significance.

though there were critical shortcomings. Failures in accuracy phase were the most significant in determining the overall grade for this case study.

7.3.3 The Effect of the President/DCI Relationship – Testing the Hypotheses

The Bush/Tenet case study is not in full agreement with the three hypotheses of this research. The three hypotheses would have predicted that the general condition of the president/DCI relationship in this dyad would have resulted in greater intelligence success. This case study, however, is very informative on how the hypotheses can be improved.

H1 states: *The nature of the personal relationship between the DCI and the president will strongly determine the quality of intelligence reports received by the president.* The relationship between Bush and Tenet is difficult to evaluate. Both members of the dyad demonstrated respect and loyalty toward one another, but the relationship is not strong enough to encourage Tenet to be forthright about intelligence he knew was wrong, such as the supposed link between al Qaeda and Iraq that OSP was advocating, or the weakness of the intelligence that supported intelligence community conclusions on WMD in Iraq. If we subscribe to the conclusion that Weiner and others purport, that Tenet was driven by an “all-consuming desire to please his superiors,”²⁰⁵ then that would be a serious flaw in their relationship and H1 would be supported. An alternate theory would begin with the differences in the Intelligence Operational Codes between Bush and Tenet in the categories concerning the nature of politics and how each views relations with opponents and allies. If this difference is the defining element of their relationship, then this would indicate that Tenet would be willing to seek harmony and cooperate rather than object. Therefore, if we assume that Tenet did not inherently need to please the President but was

²⁰⁵ Weiner, p. 487.

unwilling to confront him with the shortfalls in intelligence of which he was aware, then H1 is still supported.

H2 states: *The frequency of interaction between the DCI and the president will have a positive relationship with the quality of intelligence the president receives.* H2 is not supported by the Bush-Tenet case study. Meeting frequency was high, but the overall result was poor. The high scores in the area of relevance of intelligence and the area that concerns itself with “whether intelligence is used” can, however, be linked to the frequent interaction of the president and DCI. This would suggest that H2 should be modified as follows: *The frequency of interaction between the DCI and the president will have a positive relationship with the relevance of intelligence the president receives and cause intelligence to be better incorporated into the development of policy.* This modified H2 would still be supported by the first three case studies of this research and will be further addressed in Chapter 8.

H3 states: *DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives.* As written, the Bush/Tenet case study fails to reject H3. Tenet did not have an independent policy agenda and therefore H3 does not apply. H3 is based largely upon the Lowenthal model that describes a semi-permeable wall separating the policy realm and the intelligence realm. Intelligence may pass through the wall in both directions, but policy should only flow from the side of the policy-maker. The Bush/Tenet dyad demonstrates that policy-oriented intelligence guidance can have negative results. Specifically, the assumption that Iraq possessed an active WMD program placed the impetus on the intelligence community to prove that Iraq did not have such a program, if it could. Therefore, H3’s explanatory value could be improved by adding the following statement: *Similarly, policy-makers who request*

intelligence that proves a particular idea to be true (or false) can inadvertently politicize the process and degrade the quality of intelligence. H3 then is improved to define politicization as a two-way problem, which can corrupt the intelligence process if it crosses the wall from either side. This modification is consistent with the other case studies and will be further addressed in Chapter 8.

Table 7.2 Table of Bush/Tenet Dyad's Hypotheses Evaluation

Hypothesis	Verdict of Evidence from the Dyad
H1 - The Nature of the President/DCI Relationship	Supports
H2 - The Frequency of President/DCI Interaction	Fails to Support
H3 - The DCI Advocates Particular Policy Options	Fails to Reject

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

A President has to know what is going on all around the world in order to be ready to act when action is needed. The President must have all the facts that may affect the foreign policy or the military policy of the United States. . .¹

Harry S. Truman

The interaction between the president and his chief intelligence officer has a marked effect upon the level of intelligence success that can be achieved by each dyad. The massive staff structures that exist within the Executive Office of the President and the intelligence community dictate that there will be many variables in the relationship between the two institutions, but leadership matters. Aspects of the relationship between the president and DCI/DNI have a unique ability to contribute to the quality of the final intelligence products. This research has, therefore, defined three factors of the president/DCI relationship that affect intelligence production and then evaluated the intelligence success of four dyads to determine if those factors can explain the success or failure of intelligence during the tenure of those dyads.

This chapter will begin by comparing the individuals who comprised the sample dyads used in this research. Next, the results of the four case studies will be summarized to determine how accurately the hypotheses explained the level of intelligence success for each dyad. Thirdly, this chapter will examine how these hypotheses can be used to evaluate other dyads and whether the

¹ Truman, p. 55.

creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence affects the hypotheses. Finally, future areas of research within the subfields of intelligence studies and national security will be discussed.

8.1 Comparison of the Dyads

When comparing the presidents from the four dyads researched in this study, the dyads selected provide both diversity and similarities within the sample in numerous ways. The presidents split evenly between parties with two Democrats (Carter and Kennedy) and two Republicans (Reagan and Bush). All four came to the presidency after an election that changed the political party in control of the White House. Three of the four presidents had served as governors prior to the presidency (Carter, GA; Reagan, CA; Bush, TX), and one had served in the U.S. Congress (Kennedy, MA). Geographically, two came from Western states, one from the Northeast, and one from the South. All four had military experience, but none were career officers.² Military service offered each of these presidents limited exposure to intelligence during their time in uniform, but this experience was not sufficient to give them a working knowledge of the organization or products of the U.S. intelligence prior to their presidency.

The four DCIs also reflect a variety of backgrounds. Two were identified as conservative Republicans before serving as DCIs (Casey and McCone), one had been appointed to intelligence related positions by Democratic office holders (Tenet), and one had no formal association with a

² Carter attended the U.S. Naval Academy and then served on battleships and submarines (Smith, p. 246). Reagan served in the U.S. Army where he was assigned to an intelligence unit that made training films for the Army (Reagan, *An American Life*, pp. 97-100). Kennedy served briefly in Naval Intelligence and then as a PT boat commander in the Pacific (Dallek, pp. 83-88). Bush served as a fighter pilot in the Texas and Alabama Air National Guards (Bush, *Decision Points*, pp.16-19).

party (Turner). Notably, two were associated with the opposing political party to the president that appointed them (McCone and Tenet). Three of the four DCIs were part of the initial president/DCI dyad of their president's administration; McCone was the second DCI appointed by President Kennedy after he had initially retained Allen Dulles, the DCI during the Eisenhower Administration. Tenet was the only one of the four DCIs to have served in a previous president/DCI dyad. Two of the DCIs (Casey and Tenet) had notable experience within the intelligence community before serving as DCI. The majority of Casey's experience was with the OSS so he was not a CIA insider, although many accepted him as one.³ Tenet could be considered an insider with the CIA since he previously served as DDCI, but prior to that experience, Tenet's intelligence experience came from serving on the NSA and SSCI staffs. Therefore, none of the DCIs were career intelligence officers, and only Casey had ever managed an intelligence operation before.

Each of these characteristics was brought out in the individual case studies (Chapters four through seven) but when discussed in summary they demonstrate the strength of this sample group. In addition to providing a good representation of the independent variables, the sample dyads possess a balance in political party affiliation and a relative similarity in intelligence experience. In reviewing the results, the importance of the president/DCI dyad is clearly evident.

8.2 Reviewing the Results

The three hypotheses were evaluated at the conclusion of each case study, and a summary of the evaluations can be seen in Table 8.2. Two case studies (Reagan/Casey and

³ Casey had maintained contact with many former OSS associates in the CIA and had served on the PFIAB during the Ford Administration.

Kennedy/McCone) fully support all three hypotheses as they were originally presented in Chapter 2 (See Table 2.2). H2 was not supported by the Bush/Tenet dyad. H3 could only be supported if the DCI engaged in advocating policy options. Since this did not occur to any great extent in the Carter/Turner dyad or the Bush/Tenet dyad these case studies could neither support nor reject H3. These results can be seen in Table 8.1.

8.2.1 H1–The Nature of the President/DCI Relationship

Consistent with H1, a stronger relationship between the president and DCI, was accompanied by greater levels of intelligence success in each of the dyads that were examined. In Carter/Turner the poor relationship left Turner with little ability to access Carter or be involved in the most important foreign policy discussions. As a result, personnel exogenous to the dyad, especially APNSA Brzezinsky, effectively managed the flow of intelligence to the President. Therefore, Turner was unable to improve the relevance of intelligence projects. Relevance of intelligence projects could have been improved if Turner would have possessed greater insight into the needs of policy-makers and if he could have personally argued for the relevance of intelligence that was not considered by the inner circle of policy-makers.

In the Bush/Tenet dyad the nature of the president/DCI relationship was not sufficiently strong that Tenet was willing to raise objections he had with Department of Defense/OSP assessments with the President, whom he saw daily. It has also been suggested that his desire to please the President by delivering intelligence that supported desired foreign policy led to poor intelligence tradecraft. This demonstrates that relationships can be harmonious and still be poor.

Table 8.1 Summary of the Results of Original Hypotheses in Case Studies

	Carter/Turner	Reagan/Casey	Kennedy/ McCone	Bush/Tenet
H1 - The Nature of the President/DCI Relationship	Supports	Supports	Supports	Supports
H2 - The Frequency of President/DCI Interaction	Supports	Supports	Supports	Fails to Support
H3 - The DCI Advocates Particular Policy Options	Fails to Reject	Supports	Supports	Fails to Reject

H1 was fully supported in each dyad and with each type of president/DCI relationship (Professor, Librarian, Coach, and Chaplain).

8.2.2 H2–The Frequency of the President/DCI Interaction

The first three dyads that were researched upheld the hypothesis that more frequent meetings would improve the quality of intelligence. The Bush/Tenet dyad did not support H2. Despite daily interaction between this president and DCI, the most frequent of any of the four dyads researched, the overall level of intelligence success in this dyad was poor. The intelligence was, however, very relevant and frequently used in the promulgation of foreign policy. When comparing all four dyads, an increase in the frequency of interaction was always accompanied by an increase in the relevance and the use of intelligence. The Carter/Turner dyad was a “Librarian” type relationship with less frequent interaction than generally occurred in structured meetings. Therefore, that dyad only achieved acceptable intelligence in the relevance category. The Kennedy/McCone dyad was a “Chaplain” type relationship, which also experiences less frequent interaction. McCone did have better access than Turner for the early part of the dyad, but he was still not part of the inner circle for foreign policy and intelligence. As a result of this moderate level of interaction, the Kennedy/McCone dyad achieved only an acceptable level of success in the “use of intelligence” category. Both the Reagan/Casey (“Coach” type) and the Bush/Tenet (“Professor” type) dyads featured a high frequency of interaction in their dyads and achieved a good level of intelligence success in the areas of relevance and use of intelligence.

As a result, H2 was modified to be more specific about which areas of intelligence success were affected by increased interaction within the dyad. The modified H2 reads as follows: *The frequency of interaction between the DCI and the president will have a positive relationship with*

the relevance of intelligence the president receives and cause intelligence to be better incorporated into the development of policy. This follows logically since the increased interaction with the president that was afforded to Casey and Tenet allowed them to adjust intelligence production to align with the areas of greatest concern for policy makers. Furthermore, since they were present when the primary foreign policy team was having its working discussions, they were able to ensure that intelligence data was considered in the debate. The modified H2 is both more specific about the areas where intelligence success is improved, and is fully supported by all four case studies.

8.2.3 H3–The Effect of Politicization

As originally written, H3 stated *DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives.* Therefore, it only applied to DCIs who actively tried to make policy. Therefore, the Carter/Turner (“Librarian” type) and Bush/Tenet (“Professor” type) dyads were not relevant to H3 since Turner and Tenet rarely advocated a particular foreign policy position like Casey and McCone did.

Research in the Bush/Tenet dyad, however, demonstrated that the danger of politicization was just as great from the president. Because the intelligence community was essentially tasked to prove that Iraq did not possess WMD and that an Iraq-al Qaeda connection did not exist, the intelligence community was given a far more difficult task that contributed to poor assessments and policy mistakes. H3 was, therefore, modified to include the politicization of intelligence by the president as an additional factor that will reduce the overall success of intelligence. The modified H3 now states the following: *DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will*

degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives. Similarly, policy-makers who request intelligence that proves a particular idea to be true (or false) can inadvertently politicize the process and degrade the quality of intelligence. The modified hypotheses are listed in Table 8.3.

8.3 Applying the Hypotheses

Using the classifications of dissertations laid out by Stephen Van Evera, this research has primarily taken an historical explanatory approach to the interaction between the president's decision cycle and the intelligence cycle.⁴ The hypotheses presented, however, can be applied to present and future president/DNI dyads. This section will review the application of each of the three hypotheses and discuss the effects of the change from a president/DCI to a President/DNI dyad.

8.3.1 H1—The Nature of the President/DNI Relationship

The president/DNI relationship must be one of trust. The president must have confidence that the information he receives is the most timely and accurate available and is being delivered in the most policy neutral manner possible. Therefore, if intelligence supports or rejects a certain policy, the president should be more willing to see the value of the information, rather than considering it to be the opinion of another member of his staff. This means that selection of a DNI is a critical choice. While it may not be necessary that the DNI be a long-time counsel to the president, or an advisor, it must be someone with whom the president can work closely. This challenges the common belief that the position of DNI should not be changed at the start of a new presidential administration.

⁴ Van Evera, Stephen. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 89-95.

Table 8.2 Modified Hypotheses

<p>H1: <i>The nature of the personal relationship between the DCI and the president will strongly determine the quality of intelligence reports received by the president.</i></p>
<p>H2: <i>The frequency of interaction between the DCI and the president will have a positive relationship with the relevance of intelligence the president receives and cause intelligence to be better incorporated into the development of policy.</i></p>
<p>H3: <i>DCIs who actively involve themselves in the policy-making process by choosing sides instead of remaining a neutral source of information will degrade the quality of intelligence the president receives. Similarly, policy-makers who request intelligence that proves a particular idea to be true (or false) can inadvertently politicize the process and degrade the quality of intelligence.</i></p>

Changing DCI/DNI with each new president's inauguration is not necessarily the dangerous practice that it is often assumed to be if it means that a positive relationship will exist between the president and his chief of intelligence. Continuity within the position is useless if the chief of intelligence does not have the confidence of the president and cannot gain access to him when necessary. Stansfield Turner, Carter's DCI, for example, would not have had access to Reagan because of Reagan's total rejection of everything the Carter Administration was doing. By appointing Bill Casey, Reagan was confident that the DCI shared his vision for the role of the intelligence community and understood his worldview. This conclusion runs counter to the idea espoused by some that the DNI should serve a fixed term like the FBI Director.

Many of the issues involved in the debate over the selection and tenure of a DNI are similar to the discussion of the military Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs, particularly the CJCS, are the president's senior military advisors and, like the DNI, should serve in an advisory role, not a policy role. General Maxwell Taylor commented that the practice of replacing the Joint Chiefs based upon political partisanship was "repugnant to the professional military, who pride themselves on detachment from party politics at all times."⁵ Taylor, however, wrote that he had "come to understand the importance of an intimate, easy relationship, born of friendship and mutual regard, between the President and the Chiefs."⁶ The same argument applies to the president's chief intelligence advisor. The appointment of a DNI should not be partisan, but to retain a DNI who does not have the full confidence of the president and will serve as part of the inner circle of foreign policy-makers is likely to remove intelligence from the foreign policy

⁵ Taylor, p. 252.

⁶ *Ibid.*

process altogether.

8.3.2 H2—The Frequency of the President/DCI Interaction

The DNI needs to be part of the inner circle of the foreign policy team to ensure a high frequency of interaction with the president. The foreign policy process of different presidential administrations can vary widely; therefore, making the DNI a member of the cabinet may be a requirement for the DNI to have the necessary level and frequency of access. This was the case in the Reagan Administration. Cabinet membership, however, does not mean that the DNI needs to advocate policy. By serving as part of the cabinet but not as a policy-maker, the importance of the role of intelligence in informing policy is emphasized, but the dangers of the perceived politicization of intelligence are reduced.

Additionally, frequency of access to the president is a measure of power in Washington D.C., and the DNI needs a recognized level of authority throughout the loosely confederated membership of the intelligence community. As demonstrated by every DCI who attempted to exercise his role as a community leader, managing the other agencies within the intelligence community necessitates that the DNI have a measure of authority with the other cabinet-level department heads. This kind of authority will never be acknowledged without the expressed support of the president; regular interaction with the president and cabinet status can assist in this process.

Frequency of interaction also increases president's familiarity with the entire intelligence cycle. Familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence process improves the president's ability to provide guidance to the intelligence community, which often results in an improved intelligence product. Richard Betts discusses how intelligence is generally viewed as a

consumer-driven process, but that the time constraints on the senior consumer often limit the amount of time they can give.⁷ DCI Turner attempted to provide weekly “tutorials” to President Carter on intelligence systems and capabilities, but these briefings were gradually curtailed as Carter’s interest waned and the day-to-day responsibilities of the presidency mounted.⁸ DCI Tenet’s access to President Bush for current intelligence briefings remained a daily event throughout the tenure of the dyad. If Tenet had endeavored to illustrate portions of the intelligence cycle through the intelligence he presented in the PDB, it might have better prepared Bush for the challenges of using intelligence. This would have been highly relevant for Bush’s doctrine of preemption. Therefore, a dyad desiring to improve intelligence success should maintain frequent, regular intelligence briefings, and the DNI should make use of available opportunities to stress process as well as results.

8.3.3 H3–The Effect of Politicization

This research has also demonstrated that the perception of politicization can be as dangerous as actual politicization. For example, during the preparation of a U.S. diplomatic response to the Soviet Union’s downing of KAL 007 on 1 September 1983, Secretary of State Shultz refused to accept intelligence updates that indicated the Soviets might have thought they were shooting at a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Shultz considered the idea of mistaken identity to be “not remotely plausible,” and it furthered his suspicions about the CIA.⁹ In situations like this, when intelligence facts seem contrary to a desired policy, the perception of politicization compounds the difficulty of getting policy-makers to accept the available evidence. Robert Gates,

⁷ Betts, pp. 71-72.

⁸ Andrew, pp. 429-430.

⁹ Shultz, p. 364.

who was serving as DDCI at the time of this incident, notes that in the case of KAL 007, the facts “tended to complicate the nice clean case being used to pillory the USSR,” even though the facts alone would have served as sufficient condemnation of Soviet actions.¹⁰ If the perception of politicization can be avoided, then it will be easier for intelligence to be accepted in situations where it runs contrary to popular beliefs or desired policies.

The perception of politicization is also difficult to avoid in situations where the intelligence supports policy. Former Secretary of State and APNSA Henry Kissinger had high praise for Richard Helms (DCI for Presidents Johnson and Nixon). “[Helms] never volunteered policy advice beyond the questions that were asked him, though he never hesitated to warn the White House of dangers even when his views ran counter to the preconceptions of the President or his security adviser.”¹¹ Kissinger also noted, however, “Since decisions turn on the perception of the consequences of actions, the CIA assessment can almost amount to a policy recommendation.”¹² Perceptions of politicization can exist whether intelligence is in agreement with desired policy or runs contrary to it. As Robert Jervis notes, “Intelligence is also easier to keep pure when it is irrelevant.”¹³

Despite the dangers of perceived politicization, intelligence must remain relevant. Richard Betts notes, “To be useful, intelligence analysis must engage the concerns of policymakers who need studies that relate to the objectives they are trying to achieve. Thus, analysis must be sensitive to the policy context, and the range of options available, to be of any use in making

¹⁰ Gates, *From the Shadows*, p. 269.

¹¹ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 37.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Jervis, Robert, "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 1.1 (1986): 28-41, p. 39.

policy.”¹⁴ The Bush/Tenet and Kennedy/McCone dyads had the potential to achieve the greatest levels of intelligence success in this research, and their familiarity with the current policy debates, contributed to their success. Because Casey and McCone were so integral to the policy process, they were aware of the issues that most relevant to policy-makers and they ensured that intelligence addressed those issues. The effectiveness of these dyads, however, was reduced because the DCIs assumed an active role in policy making. Ultimately, it was that active pursuit of a policy-making role that prevented the intelligence success from reaching its potential (scoring “acceptable” instead of “good”). Therefore, this hypothesis prescribes that a DNI will improve his chances of achieving intelligence success if he can remain actively engaged in the policy process by providing accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence, but can eschew advocating policy or the perception of doing so.

8.3.4 Relevance of Hypotheses to Area of Intelligence Success

Examination of the three hypotheses demonstrates that level of relevance of each hypothesis to each area of intelligence success is not uniform. For example, H1, the nature of the President/DCI relationship had a weak relevance to the level of accuracy attained by each dyad. H1 had a medium level of relevance to the actionability of intelligence produced in each dyad. Finally, H1 had a high relevance to the timeliness and relevance of intelligence products, and to the likelihood that the intelligence products would be used in policy development. Table 8.3 provides a provides a break out of how each of the three hypotheses interacts with each of the five areas of intelligence success.

¹⁴ Betts, p. 76.

Table 8.3 Relevance of Hypotheses to Areas of Intelligence Success

	H1 - Nature of Relationship	H2 - Frequency of Interaction	H3 - Politicization
Accuracy			
Timeliness			
Relevance			
Actionable			
Was Intelligence Used			

-  - High level of relevance
-  - Medium level of relevance
-  - Low level of relevance

8.3.5 Creation of the Director of National Intelligence

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The new office was given three principal responsibilities: 1) to serve as the head of the intelligence community; 2) to act as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security; and 3) to oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The DNI was also restricted from simultaneously serving as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This new position does not significantly change the dynamics or importance of the president/DCI (now president/DNI) relationship.

As the president's chief intelligence advisor and head of the intelligence community, all three hypotheses discussed in this research apply to the DNI as they did to the DCI. The DNI requires a good relationship, regular and timely access, and a process that avoids politicization. Further, the DNI still faces many of the problems that the DCIs with in their role as community leader. The DNI is given authority to "participate" in the development of the Department of Defense's Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence And Related Activities (TIARA) budgets, and to "provide guidance" for "each element of the intelligence community that is not within the National Intelligence Program."¹⁵ Without the support of the president, however, neither the Secretary of Defense, nor the other cabinet level equivalents will

¹⁵ Public Law 108-458—DEC. 17, 2004, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

be obliged to adhere to the DNI's guidance. This makes the dyad's relationship just as vital for the DNI as it was for the DCI.

Other aspects of the ODNI's authority make him more vulnerable than the DCI on issues of community management. While the DNI has a sizeable staff, he no longer has an intelligence agency of his own that he can fall back upon as the DCI could do when the remainder of the intelligence community would not participate in projects. Furthermore, the DNI still needs the kind of support from the president that DCI Turner requested from Carter in 1977 in order to unify the efforts of the intelligence community. The bottom line is that the president and DNI will still be able to improve the overall level of intelligence success achieved by establishing and maintaining a good relationship, by maintaining frequent direct interaction, and by preserving the DNI's role as one that informs policy instead of advocating it.

8.4 Future Areas of Research

This research suggests that other relationships inside and outside the intelligence community might be compared in a similar manner. At face value it might be assumed that dyads of a longer duration would be more successful. The logic is, simply stated, that dyads achieving intelligence success will continue working together, but dyads that are not achieving success will be ended by one or both of the members and therefore be shorter. The primary fault in this argument is that it ignores late-term appointments by presidents who are late in their term. The Ford/Bush dyad (357 days) and the Bush/Gates dyad (442 days) were both significantly shorter than the average of 762 days for a dyad, but the reason for their termination was that the president was voted out of office, not that one or both members of the dyad chose to terminate the dyad for lack of success.

Presidents Eisenhower and Carter are the only presidents who appointed only a single DCI or DNI that lasted their entire tenure. All other presidential administrations included at least two dyads; President Clinton appointed three DCIs and President Truman appointed a total of four. Comparing the intelligence success of the initial dyad of an administration to subsequent dyads within the same administration could test a hypothesis that later appointments by a president might be better selections since the president is, by that point, better acquainted with the intelligence process and with his own foreign policy process. This might also show that duration of a dyad is not an indicator of the success of a dyad.

The president/DNI relationship is unusual amongst the president's senior advisors, but it is not unique. There are other relationships that benefit from their supposed non-partisan nature. Within the subfield of national security, two stand out, the relationships that the president has with his CJCS and with his APNSA. There are two statutory advisors to the NSC—the DNI and the CJCS. The CJCS is the president's principal military advisor and is constrained to serve in an apolitical fashion to avoid the politicization of the military. Furthermore, the position is always granted to a senior military officer who would have been imbued with the importance of avoiding a partisan role from the beginning of his military career. The APNSA is a purely political appointment, and decisions regarding the qualifications of the person filling the office and the role the APNSA should assume will vary depending on the administration. The APNSA should be recognized as an honest broker, representing the ideas and positions of all NSC members to the president. The APNSA is often, however, a policy advocate.

Colin Powell has served in both of these positions. Powell was the first CJCS to take

office after the Goldwaters-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and described the importance of the Chairman's role as being able to stand apart from the rest of the Joint Chiefs and "give his own counsel directly to the Secretary [of Defense] and the President."¹⁶ Powell characterized the job of APNSA as that of a "judge, traffic cop, truant officer, arbitrator, fireman, chaplain, psychiatrist, and occasional hit man."¹⁷ More importantly, he describes his policy role in the position: "I would not only be organizing the views of others to present to the President; I was now expected to give him my own national security judgments. I had become a 'principal,' with cabinet-level status, if not rank."¹⁸

The methodology of examining dyads whose relationship holds considerable influence should also be applied to other important relationships that involve the president and a chief advisor. While examining the processes of foreign policy is important, examining the dyad allows for the effects of the character of principal participants to be assessed as well. Additionally, using further modified versions of the hypotheses developed in this research could prove to be beneficial to both this study and to the new areas by allowing for comparisons. H1 would expect improved military policy from the president/CJCS dyad and improved national security policy from the president/APNSA dyad. H2 should still focus on relevance and use. To the CJCS, relevance of military policy is a factor that needs to be incorporated in every military process. The manner the armed services organize, train, and equip their forces should be done in accordance with the intended foreign policies. Proper application of military force is equally

¹⁶ Powell, Colin L., and Joseph E. Persico. *My American Journey*. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 1995, p. 411.

¹⁷ Powell. p. 352.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

dependent on proper advisement of the civilian commander-in-chief by the principal military advisor. Frequent interaction between the president and APNSA should not only increase the relevance of foreign policy, but also reduce the possibility of a repeat of the Iran-Contra affair, where the NSC engaged in independent activity beyond the apparent intent of President Reagan. H3, politicization, should be strictly applied for the CJCS, but for the APNSA it should be limited to ensuring that he is perceived by all principals as an honest broker.

8.5 Conclusion

This dissertation focuses on the offices of the President and his chief intelligence advisor (DCI or DNI) and how their relationship affects the success of the intelligence community in supporting the creation of U.S. foreign policy. The starting point was a study of intelligence in grand strategy. After examining how classical masters of grand strategy, such as Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu, saw the conduct and use of intelligence in the development of strategy, a theory of intelligence was developed that was summarized by five principles of intelligence (see Figure 2.1). These five principles were then used to construct three hypotheses on how the interaction between the president and his DNI/DCI affected the level of intelligence success within the dyad. The president's decision cycle, as depicted by the OODA loop, and the intelligence cycle have a critical point of overlap, and it is that point of interaction that this study has focused.

Next, case studies were presented on four dyads that represented the four different types of president/DCI relationships presented in Figure 3.2. The dyads varied in their type of relationship and the DNI/DCI's degree of policy advocacy. The case studies demonstrated that the hypotheses were supported, with some modification, by each type of dyad. A good relationship between the president and his intelligence chief improves the level of intelligence

success that the dyad experiences. While no animosity existed in the Carter/Turner dyad, Turner did not have the strong relationship with the president necessary to improve intelligence support. Intelligence did succeed in Reagan/Casey dyad, where faith and trust was strong between the two individuals, based upon their campaign experiences. The Bush/Tenet dyad lacked the strength necessary for Tenet to openly communicate disagreement with Pentagon intelligence estimates to the president, which contributed to intelligence failure in the intelligence assessment of an Iraqi WMD program.

The four dyads consistently showed that a higher frequency of meetings facilitated the “Professor” and “Coach” type dyads in their production of intelligence products that were both more relevant and more likely to be considered in development of policy. “Librarian” or “Chaplain” type dyads were at a distinct disadvantage in this area. The Reagan/Casey and Bush/Tenet dyads were able to produce highly relevant intelligence products that were integral to policy development. The Kennedy/McCone dyad succeeded in key areas because McCone continually pushed to increase awareness of intelligence products, and the Carter/Turner dyad evolved to meet with such infrequency that the relationship became dominated by the APNSA and relevance suffered.

Finally, the advocating of policy by the DCI demonstrated negative consequences in the Reagan/Casey and Kennedy/McCone dyads (“Coach” and “Chaplain” types). The Bush/Tenet dyad, however, demonstrated that the same negative consequences can develop when the president specifies his intelligence requirements based upon his policy preferences. The Carter/Turner dyad did not demonstrate an excessive policy role by the DCI.

The contributions to the field of intelligence studies by this dissertation are twofold. First is the development of a methodology for examining the influence of critical dyads such as the

president and the DNI/DCI. Second is the development and testing of three hypotheses that explain how aspects of that dyad affect intelligence success. The dyad methodology can be applied to the interaction of other principal participants in the national security area, and the three hypotheses can be tested across the other twenty-six President/DCI or President/DNI dyads that have occurred. Intelligence was cornerstone in the success of the American Revolution and will remain integral to the foreign policy and national security processes of the United States; therefore, the continued development of the field of intelligence studies is critical.

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Appendix A

Directors of Central Intelligence Ordered by Duration

DCI	DATES	TOTAL DAYS	TOTAL YEARS, MONTHS, & DAYS
Allen W. Dulles	February 26, 1953–November 29, 1961	3199	8 years, 9 months, 4 days
George J. Tenet	July 11, 1997–July 11, 2004	2558	7 years, 1 day
Richard M. Helms	June 30, 1966–February 2, 1973	2410	6 years, 7 months, 4 days
William J. Casey	January 28, 1981–January 29, 1987	2193	6 years, 2 days
William H. Webster	May 26, 1987–August 31, 1991	1559	4 years, 3 months, 6 days
ADM Stansfield Turner, USN	March 9, 1977–January 20, 1981	1414	3 years, 10 months, 12 days
RADM Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, USN	May 1, 1947–October 7, 1950	1256	3 years, 5 months, 7 days
John McCone	November 29, 1961–April 28, 1965	1247	3 years, 5 months
William E. Colby	September 4, 1973–January 30, 1976	879	2 years, 4 months, 27 days
GEN Walter Bedell Smith, USA	October 7, 1950–February 9, 1953	857	2 years, 4 months, 3 days i
R. James Woolsey	February 5, 1993–January 10, 1995	705	1 year, 11 months, 6 days
John M. Deutch	May 10, 1995–December 15, 1996	586	1 year, 7 months, 6 days
Robert M. Gates	November 6, 1991–January 20, 1993	442	1 year, 2 months, 15 days
VADM William Raborn, USN (Ret.)	April 28, 1965–June 30, 1966	429	1 year, 2 months, 3 days
George H. W. Bush	January 30, 1976–January 20, 1977	357	11 months, 22 days i
LTG Hoyt Vandenberg, USA	June 10, 1946–May 1, 1947	326	10 months, 22 days
Porter J. Goss	September 24, 2004–April 21, 2005	210	6 months, 29 days
James R. Schlesinger	February 2, 1973–July 2, 1973	152	5 months, 2 days
RADM Sidney Souers, USN	January 23, 1946–June 10, 1946	139	4 months, 19 days
AVERAGE	N/A	1,101	3 years, 6 days

Appendix B

President/DCI Dyads Ordered by Duration (Current as of 1 Nov 2010)

DCI/President	Total Days
Dulles & Eisenhower	2886
Casey & Reagan	2193
Helms & Nixon	1475
Turner & Carter	1414
Tenet & Clinton	1290
Tenet & Bush	1268
Hillenkoetter & Truman	1256
Webster & Bush	953
Helms & LBJ	936
Smith & Truman	837
McCone & JFK	724
McConnel & Bush	715
Woolsey & Clinton	705
Negroponte & Bush	664
Webster & Reagan	606
Deutch & Clinton	586
Colby & Ford	539
McCone & LBJ	523
Blair & Obama	485
Gates & Bush	442
Raborn & LBJ	429
Bush & Ford	357
Colby & Nixon	340
Vandenberg & Truman	326
Dulles & JFK	313
Goss & Bush	210
Schlesinger & Nixon	152
Souers & Truman	139
Clapper & Obama	85
Smith & Eisenhower	20
Average 762	

Appendix C

John Boyd's Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop




Chart adapted from Chester W. Richards, "A Swift, Elusive Sword: What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd did a National Defense review," Center for Defense Information, February 2003, 22.

Appendix D

National Security Action Memorandum Number 135.

1a 

March 8, 1962

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 135

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: British Guiana

No final decision will be taken on our policy toward British Guiana and the Jagan government until (a) the Secretary of State has a chance to discuss the matter with Lord Home in Geneva, and (b) Hugh Fraser completes his on-the-spot survey in British Guiana for the Colonial Office.

The questions which we must answer before we reach our decision include the following:

1. Can Great Britain be persuaded to delay independence for a year?
2. If Great Britain refuses to delay the date of independence, would a new election before independence be possible? If so, would Jagan win or lose? If he lost, what are the alternatives?
3. What are the possibilities and limitations of United States action in the situation?

(signed) JOHN F. KENNEDY

cc:

The Attorney General
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Bundy (3)
C. Johnson
NSC Files

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 2.3
US ARCHIVIST (AK-52-225)
By MSM, NARS, Date 5/16/83

Appendix E

Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees.

JUN. 17. 2004 2:27PM LEGAL

NO. 499 r. 4

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 7, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees

1. Our recent extensive discussions regarding the status of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees confirm that the application of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva) to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban involves complex legal questions. By its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving "High Contracting Parties," which can only be states. Moreover, it assumes the existence of "regular" armed forces fighting on behalf of states. However, the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states. Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm -- ushered in not by us, but by terrorists -- requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva.
2. Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive of the United States, and relying on the opinion of the Department of Justice dated January 22, 2002, and on the legal opinion rendered by the Attorney General in his letter of February 1, 2002, I hereby determine as follows:
 - a. I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva.
 - b. I accept the legal conclusion of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to

NSC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW [E.O. 12958 as amended]
DECLASSIFIED IN FULL ON 6/17/2004
by R.Soubers

[REDACTED]
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 02/07/12


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exercise that authority at this time. Accordingly, I determine that the provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban. I reserve the right to exercise this authority in this or future conflicts.

- c. I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to "armed conflict not of an international character."
 - d. Based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the recommendation of the Department of Justice, I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. I note that, because Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war.
3. Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment. Our Nation has been and will continue to be a strong supporter of Geneva and its principles. As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.
 4. The United States will hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain control of United States personnel responsible for treating such personnel humanely and consistent with applicable law.
 5. I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the Secretary of Defense to the United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.
 6. I hereby direct the Secretary of State to communicate my determinations in an appropriate manner to our allies, and other countries and international organizations cooperating in the war against terrorism of global reach.



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Appendix F

The CIA Counterterrorism Center

The CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) is highly relevant to this dissertation in both the Reagan/Casey and Bush/Tenet dyads. CTC was established in 1986 at the urging of DCI Casey and with the endorsement of a task force headed by Vice President George H. W. Bush.¹ CTC was originally designated the Counterterrorist Center to specify that the center's mission focused upon the individuals committing acts of terrorism, not on the tactic of terrorism, but this was later changed to Counterterrorism Center and it is by this designation that it is referred to throughout this document.² The CIA currently describes the mission of the CTC as follows:

CIA's war on terror is coordinated and run from the CTC which has both operational and analytic components; the fusion of these two is the key to its success. Terrorist plots and groups are not broken by single reports or sources, and no detainee knows everything about the compartmented activities of a group. All-source analysis is crucial to supporting and driving operations. Waging a global, high-stakes war against al-Qa'ida and other terrorists that threaten the United States remains a fundamental part of CIA's mission. The CTC, working with other US Government agencies and with foreign liaison partners, target terrorist leaders and cells, disrupt their plots, sever their financial and logistical links, and roil their safe havens.³

¹ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 75.

² Magnet, Fred. Interview with Fred Magnet Via Electronic Mail on 5 March 2011. Ed. Lt Col Jim Borders, USAF, 2011.

³ Central Intelligence Agency. "Centers in the CIA." *Central Intelligence Agency*. 9/10/2009 2009. Web. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a->

In a response to criticism concerning the CIA's level of attention to terrorism issues prior to the 9/11 attacks, CIA Spokesman Bill Harlow made an official statement in 2002 noting that the manning at the CTC doubled under DCI Tenet in the time period immediately preceding the 9/11 attacks despite reductions in the intelligence budget throughout the 1990s.⁴ The CTC was a CIA center that integrated FBI personnel. In 2003 the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was created and made responsible for fusing terrorism analysis among analysts from across the intelligence community.⁵ The 9/11 Commission later recommended the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). NCTC is built upon the foundation of TTIC and reports to the DNI.⁶ The CTC and NCTC remain in service today.

[nation/cia-director-and-principles/centers-in-the-cia.html](http://www.cia.gov/nation/cia-director-and-principles/centers-in-the-cia.html)>.

⁴ Harlow, Bill. "Statement by CIA Spokesman Bill Harlow: 2008September 19, 2002." *Central Intelligence Agency*. 6/17/2008 2008.Web. <<https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2002/pr09192002.html>>.

⁵ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 401.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 403.