

THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH AND WASHINGTON POLITICS

by

CATHERINE A. BECK

(Under the Direction of Loch K. Johnson)

ABSTRACT

At times, the Intelligence Community struggles with a reputation for inaccuracy. In two critical moments in American history, the Intelligence Community as a whole failed to predict the United States' defeat in Vietnam, and recently, wrongly supported a war in Iraq based on inaccurate intelligence. What is rarely acknowledged is that the State Department's intelligence "branch," the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), has been a dissenting voice in both cases. How, then, was INR accurate in its predictions when other members of the Intelligence Community were not? Why was the Intelligence Community not convinced by INR's reports? INR's courage in asserting unpopular views in these two cases is impressive; however, the fact that the most accurate of the intelligence agencies is the most ignored reveals that when bureaucratic politics and the Intelligence Community mix, it can be hazardous to American foreign policy, and can have serious future consequences.

INDEX WORDS: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Community, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Iraq, Vietnam War, Bureaucratic Politics

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH AND WASHINGTON POLITICS

by

CATHERINE A. BECK

B.A., Wake Forest University, 2003

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2005

© 2005

Catherine A. Beck

All Rights Reserved

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH AND WASHINGTON POLITICS

by

CATHERINE A. BECK

Major Professor: Loch K. Johnson
Committee: Jeffrey Berejikian
Howard J. Wiarda

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2005

I dedicate this thesis to my family who has provided me with the stability, enthusiasm, and inspiration needed to succeed in my academic endeavors. Without their kindness, unyielding support, as well as humor, I would not be where I am today.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my deepest and most sincere gratitude to Dr. Loch K. Johnson, Dr. Jeffrey Berejikian, and Dr. Howard J. Wiarda for their tremendous assistance, critical feedback, and enormous patience during this phase of my career.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	x
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION	1
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)	5
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	9
3 THE VIETNAM WAR	
Introduction	14
Background of INR Report	16
“A Review of Judgments in INR Reports”	18
“Statistics on the War Efforts in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends”	25
Conclusion.....	27
4 IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION	
Introduction	29
Introduction to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report	32
Summary of October 2002 NIE.....	34
Summary of the SSCI Report.....	39

Conclusion.....	48
5 BUREAUCRATIC MODEL APPLIED.....	53
History of the State Department.....	56
Structure of the State Department	57
State Department Subculture.....	61
Competition for Intelligence in Washington	64
6 CONCLUSION.....	69
REFERENCES	75
APPENDICES	80
A Summary of Iraq Survey Group’s Duelfer Report.....	80
B INR’s Footnote to October 2002 NIE: State/INR Alternative View of Iraq’s Nuclear Program	81
C INR’s Footnote to October 2002 NIE: INR’s Alternative View of Iraq’s Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes	83
D INR’s Suggestions for Colin Powell’s Speech Before the UN	84

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 5.1: Growth Discretionary Budget Authority	68

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 5.1: Department of State Organization.....	59

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BW- Biological Weapons

CBW- Chemical and Biological Weapons

CIA- Central Intelligence Agency

CW- Chemical Warfare

DCI- Director of Central Intelligence

DIA- Defense Intelligence Agency

DNI- Director of National Intelligence

DOD- Department of Defense

DOE- Department of Energy

FBI- Federal Bureau of Investigations

FSO- Foreign Service Officer

IAEA- International Atomic Energy Agency

IC- Intelligence Community

IN- Intelligence Notes

INR- Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INVO- Iraq Nuclear Verification Office

ISG- Iraq Survey Group

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NESA- Near East South Asia

NIC- National Intelligence Council

NIE- National Intelligence Estimate

NIO- National Intelligence Officer

NP- Nonproliferation

NSC- National Security Council

OSS- Office of Strategic Studies

PDB- President's Daily Brief

RS- Research Studies

SOCM- Sense of the Community Memorandum

SOP- Standard Operating Procedure

SSCI- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

UAV- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN- United Nations

UNMOVIC- United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission

UNSC- United Nations Security Council

USIB- United States Intelligence Board

WINPAC- CIA's Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control

WMD- Weapons of Mass Destruction

XRS- External Research Studies

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote of 15 to 0. It called for Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq to declare and disarm all weapons of mass destruction and threatened "serious consequences" if the regime would not comply.¹ Saddam agreed to accept the resolution, and on November 27, U.N. Weapons inspectors arrived in Baghdad and began monitoring sites suspected of housing prohibited weapons.

On December 7, Iraq submitted a written declaration of its weapons programs to the United Nations. Although the document stated that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, Hans Blix said that his team of inspectors needed more time to substantiate the claim. President George W. Bush expressed immense doubt that Saddam Hussein would comply with Blix regardless of the timeframe, and on January 14, 2003, Bush declared that "time [was] running out."² The United States continued to make further calls for Saddam to disarm, yet France and Russia were in agreement that Blix did, in fact, need a longer inspection timetable.

As it stood in January 2003, Hans Blix had not found a "smoking gun" of illegal chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Iraq despite the United States laying out the case against Saddam. On January 28, however, President Bush further defined the case against Saddam in his State of the Union address, citing intelligence that alleged that he had weapons of

¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1441

² Woodward 2002, 354

mass destruction and connections to al Qaeda terrorists.³ Less than a week later on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the United Nations with new allegations of Iraq's secret weapons programs based on U.S. intelligence. Though Powell's audiovisual report also lacked a "smoking gun," the speech seemed to strengthen American support for the impending war.

Shortly thereafter, President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair urged the United Nations to support a second U.N. Security Council resolution which clearly authorized military action against Iraq. This authorization was based on U.S. and British intelligence outlining Iraq's undisclosed weapons of mass destruction. Because these intelligence reports conflicted with reports coming from Blix and U.N. weapons inspectors, as well as from Iraq, France and Russia announced that they would veto any second resolution authorizing war, thereby assuring the resolution's defeat. Knowing that public support would back him when the United Nations would not, President Bush went on national television on March 17 to issue a 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam to leave Iraq. Bush further spelled out Iraq's alleged weapons violations and terrorist connections and warned that war was imminent. Two days later at 10:15 pm, Bush delivered another television address to announce that the war had begun.⁴

We now know that the United States went to war with Iraq under the pretense that Iraq was lying about its weapons of mass destruction programs. How did the United States *know* that Iraq was lying? Because the United States' Intelligence Community had "proof" that it was. However, on January 12, 2005, the United States formally ended the Iraq Survey Group's efforts to uncover hidden weapons systems after a fruitless endeavor of more than a year. What changed between 2003 and 2005? Citing misinformed intelligence, the United States now

³ State of the Union address 2003

⁴ President Bush address to the nation, March 19, 2003

hesitatingly admits that they were misled into believing Saddam was hiding weapons of mass destruction, but that “the invasion that toppled [Saddam’s] regime was justified on other grounds anyway.”⁵ However, this was not the only instance that mistaken intelligence assumptions have had unfortunate consequences for American foreign policy.

In early 1961, President John F. Kennedy took office certain that America’s survival depended on its willingness to defend free institutions. Promising the nation vigorous leadership, Kennedy guaranteed the country that his administration would meet the new crises of the new era. He assembled together a group of young, energetic advisers from academia and the private sector who shared his determination to “get the country moving again.”⁶ These so-called “New Frontiersmen” accepted, without question, the basic premises of containment policy. Kennedy was expected to assertively beat communism first, versus waiting to take a more defensive approach, with domestic pressure and considerations having a strong and very persuasive effect on his foreign policy.

President Kennedy, from the outset of his administration, put pressure on his administration to see South Vietnam as a “test case of America’s determination to uphold its commitments in a menacing world and... to meet the new challenges posed by guerrilla warfare in the emerging nations.”⁷ Kennedy, while wary of a full-scale involvement in Vietnam, also knew the domestic and international consequences of a negotiated settlement. His policies of expanding the American role while trying to keep it limited were supported in the short run, yet they set the tone for thereon, which evolved into a dangerous, and ultimately fatal, mindset.

This mindset, transferring to the Johnson administration after President Kennedy’s death, was captured in one of President Johnson’s many infamous quotes stating that he was “not going

⁵ CNN online news article, January 12, 2005.

⁶ Herring 1996, 82

⁷ Ibid 83

to be the first American president to lose a war.”⁸ Therefore it seems quite logical that both his advisers, as well as the Intelligence Community, would enter a certain inescapable vacuum that would force them to support the United States’ effort at any cost.

During the early 1960s, certain members of the Intelligence Community, specifically the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, were at odds with the executive branch’s foreign policy that maintained the view that with increased pressure, Hanoi and the Viet Cong would comply with U.S. demands. Specifically, with events such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and decisions such as Rolling Thunder were set forth by the administration in hopes of achieving a great victory that might save the world from communism. Decisions such as these represented “the culmination of a year and a half of agonizing over America’s Vietnam policy and stemmed from the administration’s refusal to accept the consequences of withdrawal.”⁹

Because of this preconceived partiality, American policy in Vietnam remained relatively unchanged throughout the war, and ultimately failed. In this scenario, if the Intelligence Community was convinced that policies in Vietnam were failing, why could they not muster the clout to convince the administration that other options were more feasible and could thereby produce more fruitful results? While the Intelligence Community might have been a more united front against Vietnam policies in the early 1960s, they were very far from that same consensus in the scenario dealing with Iraq and WMD’s. What very few people realize is that in both of these cases, there was one agency in the Intelligence Community that consistently disagreed with the assumptions the executive branch was making when it came to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the course of the Vietnam War. In evidence that is now surfacing through a recently-declassified study about the Vietnam War, as well as a major Senate Select Committee on

⁸ Herring 1996, 133

⁹ Ibid 155

Intelligence investigation in 2004 dealing with WMD's in Iraq, we now know that the State Department's intelligence "branch," the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), has in at least these two cases, been the most accurate yet the most ignored. In describing these two aforementioned cases in great detail, this research will explain why INR was ignored, the implication this carries for foreign policy, and possible solutions for the future.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)

The State Department's intelligence division, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), was created in the aftermath of WWII when the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was abolished and the Research and Analysis unit went to the State Department where it became the foundation for analytic intelligence capabilities that American diplomats have relied upon ever since. Soon thereafter, the CIA replicated the capabilities of Research and Analysis, but INR's identity in the intelligence community has continued to be unique and long-lasting.¹⁰

The Bureau has two primary responsibilities: The first responsibility of INR is to provide raw and finished intelligence to the Department of State and to participate in certain community-wide intelligence production efforts. Raw intelligence is defined as any kind of "unevaluated information, no matter how it is collected or reported."¹¹ Examples include press reports, foreign radio broadcasts, foreign publications, and reports from U.S. Foreign Service officers and military attaches. Finished intelligence results from the total "intelligence process" and takes the form of a report to policy and operational officers. The second responsibility of INR is to serve as coordinator within the State Department, for U.S. government intelligence activities abroad

¹⁰ Prados 2004, 4

¹¹ Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1973, 4

which have “operational significance” for the Department.¹² INR is in liaison with the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and other members of the intelligence community. It represents the Department of State on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and works with all the USIB committees on programs and priorities in the fields of collection and analysis.¹³ Specifically, a large portion of the Bureau’s responsibilities deal with intelligence briefings and reports. The main purpose of oral briefings is that they “lend perspective to reports of up-to-the-minute information by assessing such developments against INR’s reservoir of background knowledge.”¹⁴ Ideally, INR’s briefings should include a symbiotic exchange from which members of the Bureau “gain indispensable knowledge of problems that guide INR’s written research agenda.”¹⁵

INR also issues several kinds of reports that are distributed fairly widely. Each day senior officers type up a one page Intelligence Brief known as the “INR Briefing Note” for the Secretary. Other longer, more analytical reports include Intelligence Notes (IN’s), Research Studies (RS’s), and External Research Studies (XRS’s). Intelligence Notes usually include a brief assessment of an event in a developing situation which has special implications for United States’ foreign policy.¹⁶ Seldom do these run more than four pages long. Research Studies are a more in-depth report designed to give Department officers background information on policy-related subjects. It is in these reports that an INR analyst could examine the social and political factors shaping the outcome of an election, or any other general political, economic, or military developments.¹⁷ Finally, the external research program can commission studies made available

¹² Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1973, 2

¹³ Ibid 3

¹⁴ Ibid 6

¹⁵ Ibid 6

¹⁶ Ibid 7

¹⁷ Ibid 7-8

to officials who would like a more scholarly background to a particular issue. These can include external research studies, declassified contract and consultant papers, and reports from academic and research institutions.¹⁸

Despite its storied history, INR has consistently reigned among the smallest, yet most reputable organizations in the U.S. intelligence community, with no more than about 350 people at any given time, including support staff.¹⁹ In spite of its size, INR can make up for its disadvantages with certain advantages. One major advantage is that INR has a low turnover rate of analysts. Loch Johnson, professor and intelligence expert, quotes an “envious” CIA official, stating that “INR is headed by a man of twenty years experience...We have no such corporate memory at CIA.”²⁰ The second advantage is its physical location. Located in the “rambling State Department complex known as Foggy Bottom,” the Bureau is close to the two of the most important players in the policymaking process: the White House and the Secretary of State.²¹ Another specific advantage that INR enjoys is an “awareness of the U.S. policy ingredients in the given estimative question at hand.”²² Because of INR’s low turnover rate, as well as its locale, the Bureau’s policy awareness has resulted in its current intelligence reports being among the most highly regarded in government.²³

For this very reason, circulation of INR memoranda is quite impressive. According to former INR Director Thomas Hughes, INR products are widely distributed in official circles in the United States as well as overseas, and any of the aforementioned INR research is readily available to any government official cleared to read them. Perhaps the most important aspect of

¹⁸ Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1973, 9-10

¹⁹ Prados 2004, 6

²⁰ Johnson 1989, 51

²¹ Ibid 51

²² Ford 1998, 168

²³ Johnson 1989, 51

these reports that differentiated these memos and reports from those of the CIA, for example, was that “those responsible for writing and issuing them were not anonymous, but identifiable and accountable.”²⁴

²⁴ Hughes 2004, 4

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Since the topic of accurate versus inaccurate intelligence is of a sensitive nature, there is a predictable void in the literature about the interaction between the Intelligence Community, INR, and other agencies in Washington. What is not predictable, however, is that there is still very little research on how the United States' government, when they have access to good information, can continue to make bad decisions. Assuming that we dismiss one-dimensional explanations such as government actors setting out purposefully to make bad decisions, the most natural place to examine the literature for an answer to this research question is found in literature dealing with government institutions, specifically the inner-workings of the United States' bureaucracy.

When one refers to “bureaucratic politics” in Washington DC, one is referring to the different interests and points of view that each of the government agencies, especially those that carry out foreign policy initiatives, disagree on.²⁵ Each of these agencies has a different culture, set of norms, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) that can obstruct coordination.²⁶ Therefore the most common definition of the “bureaucratic model” contains this concept of different perspectives and competition between the different government agencies over foreign policy issues. Some debate the root of bureaucratic competition, which is said to come from overlapping jurisdictions on policy matters, but by and large, the literature on the matter has been

²⁵ These agencies include the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Departments of Treasury and Justice, and the CIA

²⁶ Wiarda 1996, 8

quite synthesized over the years.²⁷ Simply put, the research has described the political nature in Washington to be one of bargaining and negotiating, especially as it relates to foreign policy. Noted scholars that have all contributed to the literature in this regard include Samuel Huntington, Warner Schilling, Roger Hilsman, Richard Neustadt, Jerel Rosati, and Graham Allison.

In 1960, Richard Neustadt published his oft-cited book, *Presidential Power*. Neustadt, in describing “presidential power [as] the power to persuade,” laid the foundation for the understanding of how the bureaucratic model functions.²⁸ According to Neustadt, one of the sources of presidential power comes from bargaining power. Since many different political actors have direct influence on foreign policy decisions, power has to be shared in Washington, and as a result, bargaining is the byproduct. *Presidential Power* was one of the earliest works to describe the government process as one that includes innate bargaining with an emphasis on presidential choice.

Another noted scholar that has laid the foundation for the bureaucratic politics model is Jerel Rosati. Rosati builds on the works of Graham Allison’s *Essence of Decision*, Allison and Morton Halperin’s “Bureaucratic Politics,” and Halperin’s *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* to develop four of his own propositions that “express the essential ingredients of the bureaucratic politics model.”²⁹ His first proposition or assumption is that the executive branch is composed of numerous individuals and organizations, all with different goals and objectives. The second proposition is that while no predominant individual or organization exists, if the President is involved, his influence may be the most powerful. The third proposition is that final decision, referred to as a “political resultant,” is the outcome of political bargaining and

²⁷ Wiarda 1996, 19

²⁸ Neustadt 1960, 10

²⁹ Rosati 1981, 236

compromise among participants. Finally, the last proposition states that once a decision has been made, there can still be a gap between actual decision-making process and the implementation of the decision.³⁰ Each of these assumptions about the bureaucratic politics model, while perhaps self-evident at first glance, has provided a large amount of substantial content to research in this area.

While the literature on bureaucratic politics has been developing in recent years, it was Graham Allison's book, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1971) that has become the benchmark in describing foreign policy decision-making specifically through a bureaucratic political lens. Allison's biggest influence on the discipline has been to define intentions as a "conglomerate of large organizations and political actors," instead of intentions resulting from one person. Resting on this assumption are Allison's three models that explain foreign policy decision-making: Model I: The Rational Actor; Model II: The Organizational Process; and Model III: Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics. In each of these models, the point of explanation is to clarify how the nation or government acts as it does, given the strategic problems it faces.³¹

Since the bureaucratic politics model focuses on the "politics" of a government, events in this model are neither choices nor outputs, and what happens is characterized as a result of various "bargaining games" among major players in government. This model does not simply focus on one decision-maker; instead the model centers on many actors who are well-versed in the "pulling and hauling that is politics."³² Those who are political leaders at the top of their organization are joined by peers who also come with some independent standing, therefore in Washington, the people who lead organizations are forced to share power. In an environment

³⁰ Rosati 1981, 236-238

³¹ Allison 1971, 3-5

³² Ibid 144

such as this, these leaders are bound to disagree. As a result, human nature dictates that government decisions and actions, at least in part, result from the political process.

While the issue in this scenario is framed by the decisions resulting from bargaining with certain governmental actors, then the unit of analysis is the “political resultant.” To apply this model, the perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of the actors must be analyzed. According to Allison, “a [bureaucratic model] analyst has explained an event when he or she has discovered who did what to whom and that yielded the action in question.”³³ To answer this question, a researcher cannot ignore how political players chose what issues to care about. The problem, however, is that most issues- the course of the war in Vietnam or the existence of WMD’s in Iraq- emerge piecemeal overtime. Scores of issues compete for a political player’s attention every day. Each player has to make a conscious decision as to what issue gets the most attention at that very moment, then he or she must move onto the next. Simply observing the choices and issues facing a decision-maker day-to-day is not enough though; the real essence of decision lies with games and its players, the coalitions that are built, and the bargains and compromises that are reached over time.³⁴

The concept that national security policy is the result of bureaucratic politics contradicts what we intuitively assume (and hope) is going on in Washington. Sensitive issues are supposed to be above politics, yet internal bureaucratic politics is a very real occurrence. Prior to 1971, with the exception of Allison, most the literature ignored bureaucratic politics especially as it related to foreign policy decision-making, and the topic has been addressed in different forms since then. Undeniably, academics have since proven that government leaders have competitive, not homogeneous, interests. Furthermore, priorities and perceptions are shaped strategically, and

³³ Allison 1971, 6-7

³⁴ Ibid 146.

problems are much more varied than the seemingly-straightforward issues suggest. The bureaucratic model has evolved since Allison's time, yet there are still gaps in the literature as it pertains to decision-making in the intelligence community.

The importance of bureaucratic politics in regards to foreign policy decision-making, specifically intelligence, is essential, yet it can be a very nebulous issue to grasp. The intelligence agencies are powerful and they have their own ways of doing things, sometimes outside of the control of the individual players. They are permanent fixtures that will be there long after these players leave and the different bureaucratic approaches will most likely continue to thrive as long as the institutions exist.³⁵ That being said, the importance and relevance of this particular topic, as well as these particular case studies, is indeed self-evident. After all, good decisions require good information, so if we can understand how bureaucratic politics in Washington works, then we can perhaps explain how our government arrives at poor decisions despite good evidence being presented to the contrary.

In the following two sections, I lay out INR's analysis of both the Vietnam War and the government's search for WMD's in Iraq, as well as how and why they were ignored in both situations. Following the case studies, I answer the larger question of why INR is ignored time and time again, even though their intelligence is often most sound.

³⁵ Wiarda 1996 8

CHAPTER 3

THE VIETNAM WAR

Introduction

In 1960, President-elect John F. Kennedy selected Robert McNamara, the new president of Ford Motor Company, to head the Defense Department for his administration. While McNamara didn't initially feel qualified for the job, by early 1962, he emerged as the dominant policy strategist for Vietnam within the Kennedy administration. Coming on the heels of the Bay of Pigs debacle, McNamara was prepared not to let similar mistakes happen again in Vietnam, for both Kennedy's sake as well as his own. Rather than play the "me too" role like he had during the Bay of Pigs, McNamara was determined not to let others do the thinking for him. He was convinced that a noncommunist government in South Vietnam was vital to US economic, political, and military interests, and he believed that the entire peninsula would be at risk if South Vietnam fell to the communists. McNamara also believed that the US had to confront the tests faced in Vietnam in order to deter the power of the Soviet Union's premier, Nikita Khrushchev, who was determined to challenge the US at vital points throughout the world. It was with this steadfast mentality that the war in Vietnam eventually became known as "McNamara's war," a phrase McNamara claimed he did not mind.³⁶

Throughout the mid-1960s, McNamara was optimistic about the progress made in defeating the communists in North Vietnam, and urged Kennedy, and then his successor President Johnson, to pursue aggressive policies against infiltrators coming to the south. In 1965, McNamara supported Johnson strategy of gradually increasing US military pressure on

³⁶ Trehwitt 1971, 197

North Vietnam, on the assumption that the North would eventually succumb to the demands of the US and accept a reasonable settlement.³⁷

Eventually, McNamara realized that his calculations of Northern resiliency were underestimated, and the analysis of the determination, tenacity, and resourcefulness of the Vietnamese was misguided. As McNamara eventually came to accept that the war was unwinnable- a very unpopular move in an administration where escalation was still an option- McNamara proposed policies that called for eventual US withdrawal. McNamara's shift was perceived as out of step with the administration, and President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff increasingly isolated him.³⁸

When Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara resigned in February 1968 to take over a post at the World Bank, he left behind at the Defense Department three dozen analysts who were writing a secret history of America's involvement in Vietnam. The massive study ended up being over 7,000 pages long, and while not completed when McNamara resigned, it was finished in early 1969 and eventually leaked to the *New York Times* in 1971. It was while McNamara was concluding that the administration's policies had failed in the fall of 1966 that he first considered commissioning the study eventually known as the Pentagon Papers. McNamara was intrigued by a study that explained why the US was engaged in an Indochina war, and he personally looked to the study to help explain why the administration's policies had failed. Now famous (or infamous), the Pentagon Papers have afforded researchers, scholars, students, and everyday citizens a behind-the-scenes look into a war so tragic and controversial.

³⁷ Karnow 1984, 395-426

³⁸ Ibid 507-514

At the same time that the Pentagon Papers were commissioned, a study dealing particularly with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research was commissioned in 1968 by Thomas Hughes and titled "A Review of Judgments in INR Reports." Also completed in early 1969, portions of the INR report are just now in 2005 being declassified. While the Pentagon Papers dealt a major blow to Kennedy and Johnson's policies in Vietnam, they only tell part of the story. Another part of the story is found in "A Review of Judgments in INR Reports." This particular study summarizes State Department views on various intelligence subjects through the 1960s, as well as provides an analysis of INR intelligence, but instead of simply shedding light on policies that were ill-informed, this study reveals the inner-workings of an intelligence agency largely ignored despite its accurate assumptions about the course of the Vietnam War.

Background of INR Report

Roger Hilsman, director of INR under President Kennedy, used his experience in senior roles at the Legislative Reference Service (the predecessor of the Congressional Research service) to make INR relevant to policymakers during the 1960s. He commenced a series of changes that greatly altered its profile, both at the State Department and within the U.S. government. Because of his great success in revitalizing INR, Hilsman became one of the people Kennedy relied upon, especially on intelligence matters. When Thomas Hughes joined INR as Deputy Director to Roger Hilsman in 1961, both worked hard at making sure the Bureau was dedicated to policy-relevant research. After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Hughes noted that President Kennedy wanted the in-depth analysis that was missing prior to the disaster, and

he would test INR repeatedly on how close to policy intelligence they could get without becoming overt policy advisors.³⁹

Strictly speaking, the intelligence community is supposed to be separate from policymaking. In a perfect world, policymakers would not intrude on the independence of intelligence analysts. According to Hughes though, “these somewhat artificial fences were maintained in the 1960s, but there were several conspicuous exceptions.”⁴⁰ The biggest exception Hughes cites is that of the “so-called policy role” of the Director of Central Intelligence. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, DCI John McCone often gave policy advice to the President and enjoyed “official” visits to foreign capitals to discuss policy matters with foreign heads of state. McCone also did not hesitate to push his personal policy advice onto his intelligence estimators, and he was quick to differentiate his own personal estimates when they disagreed with his CIA analysts. Hughes believes that “the confusion of [McCone’s] roles that resulted was a disservice to both intelligence and policy-making.”⁴¹

Under Roger Hilsman, though, INR was in a similar situation. According to Thomas Hughes, Hilsman, a personal friend and adviser to Kennedy on Vietnam, was a “policy champion” of the strategic hamlet program and counter-insurgency initiatives, as well as a frequent participant in White House policy meetings on Vietnam. In this dual role, Hughes states, he was “simultaneously both intelligence interpreter and policy advocate.”⁴² The Bureau, being the small organization that it is, benefited somewhat from its Director and his high profile activities, but nonetheless, “it violated the essential tenets that separated intelligence from

³⁹ Hughes 2004, 14

⁴⁰ Ibid 15

⁴¹ Ibid 15

⁴² Ibid 15

policy.”⁴³ In March 1963 when Hilsman was appointed Assistant Secretary for East Asia, INR returned permanently to its singular role as appraisers of intelligence. Now led by Hughes, one of the “few genuine intellectuals of the era,”⁴⁴ INR transferred back to its role as unbiased intelligence collector and analyst, and as a result, the Bureau started differentiating themselves from the rest of the intelligence community when it came to truly grasping what was going on in the war in Vietnam.

“A Review of Judgments in INR Reports”

As Director of INR, Thomas Hughes commissioned the 1968-9 study as an in-house classified review and evaluation of INR’s major published research and analysis on Vietnam during President Kennedy and Johnson’s administrations. The study was completed in the spring of 1969 and was first disclosed by *Time* two months after the Pentagon Papers were disclosed. In its August 9, 1971 issue, *Time* summarized the purpose of the study:

Composed by two State Department Asia analysts, the study compared the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations’ key Vietnam decisions with the bureau’s own major judgments during the same period. In almost every case, the intelligence reports called the shots perfectly about such matters as the ineffectiveness of the bombing campaign, Vietnamese political upheavals and North Vietnamese troop buildups. Daniel Ellsberg is said to have read the study as a consultant for Henry Kissinger in 1969 and

⁴³ Hughes 2004, 15

⁴⁴ Halberstam 1992, 19

reacted: ‘My God, this astonishing. I thought the CIA stuff was great, but these papers are even more accurate.’⁴⁵

While portions were leaked to the press in the 1970s, according to the National Security Archive, “bureaucratic inertia” kept the bulk of this study hidden until November 2003, when Clemson University professor Edwin E. Moise forced the release of the study in its entirety, using the Freedom of Information Act.

A summary of study, including the Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s views on communist intentions, political stability, the course of the war, and negotiable settlements during the Vietnam War, are cited below.

Communist Intentions

North:

From 1961 to the Tonkin Gulf crisis in August 1964, INR maintained that Hanoi’s policy-makers were determined to step up the political-military insurgency in the South...INR at no time believed that the threat or event of US action against the North would be effective in forcing Hanoi to cease its support of the insurgency or to call off the Viet Cong...When asked to estimate Hanoi’s reactions to possible courses of U.S. escalation during debates of the fall and winter which preceded the decision in February 1965 to begin bombing, INR increasingly departed from the rest of the Intelligence Community in foreseeing no chance that the DRV would actually comply with US demands or even feign to do so. Instead, INR predicted that North Vietnamese would react aggressively and might dispatch regular units into force...

⁴⁵ *TIME Magazine* August 9, 1971, p. 16

Communist China:

INR felt that Peking would be motivated by the political considerations of backing Hanoi and warning the US than by hopes of having any appreciable military impact. The rest of the Intelligence Community did consider Chinese intervention to be distinctly possible and a prospect which could not be ignored in a US decision to bomb the North; INR, however, generally took a view that was even more concerned, estimating that the threshold at which the Chinese would possibly react was lower than the rest of the community thought likely. Similarly, INR believed that the Chinese were more likely to introduce ground forces into North Vietnam as a warning against invasion and as a replacement for North Vietnamese forces going South...A greatly intensified US bombing program would, in INR's view, increase the chances that the conflict would gradually slip into a confrontation between the US and China.⁴⁶

Political Stability

Diem's Regime:

In general assessments undertaken during the first part of 1961, INR considered that Diem's earlier popularity had faded and that the veneer of unity resulting from Diem's actions against dissident power structures in the mid-1950s had worn thin. Disaffection was increasing among groups in South Vietnam, and INR observed that the tensions were heightened by the rising Communist insurgency, while at the same time, in a vicious

⁴⁶ Declassified Top Secret Study- "Thematic Summaries: I- Communist Intentions and Response to US Actions"

circle, they added to the difficulties of taking effective action against the Viet Cong...Diem probably would not willingly undertake what the US considered to be reform necessary to wage the war successfully, for fear that these moves might weaken his own power position...In the course of debating a much contested Estimate in February 1963, INR attacked the implication that it would be impossible to “win without Diem”...After the Buddhist crisis broke in May 1963, INR estimated that this upheaval offered Diem a threat greater than that of the Communist insurgency; if handled ineptly and arbitrarily it was likely to erode the war effort and lead to Diem’s downfall at the hands of the military...⁴⁷

Course of war

Vietcong:

In assessing the South Vietnamese security situation for the new administration in the spring of 1961, INR judged the Viet Cong could supplant the government’s authority over a substantial part of southern South Vietnam, even if the Communists were not strong enough to overthrow the central government. INR felt that the deterioration had occurred not only because the Communists were pressing harder, but also because the GVN was making an inept and misdirected response...Later in 1961, the Intelligence Community generally agreed that areas of VC control could be reduced over the course of time if US aid continued at a high level and the GVN made a strenuous, well-focused and properly

⁴⁷ Declassified Top Secret Study- “Thematic Summaries: II- Political Stability”

implemented effort. In its own independent writing, INR tended to make a more pessimistic estimate of the regime's willingness to make the type of effort required and of its ability to reverse the deteriorating security situation

Negotiable settlements

Prospects for Settlement with Hanoi

In the fall of 1964, INR still believed that Hanoi might make moves toward negotiating while escalation was being debated, but thought that Hanoi would not do so to halt a sustained bombing program- largely because of its concern to avoid appearing weak and compliant with American demands...First, the North Vietnamese eventually would negotiate but, being confident that their position in the South would grow stronger over the long run, they were in no hurry to undertake talks, let alone quickly seek a compromise agreement. Bombing or no bombing, they were certainly under no pressure such as to force them off their steadfast determination to avoid the appearance of yielding to coercion... INR also believed that North Vietnam was deeply suspicious of US and distrustful of US actions.⁴⁸

Summary of Report

As the INR study plainly details, the State Department intelligence Bureau retained a clear conception of the major issues in facing the United States in Vietnam. On the military side,

⁴⁸ Declassified Top Secret Study- "Thematic Summaries: IV- Prospects for Beginning Talks and Negotiating a Settlement"

INR described National Liberation Front/VC capabilities, and similarly on the political side, the Bureau conceptualized the degree to which the Saigon government could garner support from the local villagers. The Bureau also claimed that President Ngo Dinh Diem was the least desirable of all possible candidates in the South because he neutralized potential U.S. leverage by arguing his indispensability to the South Vietnamese government. In addition, INR also suggested that the U.S. problems in the South were partially the result of Washington's own aid programs, and that the NLF's strength was being supplied by villagers in the South rather than infiltrators in the North.

This last point was especially controversial because the United States military had always insisted that the main source of trouble in the South hinged on infiltrators traveling through the country on the Ho Chi Minh trail. As INR director, Roger Hilsman had repeated problems with the military reporting from South Vietnam. He felt that the US military was claiming progress when there was none, and he suspected them of using claims of infiltration from the North to justify continued resistance of the Vietcong.

The INR study also shows that the Bureau was quite diligent in outlining what actions would cause certain reactions from the North. The study proves that INR argued from as early as 1963 that Hanoi had decided to stand stalwartly by the NLF and no amount of United States' action was likely to deter it. This ran contrary to CIA and military SNIEs which contended that the application of force would induce Hanoi to make concessions or negotiate a settlement to the war.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ INR was wrong, however, in assuming that the DRV and the NLF was one single actor, with Hanoi calling most of the shots for its proxy in the South. In fact, there are tremendous differences between the DRV and the NLF despite their close relationship. The INR study fails to note this error, possibly because at the time it was written in 1968-69, no U.S. agency was aware of these differences.

One of INR's finest hours came in 1964-5 when the intelligence community debated whether or not Beijing would join Hanoi and enter the war. President Johnson and his advisors continually pondered whether or not China would come into the war in response to Johnson's dispatch of large numbers of troops, U.S. tactics, such as the invasion of Laos or North Vietnam, or escalating the bombing in the North. John McCone, CIA Director, felt that as the United States deployed ground troops into the South, the North would be distracted so the timing would be right to inflict the North with massive damage. Contrary to the CIA's view, the Bureau under Hughes' direction warned against instigating the North as early as October 1964, because of fear of Chinese action. Both the CIA and INR, though, predicted with reasonable certainty that China would introduce "volunteers" into North Vietnam, but further differing points between the two agencies include estimates of whether or not China would use jet fighters over the DRV. Hughes argued that the DRV would trade damage from a U.S. air campaign for its gains in the South, and that vigorous attacks on the North would probably cause the Chinese to defend its bases with flyovers of the DRV.⁵⁰

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research was correct that Hanoi and Beijing had had talks and coordinated actions. To be specific, in April and June 1965, military talks between North Vietnam and China had occurred, and in May 1965, political talks between the two took place. Beijing agreed to send "volunteer" pilots and regular air units to the DRV in 1965, but as INR estimated in 1967, Beijing was to restrict itself back to low level actions, like permitting North Vietnamese aircraft to operate out of Chinese bases. Although the Chinese did not follow through with the air patrol, the accuracy of INR's predictions of Chinese-North Vietnam relations was proof enough of the agency's capabilities.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Prados 2004, 15

⁵¹ Ibid 17-18

“Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends”

As previously noted, as early as 1963, INR began to actively challenge military estimates with great regularity. At this time, Secretary of Defense McNamara was standing by his view that all was going well in Vietnam because he had the statistics to prove it, and he was not interested in finding out why INR claimed he was wrong. Roger Hilsman, then director of INR, commissioned Lewis Sarris, one of his deputies in INR to do a major study on exactly how INR could prove McNamara was wrong. Known as one of the most celebrated INR efforts of the period, “Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends” was released on October 22, 1963. The abstract of the report introduces INR’s position on the changing situation in South Vietnam.

Statistics on the insurgency in South Vietnam, although neither thoroughly trustworthy nor entirely satisfactory as criteria, indicate an unfavorable shift in the military balance. Since July 1963, the trend in Viet Cong casualties, weapons losses, and defections has been downward while the number of Viet Cong armed attacks and other incidents had been upward. Comparison with earlier periods suggests that the military position on the government of Vietnam may have been set back to the point it occupied six months to a year ago. These trends coincide in time with the sharp deterioration of the political situation. At the same time, even without the Buddhist issue and the attending government crisis, it is possible that the Diem regime would have been unable to maintain the favorable trends of previous periods in the face of the accelerated Viet Cong efforts.⁵²

⁵² State Department Research Memorandum, RFE-90, “Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends,” 22 October 1963.

Using the DIA's own statistics, as well as MACV's field reports, Sarris was able to prove that the war effort was slipping away, and that the Buddhist crisis for Diem was hurting the United States. Sarris also discovered that damaging trends in the war situation were omitted by the military in favor of claims of progress. One of the most important facts omitted was one that was stated in the abstract: that the NLF attacks were up since July while reports of prisoners taken, defectors, and weapons captured were all down. The report also emphasizes that there were several other important factors that were also omitted because they were impossible to calculate statistically. These include "morale and efficiency within the bureaucracy and the armed services, the degree of locally acquired or volunteered intelligence, popular attitudes toward the Viet Cong and the government, and the status and impact of the government's political, social, and economic activities in support of the strategic hamlet program."⁵³ Sarris knew exactly what figures to trust from the military accounts, and the result "was a devastating report on the course of the war."⁵⁴

The military was furious and claimed that Sarris' findings were wrong. Even more damaging, the Department of Defense questioned the right of State to even produce such a report and threatened them to stay far away from "the military's area." McNamara continued to trust his own statistics, requesting the censorship of INR in favor of unanimity, until 1967 when he would change his tune concerning the war. Ironically he would confide in friends that if they had "only known more about the enemy, more about the society, if there had been more information, more intelligence about the other side, perhaps it [Vietnam] would never have happened."⁵⁵

⁵³ State Department Research Memorandum, RFE-90. 1963. 2

⁵⁴ Halberstam 1992, 257

⁵⁵ Ibid 257-258

Conclusion

As this research shows, INR's analysis on Vietnam "stood out tenaciously pessimistic from 1963 on."⁵⁶ Whether they were questioning the viability of the successive Saigon regimes, the Pentagon's statistical underestimation of enemy strength, the ultimate ineffectiveness of bombing in the north, the persistence of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, or the danger of Chinese intervention, INR, without fail, saw no realistic escape from policy trapped inside an "iron triangle."⁵⁷ Though from the outset, INR's information was generally ill-received by the administration and members of the Defense Department. For example, once Thomas Hughes had made a pessimistic appraisal of the chances for U.S. success in Vietnam, as well as a positive estimate on the validity of the enemy, John McNaughton from the Defense Department looked at him with disdain and said, "Spoken like a true member of the Red Team."⁵⁸

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research's 1968-69 study, as well as the 1963 study, clearly shows that despite being ignored, INR took an active role in intelligence collection and analysis, especially as it questioned the infiltration reporting. While INR stopped short of direct policy recommendations, Thomas Hughes believes that "the policy implications of INR's analysis were obvious" and therefore should not have been ignored. After the release of the study, there is no way the administration, the intelligence community, or the Defense department could say, in good faith, that they did not know where INR stood on the issues.⁵⁹

While the Bureau lacked the resources for truly intensive studies to be conducted, analyst for analyst, and dollar for dollar, INR was "possibly the most effective agency in the intelligence

⁵⁶ Hughes 2004, 4

⁵⁷ The "Iron Triangle" is defined as 1) the unremitting instability in the South; 2) Chinese intervention if the U.S. provocation overstepped a threshold in the north, and (3) the North's determination to persevere despite escalating and injurious attacks from the air.

⁵⁸ Halberstam 1992, 363

⁵⁹ Hughes 2004, 4

community,” especially during the Vietnam War.⁶⁰ The Bureau of Intelligence and Research helped specify U.S. intelligence conclusions and called attention to poor data and inadequate intelligence collection used by the military. In retrospect, Hughes sees those who had the chance to work at INR during the 1960s as having the ironic satisfaction of knowing that most of their forecasts had been vindicated by history. Yet at the same time, Hughes and others at INR are left lamenting that they “were unable to persuade, sway, or prevail when it came to the ultimate decisions” of the administration.⁶¹ As the next section details, the apparent vindication that INR could receive by knowing that its estimates regarding Vietnam were correct are all but moot now, since history has repeated itself as President George W. Bush’s administration commenced a failed campaign against weapons of mass destruction in Iraq starting in 2001.

⁶⁰ Prados 2004, 23

⁶¹ Hughes 2004, 19

CHAPTER 4

IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Introduction

When President George W. Bush assumed the presidency after a hotly-contested election in November 2000, he immediately made clear that the status quo with regards to Iraq would not be tolerated. In the years between 1991 and 2000, Saddam Hussein had been relatively free to resurrect his country's various weapons of mass destruction programs, but with President Bush now leading the country, it was clear that the United States was no longer going to stand idly by. According to National Security Achieves, as part of their campaign against the status quo, the United States, along with Great Britain, made clear the possibility of the use of military force against the Iraqi regime. Supporting their threat, the U.S. and Britain published documents and provided intelligence detailing their conclusions concerning Iraq's WMD programs and its attempts to mislead other nations about those programs.⁶²

After a fierce battle at the United Nations (UN), the UN Security Council members decided in UN Resolution 1441 to force Iraq into accepting a rigorous inspections process which would be carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or else they would face "serious consequences."⁶³ Iraq agreed to accept the U.N. resolution and inspections resumed in late November 2002. Just a few weeks later, on December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted its 12,000 page declaration of its weapons systems, and included in that was the assertion that it had no

⁶² Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No 80

⁶³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, November, 7, 2002.

current WMD programs. The United States was immediately skeptical and the Intelligence Community began to criticize the document, rejecting Iraq's claims.

Despite the United States' disbelief, inspections continued over the next several months in Iraq. Chief inspectors, Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohammed El Baradei (IAEA) provided periodic updates to the U.N. Security Council concerning the extent of Iraqi cooperation, what they had (or in most cases had not) discovered, and what they believed remained to be done. Most of the UN Security Council members, including France, Germany, and Russia, supported the work that Blix and El Baradei were doing and argued that the inspections were working and should be allowed to continue. The United States, skeptical of Iraq's sincerity, continued to stand by its hesitation regarding Iraq's disclosure of its nonexistent weapons systems. When it became apparent that a second, more forceful resolution against Iraq would not be approved, the United States came out publicly and stated that Iraq could not possibly be living up to its end of the bargain to fully disclose its WMD activities, and President Bush stated in a nationally televised address that he was prepared to bypass the UN because "the United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we [the United States] will rise to ours."⁶⁴ President Bush further asserted that if Iraq should continue avoiding sincere disclosure, "serious consequences" would soon be defined as invasion.

Along with Great Britain and other allies, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003, two days after President Bush's television address. While the search was on to find Saddam Hussein and remove his government from power, U.S. forces spent a great deal of their time trying to uncover chemical or biological weapons in an effort to prove that their case for war had been justified. As initial reports surfaced that some WMD's might have been found, closer examinations produced fruitless results. Therefore in May 2003,

⁶⁴ President Bush, March 17, 2003, Address to the Nation on Iraq

the Bush administration decided to establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), to spend all of its time and resources searching the country for WMD's.

The Iraq Survey Group was comprised of Australian, British, and US experts and was headed by David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector after Operation Desert Storm. The group continued the work of Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei, replacing them as chief scientists searching Iraq for WMD's. The replacement of UNMOVIC/IAEA with British and American scientists was controversial but consistent with general foreign policy trends President Bush was supporting in Iraq- the influence of United Nations waning in favor of occupying military forces.

After six months searching for WMDs, the ISG issued an Interim Progress Report on October 2, 2003, stating that the team had found evidence of "WMD-related program activities" but no actual chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. While the October 2003 report describes details of dormant WMD programs, the report also includes discoveries of non-WMD programs banned by the UN and concealed during the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspections that began in 2002.⁶⁵ On January 23, 2004, David Kay resigned his position stating that he believed the ISG effort was futile and that WMDs would not be found in Iraq. A little under a year later, with the search producing minimal leads, the Iraq Survey Group's efforts were concluded in January 2005, having not recovered weapons of mass destruction.⁶⁶ The failure of the ISG to find any stockpiles of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons has proven a problem for President Bush and his administration, who used intelligence indicating that Iraq did possess WMD as one of the primary justifications for the invasion of Iraq.

⁶⁵ Iraq Survey Group Report to CIA, October 2, 2003

⁶⁶ See Appendix A for a summary of this report

While the Bush administration was certain all along that WMD's would be unearthed in Iraq, the debate over their existence continued at home in the United States. This debate was fueled by a controversy over the accuracy of U.S. (and British) intelligence that was gathered about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. Members of Congress criticized the use of intelligence by the Bush administration, with charges ranging from the use of selective use of intelligence, outright distortion, and the exertion of political pressure to influence the content of intelligence estimates in order to provide support to the decision to go to war with Iraq. However, according to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report released on July 9, 2004, the entire Intelligence Community was not on board with these false assumptions regarding Iraq and WMD's. One agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), was consistently ignored in favor of other IC options that more favorably supported the administration's case for war.

Introduction to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report

Starting in June 2003, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) began a formal audit of the U.S. Intelligence Community's claims on many issues concerning Iraq, including the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. This review, as part of the Committee's continuing oversight of intelligence activities in the United States, also examined the "objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community," whether those judgments were properly conveyed to policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches in Congress, and whether any "politicization" of intelligence had taken place.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ SSCI US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 9, 2004, 1

After the launch of the investigation, the Intelligence Community provided the Committee with nineteen volumes (approximately 15,000 pages) of the appropriate intelligence assessments and source reporting outlining. Committee staff members analyzed how the IC had reached their conclusions and whether the documents supported these conclusions. If there was a discrepancy of any kind, the Committee requested additional supporting intelligence. During the twelve months of Committee review, the staff submitted almost 100 requests for supplemental intelligence information, and received 30,000 pages of documents in response to those requests.⁶⁸

The staff interviewed more than 200 individuals including intelligence analysts and senior officials at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the State Department, the National Ground Intelligence Center, the Air Force, and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The Committee held four preliminary hearings to review the Iraq-Niger connection, the CIA and State Department Inspectors General report on the review of the Iraq-Niger issue, the history and continuity of weapons of mass destruction assessments pertaining to Iraq, and Iraq prewar intelligence. According to the report, the Committee believes that it was able to gain a “full understanding of the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting” regarding Iraq.⁶⁹

Regarding the Intelligence Community’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) analysis, the Committee focused its evaluation primarily on the October 2002 NIE: *Iraq’s Continuing*

⁶⁸ The Committee was denied its request to examine only those Presidential Daily Briefs (PDB) that were relevant to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorists. Therefore the report openly discloses that its assumptions about whether Intelligence Community judgments were properly disseminated to policymakers in the executive branch may be flawed.

⁶⁹ SSCI 2004, 3

*Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction.*⁷⁰ This particular document was chosen because according to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the NIE's are the International Community's "most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues."⁷¹ In addition, the 2002 NIE did not simply address all of Iraq's WMD programs, but it was a comprehensive analysis of more than ten years of source reporting and intelligence dealing with the matter, where all agency views were represented and dissenting opinions were noted.

Summary of the October 2002 NIE

In a now declassified letter written on September 9, 2002, Senator and SSCI member Richard Durbin requested that the DCI direct the Intelligence Community to write an NIE on the status of Iraq's WMD program. Because the IC had not produced an in-depth and comprehensive assessment of Iraq's WMD programs since the production of the December 2000 IC assessment, *Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities*, the belief was that with this updated NIE, "policymakers in both the executive branch and the Congress [would] benefit from the production of a coordinated, consensus document produced by all relevant components of the Intelligence Community."⁷² Within the week, Senator Bob Graham (D, Florida), the SSCI Chairman, and SSCI members Diane Feinstein (D, California) and Carl Levin (D, Michigan) all wrote the DCI to request that certain topics be addressed in the NIE, including the status of Iraq's development of WMD's and the immediacy of the threat of Iraq to the United States and regional stability.

⁷⁰ This NIE was declassified on July 8, 2003 and presented at a White House background briefing on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq:

⁷¹ SSCI 2004, 8

⁷² Ibid 12

By the morning of September 12, the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs gained official word from the DCI to begin work on the NIE. The work was then divided between four NIO's: the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs was responsible for the nuclear and ballistic missile portions, as well as overall management of the entire NIE; the NIO for Conventional Military Issues was responsible for the chemical warfare (CW) and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) portions; the NIO for Science and Technology was responsible for the biological weapons (BW) portion, and the NIO for Near East South Asia (NESA) was involved in issues regarding regional reactions, doctrine issues, and some terrorism issues, specifically whether Iraq might use terrorist to deliver WMD's.⁷³ The key points of the October 2002 NIE are quoted below:

General Assumptions

We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions⁷⁴...Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs...Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production...Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.

⁷³ SSCI 2004, 12-13

⁷⁴ INR submitted a footnote to this section of the NIE, stating that it disagreed with the assumptions made by the rest of the IC concerning Iraq's nuclear program. See Appendix B.

How Quickly Iraq will Obtain a Nuclear Weapon

Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotor- as well as Iraq's attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools- provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program...Iraq's efforts to reestablish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect nuclear sites further indicate that reconstruction is underway.

All Aspects of Iraq's Offensive BW Program are Active

We judge that Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives. Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program. Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents.

Uranium Acquisition

A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of "pure uranium" (probably yellowcake⁷⁵) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working

⁷⁵ Yellowcake is extracted from uranium ore through a milling and solvent extraction process. It requires further processing before it can be used as reactor fuel for a nuclear weapon. SSCI Report 36

out arrangements for this deal, which would be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake... Reports indicate that Iraq also has sought uranium ore from Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁷⁶

The Senate Select Committee came to the conclusion in its report that the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 NIE were either overstated, or were not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting. The report goes on to mention that "a series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence."⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Committee concludes that the IC did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the October 2002 NIE. The IC also suffered from the presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction program, and the "groupthink" dynamic led IC analysts to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program, and to ignore evidence, mainly from INR as discussed below, that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs.

Perhaps the most damaging conclusion drawn by the Committee about the October 2002 NIE is that the CIA seemed to have abused its "unique position in the Intelligence Community," particularly in terms of information sharing, to the "detriment of the Intelligence Community's prewar analysis concerning Iraq's WMD programs. According to the SSCI report, the IC is far from a level playing field when it comes to competition of ideas in intelligence analysis. Since it is the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) responsibility, as laid out by the National Security Act of 1947, to coordinate the nation's intelligence activities, this places the CIA in a unique position in the IC. Because the DCI is head of the CIA *and* head of the IC

⁷⁶ INR submitted a footnote to this section of the NIE, stating that it disagreed with the assumptions made by the rest of the IC concerning Iraq's attempts to acquire aluminum tubes. See Appendix C.

⁷⁷ SSCI 2004, 14

simultaneously, as well as the principle advisor to the President, the DCI is supposed to provide the most accurate and objective analysis to policymakers. SSCI found in the case of WMD's in Iraq, that in practice, the DCI was actually far from objective since it "undermined the provision of accurate and objective analysis by hampering intelligence sharing and allowing CIA analysts to control the presentation of information to policymakers, and exclude analysis from other agencies," such as INR.⁷⁸

Generally speaking, in what would be the first of many embarrassing confessions for the IC on this issue, the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs testified at a SSCI hearing that the NIE had been completed in abnormally rapid fashion, taking three weeks to finish instead of the typical three months. Furthermore, during the course of the Committee's review of the intelligence assessments on Iraq's WMD programs, several analysts from the CIA, DOE, DIA, and INR confirmed that the NIE was hastily put together; however, only a few of them believed that the rapid time period in which the NIE was produced "negatively impacted the quality of the final document."⁷⁹

In the first of many examples the Committee got to observe where INR disagreed from the rest of the IC, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research was one of the only agencies to testify that in these hearings that because the production of the October 2002 NIE was rushed, the accuracy of the report was compromised. An INR chemical and biological weapons (CBW) analyst told Committee staff, "there is no question in my mind that the process was rushed and I've never participated in an NIE that was coordinated in [such a] manner." The analyst went on

⁷⁸ SSCI 2004, 27

⁷⁹ Ibid 299

to state that had more time been allowed, “the key judgments [would] better reflect what was in the back of the book.”⁸⁰

Summary of the SSCI Report

The following sections on Iraq’s nuclear programs and the issue of Niger’s involvement with Iraq summarize the point that while INR dissented from the majority opinion each of these cases, their analysis, if acknowledged, was oftentimes given a low “footnote” priority. Regardless of the priority, the footnotes were read and INR’s views were made explicitly clear, yet the IC still selected intelligence in favor of views more compatible with the Bush administration. The following research is based on the now partially-declassified SSCI report.

*Nuclear Program*⁸¹

In the October 2002 NIE, the IC assessed that Iraq had began reconstituting its nuclear program shortly after inspectors left in 1998. Once the inspectors were gone, intelligence analysts became concerned that Iraq might use the opportunity to restart its nuclear program. In the October 2002 NIE, the IC believed that Saddam Hussein had a “clearly established desire to acquire nuclear weapons” and instead of waiting for sanctions to end to commence the program, he was instead waiting for inspections to end first, since the latter timetable was sooner. However, the IC had no direct intelligence reporting to show that Saddam had decided to shift his strategy. The six reasons the IC assessed Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program in the October 2002 NIE were Iraq’s procurement of (1) aluminum tubes, (2) magnets, (3) high-speed

⁸⁰ Ibid 300

⁸¹ Ibid 84-142

balancing machines, and (4) machine tools, as well as Iraq's (5) efforts to reestablish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel, and (6) activity at several suspect nuclear sites.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, along with the DOE, disagreed with the IC assessment that Iraq had begun resuming its nuclear program. The bulk of their argument rested on the issue of aluminum tubes. The CIA assessed that the tubes were probably intended for an Iraqi uranium enrichment centrifuge program, and they backed their claim up in their first assessment on the aluminum tubes on April 10, 2001, noting that aluminum tubes would have "little use other than for a uranium enrichment program." One day after the CIA published its assessment, the DOE published its own analysis of the aluminum tube procurement. The DOE report refutes the CIA's assumption that aluminum tubes can only be used for a uranium enrichment program. Instead, the DOE stated that the specified tube diameter that Iraq was manufacturing were only marginally large enough for "practical centrifuge applications, and other specifications are not consistent with gas centrifuge use." The DOE elaborated further to say that "while the gas centrifuge application cannot be ruled out, we assess that the procurement activity more likely supports a different application, such as conventional ordnance production."

The dispute in the IC over the use of aluminum tubes continued well into September of 2002. Although the IC had been debated for nearly a year and a half, the DCI testified at a SSCI Committee hearing that he was unaware of the debate until mid-September 2002, when the 2002 NIE was being drafted. At this time, the DOE's Office of Intelligence and the State Department's INR believed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a conventional rocket program and probably not a nuclear use. Both the DOE and INR included extensive text boxes in the NIE outlining their analysis of the tubes.⁸² In contrast, the CIA and the DIA were the "all-source analysis agencies" that supported the NIE assessment that the aluminum tubes could not

⁸² See Appendix C

be used for conventional rocket applications, because they seemed “considerably more expensive than other more readily available materials” and had Iraq wanted materials or tubes meeting more conventional rocket requirements, they could “be acquired at much lower prices or be produced indigenously.”

On December 17, 2002, CIA analysts wrote a review to the United Nations of Iraq’s WMD declaration titled, *US Analysis of Iraq’s Declaration, 7 December 2002*. On December 30, the points from the CIA paper were worked into the talking points for the NIO for Science and Technology. This paper, titled *Talking Points on US Analysis of Iraq’s Declaration*, reviewed Iraq’s “currently accurate, full, and complete disclosure” to the UN of its WMD programs. It also further outlined that Iraq “fails to acknowledge or explain procurement of high specification aluminum tubes we believe suitable for use in a gas centrifuge uranium effort. The titles in both of the reports said, “US analysis,” indicating that they represented more than just the CIA’s position. Yet clearly at this time, there were at least two dissenting views from INR and the DOE regarding the purpose of aluminum tubes, and at this time, neither agency’s view was included in the assessments.

Information provided to SSCI indicates that the December 17, 2002, assessment was passed onto the President without INR or the DOE having a chance to review or comment for the report. An INR analyst sent an e-mail to the CIA asking them if they “happened to know offhand if INR will get to review and clear the draft ‘detailed analysis’ of the declaration before it is issued in its capacity as a ‘US position’?” The e-mail went on further to state that INR had not been invited to review or clear on the draft which subsequently went to the President. A CIA analyst responded that all agencies had been invited to participate in the analysis. According to SSCI testimony, INR and DOE analysts did not even know that points were being prepared for

the NSC and the President, and although the CIA analyst claims they were invited to participate, the analyst believes that the CIA was well aware of their positions, so their views should have been included in the points anyway. At least in INR's case, their concerns about the use of aluminum tubes were passed to the CIA on December 23, 2002, but they still did not make it into the December 30, 2002 talking points.⁸³

*Niger*⁸⁴

The first possible sign of a uranium yellowcake sales agreement between Niger and Iraq came to the attention of the IC on October 15, 2001. As a result, the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) issued an intelligence report from a foreign government service indicating that Niger planned to ship several tons of uranium to Iraq. The intelligence report said that the agreement had been negotiated prior to early 1999, and was approved by the State Court of Niger in late 2000.

The CIA, DIA, and the DOE all considered these reports "possible" while INR regarded the reports as "highly suspect," primarily because INR analysts did not believe that Niger would be likely to engage in such a transaction, nor did INR believe that Niger would be able to transfer uranium to Iraq since a French consortium maintained control of the Nigerian uranium industry. On November 20, 2001, the US Embassy in Niamey circulated a cable dealing with a recent meeting between the ambassador and the Director General of Niger's French-run consortium. In this cable, the Director General said "there was no possibility" that the government of Niger had diverted any of the 3,000 tons of yellowcake produced in its two uranium mines.

⁸³ Conclusions from the SSCI report regarding the IC and the debate over aluminum tubes were still classified as of this writing.

⁸⁴ SSCI 2004, 36-83

The CIA's DO then issued a second intelligence report citing a source from the "foreign government service." This particular report provided many more details about the previously reported Iraq/Niger uranium agreement and provided what was said to be "verbatim text" from the source. IC analysts at the CIA and DIA were very proud of the second report, yet INR analysts continued to doubt the accuracy of the DO reports. INR was still convinced that Niger would be unwilling to sell uranium to Iraq since Iraq was "bound to be caught." Because of these doubts, an INR analyst asked the CIA whether the source of the report could submit to a polygraph test, and while the CIA avoided the topic of a polygraph, their response was further affirmation that the report was from a "very credible source."

INR expressed its skepticism that the alleged uranium contract could be carried out because it would be extremely difficult to hide such a large shipment of yellowcake, and further "the French appear to have control of the uranium mining, milling, and transport process, and would seem to have little interest in selling uranium to the Iraqis." On March 1, 2002, INR published an intelligence assessment titled, *Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq is Unlikely*. The assessment reiterated INR's opinion that since France controlled Niger's uranium industry, they would have taken action to "block a sale of the kind alleged in a CIA report of questionable credibility from a foreign government service." The assessment further added that "some officials might have conspired for individual gain to arrange a uranium sale," but INR still considered this unlikely. According to the State Department, the assessment was distributed through "the routine distribution process in which intelligence documents are delivered to the White House situation room," but INR was not able to provide the assessment to the White House directly, outside of NSC involvement. While the Niger reports were being disseminated, a CIA nuclear analyst said he discussed the issue with an INR colleague and was aware that INR

disagreed with the CIA's position. He said they discussed Niger's uranium production rates and whether Niger could have been diverting any yellowcake for Iraq. He said that he and the INR counterpart simply "agreed to disagree" about the issue of Niger's involvement.

On September 11, 2002, a year after the terrorist attacks, the CIA was asked to clear language for possible use in a statement by the President. The language which was cleared said,

Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And we also know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient of this processes. The regime was caught trying to purchase 500 metric tons of this material. It takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon.

Despite the language being cleared by the CIA, the statement was never specifically used publicly.

Around this same time, the October 2002 NIE was being drafted. The uranium text was only included in the body of the NIE, not in the key judgments section because the interagency consensus was that Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium were not key to the argument that Iraq was restarting its nuclear program. During the initial discussions concerning where the uranium text would be placed in the NIE, someone suggested that the uranium information be included as another sign of Iraq's reconstitution of its nuclear program. In response to this suggestion, INR's Iraq nuclear analyst spoke up and said that he did not agree with the uranium reporting and that INR would be including text in their footnote on nuclear reconstitution indicating their disagreement. Because INR disagreed with much of the nuclear section of the NIE to begin

with, it decided to convey its alternative views in text boxes, rather than object to every point individually throughout the NIE. INR prepared two separate boxes, one for the key judgments section⁸⁵ and a two page box for the body of the nuclear section, which included a sentence which stated that “the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious.”⁸⁶

On October 9, 2002, an Italian journalist from the magazine *Panorama* provided US Embassy Rome with copies of documents pertaining to the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. The journalist had acquired the documents from a source who had requested 15,000 Euros in return for their handing them over, and wanted the embassy to authenticate the documents. The Embassy, on October 15, 2002, faxed the documents over to the State Department’s Bureau of Nonproliferation (NP), which then passed a copy onto INR. The CIA did not seek to obtain copies of the documents because they believed that the foreign government service reporting good enough since they considered it “verbatim text,” and since the CIA was preparing its case on reconstitution, these particular documents were not seen as significant to their argument so they obtaining the documents was not a priority.

Immediately after receiving the documents, the INR nuclear analyst e-mailed his IC colleagues to describe his suspicion for the authenticity of the documents, noting that “you’ll note that it bears a funky Emb. Of Niger stamp (to make it look official, I guess.)” The INR analyst told SSCI staff members that the thing that stood out immediately about the documents was that the companion document, a document included with the Niger documents that did not relate to uranium, mentioned some type of military campaign against major world powers. The members of the alleged military campaign included both Iraq and Iran, and the supposed future

⁸⁵ See Appendix B

⁸⁶ See Appendix C

attack was being orchestrated through the Nigerian Embassy in Rome. All of these registered with the INR officials as being “completely implausible.” Because the stamp on the document matched the stamp on the uranium document, the analyst thought that all the documents together were equally suspect.

On January 13, 2003, the INR nuclear analyst sent an e-mail to several other IC analysts outlining his reasons why the documents were “clearly a forgery.” Because the stamps were the same between documents, the analyst concluded that “the uranium purchase agreement probably is a forgery.” Four days later, on January 17, 2003, the CIA’s Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC) published an intelligence paper titled *Request for Evidence of Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program Other Than the Aluminum Tube Procurement Effort* that proved, excluding information about aluminum tubes, Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. Regarding uranium acquisition, the paper said, “fragmentary reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from various countries in Africa in the past several years is another sign of reconstitution. Iraq has no legitimate use for uranium.”⁸⁷ Based on this report, President Bush submitted a report to Congress on Iraq’s noncompliance with UNSC resolutions on January 20, 2003. The report stated that Iraq had failed to include in its declaration “attempts to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it.”⁸⁸

On January 27, 2003, the day before the President was to address Congress and that nation in the State of the Union address, the DCI was provided with a hardcopy draft of the speech at an NSC meeting, contrary to testimony at a July 16, 2003, hearing stating that he had never read the State of the Union speech.⁸⁹ On January 28, 2003, the President noted in his State of the Union address that the US believed that “Saddam Hussein recently sought significant

⁸⁷ SSCI 2004, 62-63

⁸⁸ Ibid 63

⁸⁹ Ibid 64

quantities of uranium from Africa.”⁹⁰ At the time of the speech, the CIA and WINPAC still believed that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. It was not until two months later that the IAEA/Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) determined that the Niger uranium documents were forgeries and did not substantiate any assessment that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. On April 5, 2003, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) issued a Sense of the Community Memorandum (SOCM) titled *Niger: No Recent Uranium Sales to Iraq*. The IC agreed with the IAEA assessment that key documents were fabricated, and therefore did not constitute credible evidence of a recent or impending sale. On June 17, 2003, eight months after INR analysts expressed their reservations about the authenticity of the documents in October 2002, and five months after the State of the Union address, the CIA produced a memorandum for the DCI which said, “since learning that the Iraq-Niger uranium deal was based on false documents earlier this spring, we no longer believe that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from abroad.”

According to the SSCI report from 2004, when documents regarding the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting became available to the IC in October 2002, the CIA should have made an effort to obtain copies. As a result of not having copies, CIA analysts continued to approve false language in administration publications and speeches. The report goes on further to state that even after obtaining the forged documents and being alerted by INR analysts of their authenticity problems, the CIA and DIA did not examine them carefully enough to see the “obvious problems” with the documents. Both agencies continued to publish assessments that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa despite listening to the words of caution from INR. In addition, the CIA continued to approve similar language for speeches such as the State of the Union in 2003. Lastly, SSCI stated that the CIA was wrong in insinuating all along that there

⁹⁰ White House website

was an Intelligence Community consensus regarding Iraq's attempt to acquire uranium from Niger, especially since INR believed the reporting to be based on forged documents.

Conclusion

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State, Colin Powell, delivered a speech before the UN Security Council (UNSC) that outlined Iraq's noncompliance with UNSC Resolutions and provided US analysis on Iraq's WMD programs. Secretary Powell told the UN that "every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence." The speech originated in early December 2002, shortly after the completion of the October 2002 NIE, when the NSC asked the CIA to prepare a presentation in response to Iraq's declaration to the UN.

Shortly after December 2002, National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, thought that Secretary of State Powell was a logical choice to make the presentation to the U.N. for three reasons. First, sending Powell to the U.N., since he was the one person in the administration that was considered "soft" on Iraq, would increase U.S. credibility. Second, Powell was conscious of his credibility and his reputation and would examine the intelligence carefully. Third, and perhaps most importantly, when Powell was prepared, he was very persuasive.⁹¹

A week before Powell was scheduled to give his speech to the U.N., Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei gave their report to the Security Council that covered the first few months of inspections. They concluded that, to date, there was "no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since its elimination of the program in the 1990s."⁹² This presentation to the U.N. was a setback for the administration, especially since Powell was to deliver evidence

⁹¹ Woodward 2004, 291

⁹² Ibid 293

of WMD's to the Security Council a week later. The administration, according to Bob Woodward, decided to use its time in front of the Security Council to refute what Blix and ElBaradei had reported on January 27.

According to a State Department foreign affairs officer in the Bureau of Nonproliferation, the general rule set by Secretary Powell as he was planning his speech, was that any intelligence information used in his speech to the UN had to be corroborated. CIA analysts, who were the only ones asked initially to help with the speech, promised that the language was carefully reviewed time and time again, and that they were not aware of any single-source information that would be used in the speech. Powell, however, had some skepticism about much of the intelligence. The deeper Powell dug, the more he realized what INR had been asserting all along, that the HUMINT sources were few and far between and that the intelligence community was probably being influenced by Saddam's past behavior. Secretary Powell was placed in a no-win situation from the beginning. He was forced to present a case to the U.N. that he personally found hard to believe, as well as preserve the credibility of the United States at the same time. While he might have agreed with INR that there was sketchy intelligence, the administration expected him to rely heavily on CIA intelligence to substantiate their claims.⁹³

In fact, INR was not asked to prepare its own thoughts for the speech until late January 2003. The comments outlined by INR included a specific "scorecard" on the analytic merits of the arguments in the speech. Of the thirty-eight items that INR considered "weak" or "unsubstantiated," only twenty-eight were removed from the draft or changed to eliminate the problem INR had with the draft.⁹⁴ More importantly however, of the seven issues INR described as the "most problematic," SSCI believes only three were removed. INR's remaining concerns

⁹³ Woodward 2004, 290-309

⁹⁴ See Appendix D for INR's full comments

were 1) the numerous references to human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting as fact, including use of the phrase “we know that...”, 2) the report that key files were being driven around in cars to avoid inspectors, which INR believed was highly questionable, 3) the report that an Iraqi missile brigade was dispersing rocket launchers and biological weapons warheads, which INR also said was highly questionable, and 4) the claim that the aluminum tubes Iraq was seeking “far exceeded US requirements for comparable rockets.”

Because the CIA’s primary role was to check the accuracy of Secretary Powell’s speech, the CIA eventually concurred with all of the intelligence information that was included in the final draft of the speech and they could not think of any intelligence that was used in the speech that they would have wanted removed. Almost all of the information in the speech was from the intelligence included in the 2002 NIE, *Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*. This proved fatal for the IC because, as previously discussed, there were many reservations that analysts at INR and a few other agencies had concerning the accuracy of the intelligence.

SSCI concluded that much of the information provided or cleared by the CIA for inclusion in Secretary Powell’s speech was misleading, overstated, or incorrect. Furthermore, according to the report, some of the information supplied by the CIA, though not used in the UN speech, was simply incorrect. This information, according to the Committee, should have never been provided for use in a public speech. Overall, the report comes down harshly on the CIA’s role in leading the IC into claims of WMD use in Iraq, and as a result, SSCI expanded its investigation to include whether the CIA placed undue pressure on the rest of the IC regarding WMD capability assumptions.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ SSCI 2004, 239-302

Generally speaking, the Committee did not find any evidence that intelligence analysts changed their judgments as a result of political pressure, nor was the IC asked to alter or produce intelligence products to conform to Administration policy. Though while there may not have been a conscious effort of the IC to support already-established Administration policies, there was certainly a selective bias in how dissenting views were used. For example, when asked by the Committee if INR had ever felt pressure to change its views, an INR analyst responded, “Not at all...INR has a pretty solid track record of stating its views, whether they are in sync with the prevailing winds of policymakers, but we have never shied away from stating our view where it diverges...” However, this was no guarantee that INR’s opinions, especially when they diverged from the rest of the IC’s views, would be noted in the final intelligence reports or talking points, such as the ones disseminated on December 30, 2002.

It is worth noting, according to the SSCI report, that one INR analyst did feel pressure to conform to IC and ultimately Administration beliefs. When SSCI Chairman Pat Roberts asked on June 19, 2003, whether analysts had been pressured to change their assessments at a Committee hearing, one INR analyst stood up and stated that he had “some encounters involving some pressure” but noted that he had not changed his assessments as a result. Because of the seriousness of the accusation, the Chairman asked the analyst to meet separately with the Committee to discuss the issue.

Though the particular instance the INR analyst had been referring to had nothing to do with Iraq, he still firmly believed that his instance was merely an example of an overall hostile climate between INR’s judgments and the rest of the IC. He said that INR was not being listened to by the IC, and the Administration preferred to listen to the CIA instead.⁹⁶ To further check out

⁹⁶ SSCI 2004, 278-279. The incident that the INR analyst was specifically referring to involved an issue over Cuba’s BW program.

the claims of politicized intelligence laid out by the INR analyst, SSCI staff members contacted a retired Office Director in INR who had made comments in the press suggesting that analysts may have been pressured to change their analysis. At a press conference at the Arms Control Association on July 9, 2003, the Director said, “this [Bush] administration has had a faith-based intelligence attitude, its top-down use of intelligence: ‘we know the answers; give us the intelligence to support those answers.’”⁹⁷ The Director stated that the pressure placed on INR did not come from the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or Director of INR in any way. In fact, INR felt protected from politics and was supported by the State Department to “call it like they saw it.”

Yet if INR had the ear of Secretary of State Powell, why weren’t their considerations taken seriously? Invariably, this has to do with the perception the Secretary of State has of INR in relation to his role as a member of the executive branch. In Powell’s case, he states that in order to do his job, he needs “both tailored intelligence support [from INR], responsive to- indeed able to anticipate- my needs, and I need informed competitive analysis.”⁹⁸ Ultimately his needs as the Secretary of State are to serve at the pleasure of the president, or risk being an outsider in an administration that values “insiders.” Ultimately, perhaps due to the unpopular intelligence INR was collecting on behalf of his State Department, Powell did indeed become an outsider in the administration and resigned his post on November 15, 2004.

⁹⁷ While the Director had strong views about the politicization of intelligence concerning INR, he retired in September 2002, prior to the publication of the NIE, so he had no specific knowledge of the coordination of intelligence regarding Iraq.

⁹⁸ State Department website

CHAPTER 5

BUREAUCRATIC MODEL APPLIED

In addressing the question of why INR's intelligence was ignored in both the cases of Vietnam and Iraq, it is apparent that the answer is not simply that one agency's intelligence is chosen over INR's. There are precise reasons why INR's intelligence is ignored in favor of other intelligence agencies, specifically the CIA or the Defense Department, and the primary reason is because INR is an agency controlled by the State Department. As explained in detail below, because INR suffers from the declining reputation of the State Department, the agency was ignored in both the cases of Vietnam and Iraq, and will continue to be ignored unless the State Department is afforded more respect in the nation's national security deliberations.

Contrary to what seems most natural, foreign policy decision-making is not a rational process. While rational action may certainly be a component, any political action is susceptible to logrolling, partisanship, and deal-making, just to name a few influences. The entire foreign policy process has become so politicized that not to consider the bureaucratic politics model as a possible explanation for certain agency behavior is to ignore a vital aspect of the policymaking process. There are many reasons why the bureaucratic model seems counter-intuitive to our instincts about how government should work. For example, agencies such as the INR are supposed to perform separate but interrelated foreign policy functions that are ultimately supposed to be coordinated through the National Security Council (or the newly-established NID). However, the reality is that each of the agencies has different standard operating

procedures (SOPs) as well as different subcultures that often get in the way and prevent easy harmonization with the other agencies.

Another reason why the bureaucratic politics model is important stems from fact that the relative influence of each of the agencies has changed over time, so there has been a natural ebb-and-flow of competitive power in foreign policy decision-making. The Department of State has always been considered one of the main agencies for carrying out the foreign policy initiatives of the United States. In recent years, however, the political relevance of the State Department for the president has fallen to the wayside in favor of the more politically loyal CIA and the Department of Defense. As Wiarda states, “State then fades back into oblivion...[and] all recent presidents have chosen to concentrate foreign policy decision-making, especially on the big issues, in their own hands and to bypass State.”⁹⁹ Initially, an exception to this might have been when Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State. However, Kissinger was extremely close with the Nixon administration, he ended up neglecting his obligations to the State Department, and ultimately INR. By and large, the State Department lost considerable influence to the CIA after the Vietnam War; and in a post-9/11 world, it now seems as though it is the Defense Department may be the one agency currently on the rise.

Regardless of the State Department’s devolution in power over the years, INR still has many advantages over its competitors. Among INR’s many strong points is its ability to maintain a coherent, yet dissenting and independent stance regarding both Vietnam War and Iraq. First, in producing and publishing its analysis, INR had an obvious comparative advantage to the rest of the intelligence community: “In INR there was no need for the uncomfortable straddling that often confronted the Directors of Central Intelligence, for example, as they tried to paper over the opposing tendencies between analyst and operators within CIA, or as they

⁹⁹ Wiarda 1996, 199

compromised CIA's ultimate analytical judgments with those of the Pentagon."¹⁰⁰ As a result, former head of INR, Thomas Hughes, believes that the Bureau is the "least culture-bound, bureaucratically staked, umbilically connected, or career-limited of all the intelligence community."¹⁰¹

A second benefit to INR intelligence is that it can remain more objective than the rest of the intelligence community is because of its small size. Since there were so few people working on Vietnam and Iraq, Thomas Hughes believes there was less anonymity and, therefore, more responsibility and accountability than is the case for the rest of the intelligence community. With what little personnel they have, INR is able to organize them in a manner that sustained and maximized its privilege of pressure-free, objective situations. Consequently the Bureau deliberately selects a judicious mix of officers with highly differentiated career patterns. For example, Foreign Service Officers are chosen especially for their analytical expertise in certain areas, civil servants guaranteed tenure are protected from the inroads of the Foreign Service promotion system, and academic experts are externally drawn and placed in charge of specific regionally areas.

In spite of its strong points, to fully understand how INR has lost power to other intelligence agencies through the years, we must first examine the history and the structure of the State Department. This will then shed light on the Department subculture, which will eventually help us answer the ultimate question: Can anything be done to prevent the US government from making bad intelligence decisions when good intelligence, specifically from INR, is available?

¹⁰⁰ Hughes 2004, 15

¹⁰¹ Hughes 1974, 17

History of the State Department

The history of the State Department can be separated into three distinct periods: before 1940, 1940-1960, and 1960-present. In the first period, the State Department started off quite small. The Department had very few personnel and was assigned limited activities, reflecting the nation's isolationist mentality at the time. Foreign Service officers were assigned to problems as they arose on an ad hoc basis, and eventually developed an expertise in specific countries and areas. Although the officers were highly intelligent, the nature of the Department restricted a lot of their activities to a "last-minute" type of timeline. Unfortunately though, the seeds of the critique for the State Department were sewn in this first period: elitism, a more general knowledge base, and unsystematic analysis continue to haunt it today.¹⁰²

As the United States expanded its foreign policy to be more aggressive after WWII, so too did the State Department expand its responsibilities to be a more active player in foreign affairs. In fact, according to Dean Acheson, most matters that the State Department addressed during this period rose from specific incidents or problems, which then evolved into policies, rather than beginning as matters of broad decision and ending in specific action.¹⁰³ The beginning of the Cold War meant that the diplomatic community was going to have to be more prominent than ever, and the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Marshall Plan placed a growing demand for a larger Foreign Service. In this second phase of the State Department's development, the Department expanded from a few hundred Foreign Service officers (FSOs) to several thousand in order to keep up with the growing demands of the post-WWII global power struggle. Despite its rapid growth and prominence during the Cold War, the State Department continued to struggle with some of the problems it faced since its

¹⁰² Wiarda 1996, 199

¹⁰³ Acheson 1969, 15

inception. For example, its personnel continued to primarily be academics from east coast, elite private schools. The Department also continued to be more generalists than specialists, and it was still not well regarded for conceptualizing.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, internal bureaucratic pressure was placed on each of the division chiefs at the Department, and these chiefs, “like barons in a feudal system weakened at the top by mutual suspicion and jealousy between king and prince, were constantly at odds, if not war.”¹⁰⁵

Regardless of its problems, many at the State Department regard the period between WWII and the Vietnam War as its heyday. After Vietnam however, the prestige and relevance of the State Department to foreign policymaking started to decline. As outlined previously, the INR took a beating in Vietnam despite its intelligence being the most accurate, and it was at this time when the Secretary of State started to disconnect himself from the true intentions of the State Department. Resulting from the State Department’s decline was the ascension of the CIA and the Defense Department. Both agencies took on a stronger foreign policymaking role, and gradually State’s planning and research functions were eventually distributed to think tanks and interest groups.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, in this crucial period of the Cold War, presidents became more content on taking their own foreign policy initiatives and running them, and distributing them to agencies that would get the job done in the form of proxies for the president’s own ideas.

Structure of the State Department

The State Department is organized in pyramidal fashion, not too differently than other government agencies. At the top is the Office of the Secretary which handles all of the day-to-day matters of the Secretary, including meetings at the Department and functions in Washington

¹⁰⁴ Wiarda 1996, 199-200

¹⁰⁵ Acheson 1969, 15

¹⁰⁶ Wiarda 1996, 200


and throughout the country. The Secretary of State specifically is expected to advise the president, testify before Congress, serve as a spokesperson for diplomatic matters, and negotiate and implement policy.

There are several offices attached to the Office of the Secretary of State. Included are the following: *the Policy Planning Staff*, which was created in 1947 by George Kennan at the order of Secretary George Marshall, and serves as a source of independent policy analysis and advice for the Secretary of State; *the Office of Protocol*, under the direction of the Chief of Protocol, which directly advises, assists, and supports the President of the United States, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State on official matters of national and international protocol; the *Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism* which heads U.S. Government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments; *the Office of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations*, which shapes U.S. policy at the UN, works for multilateral policy formulation and implementation where possible, and seeks to make the UN and its agencies more effective instruments for advancing U.S. interests and addressing global needs; *the Bureau of Legislative Affairs*, which serves as liaison between the State Department and the Congress and performs a critical role in advancing the President's and the Department's legislative agenda in the area of foreign policy; and *the Bureau of Intelligence and Research*, which ensures that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security purposes and serves as the focal point in the Department for ensuring policy review of sensitive counterintelligence and law enforcement activities.

Under the Office of the Secretary are six Under Secretaries. They report directly to the Secretary and serve as the Department's "corporate board" on foreign policy in the following areas: Political affairs; Economic, business, and agricultural affairs; Arms control and

international security; Global affairs, including the environment, human rights, and health issues; Management; and Public diplomacy and public affairs.

Figure 5.1 Department of State Organization



The Under Secretary for Political Affairs is the Department's crisis manager and is responsible for integrating political, economic, global, and security issues into the United States' bilateral relationships. The geographic bureaus coordinate the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. The Department has six groups that are responsible for countries in the world. These include the Bureau of African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere Affairs.¹⁰⁷

The Under Secretary of Economics, Business, and Agriculture helps stimulate U.S. investment and sales abroad, while the Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security has the Bureaus of Arms Control, Political-Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, and Verification and Compliance. The Under Secretary of Management handles the day-to-day running of the Department and includes Bureau of Information and Resource Management, the Foreign Service Institute, and the Bureaus of Administration, Consular Affairs, and Resource Management.

To help give “global issues” such as population control, human rights, the environment and sustainable development greater importance, President Clinton created the Under Secretary for Global Affairs group. Included in this group are the Bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; and Population, Refugees, and Migration.

Finally, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was created in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, and has oversight of the public diplomacy functions of cultural and educational exchange, as well as international information programs and the public affairs function of providing information to the U.S. audience. Included in this group are the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public

¹⁰⁷ Department of State Website

Affairs; and the Bureaus of Public Affairs, Educational and Cultural Affairs, and International Information Programs.¹⁰⁸

The jobs of secretary, undersecretary, and assistant secretary are all “political,” both in the pejorative sense of the word as well as the literal sense. Each position requires congressional approval and usually for political reasons, the appointments are made strategically to satisfy political, gender, and ethnic expectations. Below these levels are the career FSOs who serve in the various bureaus and as the country desk officers. Since they handle the flow of information coming and going about their particular region, their job is quite tiresome and is often frustrating. On the outside, the “life of a young FSO is often a frustrating one doing low-level work...after several years’ service, the young FSO may be ready for a higher job- only to see it given to an outside political appointee.” Ultimately, a culture such as this tends to breed resentment and a feeling of inferiority in regards to “bureaucratic politics.”¹⁰⁹

State Department Subculture

The subculture of the State Department is often cited as including “bright, talented, mostly able people...but it is also widely thought of as snobbish, elitist, haughty, and a bit stuffy.”¹¹⁰ Although there is some truth to the stereotypes, the State Department has worked hard in recent years to correct their reputation in Washington. For example, the “snobbish and elite” stereotype emerged from the State Department’s heavy recruitment over the past few decades at east coast, private schools. Now, the Department is trying to recruit more from public universities, and in its search, it is employing more women and minorities. Nevertheless,

¹⁰⁸ Department of State Website

¹⁰⁹ Wiarda 1996, 202

¹¹⁰ Ibid 203-204

regardless of what academic institutions the employees come from, those employed at State still suffer from the elite subculture that has been hard to shake.

The State Department's appearance of hostility to outsiders is also frequently a bone of contention because the Department is seen as being overconfident in its ability to function "just fine," without any outside help. However, the State Department, just like any other agency that might fall into this category, can benefit from a more diverse knowledge basis. The Department often resents presidents and new administrations trying to tell it what to do or how to change its course. An actual source of pride for the Department is that it tries to stay out of "political" affairs, mainly domestic politics. Dean Rusk, one of the last Secretaries of State to have the President's full support, mentioned that one of the main reasons the President and the Secretary of State disagree over foreign policy has to do with this issue. "Presidents are in very different political positions from secretaries. Secretaries of state try to deal with foreign policy in terms of the national interest, but presidents must also take into account the domestic political situation."¹¹¹

As a result, the State Department often does a poor job of framing its proposals in terms of what will elicit political support, while at the same time, it does not consider the potential domestic ramifications to the president in such matters.¹¹² Such attitudes often get the State Department in trouble with elected officials because they are not considering political implications of their assessments and are not paying lip service to foreign affairs leadership. The result is often bickering and conflict between the Department of State and other agencies. Because of this subculture, the State Department is often seen as "the department of bad

¹¹¹ Rusk 1990, 517

¹¹² Inderfurth and Johnson 1988, 224

news.”¹¹³ Because the Department deals with more hundreds of foreign governments on a daily basis, each with its own problems and policies, disappointment and frustration are built into the very essence of the Department.

Because the State Department prefers to stay out of seemingly “avoidable bureaucratic politics,” they continue to think that they can make policy in a vacuum, regardless of public opinion and interest group lobby groups. Many critics believe that State needs to shed its aloof nature and lobby firsthand for its policies- thus playing the bureaucratic “game” the way it was intended to be played. Naturally, this is a very uncomfortable role for the State Department and even to this day, it has resisted it.¹¹⁴

Another component to State’s subculture is its knowledge base. As briefly mentioned before, the Department of State prefers generalists to specialists; a culture perpetuated by the constant rotation of employees from area to area. As a result of this issue, as well as the ones mentioned above, recent presidents have concluded that they cannot trust anyone in the State Department below the Secretary. Rarely is policy discussed with the assistant secretaries of state, who are actually responsible for making the connection between policy and action in the bureaucratic machinery. Ultimately the Secretary is put in a dubious position- he or she can either distance themselves from their own department to preserve their standing with the president, or they can become an advocate for the department and end up being ignored as well.¹¹⁵

Senior State officials never really vigorously support INR because of its competition for money and personnel. Ray Cline, Director of INR after Thomas Hughes in the 1960s, recalls that he “had to rely on his connections in CIA and the White House to get things done and make an

¹¹³ Rusk 1990, 526

¹¹⁴ Wiarda 1996, 204-205

¹¹⁵ Gelb 1980, 233

impact in high-level intelligence matters, mainly because the rest of State officialdom still did not really value an independent analytical approach that sometimes threatened already established policy positions.”¹¹⁶ INR has had to conduct business in this “uncertain milieu” and since State Department bureaucrats are ultimately responsible for the sometimes unpopular analysis of the Bureau, their attitudes towards INR left something to be desired. Especially as it related to Vietnam and Iraq, INR’s role as objective analyst had to force its way into an environment where others were seeking and supplying intelligence-to-please.¹¹⁷

Competition for Intelligence in Washington

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, as a result the State Department’s reputation, appears to be the “black sheep” when it comes to piercing the fog of bureaucratic politics in Washington D.C. INR tends to have a different outlook on foreign policy initiatives than the rest of the intelligence agencies, which can frequently be a cause of conflict. For example, in general, the State Department embraces its reputation as the “guardian of continuity in foreign policy,” while the White House is primarily concerned with domestic implications and ramifications. As a result, the White House is likely to look towards the National Security Advisor for a “less constrained” view of intelligence, rather than go to INR or the State Department.¹¹⁸ Likewise, INR and the Defense Intelligence Agency are continually at odds over whether foreign policy should be diplomatically or militarily constructed.¹¹⁹

Perhaps the strongest rival INR has competing with it for intelligence is the CIA. For example, the CIA and INR are often at odds over which intelligence is more “valuable” to the

¹¹⁶ Cline 1976, 217

¹¹⁷ Hughes 1974, 19

¹¹⁸ Rockman 1988, 242

¹¹⁹ Wiarda 1996, 8

community as a whole. The CIA argues that its paid, clandestine sources are more important, especially since they are “controlled” by the CIA. However, as Robert Keeley points out, “this is a false concept...once on the payroll, the controlled source has a strong motivation to tell his controller what he thinks the latter wants to hear, because if he doesn’t he may not be on the payroll for long.”¹²⁰ Contrast this with INR, which derives a lot of its information from open source information. Certainly misleading information can still surface, but INR has the ability to examine the open source information more objectively.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research is quick to compete with other agencies about the validity of its intelligence, partly because it has to overcome so many obstacles along the way, such as the CIA culture, the cult of secrecy, the general tendency to “naïve politicians in both the executive branch and Congress to be thrilled when they are allowed access to allegedly important secrets.”¹²¹ Because of the bureaucratic obstacles, however, INR is almost always on the losing end because clandestinely-obtained intelligence is given a much higher value than free, open, unpaid sources.

Ironically, another group often chosen in favor of INR is the National Security Council (NSC), of which the Secretary of State is a member. The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947, and a few years later in 1949, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President. The primary function of the NSC is to serve as the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters. The Council also serves as the President's primary arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

¹²⁰ Keeley 2000, 62

¹²¹ Keeley 2000, 62

The National Security Council is chaired by the President, with regular attendees including (both statutory and non-statutory) the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of Central Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting if they so choose, and the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings if it pertains to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are also invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.¹²²

The tug-of-war for intelligence influence between the rest of the NSC and INR centers on the State Department's relations with the White House. As Leslie Gelb describes, the relationship between the State Department and the NSC is "a replay of the historical struggle between the palace guard and the king's ministers, between any personal staff and the line officers [and] at a still deeper level, it was the story about presidents, their wants and needs as they see them."¹²³

Traditionally, the White House has made the State Department its primary advisor for policy recommendations. Every president, at the beginning of his term, has reasserted the importance of the Department, and has recommitted the executive's commitment to its efforts. However, the relationship always seems to diminish and become clouded as the National Security Advisor gains prominence. In recent years, the National Security Advisor has become

¹²² White House website

¹²³ Gelb 1980, 230

the president's personal foreign policy spokesperson as well as "influential molder, and sometimes executor of [the president's] foreign policy choices."¹²⁴

Ideally the relationship of both the State Department and the NSC to the White House should be reciprocal. As Henry Kissinger states in his memoir, "a president should make the Secretary of State his principal adviser and use the National Security Adviser primarily as a senior administrator and coordinator to make certain that each significant point of view is heard."¹²⁵ Unfortunately, this is very rarely the case. As Kissinger concedes, the State Department will always be overlooked in favor of National Security Council because foreign policy cannot be freed from short-run domestic political considerations.¹²⁶ And as stated before, that is something that the State Department has considerable trouble accepting.

Another reason INR continues to lose the battle with other intelligence agencies in Washington is simply because the State Department as a whole is allocated less money and resources to do its job. Since the Vietnam War, spending on diplomacy has steadily declined for decades. Congress slashed the State Department's budget by 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s, and as a result, the department was forced to close more than thirty embassies and consulates, and twenty-two percent of the department's employees were cut from the payroll.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, while the State Department's budget has started to increase again, it still cannot keep up with the tremendous growth of the budget of the Defense Department. For example, for Fiscal Year 2006, the Office of Management and Budget reports that if the Department of State and the Defense Department given all the money they have requested, the State Department will still only have 7.6 percent of the budget that the Defense Department has.

¹²⁴ Rockman 1981, 243

¹²⁵ Kissinger 1979, 30

¹²⁶ Gelb 1980, 230

Table 5.1 Growth Discretionary Budget Authority: in billions of dollars¹²⁷

	2002	2003	2004	2005 Enacted	2006 Requested
DOD	327.8	365.3	375.7	400.1	419.3
State	21.7	22.8	25.0	27.5	31.8

While this is an improvement over the 6.2% the State Department had compared to the Defense Department in 2003, the discrepancy is still staggering. While “more money is not a substitute for an effective foreign policy,” states Richard Gardner, a professor at Columbia University who served on the largest government-sponsored study of the State Department, “an effective foreign policy will simply be impossible without more money.”¹²⁸

While the reputation of elitism, a lack of domestic policy considerations, and a poor knowledge base may be somewhat deserved, the problems of the State Department are inherent in the nature of the work that it is required to do, as well as the position in which they find themselves. As a result, INR suffers at the reputation of the Department, and it can do very little to fix the problem on its own, especially since it has no natural constituencies in the American public and it has few natural allies in other agencies and departments. Furthermore, INR is inevitably hampered by the way the State Department perceives the very nature of foreign affairs. It must deal with hundreds of nations and a variety of international organizations, each of which has its own rivalries and “bureaucratic politics” to deal with. The State Department’s baggage thus becomes INR’s baggage and quite frequently INR’s ability to function properly in its own bureaucratic political sphere suffers as a result.

¹²⁷ White House Website, Budget of the United States Government FY2006

¹²⁸ Priest 2003, 45

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, despite its record of accuracy in intelligence analysis, has been ignored in a few, pivotal moments in American history. These two moments when INR failed to be heard, during the Vietnam War, as well as the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, have had great consequences on our country's foreign policy initiatives. The reason why INR is so easily discounted within the Intelligence Community is because it suffers at the reputation of the State Department.

A job at the Department of State was once a glamorous and exotic job, but it has lost its appeal in recent years. According to George Kennan, the State Department has been largely deprived of its traditional role as the spokesman for and coordinator of foreign policy, and as a result, internally, the work is perceived as routine and boring, promotions are rarely granted, and morale is low.¹²⁹ Furthermore, service abroad is also much more dangerous than it used to be, so recruiting has been difficult in recent years. Congruently, the budget of the State Department does not come close to competing with the Defense Department's budget. Further hindering its cause, the State Department has no constituency to lobby for it, whereas the Agriculture Department has a strong farming lobby, Commerce has big business, and the Defense Department has the military-industrial complex. Therefore, it is no surprise that, given this culture, the president is not going to wait for INR to "shape up," especially in light of the fact that he can have his intelligence decisions framed more politically by his own staff, the National Security Advisor, the Defense Department, or the CIA. Once a president comes to believe that

¹²⁹ Kennan 1997, 2

Foggy Bottom is not attuned to domestic politics and that his staff is more savvy, in that regard, and ultimately the loser is almost invariably INR.

So how is INR's plight remedied? Central to this question must be to try and mend the reputation of the State Department, especially in the eyes of the president. According to Gelb, purists in the State Department maintain that the president, with work, can recreate the conditions of the past where the State Department was influential. Specific remedies include diminishing the role of the National Security Adviser, advocacy on behalf of the new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte, and changes to the President's Daily Brief (PDB).

Since the National Security Advisor exists only at the sufferance of the president, the president "can make or break the role of their National Security Advisor as policy advocates."¹³⁰ Specifically, purists believe that these changes for the NSC adviser would help: no chairing of interagency meetings, no contact with the press, no foreign travel, no NSC channels and dialogues with foreign counterparts or with ambassadors in Washington, and no contact with Congress.¹³¹ It is argued that these restrictions would not constrain the adviser's influence on policy matters, given his or her close relationship with the president; however, by the same token, these restrictions would pave the way for a more prominent role for the Secretary of State (and ultimately the department) in the eyes of the public as well as the president. Obviously there could be perceivable problems with this scenario. While it may be easy to argue that the Secretary of State can easily handle the role of an executive branch "public relations" expert, such as making speeches and appearing in interviews, it is quite difficult to imagine the State

¹³⁰ Rockman 1981, 245

¹³¹ Gelb 1980, 234

Department changing its tune overnight to assume the role of chief policymaker to the president, especially when the role may be better suited to the NSC adviser.

The Secretary of State has to bear a lot of the burden for strengthening the stature of the State Department, which will ultimately be responsible for INR's revival as a legitimate part of the IC. Only time will tell if the current Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, will help bring prominence back to the State Department, or if her close relationship with the president will further hurt INR's cause. Born and raised in segregated Birmingham, Alabama, Rice's initial political persuasion was Democratic, but in 1982, she switched to what she calls an "all-over-the-map Republican."¹³² During the end of the Cold War, Rice was the top Russian expert on the NSC, but she left in 1991 to become the first female, non-white, and youngest provost at Stanford University. She returned to politics to become the first female National Security Advisor during President George W. Bush's first administration. According to Elaine Sciolino, columnist for the *New York Times*, Rice and President Bush share a "realist, Republican balance-of-power approach that focuses more on the big powers and less of the international community."¹³³ Now that Condoleezza Rice is Secretary of State, Rice may end up becoming an advocate for the agency she heads, like most of her cabinet member peers. She certainly has the ability to strengthen the State Department's role in the eyes of the administration, considering her close relationship with President Bush, however, if Rice were to treat her cabinet position much like Henry Kissinger did serving under Nixon, then the close relationship of Rice and Bush might end up hurting the State Department further if she abandons it in favor of pleasing the president.

¹³² Sciolino 2000, 213

¹³³ Ibid 214

Perhaps the most promising solution to enhance the role of INR on the immediate horizon is the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position with John. D. Negroponte at the helm. The former classmate of CIA Director Porter Goss at Yale, Negroponte joined the Foreign Service shortly after graduation and was stationed first in Hong Kong, then in 1964 to Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he garnered the attention of then visiting Harvard professor Henry Kissinger, who ultimately brought Negroponte to the National Security Council during the Nixon administration. Negroponte and Kissinger's relations ultimately fell apart when Negroponte, who was then the Liaison Officer between the U.S. delegation and the delegation of North Vietnam during the Paris peace talks, began to be critical of the way Kissinger and Nixon were conducting the agreement to end the war.¹³⁴ As a result of their falling out, Secretary of State Kissinger sent Negroponte to the "relative backwaters" of Ecuador and Greece.¹³⁵

More recently, with a career shaped by the State Department via ambassadorships to Honduras, Mexico, the Philippines, and the newly-liberated Iraq, Negroponte seems positioned to increase the stature of INR among the 14 other intelligence agencies he would oversee. However, his appointment has drawn resentment from both the CIA and the Defense Department because it seems as though they would stand to lose the most, in terms of influence over President Bush. Negroponte's big responsibility is that he will have control over the President's Daily Brief (PDB) that President Bush reads every morning, taking the role away from the CIA which has previously presided over the documents' production for every president since Harry Truman.

¹³⁴ Negroponte, in an interview with the National Security Archive at George Washington University in 1997, said that Kissinger repeatedly undermined his efforts by conducting secret peace talks with Le Duc Tho, in an effort to speed up the end of the Vietnam War before Nixon's upcoming election in November 1972. "Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon himself were very, very eager to move the process as quickly as possible. They said repeatedly - and I heard Dr. Kissinger say this many, many times - that they simply did not want to begin President Nixon's second term of office still having to read battle field reports every morning after breakfast. That was the way he put it quite frequently."

¹³⁵ *Time* Feb 28, 2005, 34

The PDB, for fifty-eight years, has been known for being powerful and influential in shaping the President's agenda. A small document, the PDB is a compilation of about ten articles that usually run twenty pages long, and is circulated to fewer than a dozen senior officials, the most important being the President.¹³⁶ With that capability no longer residing with the CIA, Negroonte, not Porter Goss, will begin to serve, not only as chief intelligence adviser, but as one of the most influential people in Washington DC.¹³⁷ If Negroonte wanted to help INR's reputation among the rest of the IC, one change he could implement would be to make sure each member of the IC, including INR, had a section in the PDB to voice its opinion on intelligence concerns. Assumingly, this would eliminate deniability for the president and his administration if he were presented daily with each agency's intelligence analysis- whether good or bad.

Since Negroonte will be expected to brief the president, direct intelligence collection, determine agencies' budgets, and serve as a kind of "gatekeeper" for the president on intelligence, Negroonte impact on the INR's influence is direct and powerful. However, at first glance, the role of the DNI may seem powerful; but considering how vague the legislation that established the DNI is, Negroonte's institutional ability to do his job may be in doubt. In what *Time* refers to as potentially "the nastiest bureaucratic battle in Washington for years to come," Negroonte is bound to get into a turf war with the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who has until now controlled roughly 80 percent of total intelligence spending.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ *New York Times* Feb 20, 2005. A16

¹³⁷ In a glaring example of the DNI's newly-designated power, as well as "DC politics" at work, it seems as though Negroonte and his staff of 500 people might temporarily set up show at CIA headquarters in Virginia, with Negroonte quite possibly taking over the very office now occupied by Porter Goss. According to a former senior intelligence official, "if he [Negroonte] moves into that office, then he will send a signal to the community that he's the top guy now."

¹³⁸ *Time Magazine* Feb 28, 2005 p. 32

In addition, according to Washington insiders, Rumsfeld is also unhappy with the appointment of the Air Force Lieut. General Michael Hayden as Negroponte's deputy. Rumsfeld has made it clear that he thought Hayden, who supported intelligence reform after 9/11 and the Iraqi WMD disaster, "was not right-thinking on these matters."¹³⁹ Although there may be some loopholes in the law that allow Rumsfeld to ultimately justify holding onto the Pentagon purse strings, it is unlikely that Rumsfeld will openly take on Negroponte and his deputy because of his reluctance to challenge President Bush's authority. As for now though, the heads of the fifteen intelligence agencies seemed poised and ready for Negroponte to succeed. House intelligence committee chairman Peter Hoekstra (R, Michigan) stated, "I think they're all genuinely excited about him coming on board...I think all of these folks recognize that this is where the President wants to go."¹⁴⁰

Some intelligence officials believe that Negroponte's appointment sends a signal of the administration's independence from the CIA, which undoubtedly is a good sign for INR. With Negroponte as the director, the diminution of power for the CIA may bring about a rise in influence for INR and the State Department, in what is a bargaining game of bureaucratic politics in Washington. As quoted by the *New York Times*, President Bush agrees that "everybody will be given fair access, and everybody's ideas will be given a chance to make it to John's office."¹⁴¹

However if Negroponte is not the answer to INR's troubles, is there another solution on the immediate horizon? In watching the relationship of the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, and the DNI with the State Department unfold, we can perhaps begin to answer the necessary question when (or if) INR's intelligence will finally be taken seriously within the IC.

¹³⁹ *Time Magazine* Feb 28, 2005. p. 34

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid* p. 35

¹⁴¹ *New York Times* Feb 20, 2005 A 16

REFERENCES

- Acheson, Dean. 1969. *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (New York: WW Norton & Company)
- Allison, Graham. 1971. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, and Company).
- Allison, Graham and Morton Halperin. 1974. "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." in *American Foreign Policy*, G. John Ikenberry, ed. (Washington DC: Brookings Institute.)
- Barrett, David. 1997. *Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam Papers: A Documentary Collection*. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press).
- Bendor, Jonathan, and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. "Rethinking Allison's Models." *American Political Science Review* 86:301-322.
- Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. 1973. "INR: Intelligence and Research in the Department of State."
- Bush, George W. March 17, 2003. Address to Nation on Iraq.
- Bush, George W. March 19, 2003. Address to Nation on Iraq- Declaration of War.
- Cline, Ray. 1976. *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*. (Washington DC: Acropolis Books).
- CNN online news article. January 12, 2005. "Official: US Calls Off Search for Iraqi WMD's."
- Colby, William. 1978. *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*. (New York: Simon and Schuster).
- Department of State Website.
- Ford, Harold. 1998. *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968*. (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence).
- Ford, Harold. 1993. *Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating*. (New York: University Press of America).
- Gelb, Leslie. 1980 "Why Not the State Department?" *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn) pp. 25-40.

- Halberstam, David. 1992. *The Best and the Brightest*. (New York: Ballantine Books).
- Halperin, Morton. 1974. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. (Washington DC: Brookings Institute).
- Herring, George. 1996. *America's Longest War*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc).
- Hilsman, Roger. 1956. *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*. (Gelncoe, IL: Free Press).
- Hilsman, Roger. 1967. *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy*. (Garden City: Doubleday).
- Hilsman, Roger 1993. *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc).
- Holsti, Ole. 1972. "Review of *Essence of Decision* by Graham Allison." *Western Political Quarterly* 25:136-40.
- Hughes, Thomas. May 2, 2004. "INR's Vietnam Study in Context: A Retrospective Preface Thirty-Five Years Later."
- Hughes, Thomas. 1976. "The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making." *Headline Series: Published by the Foreign Policy Association*. December 1976, Number 233.
- Hughes, Thomas. 1974. "The Power to Speak and the Power to Listen: Reflections on Bureaucratic Politics and a Recommendation on Information Flows" in *Secrecy and Foreign Policy*, Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Huntington, Samuel. 1961. *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Inderfurth, Karl and Loch Johnson. 1988. *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council*. (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company).
- Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Feb 11, 2004. National Security Archive. Electronic Briefing Book Number 80.
- Iraq Survey Group. October 2, 2003. Report to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
- Johnson, Loch. 1989. *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*. (New York: Oxford University Press).

- Karnow, Stanley. 1984. *Vietnam: A History*. (New York: Penguin).
- Keeley, Robert. "CIA-Foreign Service Relations." in *National Security: US Intelligence After the Cold War*, Craig Eisendrath, ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).
- Kennan, George. 1997. "Diplomacy without Diplomats?" *Foreign Affairs* (September/October).
- Kissinger, Henry. 1979. *White House Years*. (Boston: Little Brown).
- Krasner, Steven. 1972. "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison in Wonderland)." *Foreign Policy* 7:159-79.
- Negroponte, John March 31, 1997. Interview with National Security Archives
- Neustadt, Richard. 1960. *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*. (New York: Wiley).
- New York Times* article. February 20, 2005. A16.
- Prados, John. May 2, 2004 "The Mouse that Roared: State Department Intelligence in the Vietnam War."
- Priest, Dana. 2003. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*. (New York: WW Norton & Company).
- Rockman, Bert. 1981. "America's Department of State" in *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council*, Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, eds. (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company).
- Rosati, Jerel. 1981. "Developing a Systemic Decision-making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective." *World Politics* 33:2 (January) pp. 234-252.
- Rudenshtine, David. 1996. *The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case*. (Los Angeles: University of California Press).
- Rusk, Dean. 1990. *As I Saw It*. (New York: WW Norton & Company).
- Rusk, Dean. Oral History interview with L K Johnson and R Rusk. Catalog P, Jan 18, 1985.
- Rusk, Dean. Oral History interview with L K Johnson and R Rusk. Catalog Y, Jan 18, 1985.
- Sciolino, Elaine. 2000. "Compulsion to Achieve- Condoleezza Rice." in *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*, Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. July 9, 2004. Report on the US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.

State Department Research Memorandum, RFE-90. October 22, 1963. "Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends"

State Department Review of Judgments in INR Reports. 1961-1968. "Thematic Summaries I: Communist Intentions and Response to US Actions"
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121.

State Department Review of Judgments in INR Reports. 1961-1968. "Thematic Summaries II: Political Stability" www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121.

State Department Review of Judgments in INR Reports. 1961-1968. "Thematic Summaries III: The Course of the War" www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121.

State Department Review of Judgments in INR Reports. 1961-1968. "Thematic Summaries IV: Prospects for Beginning Talks and Negotiating a Settlement"
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121.

State of the Union address. 2003.

Summers, Col. Harry. 1985. *Vietnam War Almanac*. (New York: Facts on File Publications).

Time article. August 9, 1971. p.16

Time article. February 28, 2005. p. 32-35.

Trewhitt, Henry L. 1971 *McNamara*. (New York: Harper and Row).

UN Security Council Resolution 1441. November 7, 2002.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1974. "Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations." *International Organization* 28:435-66.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1989. "Uncertainty, Rational Learning, and Bargaining in the Cuban Missile Crisis." in *Models of Strategic Choice in Politics*, Peter Ordeshook, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).

White House Website.

Wiarda, Howard. 1996. *American Foreign Policy*. (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers).

Wiarda, Howard. 1987. *Foreign Policy without Illusion*. (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company).

Woodward, Bob. 2002. *Bush at War*. (New York: Simon & Schuster).

Woodward, Bob. 2004. *Plan of Attack*. (New York: Simon & Schuster).

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF IRAQ SURVEY GROUP'S DUELFER REPORT

SEPTEMBER 30, 2004

On September 30, 2004, the ISG released the Duelfer Report, its final report on Iraq's WMD programs. The main points of the report include the following:

- Iraq's WMD programs had deteriorated significantly since the end of the first Persian Gulf War
- Iraq had no deployable WMD of any kind as of March 2003, and had stopped production starting in 1991.
- There was no proof of any Biological Weapons stocks since 1991.
- Iraq hoped to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, a prospect that the Iraqi government thought was coming soon.
- Until March 2003, Saddam Hussein lied to his top military commanders, stating that Iraq did indeed possess WMD's that could be used against any US invasion force, in order to prevent a coup during the impending invasion
- Iraq used procurement contracts allowed under the Oil for Food Program to buy influence amongst UN Security Council member states including France, China, and Russia, as well as dozens of prominent journalists and anti-sanctions activists.

APPENDIX B

INR's FOOTNOTE TO OCTOBER 2002 NIE

State/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.

In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that

purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program.

APPENDIX C

INR's FOOTNOTE TO OCTOBER 2002 NIE

INR's Alternative View of Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes

Some of the specialized but dual-use items being sought are, by all indications, bound for Iraq's missile program. Other cases are ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnet-production line whose suitability for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some efforts involve non-controlled industrial material and equipment-including a variety of machine tools-and are troubling because they would help establish the infrastructure for a renewed nuclear program. But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors departed) are not clearly linked to a nuclear end-use. Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.

APPENDIX D

INR's SUGGESTIONS FOR COLIN POWELL'S SPEECH BEFORE THE UN

JANUARY 2003

APPENDIX A

() We provide specific comments below, in the form of a scorecard. We flag the draft's strengths as well as weaknesses. This scorecard is pegged to analytic merit, not persuasive power. On a range from one to five stars (asterisks), five denotes a smoking gun in terms of UNSCR 687-prohibited weapon systems. One star denotes a claim we do not consider strong, but which is plausible. A bifurcated score (e.g., "****/WEAK) indicates that parts of the discussion are strong, other parts weak.

Introduction

-- Page 1-2. **** Discussion of historical, outstanding issues and Iraq's track record of noncompliance, deception, and denial. There is further discussion at the beginning of the biological, chemical, nuclear, and missile sections. These discussions might be expanded.

Iraq Deception and Denial

-- 4-5. ***/WEAK. Intercepted conversation of [REDACTED] re hiding vehicle from inspectors. Weak re [REDACTED] Virtually conclusive re hiding prohibited vehicle, presumably involving OFF violation. But it demonstrates Iraq's continuing proclivity to hide proscribed equipment from inspectors--reinforcing our concerns about hidden WMD.

-- 6-7. * Information on Higher Committee: Generally valid, even though we don't take the source's every claim as Gospel, and the insider's information is very general.

-- 7, last bullet. * Information from senior official in [REDACTED] Okay.

-- 8, first bullet. *** Orders to hide correspondence with OMI: Highly compelling, even though the high-level orders apparently cover sensitive materials not exclusive to WMD.

-- 8, second bullet. WEAK. Qusay order to remove prohibited items from palaces.

-- 8, third bullet. *** Multiple humint reports of hiding prohibited items in various homes. Compelling, even though some reports appear based on rumor and/or circular reporting, and the hidden items presumably include sensitive non-WMD documents as well as WMD items.

-- 8, last bullet. WEAK. Sensitive files being driven around in cars, in apparent shell game. Plausibility open to question.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-- 9, first bullet. * Computer hard drives reportedly removed from “weapons facilities.” Such claims are highly credible, even though they apparently extend to non-WMD sensitive files as well. (Note: Draft states claim as fact.)

-- 9, second bullet. WEAK. Plans to hide WMD in [REDACTED] We cannot rule this out, but virtually all of the many reports come from questionable sources. Also, inspectors may have already investigated one or more such reports and found nothing.

-- 9, last bullet. WEAK. Missiles with biological warheads reportedly dispersed. This would be somewhat true in terms of short-range missiles with conventional warheads, but is questionable in terms of longer-range missiles or biological warheads.

-- 10, first bullet. * Missiles hidden [REDACTED] Authenticity of information is questionable, but claim is not implausible.

Chemical Weapons

-- 10-11. ***/WEAK. We support much of this discussion, but we note that decontamination vehicles--cited several times in the text--are water trucks that can have legitimate uses. A safer characterization is, “a vehicle used for chemical weapon decontamination.”

-- 11. **WEAK We agree there has been suspicious activity [REDACTED], including presence of a decontamination vehicle. We caution, however, that Iraq has given UNMOVIC what may be a plausible account for this activity--that this was an exercise involving the movement of conventional explosives; presence of a fire safety truck (water truck, which could also be used as a decontamination vehicle) is common in such an event.

-- 12. top. ***/WEAK. Much of discussion is valid, but it is unlikely the Iraqis [REDACTED] This paragraph really should describe [REDACTED]

-- [REDACTED] Authenticity of information is questionable, though some of the claims are plausible. Nuclear claims are WEAK, and open to IAEA criticism. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

Thwarting Interviews

-- 13-14. *** Discussion is good and valid.

-- 14, last bullet. ***/WEAK. Iraqi intelligence officials posing as WMD scientists. Such claims are not credible and are open to criticism, particularly by the UN inspectorates. (Interviews typically involve such topics as nuclear physics, microbiology, rocket science, and the like; and inspectors tend to be leading scientific or technical experts.) Better to state that some Iraqi intelligence officials have been part of WMD programs for

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
years, filling scientific positions [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-- 15, first half. * Saddam reportedly warned scientists of serious consequences if they revealed sensitive information to inspectors. Not clear the information is authentic, but it is generally credible. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

-- 15, penultimate bullet. * WMD scientists reportedly attended pre-inspection training. Unsubstantiated but credible. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

-- 15, last bullet. WEAK. Claim of intelligence officials posing as WMD experts. Aside from the question of plausibility, note that such claims arguably are at odds with the above-cited report of pre-inspection training by WMD personnel.

-- 16, first bullet. * Claim that intelligence agents posed [REDACTED] Unsubstantiated, but plausible. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

-- 16, second bullet. WEAK. Alleged false death certificate for scientist. Not implausible, but UN inspectors might question it. (Note: Draft states it as fact.)

-- 16, third bullet. * Iraqi regime prepared to execute key scientists to prevent disclosure of sensitive information. Unsubstantiated, but plausible--at least to the point where a suspiciously high number of scientists start dropping off.

-- 16, bullets four and five. WEAK. WMD personnel leaving Iraq under various circumstances to avoid interviews. Some details are highly questionable, and this reporting is arguably at odds with other claims in the draft.

-- 16-17. WEAK. Experts at one facility being substituted by workers from other facilities. Plausibility open to question.

-- 17, first full bullet. * Some [REDACTED] officials reportedly [REDACTED] We question report's authenticity, but it is not implausible.

-- 17, second bullet. WEAK. 12 experts reportedly under house arrest, 70 others in prison, to prevent contact with inspectors. Highly questionable.

-- 17, third bullet. * Unidentified scientist reportedly held by authorities to prevent contact with inspectors; family threatened. We question report's authenticity, but it is plausible.

Illegal Procurement of WMD-Related Goods

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the prevailing IC view, with which INR (and many DOE experts in private) disagree.

[REDACTED]

Biological Weapons

22-23. ***** We endorse the discussion of outstanding, historical issues. We suggest adding that “UNSCOM reported in 1997 that a panel of 13 experts from member states unanimously found that ‘the outstanding problems’ in Iraq’s BW declarations were ‘numerous and grave.’” (Quoted from recent CIA product.)

-- 25, first full para. *** Discussion of MIG-21 and BW delivery. We share the strong concern about Iraqi intentions for recently refurbished MIG-21s for BW purposes. However, the claim that experts agree UAVs fitted with spray tanks are “an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons” is WEAK.

-- 26 - The date of the accident asked for in the text is 1998.

-- 29, end of middle para. ****/WEAK. Smallpox indeed is a great concern: We believe there is an even chance smallpox is part of Iraq’s offensive BW inventory. But there is no solid evidence Iraq has researched smallpox for weaponization purposes.

-- 31, third bullet. ***/WEAK. This is a legitimately serious issue, but “marks on his arm” is not compelling and should be deleted; or the text should read, “UN inspectors acquired a photograph of one of the prisoners that showed biological experimentation.”

-- Page 32, last para. **/WEAK. Most of the discussion is valid, but the reference to “central” as part of Iraq’s battlefield strategy should be deleted. The use of CW was small, but not inconsequential, in comparison to the many strictly conventional attacks that claimed thousands more lives.

-- Page 34, second bullet. ***/WEAK. The text in fact should be strengthened, by deleting the word “laboratory” from the first bullet. This will strengthen our concerns about equipment being used for production.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-- Page 38, second bullet. ***/WEAK The castor oil issue is serious, but the discussion should be modified. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Nuclear Weapons

-- 39-40. **** We support the focus on Saddam's continued intent/ambition to acquire nuclear weapons; track record of deception, denial. We would add that the nuclear-weapon program has always been the jewel in the crown for Saddam.

[REDACTED]

-- 40. ****/WEAK. We support the focus on Iraq's record in the early-to-mid 1990s of deceiving the IAEA. But most of the discussion is overstated, in our opinion, especially the suggestion that only a single defector stood in the way of an IAEA clean bill of health for Iraq. [REDACTED]

-- 41. **/WEAK. We concur with some of the discussion of Iraq's nuclear-weapon status. [REDACTED]

-- 41-42. **/WEAK. On the tubes, in addition to our general remarks above, we suggest not playing the cited intercept, as it is taken out of context and is highly misleading. Meantime, we will work with our IC colleagues to fix some more egregious errors in the tubes discussion.

-- 43-44. **/WEAK. While the discussion of magnet procurements is largely valid, [REDACTED] Nonetheless, this discussion tracks with the majority IC view.

-- 44. ***/WEAK. We support the focus on the fact that Saddam's cadre of nuclear experts remains largely intact. However, some specific claims are WEAK, namely that many key scientists and equipment were "often hidden [REDACTED] and the suggestion that Iraq moved and renamed teams of personnel [REDACTED]

-- 45, last para. */WEAK. While we too are concerned about Saddam's periodic meetings with nuclear personnel, we have a more mixed interpretation as to motive.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Delivery Systems

-- 47, first full para. WEAK. Linkage of specialty trucks to Scuds is unsubstantiated.

-- 47, middle of page. WEAK. Reports of missiles being transported on trucks, or moved into southern Iraq at night, come from questionable sources, in our view.

-- 48. **/WEAK. We support much of the discussion of al-Samouds. For the record, however, we question the claim that Iraq has developed an al-Samoud with a 300 km range. We believe it might be a garbled reference to the wider-diameter, al-Samoud II variant.

-- 49, top of page. **/WEAK. We agree the reporting on clandestine work on the Scud-type engine is compelling, though it is unproven and, in our view, at odds with other compelling humint. (Note: The draft states it as fact.)

[REDACTED]

-- 49, bottom. **/WEAK. While we agree that Iraqi contacts with North Korea are worrisome, we believe the discussion overstates the evidence of any missile link.

-- 50, first full para. ****/WEAK. We agree that the evidence suggests work on large-diameter motor cases, though we do not believe the evidence is necessarily conclusive, contrary to what the draft suggests. (The intercepts are hardly straightforward.)

Page 55, bottom. **/WEAK. While we agree with much of the discussion, we are unconvinced that "...all the bad actors and terrorists who could come through Baghdad and pick-up biological weapons..." is a likely scenario unless Saddam's regime is about to fall.

ⁱⁱ [State | WashDC 022561 | 199802071709 | (U)]

[REDACTED]