INSTITUTIONS AT A CROSSROADS: THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATING MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS IN WESTERN SOCIETIES

by

MURAT BAYAR

(Under the Direction of Markus Crepaz)

ABSTRACT

The challenge of integrating Muslim immigrants in Western societies has become salient, as evidenced by burkha bans in France and Belgium, cartoon protests in Denmark, and homegrown terrorism in the United States, despite significant differences in the political institutions and public policies of host countries. The question is, if different institutions and public policies don’t matter (at least to the extent that they were expected), what else matters in integration? This study theorizes that host countries’ violent conflicts in Muslim countries have a negative impact on the social cohesion of Muslim immigrants and host societies. For the transmission mechanism, I suggest that external violent conflicts are particularly utilized by transnational Islamist networks to strengthen in-group/out-group identities and contribute to the mobilization of these groups against each other. Conducting a quantitative analysis of sixteen Western countries for the period 1970-2010, I find that institutions and public policies have a weak positive impact on social cohesion, whereas the external conflict variable has a strong and negative impact. Employing case studies, I also trace the processes through which external conflicts are transmitted to host countries.

INDEX WORDS: Muslim, immigrant, multiculturalism, welfare state, transnational networks.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 INSTITUTIONS &amp; PUBLIC POLICIES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 MUSLIM IMMIGRATION &amp; HOST COUNTRY RESPONSES IN THE WEST</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 PUZZLE, RESEARCH QUESTION &amp; THEORY</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 RESEARCH DESIGN</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 RESULTS &amp; ANALYSIS</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 CONCLUSION</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX: MODIFICATIONS ON MULTICULTURALISM SCORES</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Democratic political systems of Western countries</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Multiculturalism scores of Western countries</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Annual immigration to Western Europe, 1948-1993</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Muslim population in Western countries, 2009</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Radical right parties in national governments</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Multinomial logistic regression results</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Dimensions of immigrant integration</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Theorized relationship between external violent conflicts and social cohesion</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Dependent variable, independent variables, and hypotheses</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Descriptive statistics by country-year</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>In-sample predicted probabilities, by population</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>A Swiss poster during the minaret campaign</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In October 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated, “This [multicultural] approach has failed, utterly failed… the idea of people from different ethnic backgrounds living happily "side by side" did not work” (Weaver 2010). In February 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said, “My answer is clearly yes, it [the promotion of distinct cultural and religious immigrant groups] is a failure… Of course we must respect differences, but we do not want… a society where communities coexist side by side” (Canada Free Press 2011). Finally, in June 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron said, “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. All this leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless, and the search for something to belong to and believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology…. If we are to defeat this threat, I believe it's time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past” (New York Magazine 2011).

Above remarks indicate a common disappointment in multiculturalism among policymakers in the West. However, these attitudes are not limited to multicultural policies. Western countries also show significant variance in terms of their democratic political systems (consensual-majoritarian) and welfare provisions. The expectation had been that certain institutions and public policies, including accommodation of ethnic differences and a generous welfare state, would win the hearts and minds of immigrants and promote integration. Instead,
the challenge of integrating Muslim immigrants has become a salient issue. For instance, they suffer from much higher unemployment rates than natives and non-Muslim immigrants. Furthermore, from the United States (U.S.) to Australia, and Sweden to Italy, Western countries have witnessed mass protests and violent incidents between Muslim immigrants and host societies.

These observations are puzzling not only for politicians, but also for political scientists. The literature suggests that institutions and public policies do matter in integrating historical minorities, social classes, and immigrants. Yet, more recent studies produce mixed results for the strength and direction of this relationship, especially when it comes to Muslim immigrants. While some studies find that national citizenship policies (e.g. *jus soli* –citizenship by birth vs. *jus sanguinis* –citizenship by descent) matter the most in integration, others find the opposite or no effect at all. Thus, the question is, why do all of these institutions and public policies that have worked so well in managing ethnic and religious diversity in the Netherlands and Switzerland, integrating social classes in Germany and Austria, and winning the consent of new immigrants in Canada, seem to fail when it comes to Muslim immigrants? What is it that makes the integration of Muslim immigrants in the West so challenging? Is it just the 9/11?

In order to address this question, I take a novel approach. Unlike most of the studies in the literature, this study suggests that the integration of immigrants cannot be understood by solely investigating domestic factors. This is because “immigration” is by definition a transnational phenomenon: it involves at least a sender and a recipient country. Furthermore, contemporary globalization facilitates the flow of people and information across borders at an unprecedented rate, and keeps immigrants “close” to the affairs of their homelands more than ever before.
The main argument of this study is that a host country’s involvement in a violent conflict with a Muslim country has a negative impact on the social cohesion of Muslim immigrants and the host society. This theory is primarily inspired by the polarization of German, Italian, and Japanese immigrants in Allied countries, especially in the U.S., during World War I (WWI) and WWII. This study tests the external conflict hypothesis along with several other institutional and socioeconomic hypotheses in sixteen Western countries for the period 1970-2010.

Chapter 2 discusses the institutionalist school of thought with a particular emphasis on electoral systems, the welfare state, and multiculturalism. Chapter 3 presents the literature on the performance of institutions and public policies with regard to the integration of Muslim immigrants in the West. Chapter 4 puts forward the puzzle, the research question, and the theory. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 involve the research design, and findings and analysis, respectively. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications of this study and alternative policy options.
CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONS & PUBLIC POLICIES

The impact of institutions on socioeconomic and political outcomes has been widely studied by social scientists. North (1981, 1990) defines institutions as man-made constraints that shape human interaction, created to reduce uncertainty and lower transaction costs. According to this definition, institutions include any forms of constraints, including norms of behavior. On the other hand, Hall (1986) defines institutions as formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices. This study adopts Hall’s approach, which distinguishes institutions from culture and enables a relatively objective operationalization.

In the first half of the 20th century, comparativists mainly studied the formal and legal institutions of government of the United States (U.S.) and few Western European countries, especially Great Britain and France. Their goal was to find the correct constitutional formula, which could be implemented in other polities for stable, effective, and democratic governance (e.g. Finer 1932; Friedrich 1950). Yet, the emergence of fascist regimes out of democratic systems in Germany and Italy largely discredited this notion for three decades in the post-WWII era.

A renewed interest in formal institutions coincided the late 1970s, partly due to the increasing applications of rational choice in political science and the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). Beginning in Portugal, the fall of several authoritarian regimes in Europe, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa brought democratic institutions
forward as a potential solution to economic crises, ethnic warfare, and poverty. Accordingly, new institutionalists focused on the independent impact of state’s administrative, legal, and bureaucratic organs on society (e.g. Krasner 1976; Stepan 1978; Trimberger 1978; Nordlinger 1981; Skocpol 1985; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985; Migdal 1988; Pierson 2000).

New institutionalism can be divided into three categories: rational choice, sociological, and historical (Hall and Taylor 1996). First, rational choice institutionalism was inspired by Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1963), which shows that if choice situations involve more than two alternatives and the preferences of individuals are diverse, no unique and transitive general welfare function can be constructed, unless some part of the society dictates it to the rest. Yet, Riker (1980) indicates that congressional processes show considerable stability, since procedural rules provide agenda control that limits the range and order of the options facing votes, while lowering the transaction costs of making deals. Thus, formal rules put limits on policymaking processes even when there is no natural equilibrium of preferences.

Second, sociological institutionalism specifies ways in which institutions can affect the underlying identities or interests of actors that rational choice institutionalists take for granted. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that individuals find themselves embedded in cultural and organizational sectors which determine the very concept of self-interest and utility. Accordingly, sociological institutionalists argue that many institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations are not adopted simply because they are the most efficient; instead they are culture-specific practices.

Sociological institutionalists define institutions broadly and include not only formal rules, procedures, and norms, but also symbols, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that guide human action. According to Hay (2007), interests do not exist; constructions of interest do.
Furthermore, Blyth (2007) suggests that the U.S.’s response to the Great Depression has more to do with particular ideas available at the time regarding the problem and potential solutions. In this regard, institutional variation can be explained as an ideationally path-dependent process in which agents construct their institutional future out of a limited set of ideas.

Finally, historical institutionalism suggests that preferences are formed by the institutional context within which they emerge and ought not to be treated as fixed. Thelen and Steinmo (1992) argue that institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes by shaping not only actors’ strategies (as in rational choice), but also their goals, while mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict. In this regard, institutions do not determine behavior but provide a context for action that helps us to understand why actors make the choices that they do. Overall, institutionalism stresses the autonomy of political institutions, possibilities for inefficiency in history, and the importance of symbolic action in understanding politics (March and Olsen 1984).

**Democratic Political Systems**

The comparative study of political systems provides rich insights into the experiences of industrialized democratic counties, particularly in mitigating ethnic and class conflicts. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) define democratization as a process in which rules of citizenship are applied to political institutions that were previously governed by coercive control, or expanded to include persons (e.g. ethnic minorities) that were not previously enjoying such rights, or extended to cover issues and institutions that were not previously subject to citizen participation. O’Donnell and Schmitter, and Dahl (1998) suggest that democracy is desirable because it provides essential rights, general freedom, self determination, human development,
and political equality. Furthermore, educated workforce is more productive and innovative, rule of law is stronger, property rights are more secure, contractual agreements are more effective, and barriers to communication are lower in democracies than in other regimes.

While there is a consensus among political scientists on the desirability of democracy, they disagree over the specifics of democratic systems, such as electoral rules and executive-legislature balance. Focusing on Latin America, Linz (1990) contrasts the parliamentary system with the presidential system and concludes that parliamentarism is more conducive to stability especially in countries with numerous parties and deep political cleavages. This is because, presidentialism involves rigidity with fixed terms, control of cabinet, and zero-sum game mentality, whereas parliamentarism entails flexibility due to having prime minister as a removable spokesperson without a regime crisis. In a large-n study that spans the period 1950-1990, Przeworski et al. (2000) also find that the expected life of democracy under parliamentarism is much longer than that under presidentialism.

In contrast, Horowitz (1990) criticizes Linz for being regionally biased, for having a mechanistic view of presidency, for assuming a particular electoral system (i.e. majoritarian system), and for ignoring what a president can achieve in a divided society. Horowitz argues that the problem is not about presidential systems but about plurality systems, since the winner-take-it-all mentality in heterogeneous societies is worrisome. In his view, checks-and-balances can restrain presidential ambition, and electoral systems can force the president to gain support from a broad base in a divided society, as in the cases of the U.S. and Sri Lanka, whereas parliamentary instability is a significant problem in several developing countries.

In parallel to Horowitz, Lipset (1990) indicates that parliamentary systems are more prone to concentrate power than presidential systems. Parliaments often vote in support of the
prime minister and cabinet policies in order to prevent reelectios. Furthermore, opposition parties are usually powerless in the policymaking process. On the other hand, the separation of presidency from legislature allows for weaker party discipline among legislators and more attention to constituency preferences (e.g. the U.S). Thus, two-party system is better suited to absorb protest than the Canadian experience of the rise and fall of third parties.

While several studies focus on presidential systems in North and South America, others examine the institutions and public policies of European countries with historical ethnic and class divisions. Lijphart (1969) and Lehmbruch (1974) introduced the term “consociational democracy” in reference to small Western European countries with ethnically divided societies and stable political systems: the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland have adopted proportional representation in order to provide minority representation and counteract potential threats to national unity and political stability.

A major divide in the electoral debate is that, while proportionality attaches greater importance to the representativeness of government, plurality emphasizes the capacity to govern. In other words, one-party governments can decide and act faster than coalition governments, although the latter perhaps represents a broader constituency. For instance, Quade (1991) points out that Lijphart calls proportional representation more fair, just, and representative than plurality system without defining “fairness.” According to Quade, the excellence of state action and accountability may well stand for fairness. In his view, plurality voting encourages competing parties to adopt a majority-forming attitude: parties are inclined to move to the center and seek conciliation before elections. By this way, the paralysis of a divided government doesn’t become a problem before the nation, and it will be voters, not the parliament, who truly elect and depose governments.
Lijphart (1984) compares the consensual and majoritarian systems in twenty-one democratic countries. He defines the consensual model as executive powersharing that involves separation of powers, balanced bicameralism, minority representation, multiparty system, federalism and decentralization, written constitution and minority veto, and proportional representation. On the other hand, the majoritarian model involves one-party and bare-majority cabinets, cabinet dominance over the parliament, asymmetrical bicameralism, two-party system, unitary and centralized government, unwritten constitution and parliamentary sovereignty, exclusively representative democracy (i.e. referendum uncommon), and the plurality system of elections. Accordingly, Lijphart places Western countries into four groups (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Democratic political systems of Western countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majoritarian</th>
<th>Majoritarian-Federal</th>
<th>Consensual-Unitary</th>
<th>Consensual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In order to test above hypotheses, Lijphart (1999) conducts a quantitative analysis on the democratic political systems of thirty-six countries, including former European colonies, Japan, and Israel, for the period 1945-1996. Based on the above framework, he places these countries on two dimensions: majoritarian-consensual, and federal-unitary. Lijphart finds that, despite the conventional wisdom, there is no tradeoff between government effectiveness and democratic quality (i.e. better representation). Instead, consensual democracies have a better performance in controlling inflation and violence than majoritarian democracies, whereas the latter system doesn’t have a better record in any macroeconomic or social indicators. Furthermore, consensual
democracies are more likely to be welfare states, have a better record in protecting the environment, have less people in prison, and are more generous in foreign aid.

In parallel to Lijphart, Saideman et al. (2002) demonstrate that increase in the proportionality of the electoral system decreases ethnic strife, and federal arrangements decrease ethnic dissent even under authoritarian regimes. Similarly, Chandra (2005) underlines that the threat to democratic stability doesn’t come from ethnic divisions but from the institutional context of politics: institutions that replace unidimensional ethnic identities with multidimensional ones sustain democracy.

Nevertheless, Gladdish (1993), and Crepaz and Steiner (2008) warn against universal prescriptions, since political scientists tend to examine electoral systems independent of the whole body of domestic politics. Furthermore, Elkins and Sides (2007) point out that the literature is inconclusive on whether minorities in consensual systems are more attached to the state. In this regard, the imposition of proportional representation or federalism may actually reinforce ethnic identities and have a negative impact on the attachment of geographically-concentrated minorities.

The Welfare State

The urge to mitigate ethnic and class conflicts in Europe produced another important institution, the welfare state. Freeman (1986) defines the welfare state as a closed system based on social membership whose distributive logic involves “mutual aid undertaken by members of a community according to socially defined conceptions of need” (p. 52). Beginning in Germany, this institution has proved successful in integrating historical minorities and social classes. Welfare provisions were also successfully utilized by Canada to win over and integrate
Newfoundlanders, who voted in favor, although by a thin margin, of unification in 1949 (Banting 1999).

While the welfare state had been effective in promoting socioeconomic and political stability in the West in the 19th and the early 20th centuries, its capacity to redistribute wealth is increasingly under scrutiny. Several political scientists indicate that globalization, ethnic diversity, and immigration pose challenges to the welfare state (e.g. Freeman 1986; Strange 1995; Banting 2002; Habyarimana 2007). Furthermore, Wolfe and Klausen (1997) point out that the welfare state is threatened not only by the right for lower taxes and less government intervention, but also by the left, which preoccupies itself with identity politics. Yet, other scholars find that exposure to global economy doesn’t necessarily hinder the provision of public goods and that the welfare state can continue to integrate minorities (e.g. Gilpin 2001; Crepaz 2002; Rudra and Haggard 2005).

Another challenge to the welfare state is the misrepresentation of redistributive policies by the media. Gilens (1999) conducts content analysis on media broadcasting in the U.S. and finds that the welfare state is negatively associated with African Americans. Similarly, Gilliam (1999) demonstrates that the mainstream American media’s portrayal of the “Welfare Queen,” which was President Reagan’s representation of African Americans with regard to the welfare state, was highly biased. The Welfare Queen script argued that welfare recipients were disproportionately women, and women on welfare were disproportionately African American. This portrayal was found to have reduced the support of white subjects for various welfare programs and increased stereotyping of African Americans. In the end, the media is perhaps influential on smaller welfare provisions of U.S. states with bigger black populations than others.
Multiculturalism

As Western European countries faced with increasing ethnic diversity beginning in the 1950s, particularly due to immigration, they gradually adopted multicultural policies at varying degrees. Joppke (1998) defines multiculturalism as, “Seeking of equal rights and recognition for ethnic, racial, religious, or sexually defined groups” (p. 449). Similarly, Banting and Kymlicka (2006) describe multicultural policies (MCPs) as the policies of public support, recognition, or accommodation of ethnocultural diversity. The objective of multiculturalism is to integrate historical minorities, indigenous people, and immigrants in the predominant society through a pluralist framework. Nickel (1988) highlights pluralism as the ideal way to deal with ethnic and religious diversity, since it would eliminate potential conflicts between full national membership and the preservation of distinct identities.

Multiculturalism involves changes in the legal framework and citizenship policies, including exemptions from dress codes, funding of ethnic institutions and bilingual/mother-tongue language education, and affirmative action. Based on these dimensions, Banting and Kymlicka (2006) rank Western countries on their level of immigrant multiculturalism. On a scale of 0-8 (high scores mean more multiculturalism), Table 2.2 indicates that there is a great degree of variance among Western countries. Although Australia, Canada, and New Zealand score high as immigrant-countries (i.e. host society members are nth-generation immigrants), the U.S. is in the middle and prevents a generalization for this group. Western European countries that have received substantial number of Muslim guest workers demonstrate a similar variance.
Table 2.2: Multiculturalism scores of Western countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Level of Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Banting and Kymlicka 2006.

Despite the expectations and early victory statements (e.g. Kymlicka 1999), the success of multiculturalism in integrating immigrants is under scrutiny as well. Joppke (1998) suggests that multiculturalism challenges nation state’s principle of the congruence of political and cultural boundaries by preserving immigrant cultures. Furthermore, Barry (2001), a major critic of multiculturalism, writes, “Multiculturalism poses as many problems as it solves” (p. 328). The critics generally point out the tradeoffs between heterogeneity, recognition, and redistribution. The heterogeneity-redistribution tradeoff hypothesis suggests that ethno-linguistic and/or racial diversity weakens the welfare state (i.e. it is difficult to generate trust and solidarity along ethnic and racial lines). On the other hand, recognition-redistribution tradeoff hypothesis underlines the misdiagnosis of socioeconomic problems, as the left falsely seeks the solution in ethnic recognition (Banting and Kymlicka 2006).
Banting and Kymlicka (2006) test above hypotheses and find that, although not statistically significant, the interaction of the percentage of immigrants in population and MCPs has a positive impact on social spending. They conclude that MCPs may offset the negative effect of the increase in the number of immigrants in overall population. Their findings are supported by Crepaz (2008)’s study, which demonstrates that the strongest support for redistributive policies exist in countries with modest MCPs and the second strongest support exists in countries with strong MCPs. Thus, there is no systemic negative association between MCPs and redistributive policies. Furthermore, when the support for redistribution is the dependent variable, and MCPs, percentage of immigrants, and demographic factors are independent variables, MCPs have a positive impact on the support for the welfare state, while the percentage of immigrants still has a negative impact. Crepaz concludes that MCPs can help decreasing the cultural distance between host societies and minorities.

Overall, institutionalism underscores the impact of political institutions on society. In particular, the consensual system, the welfare state, and multicultural policies are expected to mitigate ethnic conflict and integrate minorities and immigrants. Based on these foundations, the following chapter investigates the role of institutions and public policies integrating Muslim integration Western countries.
CHAPTER 3

MUSLIM IMMIGRATION & HOST COUNTRY RESPONSES IN THE WEST

Man hat Arbeitskrifte gerufen und es kommen Menschen

[We called for manpower, but people came instead].

Max Frisch

Muslim Immigration to the West

The mass immigration from the Middle East and North Africa to Western countries began in the late 1940s. The primary reasons for this flow of people included Western Europe’s loss of workforce in World War II and the isolation of Eastern European labor by the Iron Curtain. On the supply side, Muslims chose to immigrate due to socioeconomic and political problems in their countries of origin: unemployment, poverty, state oppression, and violent conflicts were among the reasons for Muslim immigration to Western Europe, as well as to the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

At the outset of Muslim immigration, the recipient countries already showed variance in terms of their democratic political institutions and public policies. Hollifield (1997) highlights Germany as a prototype for the guestworker model, since it has perceived immigrants as temporary workers conditional on the labor market’s needs. France, on the other hand, is a prototype for the assimilation model, since it has expected immigrants not only stay permanently, but also assimilate into the host society and become “invisible.” Unlike the U.S.,

1 As quoted in Mandel (1989).
which “hyphenates” citizens, France perceives ethnic and religious characteristics as divisive, and hasn’t measured these attributes in censuses since 1872 (Giry 2006). Finally, Hollifield gives the U.K. as an example for the ethnic minorities model, since it has perceived immigrants as potential permanent residents that will remain visible ethnic communities.

Sainsbury (2006) differentiates the welfare regimes of the U.S., Germany, and Sweden as liberal, conservative and social democratic, respectively. Among them Germany has provided the most social rights to immigrant workers, since the conservative regime is based on labor market participation, for which guest workers qualify at the outset. The social rights provided by the generous German welfare state include health insurance, pensions, disability benefits, unemployment benefits, and child allowance, even when children live in immigrants’ country of origin. On the other hand, the social democratic regime is based on residency or citizenship, which has been a relatively smooth process in Sweden. Finally, the U.S. has provided significantly less social provisions both to natives and new immigrants. Providing a path dependency explanation, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) suggest that ethnic diversity of the U.S. has prevented the formation of a sizeable welfare state.

More recently, Howard (2009) categorizes Belgium, France, Ireland, and the U.K. as historically liberal; Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden as liberalizing; Austria, Denmark, Italy, and Spain as still restrictive; and Germany as a hybrid case with liberal-restrictive swings. Howard suggests that the colonial and early democratization legacies of the first two groups have contributed to their relatively inclusive citizenship laws, whereas the successful mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiments by radical right parties has hindered liberalization in others.
The massive flow of guest workers and their families in the second half of the 20th century caused substantial socioeconomic and institutional changes in Western countries. For instance, Sweden turned from an ethnically homogenous society (i.e. only 1 percent of the population was foreign in 1930) into a constitutionally multiculturalist and diverse country in the 1970s. What followed was, however, not integration but segregation in schools and housing, and income gap and hostility between non-European immigrants and the host society (Runblom 1994). Runblom partly attributes this outcome to the poor educational backgrounds of immigrants, who mostly came from rural areas. On the other hand, Iranian workers, who had a relatively strong educational background among Muslim immigrants, still suffered from higher levels of unemployment than natives in recipient countries.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Palestinian, Yemeni, Lebanese and Iraqi immigrants and refugees, who were mostly illiterate and didn’t speak English, moved to Detroit’s auto-industry beginning in the 1960s (Abraham 1977). While some of these groups immigrated with their families, others, such as the Yemenis (about 30 percent of Arab workers in Detroit), were single males who visited their families once in every 3-5 years and maintained their ties to their country of origin. Other factors that preserved those ties included citizenship duties (e.g. military service requirements) and arranged marriages (Rogers 1986).

By the early 1970s, Western European labor markets had saturated. The 1973 oil crisis and rising unemployment rates led recipient countries terminate foreign worker systems. The increase in unemployment didn’t initially create a gap between immigrant workers and host societies, since the former group was mainly performing low wage, socially undesirable, and hazardous tasks for which the latter didn’t compete for (Rystad 1992). However, Muslim

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2 Arranged marriages are also a common practice among Muslim immigrants in Europe. For instance, about two third of all Moroccan and Turkish youngsters (i.e. second-generation immigrants) in the Netherlands find their spouse in their country of origin (Hooghiemstra 2003).
immigrants began to stand out in socioeconomic statistics overtime. For instance, the rate of unemployment for Turkish citizens in West Germany reached 18 percent by 1984, as compared to 15 percent for all foreign labor and 10 percent for the total population (Rogers 1986).

Despite the “guest” worker status of these immigrants, European governments failed to send them back home. This was partly because some of them had already acquired a protected status due to long residence. Furthermore, mass deportation of minorities was perceived socially unacceptable and politically incorrect in Western Europe due to the Nazi atrocities in relatively recent past (Hollifield 1986).

As a result, hundreds of thousands of Muslim workers stayed and participated in the labor market, education, the welfare state, and even local politics without citizenship. This process has brought the welfare state under scrutiny. Banting (1999) writes, “The primary challenge to social citizenship does not seem to come primarily from ethnic and racial minorities. The greater danger is that majorities will withdraw, denying benefits to newly arrived “strangers” or retreating to smaller welfare state in order to minimize transfers across ethnic and racial lines” (p. 121). Accordingly, immigrant communities stirred a debate on the need for a postnational approach that enables incorporation into a system of membership rights without incorporation into the national collectivity (Soysal 1994).

Table 3.1: Annual immigration to Western Europe, 1948-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Period</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1964</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1972</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1982</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1988</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1993</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Runblom (1994).

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Until the early 1970s, Western European welfare states were a net beneficiary of immigrants, since guest workers were paying taxes without receiving much benefits; they were either excluded from welfare provisions or less in need as young, healthy singles (Freeman 1986). Yet, once settled and achieved family reunifications, Muslim immigrant communities continued to multiply (Table 3.1; Table 3.2). As a result, aging workers and their families have turned Western European welfare states into a net contributor to immigrants (Rogers 1986), and further promoted the association of the welfare state with a visible and subordinate minority in the public mind (Freeman 1986).

Table 3.2: Muslim population in Western countries, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Muslim Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Host Country Population that is Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>353,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>281,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>657,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,554,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,026,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>946,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>149,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>323,000</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,647,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,454,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The differences in citizenship regimes have automatically reflected on naturalization rates: the naturalization rate of foreign citizens was 5 percent in Sweden, 1 percent in Switzerland, 0.8 percent in France and the Netherlands, and 0.5 percent in West Germany in

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4 Muslim immigrant birthrate has been about three times higher than host society birthrate in Western Europe (Walker 2006).
1983 (Rogers 1986). By the early 1980s the biggest non-European (i.e. non-European Economic Community) immigrant groups in Western Europe were Algerians and Moroccans in France, and Turks in the Netherlands and West Germany, while Turks constituted the second biggest non-European community in Sweden and Switzerland.

While host countries struggled with the challenge of integrating millions of Muslim immigrants, sender countries generally benefited from the outflow of people. Sayari (1986) points out that Turkey, for instance, has received substantial remittances and enjoyed less pressure from unemployment during this process. Sender countries also benefited from returning workers in terms of transfer of technology and know-how.

An unexpected outcome, however, was that many Muslim immigrants began to identify themselves with “conservative Islam,” partly due to their search for a group identity in a foreign culture (Sayari 1986). Religiosity has also been on the rise in the U.S. More than 20 percent of U.S. mosques have Islamic schools associated with them, and mosque attendance increased 75 percent in the late 1990s (Bagby, Perl, and Froehle 2001). Furthermore, the U.S. National Home education Institute indicates that the number of Muslim children homeschooled is rapidly rising (Ghayur 1981; Bahrampour 2010).

Integration

Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) define integration as the degree to which the constituent parts of a society (groups or individuals) relate to one another. They put forward the four dimensions of integration as: (1) socioeconomic (income, employment, social security, level of education, housing and segregation); (2) cultural (choice of spouse, delinquency, language skills, frequency of contacts with host country and country of origin, respect for host society values
such as democracy, gender equality, the rule of law, separation of the church and the state); (3) legal and political (number of migrants naturalized, number of migrants with dual citizenship, participation in politics, participation in civil society); and (4) attitudinal (reported cases of discrimination, perceptions of migrants by the host society, violence directed at migrants, incidence and effects of diversity policies, role of media). Entzinger and Biezeveld also suggest that integration can be studied at the micro level in terms of frequency and intensity: frequency refers to the number of social ties and contacts, while intensity concerns the nature of those ties, including the feelings of belonging and familiarity.

Entzinger and Biezeveld’s (2003) definition reflects the overall approach in the literature. Esser (2000) puts forward the four dimensions of integration as acculturation (i.e. acquisition of linguistic and social competencies), placement (i.e. participation in socioeconomic and political life), interaction (e.g. friendships, marriages), and identification with the host society. Similarly, Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) suggest, “Social integration… refers to the inclusion of individuals in a system, the creation of relationships among individuals and their attitudes towards the society.”

The pursuit of defining integration necessitates its distinction from assimilation. According to Park and Burgess (1921), (ethnic) assimilation involves the gradual outcome of accommodation, which is manifested by a shared culture and historical narrative in a society. Similarly, Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) define assimilation as the process by which immigrants become visibly indistinguishable from the host society in their social situation and cultural orientation, although not necessarily in names and complexion, in two or three generations. Finally, Brubaker (2001) defines assimilation as becoming similar as opposed to
being segregated. Overall, assimilation refers to the “invisibility” of immigrants not only in socioeconomic and political statistics, but also in terms of their outlook in the public sphere.

“Immigrant” is another key concept in this study that is hard to specify, partly due to the fact that host countries have different terminologies, visa categories, and legal frameworks for immigrants. It refers to “a person who comes to a country to take up permanent residence” (Merriam-Webster 2010), “someone who comes to live in a country from another country” (MacMillan 2010), and “a person who has come to a different country in order to live there permanently” (Cambridge 2010). Another commonality of the first-generation immigrants is being foreign born rather than native (Vogel and Triandafyllidou 2005). These definitions underline the will of the foreigner to stay permanently as the distinctive aspect of immigrant, regardless of his/her visa status. In this regard, illegal entrants can also be considered as immigrants, although they don’t have a valid visa or permanent residency.

**Determinants of Muslim Integration**

The investigation of the determinants of immigrant integration is no easier task than the operationalization of key concepts. Brettell and Hollifield (2008) point out that, while political scientists address the question “Why do states have difficulty controlling migration?” from institutionalist and rationalist perspectives, sociologists ask “What explains incorporation and exclusion?” from institutionalist and structuralist perspectives (p. 4). In this regard, the unit of analysis is political/international system and the dependent variable is policy outcomes in political science, whereas the unit of analysis is ethnic group/social class and the dependent variable is migrant behavior in sociology. The commonly examined factors include institutions, rights, and interests in political science, and networks, enclaves, and social capital in sociology.
The literature provides rich insights into the determinants of (Muslim) integration in the West. In addition to assessing electoral systems, welfare provisions, and multiculturalism, political scientists and sociologists investigate the rhetoric of political parties and home-country schooling. Although sometimes contradictory, their findings indicate that institutions and public policies do have an impact on integration. A survey of the literature is presented below according to major independent variables.

**Multicultural Policies**

As part of the Mobilization on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship, and Immigration (MERCI) project, Koopmans and Statham (1999a) retrieve reported event data from *The Guardian* (the U.K.) and *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Germany) for the period 1990-95 in order to test national, post-national, and multicultural citizenship hypotheses. They code both institutional and non-institutional actors with regard to protest events and other forms of public claims making. Koopmans and Statham find that national citizenship policies are the strongest determinant of immigrant incorporation.

In a follow-up study, Koopmans (2004) examines the political integration of immigrants by looking at (1) the degree to which they participate in public debates and mobilize around issues of ethnic relations and rights, and (2) their focus on the politics of their countries of origin. He conducts content analysis on selected national quality newspapers in Germany, the Netherlands, and the U.K. Koopmans finds that the opportunities offered to immigrants affect their identification with the host country, and the more immigrants participate in public debates, the less they focus on the politics of their countries of origin. In parallel to Koopmans and Statham (1999a)’s study, he finds national integration and citizenship regimes more decisive on
immigrant incorporation than local institutions and policies. In a more recent study, Koopmans (2010) examines eight Western European countries and finds that the combination of multicultural policies with a generous welfare state has actually produced segregation, overrepresentation in crime statistics, and low job market participation for immigrants.

Yet, Ireland (2004) conducts a study in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands at the national level and at selected cities. Contrary to the studies of Koopmans and Statham (1999a) and Koopmans (2004), Ireland documents that host country institutions and policies matter only partially and sometimes in a counterproductive way. Making the picture more complicated, Hooghe, Reeskens, and Stolle (2007) demonstrate that, while extensive voting rights decrease ethnocentrism in host countries, multicultural policies and naturalization practices have no effect.

O’Neill (1999) highlights the Rushdie affair as a major challenge to the premise of multiculturalism as it demonstrates that cultural autonomy of Muslim immigrants can clash with a basic principle of liberalism: the freedom of speech. In this particular case, Salman Rushdie, who wrote a book (perceived as) critical of Islam, and the bookstores selling it have become a target of Muslim anger, protest, and even violence in the U.K. and across Europe since 1989. The incident has escalated to a new high when Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against Rushdie’s life; the fatwa was still in effect as of 2011 (Miller 2001).

According to Macey (1999), multiculturalism has also failed in promoting gender equality in immigrant Muslim communities. She points out that immigrant Pakistani communities view women as central to their honor and as transmitter of their culture from one generation to the next. For this reason, Pakistani men tend to force women not to go out but make arranged marriages with a kin in Pakistan. Cultural relativists often oppose at criticizing
the violence of Pakistani men against their wives and female relatives in the U.K., and argue that those actions can only be understood within their cultural and religious contexts.

Socioeconomic Factors

Helbling et al. (2010) conduct a cross-national analysis of socioeconomic inequalities among immigrants and natives in eighteen European countries. Based on survey data and Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) indicators, their study indicates that comprehensive and immigrant-friendly integration policies produce lower political engagement gaps between natives and immigrants, but they don’t affect social integration and social capital. This is particularly an important finding, since it indicates that integration has multiple dimensions, including employment, political participation, and social cohesion, which don’t necessarily respond to institutions and public policies at the same rate or in the same direction. Helbling et al.’s finding is incorporated in this study’s operationalization of integration, as described in Chapter 4.

Timmerman et al. (2003) point out that the employment gap between Muslim immigrants and natives emerged in the 1980s and continued in the 1990s in the West. For instance, unemployment rate was about 38 percent for men (aged 18-20) among Turks and Moroccans in Belgium in 1991, as opposed to 10 percent for native Belgians with the same level of education. Timmerman et al. attribute this gap to racial prejudice among employers against Muslim immigrant men and to overpopulated immigrant schools. They conclude that the weak socioeconomic status of Muslim men in the Belgian society contributes to their embrace of political Islam, which gives them a solidified identity and re legitimizes male dominance in family.
On the other hand, Giry (2006) suggests that jihadism, as an extreme manifestation of political Islam, is a highly limited phenomenon among millions of Muslim immigrants in Europe. Her argument is partly based on a 2005 survey that finds no difference between naturalized Muslim citizens and the native French in terms of religiosity (e.g. self-identification, participation in religious services). Accordingly, she attributes protests and violence in French banlieues to socioeconomic problems rather than the promotion of a worldwide caliphate. In fact, unemployment rate is 30 percent among French citizens of Algerian and Moroccan descent as opposed to 10 percent in the overall population. Furthermore, Muslims constitute 8 percent of the overall population but 50 percent of the people in prisons.

Using the European Social Survey data, Fleishmann and Dronkers (2007) investigate the socioeconomic integration (e.g. the labor market participation, employment, occupational status and upward mobility) of immigrants in thirteen European Union countries in 2004 and 2005. Controlling for public policies and individual-level factors, they find that Muslim men have significantly higher unemployment rates than natives and non-Muslim immigrants. Fleishmann and Dronkers argue that their findings indicate systemic discrimination against Muslims and provide support for Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis (Huntington 1993). They also find that unemployment rate of female immigrants is higher in countries where laws facilitate, rather than hinder, family reunifications. A potential explanation for this phenomenon is that “imported” brides tend to be uneducated and lack host country language skills. To complicate this picture further, the likelihood of marrying from home country actually increases with the level of education in Belgium for immigrant Moroccan men in the second generation and for all Turkish women regardless of generation (Lievens 2000).

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5 France experienced large-scale immigrant violence in October 2005 with the burning of 10,000 cars, schools and community centers in 300 towns and cities.
Employing survey data in twelve European countries, Quillian (1995) highlights the relative size of immigrant group, in addition to economic conditions, as a determinant of collective threat perception: host societies tend to develop prejudices against a rapidly growing immigrant group that diverts public resources on themselves. In parallel, Dancygier (2010) suggests that local economic scarcity can explain the immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflicts in Germany and the U.K. She finds that native protests and violence against immigrants increase when the latter group participates in local politics and succeeds in redistributing local resources, whereas immigrants turn against the host state when their political participation is hindered by institutions and public policies. Considering the experience of African Americans, she concludes that minority participation in politics may increase native resentment in the short-run, but it’s a step forward in integration.

**Ethnic/Religious Origin**

Rath (1981) points out that Muslim immigrants tend vote for co-ethnics in district elections in the Netherlands, while natives vote along party lines. Rath argues that the immigrant behavior reflects their clientelistic political orientation in Turkey and Morocco. Similarly, Van Londen et al. (2007) examine the impact of organizational participation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands on their social trust and formal political participation. Based on the Rotterdam Minorities Survey, they find that Moroccans and Turks are more likely to vote if they participate in client-oriented (e.g. religious organizations) and authority-oriented (e.g. trade unions) organizations, respectively. However, participation in cross-ethnic organizations (e.g. mixed neighborhood associations) doesn’t increase generalized social trust among Turkish immigrants.
Togeby (2004) tests the social capital hypothesis, which suggests a positive impact of partaking in civil society organizations on the level of social trust, as well as on democratic attitudes, including formal (e.g. voting) and informal (e.g. signing a petition) political participation. Using survey data on second-generation immigrants in Denmark, she finds that partaking in ethnic organizations has a weak impact on the political participation of Turks, a strong impact on the informal but no impact on the formal political participation of Pakistanis, and no impact on the formal or informal participation of former-Yugoslavs. She also finds that organizational participation does not build social trust in any of these groups. In parallel, Hooghe (2003) finds that only participation in associations that don’t tolerate ethnocentrism produce social capital. These studies support the theoretical foundations of this dissertation further, since transnational Islamist organizations, which utilize external violent conflicts (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, Israeli-Palestinian) to recruit and mobilize Muslim immigrants, cannot be expected to generate universal trust among their members.

Bisin et al. (2008) conduct a quantitative analysis of survey data on 6,000 Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants in the U.K. Controlling for income, education, and time spent in the U.K., they find that Muslims are more attached to their religious identities, more resistant to cultural integration with the host society, and more likely to have an arranged marriage than non-Muslims. Bisin et al. point out, “A Muslim born in the U.K. and having spent there more than 50 years has on average the same probability of having a strong religious identity as a first generation non-Muslim who has been in the U.K. for less than 20 years” (p. 455).

Van Tubergen et al. (2004) employ survey data and look at the economic incorporation of immigrants in eighteen Western countries. Their dependent variable is employment status (employed/unemployed/inactive), whereas independent variables include religious origin,
political suppression in countries of origin, specific immigration laws (e.g. point system), relative income inequality, presence of left-wing parties in the government, and relative group size. They find that political suppression in countries of origin, relative income inequality, and geographic distance between the host and home countries adversely affect the employment status.

Finally, Kanas and Van Tubergen (2009) examine the impact of origin and host country schooling on economic performance of Antillean, Surinamese, Moroccan, and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. They find that, compared to immigrants from Morocco and Turkey, economic returns to origin country-schooling are higher for immigrants from former Dutch colonies. Kanas and Van Tubergen attribute the latter group’s economic success partly to their exposure to the Dutch language and culture in their countries of origin.

Radical Right Parties

Art (2011) suggests that radical right parties (in Western Europe) share a common view on immigration: [they demand that] “immigration be dramatically reduced or reversed through deportation” (p. 11). Betz (1994, 2001) points out that a new wave of radical right parties with an exclusionary populist ideology have emerged in Europe in the late 1980s. Utilizing the conflicts generated by the transition from industrial welfare state to postindustrial individual capitalism, these parties centered their arguments on restrictive citizenship, the welfare state, and national identity.

In parallel, Schain et al. (2002) indicate that the increase in support for radical right parties in Western Europe over the past two decades accompanied the expression of ethnic hatred against immigrants. Furthermore, Van Spanje (2010) finds that electoral successes of anti-immigration parties create a contagion effect: several parties in both sides of the political
spectrum have adopted anti-immigration discourses and policies, and even collaborated with radical right parties in national governments (Table 3.3).

**Table 3.3: Radical right parties in national governments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austrian Freedom Party</td>
<td>2000-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>1994, 2001-2006, 2008-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>List Pim Fortuyn</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Swiss People’s Party</td>
<td>Mid-1980s-2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Art (2011).

While economic factors play a role in the rise of radical right parties, they fall short of explaining the full picture. Betz (2001) points out that radical right parties have attained substantial parliamentary presence even in countries with low levels of unemployment, including Austria (e.g. Austrian Freedom Party *-Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs*, FPO) and Switzerland (e.g. Swiss People’s Party *-Schweizerische Volkspartei*, SV). Employing surveys on 50,000 Europeans, Lubbers et al. (2002) explain this phenomenon with the fear of losing existing gains to immigrants.

Overall, multicultural policies, welfare provisions, unemployment rate, the percentage of immigrant population, ethnic/religious origin, and radical right parties are commonly investigated variables with regard to the integration of Muslim immigrants in Western countries.
CHAPTER 4
PUZZLE, RESEARCH QUESTION & THEORY

Puzzle and Research Question

As discussed in the previous chapter, the literature provides mixed results on the impact of institutions and public policies on the integration of Muslim immigrants in Western countries. These countries vary in terms of their welfare provisions, level of multiculturalism, and immigration policies, yet Muslim immigrants stand out in socioeconomic statistics, such as the unemployment rate, in virtually all of them. Furthermore, their low social cohesion with host societies manifests itself in value and identity clashes, such as burkha bans in France and Belgium, the minaret referendum in Switzerland, cartoon protests in Denmark, and rallies against the construction of mosques and Islamic Centers across the U.S. The question is, “If institutions and public policies fail to promote integration, at least to the extent that they were expected, what else matters?”

Theory

The various definitions of immigrant integration involves economic and political incorporation, and social cohesion (e.g. Esser 2000; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Bosswick and Heckmann 2006). For instance, Entzinger and Biezeveld suggest that integration involves respect for host society values, perceptions of migrants by the host society, violence directed at migrants, and feelings of belonging and familiarity. Hooghe et al. (2007) define social cohesion
as “close ties with… fellow community members” (p. 3), and Soroka, Johnston, and Banting (2002) suggest that social cohesion involves shared norms, values, and identities that serve people live together in a society.

This study underlines that integration of immigrants is a multidimensional phenomenon whose elements may not necessarily respond to institutions and public policies at the same rate or even at the same direction. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, Helbling et al. (2010) find that immigrant-friendly integration policies produce lower political engagement gaps between natives and immigrants but don’t promote social integration and social capital. 6 This study suggests that integration can be studied in three broad categories: economic, political, and social (cohesion) (Figure 4.1).

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**Figure 4.1**: Dimensions of immigrant integration

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6 Social capital refers to features of social organization such as networks of civic association, norms of reciprocity, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1995).
This study focuses on the social cohesion dimension of integration. By definition, conflicts over values and identities between immigrants and host societies manifest a low level of social cohesion, although these conflicts may not (immediately?) affect their political participation or employment levels. A review of news demonstrates numerous incidents of value and identity clashes between Muslim immigrants and host societies in the West:

- In February 2006, a Danish imam, Ahmed Abu Laban, declared to worshippers in Copenhagen: "In the West freedom of speech is sacred; to us, the Prophet is sacred" (the cartoon controversy) (Kingston Whig-Standard 2006);

- In February 2006, hundreds of Muslims marched in London with messages such as: “Whoever insults a prophet, kill him.” A 20-month old baby was dressed in a bonnet with the words “I love Al-Qaida” on the front (Daily Mail 2006).

- In May 2007, two imams were removed from a flight from Tennessee to North Carolina, because other passengers felt uncomfortable with their Islamic attires, although they had been found clean in double security checks at the airport. Ironically enough, the imams were on their way to attend a conference on prejudice against Muslims (CNN 2011b);

- In 2009, Belgium banned headscarves at schools in order to “promote friendship, equality, solidarity between societies and to prevent discrimination” (NTVMSNC 2009a);

- In December 2009, a Belgian Muslim woman was fined 200 euros for wearing burkha in a public place (RIA Novosti 2009);

- In 2010, Spanish Senate accepted a proposal to ban burkha at the national level (NTVMSNBC 2010b);

- In 2010, French Parliament banned burkha (Gauthier-Villars and Forelle 2010);
• In 2010, from New York City, NY to Murfreesboro, TN, and Sheboygan, WI to Temecula, CA, hundreds of Americans protested against and even sued the construction of mosques and Islamic centers, while arguing that those buildings are “Monuments to Terrorism” and that “Islam is not about a religion. It’s a political government, and it’s 100 percent against our Constitution” (Goodstein 2010);

• In January 2010, Danish Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen said, “Burkha and jilbab have no place in the Danish society. These clothes symbolize the notion of women and humanity that we oppose” (NTVMSNBC 2010c).

• In September 2010, two pastors in Tennessee, Bob Old and Danny Allen, burned copies of Qur’an on the ninth anniversary of the 9/11. Another small group of protesters gathered in front of the White House and tear apart a Qur’an (NTVMSNBC 2010d);

• In September 2011, a Muslim woman was fined 120 euros for wearing burkha in France. She said, "I am happy to be fined, since I can now take this to the European Court of Human Rights" (Vandoorne 2011).

These incidents partly reflect the fear of host societies from political Islam and the rapid increase in the number of Muslim immigrants (Swissinfo.ch 2009; Goodstein 2010), although Muslims currently represent less than 5 percent of the population in most of the Western countries (Table 3.2). The 9/11 and following terrorist attacks in the West certainly fuel those reactions, but as my findings in Chapter 6 indicate, value and identity clashes between Muslim immigrants and host societies were not uncommon in the pre-9/11 era as well. So, to reiterate the research question, what else affects the social cohesion of Muslim immigrants and host societies?

This study underlines that immigration is inherently a transnational phenomenon, since it involves at least two countries for the flow of people. For this reason, this study addresses a
major shortcoming of the literature and considers external factors along with domestic ones. This study theorizes that a host country’s violent conflicts with predominantly Muslim states (i.e. states with a Muslim majority) adversely affect the social cohesion of Muslim immigrants and the host society. For the transmission mechanism, I suggest that external violent conflicts are particularly utilized by transnational Islamist networks originated in the Middle East and North Africa to solidify immigrant Muslim communities. Once mobilized, these networks can be utilized for common purposes, such as mass events like the cartoon protests or donations to sister organizations in the conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, and Chechnya. The portrayal of these conflicts in the host-country and homeland media is also a part of the transmission mechanism: immigrant Muslim communities have a growing access to the screen, print, and online media (e.g. Al Jazeera) of their countries of origin due to the advances in communications technology. On the other hand, the selective representation of minorities in the host-country media is found to foster stereotypes and discrimination in the predominant society (Gilens 1999; Gilliam 1999; Brader et al. 2008). Overall, I suggest that transnational Islamist networks and media are agents of the transmission of external violent conflicts to immigrant Muslim communities and host societies (Figure 4.2).

![Figure 4.2: Theorized relationship between external violent conflicts and social cohesion](image-url)
External Violent Conflicts and Social Cohesion

Political scientists have extensively studied ethnic minorities in domestic contexts (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 1996; Saideman et al. 2002; Chandra 2005). Recently, Han and Mylonas (2011) examine nation-building policies in China for the period 1949-1965 and find that China’s treatment of an ethnic group depends on whether the group has an external patron; if the external patron is enemy to the host state, it tends to follow repressive policies against the ethnic group. What is understudied in the literature, however, is the impact of external violent conflicts on immigrant-host society relations.

The observation that external conflicts polarize immigrants in host societies goes back to the world wars, if not earlier. Ismael and Ismael (1976) point out that U.S.’ militarized disputes with Germany, Italy, and Japan marginalized immigrants from these countries. For instance, German immigrants had largely preserved their language and cultural organizations in the U.S. until WWI, at which point they began to keep a low ethnic profile and even changed the German names of their institutions due to the rise of anti-German sentiments in the American society (Cornell and Hartmann 1998). On the other hand, in the months following the Pearl Harbor attack, 120,000 Japanese Americans living in the West Coast, including women and children, were suspected of being subversive, forced to abandon their houses and businesses with a few days’ notice, and shipped on trains to internment camps in the interior areas of the country (Saito 2001).

From a theoretical perspective, it is possible to extend the implications of an external violent conflict on integration for other immigrant groups. In fact, the first signs of polarization of Muslim immigrants in the U.S. came in the mid-1970s due to the increasing U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars and the following oil embargo. Abraham (1977) writes,
Weeks after the October War [Yom Kippur War, 1973] Arab community nationalist activities culminated in a head-on challenge to the United Auto Workers (UAW) leadership. The latter's staunch support of Israel, particularly its large purchases of Israeli war bonds, had angered many Arabs in Detroit. On the evening of November 28, a predominantly Yemeni and worker mass demonstration, about 2,000 strong, was staged outside a B'nai Brith gathering, which was convened to honor UAW President Leonard Woodcock with a "humanitarian award" for his support of Israel. Earlier that day, the (mostly Yemeni) Arab workers at Dodge Main effectively shut down one of the two assembly lines at the plant, and slowed down production on the other. Chrysler responded with lay-off notices for hundreds of Arab workers at Dodge Main, while the UAW bureaucrats, already indignant over the workers' action, stood by with folded arms. (p. 9)

In the following decades, social relations between Muslim immigrants and natives have been strained due to external developments such as the Tehran hostage crisis and the First Gulf War. McCloud (1995) notes that the harassment of people carrying Islamic symbols in the U.S. escalated on the streets during the First Gulf War “as if there is a suspension of rights in an undeclared war between the U.S. and some of its citizenry” (p. 55). Other examples include the mistreatment of Muslim school girls in the classroom due to their headscarves or Middle Eastern sounding names. For instance, Nikides (1991) reports that in one instance, when an Afghan American girl stood up in a Winnipeg schoolroom, her classmates called out "Saddam, Saddam." Although anecdotes like this one don’t constitute generalizable and systemic evidence, they still imply a relationship between external violent conflicts and perceptions of migrants by the host society.

Horowitz (2001) writes, “Ethnicity is a powerful affiliation, both because similarity is valued and because genetic (or putatively genetic) and early socialization are potent sources of… appearance, customs, gestures, language, clothing, tastes, and habits” (p. 48). This study assumes Muslims as a homogenous group. Although this assumption is obviously far from reality -not only do Muslims show national and sectarian differences, but immigrants coming from
predominantly Muslim countries are not necessarily Muslim,- it can be justified by the fact that host societies tend to generalize Muslims based on their outlook alone (e.g. dresses, general physical traits). In fact, in the week following the 9/11, the media reported 645 incidents of aggression (e.g. assault, shootings) or harassment (e.g. on streets, by e-mail/phone) in the U.S. against “Middle Eastern-looking” individuals, three of whom died as a result of these assaults (South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow 2001). Overall, hate crimes against Muslims and Arab-looking people increased by 1,600 percent in the U.S. after the 9/11 (Stubbs 2003).

Lorkovic (1993) and Akbar (1995) suggest that individuals tend to retreat to their ethnic group when they find themselves in a socially insecure position. By the 1980s, Arab Americans weren’t already welcomed by civil society organizations and local political campaigns, unless they were “light-skinned, and agreed to downplay their Arabness and keep quiet about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East” (Cainkar 2002, p. 24). After the 9/11 and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, value and identity clashes have become more visible. Many Americans flooded FBI phones with tips about suspected Middle Easterners, most of who turned out to be innocent after intrusive home and work visits by agents. Overall, 40 percent of mosque attendants in the U.S. report discrimination against them: Muslim women for wearing hijab and Muslim men for advocating Muslims rights against stereotypes at workplace. Accordingly, American mosques have become a center of advocacy work against prejudices, in addition to being a house of worship (Jamal 2005).

In the U.S. context, the distinction between immigrant and indigenous Muslims can also provide important insights with regard to external conflicts. Mazrui (1996) distinguishes immigrant Muslim Americans, whose countries of origin range from Morocco to Indonesia, from “indigenous” Muslim Americans, who are mostly African Americans. He indicates that Muslim
immigrants, unlike Muslim African Americans, are highly vocal about the U.S. foreign policy towards the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. He suggests, “African American Muslims are fully Americanized but not always fully Islamized,” as they are mostly unilingual (English), whereas immigrant Muslims are “often substantially Islamized but not yet fully Americanized” and retain their language of origin (e.g. Arabic) (p. 505). This study suggests that attitudinal differences between immigrant and indigenous Muslim Americans underscore the importance of transnational ties in integration. A similar comparison, however, is not possible in the Western European context, since those countries lack indigenous Muslim populations.

Like the U.S., Western Europe has witnessed low social cohesion of Muslim immigrants and natives. The incidents ranging from the murder of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands (November 2004) to cartoon protests in Denmark (September 2005) and attacks on mosques and Islamic centers in France (October 2005) indicate value and identity clashes between Muslim immigrants and host societies. Furthermore, Walker (2006) points out that there are relatively unattended incidents, including honor killings (i.e. murder of Muslim women by their family members for dating Western men), moral justification of these crimes by many Turkish schoolchildren in Germany, and praise for the 9/11 attacks by some Islamic authorities (e.g. imam Reza Mosque in Berlin, Germany). Yet, Walker warns against generalizations, since fundamentalists constitute only 5 percent of Muslim immigrants in Europe and only 3 percent of fundamentalists are violent radicals.7

Employing surveys of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Allen and Nielsen (2002) find that Muslim communities have become targets of aggression, harassment and discrimination since 2001 by the members of host societies and public servants

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7 There is a national variance in these numbers. For instance, 1995-96 Migration History and Social Mobility surveys indicate that 10 to 15 percent of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are involved in Islamic fundamentalist factions in Belgium (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2000).
in European Union countries. They write, “Through a greater *perceived threat of the enemy within* [emphasis added], and an increased sense of fear and vulnerability both globally and locally, this type of xenophobia resulted in many countries experiencing a dramatic increase in the type of prejudices and hatreds that were already pre-existent” (p. 42). Thus, European societies have begun to perceive Muslim immigrants as a “Fifth Column.” Furthermore, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance reported that “the use of racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic political discourse is no longer confined to extremist political parties, but is increasingly infecting mainstream political parties, at the risk of legitimizing and trivializing this type of discourse” in 2005 (Art 2011, p. 236).

Allen and Nielsen (2002) note that not only do Muslims have become visible targets (e.g. bearded swarthy men, women wearing headscarves) on the streets, at work, and at schools from Sweden to Italy, but also “Muslim-looking” individuals like the Sikh men, who are not Muslim but wear turban. The collateral damage in the case of the Sikhs support the above observation that host societies tend to generalize on appearances as a short-cut to identify the “other.” Although this generalization is obviously misleading in the case of the Sikhs, it’s a safe assumption that people wearing “Islamic” clothes (e.g. turban, headscarf, burkha) are Muslim.

As a matter of fact, the integration of Muslim immigrants in France came to the fore of public debate with the *foulard Islamique* affair in 1989. The French state initially assumed that one could be *laique* (i.e. supporter of the separation of church and state) and Muslim (or Catholic, etc.) at the same time (Giry 2006). This affair polarized Muslims, who perceived headscarf as a religious requirement, and the host society, who perceived it as an indication of gender discrimination.
In response, the French parliament approved a law banning noticeable signs of religion in elementary and secondary public schools in 2004. While Jewish yarmulkes and excessively large crucifixes were also mentioned, the law targeted the hijab, a veil worn by Muslim women to cover their hair and neck (Ezekiel 2006). Furthermore, France has constructed social centers and sport facilities in predominantly Muslim banlieues in order to disseminate secular attitudes in neighborhoods controlled by Islamic associations.

Hélie-Lucas (1994) points out that Muslim women in France who wear veil often have male family members who do not carry any Islamic markers. Accordingly, Muslim women are more likely to be perceived as protectors of traditional identity and as barriers to integration by host societies. Furthermore, Limage (2000) notes that this conflict is partly based on French society’s growing fear and suspicion of the objectives of political Islam. Conducting in-depth interviews with 45 North African women in France, Killian and Johnson (2006) find that the more North African traits the respondents carry (e.g. dress, accent, names, and phenotypical traits like darker skin color), the more discrimination and prejudices they experience.

Similar tensions have also taken place in Germany (Mandel 1989). In one incident in July 2009, Marwa al-Sherbini, a pregnant Egyptian pharmacist wearing a headscarf, was verbally assaulted by a German man when she asked him to make some room for her son on the playground swings. He called her an Islamist, a terrorist, and a slut. At the courtroom, he attacked her with a knife in front of the judges and other witnesses and stabbed her 18 times to death. When her husband, Elwi Okaz, a genetic research scientist, intervened to save her life, he was stabbed too, and also shot on the leg by the German police who just entered the courtroom and saw a German- and a Middle Eastern-looking men fighting. The death of Marwa al-Sherbini
led to mass protests in Germany with the participation of thousands of Muslims shouting, “Down with Germany” (Kimmelman 2009).

Overall, surveys indicate that almost half of the French and Germans perceive Muslim immigrants as “[a] threat to the national identity.” The major reason for this perception is “[Muslims’] resistance to integrate in the society” (61 percent in France, 67 percent in Germany), as well as “cultural differences” and “segregated communities.” Furthermore, 31 percent of the French and 34 percent of Germans suggest that Islam is equivalent to “rejecting Western values” (Karaca 2011).

Even remote Western countries have had their share of Muslim immigrant-host society tensions. Jupp (2006) notes instances of anti-Muslim protests and violence in Australia, such as the Cronulla riots against Lebanese immigrants and the burning down of a mosque in Brisbane, in the post-9/11 period. On the other hand, the Muslim unity in Australia revolves around their opposition to the Iraq War, Zionism, and socioeconomic discrimination. In 2006, the pessimism about integration was expressed by the Australian Prime Minister as, “Muslims [are] uniquely unable to integrate” (p. 708). He criticized multiculturalism, Shari'a law, and the burqa as parts of the problem, while suggesting that disloyal dual citizens might lose their Australian citizenship.

In fact, Australia has tightened its visa regime in order to keep a relatively low percentage of Muslim immigrants in the country. A major motivation for Australian non-refugee policies has been the fear of becoming a target of Islamist terrorism due to the country’s involvement in the 2003 Iraq War (Jupp 2006). Examples of institutional change includes the U.S. Patriot Act, which enabled the arrest and detention of Muslims without access to legal assistance (Stubbs 2003), and the U.K.’s Terrorism Act and Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which
permit the deportation of non-citizens if they justify or glorify terrorism and intra-communal violence (Walker 2007).

Overall, value and identity clashes between Muslim immigrants and host societies have become visible since the 9/11 and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but similar incidents existed in the earlier decades. The cases and anecdotes provided by the literature and news indicate that during times of external violent conflicts, the social cohesion of Muslim immigrants and host societies experience a setback in the West. However, there is also a need to explain how those external conflicts are transmitted to immigrant communities and host societies. This study suggests that transnational Islamist networks, whose roots can be traced back to struggles against Western and pro-Western regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, act as political entrepreneurs that utilize external conflicts to mobilize Muslim immigrants.

**Transnational Islamist Networks**

The advances in communications and transportation technologies enhance immigrants’ socioeconomic ties with their countries of origin at an unprecedented rate (Lie 1995; Faist 2000). Accordingly, Soysal (1997) and Faist (2000) suggest that geographically bounded conceptions of citizenship fall short of explaining the transnational social and political claimsmaking of immigrant groups. In this regard, assimilationist theories falsely predict that those ties would disappear over time and fail to take cultural segregation into account.

Faist (2000) suggests that three forms of transnational social spaces exist. First, transnational kinship groups (families, relatives) maintain their ties on the basis of diffuse reciprocity; they are characterized by shared social norms and evidenced in the case of remittances. Second, transnational circuits are facilitated by instrumental exchanges (e.g. tit-for-
tat); they are characterized by the exploitation of insider advantages (e.g. shared mother tongue) and manifested in the case of trading networks (e.g. transnational Lebanese businessmen and the growth of immigrant businesses). Finally, transnational communities are based on collective religious, ethnic, or national identities; they are mobilized by collective representations and are noticeable in diasporas (e.g. Palestinians, Kurds). Similarly, Portes (1999) defines transnational communities as “dense networks across political borders created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition” (p. 29).

The study of transnational Islamist networks necessitates the definition of Islamism and related concepts. First, Keddie (1998) distinguishes two types of fundamentalism: (1) religious nationalism, which is directed against other religious communities, and (2) conservative religious politics, which is directed against “internal enemies.” She highlights a number of trends that fuel religiopolitics, such as income disparity, economic crises, migration, and reaction to the dissemination of the Western culture to the developing world.

In the Islamic context, Lewis (2004) suggests that fundamentalism means, “The literal divinity and inerrancy of the Qur’an” (p. 131). Muslim fundamentalists argue that modernization corrupts Islamic values and leads to the problems in the Muslim world -a simple message comprehensible for both educated and uneducated Muslims. Lewis (1990) writes,

In the classical Islamic view, to which many Muslims are beginning to return, the world and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, and the rest, known as the House of Unbelief or the House of War, which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam. But the greater part of the world is still outside Islam, and even inside the Islamic lands, according to the view of the Muslim radicals, the faith of Islam has been undermined and the law of Islam has been abrogated. The obligation of holy war therefore begins at home and continues abroad, against the same infidel enemy (p. 1).
Winter (2006) defines Islamists as, “Fundamentalist extremists who impose or attempt to impose ultraconservative interpretations of the Qur'an and the Shari'a, particularly on women, and whose tactics include the use of some level of physical or psychological violence” (p. 279). Keddie (1998) puts forward three key events in the development of Islamist movements as the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 (world’s oldest Islamist network) as an opposition to the British rule, the Israeli victory over Egypt in 1967, and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Other contributing factors include the Saudi and Gulf funding of Islamic centers abroad and the U.S.’s financial and military support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.

As above definitions suggest, not all Muslim organizations are Islamist. The countries of origin established guest worker institutions in Western Europe as early as the 1960s based on bilateral agreements and on the assumption that these workers would need reintegration when they returned home (Heisler 1986). For instance, Turkey sent imams to provide religious services and teachers to instruct Turkish in West Germany. These service networks established institutional and cultural links between origin countries and immigrants, and continued to operate even after guest workers stayed and began family reunifications. Over time, Muslim associations have revitalized national and religious loyalties and been used to mobilize Muslim immigrants for claims-making on behalf of their home countries (Kastoryano 2007). In this regard, Turkish governments demand that Turkish immigrants do not assimilate in the West but maintain their identity so that they can lobby for Turkey’s political interests, such as its membership in the European Union (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

The immigrant Muslim associations multiplied in Western Europe in the early 1980s, partly due to the rapid increase in immigrant populations (Maussen 2004). Accordingly, mosques
and Islamic centers began to perform not only religious, but also communal and educational functions. While several immigrant Muslim associations promote peaceful relations with host countries, Islamist networks, many of which were outlawed in their countries of origin, enjoyed associational freedom in Western Europe (Heisler 1986). These organizations proliferated after host countries allowed Muslim immigrants to organize under public law and have pursued their claims on contentious issues like the *foulard* affair by using religious arguments (e.g. “it’s our religious duty”), while enjoying citizenship rights (i.e. “it’s our freedom to choose our dress”) (Soysal 1997).

The literature indicates that violent conflicts are utilized by political entrepreneurs to solidify in-group/out-group identities for further and effective mobilization of these groups (e.g. Kasfır 1979, Chandra 2001, Van Evera 2001). Van Evera writes, “The experience of warring or oppressed peoples, filled as it is with tales of common struggle and sacrifice for the common good, creates a stronger we-feeling than the experience of people who escape these tragedies; hence it has stronger effects when national scribes record and purvey it” (p. 21). In this regard, diasporas with genocide histories (e.g. Jews, Armenians), for instance, can be expected to be more effective in solidifying their group identities and acting for common purposes than immigrant groups without those experiences.

*Major Islamist Networks*

A prominent ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb (1964), who was executed by the Nasser regime in Egypt in 1966, criticizes his contemporary Muslim thinkers for presenting jihad as a defensive war and advocates for a total war against enemies. Qutb writes that jihad is not the imposition of religion by force but the destruction of all political and material
barriers standing between Islam and people. In this regard, Qutb opposes to all non-Islamic political systems and governments. Gerges (2009) underlines that Qutb has been referred as the theoretical father of jihad by leaders like Ayman al-Zawahiri (Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda), Osama bin Laden (al-Qaeda), and Anwar al-Awlaki (extremist American imam killed in Yemen). Esposito (2010) calls Qutb “the godfather (what Marx was to Communism) of radical Islam” (p. 67).

Vidino (2005) points out that several members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled secular-authoritarian Egypt and went to Western Europe as political refugees beginning in the early 1960s. The Western expansion of the organization paralleled the influx of Muslim guest workers and university students, and materialized through the operation of mosques, charities and Islamic associations. The Muslim Brotherhood has received generous financial contributions from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and mobilized Muslim immigrants to provide donations to Hamas and other jihadist organizations. Despite the repeated requests by Egypt, however, Western countries didn’t take any action against them, even when internal jihadist propagandas of Saudi-funded Islamic organizations were documented by hidden TV cameras. These organizations officially maintain that they have peaceful aims and accuse their critics with xenophobia.

Merley (2008) suggests that the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) is another organization that fosters the interests of Muslim immigrants in Europe, while maintaining organic ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and being funded by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Founded in 1989, the FIOE operates schools and community centers, and are involved in lobbying facilities. Rufford and Taher (2004) note that the former president of the FIOE, Ahmad al-Rawi is a British citizen and has been living in the U.K. for more than three decades. He joined a declaration of ninety-three Islamic International Scholars in 2004 that
supported attacks on the British and other coalition troops in Iraq. The FIOE is also cooperating with Milli Görüş, a major Turkish Islamist network, in order to unify Muslims in Europe under an umbrella organization (Merley 2008).

The Muslim World League (MWL), which was founded in Mecca in 1962, has aimed at “fostering the cause of Islam throughout the world… the defense of Islam against those who seek to destroy it” (Haddad 1983, p. 69). Haddad points out that the MWL has provided funding for mosques and Islamic centers all round the world and provided them with imams educated in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon. Furthermore, its sister organization, the World Supreme Council for Mosques, provides millions of Euros for the construction and management of mosques every year in France alone. Laurence and Vaisse (2006) note that, although the MWL functions as a nongovernmental organization, it has close ties with Saudi Arabia, since its current president Prince Abdallah bin Abdul Muhsen al-Turki is a former Saudi minister of religious affairs.

Founded a year after the MWL, the Muslim Student Association has been particularly active in the U.S. in opposing the ideologies “alien to the essence of Islam” (Haddad 1983, p. 70). As the 1973 crisis provided oil-rich Middle Eastern countries with excessive revenues, the number of Muslim Arab students sent to the U.S. skyrocketed. Haddad underlines that their involvement has “Arabized” Muslim American institutions and shifted their orientation towards “true Islam” (i.e. political Islam). They were also inspired by the role of the Iranian Muslim Student Association in the success of the Iranian Revolution.

Joppke (1996) indicates that the major reasons for the spread of political Islam among Turkish immigrants in Germany include the Iranian Revolution and the escape of fundamentalist organizations from Turkey after the 1980 military coup. The same period also witnessed a boom
in the number of Koran schools, Islamic centers, and mosques in Germany (e.g. three mosques in
the late 1960s as opposed to 1,500 in 1995). One of the most influential Turkish Islamist
networks in Western Europe is the Suleymanci movement with more than 200 Islamic centers
and 18,000 members. The Suleymanci movement preaches a highly militant, fundamentalist
interpretation of Islam that prohibits contacts with non-Muslims (Joppke 1996).

Al-Muhajiroun is another transnational radical Islamist group based in the U.K.
Wiktorowicz (2005) conducts ethnographic fieldwork and finds that the social activities
discouraged by Al-Muhajiroun includes watching host-country TV, listening to music and radio,
and “deserting reading serious books such as the Qur’an, Hadith and Fiqh to read cheap
newspapers, novels and magazines” (p. 57). Furthermore, al-Muhajiroun’s illustration of
apostasy range from “thinking than human made law is better or similar to Islam” to “refusing to
call Jews or Christians unbelievers” (p. 174). Wiktorowicz indicates that “catalysts for thinking
more deeply about Islam” include dissatisfaction with own life and international conflict
involving Muslims (p. 105), and radical groups like al-Muhajiroun “fill the [identity] gap” (p.
106).

Despite the constant requests of especially Egyptian and Turkish governments in the
1980s and 1990s, Western countries hosted Islamist organizations on democratic grounds and
changed their attitudes only after the 9/11. For instance, German authorities arrested Metin
Kaplan in 2004. His “Caliphate State” included 1,100 members mostly in Cologne and had been
calling for the violent removal of the secular Turkish state. German police found €1 million in
cash in Kaplan’s apartment, although he was claiming social benefits in Germany (BBC News
2004).
Transmission of External Violent Conflicts

The violent conflicts between the West and Muslim countries enable transnational Islamist organizations not only to recruit new members, but also to receive donations by appealing to the ethnic and religious attachments of Muslim immigrants. Sageman (2008) indicates that Muslims around the world pour money into charities aimed at helping their co-religionists in the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, Chechnya, and other conflict zones. Nevertheless, some of these networks have also been employed by terrorist organizations, which recruit and train young Muslims for global jihad. The training camps in Afghanistan held “programs” in guerrilla tactics, urban warfare, and weapons of mass destruction. Overall, Sageman finds a strong relationship between terrorism and Muslim diaspora, since 60 percent of Islamist terrorists joined their organization while living in a host country and an additional 20 percent were second or third generation immigrants in the West. The major reasons for their radicalization include socioeconomic discrimination in host countries and the sufferings of Muslims around the world.

In the weeks following the 9/11, Imam Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born of Yemeni origin, condemned the attacks and was frequently hosted by the Western media to talk about Islam. Nine years later, he was mobilizing Muslims in the U.S., U.K., and other Western countries from his hideout in Yemen, including Major Nidal Malik Hassan of the Fort Hood attack and Faisal Shahzad of the Time Square bombing attempt. Through Internet, he was preaching jihad as a religious duty for all Muslims and legitimizing self-sacrifice. He argued that the U.S.’s attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, and covert attacks on Pakistan and Yemen have been influential in his actions. Before Al-Awlaki was killed by a U.S. drone attack in Yemen in October 2011 (CNN 2011a), he was professing, “So this is not now a war on terrorism, we need to all be clear about this, this is a war on Muslims!” Fluent in English and familiar with the Western culture, he said,
“Jihad is becoming as American as apple pie and as British as afternoon tea.” After leaving the U.S., he spent a brief time in London and lectured young Muslims, “The important lesson to learn here is never, ever trust a kuffar [unbeliever]” (CNN 2011a). During his teenager years, Anwar al-Awlaki was attracted to the cause of jihad by aspiring to and watching the videotapes of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. During his higher education in the U.S., he served as the president of the Muslim Student Association. In the mid-1990s he was preaching at mosques in Denver and mobilizing young Muslims to join the jihad against Russians in Chechnya (Shane and Mekhennet 2010).

There are several cases in which these extremist messages mobilized Muslim immigrants through TV and Internet, as discussed in the following section. To name a few:

- Mohamed Mahmood Alessa (born in the U.S. to Palestinian and Jordanian parents) and Carlos Eduardo Almonte (naturalized U.S. citizen born in the Dominican Republic; converted to Islam) were arrested at the Kennedy International Airport in 2010 on their way to join an Islamic extremist group in Somalia. During his teenager years, Alessa was involved in neighborhood gangs called the P.L.O. and the Arabian Knights. Two “homegrown terrorists” were particularly watching videos and audio recordings of the lectures of Anwar al-Awlaki (Rashbaum 2010);

- Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, a Swede of Iraqi origin, detonated a bomb in a commercial district of Stockholm crowded with civilians shopping for the Christmas. His early detonation averted a massacre, and he is found to be acting independent of any terrorist organizations (Burns and Somaiya 2010). Minutes before the attack news organizations received an e-mail condemning Muhammad cartoons and the war in Afghanistan (Anderson and Burns 2010);
Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin and the perpetrator of the Time Square bombing attempt, has stated the reasons for his attack as “the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the plight of Palestinians, the publication in Denmark of cartoons lampooning the Prophet Muhammad” (Elliott, Tavernise, and Barnard 2010).

Another reason why Muslim immigrants tend to reflect on these external conflicts, peacefully or violently, is that some of them came to the West as refugees from conflict zones. They continue to connect with those places and people on a personal level with the help of communications technologies and homeland media, such as Al Jazeera. For instance, in 1995, Bosnian refugees occupied a former concentration camp at Buchenwald in Eastern Germany and requested the lifting of the embargo against the Sarajevo government (The Irish Times 1995). Their argument was that German-led arms embargo of the United Nations was practically leaving Muslim Bosnians to the mercy of the heavily armed Serbian government, which inherited the former Yugoslavian military forces.

Islam4UK, which is an Islamist group that describes itself as a platform for promoting the views of al Muhajiroun, provides another example for the transmission of external conflicts to host societies. In January 2010, Islam4UK attempted to organize a march on Wootton Bassett, a town near London that is iconized by the passing corteges of British military casualties coming from Afghanistan. Islam4UK explained their goal to the families of 246 dead British soldiers in an open online letter as, “[marching] not in memory of the occupying and merciless British military, but rather the real war dead who have been shunned by the Western media [emphasis added] and general public as they were and continue to be horrifically murdered in the name of democracy and freedom, the innocent Muslim men, women and children.” Anjem Choudary, a British-born Pakistani immigrant and the leader of the group, says, “It is worth reminding those
who are still not blinded by the media propaganda that Afghanistan is not a British town near Wootton Bassett but rather Muslim land which no one has the right to occupy, with a Muslim population who do not deserve their innocent men, women and children to be killed for political mileage and for the greedy interests of the oppressive U.S. and U.K. regimes” In response, three British Facebook groups have signed up more than half a million supporters against the march (Burns 2010a). A week later, the group was banned by the British government in accordance with counter-terrorism laws (The Telegraph 2010).

Transnational Islamist networks promote particularized trust, which doesn’t contribute to integration or generate social capital (Putnam and Goss 2002; Uslaner 2002). Yet, their role in hindering social cohesion is not limited to transmitting external conflicts. These networks also compete with local civil society organizations, which are expected to be more community-oriented, for members and financial resources (Kastoryano 2007).

To note, the Gulf States, which fund Islamist networks abroad, follow a different policy at home. While Western countries have provided Islamist networks with associational freedom (at least until the 9/11), the Gulf States ironically have preferred immigrants from South Asia rather than from other Arab countries due to their fear of Islamic fundamentalism.8 Furthermore, they don’t grant citizenship to Palestinian refugees due the latter group’s involvement in political Islam (Weiner 1990).

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8 Gulf States received about three million foreign workers in the 1970s in order to sustain their booming oil and construction sectors. By the late 1980s, the proportion of immigrants in the labor force increased to as high as 85 percent in the United Arab Emirates, 81 percent in Qatar, and 71 percent in Kuwait (Weiner 1990).
The Media

The transmission of external violent conflicts to immigrant communities and host societies also takes place through host-country and homeland media. Mass immigration from the Middle East to the U.S. began in the 19th century with Christian Arabs from Syria and Lebanon. The post-WWII immigration, however, mostly involved Muslim Arabs, especially Palestinian refugees, who found that American society had already developed negative stereotypes against them, partly due to the Arab-Israeli wars and the negative depiction of Arabs in the media (Ismael and Ismael 1976).

The involvement of the U.S. in Middle Eastern conflicts has been influential on the emergence of Arab American organizations with a focus on the U.S.-Middle East relations (Pulcini 1993). The former deputy director of the Arab American Institute, Amhan (1987) writes, “It was the Palestinian struggle for national rights that became a force that both unified many segments of the Arab American community and exposed the more politicized members to new forms of racist exclusion” in the 1960s and 1970s (p. 16). On the other hand, she attributes anti-Arab stereotypes in the U.S. partly to media’s depiction of Arabs as “villainous, greedy, blood-thirsty, or dangerous” (p. 18). These images even led American politicians to return campaign donations from Muslim Americans (e.g. Mondale’s presidential campaign), when they were accused of accepting “Arab money” (p. 22).

Douglass and Dunn (2003) point out that the coverage of Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Arab oil embargo, Tehran hostage crisis, and adversarial acts of Middle Eastern leaders like Gaddafi of Libya and Khomeini of Iran in the media, have contributed to the development of negative stereotypes against Muslims in the U.S. Saito (2001) adds that the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya by Islamist terrorists in the 1990s inflicted another major blow
on the Arab American image in the public mind. The U.S. government has responded to these developments by investigating Islamic social groups and mosques, as well as the financial contributions of Muslim Americans to foreign Islamist organizations.

Movies also play an important role in depicting certain minorities and mobilizing ethnic/religious groups. In March 1996, Muslim Americans across the country protested against the movie Executive Decision, which “depicts a group of Muslim terrorists - some identified as Arabs - who hijack a jet full of passengers and threaten to crash the plane, which is loaded with deadly nerve gas, into Washington, D.C.” (San Jose Mercury News 1996). In November 1998, the movie Siege was protested by Muslim immigrants on the grounds that it stereotyped Arabs and Muslims as terrorists (Orange County Register 1998).

While some Western movies depict Arabs and Muslims as usual suspects, the Turkish TV series and movie franchise Valley of the Wolves has been particularly criticized by Western countries and Israel for fueling xenophobia. For instance, in the 104th episode of the TV series, the chief German agent in Turkey says that Germany uses multiculturalism to create ethnic divisions among Muslim immigrants. In the 125th episode, the chief CIA agent in Turkey says that Osama bin Laden was killed in order to prevent him from revealing that he (bin Laden) had been working for the U.S. government. The series is consistently rated among top programs not only in Turkish TVs, but also in Arab TVs across the Middle East and North Africa, and accessible by immigrant communities through satellite and Internet. Furthermore, the movie Valley of the Wolves - Iraq depicts Israeli and American agents stealing organs of Muslims in Iraq, and Valley of the Wolves - Palestine tells the fictional story of Turkish armed men taking revenge of the Gaza flotilla incident from Israeli officials (Haaretz 2011). The U.S. State Department criticized the movie for fuelling anti-Semitism (NTVMSNBC 2011a), and Germany
banned the screening of Valley of the Wolves - Palestine, which was scheduled to open on the Holocaust Day (NTVMSNBC 2011b).

Brader et al. (2008) find that, while news on the cost of immigration fuel the perceived threat from immigration among Americans, their anxiety level increases (i.e. felt more threatened) when those news emphasize stigmatized groups, rather than European or Canadian immigrants. Brader et al.’s results indicate that elite (e.g. journalists and political candidates) discourse contribute to public stereotypes and shape action on immigration policy.

Employing the 2002-2003 European Social Survey in twenty countries, Sides and Citrin (2007) find that preferences for cultural unity and misperceptions of the size of immigrant populations (i.e. the general public tend to overestimate the number of immigrants) have stronger effects on individual opinion about immigration than economic status. National level findings also indicate that residents of countries with economic difficulties or countries with sizeable immigrant populations are not particularly likely to oppose immigration. These findings are important for policymaking since the growing support for radical right parties in Europe keeps the immigrant-friendly European Union elite in check. Sides and Citrin conclude, “perceptions of immigration and immigrants come to rely more on vivid events (at home and abroad) and messages from politicians and media, and less on the demographic and economic conditions that have been the main focus of research to date” (p. 501).

Gerges (2003) argues that Islamist terrorism is a desperate and isolated act and that its depiction by mainstream media and Congress as a systematic war against Western civilization is an exaggeration. Similarly, Ramadan (2004) writes, “Prejudices, racism, and Islamophobia are tangible expressions of the hard reality of Western societies” and barriers against the integration of Muslim immigrants (p. 226). Furthermore, Esposito (2010) points out that the perception “no
major Muslim cleric condemned Osama bin Laden” is simply not true, since many Islamic authorities, including the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and the principal of the Muslim College in London, collectively and publicly did so in October 2001. Finally, Ibrahim (2010) underlines that neither 9/11 perpetrators, nor the leadership of Al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, have gone through formal religious education. He writes, “if radical Islamists were educated as Muslim scholars, they would have known that what they advocate contravenes Islamic ethics and norms” (p. 3). Accordingly, Ibrahim (2010) suggests that the only permanent measure to fight Muslim radicalism is to teach “mainstream,” non-violent Islam to Muslim teenagers, who are at a critical age in forming their identities. He refers to SOLAS Foundation’s education programs in Scotland as: “[terrorists] seek to prove that Islam is, by its very nature, a faith that spread through the force of arms against countries that resisted its attempt to spread. This viewpoint, which is historically incorrect, can be rebutted only by presenting an overview of Islamic history and the role played by religious teachings and the theory of jihad in Islam’s spread” (p. 6).

In this regard, the association of internal and external conflicts with Muslims in the public mind in Western countries partly stem from the perception that Muslims sympathize with the attacks on Western targets. Yet, Lewis suggests that the (mis)association of Islam with terrorism is not the fault of the media or host societies, but first and foremost the responsibility of Al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad and similar other groups, whose leaders and foot soldiers have repeatedly justified their acts with Islam. Furthermore, while a handful of Muslim clerics denounced the 9/11 attacks, thousands of Muslims celebrated those incidents on the streets of Muslim countries smiling at TV cameras, and when the NATO attacked Afghanistan, 5,000 protesters chanted "Long live Osama bin Laden" in a Muslim-dominated region of the Philippines while burning U.S. flags and a picture of President George W. Bush (The Vancouver
Province 2001). More recently, Panaroma, a BBC documentary broadcasted in November 2010, shows “[a] British network of more than 40 part-time Islamic schools and clubs with 5,000 students has been teaching from a Saudi Arabian government curriculum that contains anti-Semitic and homophobic views, including a textbook that asks children to list the “reprehensible” qualities of Jews” (Burns 2010c).

While the depiction of external violent conflicts and immigration in the media is particularly influential on host societies’ attitudes towards Muslims, homeland media are performing a similar function for the latter group. Immigrant associations were legalized in France in 1981, and TV and radio programs for Muslims were created in 1982. These institutional changes were followed by an increasing financial and organizational support for Islamic associations and prayer groups by North African governments (e.g. sending imams and Arabic language teachers) (Limage 2000). By the 1990s, Muslim immigrants in Europe had gained access to homeland media to the extent that Turks living in Berlin were following Turkish newspapers and TV shows on a daily basis (Kosnick 2004). A leading Turkish newspaper, Hurriyet is currently available at 20,000 sales points in Germany and 30,000 points in Europe, and recently started to circulate in the U.S. (Hurriyet 2011).

On the recipient side, Timmerman (2000) finds that Turkish school girls in Belgium, for instance, follow news with their families on Turkish TV channels, express strong nationalist feelings for Turkey, and those who took Belgian citizenship at birth (e.g. due to their families’ pragmatic decisions) express feelings of shame and betrayal to the Turkish community. Timmerman indicates that Islamic identification, partly manifested in the increasing number of Turkish school girls wearing head scarves, is growing in Belgium.
Fearing that transnational Islamist media might disassociate Muslim immigrants further, German authorities have facilitated local broadcasting through public-service open radio and TV channels. Their expectation was that local immigrant media would focus on community problems and help integration. Instead, a large number of immigrant media began to broadcast Islamist programs that evoked the charges of extremism by native Germans and public authorities. For instance, the spokesperson for the State Media Council of Germany says, “Of course there are complaints about the foreign programs, because - well, there is some Mullah sitting there in his garb, or a woman with headscarf, who says something in a language that nobody understands, and you get the feeling, that can't possibly be anything good” (Kosnick 2004 p. 26).

Overall, transnational Islamist networks and media are particularly influential in transmitting external violent conflicts to immigrant Muslim communities and host societies. However, above cases reflect the direct impact, such as Islamist groups mobilizing Muslim immigrants to protest wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or Muslims being attacked on the streets during the First Gulf War, but they don’t explain how external violent conflicts lead to incidents that apparently stem from other reasons, such as the cartoon crisis.

**Case Study: Cartoon Crisis**

In September 2005, Flemming Rose, the editor of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, asked a number of Danish cartoonists to draw Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, as they perceive him. According to Muslims, any drawing of Prophet Muhammad is a violation of their sacred beliefs. On the other hand, Rose’s goal was to demonstrate that freedom of expression shouldn’t be restricted by anybody or any religion. Accordingly, the newspaper published a dozen of
Muhammad cartoons, including those showing him with a turban-bomb and greeting suicide bombers in heaven (Shadid and Sullivan 2006).

The cartoons led Muslim clerics and leaders of Muslim organizations in Denmark first write letters to Jyllands-Posten and Danish officials. Immediately after, they petitioned and submitted 17,000 signatures to Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen. When Prime Minister Rasmussen declined their request for a meeting, they sent e-mails, text messages, and letters to Muslim groups in Denmark and Europe, and toured the Middle Eastern countries with a 40-page dossier to notify them about the cartoons (Saint Paul Pioneer Press 2006). Ahmed Akkari, a chief spokesperson for these groups, said, “Freedom of expression without limits is like a car without brakes.” What followed were mass protests in the West, as well as in Muslim countries, many of which boycotted Danish products and diplomatically protested Denmark (Shadid and Sullivan 2006).

In response, Prime Minister Rasmussen expressed his respect for all religions but defended the freedom of expression, while Jyllands-Posten apologized for offending Muslims. A backlash came this time from other European newspapers, which perceived these remarks as a setback for Europe’s traditions of free speech and secularism. Accordingly, six European newspapers published these cartoons on the front page in January 2006 (Shadid and Sullivan 2006). Nevertheless, many other Western entities have largely imposed self-censorship due to fears of violence. For instance, Yale University Press decided not to include these cartoons in the book The Cartoons that Shook the World in August 2009 (National Post 2009).

Even distant Western countries couldn’t save themselves from these protests. During my primary data collection, I noticed that the Globe and Mail, a Canadian newspaper, put the

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9 For instance, “About 1,000 people protested outside Cairo's Al-Azhar Mosque, some chanting, "Osama bin Laden, explode Copenhagen," and burning a Danish flag” (The Star-Ledger 2006).
headline, “Why the global rage hasn’t engulfed Canada; Multiculturalism and media likely muted protests” on February 8, 2006. Inside the news, Earle Waugh, a University of Alberta Islamic scholar, said "There is no sympathy within the Canadian Muslim community for a radical approach, no sympathy for the fundamentalists" (Valpy 2006). Yet, only two days later, the Hamilton Spectator, an Ontario-based newspaper, was using the headline, “Rising tensions in Canada; Muslims worry protest could turn violent” (Tutton and Doucette 2006). On the same day, Haneen Aweidah from the Palestinian Solidarity Society in Ottawa said, “I support freedom of speech and academic freedom, except when it involves religion” (Ottawa Citizen 2006). In the end, Canadian newspapers didn’t publish the Danish cartoons, and protests in Halifax, Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto ended without any violence.

The controversy escalated again in 2008, when all major Danish newspapers published the cartoons after the Danish intelligence uncovered a plot to kill one of the cartoonists by three Tunisians. In return, hundreds of Danish Muslims demonstrated in Copenhagen and shouted “God is Great!” and “Freedom of speech is like a plague,” while many of them carrying the flags of Hisb ut-Tahrir, a transnational Islamist organization that was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 and aims to unify all Muslims under a Caliphate. Many Danish Muslims blamed Danish media for the controversy (Harrison 2008). Emon (2006) argues that Shari’a functions not only as a system of religious rules of ritual conduct, but also as a symbol of political identity. He points out that references to Shari’a by Muslims and non-Muslims during the cartoon protests have served to define and differentiate one group from another and raised further questions about Islam’s adaptability into a modern, liberal, secular state.

The Muhammad cartoonists have continued to be target of attacks by immigrant Muslims. In November 2010, Lars Viks was protested and attacked by Muslims while giving a
university lecture in Stockholm on the limits of artistic freedom (Rising 2010); in January 2010, Kurt Westergaard was saved from a Somalian’s attack by an axe at his home (Burns 2010b); and in December 2010, a “Mumbai style” attack by 5 Muslims on Jyllands-Posten was averted by the Danish security officials. The plotters included a Danish permanent resident of Iraqi origin, and permanent residents from Sweden (Goodman 2010).

At the forefront of these protests was Ahmed Abu Laban, the leader of the Islamic Society in Denmark. Abu Laban was expelled from Egypt for his Islamist views, and accused of giving political and economic support to Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, an Islamist group that is considered as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and the European Union (Gunaratna 2003). He said, “The cartoons are merely the final drop that caused the cup to overflow. The Muslim faith has been under attack for years” (Saint Paul Pioneer Press 2006). Muslim leaders like Muhammad Fadlallah (the senior Lebanese Shiite cleric) and Sheik Yusuh Qaradawi (a leading Sunni scholar) asked Muslims to use the dispute to strengthen their solidarity (Shadid and Sullivan 2006).

The cartoon crisis is apparently a clash between the freedom of speech and Islamic values but perhaps not a direct result of Denmark’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Yet, this study underlines that the fast and effective mobilization (e.g. through e-mails, text messages) of Muslim immigrants for mass protests became possible with preexisting networks, whose leaders include transnational Islamist figures that had been using external violent conflicts to solidify in-group/out-group identities. In other words, once transnational networks establish a membership base, they can mobilize Muslim immigrants for other common purposes at the expense of social cohesion with the host society.
On the other hand, I learned during my fieldwork in Denmark and Turkey in July and August 2011 that the Turkish Embassy in Denmark asked Turkish Islamic associations not to join the protests, while Turkish Islamist networks, including Milli Görüş, Nurcu movement, and the Suleymanci movement, acted independently. Thus, my interviews reveal a difference in the orientation of state-sponsored Muslim organizations (e.g. mosques funded and staffed by the Turkish state) and transnational Islamist groups, which took ground in Western Europe after fleeing the country in the early 1980s due to the persecution by the staunchly secular Turkish military.

My interviews in Copenhagen, Denmark involve twenty-five officials, leaders, and members of Turkish organizations. Except for two Turkish members of the Danish parliament, Ms. Ozlem Cekic and Ms. Yildiz Akdogan, my interviewees requested that their names and titles not be disclosed. The views of my interviewees can be summarized in five points. First, they argue that Denmark (i.e. government and natives) speaks of integration but expects assimilation, which is unacceptable by Muslims due to cultural differences. My interviewees generally agree that incidents like the cartoon crisis highlight differences in values and identities, and polarize immigrant and host societies. Another example to their value differences is alcohol and pork consumption. In the words of one of my interviewees, “One cannot truly integrate with co-workers and in the host society as long as religious and traditional values separate these groups.”

Second, my interviewees complain about discrimination, which includes denial of internships and jobs at the phone interview stage, even when they have the same education and language skills as their Danish counterparts. Turkish immigrants attribute this outcome to their Muslim-sounding names and note that this particular behavior was common even before the 9/11. Third, Turkish immigrants follow news almost exclusively from the Turkish media, both
screen and print. Their religious organizations are also subscribed to Turkish print media. Finally, 98 percent of Turks have a satellite TV and watch Turkish shows (a commonly stated program is Valley of the Wolves); and (5) 90 percent of Turks in Denmark find a spouse from Turkey. Overall, my interviews strongly support the previous insights that social cohesion is hindered by fundamental value and identity differences even before the 9/11, and also adversely affect other dimensions of integration, as in the case of job searches.
CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter discusses case selection, key concepts, the model, dependent variable, independent variables, and hypotheses.

Case Selection

This study includes sixteen Western countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.). The case selection is based on the following three criteria.

First, Western European countries share similar experiences with regard to Muslim immigration in the post-WWII period. Some of them had colonial ties with countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, so Algeria and Pakistan, for instance, became natural sources of labor for France and the U.K., respectively. In the absence of colonial ties, geographical proximity facilitated the process, as in the case of West Germany and Turkey. Western European countries received guest workers for post-war reconstruction until the oil shock and recession hit in the mid-1970s. Most of these Western European countries are also members of the European Union and have been subject to the same supranational framework that requires convergence in several policy areas, including the flow of people (Niessen et al 2010).
Second, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. are historically Anglo-Saxon countries that have received Muslim immigrants in the post-WWII period (e.g. Palestinians to the U.S. and Canada due to the Arab-Israeli wars; Afghans to Australia and New Zealand due to the Soviet invasion). These four countries enable this study to test the immigrant country hypothesis, as discussed below. On the other hand, Latin American countries are not included, since they didn’t receive Muslim guest workers or substantial number of Muslim refugees during the same period due to a number of reasons, including high unemployment rates, economic crises, political instability, and geographic distance.

Finally, other European countries are not included due to comparability limitations. Among these Eastern European countries didn’t receive Muslim guest workers during the Cold War as a result of their closed economic and political systems. Furthermore, Finland, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Portugal hosted a very small number of Muslim immigrants (mostly stood below 1,000). Finally, Greece is not included, since its Muslim population is mostly composed of a historical Turkish minority, rather than post-WWII immigrants as in the case of other countries, and the integration of historical minorities is not within the scope of this study.

Key Concepts

Based on the definitions provided in Chapter 3, this study considers an individual who has gone to another country for potential settlement as immigrant. Accordingly, tourists, who visit other countries for vacation, and terrorist operatives, who enter other countries for imminent or future attacks, are not considered as immigrants by this study. On the other hand, guest workers, many of who attempt to stay in their host countries, are considered as immigrants. Furthermore, this study considers foreign students within this category, since a student visa is a
convenient mode of entry to a Western country for a foreign national who aspires to work and stay there. An admission to a college, university, or even to a language program provides foreign students not only with a visa, but also with skills that later increase their chances of finding a job. Since it’s impossible to know the long-term aspirations of foreign students, this study assumes all of them as immigrants and their involvement in mass protests and violent incidents are coded along with other immigrants.

A downside of including guest workers and foreign students in this study is that, they are, after all, not technically immigrants according to their visa status. Nevertheless, Vogel and Triandafyllidou (2005) point out that the entry status (e.g. legal, illegal, temporary, permanent resident) is a weak predictor of later settlement. In other words, individuals who go to a country as a foreign student or a temporary worker are not less likely to stay there than those who go there as legal immigrants. As a matter of fact, hundreds of thousands of Turks who went to West Germany in the 1960s and early 1970s as guest workers, for instance, later stayed and have become permanent residents. Since this study investigates value and identity clashes between host societies and foreign-born Muslims and their children, this operationalization is considered consistent with research objectives.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is the social cohesion of Muslim immigrants and host societies, which is operationalized by value and identity clashes or lack thereof. The assumption is that ethnically/religiously-motivated mass protests and violent incidents are a manifestation of weak social cohesion. The unit of analysis is country-year (n = 640, lagged) and the studied period is
1970-2010. Ethnically/religiously-motivated mass protests and violent incidents are coded on a four-point scale for each country-year:

0 None reported
1 Protest
2 Violence
3 Protest and Violence

Violent Incidents

Spanning from 1970 through 2008, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) includes: (1) intentional (2) violent events committed or threats of violence made by (3) sub-national actors in all countries. In addition to these criteria, the GTD looks for the satisfaction of at least two of the following three conditions: (1) the event has a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) its perpetrators aim at coercing, intimidating, or communicating a larger audience than the immediate target; and (3) it takes place outside the context of internationally legitimate warfare (e.g. targeting civilians or non-combatants). The database provides the year, country, city, type, perpetrator, target, motive, and outcome of the incident, among other relevant information (Global Terrorism Database 2010).

This study employs the GTD as a major source of measuring violent incidents for three reasons. First, the database covers the spatial and the temporal (except for 2009 and 2010) dimensions of this study. Second, the GTD provides information on the perpetrator, target, and nature of incidents, which enables this study to include only the relevant cases based on the below criteria. Finally, the GTD selects for incidents that project a political, economic, religious,
or social message to a larger audience. In this regard, the database concurs with the objectives of this study, which investigates group-level, rather than individual-level, social cohesion.

This study only includes the GTD incidents that satisfy the following two criteria: (1) the incident takes place in one of the examined sixteen Western countries, and (2) the perpetrator is a Muslim immigrant/group and the target is host society member(s) or vice versa. Since this study examines Muslim immigrant-host society value and identity clashes, the GTD incidents that do not involve both of these groups in the same country are not included in the dataset. The omitted incidents range from Muslims attacking Hindus in the U.S. and Palestinians attacking the U.S. embassy in Sweden to Neo-Nazis attacking Jews in France. Furthermore, this study also excludes the GTD incidents in which the perpetrator is unknown and the target is the building/official of another country (e.g. Air Algeria office in France), or the perpetrator is unknown and the target is a dissident of another country (e.g. anti-Tehran refugees in France), or the perpetrator is unknown and the target is a Turkish business or bank in Germany. These preferences are made for more conservative data collection. Furthermore, Muslim immigrants who joined terrorist organizations (rather than acting independently) and committed attacks against Western targets, either in the West or abroad (e.g. Somalia), are excluded.10

Since the GTD ends in 2008, this study extends the data collection to 2009 and 2010 through online media sources (e.g. New York Times, NTVMSNC (in Turkish)). Consistent with the original methodology, this study provides all necessary information, including the sources and the full content of the news, for each new entry.11

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10 Similarly, Koopmans and Statham (1999b) code protest events but exclude acts of international terrorism that could not be plausibly interpreted as part of the claims making of a particular resident ethnic community.

11 The constructed dataset will become available online as part of the publication of this original study.
Protests

Fillieule (1999) suggests that a protest should fulfill the following criteria: (1) the number of participants is more than one, (2) the event has an expressive dimension both for the participants and their audience, (3) the event has a political nature, as compared to folkloric parades, etc., (4) organizers may or may not be an institutionalized group, such as a political party; and (5) the form of event includes rallies, public marches, occupations, obstructions, sit-ins, and operation-rescue style actions, as well as demonstrations and violent action. Similarly, Koopmans et al. (2005) define claims-making as a strategic claim that consists of the “purposive and public articulation of political demands, call to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (p. 24).

This study employs the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database (1945-2006) as a major source of protest events (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). MAR’s operationalization of protest is consistent with the approaches of Fillieule (1999) and Koopmans et al. (2005): it defines protest activities (PROT) as “actions initiated by members of the group on behalf of the group’s interests and directed against those who claim to exercise authority over the group” (Minorities at Risk Project 2003, p. 87). The MAR divides protest activities into five categories: verbal opposition (e.g. public letters, petitions), symbolic resistance (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic), and demonstrations, including rallies and strikes, with small (less than 10,000 people), medium (between 10,000 and 100,000 people), and large (more than 100,000 people) participation. Only the highest level of activity is coded per year, group, and country. The database provides information on country and group characteristics, and other relevant aspects of the event.
Yet, the MAR covers Muslim immigrants only in France and (West) Germany. In addition to the MAR, this study employs protest data from the European Protest and Coercion Database (Francisco 1996), online news sources, and the literature (e.g. Abraham 1977, Bhabha 1998, Macey 1999, O’Neill 1999, Limage 2000, Betz 2001, Warner and Wenner 2006), in accordance with MAR’s methodology. The European Protest and Coercion Database (EPCD) covers protests in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. for the period 1980-1995. Consistent with the MAR, the EPCD presents events with date, country, group attributes, description of event, number of protesters, and other relevant information. The primary data collection, on the other hand, was conducted via online news databases including LexisNexis Academic (all countries; period 1980-2010), International Newspaper Archive (all countries; period 1995-2010), iBiblio (2011), and NewspaperArchive.com (Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States; entire research period 1970-2010). The online search was conducted with keywords “Muslim/Islam,” “protest/demonstration,” and “country name.” If there were multiple protests for a country in a given year, the highest ordered one was coded in my dataset, which also includes the source and entire content of the news for transparency purposes.

This study incorporates only demonstrations (small, medium, and large) and omits lower-order verbal opposition and symbolic resistance due to two reasons. First, reported news may suffer from selection bias (i.e. selective of the size, location, and purpose of protests) and/or description bias (i.e. omission, misrepresentation, or framing of information) (Rucht, Koopmans, and Neidhart 1999; McCarthy et al. 1999). In this regard, demonstrations are more likely to be reported than verbal opposition and symbolic resistance. Second, this study investigates group level integration, which is more likely to be manifested in mass protests.
The Model

\[ Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 MCP_{it} + \beta_2 POLS_{it} + \beta_3 WELF_{it} + \beta_4 UNEMP_{it} + \beta_5 POP_{it} + \beta_6 MID_{it} + \beta_7 RIGHT_{it} + \beta_8 IMMG_{it} + u_{it} \]

- \( Y_{it} \) is the dependent variable where \( i = \) country and \( t = \) year.
- \( \beta_k \) is the coefficient for the independent variables,
- \( X_{k, it} \) represents independent variables,
- \( u_{it} \) is the error term.

Independent Variables

Independent variables include the level of multiculturalism, the type of the democratic political system, the welfare state, unemployment rate, the percentage of Muslims in the population, Muslim country-host country violent conflicts, immigrant country effect, and the participation of radical right parties in the government. The hypothesized relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables are summarized in Figure 5.1.
To illustrate, multiculturalism is expected to mitigate value and identity clashes (i.e. less mass protests and violence). The level of multiculturalism is measured on a scale of 0-8 with higher scores indicating stronger multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Appendix 1 lists the modifications made on Banting and Kymlicka’s rankings by this study.

**Hypothesis 1**: The higher the level of multiculturalism, the less likely that Muslim immigrants and the host society engage in dyadic mass protests and violent incidents.

Political system is measured by a dummy variable. It is “0” if the host country has a majoritarian or majoritarian-federal political system, and “1” if the host country has a consensual or consensual-unitary political system. Lijphart’s (1984) four categories are reduced down to two, since the federal-unitarian dimension is applicable to historical minorities (e.g. the Basque in Spain) and indigenous people (e.g. Native Indians in the U.S.), but not to immigrants, who typically don’t claim a certain territory or demand territorial autonomy due to the lack of historical justification.

**H2**: A host country with a consensual political system is less likely to have mass protests and violent incidents between Muslim immigrants and the host society than a host country with a majoritarian system.

The welfare state is measured in terms of total social spending (e.g. health care, education, unemployment, and housing benefits) as percentage of the GDP (OECD 2010).

**H3**: The higher the social spending, the less likely that Muslim immigrants and the host society engage in dyadic mass protests and violent incidents.

The unemployment rate reflects the overall population (World Bank 2011; U.S. Department of Labor 2010). For few years in the early 1970s when the data were not available for some countries, this study assumed 4 percent natural rate of unemployment.
**H4:** The higher the unemployment rate, the more likely that Muslim immigrants and the host society engage in dyadic mass protests and violent incidents.

The strength of radical right parties is measured by a dummy variable: “0” if a radical right party is not part of the government, and “1” if a radical right party joins a coalition government or supports the government outside the cabinet (Lubbers et al. 2002; online sources). The coding system is based on the study of Van Tubergen et al. (2004).

**H5:** The involvement of a radical right party in government is likely to increase mass protests and violent incidents between Muslim immigrants and the host society.

Muslim immigrants are expressed as their percentage in overall population (World Christian Encyclopedia 1982, 2001).

**H6:** The higher the Muslim population, the more likely that Muslim immigrants and the host society engage in dyadic mass protests and violent incidents.

External violent conflict is measured by a dummy variable in a given year: “0” if the host country is not involved in a violent conflict with a Muslim country, and “1” if the host country is involved in a violent conflict with a Muslim country. The data for this variable are derived from the Correlates of War (COW) 2 Project, Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset, which covers the studied period until 2002 (Ghosn and Bennett 2003). The COW Project defines militarized interstate disputes as “united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. The disputes include incidents that range from threats to use force to actual combat (Jones et al. 1996). For 2002-2010, primary data were collected from the websites of the U.S. Department of Defense (2011) and the U.S. State Department (2011) based on COW 2 Project’s methodology.
**H7**: Militarized Interstate Dispute between a host country and a Muslim country is likely to increase mass protests and violent incidents between Muslim immigrants and the host society.

Immigrant country effect is measured by a dummy variable: “0” if the host country is not an immigrant country, and “1” if it is an immigrant country (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S.). The premise of this hypothesis is that host societies in immigrant countries are mainly composed of individuals who themselves are the “-nth” generation immigrants. For this reason, immigrant countries have more experience with receiving and integrating immigrants than non-immigrant countries. Furthermore, the words “American” and “Canadian” don’t have ethnic connotations and are more inclusive, as opposed to “German” and “Dutch” (Joppke 1998).

**H8**: An immigrant country is less likely to experience mass protests and violent incidents between Muslim immigrants and the host society than a non-immigrant country.
CHAPTER 6
RESULTS & ANALYSIS

This study uses multinomial logistic regression (n = 640) to test the hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter. The baseline category is “no protest, no violence.” The results are presented in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Multinomial logistic regression results (* p < 0.05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1: Protest</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Std.Errors</th>
<th>Relative Risk Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political System</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>1.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare State</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>1.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Population</td>
<td>0.600*</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>1.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Conflict w Muslim Country</td>
<td>1.288*</td>
<td>1.339</td>
<td>3.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical right Party</td>
<td>-1.255</td>
<td>1.360</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Country</td>
<td>1.467*</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>4.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.962*</td>
<td>1.237</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2: Violent event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Conflict w Muslim Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radical right Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3: Protest and violent event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare State</td>
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<td>Unemployment</td>
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<td>Muslim Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent Conflict w Muslim Country</td>
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<td>Radical right Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrant Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypotheses Testing

The results indicate that at 95% confidence level the statistically significant variables are:

1. immigrant population, external violent conflict, and immigrant country for the protest outcome;
2. immigrant population and external violent conflict for the violent event outcome;
3. multiculturalism, the welfare state, immigrant population, and external violent conflict for the protest and violent event outcome. A notable change is that multiculturalism and the welfare state show the hypothesized mitigating effect only at the protest and violent event category. The impact of independent variables is investigated further in relative risk ratios below.

**Hypothesis 1**: Compared to the baseline (no conflict outcome), one unit increase in the level of multiculturalism corresponds to a decrease in the likelihood of protests \textit{and} violent events between Muslim immigrants and host societies by 30 percent.

**Hypothesis 3**: One unit increase in social spending corresponds to a decrease in the likelihood of protests \textit{and} violent events between Muslim immigrants and host societies by 16 percent.

**Hypothesis 6**: One unit increase in the relative immigrant group size corresponds to an increase in the likelihood of protests, versus no conflict outcome, by 82 percent; an increase in the likelihood of violent events, versus no conflict outcome, by 42 percent; and an increase in the likelihood of protests \textit{and} violent events, versus no conflict outcome, by two times.

**Hypothesis 7**: The involvement of a host country in a violent conflict with a Muslim country increases the likelihood of protests, versus no conflict outcome, by more than three times; increases the likelihood of violent events, versus no conflict outcome, by more than two
times; and increases the likelihood of protests and violent events, versus no conflict outcome, by more than six times.\textsuperscript{12}

**Hypothesis 8**: Immigrant countries are about four times more likely to have protests between Muslim immigrants and the host society than non-immigrant countries.

The marginal effects indicate:

- At mean levels of independent variables, the change in the probability of all categories (Pr(Protest), Pr(Violence), Pr(Protest\&Violence)) associated with external violent conflicts is positive, and statistically different from zero.
- Similarly, at mean levels of X, the change in the probability of all categories associated with an increase in Muslim population is positive, and statistically different from zero.
- The effects of multiculturalism and the welfare state on Pr(Protest\&Violence) are negative and significant.

**Analysis**

The results indicate that host countries’ violent conflicts with Muslim countries significantly increase the likelihood of ethnically/religiously-motivated mass protests and violence between Muslim immigrants and host societies. The percentage of Muslim immigrants is another variable that negatively affects social cohesion. This is perhaps because larger communities can sustain bigger immigrant organizations in terms of membership and funding, and in turn these organizations can organize mass protests more effectively. Furthermore, a higher percentage of Muslim immigrants in the population literally means greater “visibility” in

\textsuperscript{12} Pseudo $R^2$ for the overall model is 0.15.
the public sphere in terms of Islamic outlook and practices, which may fuel the fears of host societies for Islamism further.

**Figure 6.1**: Descriptive statistics by country-year

The descriptive statistics in Figure 6.1. show that the U.S., the U.K., France, and Germany have experienced mass protests and violence over the years, whereas New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland have been particularly peaceful. Among these countries, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland are not NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) members, and Norway, a NATO member, has one of the lowest percentage of Muslim immigrants in the West (Table 3.2). Figure 6.1 also demonstrates that value and identity clashes between Muslim immigrants and host societies are *not* solely a post-9/11 phenomenon.
In-sample predicted probabilities by population (Figure 6.2) demonstrate that the likelihood of mass protests between Muslim immigrants and the host society sharply increases after Muslim population passes six percent threshold in the host country. This outcome may partly be attributed to two factors. First, the visibility of an immigrant group is a factor of their relative size in the overall population, other things equal (e.g. geographic concentration). Second, mass protests require a substantial pool of human population to draw from. These human resources also help sustaining transnational Islamist networks at organizational and financial levels.

![Figure 6.2: In-sample predicted probabilities, by population](image)

These findings also indicate that multiculturalism and the welfare state have a weak positive impact on social cohesion. A reason why the welfare state performs poorly than expected in the literature may be that higher social spending decreases the likelihood of Muslim
protests and violence, while increasing the likelihood of host society protests and violence due to resource conflicts (Dancygier 2010). On the other hand, multiculturalism fails to meet the expectations of its proponents, as increasingly suggested by the literature. This is perhaps because immigrant organizations, including transnational Islamist associations, have been supported by multiculturalist policies, although especially the latter group doesn’t promote social cohesion and social trust between Muslim immigrants and host societies.

Another finding is that immigrant countries are more likely to experience value and identity clashes. This is because U.S.’ frequent involvement in militarized disputes with Muslim countries drives the results for immigrant countries. Conversely, unemployment rate, radical right party involvement in government, and consensual political systems are not statistically significant. First, the finding on the unemployment rate is consistent with Lubbers et al. (2002)’s study, which shows that unemployment matters at the personal level, but not at the cross-national level when it comes to anti-immigrant attitudes. Second, there is no country-year in which a radical right party formed the government, and there are few cases in which they became coalition partners or supported the government from outside. Furthermore, it is likely that the involvement of radical right parties in government compromises their anti-immigrant rhetoric and moves them to the center, as in the case of Italy (Art 2011).

Finally, consensual political systems do not perform any better than majoritarian systems in promoting social cohesion of Muslim immigrants and host societies. This is perhaps because the “consensus” in the former group is that Muslim immigrants pose a threat to the Western values. In fact, in November 2009, 57.5 percent of Swiss voters and a majority of cantons voted in favor of the ban of the construction of new minarets in Switzerland, although there are 150 mosques but only four minarets in Switzerland (Cumming-Bruce and Erlanger 2009;
Swissinfo.ch 2009). A poster used by the political parties supporting the ban included a woman wearing a burkha and the Swiss flag breached by minarets, which were depicted as missiles (Figure 6.3). The irony is that even Switzerland, which is an archetype of the consensual system, shows majoritarian tendencies with a referendum on minority rights when it comes to Muslim immigrants.

Figure 6.3: A Swiss poster during the minaret campaign
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The literature indicates that institutions and public policies help integrate ethnic minorities, social classes, and immigrants. Yet, recent studies that focus on the integration of Muslim immigrants in Western countries produce mixed results. While some scholars find that inclusive citizenship policies and multiculturalism facilitate integration, others find negative or no relationship at all. Based on this empirical puzzle, this study suggests that external violent conflicts, which are transmitted to immigrant Muslim communities and host societies particularly by transnational Islamist networks and the media, have an adverse effect on integration.

The quantitative results in Chapter 6 indicate a strong and negative relationship between external violent conflicts and social cohesion, which is measured by ethnically/religiously-motivated mass protests and violent incidents. However, a quantitative relationship is not sufficient to establish the theoretical link. This study suggests that political entrepreneurs (transnational Islamist networks, in particular) utilize external violent conflicts to solidify in-group/out-group identities in order to mobilize immigrant Muslim groups for common purposes, such as mass protests and donations to sister organizations in the Middle East and North Africa. The host-country and homeland media are another part of the transmission mechanism, since immigrants are increasingly connected to the screen, print, and online media of their countries of origin. The cases provided in Chapter 4 provide a rich account of the roles played by political
entrepreneurs and the media in transmitting external violent conflicts to immigrant communities and host societies.

These findings make an important contribution to the literature in four ways. First, unlike most of the former studies, this study highlights the impact of transnational factors on integration. Second, this study challenges the assumption that domestic institutions would yield the same result for all immigrant groups. Instead, integrating Muslim immigrants may be a bigger challenge than integrating, for instance, Latino immigrants, due to external violent conflicts or lack thereof. Third, this study demonstrates that value and identity clashes between Muslim immigrants and host societies are not entirely a post-9/11 phenomenon. Fourth, it becomes evident that multiculturalists didn’t foresee the impact of transnational Islamist organizations. While they are “civil society organizations” from a domestic perspective (i.e. they don’t have an organic link to host governments), they are founded and/or funded by Muslim states and have different priorities than local civil society organizations, against which they compete for members and resources.

Although this study focuses on the social cohesion dimension of integration, it wouldn’t be surprising to see an adverse impact of value and identity clashes on employment, housing, and even political rights of Muslim immigrants in the long-run. The concerns about Muslims in security-related jobs are particularly common in Western countries. For instance, in March 2009, twenty Islamist groups in the U.K. protested British soldiers in Iraq. One of the protesters, who was carrying a billboard saying, “War against Islam & Muslims – Anglican Soldiers: Butchers of Basra,” was recognized as a worker at the Luton Airport of London. Accordingly, his access to the airport was revoked, creating a debate over his punishment based on participation in a non-violent protest (Hurriyet 2009). As another example, the U.S. military employs Muslim
Americans of Middle East descent for their language skills. Yet, Muslim military members face a double challenge: in their Muslim communities and at mosques they are criticized for killing fellow Muslims, whereas other American soldiers don’t trust them especially in the battlefield (Elliott 2009). To make things worse, five Muslim soldiers working as Arabic interpreters at the Fort Jackson military base were arrested in February 2010 for attempting to poison the army personnel, shortly after the massacre committed by Major Hassan at the Fort Hood (New York Post 2010).

Furthermore, McCloud (1995) notes several examples in which wearing headscarf has become a barrier against Muslim women’s employment in American companies, such as J.C. Penney and Pinkerton Security & Investigation Services, which do not perceive headscarf as an acceptable part of work attire. Complaints about discrimination at security and non-security related jobs is increasing among Muslim Americans, and more than 800 such claims, including bans on wearing headscarf or taking prayer breaks, were filed in 2009. For instance, JBS Swift, a meatpacking company, was sued by 160 Somali immigrants for cursing Muslim workers and interrupting prayer breaks (Greenhouse 2010). In the European theater, job applicants with Moroccan-sounding names are found to be six times less likely to get an interview in France than people with French-sounding names and identical credentials (Giry 2006). My own fieldwork in Denmark provides similar results.

As for political rights, Panagopoulos (2006) finds that Americans are increasingly concerned about the compatibility of Islam and Muslim immigrants with Western values and societies. Similarly, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) (2006) conducts surveys and finds that one in every four Americans perceives Islam as a religion of hatred and one in every five Americans agrees that “the civil liberties of Muslims should be restricted”.

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13 Currently, 3,557 military personnel out of 1.4 million people in active-duty identify themselves as Muslim.
added] because of security reasons” (p. 4). During a congressional hearing on the radicalization in the American Islamic community, the Council on American-Islamic Relations was accused of being a terrorist organization by Representative Chip Cravaack of Minnesota, although his views weren’t supported by most of his colleagues (Shane 2011).

From a purely technical point of view, there are two possible policy options. First, Western countries resolve their existing violent conflicts with Muslim countries through peaceful processes and avoid future violent conflicts. This option is not “realistic,” since integration of immigrants is hardly prioritized in foreign policymaking. Alternatively, Western countries with violent conflicts with Muslim states may stop further Muslim immigration and family reunifications, ease deportation, and even withdraw citizenship in the cases of participation into certain types of protests and organizations, not to mention violence. This option is advocated by radical right parties and is highly controversial from a humanitarian point of view. As a half measure, France and Germany have initiated programs to train “indigenous” imams, rather than importing them from Muslim countries. Thus, the transnational aspect makes integration even more challenging with no easy solution, and it is unlikely that institutions and public policies will be able promote social cohesion without addressing the root causes of value and identity clashes.

A limitation of this study is that it assumes anybody coming from a predominantly Muslim country as Muslim. This assumption disregards individual, national, and sectarian differences. The major reason for this preference is that, as discussed in Chapter 4, host societies tend to perceive Muslims as a monolithic group. For future research, the response of Muslim immigrants to external violent conflicts and institutional arrangements needs to be studied by considering those differences in order to extend our understanding of this complex relationship.
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APPENDIX

MODIFICATIONS ON MULTICULTURALISM SCORES

- Austria’s multiculturalism score is reduced from 0.5 to 0.0 for 2006 and onwards, since this country passed the Settlement and Residence Act and made the integration agreement even less favorable (MIPEX 2010).

- Belgium’s score is increased from 3.0 to 4.0 for 2000 and onwards, since this country passed the Reform of the Belgian Code on Nationality and eliminated the integration test and reduced the residence requirement from five years to three for most first-generation migrants, and to two for refugees. However, its score is reduced to 3.5 in 2006, since the 15 September 2006 law transposing the European Community Directive on family reunion improved Belgium’s score on one indicator but weakened it on two others (MIPEX 2010).

- Canada’s score is reduced from 7.5 to 7.0 between 1970 and 1977, at which point it enabled the Canadian-born children of migrants and naturalizing migrants to retain their foreign nationality. Its score is increased from 7.5 to 8.0 in 2005, since this country allowed any permanent adult resident, regardless of their duration of stay in Canada, to sponsor their family to join them (MIPEX 2010).

- France’s score is kept at 2.0 due to two opposing changes. In 2004, France banned the wearing of religious symbols at public and private schools, while it founded a new institution named HALDE to provide legal advice, alternative dispute resolution and independent investigations to victims of discrimination (MIPEX 2010).
- Germany’s score is increased from 0.5 to 1.0 in 2000 and onwards, since this country changed the citizenship laws and enabled second-generation immigrants to become German citizens under certain conditions (MIPEX 2010). This score is maintained due to two opposite changes. In 2006, Germany made the criteria to assess an applicant’s knowledge of German language and basic values before taking on citizenship flexible, thus, subjective, while it passed the General Law on Equal Treatment and banned direct or indirect discrimination directly on the grounds of race/ethnic origin, sex, religion/belief, disability, age or sexuality (MIPEX 2010).

- Italy’s score is increased from 1.5 to 2.0 in 2006, since this country passed a naturalization bill that make Italian-born children automatically citizens if their migrant parents fulfilled certain additional requirements (MIPEX 2010).

- The Netherlands’ score is reduced from 4.5 to 4.0 in 2007, since this country passed a regulation that provide migrants with face less favorable conditions to become long-term residents (MIPEX 2010).

- Spain’s score is increased from 1.0 to 1.5 in 1996, since this country passed a regulation that allow all third country nationals an unconditional right to long-term residence status after five years of continuous legal residence (MIPEX 2010).

- Sweden’s score is increased from 3.0 to 3.5 in 2006, since its Migration Board introduced a simpler family reunification procedure for nuclear family members and more flexible regulations on written and oral proceedings (MIPEX 2010).

- Switzerland’s score is reduced from 1.0 to 0.5 in 2009, since this country banned the construction of new minarets by a referendum (MIPEX 2010).

- The U.K.’s score is maintained at 5.0 due to two opposite changes. In 2006, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act enabled the withdrawal of citizenship, while it established the