

LIVY, VEII, AND ROME: *AB URBE CONDITA*, BOOK V

by

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(Under the Direction of James Anderson)

ABSTRACT

The Roman historian Livy, when writing his account of the siege of Veii, embellished many of the details with epic language and tone. By examining similarities with other epics and by contrary archaeological evidence, Livy's narrative can be shown to be a misrepresentation of the scale and importance of the actual siege. Instead, Livy's portrayal of events presents readers with an ulterior motive as can be seen in the actions of the main character of Book V, Camillus. The exaggerated account surrounding the siege of Veii lifts Camillus, as a character, into the realm of the epic and legendary heroes of Rome's past. In doing so, Camillus, an historical character that carries ancient values, becomes a perfect exemplum for right and moral action in the eyes of Livy's readers.

INDEX WORDS: Livy, Veii, Camillus, Roman historiography

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CHAPTER I

LIVY AND THE SIEGE OF VEII

Livy's narrative surrounding the siege of Veii is more than an historical account of an important event in the history of Rome. To the casual reader, the narrative presents an engaging picture of the difficulties and triumphs of the burgeoning Roman Republic. There are exciting action sequences, treachery, and betrayals; there are also moments of honor, morality, and even some incredible portents. Coupled with Livy's skill at story-telling, these concepts come together to form a captivating picture of Rome's conquest over the Veientes.

However, at closer inspection, many of the facts that Livy presents seem to be more like his own inventions than plausible historical realities. At times, these "facts" differ from the established traditions which preceded his work. Not only are there inconsistencies in the information that Livy gives, there are also striking similarities to other accounts of siege warfare; some similarities are found in other passages from Livy's own work. When examined closely, these details suggest that he was trying hard to make the siege of Veii parallel the content and language of epic poems as closely as possible.¹

Livy's Account of the Siege of Veii

The ultimate struggle with Veii is foreshadowed by the expiration of the truce between Rome and the Etruscan city (4.57.1) in the closing chapters of Book IV; the war begins with hostilities brought about "because of a haughty response of the Veientine senate" (*ob superbum responsum*

¹ In the following arguments "epic" will denote the genre of epic poetry. When I say that Livy's narrative was epic, I mean that he was presenting the narrative in a way that would bring to mind the grandeur, scale, and morality of Homer, Hesiod, Ennius, et al. without writing in verse. His narrative contains the language and imagery of epic poetry as well as the educational motifs that show the cause and effect of pious versus impious behavior.

Veientis senatus; 4.58.6).² However, it is not until after the capture and conquest of Anxur, a Volscian stronghold, that Veii was first besieged in 406 B.C.E. (4.61.2). There is then a period of relative peace until, in 403 B.C.E.,³ the Romans begin the construction of winter quarters and whole-heartedly conduct siege warfare with Veii. Winter quarters (*hibernacula*) were a new concept for the Roman soldiers (*res nova militi Romano*; 5.2.1) who were accustomed to return home after the summer's campaign. Livy uses the introduction of this new concept to stress the problems between Roman social orders in that the plebs had agreed to go to war with Veii only after Anxur was captured and pay was given to the soldiers. Because the military leaders wanted to continue the fighting into the winter months, the tribune of the plebs claimed that the institution of winter quarters was detrimental to the well being of the plebian citizens (5.2.1-15). It is at this point that Livy focuses on the politics of the Roman state, a theme recurring throughout the entire *Ab Urbe Condita*, and ignores the siege until the problems at Rome between the political factions are described fully.

In the midst of the bickering that takes place between the tribunes and the other senators about the winter siege, Livy takes time to allude to the fact that the scale of the siege and its importance to the survival of Rome, even from an early time, was considered comparable to the epic sieges from long ago. In a set speech, Livy has Appius Claudius directly compare the siege, although it had as of yet lasted only one continuous year, to the Trojan War. Claudius reminds the assembly that “a certain city was fought with for ten years by all of Greece because of a single woman” (*Decem quondam annos urbs oppugnata est ob unam mulierem ab universa*

² Quotations from Livy are from R.M. Ogilvie, *Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). All translations from Livy and other ancient authors are my own unless cited otherwise.

³ All dates surrounding the siege are taken from R.M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy: Books 1-5* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).

Graecia; 5.4.11); he also rebukes them for failing to act against a city that is nearly within sight of Rome and which has committed frequent atrocious acts against the Roman state (5.4.13-14):

Septiens rebellarunt; in pace nunquam fida fuerunt; agros nostros miliens depopulati sunt; Fidenates deficere a nobis coegerunt; colonos nostros ibi interfecerunt; auctores fuere contra ius caedis impiae legatorum nostrorum; Etruriam omnem adversus nos concitare voluerunt hodieque id moliuntur; res repetentes legatos nostros haud procul afuit quin violarent.

Seven times they have made war; they were never trustworthy in peace; countless times they have devastated our fields; they coerced the Fidenates to defect from us; they have murdered our colonists; they went against the law in the impious murder of our ambassadors; they wanted to incite all Etruria against us and they still scheme today; they even violated our ambassadors who were seeking reimbursement.

Through Appius Claudius' speech, Livy is claiming outright that even *during* the siege it was considered an epic task⁴ by those taking part in the struggle and so gives evidence to any would-be critics that his presentation of the event is justifiable; he also allows his readers to associate his historical account with the mythological stories with which they are already familiar. This war did not come about, according to Livy, on a whim; there had been a long history of animosity between the two states dating back to more legendary times. What is more, Livy claims that there was a very real possibility that the Veientes would bring all of the Etruscan states into the war. Livy often makes no distinction between the Veientes and a combined Etruscan state to provide a much larger and unconquerable foe for the Romans. Ogilvie states:⁵

The hostility [between Rome and Veii] led to war, first the capture of Fidenae and then, as a natural sequel, the siege of Veii herself. The course of events is consistent and intelligible. It is only confused by Livy's failure to distinguish between the inhabitants of Veii and the rest of Etruria...The other Etruscans, as the Caeretan lodging of the *sacra publica* demonstrates, were anxious to retain the goodwill and friendship of Rome.

The next major event in the war occurs when the Roman siege works are brought closer to the Veientine walls. Because the Roman soldiers are working so hard on the siege towers during

⁴ That it falls into the realm of epic comes from the fact that the enemy acted against the divinely sanctioned laws protecting ambassadors. This would be no mere struggle between and for the sake of mortals.

⁵ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 627.

the day, they are not as alert as they should have been at night. Consequently, the Veientes are able to sally forth after dark and burn the Roman constructions (5.7.2-3). Because of this calamity, there erupted in Rome a sense of patriotic fervor in which those of equestrian rank promised to serve using their own horses (5.7.5) and the plebs volunteered for military service “whether (the senate) wished to lead them to Veii or to some other place” (*seu Veios seu quo alio ducere velint*; 5.7.7).

At the beginning of the next year the Romans suffered even more troubles in their war with Veii. Not only did the garrison at Anxur lose the city (5.8.3) but the Capenates and the Faliscans, neighbors of Veii, joined in the attack and assaulted the besiegers (5.8.6 ff.). This event corresponds to the fears that Appius Claudius had pronounced concerning the unification of Etruria and reiterates the need for the Roman state to come to agreement on the issue of the war. This catastrophe, however, was followed by still more bickering in the Roman Senate as to who was to blame for the disaster instead of how to react.

In the next year, 401 B.C.E., Rome busied herself with warfare around all of the troubled areas and stretched her resources to new levels. It is at this point in the narrative that the comparison between the sieges of Veii and Troy are both apparent and problematic. Livy claims that one of the plebian complaints against the aristocracy was that they were “dragging one war into its third year and waging it with bad planning so that they might continue even longer” (*Unum bellum annum iam tertium trahi et consulto male geri ut diutius gerant*; 5.10.7). This statement must cast some doubt on the analogy with the Trojan War in the readers’ minds, at least with respect to the timeline of ten years; it also reveals Livy’s reinterpretation of the facts in order to make the connection in the first place. The fact that the tribunes charged the Roman leadership with purposefully drawing out the war into its third year suggests that the war started

when the siege works were first built in 403 B.C.E., not when the ambassadors from Veii insulted the Senate in 406 B.C.E.; the institution of the first winter barracks would support this idea more suitably if in fact it was Livy who extended the declaration of war back three years in order for the war to last ten years in his narrative, as Ogilvie suggests:⁶

Roman heroism invited comparison with Greek and a prolonged siege of a redoubtable opponent could not but evoke the ten-year siege of Troy... [Similarly] the assimilation of the siege of Veii with the siege of Troy is of a piece with other Hellenizing adaptations in Roman history—Tarquinius Superbus or the Fabii at Craemere—and belongs to the first generation of Roman historians who were writing with an eye to a Greek audience. The historical truth was thus gradually overlaid with legendary distortion.

Throughout the Veientine siege, Livy spends much more space describing the bickering between classes and the rivalry among colleagues than he does describing the supposedly epic siege that he is recounting.⁷ In fact, after the loss of Anxur and the almost disastrous attack on the besiegers by a combined Etruscan force in 402 B.C.E., the next event of importance described by Livy concerns the celebration of the first *lectisternium* (a rite in which the simulacra of the gods were paraded around the city upon dining couches) in Rome in 399 B.C.E.⁸ This celebration, which was suggested by the Sibylline Books, lasted for eight days during which no foul deed was carried out by anyone in the city even though everyone's door lay open (5.13.6-7). In order to take his readers' attention away from the fact that his epic siege has stalled, he marks out other acts that would be worthy of an epic narrative: the honorable actions

⁶ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 628. C.f. also Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 629: "[Livy] dates the war from 406 (4.58.6, 60.9) to 396 (5.22.8) and in consequence the capture of Rome by the Gauls to 390 (cf. 5.4.5 n.). The absolute dates are wrong. Early Greek sources, which synchronize the capture of Rome with the peace of Antalcidas and the siege of Rhegium by Dionysius, demonstrate that the city of Rome actually fell in the summer of 387/6. But the six-year interval between Veii and Rome is not objectionable."

⁷ This representation must bring to mind the proem of Homer's *Iliad* 1.6-7: ...ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε ἼΑτρείδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς. – "(Sing Muse) from which time they first stood apart in strife, son of Atreus, lord of men, and godlike Achilles."

⁸ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 651: "The Romans attribute their failure to divine displeasure and take such steps as are open to them to remedy the situation: the *lectisternium* (13.6 n), the seer of Veii (15.4 n), and the Delphic oracle (16.9-11 n.). The first and last of these are likely enough to be authentic facts, even if the circumstances have been doctored to the extent of relating them directly to the issue of the war with Veii whereas the character both of the *lectisternium* and of the consultation of Delphi suggests that they were motivated not by the protraction of the Veian War but by a series of wasting plagues."

of the entire population of Rome. At about the same time as the pious festival was being celebrated in Rome, however, a tri-city force of Etruscans again attacked the besiegers at Veii (5.13.9).⁹ This time though, because of the memory of the condemnation of Sergius and Verginius (5.12.1-2)—the two tribunes who had nearly caused the Roman army to be destroyed because of their squabbling—and because of the piety exhibited in the *lectisternium* (according to the Romans themselves), the Romans routed the Etruscan forces. Livy is using the historical information surrounding the siege (a bitter defeat followed by a striking victory) as a vehicle for conveying a sense that the *maiores* exhibited good and sound moral judgment by rejecting the immoral men who strove for personal glory over the good of the state.

The next year Livy states that “nothing worth mentioning was carried out at Veii by these (new) tribunes” (*His tribunis ad Veios nihil admodum memorabile actum est*; 5.14.6). That is not to say that nothing noteworthy happened; it is at this juncture that Livy describes the divine portent of the overflow of the Alban Lake. Again, it is after yet another period of quiet that Livy describes a religious omen which overshadows the events of his siege; either Livy’s sources only make mention of this event (because this omen was more likely to have been passed down through the ages in the *annales*),¹⁰ or Livy was in need of something worth mentioning for his narrative at this juncture.¹¹

It is also in regard to the omen surrounding the Alban Lake that Livy tells the story of a Roman soldier who captures a Veientine soothsayer who was in the habit of coming to the walls

⁹ *Namque eodem quo antea modo circa munimenta cum repente Capenates Faliscique subsidio venissent, adversus tres exercitus ancipiti proelio pugnatum est.* “For in the same way as before the Capenates and the Faliscans arrived suddenly with aid, and a battle was fought against three armies on two sides.”

¹⁰ E. Rawson, “Prodigy Lists and the Use of the *Annales Maximi*,” *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971): 158 ff, and B.W. Frier, *Libri Annales Pontificum Maximorum* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999) both discuss the significance of the *Annales Maximi*. Both even agree that the *annales* themselves were probably not a single source, but were rather a collection of yearly reports and recordings by the pontiffs which were widely varying in their form and content. For simplification, I have chosen to refer to the source material of the historians as the *annales*.

¹¹ The importance of the Alban Lake will be discussed more in Chapter 2.

and yelling at the Roman troops (5.15.4). Apparently, it was an Etruscan custom that soothsayers would yell prophecies to Roman troops and allow themselves to be captured; the same thing is reported in relation to the capture of Fidenae a few decades before (4.22.4-6; 5.19-21). More doubt is cast on this capture by the fact that the senators disregarded the Etruscan soothsayer and acted to drain the Alban Lake—an act that would bring about the destruction of Veii—only after hearing the reply of the Delphic oracle (5.15.11 – 16.11). Because the Romans waited until the delegation that was sent to Delphi returned to carry out the draining of the Alban Lake, it is more likely that the tale of the Etruscan soothsayer, a recurring motif, was inserted into the account at this juncture so that the Roman would have a reason, in connection with the ongoing siege, to ask the opinion of the Delphic oracle.

Finally, in the year 396 B.C.E., after the Alban Lake had been drained, the stage was set for the victory over Veii when M. Furius Camillus was appointed dictator (5.19.2). To end the siege, Camillus stopped all skirmishes with the enemy around the walls and set his men to digging a tunnel, a *cuniculus*, into the enemy citadel (5.19.10; 5.21.10ff.). Here again, as with the capture of the Etruscan soothsayer, Livy seems to have been drawing on a repeated concept for his narrative.¹² One obvious reason for this reiteration of events from two different times was to connect the siege of Veii more closely with the events of the Trojan War.¹³ The siege of Troy was brought to an end after ten years of fighting when the Greeks created the Trojan horse as a way of entering the city without the inhabitants knowing; so too, according to Livy, did the Romans enter the city of Veii through a deception.¹⁴

¹² Fidenae was also captured by means of a tunnel in 426 B.C.E. (4.57.4 ff.). Cf. Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 672.

¹³ M.E. Payne, "History as Epic: Livy's Veii" (M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 1999), 2.

¹⁴ Ogilvie (*A Commentary*, 628 ff.) believes that the occurrence of *cuniculi* and siege works being burned in both events should not force readers to assume that they did not happen in at least one of the sieges. The *cuniculi* themselves, which provide no evidence of being used in the defeat of Veii, will be discussed in much more detail in Chapter 2.

Tunneling, or sapping, was a common tactic used to undermine strong fortresses. What makes the capture of Veii stand out however is that Livy spent so much time drawing out the point that Veii was captured through deception when Fidenae had fallen by the same tactics four decades before (making the tunnels far from novel); moreover, there is no archaeological evidence supporting the claim that the Veientine citadel was ever breached by a tunnel.

Whatever the origin of the story that the sack of Veii was carried out through these *cuniculi*, Livy found a use for the legend in drawing a parallel to the Trojan Horse of Odysseus as he writes (5.22.8):¹⁵

Hic Veiorum occasus fuit, urbis opulentissimae Etrusci nominis, magnitudinem suam vel ultima clade indicantis, quod decem aestates hiemesque continuas circumsessa cum plus aliquanto cladium intulisset quam accepisset, postremo iam fato quoque urgente, operibus tamen, non vi expugnata est.

This was the end of Veii, the most opulent city of Etruscan name, (a city which) presented its own greatness in its final destruction, (and) which, having been surrounded continuously for ten summers and winters, had given more injury to the other side than it had received; in the end, with fate playing a part, it was conquered by siege works and not force.

Despite Livy's obvious exaggeration of the amount of time it took to capture Veii—it was probably a siege of seven years at most,¹⁶ if the siege was begun only after the institution of winter barracks, instead of the ten given by Livy—he may not have been the first author to describe the siege of Veii as an event worthy of an epic storyline. In fact, Cicero provides possible evidence that the siege was considered worthy of epic mention by the poet Ennius (Cicero, *De Re Pub.* 1.25):

¹⁵ C.S. Kraus, “‘No Second Troy’: Topoi and Refoundation in Livy, Book V,” *TAPA* 124 (1994): 272, in an excellent examination of the *topoi* of siege narratives, refers to Camillus' tunnel as the “Trojan Rabbit.”

¹⁶ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 629: “Nothing happens in the first three years of the war in L.’s account (4.60.9, 61.2-3, 9). The first memorable event of any kind takes place in 403, and it might reasonably be held that the 403 (399 on the absolute chronology) marked the true beginning of the war. Its start and in turn the expiry of the twenty years' truce were pushed back to increase the parallelism between Veii and Troy.” So, with a start date of 399 B.C.E. in absolute dating and an end at 392-1 B.C.E., the total length of the war was only seven years.

id autem postea ne nostrum quidem Ennium fugit, qui ut scribit anno quinquagesimo ccc fere post Romam conditam, "Nonis Iunis soli luna obstitit et nox." atque hac in re tanta inest ratio atque sollertia ut ex hoc die quem apud Ennium et in Maximis Annalibus consignatum videmus superiores solis defectiones reputatae sint usque ad illam quae Nonis Quintilibus fuit regnante Romulo.

Afterwards this event (eclipse) did not escape the notice of our Ennius, who wrote that in the three hundred fiftieth year after Rome was founded, "On the Nones of June the moon and night stood before the sun." There is such reason and skill in this account that, from this day which we see written down in Ennius and in the *Annales Maximi*, the former failings of the sun might be counted – even to that one which was on the Nones of July during the reign of Romulus.

The eclipse mentioned by Cicero here is believed to be the eclipse which occurred on June 21, 400 B.C.E.¹⁷ If Ennius was alluding to the siege of Veii in this passage (what other event could have shown enough *gravitas* to be worthy of an eclipse in Ennius' epic?), it would suggest that the events surrounding Veii were considered worthy of epic treatment by at least the beginning of the second century B.C.E. when Ennius was writing his *Annales*. While the inclusion of the eclipse in the pontifical annals does not, by itself, suggest connection with the war with Veii, one can only assume that Ennius' mention of the eclipse was in direct relation to the war.¹⁸ Even if the reference of the eclipse was merely to point out a prodigious event and there was no thematic connection with the siege, Ennius could not have overlooked the coincidence in the occurrence of the eclipse and the siege of Veii.¹⁹ Prodigies are rarely separated from any contemporary events of significance and the war with the Veientes would have provided a wonderful background to which portents and religious rites could be associated.²⁰

¹⁷ A. Alföldi, *Early Rome and the Latins*, *Jerome Lectures*, 7th series (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 166.

¹⁸ O. Skutsch, *The Annals of Q. Ennius* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 6. Eclipses by themselves carry no special epic connotation (as can be seen from the Cicero passage). They were, however, often associated with divine happenings such as the apotheoses of Caesar.

¹⁹ Skutsch, *Annals*, 313.

²⁰ Another example is that in Dionysius (12.9.3); L. Calpurnius Piso is cited as the source of information about the *lectisternium* of 399 B.C.E.²⁰ Here again, a divinely inspired ritual is described as being adopted at the same time as a difficult siege with their rival, Veii.

However, despite the likelihood that the epic presentation of events surrounding the siege of Veii began before Livy wrote, it is important to remember that descriptions of the siege itself survive in only a few of the ancient sources. The only source not written after Livy in which the memory of the siege proper survives is Diodorus Siculus.²¹ Diodorus' account is completely lacking in epic presentation as it is merely a side note to the establishment of annual pay for Roman soldiers. Moreover, the account in Diodorus is at odds with Livy's "epic" storyline in that he places the beginning of the war not in 406 B.C.E., but in 403 B.C.E. (14.16.5):²²

Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Ῥωμαῖος πρὸς Βηίους πόλεμος συνέστη διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας... τότε πρῶτως ἐπεψηφίσαντο Ῥωμαῖοι τοῖς στρατιώταις καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν εἰς ἐφόδια διδόναι χρήματα. ἐξεπολιόρκησαν δὲ καὶ τὴν Οὐόλσκων πόλιν, ἣ τότε μὲν Ἄνξωρ ἐκαλεῖτο, νῦν δ' ὀνομάζεται Ταρρακίνη.

In Italy there was a war among the Romans against Veii for the following reasons... (It was at this time) when the Romans voted for the first time to give pay to the soldiers for each one's service. They also assaulted the city of the Ouolskoi (Volscians), which was then called Anxur, but now is known as Tarracine.

The reasons that Diodorus gives for the war are lost. Nevertheless, the important part of this passage is that although Diodorus disagrees with Livy's assertion that the war began in 406 B.C.E., he does agree with the Roman historian in placing the first account of annual pay in this year. It is in this agreement that the true core of the historical record comes to the surface. Diodorus places the foundation of annual military pay in this year because he was, either directly or indirectly, drawing upon information contained in the Roman historic record; the duty of the

²¹ Diodorus of Agyrium, Sicily wrote a comprehensive history of Greece, the *Βιβλιοθήκη*, which was completed sometime around 30 B.C.E. (*OCD* 3rd ed., "Diodorus (3).") Plutarch, writing in the first century C.E., mentions the siege in digressions from his portraits (*Cam.* 2.5; 3.1-3.4; 5.4); Quadrigarius (frag. 7 P) and Nepos (from Pliny, *N. H.* 3.125) make mention of Veii only in relation to Camillus in their works from the first half of the first century B.C.E..

²² Coincidentally in the year Livy ascribes to the first winter quarters. Quotations from Diodorus Siculus come from C.H. Oldfather, *Diodorus of Sicily VI: Books XIV-XV*, 19 (Loeb Classical Library, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1954). Translations are my own.

pontifical annals was to record religious and governmental occurrences during the year for the sake of history.²³ Alföldi writes:²⁴

Rolls of the annual magistrates were started, and with them some basic facts of public interest were recorded. Rome was certainly not the only nor the first city to introduce such an annual protocol. Therefore, the combination of the list of eponymous officers with short remarks on wars, triumphs, hunger, pestilences, and on prodigies, etc., is likely to imitate usage established in other (Etruscan or Latin) communities.

The idea that Diodorus knew full well the history of the siege comes from the fact that he mentions Veii again in Book XIV of his histories. He writes (14.43.5): “The Romans were besieging Beios (Veii), and some were cut to pieces by the Veientes coming out of the city, others fled shamefully” (Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς Βηίους, ἐξελθόντων τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως οἱ μὲν κατεκόπησαν ὑπὸ τῶν Βηίων, οἱ δ’ ἐξέφυγον ἀίσχρῶς). This passage about the sally of Veii’s troops is Diodorus’ last mention of the siege until the events surrounding the invasion of the Gauls.²⁵ He mentions neither the Alban Lake nor the glorious exploits of Camillus. Granted, Diodorus was not writing a history of Rome, though he did think the pay for soldiers and the attack against the siege works important to his history. Why would a historian record information about an institution of military pay and not about the divinely aided sack of an important Etruscan city unless the information was either not connected with the siege or the information was not contained in the *annales*? This question, when taken together with the fact that Livy molded the timeline of the siege to parallel the Trojan War more closely, casts doubt on how closely Livy was relying upon the *Annales Maximi* for his own source material; it also begs

²³ See Rawson (1971) and Frier (1999) for a discussion on the content of the *Annales Maximi* and their usefulness to ancient historians. Rawson agrees that the annales contained yearly lists of prodigies and omens, but she provides a compelling argument that there were other sources from which the historians drew their information.

²⁴ Alföldi, *Early Rome*, 165.

²⁵ Diodorus Siculus 14.114.2: ...οἱ μὲν πλεῖστον τῶν διασωθέντων πόλιν Βηίους κατελάβοντο...- “Most of those who escaped the city settled in Veii.”

the question as to whether or not Livy was copying motifs from other historical events (such as the Etruscan soothsayer and the *cuniculi*) or inventing material as it suited his needs.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch also relate the events of the siege, though because they were writing after Livy it would be hard to argue that they were not influenced by his ideas about the importance of Veii. Even in these later sources, however, the focus of the material is not on the military aspects of the so-called epic siege, but on the portents surrounding it. For example, Dionysius constantly cites military or political events as a mere introduction to omens (Dion. Hal. 12.10.1):²⁶

Οὐιεντανοὺς πολιορκούντων Ῥωμαίων περὶ τὴν ἐπιτολὴν τοῦ κυνός, ὅτε μάλιστα λίμναι τε ἐπιλείπουσι καὶ ποταμοὶ τάντες, ὅ τι μὴ μόνος ὁ Αἰγύπτιος Νεῖλος, λίμνη τις ἀπέχουσα τῆς Ῥώμης οὐ μείον ῤκ' σταδίων ἐν τοῖς Ἀλβανοῖς καλουμένοις ὄρεσι...καὶ ποταμὸν ἐγγέαι κατὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων πεδίων ἐξάσιον.

While the Romans were besieging the Veientes at the time of the appearance of the dog star, when lakes and rivers are most accustomed to go dry, with the only exception being the Nile in Egypt, a certain lake which was not more than one hundred twenty stades from Rome in what were called the Alban Mountains... poured out a river which flooded the plains below.

Plutarch, in his *Life of Camillus*, also uses the siege as a backdrop for the discussion of the character of Camillus or as a reason for various portents. He begins his account of the siege with a description of the grandeur of Veii (1.2.3):

...καὶ μάλιστα κατήπειγεν ἡ Οὐηίων πολιορκία. τούτους ἔνιοι Οὐηιεντανοὺς καλοῦσιν. Ἦν δὲ πρόσχημα τῆς Τυρρηνίας ἡ πόλις, ὅπλων μὲν ἀριθμῶ καὶ πλήθει τῶν στρατευμένων οὐκ ἀποδέουσα τῆς Ῥώμης...²⁸

...the siege of Veii troubled them the most. These men were called the Veientes. Their city was not only preeminent among the Etruscans, it was not inferior to Rome in neither the amount of materiel nor in the number of soldiers...²⁹

²⁶ Cf. also Dion. Hal. 12.6.1; 12.8.1; 12.11.1.

²⁷ Passages from Dionysius of Halicarnassus are from E. Cary, *The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus VII: Book XI and fragments of Books XII-XX* (Loeb Classical Library. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1958). Translations are my own.

²⁸ Passages from Plutarch from B. Perrin, *Plutarch's Lives II: Themistocles and Camillus; Aristides and Cato Major; Cimon and Lucullus* (Loeb Classical Library. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1968).

After Plutarch mentions the establishment of winter quarters (1.2.5) and Camillus' second tribuneship (1.2.6), he mentions the siege again only in relation to the Alban Lake (1.3.1):

Ἐκ τούτου τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀλβανίδα λίμνην πάθος ἀκμάζοντι τῷ πολέμῳ συνενεχθὲν οὐδενὸς ἦπτον τῶν ἀπίστων πυθέσθαι θαυμάτων αἰτίας κοινῆς ἀποοία καὶ λόγου φυσικὴν ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν ἐφόβησεν.

And now, when the war was at its climax, the calamity of the Alban Lake added its terrors. It seemed a most incredible prodigy, without familiar cause or natural explanation.³⁰

As Plutarch is focusing on the character of Camillus and not on the history of the siege, it is of course understandable that he puts the siege itself in the background.³¹

In every case the account of the siege is reported in relation to omens, portents, or religious activities. If the eclipse of 400 B.C.E. that was reported by the *Annales Maximi* and Ennius does in fact allude to the siege of Veii, the tradition of blanketing the siege with religious events was started from an early time. The domination of religious rites and omens in the work of Roman historians is to be expected since they got much of their information from the *annales* of the pontifical records. Because it was the duty of the Pontifex Maximus to record the events of the year in Rome, those events with religious connotations would be preferred above others. Even though these annals were not collected into a single work until the last half of the second century B.C.E., the separate yearly reports were utilized by early historians, and by poets writing epics for the aristocracy such as Ennius for *Nobilior*.³² Alföldi states:³³

“...the combination of the list of eponymous officers with short remarks on wars, triumphs, hunger, pestilence, and on prodigies, etc., ...were not prepared for publication,

²⁹ My translation.

³⁰ Translation by B. Perrin, *Plutarch's Lives II: Themistocles and Camillus; Aristides and Cato Major; Cimon and Lucullus* (Loeb Classical Library. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1968).

³¹ Plutarch emphasizes the usual highlights: the “old seer of Veii” (1.4.1-3); the oracle at Delphi (1.4.4-5); the ten year length of the siege (1.5.1); the *cuniculus* (1.5.3); and the sacrificial entrails (1.5.4) which Plutarch also calls a fable (μυθεύμασι).

³² Skutsch, *Annals*, 7; Rawson, “Prodigy Lists,” 158; Frier, *Libri*, 162.

³³ Alföldi, *Early Rome*, 165.

but filed for the convenience of the governing persons and their class, i.e., for the patricians alone, in the fifth century B.C. These files were the kernel of the original *annales maximi*, entrusted to the *pontifex maximus*. The style of their laconic notes had a great influence on the beginnings of historiography. The short entries in Naevius on the war operations in the years 263, 257, and 241 B.C. still reflect it.”

As such, at least with the Latin historians (the Roman historians writing in Greek were more closely connected to their Greek precursors), their histories took on the same feel as the *annales* in that history was related on a year by year basis.

In presenting the siege of Veii, Livy uses his rhetorical skill to bridge the gap between his epic and annalistic sources. The major, historically attested, events that Livy ascribes to the siege of Veii are agreed upon by the extant ancient material and the key aspects of the struggle between Rome and Veii were already canonized in Etruscan sources by the fourth century.”³⁴ However, because the material that Livy had available to draw upon for the epic siege was either scanty or decidedly ordinary he was required to fill in the gaps or to sharpen the edges of his narrative with more suitable material.³⁵ Because, according to Livy, the siege of Veii was important as the foil to the sack of Rome and under the control of Camillus, Livy had to make sure that it was an important conquest. It is in this way that “great victories have...a habit of becoming legends.”³⁶

Iliadic Parallels in Livy's Narrative

At first glance, ancient prose historians have little in common with their poetic precursors or contemporaries. Even taking for granted the obvious difference between the two, historians are compelled to present their material keeping in mind the need for credibility within their genre. Especially with well-known traditions, a historian such as Livy would not have had as much

³⁴ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 628.

³⁵ Payne, “History,” 3.

³⁶ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 628.

liberty with their narrative as a poet.³⁷ And so, when Livy began to write his history of Rome he had to find a balance between presenting his readers with an historically accurate narrative while still showing the grandeur of the Roman state. In his accounts of Roman hostility against the city of Veii, and throughout *Ab Urbe Condita* as a whole, Livy shows a flare for story telling which parallels and even rivals the epic poetry of the day.³⁸ In order to create such an epic style of history, Livy drew upon long standing traditions and extant epic works such as the *Iliad* of Homer and the *Annales* of Ennius to fill in the blanks left by a lack of resources and to keep the interest of his readers, who might otherwise read an epic to hear the story of early Rome or just “hurry on to more modern affairs,” (*festinantibus ad haec nova*; 1.1.4).³⁹ Livy would have also utilized the other Latin epics such as the *Bellum Punicum* of Naevius and the *Annales* of Ennius as they drew from sources that no longer existed during the first century. The narrative presentation of the siege of Veii and of the first five books of *Ab Urbe Condita* as a whole, with its epic language and material, is indebted as much to the epic poets as it is to earlier historical writers such as Quadrigarius or Fabius Pictor. In fact, as has often been pointed out, the first line of the *AUC*, *fāctūrūsn’ ōpērāe prēiūm sīm*, can be scanned as part of a hexameter line.⁴⁰

Livy uses epic presentation in his narrative in order to place importance on certain events and speeches which he feels express examples of morality or *paradigma* of political actions. History

³⁷ A.W. Allen, “Livy as Literature,” *CP* 54, no. 4 (Oct. 1956): 253.

³⁸ C.f. Quint. 10.1.31: *Est enim proxima poetis, et quodam modo Carmen solutum est, et scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum, totumque opus non ad actum rei pugnamque praesentem sed ad memoriam posteritatis et ingenii famam componitur.*—“[history] is very similar to poetry, and is both unrestrained in the same manner as a song, and is written in order to be read, not to be proved; the whole work is not composed to present the actions of the state but to add to the memory of posterity and the fame of our ancestors.” Quintilian taken from D.A. Russel, *Quintilian: The Orator’s Education, Books 9-10* (Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press., 2001). Translations are my own.

³⁹ This idea works both ways it seems; Cf. M. Grant, *Roman Myths* (London: Weidfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 200, “...Virgil’s account [of the defeat of Mezentius at the hands of Aeneas] is deliberately assimilated to the traditions about the siege of Veii – and was written only a few years after Livy had completed his account of that event.”

⁴⁰ J.L. Moles, “Livy’s Preface,” *PCPS* 39 (1993): 141. In this pseudo invocation to the muses Livy seems to come to terms with the fact that the information he is about to deal with, the mythological/legendary material of early Rome, is parallel with epic poetry (the hexameter meter alludes to epic without actually calling upon the divine muses).

had been a political activity as much as anything else since its inception in the late third century B.C.E.⁴¹ By making history a review of the political actions of those in the past, historians had the ability to praise or condemn a family in the same way as the epic poets who wrote under the patronage of wealthy statesmen; while families such as the Fabii and men like Nobilior were presented in respectable ways, ill-fated actions of ancestors described by historians or poets had the capacity to injure the honor of anyone's name.⁴² Livy focuses on the epic political speeches, speeches which were essential to the continuance of the state, in order to provide a link with the political power base in his own time.⁴³

This idea of perpetuating the right of control of the senatorial class by highlighting its good deeds was the driving force behind many works of literature during the Roman Republic and Empire. Augustus had a large selection of poets from whom to choose including Horace and Virgil. The *Aeneid* was written, at its most basic level, to provide Augustus and the Julii with a justified right to rule the empire as there was a connection made to Aeneas and the other heroes of old.⁴⁴ Ennius employed the same idea in his *Annales* when he focused on the exploits of M. Fulvius Nobilior.⁴⁵ Though not making a connection between the Fulvii and the foundation of Rome, Ennius did begin his epic in the mythological period. Ennius started from the beginning because that was where the Muses, through whom the Greek poets received their inspiration, always began their stories; when Ennius invoked the muses—"Muses, who shake great Olympus

⁴¹ A. Feldherr, *Spectacle and Society in Livy's History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 20.

⁴² T.J. Cornell, "The *Annals* of Quintus Ennius," *JRS* 76 (1986): 244.

⁴³ Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 78; Cf. Quint. 10.1.101: *...cum in narrando mirae iucunditatis clarissimique candoris, tum in contionibus supra quam enarrari potest eloquentem, ita quae dicuntur omnia cum rebus tum personis accommodata sunt: adfectus quidem, praecipueque eos qui sunt dulciores, ut parcissime dicam, nemo historicorum commendavit magis.* – "(Livy has) a wonderful pleasantness and a distinct clarity in his narrative, while in his speeches his eloquence cannot be described in that all the things that are spoken are made to fit not only the situation but also the speaker: even the feelings, especially those which are rather agreeable, I can only say that no historian ever rendered them better."

⁴⁴ C.f. T.J. Luce, "Livy, Augustus, and the Forum Augustum," In *Between Republic and Empire*, ed. K.A. Raafaub and M. Toher (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990): 127; J. Anderson, *Roman Architecture and Society* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 88.

⁴⁵ M. Erasmo, *Roman Tragedy: Theatre to Theatricality* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 53.

with your feet” (*Musae, quae pedibus magnum pulsatis Olympum; Annales* 1.1)—he was also at the mercy of their inspiration.⁴⁶ Even though Ennius began his treatment of the greatness of Nobilior long before the birth of his patron, he was adding glory to Marcus by comparing the politician’s deeds to those of the epic world. While Livy does not focus on the career of a single politician, he does use the deeds of earlier men to glorify the Roman state as a whole.⁴⁷ Luce writes:⁴⁸

Livy viewed Roman history as the joint achievement of leaders and the led; the *mores* of the people as a whole is a constant in his history; how the national character developed, matured, and decayed.

Livy focuses on the most influential speeches and actions so that, while certain families may have a connection to the past which they can utilize for their own benefits, the political system is the focus of his praise; the paradigms that he presents in his narrative prove the right of politicians (in general) to rule; he does not focus on the actions of a specific character for any reason other than to provide a character who can present those paradigms.

Another connection between Livy and the world of epic literature can be seen in his literary relationship with Ennius. Although one is writing epic poetry and the other history, the sources for some of the accounts seem to be the same. For Livy, the *Annales Maximi* were undoubtedly one of the main sources for his history whether through first hand examination or through the lens of other historians. This collection of pontifical documentation had been recorded in the last quarter of the second century B.C.E. and was then given a literary, prose organization by different Gracchan and Sullan annalists.⁴⁹ The earlier records would have been utilized by the

⁴⁶ Skutsch, *Annals*, 144: “the poet invokes the Muses instead of the Camenae... [in order to express] his intention to subject Roman poetry more closely to the discipline of Greek poetic form.”

⁴⁷ There are a few exceptions to this statement. Most notable is Camillus, the central figure of Book V, whose political career as described by Livy will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

⁴⁸ Luce, “Forum Augustum,” 128.

⁴⁹ A.H. McDonald, “The Style of Livy,” *JRS* 47, no. ½ (1957): 155; Rawson, “Prodigy Lists,” 158; Frier, *Libri*, 163.

earlier epic poets such as Ennius who were writing histories sprinkled with mythology for the glorification of their patrons. Because Ennius represents a convergence of both annalistic historiography and epic poetry, the idea of mixing the two genres would have been nearly two centuries old when Livy began writing his history.⁵⁰ So, in effect, Ennius, with his *Annales*, wrote an epic using historical information while Livy wrote a history using epic language and motifs.

The epic presentation in Livy's narrative can be seen more clearly when a direct comparison is made to other epic writing. From prophetic announcements and heroic deeds to battle descriptions and even story line, it cannot be ignored that Livy's siege of Veii is a *simulacrum* of Homer's story of Troy. Moreover, Livy himself does not deny that his account parallels the fall of the Trojan city; rather he welcomes the connections with the story of Ilium as an impetus for perpetuating the epic atmosphere surrounding the Veientine War. During the preface Livy even points out that there is an epic tone brought about by the great "glory of war for the Roman people" (*ea belli gloria est populo Romano*; pref. 1.7). So, to Livy, there was no better way to tell the story of Veii, one of the greatest early wars of Rome, than with epic narration.⁵¹

Many of the similarities with epic poetry found in Livy's Veientine narrative are located in the description of battles. Combat undertaken by the Romans against the Veientes transpires in the same epic manner in which it takes place in Homer and the other epic writers. Although the battlefields are packed with soldiers, battles are nearly always won or lost by the actions of a few characters. The death (or survival) of a ranking soldier is crucial to the outcome and, as in the

⁵⁰ McDonald, "Style," 167; G.M. Paul, "'Urbs Capta': Sketch of an Ancient Literary Motif," *Phoenix* 36, no. 2 (1983): 148 ff.

⁵¹ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 628: "The whole narrative of Rome's war with Veii was already consolidated in Etruscan historical sources...and must have been common currency in the fourth century."

Iliad, wounds in Livy's battles are quick and brutal, not romantic. For example, in an early skirmish between Romans and Veientes, an Etruscan warrior stabs Quintus Fabius, a Roman captain, through the heart (...*gladio per pectus transfigit; telo extracto praeceps Fabius in volnus abiit*. [the Etruscan] pierces his chest with a sword; when the weapon was pulled out Fabius fell headlong because of the wound; 2.46.4) Fabius' death is given a single line and is comparable in brevity and violence to many Iliadic death scenes such as:⁵²

... ὁ δ' Ἀσκάλαφον βάλε δουρί,
 υἷον Ἐνυαλίοιο. δι' ὤμου δ' ὄβριμον ἔγχος
 ἔσχεν, ὁ δ' ἐν κονίησι πεσὼν ἔλε γαῖαν ἀγοστῶ (*Il.* 13.518-20).

...(Deiphobos) hit Askalaphos with his spear,
 the son of Enuaios. The spear passed through him screaming at the shoulder,
 and he, falling down into the dust, bit the earth with his teeth.

In both accounts, the loser, terribly wounded, falls headlong into the earth.

When comparing Livy's battle sequences to those in Homer, Aulus Cornelius Cossus cannot be overlooked (4.19.5). Cossus observed the Etruscan King Tolumnius in battle and, after knocking the Etruscan from his horse, he:

*Adsurgentem ibi regem umbone resupinat repetitumque saepius cuspidē ad teram adfixit.
 Tum exsanguī detracta spolia caputque abscisum victor spiculo gerens terrore caesi
 Regis hostes fundit.*

knocked down the rising king with his shield and, stabbing him again and again, pinned him to the ground with his spear. Then, with the armor taken from the lifeless body, the winner, carrying the severed head upon his spear, put the enemy to flight from the terror of the slaughter of their king.

Compare this passage to *Iliad* 17.125-7 when:

Ἐκτῶρ μὲν Πάτροκλον, ἐπεὶ κλυτὰ τεύχε' ἀπηύρα,
 ἔλχ', ἴν' ἀπ' ὤμοισιν κεφαλὴν τάμοι οἷον χαλκῶ,
 τὸν δὲ νέκυν Τρωῆσιν ἐπυσσάμενος κυσὶ δοίῃ.

⁵² All quotations from the *Iliad* come from M.M. Willcock, ed. *Homer: Iliad Books I-XII* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1978) and M.M. Willcock, ed. *Homer: Iliad Books XIII-XXIV* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1984). Translations are my own.

Hektor dragged Patroklos, tearing at his famous armor,
 so that he might cut the head from his shoulders with the sharp bronze,
 and give the dead body to the Trojan dogs to be eaten.

Despite the fact that this custom was accepted and encouraged by Roman soldiers (Romans believed the practice of dueling was begun by Romulus and sanctioned by Jupiter),⁵³ the heroic allusions to scenes describing the despoliation of fallen enemies comes directly from epic poetry.

Besides motifs of single combat in warfare which Livy adapts from the *Iliad*, there are also direct similarities between the two siege accounts themselves. Pergamon, the citadel of Troy, is reported to have fallen to the Greeks in the tenth year of the war (Vergil, *Aen.* 2.554-7). So too, according to Livy, does the citadel of Veii fall to the Romans after ten years of besiegement. The equal number of years spent in stalemate cannot be overlooked as an influence of Homer on Livy – especially after taking into account the speech attributed to Appius Claudius in favor of continuance of the siege through the first winter. Claudius argues that:

*Decem quondam annos urbs oppugnata est ob unam mulierem ab universa Graecia,
 quam procul ab domo?*

A certain city, so far from home, was fought with for ten years by all of Greece because of a single woman (5.4.11).

This is Livy's assurance to his readers that the siege will be an epic undertaking worthy of the descendants of Troy.⁵⁴

Another similarity in the events surrounding the two sieges is that a shift in momentum occurs shortly after the besieged forces rally and brings battle to the encamped host. In the *Iliad*, during the second day of battle, the Trojans rally behind Hektor and are able to breach the Greek

⁵³ J.E. Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 175: "Later Romans believed that this practice of one-on-one dueling on the battlefield was sanctified by immemorial tradition. Romulus, they believed, the very founder of Rome, had been the first to dedicate to Jupiter the *spolia opima*, the "noble spoils," a special honor for a Roman commander who had killed the opposing commander with his own hand." Cf. also Livy, 1.10.5-7.

⁵⁴ It is more worthy, in fact, than the original war which was fought because of a single woman. This war was begun because of the impious actions of an inimical government located only a short distance away.

defensive wall. Hector, after a long duel, finally fights off Ajax and sets fire to the Greek ships. This sets in motion a chain of events which will culminate in Hektor's own death and the fall of Troy (*Il.* 15.137-55). Setting fire to the siege works after an improbable rally is also the turning point in the siege of Veii. In Livy's siege narrative, the Veientes take advantage of Roman infighting, sally forth, and burn the palisade surrounding Veii (5.7). As a result of this turn of fortune the Roman *equites* volunteer their services and start a "patriotic fervor" throughout the city in the same way that the assault on the Greek ships causes Patroklos to beg Achilles (*Il.* 16.38-45):

ἀλλ' ἐμέ περ πρόες ὦχ', ἅμα δ' ἄλλον λαὸν ὄπασσον
 Μυρμιδόνων, ἦν πού τι φόως Δαναοῖσι γένωμαι.
 δὸς δέ μοι ὦμοισιν τὰ σὰ τεύχεα θωρηχθῆναι,
 αἳ κέ με σοὶ ἴσκοντες ἀπόσχωνται πολέμοιο,
 Τρῶες, ἀναπνεῦσωσι δ' ἀρήιοι υἱες Ἀχαιῶν
 τειρόμενοι. ὀλίγη δέ τ' ἀνάπνευσις πολέμοιο.

Send me quickly into battle. Let me take control of the whole
 Myrmidon army so that I might make some light for the Danaans.
 And give me your own armor to strap on my shoulders,
 so the Trojans, mistaking me for you, might yield from battle
 and the fierce sons of Achaia, exhausted, might find breathing room.
 Breathing room in the midst of battle is small.

Even though the siege of Veii continues for seven more years after the burning of the siege works and while setbacks do occur because of the problems with the Roman leadership, the momentum of the war rests in the hands of the ultimate victor.⁵⁵ The Greeks too suffer setbacks after the rally of Hektor in that Telamonian Ajax commits suicide and Achilles is slain by Paris and Apollo.

Vergil, in Book II of *The Aeneid*, describes, in detail, one more similarity between the siege of Veii as presented by Livy and the sack of Troy (*Aeneid* 2.13-17):

⁵⁵ Cf. 5.8.4: *nam et duces Romani plus inter se irarum quam adversus hostes animi habuerunt, et auctum est bellum adventu repentino Capenatium atque Faliscorum*: the Roman leaders held more anger in their minds towards each other than against the enemy and the war was amplified by the sudden appearance of the Capenates and Falisci.

*Fracti bello fatisque repulsi,
ductores Danaum, tot iam labentibus annis,
instar montis equum divina Palladis arte
aedificant sectaque intexunt abiete costas;
votum pro reditu simulant; ea fama vagatur.*⁵⁶

Having been broken by war and repulsed by the fates,
the leaders of the Greeks, now with ten whole years having slipped away,
built a horse the equal of a mountain with the divine skill of Minerva
and they wove into its flank cut fir-wood;
They pretended it was a votive for returning (to Greece); its fame is widespread.

The Greeks, through an act of skilled treachery, finally find a way to conquer the Trojan walls when Odysseus oversees the creation of a giant wooden horse in which “the hand picked bodies of selected men will hide stealthily in the dark flank and they fill the innermost cavern and uterus of the huge creature with armed soldiers” (*huc delecta virum sortiti corpora furtim | includunt caeco lateri penitusque cavernas | ingentis uterumque armato milite complent; Aen. 2.18-20*). After nightfall, the Greeks emerge from the horse “pregnant with war” (“*feta armis*”) and bring about the downfall of the city after opening its gates to the Achaians waiting outside (*Aen. 2.238*). Veii comes to a similar fate when Camillus, the man in charge of the Roman war machine and hero of Book V as a whole, orders construction to begin on a tunnel that will allow “picked men” to enter the city walls in secret and attack from within (*Cuniculus delectis militibus eo tempore plenus; 5.21.10*). In this way, both cities were conquered not through military might, but by the problem solving abilities of the attacking generals.⁵⁷

Because the siege of Veii in Livy and the siege of Troy in Vergil are so similar, there is little argument with the idea that the two authors were drawing on the same source material as

⁵⁶ Taken from R.A.B. Mynors, ed., *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969).

⁵⁷ Kraus, “No Second Troy,” 272; Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 673.

inspiration.⁵⁸ Vergil seems to have been drawing his information from Ennius directly and, even if Livy was using annalistic sources (who, as we have seen, also drew their information from Ennius) the epic feel of his information would have been apparent.⁵⁹ Livy was depicting the siege of Veii using the language and style that was common to siege narrative, a language and style that was created by epic poets.

Still another way in which Livy's account of the war with Veii is similar to epic narratives is in the fact that heroes are found throughout the storyline—not only surrounding the siege of Veii, but in the *Ab Urbe Condita* as a whole. Despite the lack of mythology in Livy's predecessors, such as Sallust and Thucydides, heroes, even though not born of the gods, appear in Livy's historical tale because when they are included "it makes the beginning of cities more dignified" (*primordia urbium augustoria faciat*, Pref. 1.7). This idea was not invented by Livy. In fact, the Roman people went so far as to "(declare) that most powerful Mars was their parent and the parent of their founder" (*...suum conditorisque sui parentem Martem potissimum*, pref. 7). Therefore, in Livy's account of Roman history, the requirements to be a hero have changed somewhat from previous epics; instead, as with the Roman tradition of honoring their ancestors, an ancient and illustrious family name would suffice as a sufficient pedigree for one to become a hero.⁶⁰ Here again, Livy is taking his cues from epic poetry such as that of Ennius in his presentation of Nobilior.⁶¹ Such Roman heroes in Livy include Cincinnatus (3.26.6 ff.) and Aulus Cornelius Cossus (4.19.1-5). Another heroic name was that of the Fabii who, early in the conflicts with Veii, took on the task of fighting the Veientine army in order that ordinary Roman

⁵⁸ McDonald, "Style," 168; Paul, "Urbs Capta," 1983; Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 675. McDonald ("Style," 167) believes that even within the *Aeneid* Vergil was using the type scene of a city being besieged and that he transferred the depiction of Alba Longa to Troy (*Aeneid* 2.486-95).

⁵⁹ McDonald, "Style," 167.

⁶⁰ Erasmo, *Tragedy*, 67.

⁶¹ Skutsch, *Annals*, 145.

citizens might not have to carry the burden. In a heroic last stand the Fabii fought against an Etruscan army that had surrounded them and, although they were annihilated, one man lived to carry on the name (2.50).

The story of the Fabii is presented by Livy as a tale of bravery and patriotism exemplifying the extent of Roman courage. However, not all the heroes taking part in the Veientine war earned greatness solely from physical prowess. Appius Claudius is preeminent among the heroic characters of Book V when he keeps the Roman army at Veii from being recalled home when he confronts the tribunes (5.3.7):

Utrum enim defenditis an impugnatís plebem? Utrum militantium adversarii estis an causam agitis? Nisi forte hoc dicitis: 'Quidquid patres faciunt displicet, sive illud pro plebe sive contra plebem est,' et quemadmodum servis suis vetant domini quicquam rei cum alienis hominibus esse pariterque in iis beneficio ac maleficio abstineri aequum consent, sic vos interdicitis patribus commercio plebes, ne nos comitate ac munificentia nostra provocemus plebem nec plebs nobis dicto audiens atque oboediens sit.

Are you defending or attacking the plebs? Are you adversaries of the soldiers or are you helping their cause? Unless by chance you claim this: "Whatever the senators do is displeasing, no matter if it is for the plebs or against them." And in the same way masters forbid their servants to have contact with outsiders and in the same way they think it good to abstain from helping or hurting these slaves, thus you prohibit the plebs from any dealings with senators, lest we incite the plebs by our kindness or generosity and the plebs, listening to our discussions, become obedient.

Similarly, Odysseus, most well known for his counseling, discredits Thersites' speech for abandoning the siege of Troy when he proclaims (*Il.* 2.246-53):

Θερσίτ' ἀκριτόμυθε, λιγύς περ ἔων ἀγορητής,
ἴσχεο, μηδ' ἔθελ' οἶος ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν·
οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ σέο φημί χερείοτερον βροτὸν ἄλλον
ἔμμεναι, ὅσσοι ἄμ' Ἀτρείδης ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον.
τῷ οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνά στόμ' ἔχων ἀγορεύοις,
καὶ σφιν ὀνειδέα τε προφέροις, νόστον τε φυλάσσοις.
οὐδέ τί πω σάφα ἴδμεν ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα,
ἢ εὖ ἢε κακῶς νοστήσομεν υἱὲς Ἀχαιῶν.

Reckless Thersites, even though you are fluent in speeches,
be careful, do not think that you can taunt on equal grounds with kings!
I say that there is no other mortal man lesser than you,

no matter how many came to Ilium with the son of Atreus.
 You should not make counsel to the kings with *your* mouth,
 bringing insults against them, watching out for a homecoming.
 Even I do not know clearly how this work will end,
 or whether the sons of the Achaians will return home honorably or otherwise.

Another way in which the presentation of Livy's narrative draws upon the epic tradition is in the fact that certain divine interventions in the account affect its outcome. Although Livy's recitation of events is devoid of *direct* contact with the divine sphere, there are three main instances in which supernatural events affect the outcome of the Veientine siege. The first, a plague, spread throughout the Roman territory because the elections for high office the previous year had been an affront to the gods (5.14.4). This cause brings into focus the first scene of the *Iliad*, when "the son of Leto and Zeus...raging against the king roused throughout the host an evil plague" (...Λητούς καὶ Διὸς υἱός. ὁ γὰρ βασιλῆι χολωθεὶς | νοῦσον ἀνὰ στρατὸν ὤρσε κακὴν, *Il.* 1.9-12). Wrath carried out upon humans by gods because of an affront to the divine world is an epic tradition that Livy could not have omitted from his epic narrative of Rome.

The other two major supernatural events of Book V come in the form of prophecies that lay out the specific guidelines that must be followed for a Roman victory. First, there was the proverbial old man of Veii who told of a possible outcome to the war (5.15.4). The old man was subsequently captured and taken to Rome where he described what was written in Etruscan lore about the manner in which the water of the Alban Lake was to be drained off before the Romans would be able to achieve victory.⁶² A Veientine priest makes the second prophecy; he dictates the outcome of the war to the king of Veii during a sacrifice claiming that "victory will be given to he who carves up the entrails of that victim" (*dicentis qui eius hostiae exta prosecuisset ei*

⁶² Kraus ("No Second Troy," 272) compares this episode to the capture of Helenus by Odysseus at the end of the war (*Soph. Phil.* 604-13).

victoriam dari, 5.21). Roman soldiers, who had entered the citadel through the famous tunnel (the *cuniculus* that would serve as the Trojan Horse of the Romans), overheard the prophecy, stole the entrails from the priest, and took them back to Camillus. Camillus takes advantage of this theft and performs the sacrifice himself on behalf of the Roman army.

Prophecy in epic poetry often plays a major role in the events and their outcomes, though, when Livy writes of events such as the theft of the sacrificial entrails, he is sure to give his opinion about their accuracy (5.21.9):

Sed in rebus tam antiquae si quae similia veri sint pro veris accipiantur, satis habeam: haec ad ostentationem scaenae gaudentis miraculis aptiora quam ad fidem neque adfirmare neque refellere est operae pretium.

But in affairs so old if something like the truth is accepted as the truth, that is fine by me: this (tale) is more suitable for presentation on the stage which praises wonders than it is truth; there is no benefit either to confirm or refute this story.

Nevertheless, Livy includes it in his account, even though he discounts its historical value.⁶³ He understands that the stories he is delivering have survived and have been “interpreted” along the way (pref. 1.6):

Quae ante conditam condendamve urbem poeticis magis decora fabulis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur, ea nec adfirmare nec refellere in animo est.

The things that are handed down concerning (the times) before the foundation and (the actual) founding of the city are more decorations of poetic yarns than they are exact accounts of the undertaking of events; (regardless), it is not for me to confirm or criticize them.

Because of the mysticism surrounding the history that Livy is detailing, he is able, without regret, to add his own narrative flare to the portrayal of past events. Livy does not try to support these instances with facts because he does not mind if probabilities are accepted as truth (*Sed haec et his similia utcumque animadversa aut existimata erunt haud in magno equidem ponam*

⁶³ This episode is also found in Plutarch’s *Camillus* (5.4-5) with the same skepticism placed upon it. Strangely enough, it is absent from Dionysius, though he does include the account of the soothsayer (12.11 ff.).

discrimine; I, for my part, shall not undertake a great investigation as to whether these memories or those similar should be criticized or judged as true; pref. 1.8). It not his position in such places to argue with the tradition (as long as that tradition did not affect his overall agenda); his position is to present such tales in a captivating way so that his readers might continue to be interested. Livy stresses the expanse of his work and is sure to assert to the reader that he is covering all of Roman history and presenting every sort of moral example by contrasting his historically accurate *monumenta* with orally transferred *fabulae*.⁶⁴ Consequently, his historical account of the siege, the fulfillment of a prophecy to overcome the enemy, and the sack of Veii itself were affected by the degree of reliance he placed upon the traditions surrounding each event.

Inconsistencies, either from dilution over time of the events by word of mouth, or because of Livy shifting the dates and events in order that they might better follow the example of the Trojan siege (and, thus, parallel epic more closely), occur in his account as well.⁶⁵ The ten-year length of the siege must be criticized since winter quarters were not built until 403 B.C.E., a year when the Roman siege works were burned to the ground after a Veientine assault. It seems likely that, while war was declared in 405 B.C.E. and hostilities broke out, it was not until three years later, after the defeat of the Volscians, that Rome had the manpower and the material to besiege Veii wholeheartedly (*Et lege perlata de indicendo Veientibus bello, exercitum magna ex parte voluntarium novi tribuni militum consulari potestate Veios duxere*; And with the law enacted for enjoining the Veientes in war, the new tribunes of the soldiers led, with consular power, an army made up for the most part of volunteers against Veii. 4.60).⁶⁶ Livy spreads prophecy, heroes, and heroic deeds throughout his tale giving *Ab Urbe Condita* the feel of epic

⁶⁴ Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 6.

⁶⁵ Kraus, "No Second Troy," 273: "the fall of Troy is the literary archetype for all captured cities..."

⁶⁶ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 628-9.

poetry. Livy's acknowledgment that his sources are sometimes unreliable allows him to recreate freely "his story" in an epic manner suitable to his Rome, a Rome that lives up to his claim that "no state was ever greater nor more holy nor more jam-packed with exemplary men" (*aut nulla unquam res publica nec maior nec sanctior nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit*; pref. 1.11).

CHAPTER II

WHY VEII?

Despite the fact that many of the aspects surrounding the siege of Veii seem to be created by Livy in order to form a parallel with the Trojan War, some, if not many, of the basic facts of Livy's tale can be corroborated by archaeological, geographical, and geological evidence. By the same argument used by Ogilvie to assert the accuracy surrounding the use of *cuniculi* in at least one of Livy's siege narratives,⁶⁷ the insertion of epic motifs in his narrative does not necessarily mean that the basic information behind those motifs is incorrect. In fact, even the most incredible aspects of his tale have a sound archaeological and historical basis. Again though, as with the timeline of the siege which Livy tailored to meet his needs, he also molded the representation of the archaeology and history of the surrounding region to parallel his presentation of Veii as an epic event. Because of Livy's presentation of Veii in the events surrounding the early history of Rome, readers have no choice but to accept Veii as the arch nemesis of Rome and its fall as the true starting point for the conquest of Etruria.

Veii: Nemesis of Rome

From an early point in the narrative Veii is depicted as both a strong rival of Rome and the city's link to her Etruscan neighbors (1.15 ff.).⁶⁸ After the first skirmish between Romans and Veientes (1.15 ff.), there are numerous other antagonistic encounters between Rome and her Veientine neighbors.⁶⁹ Significantly, in the most serious of these subsequent interactions, the

⁶⁷ Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 672.

⁶⁸ E. Richardson, *The Etruscans: Their Art and Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 79; T.J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome* (London: Routledge, 1995), 45.

⁶⁹ S. Haynes, *Etruscan Civilization* (Los Angeles: The J. Paul Getty Trust, 2000), 204.

cause of the strife is Fidenae (1.15; 4.17; 4.31).⁷⁰ In fact, the first incident after the initial hostilities is nearly a disaster for the Roman people when the Veientes, after inciting the Fidenates to revolt, offer battle to the Romans and their Alban allies (1.27.3 ff.).⁷¹

The wars carried out with Veii were important for the economic health of the Roman state; there were trade issues which undoubtedly influenced the hatred between the two cities. Because the two rivals were no more than fifteen kilometers distant, they would have had to share many local resources.⁷² This would cause of much bloodshed over two important assets: the salt deposits at the mouth of the Tiber and the trade route into Etruria, the Cremera Valley.⁷³ In a struggle during the reign of Ancus Martius, the Maesian Forest was taken from the lands held by Veii (1.33.9). Roman control of this territory extended her power down to the Tyrrhenian Sea. It was at this time, so Livy writes (1.33.9), that “Ostia was founded at the mouth of the Tiber and salt processing stations were constructed in the surrounding area” (*...in ore Tiberis Ostia urbs condita, salinae circa factae*).

Salt was a commodity for the people around the mouth of the Tiber that had been sought very early in the region’s history.⁷⁴ Control of the salt marshes was an important step in the domination of the entire area—at least the area that depended on the Tiber marshes.⁷⁵ Control of the southern stretch of the River Tiber was important to both Veii and Rome because mastery of the river meant mastery of the trade routes utilizing the waterway. Veii had grown into prominence as the center of a trade network in southern Etruria principally because of her control

⁷⁰ H.H. Scullard, *A History of the Roman World: 753 to 146 B.C.* 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 1980), 97. The importance of Fidenae will be discussed below.

⁷¹ It is in this battle that Mettius Fufetius earns his punishment as a Roman traitor.

⁷² Cornell, *Beginnings*, 309.

⁷³ H.H. Scullard, *The Etruscan Cities & Rome* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 267; Haynes, *Civilization*, 204.

⁷⁴ L. A. Holland, “Forerunners and Rivals of the Primitive Roman Bridge,” *TAPA* 80 (1949): 282, 315.

⁷⁵ Holland, “Forerunners,” 282, 315.

over this waterway.⁷⁶ Fidenae, the main cause behind many of the battles between Rome and Veii, could control trade from peoples in central Italy and limit movement by river to the sea because of its location.⁷⁷ Although Rome was also in a good position to control river trade, when Fidenae was allied to Veii the two cities were able to create a kind of gateway to the sea: Veii could control land trade while Fidenae was able to limit trade by water.⁷⁸

Accordingly, when Rome took control of the mouth of the Tiber from Veii, she would have gained dominion over trade flowing in and out of the Tyrrhenian Sea towards either the Greeks to the south, the Phoenicians to the West, or even the Etruscan coastal cities to the north.⁷⁹ The permanent bridge with which Ancus spanned the Tiber (1.33.6) after the acquisition of the Maesian Forest attracted trade, which had previously gone to Veii, toward Rome.⁸⁰ Because Veii depended upon the stores of salt in the southern Tiber valley and the control of the salt trade to survive, Rome's conquest could not go unchallenged. However, control of the salt marshes was also necessary to the survival of Rome; hence, from an early date in the history of Rome, the war with Veii was a life and death struggle for the two cities.

Veii and Rome were also enemies in a much more personal manner according to Livy. While the Etruscan ties probably kept major conflicts with Veii to a minimum, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, that same familiarity and closeness caused the two cities to begin competing with one another. One of the major points of conflict arose soon after the creation of the Republic: Tarquinius asking Veii for help against the burgeoning state (2.6.1-4):⁸¹

⁷⁶ T.W. Potter, *The Changing Landscape of South Etruria* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 81; Cornell, *Beginnings*, 310.

⁷⁷ Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 267.

⁷⁸ Cornell, *Beginnings*, 311.

⁷⁹ Holland, "Forerunners," 317; G. Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 49ff; Haynes, *Civilization*, 62.

⁸⁰ Holland, "Forerunners," 316; Forsythe, *A Critical History*, 49 ff.

⁸¹ The sculptor of the terra cotta statue of the god on the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, the most important temple in early Rome and the center of the Capitoline Hill, was said to have been Vulca of Veii (Holloway,

...incensus Tarquinius non dolore solum tantae ad inritum cadentis spei sed etiam odio iraque, postquam dolo viam obsaeptam vidit, bellum aperte moliendum ratus circumire supplex Etruriae urbes; orare maxime Veientes Tarquiniensesque...Haec moverunt Veientes...

...Tarquinius, inflamed not only to grief at the misfortune of the death of such a hope but even to hate and rage, saw that the path by trickery was closed and, understanding that war had to be sought openly, he went as a suppliant to the Etruscan cities; he thought it best to beseech Veii and Tarquinia...his words moved the Veientes...

The army supporting the Tarquinius, made up of troops from Veii and Tarquinia, was eventually routed. Nevertheless, from Livy's standpoint (and from the viewpoint of his readers), the fact that Veii was the first city mentioned that was willing to give aid to the haughty tyrant reinforced the feelings of hatred held by the Romans against the Veientes. This idea is compounded by the fact that, preceding the war with Fidenae, Veii was ruled not as a republic like Rome, but by a king – Lars Tolumnius (4.17) at whose orders the ambassadors of Rome were murdered and the pretext for war was given.⁸²

In the years following their initial defeat at the hands of Brutus and Valerius, the Veientes remained a constant enemy of Rome. In the consulship of Caeso Fabius and Titus Verginius (480/79 B.C.E.), Rome suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of the Veientes because of the poor leadership of Verginius (2.48.5). This event seemed to give courage to the Veientes (2.48.5-6):

Ex eo tempore neque pax neque bellum cum Veientibus fuit; res proxime formam latrocinii venerat. Legionibus Romanis cedebat in urbem; ubi abductas senserant legiones, agros incursbant, bellum quiete, quietem bello invicem eludentes.

From that time forward there was neither peace nor war with the Veientes; the relationship was close in form to robbery. The Veientine army withdrew from the Roman legions into the city; when they sensed that the legions had withdrawn, they

Archaeology of Early Rome, 10; M. Torelli, *Etruria* (Roma-Bari: Laterza & Figli, 1993), 12); cf. Pliny *NH* 35.45.157: "(they say that) Vulca of Veii was summoned, whom Tarquinius Priscus hired in order to dedicate a statue of Jupiter on the Capitoline Temple (*Vulcam Veis accitum, cui locaret Tarquinius Priscus Iovis effigiem in Capitolio dicendam*); Haynes, *Civilization*, 204.

⁸² Not only was Tolumnius a tyrant, he was also guilty of a grave injustice by murdering the Roman ambassadors sent to ask the reason for Fidenae's change of allegiance in 439 B.C.E. and the cause of the war (4.17.2). By extension then, all of Veii was guilty of the crime: they were unjust tyrant lovers and the complete opposite of good democratic Romans.

invaded the fields, mocking both war with peace and peace with war.

Veii had become an ever present thorn in the side of Rome: not powerful enough by herself to compete with the Rome and her Latin allies, yet not inconsequential enough to be ignored

(2.48.7):

Sed Veiens hostis, adsiduus magis quam gravis, contumeliis saepius quam periculo animos agitabat, quod nullo tempore neglegi poterat aut averti alio sinebat.

But Veii (as an enemy), more incessant and serious, annoyed the spirits with treacheries more often than with danger, because at no time was she able to be ignored nor did she allow (Rome's attention) to be turned elsewhere.

The city was a constant drain on manpower and a threat to Rome's conquest of the Tiber Valley.

It was because of this drain on resources and manpower that the next major source of animosity between Rome and Veii occurred: the skirmishes with and slaughter of the Fabii.

Because the hostilities of Veii were causing too much stress upon the republic, Caeso Fabius, consul at the time, proposed that his clan take sole responsibility for the campaigns against Veii

(2.48.8 - 9):

Adsiduo magis quam magno praesidio, ut scitis, patres conscripti, bellum Veiens eget. Vos alia bella curate, Fabios hostes Veientibus date. Auctores sumus tutam ibi maiestatem Romani nominis fore...bellum privato sumptu gerere in animo est; res publica et milite illic et pecunia vacet.

Conscript Fathers, as you know, the Veientine War should fall to a constant rather than a large force. Give yourselves to the care of other wars, give the Fabian host to the Veientine struggle. We are the power by which the majesty of the Roman name will be safe...it is in our spirit to wage this war from private means; let the Republic be free from this military and financial burden.

The family of the consul undertook a campaign of raids and skirmishes that held the Cremera Valley safe for Rome. However, after a period of success, the Fabii were ambushed and slaughtered except for one man who perpetuated the name. After the defeat, the Veientes even

occupied the Janiculum (2.51.2) – the closest an enemy force had come to Rome since Porsenna was defeated.

The destruction of such a distinguished consular family must have provided yet another point of contention between the Romans and Veientes. Despite the fact that Livy seems to have logistical problems with this legend – he states (2.50.11) that “306 men died” (*Trecentos sex perisse*) even though he has stated a few paragraphs before (2.49.4) that “306 men” joined the cause (*Sex et trecenti milites*) - the general idea behind the story is believable⁸³ and remains patently anti-Veientine. That is, if not for chance, the Veientes would have been responsible for the erasure of one of the most prominent families of Republican Rome.⁸⁴ Regardless of what actually happened in the Cremera Valley, this account reinforces the suggestion that Veii, while not powerful enough to withstand the force of Rome and her allies, was a constant enemy of longstanding that could protect itself against armies that were understaffed or oblivious to the danger presented by the Etruscan city-state.

The Fortress

The historical contest between Rome and Veii provided sufficient animosity to justify Livy’s choice of Veii as the Romans’ arch-enemy. That political rivalry however does not necessarily mean that the Veientes were prepared militarily to withstand Rome’s armies for an extended period of time. As Livy writes, Veii only defeated Rome in one major battle – and that was through the ineptitude of one of her generals (2.48.5). At other times Veii remained unprepared to meet the Romans in an extended campaign or even in a pitched battle. Accordingly, it seems contrived to believe that the city could withstand the protracted siege described by Livy (or even

⁸³ Scullard, *A History*, 98.

⁸⁴ Forsythe (*A Critical History*, 196) believes that the figures in this tale were created to parallel the battle of Thermopylae. Cornell (*Beginnings*, 311) agrees, though he stresses that because the Fabians were known to have been centered around the valley of the Cremera, the story has some historical basis. It would have been in the best interest of the Fabii to protect their land.

the more believable seven year siege). To be fair, however, when discussing the ability of the Veientes to withstand a focused siege by the Roman army, one must keep in mind that the republican army was not yet the well oiled machine that conquered the entire Mediterranean basin. It was a primarily volunteer army, without the well developed siege engines of later centuries,⁸⁵ that laid siege to Veii.

Aiding the Veientes in withstanding their enemies was a circuit of recently constructed walls of impressive strength.⁸⁶ In excavations carried out on the *oppidum* of Veii during the late 1950s, J.B. Ward-Perkins uncovered sections of a large circuit of defensive walls near the northwestern gate of the ancient city of Veii that could not have been built “earlier than the middle of the fifth century and may well be as late as the closing decades of the century.”⁸⁷ Although much of the wall course has been destroyed over time because of disuse and damaged because of agricultural activity, the remaining sections provide evidence that the entire construction project was undertaken at the same time.⁸⁸ Even the large rampart was built in concert with the wall. Veii’s defenses must have been an impressive sight.

As with many Etruscan towns, Veii was situated on a promontory surrounded, for the most part, by sheer cliffs.⁸⁹ The land of the plateau that would support these new walls was leveled by the engineers with the result that any evidence of previous fortifications was erased.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ N. Spivey and Simon Stoddart, *Etruscan Italy* (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1990), 137-137; R.R. Holloway, *The Archaeology of Early Rome and Latium* (London: Routledge, 1994), 92. Dionysius of Syracuse was credited with refining the art of siege-craft at the beginning of the fourth century B.C.E. It is a telling coincidence that the walls of Etruria and Rome herself were renovated at the same time as the development of catapults and mobile assault towers. In fact, there is evidence (T. Frank, “The Letters on the Blocks of the Servian Wall,” *AJA* 45, no. 1 (1924): 68) that the Servian Walls at Rome were built after the fall of Veii by prisoners of that conflict.

⁸⁶ J.B. Ward-Perkins, *Veii: The Historical Topography of the Ancient City*, In *Papers of the British School at Rome*, vol. 29 (London: British School at Rome, 1961), 36; Spivey and Stoddart, *Etruscan Italy*, 137; Haynes, *Civilization*, 204.

⁸⁷ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 36; Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 107.

⁸⁸ J.B. Ward-Perkins, “Excavations beside the North-West Gate at Veii, 1957-58,” In *Papers of the British School at Rome*. n.s. Vol XIV, 38-40 (London: British School at Rome, 1959): 42; Potter, *Changing Landscape*, 91.

⁸⁹ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 32; Torelli, *Etruria*, 15.

⁹⁰ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 44.

Nevertheless, judging from the fact that other Etruscan sites also fortified their positions around this same time,⁹¹ it would seem safe to assume that the Veientes had relied solely upon the natural defenses—possibly supplemented⁹² by a wooden palisade—for most of the city’s history.⁹³

The idea that the city was only moderately fortified before the construction of the new walls is corroborated by the fact that on the Piazza d’Armi, the citadel of Veii, there are remains of an older circuit of walls from the seventh century B.C.E.⁹⁴ If the older walls had been considered as strong as the fortification of the *arx*, there would have been no reason to replace the defenses around the city while leaving the walls of the citadel intact.

Whatever sense of security the steep edges of the plateau afforded the citizens of Veii, their reliance upon natural defenses ended shortly after Rome’s final defeat of Fidenae in 426 B.C.E.⁹⁵ After gaining and losing the city numerous times over the course of the fifth century B.C.E.,⁹⁶ Rome decided to end the conflict permanently. The Veientes must have understood that Rome did not want to lose Fidenae again and that their own city would probably be the next target of the growing Roman state.

And so, the Veientes prepared to defend themselves. The wall which they designed was constructed of large tufa⁹⁷ blocks that were reinforced with an earth and stone rampart.⁹⁸ The remains of the walls at the northwestern gate were found with three stone courses on the front

⁹¹ Potter, *Changing Landscape*, 91-92; Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 105; According to Spivey and Stoddart (*Etruscan Italy*, 136) the towns of Etruria all began updating their fortifications around this time: Veii (late 5th C B.C.E.), Cerveteri (5th – 4th C B.C.E.), Tarquinia (6th C B.C.E.), Vulci (5th – 4th C B.C.E.), and San Giovenale (5th C B.C.E.).

⁹² Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 55; See also Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 36: “That there may have been earlier defenses is a possibility that cannot be excluded without a great deal more careful excavation.” Even without archaeological remains, this hypothesis, of course, makes perfect sense.

⁹³ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 32.

⁹⁴ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 32, 50; Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 107; Torelli, *Etruria*, 15.

⁹⁵ Potter, *Changing Landscape*, 92.

⁹⁶ Scullard, *A History*, 98.

⁹⁷ Holloway, *Archaeology of Early Rome*, 92.

⁹⁸ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 42.

(exterior) and six on the rear.⁹⁹ The walls were anywhere from 1.58 – 2.08 meters thick throughout the entire course¹⁰⁰ and the blocks were held in place by a combination of mortar and soil.¹⁰¹ Soil, which was used as a primitive substitute for mortar, was used only on the lower courses of the wall.¹⁰²

This use of soil as a bonding agent would not have been detrimental to the construction of the fortification because the lower part of the wall would have been covered by the rampart that was built at the same time. With a large rampart of earth and stone behind the wall and a sloping glacis in front, there would have been no need to finish the stones to make them uniform.¹⁰³ The rampart and glacis not only gave extra support to the fortification walls they also provided extra points of defense themselves. The glacis would have made the wall much harder to undermine by sapping as the weight of the earth would have braced the blocks of tufa.¹⁰⁴ It would have also presented anyone attempting to climb the wall with a steep slope which would have to be scaled before the walls could be attacked, and then only from below.

The ramparts were not as obvious in parts of the circuit that were not constructed in a relatively flat area.¹⁰⁵ At the northwestern gate, where the landscape was flat and at the point where there was the most obvious approach to the city, the rampart and glacis are pronounced.¹⁰⁶ However, since the topography of the plateau was such that it was naturally defensible (due to the sheer cliffs) around most of the circuit, the fortification process was a bit different in areas

⁹⁹ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 45.

¹⁰⁰ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 66; Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 108: “Half-way along the east side sixteen courses of masonry are preserved to a height of some seventeen feet.”

¹⁰¹ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 45.

¹⁰² Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 45.

¹⁰³ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 79.

¹⁰⁴ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 79.

¹⁰⁵ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 71.

¹⁰⁶ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 40.

removed from the northwestern gate.¹⁰⁷ On segments of the plateau that were especially steep, the wall was actually placed below the crown of the hill, out on the cliff face.¹⁰⁸ To augment these sections of wall, the Veientes practiced a normal Etruscan technique of cutting back the tufa below the walls in order to produce a vertical wall of natural stone below the artificial one.¹⁰⁹ A section of wall constructed in this manner was found during the excavations of J. Crawley in 1959; it also provided evidence that the upper courses, those not covered by a glacis or rampart, were chiseled down into a smooth, uniform face.¹¹⁰ This type of defense would have been extremely difficult to overcome, though it may have also been rather susceptible to collapse—despite its strengths while in use—because of lack of repair in later periods.¹¹¹

That the walls were highly polished above the earthen fill layers suggests that the construction process was not undertaken during a period of duress and, subsequently, provides an answer to how a city that was completely surrounded for nearly seven years could hold out against its attackers. That is, it would seem that if the Veientes sensed imminent danger from the Roman state, the need to polish their city walls would be a secondary concern to finishing the project itself. When Ward-Perkins was excavating the rampart and walls around the northwestern gate however, he found a chalky, white material between the earth and tufa; this material was the shavings from the polished tufa blocks.¹¹² Had the Veientes been rushed to complete the walls, it would seem only natural that the decoration and refinement of the walls would be put off. The fact that these refinements occur at a time contemporary to the construction of the wall itself points towards a more leisurely pace of construction. Also,

¹⁰⁷ Spivey and Stoddart, *Etruscan Italy*, 136.

¹⁰⁸ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 71: “the walls were not placed on the ridge...instead they were placed as much as 8 meters below and 6-7 meters forward supporting a massive artificial fill;” Spivey and Stoddart, *Etruscan Italy*, 136.

¹⁰⁹ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 32.

¹¹⁰ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 79.

¹¹¹ Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 79.

¹¹² Ward-Perkins, “NW Gate,” 45; Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 108.

because the new circuit of walls is uniform in character, the idea that Veii was under siege or constant duress during its construction seems unlikely.¹¹³

Even so, from pottery sherds found in the rampart near the northwestern gate, Ward-Perkins came to the conclusion that the wall circuit, built as one construction project, could not have been created before the middle of the fifth century B.C.E.¹¹⁴ There is no doubt that the impetus to build these new fortifications came from the growing military might of Rome. However, why, after more than three centuries of warfare, did the Veientes decide to augment their fortifications and create a monumental city wall? One obvious possibility is that the Veientes were alarmed by the final capture of Fidenae in 426 B.C.E. (Livy 4.22.4).¹¹⁵ Something about the fall of Fidenae changed the way in which the Veientes viewed the threat of Roman conquest.

From the time that the final war with Fidenae began in 437 B.C.E. until the siege of Veii itself, there were almost yearly skirmishes with Rome.¹¹⁶ One strange aspect of the conquest of Fidenae that might have alarmed the Veientes was the fact that the Romans conquered the city through deception. That is, the natural defenses which had sufficed throughout the history of the city proved useless in the face of Roman ingenuity. According to Livy (4.22.4), Q. Servilius tunneled into the city by creating or utilizing one of the many *cuniculi* nearby. This was obviously a concern to the Veientine commanders as can be seen from the fact that at the same time that the new fortification walls were being built around the city, many of the *cuniculi*, which had been used for drainage and water collection since prehistory,¹¹⁷ were also filled in.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Compare these defenses to the Themistoklean Walls in Athens; built while the Athenians were trying to keep their autonomy from Sparta, they are a conglomeration of reused stone, new construction, *stelai*, and other, random bits of stone; C.f. R.G.A. Weir, "The Lost Archaic Wall around Athens," *Phoenix* 49, no. 3 (1995): 252-54, fn. 22, 23.

¹¹⁴ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 32.

¹¹⁵ Potter, *Changing Landscape*, 92.

¹¹⁶ Richardson, *The Etruscans*, 79.

¹¹⁷ E.C. Semple, "Irrigation and Reclamation in the Ancient Mediterranean Region," In *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 19, no. 3 (Sep., 1929): 127.

The Etruscans were experts at handling the tricky process of controlling water collection and disposal.¹¹⁹ In fact, the entire plain surrounding the site of Veii, the *Ager Veientanus*, contained about 25 kilometers of *cuniculi*.¹²⁰ The tunnels were not, however, limited to the area around Veii. To the south of Rome, in the Alban Hills, there were about 45 kilometers of *cuniculi* which helped drain the area as it was prone to become marshy (and would have attracted malaria).¹²¹ Even the *Cloaca Maxima* in the Roman Forum, reputedly built by an Etruscan king (Livy 1.56.1), was constructed in generally the same manner and for the same use as the other *cuniculi* of the area.¹²² The shape and size of most of the various *cuniculi* were fairly regular—roughly egg-shaped with a flat bottom and around 1.6 meters high (just enough room for a man to be able to walk through without too much trouble)—and, as a rule, there were air shafts every 30 to 40 meters.¹²³ Some of these air shafts contained foot-holds carved into the rock, by which workers would be able to enter or exit the tunnels for cleaning; these were covered with capstones to protect against stray material, natural or human, falling in and blocking the water flow.¹²⁴

The fact that these *cuniculi* were constructed so as to allow men to walk through them gives credence to Livy's claim that Fidenae and Veii may have both been captured by utilizing such a tunnel.¹²⁵ It was also presumably for this reason that the *cuniculi* surrounding and interspersed within the city of Veii were filled in before the new circuit of walls was built. When the engineers leveled off the edges of the plateau in order to build the walls, the *cuniculi* were

¹¹⁸ Ward-Perkins, "NW Gate," 43; Spivey ad Stoddart, *Etruscan Italy*, 69.

¹¹⁹ Semple, "Irrigation," 127; Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 47.

¹²⁰ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 47; Potter, *Changing Landscape*, 85.

¹²¹ Potter, *Changing Landscape*, 85.

¹²² Semple, "Irrigation," 127; Potter, *Changing Landscape*, 85.

¹²³ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 47.

¹²⁴ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 47.

¹²⁵ Though, as has been stated earlier, the event probably only happened at Fidenae. The fact that the tunnels were filled in at Veii gives support to the legend; it suggests that both sides considered the *cuniculi* to be a gap in the defensive position of Veii – possibly because of the events at Fidenae.

blocked up with some of that material.¹²⁶ At the northwestern gate, the most obvious place for an enemy camp because of the relatively shallow slope of the land, there was another *cuniculus*; this tunnel had also been filled in with the same material as the others. Despite its proximity to what became the Roman camp, this tunnel was probably not the cause of the Veientes' downfall.¹²⁷

Veii and Fidenae

It is possible that Livy's account of Veii's capture by means of a *cuniculus* was actually a tale borrowed from the fall of Fidenae. In fact, because Fidenae was such an important city for the control of trade on the lower Tiber, Veii was tied to it; when Fidenae fell for the last time to the Romans, Veii too fell, in all but deed.

Veii could not survive long after Fidenae was taken from her control...Though Rome was powerless to blockade her on the north, support from ancient allies in that direction could only delay the inevitable end. Veii was virtually in a state of siege from the fall of Fidenae until her own capture in 396 BCE.¹²⁸

The capture of Fidenae ended Veii's strategic access to the western side of the Tiber and gave Rome a forward operations base from which she was able to make incursions into Veientine territory.¹²⁹ Fidenae provided such a strategic and economic connection with Veii that the fate of the two cities were inseparable. As such, Livy reported many of the aspects surrounding the fall of Veii first in his account of the earlier war with Fidenae.

According to Livy, Veii shared many similarities to Fidenae in that it was also an impregnable fortress (Livy 4.22.2-3):

...dictator...compulit inde in urbem Fidenas valloque circumdedit; sed neque scalis capi poterat urbs alta et munita neque in obsidione vis ulla erat, quia frumentum non necessitati modo satis, sed copiae quoque abunde ex ante convecto sufficiebat.

¹²⁶ Ward-Perkins, "NW Gate," 44.

¹²⁷ Ward-Perkins, "NW Gate," 70-71.

¹²⁸ Holland, "Forerunners," 319.

¹²⁹ Scullard, *A History*, 100.

...the dictator (Servilius)...forced (them) from there into the city and he surrounded Fidenae with a palisade; however, the city, high and fortified, was not able to be taken by ladders nor was there any strength in siege, since there was not only enough grain for any necessity, but there was also an abundance of supplies from a previous stockpiling.

Veii, in order to withstand a siege of seven years, must also have stockpiled supplies. The impetus for this, as well as the instigation for building the new circuit of walls, was surely the destruction of Fidenae and encroachment onto Veientine lands by the Romans around 406 B.C.E. The difference between the two sieges is that the Romans had not yet instituted winter quarters at Fidenae; so, a season-long siege would have been useless against a fortress that was in no danger of falling except by storm. Veii on the other hand, while “*alta et munita*,” could be worn down by a protracted siege that lasted year-round.

Throughout Livy’s account, the manner in which Fidenae was captured is eerily similar to the way in which Veii falls. The inclusions of *cuniculi* notwithstanding, Livy’s two accounts of Roman assaults on these fortress towns are almost mirror images. First, with the attack upon Fidenae, Livy relates that (4.22.4-5):

Ita expugnandi pariter cogendique ad deditionem spe amissa, dictator in locis propter propinquitatem notis ab aversa parte urbis, maxime neglecta quia suapte natura tutissima erat, agere in arcem cuniculum instituit. Ipse diversissimis locis subeundo ad moenia quadrifariam diviso exercitu qui alii aliis succederent ad pugnam, continenti die ac nocte proelio ab sensu operis hostes avertibat, donec perfosso a castris monte erecta in arcem via est...

And so with hope of overrunning (Fidenae) and forcing it to surrender lost, the dictator (Servilius), because of a detailed knowledge of the area, began to drive a *cuniculus* towards the citadel from the rear part of the city which, because of its nature, was safest and mostly neglected. There, with the army divided into quarters for going against the wall in separated positions so that some might fight here, others there, he averted the enemy, intent both day and night by battle, from the knowledge of the work, until a path was made into the citadel by digging from the camp into the hill...

Likewise, Camillus utilizes a strategy that could have been taken directly from the memoirs of Servilius as (5.19.9-11):

Inde ad Veios exercitus ductus, densioraque castella facta, et a procurstationibus quae multae temere inter murum ac vallum fiebant, edicto ne quis iniussu pugnaret, ad opus milites traducti. Operum fuit omnium longe maximum ac laboriosissimum cuniculus in arcem hostium agi coeptus. Quod ne intermitteretur opus neu sub terra continuus labor eosdem conficeret, in partes sex munitorum numerum divisit; senae horae in orbem operi attributae sunt; nocte ac die nunquam ante omissum quam in arcem viam facerent.

From there the army was led to Veii, outposts were increased, and by an edict that no one should fight without orders, the soldiers were led from the many useless skirmishes which were (common) between the wall and palisade to work. The work which was by far the greatest and most difficult was a *cuniculus* began in order to lead into the enemy citadel. Accordingly, so that the work not be interrupted nor the continuous labor beneath the earth harm the men, he divided the number of workers into six parts; the workers were placed into shifts of six hours; they worked night and day – never stopping until they should make a path into the citadel.

Livy then goes on to describe the attack on Veii which spread the enemy defenders so thinly that there was no hope of repelling the invaders attacking from within (5.21.4-7):

...superante multitudine ab omnibus locis urbem adgreditur, quo minor ab cuniculo ingruentis periculi sensus esset. Veientes...in muros pro se quisque armati discurrunt, mirantes quidnam id esset quod cum tot per dies nemo se ab stationibus Romanus movisset, tum velut repentino icti furore improvidi currerent ad muros.

...(the army) in a great host attacked the city from all locations, by which there would be no knowledge of the huge danger from the *cuniculus*. The Veientes...each man arming himself, ran to the walls, wondering why it was that, when for so many days no Roman had moved himself from his station, now they should run to the walls with a reckless fury as if seeking to be struck down.

Both Roman generals order that a tunnel be dug into the enemy citadel under the cover of feints upon the walls. What the other “digging operations” might have been in the case of Veii, Livy does not say.

That the account surrounding Veii was as much fiction as fact is suggested by Livy’s insistence that the soldiers dug a tunnel into the citadel. From Ward-Perkins’ excavations, it has been shown that the *arx* of Veii was located not within acropolis but on the outskirts of the city proper, on its own precipice.¹³⁰ Also, the fact that that no tunnels have been discovered under

¹³⁰ Ward-Perkins, *Veii*, 32; Haynes, *Civilization*, 205.

the *arx* lends credence to Scullard's statement that "the critical tunneling under Veii, a stratagem which is also attributed to the attack on Fidenae in 435, is improbable in view of the city's precipitous position."¹³¹

Finally, another strikingly similar detail between the sacks of Fidenae and Veii is the description of the moment of attack upon the fortress. For Fidenae, Livy states that (4.22.6):

...intentisque Etruscis ad vanas a certo periculo minas clamor supra caput hostilis captam urbem ostendit.

...a great clamor above the heads of the enemy showed to the Etruscans, intent upon empty threats (and distracted) from the real danger, that the city was captured.

In the same way, Camillus distracts the Veientes from the troops in the tunnel until a great shout is heard from the attackers (5.21.10-11):

Cuniculus delectis militibus eo tempore plenus, in aede Iunonis quae in Veientana arce erat armatos repente edidit, et pars aversos in muris invadunt hostes, pars claustra portarum revellunt, pars cum ex tectis saxa tegulaeque a mulieribus ac servitiis iacerentur, inferunt ignes. Clamor omnia variis terrentium ac paventium vocibus mixto mulierum ac puerorum ploratu complet.

The *cuniculus*, which was filled with picked men at that time, suddenly gave forth the armed men into the temple of Juno which was on the Veientine citadel; part moved against the back of the enemy on the walls, part opened the locks of the gates, some, when rocks and roof tiles were thrown at them from the roofs by women and slaves, started fires. A great clamor with various shouts of fear and terror filled everything with the mixed wailing of women and children.

It would seem that a powerful people such as the Veientes who had warded off defeat for the better part of a decade would be more intelligent than to fall for a stratagem that was close to forty years old and of which they must have been well aware. After having lost control of Fidenae through a similar trick, the Veientes should have been constantly vigilant against the

¹³¹ Scullard, *A History*, 100.

recurrence of such an attack.¹³² After all, would the Trojan Horse have been successful a second time after its famous conquest of Ilium?

It seems more likely that no *cuniculus* was at fault for the destruction of Veii; rather, Livy seems to have created the story based on that of Fidenae. Scullard suggests that Livy was able to do this because of the connection he created between Veii and the *emissarium* at the Alban Lake.¹³³ However, if the story of the *cuniculus* appears to be a fictionalizing of the actual events, the much more extraordinary tale of the draining of the Alban Lake – the possible cause of the confusion – must be examined; while the capture of a city by means of a tunnel is at least possible, the claim that the Romans, after overhearing an Etruscan soothsayer and subsequently sending word to Delphi, drained the Alban Lake borders on the incredible. With the story of the *cuniculus*, doubt is cast upon the narrative because of its similarity to the sack of Fidenae and from the parallels with the fall of Troy. For the draining of the Alban Lake, not only does one suspect its credibility because of its connection to the divine, but also because of the sheer scale of the project itself.

The Alban Lake is located in the *Colli Albani* to the south of Rome. The first problem with the ancient accounts surrounding this legend is the fact that the water in the lake overflowed for no apparent reason (Dion. Hal. 12.10.1; Plutarch, *Camillus*, 3.1).¹³⁴ This occurrence is extremely hard to believe because of the simple fact that the water level within the crater is more than 100

¹³² Especially after Livy's statement at (4.23.4) that: *Trepidatum in Etruria est post Fidenas captas non Veientibus solum exterritis metu similis excidii...* (All of Etruria was afraid after the capture of Fidenae and not only did a fear arise for the Veientes, terrified of a similar destruction...). The fact that the *cuniculi* at Veii were filled during the construction of the new walls (cf. Ward-Perkins, "NW Gate," 43-44) also suggests that the Veientes were wary of the Romans and their mining prowess.

¹³³ Scullard, *A History*, 100: "The critical tunneling under Veii, a stratagem which is also attributed to the attack on Fidenae in 435, is improbable in view of the city's precipitous position; it may have been suggested by local drainage systems or by the draining of the Alban Lake, if this was roughly contemporary."

¹³⁴ Dion. Hal. 12.10.1: οὔτε νιφετῶν οὔτ' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰτίας ἀνθρώποις φανεράς... (neither from rain clouds nor from any other cause known to man...); Plutarch, *Camillus*, 3.1: αἰτίας κοινῆς ἀπορία (without a common cause).

meters below the rim; there is also no spring within the crater which has been filled with rain water.¹³⁵ It would have taken rainfall of biblical proportions to come close to causing the crater to flood. Nevertheless, there is evidence to support Livy's claim that the lake was drained in the fact that the Etruscans were experts at water control issues. As has been shown by the evidence of the *Cloaca Maxima* in Rome and the huge systems of *cuniculi* in the Tiber River district, the Etruscans passed on at least the knowledge of this skill to their neighbors.¹³⁶ At the time of the war with Veii there were more than 45 kilometers of *cuniculi* surrounding the Alban Hills.¹³⁷

The most important of these tunnels is a massive *emissarium* which was built, according to the evidence, to control the seepage of the lake.¹³⁸ This tunnel was much larger than the standard *cuniculus*, five by four feet, and was nearly 8000 feet long.¹³⁹ What is more, although the opening at the down-hill end of the tunnel was constructed sometime during the first century B.C.E. (as can be gleaned from an archway at the lower opening), the tunnel itself was constructed sometime between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C.E.¹⁴⁰ Thus the construction date could have been more or less contemporary with the Veientine War. Because there was also a documented embassy to Delphi made by the Romans at this same time, Livy would have had no problem equating the three events with a unified agenda even though only the embassy to Delphi and the *emissarium* could reasonably be related.¹⁴¹

A more likely explanation is that the events were linked by the outbreak of a deadly plague in the region. The plague is attested by Livy (5.14.4) and by Dionysius (12.9.2) and although it

¹³⁵ Semple, "Irrigation," 127.

¹³⁶ Semple, "Irrigation," 128. Roman engineering would augment the skills of their Etruscan predecessors to create the extensive aqueduct systems that dotted the countryside in every province that was Roman.

¹³⁷ Potter, *Changing Landscape*, 85.

¹³⁸ Semple, "Irrigation," 127; Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 69.

¹³⁹ Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 69.

¹⁴⁰ Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 69.

¹⁴¹ Forsythe, *A Critical History*, 249; Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 69: "If, as Roman tradition asserts, it was built at the time of the Roman siege of Veii and if the Romans in fact captured Veii by means of tunneling, the two operations may have somehow become linked."

seems to be just another parallel with the story of the Trojan War (*Il.* 1.9-10), the idea that a pestilence was sweeping the countryside cannot be assumed to be literary fabrication as the wet swampy ground that was found surrounding the Alban Hills was perfect for harboring all sorts of diseases.¹⁴² It was this kind of landscape that the Etruscans were so good at draining with their *cuniculi* and there can be little doubt about the true reason for the *emissarium* at the Alban Lake. The fact that the embassy was sent to Delphi in order to consult the god of pestilence, Apollo, supports the argument that the tunnel, if it was created because of the oracle, was used to lessen the effect of sickness in the surrounding countryside, not to satisfy some task handed down by fate.

So, again as with the *cuniculi* at Veii, there is archaeological evidence to corroborate Livy's facts, but his presentation of the events remains focused on his ideas and the needs of his narrative. That is, the fact that an *emissarium* was dug in the Alban Hills in order to drain off some of the dangerous waters is not refutable. The time of its construction very well could have taken place near or during the events of the war with Veii. However, the construction project was more likely undertaken as a public health measure than because of the outbursts of an Etruscan soothsayer. Even if the oracle at Delphi did order the Romans to drain the lake, that advice would have been in response to a question about the plague that was ravaging the countryside of the Alban Hills. The coincidence of the embassy to Delphi, the draining of the Alban Lake, and the war with Veii would have had too much prospective connection with the divine to be passed over by Livy as he was writing his epic.

One further connection between Veii and Fidenae is the amount of time Rome spent overcoming Fidenae. The time frame is also reminiscent of the fall of Troy and is similar to the

¹⁴² R. Sallares, *Malaria and Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 57. For disease in antiquity, cf. also: W. Scheidel, "Emperors, Aristocrats, and the Grim Reaper: Towards a Demographic Profile of the Roman Elite," *CQ* n.s. 49, no. 1 (1999): 254-81.

sack of Veii in that Livy seems to blur the lines of his narrative to add weight to the events. The ultimate war with Fidenae was begun by the dictator Mamercus Aemilius in 436 B.C.E.

(4.17.9).¹⁴³ During the campaign, Aemilius hemmed in the Etruscan forces, comprised of Veientes, Fidenates, and the Falerii, before the walls of Fidenae. The contingents from Veii and Fidenae were in favor of waiting out the Roman besiegers; they only entered battle at the urging of their Falerian allies (4.18.1 ff.) and were soundly defeated. The next year, however, after an assault upon Rome, an army of Veientes and Fidenates was repelled and driven inside the walls of Fidenae (4.21 ff.): the final war against Fidenae had begun. Unlike Veii though, Fidenae was captured quite quickly after the Romans surrounded the city. Because, as previously noted, Servilius knew the location well (4.22.4-5), he was able to bring the siege of Fidenae to a close after only one season.

At first glance, there is no obvious connection between the sieges. However, when the hostilities between Rome and Fidenae are viewed as a whole, the connection presents itself. During the consulship of Aulus Cornelius Cossus, whose exploits in the previous campaign earned him the *spolia opima*, the Fidenates yet again joined their Veientine allies in hostilities against Rome (4.30.5). As with the previous war, the Fidenates committed atrocities against the Romans, this time by murdering local settlers (4.31.7). Nearly an exact copy of the war in 435 B.C.E., this new struggle, ten years later,¹⁴⁴ ended when the Roman army caught the Etruscans

¹⁴³ Aemilius named Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus as his Master of Horse. The fact that this man's father was the famous dictator was not lost upon Livy who commented that Cincinnatus Minor was (4.17.9): "a youth worthy of his lineage" (*dignum parente iuvenum*).

¹⁴⁴ Scullard, *Etruscan Cities*, 268; Scullard, *A History*, 99: "...Q. Servilius Fidenas captured Fidenae...in 435. Fidenae again revolted in 426 and was regained in 425; the incidents of this war are so closely parallel to those of the first, that one must be a 'doublet' of the other."

before the gates of Fidenae (4.31.6 ff.). So, what was begun in 435 B.C.E. was finally brought to a close a decade later; a time period which has obvious connotations.¹⁴⁵

Fidenae, in Livy's telling, is only important when the city is allied with Veii; there is no real power contained within the city itself as it is little more than an outpost for whichever city is in control, be it Rome or Veii. Why then does he use Fidenae as a parallel to and a source of many aspects of the Veientine siege, including the ten year timeline and its capture by trickery? The answer seems to be that Fidenae, not Veii, was the key to Rome's dominion over the southern Tiber.¹⁴⁶ Livy even states that Veii is inconsequential as an enemy on its own (2.48.7); the capture of the Maesian Forest all but destroyed Veii as a trading power and it was the control of trade that was the true power base for any state rising in the Tiber Valley. As such, control of Fidenae was essential to anyone wishing to become dominant in the area. Fidenae provided effective control of the salt trade and it was the loss of Fidenae that brought about the final defeat of Veii, not her destruction by Rome.

Despite the true causes and effects of Rome's conquest of southern Etruria, Livy could not very well describe Fidenae as the cornerstone of that undertaking because of the ease of its capture. Nevertheless, Livy did use some of the main aspects of the siege of Fidenae, such as the *cuniculi* and the description of the sack itself, to augment his account of Veii's fall. To be fair, because the life and death of Veii was so closely connected to its ability to retain Fidenae, the fall of one equated to the fall of the other. However, Livy had an ulterior motive behind his description of the siege of Veii.

¹⁴⁵ Diodorus (12.80.1, 6 – 8); See also Forsythe (*A Critical History*, 244 – 45), who discusses the fact that in other sources the wars with Fidenae are compressed into only the second campaign and that “battle narratives for each Fidenate war seem to be doublets, both in commanders and in tactics.”

¹⁴⁶ Forsythe, *A Critical History*, 242.

Veii was an important step for Rome to gain dominance in the area, but Fidenae, a much smaller opponent in every way, was the true key to the Tiber Valley.¹⁴⁷ Why then did Livy not use his machinations to place an epic siege at the gates of Fidenae? The answer comes from the fact that every epic needs a hero. While Fidenae may have been more important to Roman conquest, the sack of the city was not undertaken by a man with enough *kleos* to be considered worthy of the last book of the first pentad in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*. That honor fell, instead, on the hero Camillus – the hero, not only of Veii, but Book V as a whole.

¹⁴⁷ Alföldi, *Early Rome*, 338: “When Fidenae fell, the fate of Veii was sealed.”

CHAPTER III

*ROMA HISTORICA*Mythology, Legend, and History

We have seen that Livy went to great lengths to create a parallel of the events of epic in his historical work. The reasons for alluding to epic poetry, and the *Iliad* specifically, are justifiable when one regards the agenda behind Livy's first pentad. As Livy claims, the first five books of the *Ab Urbe Condita* present readers with a self-contained unit covering the history of their state (6.1.1):

Quae ab condita urbe Roma ad captam eandem Romani sub regibus primum, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus decemvirisque ac tribunis consularibus gessere, foris bella, domi seditions, quinque libris exposui...

All those affairs of Rome, from the foundation of the city to her capture, carried out under the kings at first and then the consuls, dictators, decemvirs and consular tribunes, (which include) the wars abroad and domestic uprisings, I have presented in five books...

Glory and tragedy abound in these tales which would have been well known to the citizenry from previous histories or epics. Because of his readers' familiarity with these stories and because of the quasi-mythological nature of the tales in general, Livy was prepared to treat the early events more loosely and with a style that seemed to mix historical narrative with elements of epic and tragedy.¹⁴⁸ Livy used this mixture of genres as a further and apparent means to separate the three different time-periods of Rome's early history. Just as the narrative of Rome moves from mythology to legend and then to history, so too do the interpolations of epic language and style lessen as the work nears Livy's own time. As Luce¹⁴⁹ writes:

¹⁴⁸ T. J. Luce, "Design and structure in Livy: 5.32-55," *TAPA* 102 (1971): 295; Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 78: "Thus [in the preface]...Livy explicitly proclaims his adherence to the conventions of historiography, but he does so in a way that simultaneously introduces the possibility of another set of practices and models for his work and so ultimately raises the question of which category his *opus* belongs in."

¹⁴⁹ Luce, "Design," 301.

Livy saw nothing wrong with taking a somewhat free hand in narrating the history of early Rome; since it was uncertain and suspect, what else could one do? But he seems to have considered efforts to invest these events with a false appearance of exactitude not only misleading, but—perhaps more important—inappropriate to the spirit which animated, or ought to animate, them...Quite clearly he considered that this applied with equal force to events after the actual founding: in fact, down to the sack, and in gradually diminishing measure thereafter (6.1.1-3). The historian was therefore entitled, and possibly even obliged, to narrate the grand and stirring legends of early Rome in the spirit of the *poet or the story-teller* (my italics). Exaggeration and the miraculous were permissible and entirely at home in such contexts, provided they were not overdone. But throughout the historian must have a serious purpose. Since the stories embodied national ideals and moral values, he must strive to bring out these qualities clearly and forcefully. The *details* were untrustworthy, but the spirit which breathed through the legends, he believed, was decidedly not.

To get around the problem that in places his reformulation was apparent and contrary to tradition, he, from time to time, gives alternate accounts or ascribes the discrepancies to fable or the mist of time as in the introduction to Book VI (6.1.2):¹⁵⁰

...res cum vetustate nimia obscuras, velut quae magno ex intervallo loci vix cernuntur, tum quod parvae et rariae per eadem tempora litterae fuere, una custodia fidelis memoriae rerum gestarum, et quod, etiam si quae in commentariis pontificum aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis, incense urbe pleraeque interiere.

...these affairs are obscured not only by their excessive age, seeming like places which can barely be seen from a great distance, but also because written works, the only true guardian of the memory of events, were few and far between in those times; and because, even if there were documents in the pontifical records or others, public or private, they were mostly destroyed when the city burned.

Veii was different. Not only was the siege and sack of Veii effectively the last mytho-historical event to take place in the development of Rome, the event marked a turning point in the history of the Roman state;¹⁵¹ Livy reiterates this fact by choosing to begin Book VI with a

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Livy 1.4.2; 1.4.7; 1.16.2; 5.21.9; Luce, "Design," 295: "Indeed, studies in such early legends as the sack of Rome...show that the process of transformation was generally gradual and took place over a long period—each generation of writers adding to, or improving, different parts of the story according to its particular concerns and prejudices. In time a "tradition about the traditions" grew up: the major episodes of early Roman history assumed certain canonical outlines with which most readers were familiar. Hence the historians of early Rome could not reasonably expect, or want, to create surprise very often in the readers' minds. The question is seldom "What will happen?", but "How will it happen?" The pleasure of reading was in recognition of the familiar, realized not so much in the fulfillment of a story, but in expectation of its fulfillment—suspense of anticipation, not of revelation."

¹⁵¹ Kraus, "No Second Troy," 269.

new preface and, indeed, a new foundation (6.1.1: *Quae ab condita urbe Roma...*). Because the written records of the Roman state burned along with so many buildings during the sack of Rome by the Gauls in the early years of the fourth century B.C.E., that sack, in effect, became the first event in Roman history (6.1.3):

Clariora deinceps certioraque ab secunda origine velut ab stirpibus laetius feraciusque renatae urbis gesta domi militiaeque exponentur.

Finally, a clearer and more certain founding of the city, both domestic and military, can be set forth from a second beginning as if from better roots and born more fruitfully.

Livy uses this scarcity of early evidence to his advantage.¹⁵² Just as the time from *Iliad* and the exploits of Aeneas to the birth of Rome under Romulus signified the change from mythology to legend, so too did the destruction of Veii and the sack of Rome signify a move from legend to history. Whereas the Romans would not have made an explicit distinction between these eras, the way in which the heroes were understood was slightly different. Because Livy makes a pointed distinction between what was before the sack and after, his representation of the characters in his narrative becomes more apparent. The characters of ages long ago are treated more as characters; that is, the specific person matters less than the traits which he or she owns. However, when Livy assures his readers that they are now entering recorded history, the characters become more solid. No longer can the characters be considered personifications for moral instruction alone; instead, they provide solid evidence as to the results or failures of adhering to ancient values.

Urbs Capta

In order to mark the boundaries between the three eras of Rome's existence, the metropolis had to be destroyed and a new city rebuilt, metaphorically at least, by each of the three

¹⁵² Allen, "Livy as Literature," 253.

conditores:¹⁵³ Troy was destroyed before Aeneas could found his dynasty in Italy¹⁵⁴ and Alba Longa had to be destroyed before Rome could attain independence under Romulus. It would seem that Rome would, in turn, also need to fall for the narrative to continue along its proper course under the direction of Camillus.¹⁵⁵ The fact that Rome does not fall is testimony to Livy's need both to conform to and to break from the epic influence (specifically that of the *Iliad*) upon his narrative. As a result, Veii takes the place of Rome as the *urbs capta* and falls under the attack of the heroic Camillus.¹⁵⁶ Rome, then, was able to be spared as her Etruscan neighbor satisfied the blood sacrifice demanded by the epic muses and the hero, Camillus, had his destroyed city.

Livy, sacrificing Veii, was able to break from the traditional format and reinvent the narrative of a besieged city. Nevertheless, a great change took place after the attack by the Gauls and their destruction of Roman history to that point: legendary Rome was destroyed after all, though *Roma historica* arose from her ashes;¹⁵⁷ Rome ceased to be legend and became historically attested.¹⁵⁸ While there was no difference in the way his readers would have accepted mythology, legend, or history (all three were “real”) the fact that the legendary evidence was destroyed in the fire made even a discussion of authenticity needless.¹⁵⁹ As a result, the

¹⁵³ Kraus, “No Second Troy,” 282: “The real Troy had to perish, but what was acceptable in it—the valor of its heroes, the pietas of Aeneas, and his descendants’ god-given destiny—would be perpetuated in Rome.”

¹⁵⁴ Alternate traditions have Ilium betrayed by Aeneas in exchange for his safety. While these older traditions were subdued by Vergil’s epic, they provide a much more apparent link between the three ages of Rome (though the argument still works with Vergil’s version). For some of the different accounts of Aeneas and Italy, see K. Müller, *Fragmenta Historicum Graecorum* (Paris: Didot, 1848), II, 66, 8; III, 92, 21; III, 168, 1; IV, 290, 8; IV, 297, 6; Cf. also Dion. Hal. 1.72.1-73.5.

¹⁵⁵ Kraus, “No Second Troy,” 268: “The work is, in a way, Rome itself. As the work progresses, so does the city.”

¹⁵⁶ Kraus, “No Second Troy,” 271.

¹⁵⁷ It is at this point that the inclusion of epic motifs (deities, heroes, etc.) falls off. In Book VI Livy specifically claims that his narrative from this point forward is based on historical evidence that is clearer than previous sections (6.1.1-3).

¹⁵⁸ Kraus, “No Second Troy,” 285: “...now Rome is without end: it was born from the fire of the Gauls (all previous history was lost) and has continued to Livy’s time without interruption.”

¹⁵⁹ Any discussion about the truth of mythology of legend, should it arrive, would be without any source material other than the traditions which Livy presents.

mythology of Rome was allowed to continue, for the most part unquestioned, into the historical era making the city truly eternal.

Livy uses the whole history of Rome to reinforce his claim that “(the study of history) is best for the understanding of things and for healthy productivity” (*Praefatio*, 9: *Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum...*) in a way that provides suitable *exempla*, historical and legendary, in both the private and public sphere.¹⁶⁰ It is as if Livy is lifting the now historical city of Rome above the splendor and glory of mythological Ilium; Rome, through the pious deeds and selfless action of her citizens, has completed a labor which proved too great for her epic predecessor in that she drove the besiegers from her gates.¹⁶¹

Nevertheless, although pious citizens added to the victory over the Gauls, it was a heroic task to move them towards such an upstanding action. As I have shown, Livy’s early history is full of legendary heroes who stood out among their peers with selfless action and strict morality.¹⁶² Not every hero was equal though. A few characters stood out as special, even among the great men of Rome’s past, in both their actions and importance to the flow of Livy’s narrative: Aeneas, the son of Anchises and Venus, represented the mythological past and provided the link from Trojan to Roman ancestry; Romulus, namesake of Rome herself, gave his people a legendary hero with mythological characteristics and brought the development of Rome into the legendary period.¹⁶³

Therefore, if Livy was going to follow his own example and bring his work into the historical

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Polybius 1.1.2; W. Liebeschuetz, “The Religious Position of Livy’s History,” *JRS* 57, no. ½ (1967): 48.

¹⁶¹ Liebeschuetz, “Religious Position,” 49.

¹⁶² Think of Horatius Cocles, Cincinnatus, et al.

¹⁶³ A lengthy discussion could follow, though, for my present purposes, I shall define myth as narrative having inter-cultural roots and legend as much more culture specific. For example, the dual founder motif would be considered myth as it appears in many different and separate cultures while the story of Romulus would be legendary as it is more of a specifically Roman cultural memory than fairytale or historical fact. Peter Heehs (“Myth, History, and Theory,” *History and Theory* Vol. 33, no. 1 (Feb., 1994), 2) describes myth as “sacred narratives of traditional societies generally involving superhuman beings, etc.” Legend, therefore, must be considered a diluted version, if you will, of myth.

era, his opus required a character who would also bridge the gap between legend and history. That character was Lucius Furius Camillus.¹⁶⁴

The fact that Camillus was associated with this new, historical, era in Rome's history does not, however, necessarily deny Aeneas or Romulus their place in the history of Rome. Characters from mythology were as real to the Romans as any historical person (such as either of the Scipiones or Hannibal). With mythological persons, it was the character himself, his actions, beliefs, values, and representations, which were important. As history was an educational medium, the information gleaned from characters was the important aspect. Whether or not a character actually existed in a specific shape or form was secondary, even inconsequential, to their impact on the expectation of readers. Even with characters such as Scipio or Camillus, it was their representation by historians that was important. Readers of history already knew the outcome of the narratives which they were reading; it was the events that brought about those ends which interested readers of history.

In fact, there have long been doubts as to whether even Camillus actually existed.¹⁶⁵ Dumézil¹⁶⁶ gives a compelling presentation of the mythological aspects of Camillus. He claims, rightly, that, "there is not one episode from Camillus' biography which is not an exemplum."¹⁶⁷ To further this point, the most important institutions developed by Camillus during his dictatorship were not, in fact, innovations; they were reestablishments of ancient institutions.¹⁶⁸ Strangely enough, "Camillus" was actually more than a name; adding to his mythological nature:

¹⁶⁴ G. Dumézil, *Camillus* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 43.

¹⁶⁵ Grant, *Myths*, 209; Ogilvie, *A Commentary*, 727.

¹⁶⁶ Dumézil, *Camillus*, 43 ff.

¹⁶⁷ Dumézil, *Camillus*, 43.

¹⁶⁸ G. Miles, "Maiores, Conditores, and Livy's Perspective on the Past," *TAPA* 118 (1988): 199. This will be discussed in greater detail below.

His very name too – possibly reminiscent of the *Marce Camitlnas* of Vulci from the François Tomb – shows he was set apart and associated with omens, for the *camillus* was a patrician child who served a most ancient corporation of priests, the *flamines*.¹⁶⁹

Accordingly, whenever “Camillus” is mentioned by name within the history, the double entendre that is associated with his name would have furthered his relationship with pious behavior. The possibility that the character that was Camillus may have been manipulated by Livy to fill an archetypal role only aids in demonstrating the historian’s agenda. As Grant states:¹⁷⁰

Although Roman mythology has to be treated historically – although the mere significance of its component stories have to be examined throughout all the phases that molded their development – the product that emerges is not what happened but what people, at different times, said or believed had happened.

Whether he existed as a man is inconsequential when discussing his place in Livy’s narrative. That is, as with Romulus and Aeneas, the fact that the men actually lived must be, at the same time, viewed with skepticism and accepted as a sort of cultural fact; it was, at least by the time of Quadrigarius, accepted by the Romans.¹⁷¹ To understand Camillus’ place within Roman history, the stance must be taken that, because the events recorded actually happened in one form or another, the men who took part in them must have shared the same qualities; the character and what he embodies was more important to Livy’s readers than pure historicity. As Cicero (*Ad Fam.* 5.12) writes:

Etenim ordo ipse annalium mediocriter nos retinet, quasi enumeratione fastorum. At viri saepe excellentis ancipites variique casus habent admirationem, exspectionem, laetitiam, molestiam, spem timorem; si vero exitu notabili concluduntur, expletur animus iucundissima lectionis voluptate.

For indeed the order of the years itself interests us only moderately, as if a simple explanation of the calendar. But men who are often successful because of wavering and varying reasons give cause for admiration, anticipation, delight, worry, hope, and fear; if, indeed, their lives should end with an honorable death, the mind of the reader would be filled with the most favorable pleasure.

¹⁶⁹ Grant, *Myths*, 201; See also Dumézil, *Camillus*, 93.

¹⁷⁰ Grant, *Myths*, xviii.

¹⁷¹ Forsythe, *A Critical History*, 255. See also Müller, *FGH*, II, 178, 245.

To understand Camillus, as presented by Livy and in accordance with the author's needs, his place in history, as a founder of Rome and a pious leader, must be discussed separately from his reality.¹⁷² Accordingly, the figures of Aeneas and Romulus and their places within their own eras must also be taken into account.

Roman Founders

The history of the Roman state contained three founders: mythological, legendary, and historical.¹⁷³ These founders represented the moral and spiritual heads of the society of which they were members.¹⁷⁴ Aeneas, living in the Heroic age, brought to Italy the ancestors of the Roman people and a connection with the Iliadic world. Romulus, born from Mars and nursed by a wolf, brought the sternness and strict characteristics of *Romanitas* to the new nation.¹⁷⁵ Camillus as the third founder of Rome carried with him no special characteristic *per se*.¹⁷⁶ Instead, Camillus exemplifies the values already created by the mythological and legendary men of Rome and he acts with strict adherence to those traditional Roman values (a characteristic which, as we shall see, sets him apart from his predecessors). Although his career began in the legendary pre-invasion times, Camillus' life and influence extend into the post-sack, historical, Rome.

¹⁷² Cf. Cicero, *De Leg.*, 1.1.4-5; R.F. Hathaway, "Cicero, De Re Publica II, and his Socratic View of History," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 29, no. 1 (Jan-March, 1968): 11-12.

¹⁷³ Miles, "Maiores," 195.

¹⁷⁴ Kraus, "No Second Troy," 270.

¹⁷⁵ The traditional kings all carry with them specific moral attitudes and mannerisms considered appropriate for good Romans though Romulus, as the first and true founder, takes special place among them. Romulus is also a bit different from Aeneas in that Livy ascribes some sense of humanity to the character; he casts doubt on both the divine parentage (1.4.2) and mythological aspect of his upbringing (1.4.7).

¹⁷⁶ Miles, "Maiores," 202: "His greatest achievement is not to create something new, but to preserve essential Roman Traditions..."

Aeneas and Camillus

Because the foundations of Rome were so steeped in the mythological past, for Livy to give Rome a connection with that past in historical times, Camillus, an historical figure, undertook epic actions and lived a life that paralleled his predecessor, Aeneas. The first pentad of the *Ab Urbe Condita* begins with a focus on Aeneas' actions in fleeing Troy (1.1.1):

Iam primum omnium satis constat Troia capta in ceteros saevitum esse Troianos, duobus, Aeneae Antenorique, et vetusti iure hospitii et quia pacis reddendaeque Helenae semper auctores fuerant, omne ius belli Achivos abstinuisse.

First of all it is agreed upon that, with Troy captured and the rest of the Trojans ravaged, the Greeks abstained from warring with two men out of the rest, Aeneas and Antenor, because of their adherence to traditional hospitality and because they were always the advocates of peace and of returning Helen.

Livy, accordingly, brings the mythological narrative of the first pentad to a close with Camillus, the first historical Roman, coming to the forefront of Roman history in a rousing speech (5.51.1-54.7) about the restoration of the city of Rome.

The most obvious connection between the characters of Aeneas and Camillus is their involvement in an epic siege. By Livy's time, Aeneas had enjoyed a place in both Greek and Latin literature (historic and poetic) for centuries.¹⁷⁷ In the *Iliad*, Aeneas was spared at least twice by the gods (*Il.* 5.311-17; 20.307-8) so that he could fulfill his destiny¹⁷⁸ once Troy fell. While he did not have a prominent role in the story of the *Iliad*, Aeneas did come into contact with some of the *Iliad*'s major characters and so he would have been a minor, but memorable character for readers in both the Greek and Italian world even before the development of Latin epics in the middle of the third century B.C.E. (even if those readers were not specifically Latin and biased towards the future of the Roman Republic).

¹⁷⁷ Here, I take for granted that the key passages mentioning Aeneas' actions in the *Iliad* are not later interpolations (a topic that deserves its own, separate discussion).

¹⁷⁸ That is, the continuation of the Trojan race and the foundation of a new homeland.

Therefore, because Livy was attempting to connect his narrative, in both plot and character development, with the stories from epic, he needed a siege worthy of his hero. In order to validate Camillus' connection with the mythological and legendary founders of Rome, the events surrounding his life needed to be parallel as well. Because of the limitations forced upon Livy by actual history (the fact that Rome did not follow the motif of the *urbs capta*), he was forced to exaggerate the siege of Veii so that at least one of the sieges in which Camillus was involved followed the correct storyline of epic siege warfare. Thus, Camillus, while not sharing the antiquity of Aeneas' connection with an epic siege, was, according to Livy, present at two sieges of epic proportion: Veii and Rome. One siege was in the realm of legend and so lifted Camillus into the position of a hero; the other, an historical siege, gave Camillus the opportunity to prove his status was warranted.

Besides Aeneas, Odysseus may seem to be the character most closely paralleled by Camillus because of the manner in which he finally destroyed the citadel at Veii. In fact, in many ancient sources, it was Aeneas' εὐσέβεια, or well-mindedness, that was most frequently documented instead of his piety which was, at best, third among that of the major characters in the *Iliad*.¹⁷⁹ In fact, some post Homeric descriptions of the fall of Troy link the city's destruction to the treachery of Aeneas as much as to the trickery of the Greeks and Odysseus. The issue of piety was not addressed specifically until much later when the definition of Aeneas' piety was reformed. By the time of pre-Vergilian Latin authors there is much more of an emphasis on Aeneas' relationship to Aphrodite and his healthy fear of the gods than on his loyalty to the monarchy of Ilium;¹⁸⁰ this refocusing changes Aeneas from a cowardly traitor to a man staunchly following the gods' wills (that is, the continuation of the state) no matter the personal cost. In

¹⁷⁹ G.K. Galinsky, *Aeneas, Sicily, and Rome* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 4, 37.

¹⁸⁰ Galinsky, *Aeneas*, 59.

fact, many of the Latin authors hint that the only reason Aeneas saved his father was that Anchises was carrying the sacred *penates* of Troy.¹⁸¹ While this type of piety is still honorable, Aeneas' connection with the divinely protected state outweighed his concern for even familial ties.

It was this (for him) recent version of Aeneas that Livy chose as the model for those behaviors shared by Camillus. The piety shown by Camillus surrounding the capture of Veii (5.20.3)¹⁸² and his recall from exile (5.46.11)¹⁸³ shows a man for whom honor and right action come before all other matters. Instead of Camillus' focus being on right action before the gods and family (although that is still a major concern being that he was a *fatalis dux*),¹⁸⁴ Camillus' *pietas* was given over, first and foremost, to the state:

Aemilius and Camillus do not, in the hour of victory, use the occasion to applaud and magnify themselves. Rather, they choose to utter the prayer that if there is any envy of Rome it should fall on themselves, not on the community as a whole...he utters 'the curse of Achilles,' but he does not sulk when Rome needs him.¹⁸⁵

Unlike the heroes of old who had divine parentage and epic poetry to chronicle their exploits, Camillus was one of a new breed of Roman hero. He was a man who sacrificed all other concerns (personal glory and renown) for the good of the state and lawful action; the personal glory (*kleos*) which was the goal of the epic heroes had been redefined for historical Rome. Now, personal glory was attained only in service of the state. As it was history, according to Livy, that presented readers with moral paradigms, Camillus represented the perfect figure to portray such standards and become, in effect, the first historical Roman.

¹⁸¹ Galinsky, *Aeneas*, 57; Grant, *Myths*, 87.

¹⁸² Even though Camillus is dictator, he asks the senate what he should do with the spoils from Veii.

¹⁸³ Camillus, according to Livy (...*quod magis credere libet*...), would not accept command until it was put into law.

¹⁸⁴ Grant, *Myths*, 87; Cf. 5.19.2.

¹⁸⁵ A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 77.

Despite this, however, the character of Camillus was still transitional. Therefore, he did have many similarities with his predecessors, and Livy emphasized these. One of the characteristics he clearly shares with Aeneas is the latter's rescue of the Trojan *Penates*. Despite the various accounts of Aeneas' departure from Troy in the aftermath of its destruction, the one bit of information that seems to be agreed upon by the ancient sources is that Aeneas brought with him the *Penates* of the Trojan state: an important action for any Roman. The *Penates* were the household gods and protectors of the family. To carry the *Penates* of Ilium to Italy would signify that the city had not been completely destroyed. One small, but important vestige remained intact and so, as a consequence, the people still had a shared identity.

In a similar feat Camillus transfers the patron deity of Veii, Juno, to Rome (5.22.7). This action was important in two ways: First, it proved that the gods favored Rome over Veii despite the fact that there seems to have been a long traditional connection between Aeneas and the city of Veii.¹⁸⁶ Numerous terra cotta figurines, paintings, and inscriptions link the Aeneas tradition to Veii and the rest of the Etruscan world.¹⁸⁷ Whether these occurrences were merely Greek influence upon Etruscan Veii or a rival account of Aeneas' legend, Livy quells any argumentation when his account suggests that the gods were willing to accept Rome and forsake Veii (5.22.5-7):

Dein cum quidam seu spiritu divino tactus seu iuvenali ioco, "Visne Romam ire, Iuno?" dixisset, adnuisse ceteri deam conclamaverunt. Inde fabulae adiectum est vocem quoque dicentis velle auditam ; motam certe sede sua... accepimus levem ac facilem tralatu fuisse, integramque in Aventinum, aeternam sedem suam quo vota Romani dictatoris vocaverant, perlatam, ubi templum ei postea idem qui voverat Camillus dedicavit.

Then when a certain youth, either touched by a divine spirit or in a youthful joke asked, "Would you like to go to Rome, Juno?" the rest exclaimed that the goddess had nodded. Then it was added to the tale that a voice was heard of her saying that she was willing; for sure we hear that she was moved from her seat...and carried lightly and easily, and

¹⁸⁶ Galinsky, *Aeneas*, 136 ff.

¹⁸⁷ Galinsky, *Aeneas*, Figs. 44, 45a, 89, 109, 111, & 116.

that she was set safely upon the Aventine, which the prayers of the Roman dictator had called her eternal seat, and where Camillus later dedicated the temple to her which he had vowed.

The second way in which the transfer of Juno to Rome was important was that it provided, as before, a parallel with the tradition of Aeneas in that Camillus transferred the patron deity from one city to another. So as not to anger Juno, Camillus promises that he will personally provide a home for the goddess should she allow the Romans to sack Veii.

According to Grant¹⁸⁸ this process surrounding Juno's move to Rome, called an *evocatio*, is of Etruscan origin and was useful to Livy in an entirely specific way. That is, the *evocatio* was used by another famous Roman at the destruction of an arch enemy. The Roman was Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus and the enemy was Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War. The connection is made all the more obvious by the fact that Camillus, as dictator, appoints a Publius Cornelius Scipio as his master of horse shortly before the capture of Veii (5.19.2). Furthermore, the report of Camillus' *evocatio* reinforces his transitional status in that he is presented with both mythological and purely historical connections.¹⁸⁹

One final parallel between Aeneas and Camillus can be seen in the tradition that both men were forced into exile despite their piety. With Aeneas, the gods conspired against him to take Troy; Camillus was thrown out of his home by greedy men¹⁹⁰ because of his right actions, not in spite of them; the success that Camillus obtained because of his devotion to the gods made the Roman people jealous and suspicious of his actions (5.25.11-12):

Simul ab religion animos remiserunt, integrant seditionem tribune plebis; incitatur multitudo in omnes principes, ante alios in Camillum; eum praedam Veientanam publicando sacrandoque ad nihilum redegisse.

¹⁸⁸ Grant, *Myths*, 200; See also G. Gustafsson, *Evocatio Deorum* (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2000), 63 ff.

¹⁸⁹ Liebeschuetz, "Religious Position," 53.

¹⁹⁰ Grant, *Myths*, 199; Kraus, "No Second Troy," 274; Gustafsson, *Evocatio*, 91.

As soon as (the senate) relaxed their minds from religious obligation, the tribune of the plebs renewed sedition; the populace was incited against all the leaders, against Camillus foremost; they claimed that he had reduced the Veientine booty to nothing by public and sacred spending.

Despite this, the expulsion of Camillus was one more way in which his life paralleled that of Aeneas, Romulus, and other pre-historical figures.¹⁹¹ It was only after their expulsion that these men came to found their legacies: Aeneas with the Roman people, Romulus with Rome herself, and Camillus with the historical Rome.¹⁹²

Romulus and Camillus

Besides the accounts of their exiles,¹⁹³ the first connection of obvious importance between Camillus and Romulus are their efforts in founding and protecting the city of Rome. It is this connection, perhaps even more so than the link between Camillus and Aeneas, which brings the ring composition of the first pentad to a close. That is, according to Livy's version, Aeneas merely founded the dynasty while Romulus was the true founder of Rome herself (1.7.3).¹⁹⁴ The link with Romulus' actions also finally brings the narrative of Rome from the sphere of legend to that of actual history; if Romulus was the *conditor* the legendary city, Camillus founded the historical one.

When the Gauls sacked the city of Rome at the beginning of the fourth century, the people were protected by retreating to the Capitoline Hill (5.39.9-10). Here they remained and, after being saved by the watchfulness of sacred geese, finally attempted to pay off the invaders with an enormous sum of money. It was at this moment that Camillus, newly appointed dictator,

¹⁹¹ Gustafsson, *Evocatio*, 96.

¹⁹² Like the myth surrounding Aeneas, the legend of Romulus has many different forms. It would, however, be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the many traditions surrounding Romulus; instead, it is sufficient to point out that, by the time of Livy, the legend had been solidified for the most part into canon. See Dion. Hal. 1.72.1-73.5; Müller, *FHG*, III, 93, 22; IV, 297, 6; T.P. Wiseman, *Remus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), 55 ff.

¹⁹³ "The Exile" is a standard motif of many mythological narratives (C.f. Oedipus, Telephus, et al.).

¹⁹⁴ 1.7.3: *Ita solus potitus imperio Romulus; condita urbs conditoris nomine appellata* (And so Romulus was placed alone into power; the city was founded and called by the name of its founder).

arrived on the scene.¹⁹⁵ Camillus receives the name of “a second Romulus and both father and founder of his country” (5.49.7: *...Romulus ac parens patriae conditorque alter urbis...*) for his deeds surrounding the rout of the Gauls. Additionally, after a rousing speech urging the citizenry not to move the capital to Veii, Camillus begins the physical reconstruction of Rome. The new Rome was built quickly without attention to layout or planning and looked like a squatters’ settlement (a possible allusion to the state of the city under the archaic settlement of Romulus) (5.55.5: *Festinatio curam exemit vicos dirigendi, dum omisso sui alienique discrimine in vacuo aedificant*).

One final important connection between Camillus and Romulus was that, after the struggle with the Sabines came to a close, the next military threat to Rome came from the Etruscans. More specifically, the enemy threatening the gates of Rome was none other than Fidenae, the very city that, in effect, began the final war with Veii and dragged Camillus into the history books (1.14.4):

...aliud multo propius atque in ipsis prope portis bellum ortum. Fidenates, nimis vicinas prope se convalescere opes rati, priusquam tantum roboris esset quantum futurum apparebat occupant bellum facere.

...but shortly thereafter and very near the gates of Rome herself war arose. The Fidentates, seeing the power that was growing so close to their own city, decided to make war against Rome at its present strength before it had as much power as was apparent it would have.

Romulus had many dealings with the Veientes as well, suggesting that, at least according to Livy, the two cities were inseparable from the earliest times when it came to their dealings with Rome.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ Here, as with the historicity of Camillus, there is some doubt as to whether the Gauls were defeated as the account suggests or if they merely left (Grant, *Myths*, 209; Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 80).

¹⁹⁶ See Chapter 1.

As dictator, Camillus was ever vigilant to the proper course of action and followed the rules set forth by the leaders of regal Rome.¹⁹⁷ Taking precedent from the good kings of Rome's past (before Tarquinius Superbus took advantage of the system), he acted according to the proper religious rites and always asked for the guidance and permission of the senate before taking extreme action, even when he was dictator and officially beholden to no one. Because of his right action, Camillus was loved by the gods and respected by good men of all rank. However, when greed and jealousy invaded the minds of the men in power and prompted them to exile their savior, the gods punished these greedy men and nearly brought about the destruction of Rome. Fortunately the citizens came to their senses and recalled their pious hero who was their guardian and, at the same time, their personification of conscience and moral uprightness.¹⁹⁸

Moral uprightness and conscience were both major issues within Livy's early history of Rome and, more specifically, the siege of Veii. The historian's accounts of the early years in Rome's history follows closely those examples set forth in epic poetry; not only are the characters larger than life, but the events themselves take on an air of importance not truly suited for a city-state the size of Rome.¹⁹⁹ By the time the final war with Veii is described, Rome and her citizens can be seen, at least as Livy describes them, as exempla of morality and piety towards the gods. The city, as well as the citizenry, provides an illustration of the results of conforming to or breaking from such standards.

More so than the description of the siege of Veii, which tests the moral fiber of the Roman citizenry, Livy, in his fifth book, tests the moral fiber of Rome's leading citizen and savior,

¹⁹⁷ Miles, "Maiores," 199-204.

¹⁹⁸ Gustafsson, *Evocatio*, 95.

¹⁹⁹ Allen, "Livy as Literature," 253: "He has used literary art to create a specific effect, treating the raw material provided by the tradition with something not unlike the freedom of a poet who incorporates the work of his predecessors into a new structure."

Camillus.²⁰⁰ The fate of Rome, both in the sphere of humanity and the divine, is placed upon the shoulders of Camillus, the Dictator. As Gustafsson writes:²⁰¹

Livy's story about the conquest of Veii cannot therefore be understood without an analysis of the figure of Camillus and his role in the story of the events... Thus, the place of legendary material in the story of the conquest of Veii must be viewed in the light of the actual historical importance of this conquest.

The “actual historical importance” surrounding Veii was, as we have seen, limited at best (Veii was for the most part defeated after Fidenae was finally annexed by Rome). Livy purposefully exaggerated the events surrounding the siege; the ten year timeline, portents, omens, plagues, and even tactics paralleled the siege of Troy to a large degree. Why?

To begin with, the first pentad of the *Ab Urbe Condita* deals with tales of mythology and legend; it only comes to recorded history near the end of the fifth book. To equate the actions of Romans in the first pentad with those of the heroes made, as Livy states in his introduction, “the beginnings of the city more venerable” (1.1.7: *...ut miscendo humana divinis primordia urbium augustiora faciat*). This was nothing new; by the middle of the first century B.C.E., Roman authors and poets had been equating the history of Rome with epic for nearly two centuries.²⁰² On top of this, when Aeneas was finally accepted as the ancestral Roman by the third century B.C.E., the epic tradition surrounding Rome's foundation was extended, by association, to the age of Homer.²⁰³

Even though Livy was writing a history instead of epic, the tradition was well established; to create a narrative that was similar to the representation of his epic predecessors would have only accentuated his accuracy within the legendary tradition. Livy followed closely the example of epic because of the genre's focus on characters (and the ways in which their traits affected their

²⁰⁰ Forsythe, *A Critical History*, 255.

²⁰¹ Gustafsson, *Evocatio*, 96.

²⁰² Naevius, Ennius, et al.

²⁰³ A detailed examination of the Aeneas myth can be found in Galinsky (*Aeneas*, 19ff.).

place in history) as opposed works such as the *De Re Publica* of Cicero which focused political ideas. As Cornell writes:²⁰⁴

Cicero's narrative is set in a kind of vacuum, the various constitutional innovations and changes occurring against a background that is simply taken for granted... What he was doing was outlining the essential features of the principal forms of government, and the changes to which they are subject, using the historical example of Rome; it is essentially a theoretical discussion within a historical framework. He therefore excluded all kinds of things that would have been included in a history – most obviously the legendary prehistory... But this historical perspective was not relevant to Cicero's purpose in the *De Re Publica*, and would have distracted the reader's attention from the main point of the argument.

Conversely, the historical perspective and how it could be transposed onto modern affairs was the main point of Livy's argument. Livy's representation of history (and pre-history) was not placed in a vacuum as it was the development over time which provided a continuation of the paradigms implicit in his narrative. Finally, within Livy's representation of the development of Roman history, the quotation of epic language and events would have furthered the idea that there was a break in that development between pre-history and the history that the career of Camillus represented.²⁰⁵

Secondly, because the sense of mythology and legend from the first five books needed closure and a viable sense of transition to the rest of his work, Livy needed a hero from the legendary period to carry his exploits into the historical era of Rome. As Camillus was an historical character,²⁰⁶ Livy needed his epic character to carry over the ancient values of heroism and piety into the historical period so that the effects of such values could be shown in their proper, historical place. Historical Rome could not be disconnected from her mythological history if she was to remain eternal. Thus, Livy crafted an epic siege out of Veii so that Camillus

²⁰⁴ T.J. Cornell, "Cicero on the Origins of Rome," *Cicero's Republic* (London: Institute of Classical Studies), 55-6.

²⁰⁵ Luce, "Design," 295.

²⁰⁶ As I have stated before, this is a debatable fact; instead, it must be stressed that, to Livy and his readers, Camillus was an historical character.

could have past heroics (as well as the unyielding piety for which he was exiled) in his favor when he saved Rome from the Gauls. It was not Veii that made Camillus a hero; instead, it was Camillus that pulled Veii into the realm of epic.

CONCLUSION

Camillus was the most important character in Livy's fifth book. He was also, it can be suggested, the most important character in the early history of Rome for two reasons.²⁰⁷ First, Camillus founded the new, historical city of Rome. After the sack of the Gauls, the Rome of Romulus lay in ruins; buildings had been destroyed, elders had been murdered and, more importantly (at least to Livy), the records of early Rome had been burned. Also, the greedy populace of Rome had been punished for condemning the pious actions of Camillus. The second reason Camillus can be considered the most important character of the first pentad is that he personified and acted according to the institutions that might have been destroyed by the Gauls. Camillus understood the need for the moral institutions handed down to his generation by its ancestors as well as the sacred nature of the site of Rome itself.²⁰⁸ These standards were associated to such a degree with Camillus because Livy had an ulterior motive within his narrative.

The events described by Livy surrounding Camillus are consistent with the use of history as a source of mores and cultural education (Quint. 10.1.31):²⁰⁹

Est enim proxima poetis, et quodam modo carmen solutum est, et scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum, totumque opus non ad actum rei pugnamque praesentem sed ad memoriam posteritatis et ingenii famam componitur.

(History) is rather close to the poets, and is, in a way, a poem which is free from meter and written for reading, not for proving anything; the whole work is not composed as a journal of proceedings or present warfare but as a record for posterity and for the fame of its creator.

²⁰⁷ Forsythe, *A Critical History*, 255.

²⁰⁸ Miles, "Majores," 199.

²⁰⁹ Liebeschuetz, "Religious Position," 51; Kraus, "No Second Troy," 270; Gustafsson, *Evocatio*, 97: "Livy finds the main explanations of Roman success or failure in the moral status of the human actors."

The life and career of Camillus parallels the successes and failures of Rome as a whole. A pious Camillus defeats Veii in a spectacular gain for the Roman state just as an greedy populace exiles their leader and brings ruin to itself; after the city is saved from the Gauls, Camillus keeps the sanctity of Rome intact by forbidding the capital from being moved to Veii.²¹⁰ In each of these events, the honor of Camillus protects the city of Rome.²¹¹ The episodes surrounding the career of Camillus all focus on the idea that a corrupt populace is saved from ruin by the actions of a pious leader.

This distinction, a powerful leader protecting the citizenry from its own vices, is important when viewing history as a venue for instruction (Quint. 10.1.34):

Est et alius ex historiis usus, et is quidem maximus...ex cognitione rerum exemplorumque... hoc potentiora quod ea sola criminibus odii et gratiae vacant.

There is another use for history, and it is an important one...as (it presents) affairs out of an understanding of events and *exempla*...that are more powerful because it is these things alone that are free from the charges of hatred or favor.

As such, it is not a coincidence that Camillus' most laudable trait was his strict adherence to tradition and morality. It is also not a coincidence that Camillus bridges the gap between two periods in Roman tradition: the legendary and the historical.²¹² When this distinction is made, there is a marked parallel between another Roman figure who bridges the gap between two periods in Roman history. This other figure also saved Rome from the barbarians and rebuilt her. This time, however, the gap being bridged was that of Republic and what would become empire; the transitional figure between these two eras was Augustus.²¹³

²¹⁰ Liebeshuetz, "Religious Position," 50; Kraus, "No Second Troy," 273.

²¹¹ Liebeshuetz, "Religious Position," 49.

²¹² As opposed to Aeneas and Romulus who belonged solely to myth or legend.

²¹³ Even if no one knew that Octavianus would become the first emperor, the fact that there had be three civil wars and three dictators in the span of about 50 years provided a solid impetus for Livy's description of a good dictator.

While Livy was writing the first pentad,²¹⁴ Augustus (then Octavianus) was quickly becoming that for which his uncle had been assassinated. The title was different, *primus inter pares* instead of dictator, but the position was the same. If the purpose of history is to exhibit moral values and the consequences of not adhering to those ideals, what better way is there to give counsel and warnings to a man that has the power to ignore such admonitions if he wished. Just as Quintilian claims that history is a good source of exempla that are separated from any bias (10.1.34), it can, in the same way, be a representation of the ideals held by the learned populace. These ideals, when they are presented in a narrative separated by many centuries also remove themselves from any current political differences.²¹⁵ In a way, the depiction of Camillus has two uses. First, it provides a model for the behavior of a just ruler as Camillus never exploits his position of dictator.²¹⁶ Secondly, it shows the results of jealousy by those whom a benevolent ruler is attempting to protect.

When these two uses are taken into account, the first pentad of the *Ab Urbe Condita* can be likened, in effect, to the panegyrics that were presented to the emperors of the first century C.E.²¹⁷ Such documents would be dangerous to their creators and, at the same time, useful as they provided a manner of discussion and debate with a ruler in a position of supreme power. Griffin claims:²¹⁸

The senatorial criteria of a good Princeps were very subtle. Frequent adulatory speeches gave senators practice in finding the laudable or odious element in any action of any Princeps...The powers of the magistrates clearly do not matter in themselves. The Emperor must not meddle with these powers; but free decisions of the Senate are

²¹⁴ There is much speculation as to the date of Livy's first pentad which date the work from shortly before the battle at Actium in 31 B.C.E. to before Augustus closed the gates of Janus for a second time in 25 B.C.E. (Cf. Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 48 n. 149). For my purposes, the important idea is that Augustus was in charge of the government.

²¹⁵ Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 6: "...it is not the events themselves that Livy sets before the eyes of his audience, but the visible traces that they have left behind."

²¹⁶ Miles, "Maiores," 207.

²¹⁷ B. Radice, "Pliny and the 'Panegyricus,'" *Greece & Rome* 15, no. 2 (1968): 166; M. Griffin, *Seneca* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 10.

²¹⁸ Griffin, *Seneca*, 122-23.

praiseworthy no matter what their content. Tacitus (*Ann.* 4.32.1) had envied the historians of the Republic who could report ‘discordias consulum adversum tribunos’.

While not addressed as specifically, the concepts presented in the *Ab Urbe Condita* surrounding the rule of Camillus can undoubtedly be referenced to events in the middle of first century B.C.E.

A man as astute as Augustus would not have missed the references to his own rule in Livy’s work as they were both numerous and obvious. One such parallel between Augustus and Camillus was the prayer to Apollo before the battle at Veii. Anyone who had read the first pentad would have realized that there was not a need to hurry on to more modern affairs as Livy feared; the events of Livy’s early history were themselves quotations of more recent events.²¹⁹ The prayer would have immediately brought to mind the similar prayer by Octavian on the eve of the battle of Actium against M. Antonius and Cleopatra (who, in a strange coincidence, ruled the wealthiest nation outside of Rome).²²⁰

Another glaring connection between Augustus and the leaders of Livy’s history can be seen not in his innovations but in his steadfast adherence to certain concepts that were apparent in the ancients (as opposed to M. Antonius’ apparent acceptance of Egyptian customs).²²¹ Aeneas’ piety helped him survive the wrath of the gods and found what would become the Roman dynasty; Romulus, with his strict moral fiber and unyielding devotion to principles (unyielding even to his murdered brother), founded the city and set up the *pomerium*; even the kings of Rome instituted civil and religious statutes that would be held for generations. With Camillus, there was a change in what being a *conditor* signified. No longer was innovation the key aspect of

²¹⁹ Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 222.

²²⁰ Cf. 5.23.1: *Hic Veiorum occasus fuit, urbis opulentissimae Etrusci nominis...*(Thus was the fall of Veii, the most wealthy city of Etruscan name...).

²²¹ Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 71.

foundation; instead, the foundation carried out by Camillus was the strict adherence to certain customs that could not be changed.²²²

The strongest example in this can be seen with Camillus' speech to end Book V and begin Roman history. In his speech, Camillus staunchly forbids, on the punishment of damnation, that the capital be moved from Rome to Veii (5.51.1-54.7). Romulus had laid out the sacred *pomerium* and created the Roman state in name and place. Should the capital be moved, the Roman state and her people would cease to exist. Camillus is, therefore, more of a refounder than an actual *conditor* in that he protects the foundations laid by his predecessors.²²³

Augustus, along with his actions, falls in line with this concept and seems to take Livy's advice (such as it was represented by the actions of Camillus). His victory over Antonius, that vile man who, as the rumors (no doubt created by supporters of Octavianus) held, wanted to move the capital to Alexandria, shows that Octavianus held the foundation of Romulus sacred.²²⁴ He also followed the precedent of Camillus with his building projects that renovated so many of Rome's temples (4.20.7) and brought about an end to the *neglegentia deorum* which was so prominent in the Late Republic.²²⁵ Again, as with Camillus, and, in a certain respect because of him, the refoundation of Rome was not concerned with the creation of anything new. Instead, it was the strict adherence to the limits upon innovation set by a pious and loyal Camillus that defined Augustus as a new *conditor* of Rome.

²²² Miles, "Maiores," 204, 206: "Livy's "objective" designation of certain Romans as *conditores* is a vehicle by which he appropriates the past in the service of his own political ideals."

²²³ Miles, "Maiores," 199.

²²⁴ Miles, "Maiores," 207; Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 221.

²²⁵ Miles, "Maiores," 207.

Accordingly, it would seem that the actions of Camillus, as recorded by Livy were, in fact, political discussions about what it meant to be a good dictator or tyrant.²²⁶ Camillus was a pious character and loved by men and gods just as Octavianus would become “someone to be revered.” Because of the inconsistency in dating Livy’s first pentad, however, the relationship to the rule of Augustus is a bit uncertain. This, in turn, makes the pedagogical nature of Livy’s *opus* that much more apparent. If the work post-dates Octavianus taking the name Augustus, the first pentad can be directly linked to the propaganda of the Emperor; that is, Camillus can be said to derive his qualities from Augustus. If, however, the work was completed before 27 B.C.E. when Octavianus became Augustus, Livy can be said to have been working towards much more independent and universal ends.²²⁷ The answer is, as with most enigmas, probably somewhere in the middle.

There is no doubt that Livy was, through his work, speaking to Augustus in one way or another. At the same time, however, he was speaking beyond Augustus. Livy knew that his republic was changing. It was his duty as a historian to provide the development and relevance of certain ideals that were needed for competent and just leadership so that the misfortunes of the Roman people under the Tarquins would not be repeated and the vices of his own day might come to an end. As such, even if the historian was working directly for the propaganda machine of Augustus, he understood that the concepts he was relating through the actions of heroes such as Camillus would be relevant for all eternity just as they had been relevant *ab urbe condita*. If Augustus was even partially drawing upon the advice of Livy given through the guise of Camillus, the importance of the first pentad of the *Ab Urbe Condita* reaches new heights; Livy

²²⁶ Miles (“Majores,” 207) and Feldherr (*Spectacle*, 18) claim that it was more specifically a direct acquiescence of Augustus’ rule. This seems to be true in spite of the fact that, for all appearances, Livy was a staunch supporter of Ciceronian language and politics.

²²⁷ Feldherr, *Spectacle*, 19.

not only instructed Augustus on how to be a good ruler, he also provided a paradigm for all subsequent emperors who took pride in their comparisons to Augustus.

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