WHERE WOULD ANYONE RATHER BE THAN DES MOINES IN DECEMBER?

THE IMPACT OF FRONTLOADING ON THE CAMPAIGN SCHEDULES OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

by

JARED ALLMAN

(Under the Direction of Paul-Henri Gurian)

ABSTRACT

With the development of a large and early Super Tuesday, it seems to reason that candidates have changed where they go about campaigning. It is theorized that larger and earlier Super Tuesdays should increase the importance candidates place on Iowa and New Hampshire, not decrease, because of the effects of momentum and the difficulty of resource acquisition. The theory is tested by examining the campaign schedules of presidential candidates during the invisible primary from 1988 through 2008. The model cannot rule out the null hypothesis, and explanations are provided as to why this could be, ranging from an incorrect idea to lack of distinct data. A second model is tested, which includes squared terms for the main independent variables to test whether candidate behavior is being influenced in opposite directions. This model is statistically significant, and its implications are examined.

INDEX WORDS: Presidential Nomination Campaigns, Primaries, Candidate Strategy, Frontloading, Super Tuesday, Invisible Primary

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DEDICATION

To Mom and Dad.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> "No serious candidate will have the luxury of picking and choosing among the early primaries. To propose such a strategy would cost that candidate delegate votes and increase the possibility of being lost in the crowd."

-Hamilton Jordan's August 1974 Strategy Memo for Jimmy Carter's 1976 Presidential Campaign[1]

In 1976, a little known former governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, used victories in the first contest, the Iowa Caucuses, and the first primary in New Hampshire, to help win the Democratic nomination for president over a crowded field of better known candidates. Ever since, presidential candidates have either used the Carter playbook to try to win their party's nomination or been laughed at (see Giuliani, Rudy) for not.

In Hamilton's August 1974 Memo (which itself was an updated version of his November 1972 Memo), he laid out a number of key points about the nature of the primary calendar, observing that, "The press shows an exaggerated interest in the early primaries as they represent the first confrontation between candidates, their contrasting strategies and styles, which the press has been writing about for two years," and, "The sequence or chronological order of primaries are important for obvious reasons. Good or poor showings can have a profound and irrevocable impact on succeeding primaries and a candidate's abilities to raise funds and recruit workers."

Looking back 35 years, it is obvious that Jordan was right concerning the nature of the early contests. Only once has a candidate lost both the Iowa Caucuses and New

1 All quotations from Hamilton's Memo are taken from Jules Witcover's *Marathon* (1977), chapter 10: Carter Adjusts His Plans, p. 132-138.

Hampshire Primary and gone on to win their party's nomination.[2] Iowa and New Hampshire are very important in who wins the presidential nominations of the two major parties. If they were not viewed as such in 1976 (and four major Democratic candidates, Senators Jackson and Church and Governors Wallace and Brown skipped both Iowa and New Hampshire), they certainly were by 1980, and they definitely are now (even the Giuliani campaign spent a significant amount of time there, while claiming to be skipping those contests). However, there is a passage in Jordan's Memo, while mostly true, deserves further study:

> "In a national campaign to win the Democratic nomination for president, there are three major factors to be considered: the relative size of the delegations to the Democratic National Convention; the sequence of the primaries and the sequence of the delegate-selection process in the non-primary states; and our own campaign strategy. Two of these are constant: size and sequence. Only one is variable."

While this statement is mostly, but not absolutely, true for a given election cycle (several states change the date of their contest within a cycle, most recently in the 2008 cycle when Florida and Michigan moved from March to January against the wishes of both parties), it is certainly not true when comparing different election cycles. In 1976 most primaries were held in April or later. In 2008, over half the country had voted by the end of February. The election calendar that exists currently looks nothing like 1976, and only has passing resemblances to even 1996, except that Iowa is still the first caucus and New Hampshire is still the first primary.

Here lies an interesting question. Campaigns adjust strategies to the conditions

2 That one candidate, Bill Clinton in 1992, benefited from Iowa Senator Tom Harkin' s presence in the race. All candidates on the Democratic side skipped Iowa that year, thus his loss (and Harkin's victory) had little bearing on the race.

they run in, whether it is office, opponent, or electorate. However, now a situation exists where a perceived constant, the date of election, is ever changing. How have campaigns reacted to this?

There have been two major changes to the nomination calendar since 1976, and they are related to each other. The first is frontloading. Frontloading occurs when the beginning of an election year sees a large number of states holding their primary or caucus. This is the result of states moving up the date of their primary or caucus. For example, in 2008 twenty-five states held their Democratic contest by February. In 1976 three states (Iowa, Mississippi, and Oklahoma) had held their contest by that date. The more states that move their contest to earlier in the year, the more frontloaded the calendar is. The second is the advent of "Super Tuesday." While a particular day in earlier elections was called "Super Tuesday" (or, in 1976, Super-Bowl Tuesday), it bears little resemblance to what we know it as today. Early on, the day saw a few states (no more than the six in 1976) hold their contests. However, in 1988, the southern and border states (except South Carolina) all held their primary on the same day, March 8th. They were joined by a few other northern and western states to create a massive single-day election early in the calendar. While the concept failed in its primary goal (to have the Democratic Party nominate a more moderate candidate), and it is questionable whether they succeeded on their secondary goal (greater attention from the candidates in comparison to Iowa and New Hampshire), the format has remained: Super Tuesday is a date early in the calendar where a large number of states hold their nomination contest and it is almost always the case that more delegates are up for grabs on Super Tuesday than on any other day in the cycle.

Over the past twenty years, as it has become the case that states late in the calendar have little influence in the selection of a nominee (since he[3] has usually wrapped up the nomination well before the last contest), later states have wanted to move up in the calendar, to have more influence. They have banded together to create an enticing proposition for candidates, a single day where the nomination can be all but won. Thus the mutual forces of frontloading and Super Tuesday have created a system in which the electoral phase of the nomination cycle could end within a month, compared to the five-month epic journey that took place in 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1984.

Given that the calendar has changed, it is reasonable to assume that candidates have changed their strategy with it. The questions are twofold: How and to what effect? This paper seeks to discover how and address theories as to why.

3 While presidential nominations are not restricted to men, all 45 Democratic nominees for President and all 39 Republican nominees for President have been men.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Candidates

There are two types of candidates who run for president. The first group is office seekers, people whose primary goal is to win the election (Aldrich 1980). Within this group are two subcategories: big shots and long shots (Gurian 1986, 1993a, Gurian and Haynes 1995). Big shots are candidates who have a sizable amount of support, either in the polls, in fundraising, or demonstrated in the state primaries, while long shots are the candidates struggling to gain that amount of support. Big shots and long shots, in the early, non-frontloaded era, acted differently, with the long shots trying to gain momentum and the big shots trying to win delegates. This makes a lot of sense for both groups, since the objective of all the office seeking candidates is to win the nomination. Long shots need early success to gain positive media attention, which in turn should lead to more donations of time and money, and thus resulting in a greater ability to gain votes. Big shots, already possessing those resources, can move onto achieving the primary goal: winning a majority of the delegates which will vote at the party convention.

This is not to say that big shots skip early states, or are not trying to hard win them. They most certainly are campaigning hard in the early states. The difference between big and long shots is in the defeat. Long shots cannot survive early losses. Big shots can survive, though in a state that is not usually conductive to success. It would make sense for both types of candidates to put their resources into Iowa and New Hampshire. Big shots can also put resources long shots do not have into other places.

A competing theory (Kessel 1992) is that every office seeking candidate starts

with the media attention strategy, and as the primary season moves along candidates who survive move on to delegate acquisition. This theory makes more sense in a frontloaded system than in a more back-loaded system, though the impact might be different for long shots and big shots. Big shots may continue to build both a national campaign as well as campaigns in Iowa and New Hampshire, while long shot candidates would be likely to scrap what national campaign they might be able to construct and instead put all or almost all of their resources into Iowa and New Hampshire.[4] While this resource pressure might be felt by long shots more so than big shots, it should impact both types of candidates. With a quasi-national primary early in the calendar, the process can stretch the resources of even the best supported candidates thin. For example, Hillary Clinton raised over $100 million in 2007, and after her 3rd place showing in Iowa, the campaign was so short on money that Clinton had to loan her campaign millions of dollars to keep it afloat. On the other hand, victory early can overcome a resource problem. John Kerry had to donate millions of dollars to his campaign to stay competitive even before Iowa, while frontrunner Howard Dean's fundraising operation went so well he became the first Democrat to opt out of the public financing system. However, Kerry won the nomination, while Dean did not even make it to Super Tuesday after losing every state prior to Super Tuesday.[5] Goldstein (1979) found that candidates who increase their standing in the polls see their fundraising pick-up, while candidates who are losing see drops in new donations. This cycle was theorized by Aldrich (1980). He suggested that winning begets momentum which begets resources which begets more winning, and so on. In a

4 Such as Chris Dodd in 2008. Dodd, a Senator from Connecticut since 1987, and a Congressman from that state from 1981 to 1987, whose father was a Senator from Connecticut, moved his family to Iowa in 2007 for the Iowa Caucuses. Dodd spent 87% of his campaigning time in Iowa, which is the highest total for any candidate since 1988. For his effort, he finished 7th with .04% of the vote.

5 After Dean dropped out of the race, he won his home state of Vermont on Super Tuesday. It was the only state John Kerry did not carry that day.

frontloaded system, this snowball effect can roll directly into Super Tuesday with fewer opportunities for it to be halted.

However, other studies have found mixed effects for candidates who have early success. Sorauf (1988) and Wilcox (1991) show that a frontloaded system makes it difficult for campaigns to plan on (and use if) an increase in donations. With the advent of internet donations to campaigns during the 2000s, allowing for the near instant gain of funds following victories (rather than waiting for the checks to arrive and get cashed), this problem of not being able to effectively use newly gained funds in near contests should be declining. Mutz (1995) demonstrated that the relationship between winning and money is not as obvious as originally believed. While most candidates are likely to see funds roll in and dry up as primary results come in, those with a very loyal following (Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson are two examples) can see donations increase when they are losing. These studies came before an increase in the number of candidates willing and able to self-finance their own campaigns; however these candidates (Steve Forbes, John Kerry, and Mitt Romney), who should be the least concerned about resource acquisition, did not demonstrate different tendencies in regards to Iowa and New Hampshire relative to their competitors, and the unsuccessful self fundraising candidates were winnowed out just like the unsuccessful cash-strapped candidates.

Iowa and New Hampshire

Aldrich (1980) found that candidates are likely to campaign in three types of states when there is a two-person field. The first is states where candidates are evenly matched. The second is states with a lot of delegates, and the third are states that hold early primaries. Brams and Davis (1982) agreed that candidates in a two-person field

would concentrate on early states. However, in multi-candidate fields what is to be expected is unknown. Aldrich suspects that candidates campaign in most contests because the multi-candidate field makes the threshold of victory decline, making more states winnable than in a two-person field.[6] However this is more speculation than fact and mostly based on Jimmy Carter's highly successful "run everywhere" 1976 campaign, in comparison to his opponents more limited strategies.

In this regard, neither Iowa nor New Hampshire are states with many delegates. Neither state would seem to have an intrinsic ability to attract evenly matched candidates than any other state. Iowa is a caucus state, not a primary, and repeated studies show that candidates spend their money in primaries rather than caucuses (Aldrich 1980, Rice 1982, Gurian 1990, Gurian 1993b). However, these two states are almost always the first contest (Iowa) and first primary (New Hampshire), which fits the bill for attracting candidates.[7]

Being the first contests make up for being small states, and in Iowa's case also makes up for being a caucus, though a high-turnout caucus.[8] Media attention to these two contests is higher than any other state. Robinson and Sheehan (1980) found that New Hampshire and Iowa combined for 28% of all coverage of the 1976 nomination campaign for both parties, and Bartels found that about 30% of the 1984 campaign was focused on

6 In 1976, Washington Senator Scoop Jackson won the Massachusetts primary, while Alabama Governor George Wallace came in third. Massachusetts was (and still is) one of the most liberal states in the country, and Jackson and Wallace were two of the more conservative Democrats in the field. However, with eight serious candidates on the ballot, it only took 23% to win.

7 In some years, other states have attempted to jump Iowa and New Hampshire in holding their contests. New Hampshire always reacts to a primary jumping ahead by moving up their own. Iowa will also move up if the state trying to hold an early caucus is not being penalized by the national parties. In both 1988 and 1996 Iowa was not the first contest for the Republicans (Michigan and Alaska were, respectively), but both states were penalized by the RNC and most of the major candidates boycotted the vote.

8 Howard Baker in 1980 called Iowa "the functional equivalent of a primary," a truly apt description (Gurian 1986 and Bartels 1988).

these two early states. Numerous other studies (Robinson and McPherson 1977, Arterton 1978a and 1978b, Bicker 1978, Marshall 1981 and 1983, Adams 1987, Brady 1989, Castle 1991, Robinson and Lichter 1991) have also found that Iowa and New Hampshire are treated substantially differently that other states because of their location on the calendar.

Thus, it makes sense for candidates to devote their resources to Iowa and New Hampshire. Both are relatively small states (Iowa is larger but also holds a lower-turnout caucus) with few expensive media markets, allowing for candidates with few resources to compete on a more-level playing field than in most other places. The media attention generated from these two states is greatly outsized relative to their population or delegate counts. Candidates who take advantage of this see greater coverage of their campaign (Patterson 1980, Adams 1987, Lichter, et al. 1988, Buell 1991 and 1996, Ross 1992), and those who do not see coverage of their campaign become negative or disappear (Robinson and Sheehan 1983, Ross 1992).[9]

As Aldrich described in 1980, the modern presidential campaign has three phases. In the first, the invisible primary, candidates go around the country seeking to gain money, volunteers, endorsers, and most importantly supporters. In the second, the early contests, the voters (with help from the media) determine which candidates deserve to move on. The remaining contenders are "winnowed" out. Unable to demonstrate enough support at the polls, their finances dry up, volunteers stop showing up, and all that is left is to call the press conference to end the campaign. The final phase, the end game, is the quest of the remaining contenders to gain the necessary delegates to win the nomination.

9 Robinson and Sheehan referred to this as "The Deathwatch," a name that has stuck. The example they use is Bob Dole's 1980 campaign, where 75% of CBS News stories in early 1980 about Dole's campaign referred to it as "dying or dead."

In 1980, when Aldrich wrote *Before the Convention*, this entire process could extend into the party convention period (like the Republicans did in 1976), or at least the end of the primary schedule (such as the Democrats that same year). The winnowing phase could last months. More recently, with the noticeable exception of 2008 on the Democratic side, the end game usually wraps up with a sweep (or near sweep) on Super Tuesday, while the winnowing phase rarely extends more than a few weeks past New Hampshire. For example, in 2004, the six top contenders on the Democratic side were down to two three weeks after Kerry's win in New Hampshire. In 2008, only Obama, Clinton, and Edwards made it to Nevada, the next contest following New Hampshire.

So there are two distinct, but not all together separate, forces at work. The first is momentum. This is what candidates wish to obtain. The second is winnowing, where the winners are separated from the losers. One of these processes, momentum, is reversible. Candidates can acquire momentum and then lose it[10] (Aldrich 1980, Bartels 1988, Norrander 1993); winnowing is not, at least for those on the outs.[11] Norrander concludes that it is winnowing, and not momentum, that determines who wins the nomination (1993 and 1996). The momentum driven candidate, as well as the frontrunner, is able to survive the early contests, but it is the frontrunner who eventually wins out when the challenger's momentum stalls. The best organized of the "big shot" candidates, as well as the momentum candidate, make it through the winnowing phase, and if those two are one and the same, the contest is over. Norrander also states that winnowing deciding the nominee, rather than momentum, should be exacerbated in a frontloaded system, since momentum

10 They can also gain it back after losing it. Momentum is a dynamic process that ebbs and flows.

11 However, candidates "winnowed in," to borrow a phrase from Fred Harris, can eventually be winnowed out. Harris, after finishing third in the 1976 Iowa Caucuses, stated, "Iowa started the winnowing-out process, and we've been winnowed in" (Witcover 1977). After finishing 4th in New Hampshire and 5th in Massachusetts, he had been winnowed out.

is precarious and the frontrunner should have ample resources to contest the large states. However, in recent elections momentum driven candidacies have been able to overcome the frontrunner, such as John Kerry over Howard Dean in 2004, John McCain over Mitt Romney in 2008, and Barack Obama over Hillary Clinton in 2008.

The Other 48 States

Thus, Iowa and New Hampshire are states that both candidates and the media pay a lot of attention to, and this attention began long before the advent of frontloading of Super Tuesday. In regards to New Hampshire, this attention predates the modern primary system. This attention is not lost on other states, who having seen the attention Iowa and New Hampshire gets, have moved up their contests. In 1976, California and New Jersey held their primaries on the last day of the calendar, June 8th. In 2008, they both held them on February 5th, the earliest allowed date by both parties. In 1976, the midpoint of the calendar (the day where half of all delegates had been selected) was in May. In 2008 it was in February.

This process of frontloading the calendar began in earnest in 1988, with the advent of a modern Super Tuesday. Prior to 1988, Super Tuesday was used to describe a day when a few states went to the polls to select their delegates. In 1976, it was used for the three states that voted on June 8th. In 1980 it described three states on March 11th, and in 1984 it was for five states on March 13th. However, in 1988 all southern and border states (save South Carolina) decided to hold primaries all on the same day. They were joined by Washington and a few New England states to create a gigantic Super Tuesday, a day where more than one-third of all delegates were for the taking. The reasoning behind this was to take advantage of three things candidates and the media pay attention to:

Primaries, early states, and large numbers of delegates (Stanley and Hadley 1987). Super Tuesday 1988 was, to that point, the largest gathering of delegates and states on a single day in the modern era by far, and would not be surpassed until 2008.

The effects of Super Tuesday were mixed, however. While there was substantial coverage for the event, on the individual state level coverage actually declined, due to the fact that large states like Texas and Florida, crowded out coverage for smaller states that previously only had to compete with a few, other small states for election coverage for that day (Hadley and Stanley 1989, Norrander 1992, Gurian 1993c). Candidate reaction was also mixed. While some candidates spent significant time in those Super Tuesday states (specifically Al Gore and Jesse Jackson), most continued to campaign predominantly in Iowa and New Hampshire (Hadley and Stanley 1989, Norrander 1992). The lessons from Super Tuesday also were mixed. A major goal of the southern states in 1988 was to influence to Democratic Party nominee in a more moderate and southern direction. However, Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts was able to translate the momentum from his New Hampshire victory into wins in five southern states, including Texas and Florida.

There might be an important lesson here, just as there was in the much smaller Super Tuesday of 1984. That year, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, who previously ran George McGovern's successful 1972 nomination campaign, turned the momentum form an upset victory in New Hampshire into victory in Florida and near wins in Alabama and Georgia. This, despite the fact that Hart had practically no campaign in those southern states. The lesson is that momentum can overcome a resource and ideological disadvantage.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A Logical Theory

While Super Tuesday 1988 did not turn out as their creators intended, the idea of having an election early in the calendar where a lot of states participate has taken what seems to be a permanent home. Even though following Super Tuesdays were smaller than their 1988 predecessor, they were still significantly larger than anything previous to them. This logically follows the concept that the earlier a state holds its contest, the more likely it will get media coverage. The more likely it will get media coverage, the more enticing it becomes to candidates. The more candidates spend their time there, the more important that state becomes in deciding who the eventual presidential nominees, and subsequently the next president, will be.

Following this logic, the impact of New Hampshire and Iowa should be in decline, since media coverage should be shifting to the larger states that have moved up in the calendar. If the three items that attract media and candidates are type of election, time on the calendar, and size of election, and two of those three are relatively constant (type of election and size of election), a move earlier in the calendar should mean more coverage. Following this, if some states are gaining media coverage (in theory), others must be losing it, and the two logical candidates are the ones which have the most to lose, Iowa and New Hampshire.

Secondly, if Iowa and New Hampshire are losing their luster, candidates should be treating them differently. The overwhelming reason candidates compete there is not for the pittance of delegates they offer, but for the momentum they would receive. However,

with less media coverage should be less momentum.

Following this, if Norrander's argument is true, that the momentum candidate loses to the frontrunner, we should see frontrunners spend most of their time in the large states, building up organization and name recognition, getting ready to do battle with the candidate that emerges from the early contests.

All of this suggests that frontloading the calendar, creating a large and early Super Tuesday, should be decreasing the amount of attention that Iowa and New Hampshire should get. Their momentum bonus should be declining, and frontrunners should be building up a firewall that no candidate without large amounts of resources can overcome.

The Actual Theory

However, this paper takes the complete opposite view: That candidates view Iowa and New Hampshire more important now because of how early and large Super Tuesday has gotten. It mainly follows from several key points.

Momentum's eventual end is not as significant. As demonstrated, momentum ends. However, when momentum begins is very important. Imagine a presidential contest as a basketball game. In practically every game, one team will go on a "run." Their shots are going in, the opposition keeps turning the ball over and is unable to score, and it looks like one team is vastly superior to the other. However, eventually that run ends, and the game reverts back to where it was before. The earlier a run takes place in a game, the more time the other team has to stop it, come back, and even make a run on its own. However, a run late in a game between two evenly-matched teams almost always results in victory. Winning Iowa and/or New Hampshire is like going on that run. The press

coverage is great, the money is pouring in, and things look great. However, the opposition is looking to break that string, either with a well-placed fire wall campaign in an upcoming state, or a new advertising strategy, or a leaked story, or even with their opposition committing a serious error. In a back-loaded era, winning Iowa and New Hampshire was like a basketball team going on a run in the first quarter. It looks great on the scoreboard, but it is not insurmountable. In 1984, Walter Mondale had months to overcome Gary Hart's win in New Hampshire. However, in a frontloaded system, winning time moves a lot closer to the beginning of the process. It is like a basketball team going on a run in the 4th quarter. A whole lot of things now have to break right to make a comeback. In 2004, Howard Dean had five weeks to overcome John Kerry's win in New Hampshire. In 2008, Barack Obama's victory in Iowa, and Hillary Clinton's defeat there, changed the dynamics of the race. By the time Clinton finally slowed down Obama's momentum in late February, Obama had secured a practically insurmountable delegate lead.

Resources from momentum matter more. In general elections, the major party's candidates are guaranteed a large sum of money to spend, larger than the amount they could raise on their own, which is why they accept it.[12] However, in the general election the candidates fight only over a dozen or so states. Modern Super Tuesdays can be as large or even larger than the general election battlefield, and fought without the tens of millions of dollars granted by the federal government. Even the best funded campaigns struggle to compete on this large scale. Two things are needed to help in this predicament. The first is more resources, which would result from winning in the early states. The

12 With the exception of Barack Obama in 2008, who declined the general election matching funds. Whether this is the beginning of the end of public financing of general election presidential campaigns or an aberration remains to be seen.

second is the large amount of free (and usually positive) press coverage winning candidates get. Both these items involve winning early, and Iowa and New Hampshire are the two earliest states.

1) Hillary Clinton raised over $100 million dollars in 2007, the largest sum totaled by a candidate during the invisible primary. On Super Tuesday, the campaign made little or no effort in eight states.
2) John McCain's 2008 campaign nearly went broke months before the Iowa Caucuses, and had scant resources devoted to any state outside of New Hampshire. On Super Tuesday, he won the most states and delegates, including New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and California.

The media attention should still be there. Each candidate's presidential campaign is usually entering its second year by the time Iowa rolls around, even though not a single state has voted yet. With the vast majority of reporting on the campaigns revolving around the “horse race,” it would make sense that the big story of the campaign would be evidence, any evidence, of who is actually winning. The news media is looking for the next main event, and in presidential campaigns, Iowa and New Hampshire are still the next events longer than everyone else. This can be compared to a baseball season. Every year, a baseball team's best attendance day is usually Opening Day, the first game of the season. Fans flock to see their team, yearning and hoping all winter to see baseball again, and hoping that this year is their year. Opening Day, in the standings, may be the least meaningful of the season. It is months away from teams being close to securing, or being eliminated from, playoff berths. But yet that is the game that more fans see than others, no matter how long the season is. The same can be said for the media. Super

Tuesday may be big and early and important, but it still is not first.

Taken in combination, the largeness and earliness of Super Tuesday should put new resource pressures on all candidates, big and long shots alike. Iowa and New Hampshire should still remain as premium media darlings, but with more states to influence in its wake. Finally, momentum effects should be more pronounced, since there is less time or places for candidates to make a stand.

Thus, it is hypothesized that as Super Tuesday becomes larger and closer to the beginning of the calendar, candidates, both frontrunners and long shots, are reacting by focusing more of their campaigning efforts in Iowa and New Hampshire relative to the other 48 states during the invisible primary season.

Of course, one key question remains: Why does it matter if changing Super Tuesday is changing how candidates allocate their time?

Simply put, the modern nomination system is how our political parties select the candidates for President of the United States, and in all probability one of those two candidates will be the next President. If candidates are spending more of their time in Iowa and New Hampshire, that would seem to suggest that they think those two contests are increasing in their importance. Following that, if those candidates are acting as if Iowa and New Hampshire are more important, is seems likely that the states are having an increasing effect on who wins the nominations, and thus the Presidency. If candidates are acting as if Iowa and New Hampshire are more important in selecting the next president, it seems to follow that those two states are even more important than before.

Defining Candidate Effort

Candidate effort can be defined a number of ways, Many authors in

examining presidential primary campaigns have used spending done by that candidate in a given state. This, historically, has been relatively easy to do, since all candidates who opt into the public financing system must disclose where and how much they have spent.[13] While candidates can have played around with this distinction (some Iowa spending is attributed to neighboring Nebraska and New Hampshire to Massachusetts, for example), this method is seen as a good reflection of candidate effort. However, in recent years candidates have begun not to participate in the public financing system. Wealthy individuals, as well as the growth of the internet, have concluded they could raise and spend more money by opting out of the system than staying in. While these candidates still must file returns with the Federal Elections Commission, they do not need to disclose where the money was spent. By 2008, almost all candidates who filed with the FEC did not opt into the system. This makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to track candidate spending on a state by state basis, and difficult to compare efforts across elections.

An alternative method is to track where the candidates actually campaigned. This method has a number of advantages. Unlike spending, which theoretically could be limitless, candidates are bounded by time. It also makes sense that where a candidate campaigns is a reflection of the priorities of a campaign. Candidates for Senate in Alaska do not go seeking votes in Kansas, so why would candidates for president campaign in places they feel are unimportant to their campaign?

However, there is a problem here. The tracking of candidates has rarely been attempted, much less tracking candidates before the "visible" primary begins. Aldrich; Norrander; and Stanley and Hadley all examined this for the 1976 and 1988

13 This is because there is a ceiling, different for each state, for the amount of money that can be spent there.

campaigns respectively, but Aldrich looked at only visits in during the year 1976, and Norrander and Stanley and Hadley looked at only a brief period before Iowa and New Hampshire (as well as the entire 'visible' primary). This leaves much to be desired.

The merits of candidate visits, as well as the difficulty of tracking down campaign expenditures in recent elections, led to the decision to use candidate visits as the measure of campaign effort. Following this, an exhaustive, two-year search began to track down campaign visits during the invisible primary for all candidates for president in the Republican and Democratic parties in the modern nomination era. This search has led to invisible primary candidate schedules for all 'media recognized'[14] candidates from 1988 onward. Attempts to include earlier campaigns proved unsuccessful, as media sources for schedules became very scarce and news reports on many candidates were rare.[15]

14 A media recognized candidate is one whose standing is significant enough to believe his or her campaign is worth following enough to have their schedule published in *The Hotline* or *The Washington Post*. Candidates that did not fit this description include Lyndon LaRouche and Bob Argan.

15 For example, a search for the whereabouts of Jimmy Carter in the archives of Wire Reports from the Associated Press' in the four months prior to the Iowa Caucuses resulted in five hits, three of which concerned the same event.

CHAPTER 4

THE MODEL

Main variables

Dependent Variable: Percentage of time a candidate spends in Iowa and New Hampshire during the Invisible Primary.

How Measured: Four months prior to the Iowa Caucuses, each candidate's schedule is examined to see where he or she is on every day during that period (Schedules were taken from National Journal's *Hotline* for 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004, from the *Washington Post*'s Candidate Tracker for 2008, and from a search of each candidate in Factvia's online database of Associated Press Wire Reports for each campaign). Each stop is recorded in a database for each day, and each state visited counts as one day spent there, even if a candidate visits multiple states in a single day, each stop counts as one day.

For example, say a candidate visits three states in one day, one of them being New Hampshire. If each visit is treated as one day and the percentage is calculated, it is one divided by three, which is 33.3333% (approximately). If each trip is given one third of a day, the percentage does not change. All campaign trips are added up, and all trips to Iowa and New Hampshire are added up, and the Iowa plus New Hampshire set is divided by the total number to create the percentage of time spent in those two early states relative to that candidate's campaign.

Table 4.1: 1992 Democrats, Late October 1991

Dates	Clinton	Tsongas	Brown	Kerrey	Harkin
10/25/91	NY, MA		CA	NE	NH, MA
10/26/91	NH, TN	NH		NE	
10/27/91	AR	MA			
10/28/91	AR		CA	NY	FL
10/29/91		MA	CO	TX	FL, DC
10/30/91	NH, MA		GA	TX	PA
10/31/91	ME			TX, NH	
Visits to IA and NH	2	1	0	1	1
Total Visits	9	3	4	7	6
% in IA and NH	**22.2222**	**33.3333**	**0**	**14.2857**	**16.6667**

Discretion was used on some occasions to determine whether a trip was for campaign purposes or not. Members of Congress often return to Washington, D.C. because of official business (especially Bob Dole, who twice ran for President while being the Republican Leader in the U.S. Senate), and candidates often went back to their home for a break. The author excluded trips to DC or to their home state unless it could be shown that they were there for campaigning purposes. Some trips, like Howard Dean's in 2003 to Hawai'i to be on hand for the return of his brother's remains, were also excluded.

The four month time period is used because by this point almost all candidates who will be in the race have declared, or will declare very shortly, allowing for a more apt comparison both within a certain primary year and across other years.[16] The four month period ends with the New Hampshire Primary, which was usually the week following Iowa during this time period.

First Main Independent Variable: Distance from New Hampshire to Super Tuesday. Super Tuesday is defined as the date on the Primary Calendar when the most contests are

16 It also coincidently corresponds with the beginning of the publishing of candidate schedules in *The Hotline* on a regular basis.

held. Since 1988, it has occurred no later than mid-March, and it also doubles as the date when the most delegates are available. This variable is measured in the number of days between the New Hampshire and Super Tuesday. It has ranged from 14 to 35 during the time period examined.

Second Main Independent Variable: Size of Super Tuesday.

This variable is a percentage, taking the number of delegates up for grabs in the states that vote on Super Tuesday and dividing it by the total number of delegates that will attend the party's convention. The delegate numbers are taken from *Congressional Quarterly's National Party Conventions* and the website The Green Papers (http://www.thegreenpapers.com/). Because Congressional Quarterly does not differentiate between elected delegates and super delegates,[17] it was not possible to use only the delegates available for election on that date for campaigns previous to 2000. Thus the delegate numbers reflect all delegates from each state, both elected and super. Since this inflates both the number of delegates available on Super Tuesday and the total delegates available, taking a percentage should be still be an accurate reflection of the delegates available on Super Tuesday.[18]

Control Variables

Ideological Difference: This variable is used to determine how different ideologically a candidate is from the party electorates of Iowa and New Hampshire. First, the ideological score of Republicans and Democrats in Iowa is averaged together with the ideological

17 Technically, they are known on the Democratic side as Unpledged Party Leaders and Elected Officials, and make up about 20% of all delegates at the convention. On the Republican side, they are called party leaders, and each state (plus represented territories and D.C.) gets three, which usually constitutes about 5 to 7% of all delegates.

18 Because super delegate totals are available for the 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections, the difference in delegate percentages by using elected delegates only or by using total delegates can be examined. In each instance, the difference was less than one-half of one percent. This suggests that using either method will result in very similar findings.

score of Republicans and Democrats in New Hampshire. Republicans and Democrats are treated separately, so Republicans get one score and Democrats get a different score. The numbers in 1988 come from *Statehouse Democracy*, the numbers for 1996 and beyond come from Boris Shor,[19] and 1992 is an average of the two. Secondly, the ideological score for each candidate is determined. Candidates are put on the -1 to 1 scale that DW-Nominate uses, with the most liberal scores approaching -1 and the most conservative candidates approaching 1. For members of Congress, their DW-Nominate score for the preceding Congress prior to the campaign[20] (for example, the 109th Congress for 2008) is their ideological score.[21] For governors and other elected officials at the state or local level, their ideology score is determined differently. The average ideology of the members of the state legislature of that party for that state is used to determine the ideology for governors, state legislators, and mayors.

This method is recommended in *Statehouse Democracy*, which concludes that it is difficult to give governor's an ideological score, but this method seems to be a fair estimate. For candidates in 1988, the state score in *Statehouse Democracy* is used, since that data set covers 1988. For candidates in 1996 onward, Shor's set is used (it begins in 1996), and for 1992 the two sets are averaged. Because they use different scales than DW-Nominate, they have been adjusted to fit the -1 to 1 parameter. *Statehouse Democracy* ranges from -10 to 10, so each score is divided by 10. Shor goes from -2 to 2,

19 Work by Boris Shor has been able to put state legislators and members of Congress on the same ideological frame by using dual members (state legislators who eventually end up in Congress).

20 For candidates who are former members of Congress, their DW-Nominate score from the last Congress they served in is used. An exception is made for John Edwards in 2008, since his last Congress, the 108th, was also one where he was running for President. His score from the 107th Congress is used.

21 Typically, presidential candidates only vote when summoned by their party leader. This usually means the candidates are only voting on important and controversial legislation where the vote outcome is questionable. This can make members appear more ideological than they really are due the selection bias in the few votes they do cast.

so each score is divided by two.

For candidates with no previous elected experience, their ideological score is taken by the DW-Nominate score of the members of Congress who endorsed them in their Presidential bid. For example, in 2004 twenty-two members of Congress endorsed Wesley Clark for President. Those 22 Congresspersons had their DW-Nominate Score averaged together to create a score for General Clark. This was done on the assumption that members of Congress would endorse a candidate for president that was relatively close to them on the issues. This takes care of 9 of the 11 candidates with no prior elected experience. The remaining two, Pat Robertson (1988) and Gary Bauer (2000), are given generic scores of .500, the middle of the conservative DW-Nominate curve.[22] Next, the candidate's ideology is subtracted from the average of party partisans for Iowa and New Hampshire to create an ideological difference score. Finally, the absolute value of this score is taken, since it is the difference from the party average, not the direction of the difference that is important here. This is how far on the ideological spectrum a candidate is from the members of his or her party in Iowa and New Hampshire.

The further a candidate is from the middle of their party in Iowa and New Hampshire, the more likely they would devote less time to those two states. However, this variable is not expected to be significant because the importance of these early states should override a candidate mismatch with them. While these candidates would probably like an early state that is more in line with their ideology, their options are slim in both other states and in possible momentum gained from doing well elsewhere.[23] On a further

22 The model was also run without Robertson and Bauer and the results were not appreciatively different. While it is highly probable that Bauer and Robertson were substantially to the right of the Republican Party center, without the data to put them on the ideological spectrum placing them anywhere is a guessing game.

23 In 2008, Mitt Romney won the Wyoming Caucuses, which took place three days before the New Hampshire Primary. Romney's victory proved to have little to no impact on the race, as did Fred

note, most nomination contests (though not all) are multi-candidate affairs, so it is possible to win Iowa or New Hampshire with a small plurality of the vote, not the majority that is usually necessitated in later states.[24]

Iowa were divided so they could be placed on the -1 to 1 scale.

Home Region: This is if a candidate is from Iowa or from a state that borders Iowa, or if a candidate is from New Hampshire or New England. Candidates from either region are coded 1, those not from either region are coded 0.

This was done for a number of reasons. First was so that the number of states in each region were similar (there are six states that border Iowa and six states other than Iowa in the West North Central Census District; the numbers are three and five respectively for New Hampshire). This would seem to imply that Census Districts should be used. However, the West North Central District does not include Illinois, a state that not only shares a border but also shares some media markets with Iowa, which one would expect to benefit candidates from Illinois running for President in Iowa. So the split determination was used: Border States for Iowa and regional states for New Hampshire.[25]

Poll Standing[26]: How far ahead (or behind) a candidate is in the last national Gallup Poll prior to the Iowa Caucuses. For all candidates the value is their poll standing minus the

Thompson's second place finish or Duncan Hunter's third in those little noticed caucuses.

24 For example, in 2008 Barack Obama won the Iowa Caucuses with 38% of the vote and Hillary Clinton won New Hampshire with 39% of the vote. Only two other states, New Mexico and Missouri, were won by a candidate who got less than 50% of the vote, and the winner in both those states got 49%.

25 The model was also tried by using both the US Census areas that Iowa and New Hampshire are in, as well as defining the regions as only the states that border Iowa and New Hampshire. The results were not appreciatively different. Apparently the model was as impressed with Joe Lieberman as the voters were.

26 An alternative method, which took the actual percentage a candidate was receiving in the poll, was also tried. Since not all frontrunners are equal, this was an attempt to differentiate candidates on their individual standing in the polls, not relative position to other candidates. However, this variable proved not to improve the predictive capabilities of the model and was not used for a variety of reasons. This is probably because relative positioning is more important. For example, in 2000 John McCain was at 17% in the last Gallup Poll, while in 2008 he was at 14%. However, in 2008 he was only 13 points back of Rudy Giuliani, while in 200 he was down 47 points to George W. Bush. Relative positioning is a better reflection of the competitiveness of a candidate, which is what is sought here, than their net positioning.

front runners standing (by definition, all candidates leading in the polls are scored as 0). For the candidate in first, it is how far ahead they are to the second place candidate. Candidates not in the Gallup Poll are assumed to be at 1%.

For 1992-2008, the numbers are taken from the Gallup Organization website from the following web pages:

1992-2004: "Iowa, New Hampshire Results Often Shift National Preferences" <http://www.gallup.com/poll/103537/iowa-new-hampshire-results-often-shift-national-preferences.aspx>

2008 Democrats: "Clinton Maintains Large Lead Over Obama Nationally" <http://www.gallup.com/poll/103351/Clinton-Maintains-Large-Lead-Over-Obama-Nationally.aspx>

2008 Republicans: "Giuliani Leads GOP Race; Huckabee, Others Tie for Second" <http://www.gallup.com/poll/103348/Giuliani-Leads-GOP-Race-Huckabee-Others-Tie-Second.aspx>

Since Gallup does not have their 1988 polling numbers up on their web site, they were taken from the January 27th, 1988 edition of *The Hotline,* which published them under the headline, "Poll Update-Gallup Poll Show's Hart's Lead Shrinking; A Bush-Dole Race." The article is available online as well as in print, but the online version is only available to *National Journal* subscribers.

This is to differentiate between candidates who have a good chance at winning the nomination from candidates with very little chance of doing so. The further a candidate is out of the lead, the less likely they will win. These candidates are known as Long Shots. Candidates in the lead or close behind are known as Big Shots. Previous literature demonstrates that Long Shots should spend more time in the early states than Big Shots, who concentrate more of their time on creating a national campaign.

Agenda Seeking: Coded 0 if Office Seeking and 1 if Agenda Seeking.

While most candidates will not expressively state that they have no chance at being elected, some run for office knowing they have no chance at winning. However, they seek to bring certain issues or ideological positions into the campaign. For example, Ellen McCormack in 1976 had no chance at being the Democratic nominee for President. Her goal was to being the abortion issue to the front of the political debate, specifically her pro-life position. Norrander (2000) defines agenda-seeking candidates has having most of the following characteristics:

> Having never served in a major elected office (President, Vice-President, Senate, House, Governor)
>
> If they have served in a major elected office, it has been a long time since they served (at least a decade)
>
> One message and focus on one part of the political party (being outside the mainstream of the party).

Based off this definition, a number of candidates that sought the presidency should be defined as agenda-seekers rather than office seekers. Office seekers, unlike their counterparts, are running a campaign to get elected, not just to get their voice heard, no matter how unlikely their nomination is. However, while their motivations are very different, it is uncertain whether office and agenda seeking candidates act differently. Since the media is paying attention to Iowa and New Hampshire, and the other candidates are paying attention to Iowa and New Hampshire, it stands to reason the agenda seeking candidates may go somewhere else so they can stand out and have the attention to themselves in some other corner of the country, On the other hand, it also makes sense that they would try to seek out the attention of the media, which is in Iowa and New Hampshire, so that is where they end up too. In the original models, all candidates, agenda and office seeking, are included. In the second series of models agenda seeking

candidates are excluded, leaving only an examination of what office seeking candidates are doing.

For purposes of this analysis, any candidate that's ideological score was higher than . 650 for Republicans or lower than -.650 for Democrats was considered outside the ideological mainstream of that party.

Table 4.2: Agenda Seeking Candidates Excluded

Candidates	Election Year	Explanation
Mike Gravel	2008	28 years since Senate term ended
Dennis Kucinich	2008	Out of Democratic Mainstream; did not win a contest in 2004 bid
Ron Paul	2008	Out of Republican Mainstream
Dennis Kucinich	2004	Out of Democratic Mainstream
Al Sharpton	2004	Never held elected office
Alan Keyes	2000	Never held elected office; did not win a contest in 1996 bid
Gary Bauer	2000	Never held elected office
Alan Keyes	1996	Never held elected office
Pat Buchanan	1992	Never held elected office
Pat Buchanan	1996	Never held elected office; did not win a contest in 1992 bid
Pat Robertson	1988	Never held elected office

There are a few candidates that, under Norrander's classification, would be agenda seeking candidates (and were classified as such in her 2000 paper), but have been determined here to be office seeking. A main reason for this is that a candidate that has never held elected office can still be trying to win and may have a legitimate chance at winning. With this in mind, a few rules are built in to reflect this possibility.

A candidate that has never been elected to a major political office, or it has been a long time since they held elected office, is classified as office seeking if this is at least their second attempt at the presidency and they won at least one contest in their previous

attempt or attempts. These candidates have demonstrated an ability to win states in a presidential nomination contest and it can be expected that they will still be trying to win states in a presidential nomination contest.

A second exception is that former Supreme Allied Commanders of NATO are office seeking candidates, based off the prestige and authority that office has is similar to that of a major political office (this would have included Alexander Haig as well as Wesley Clark, but he left the race in 1988 before the first contests and was thus excluded from the data set).

A third exception is that some lesser offices carry as much or more prestige than the prestigious ones Norrander outlines. For example, several cities have larger populations than several states, making the mayor there a quasi-governor. Thus, mayors of large U.S. cities (defined as being larger in population than the smallest state) are also prominent elected officials.

Finally, agenda seeking candidates usually run on low-budget affairs, with small staffs and little advertising. A candidate willing to spend millions of dollars of their own money is obviously making a major commitment to their campaign. If a candidate loans their campaign more than $20 million during the primary season, they would be defined as trying to win rather than seeking an agenda.

So office seeking candidates are those who meet any of the following criteria:

1) Elected to the Presidency, Vice-Presidency, U.S. Senate, U.S. House, Governor, or Mayor of a city with more inhabitants than the smallest state within the previous decade prior to the presidential campaign.

2) Holder of a prominent non-elected position, such as Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Secretary of Defense; or a high ranking and high profile military officer, such as the Chair of the Joint Chiefs or the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.

3) A candidate who has won states in previous presidential nomination contests.

4) A person willing spend tens of millions of their own dollars on their campaign bid.

Table 4.3: Included Candidates[27]

Candidate	Election Year	Why Agenda Seeking	Why Overruled
Rudy Giuliani	2008	Never held major elected office	Mayor of New York City 1994-2001[28]
Wesley Clark	2004	Never held elected office	Supreme Allied Commander of NATO 1997-2000
Steve Forbes	2000	Never held elected office	Victorious in two 1996 contests
Steve Forbes	1996	Never held elected office	Loaned $35 million of his own money to campaign
Jerry Brown	1992	Out of office since 1983	Won 5 states in 1976 campaign and 1 state in 1980 campaign.[29]
Jesse Jackson	1988	Never held elected office	Victorious in two 1984 contests

The Model will be run three different ways. In Model I, only the Calendar Days variable will be included as a main independent variable. In Model II, only the Size of Super Tuesday will be included as a main independent variable. In Model III, both main independent variables will be included.

Model I: % of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Days Between IA and NH + Ideological Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing + Agenda Seeking

Model II: % of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Size of Super Tuesday +

27 Of these candidates, Norrander classified Forbes as office seeking, while Jackson and Brown were agenda seeking. Clark and Giuliani's campaigns occurred after the publication of her paper.

28 In Rudy Giuliani's first mayoral campaign in 1989 (his defeat to David Dinkins), Giuliani received over 876 thousand votes. That more votes than were cast in total in 14 states in the 2008 Presidential Election.

29 The one state Brown won in 1980 was Michigan. However, because Michigan was in violation of Democratic Party rules, President Carter and Senator Kennedy, the two major contenders, did not have their names included on the ballot in Michigan. This would not be the last time this event occurred in the Michigan Democratic Primary.

Ideology Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing + Agenda Seeking

Model III: % of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Days Between IA and NH + Size of Super Tuesday + Ideological Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing + Agenda Seeking

Expectations

If the hypothesis has some validity, we should expect the distance from Super Tuesday variable to be statistically significant and negative. This is because we should expect as there are more days between New Hampshire and Super Tuesday, the less amount of time a candidate should be spending in those two early states (this is necessarily implied if the hypothesis, which states that the fewer days between the two, the more campaigning is done in Iowa and New Hampshire, is supported). Since the coefficient impacts the number of days, it would be expected to be somewhat small, since the difference between seven days and eight is not all that great.

It should be expected that the size of Super Tuesday variable will be statistically significant and positive, since it is expected that the more delegates (as a percentage) that are available on Super Tuesday, the more candidates will campaign in the early states. The coefficient should also be relatively small, since there is not a great deal of difference between a single percent.

With regards to the control variables, it is not expected that the ideology or home region variables should be significant. . If the theory is correct, it should not matter the positions of a candidate be or the ideological positioning of a state. Their main consideration is that they need an early win, and there are very few options on the calendar to achieve that victory.

The poll standing variable and the agenda seeking variable are expected to both

be significant and negative. Previous literature has shown clearly that major contenders act differently than long shot candidates, and this difference manifests itself in where resources are concentrated. Long shots treat Iowa and New Hampshire as "do or die" events, while contenders try to survive those two early states while building a national campaign that will, hopefully, deliver the delegates necessary to capture the nomination. Since long shots are trailing in the polls, the worse they are doing should mean the more time they devote to Iowa and New Hampshire. Agenda seekers play by totally different rules, and are likely to try to maximize their attention. Iowa and New Hampshire are poor places to do so, because even though there is significant media coverage, that media is covering the candidates who are trying to win. Other areas of the country, being ignored by the main candidates, are better targets for these candidates to get their message heard.

Expected Problems

The original intention of this study was to examine the entire modern nomination system, but the lack of available data made that impossible. The result is a time period from 1988 onward, which causes difficulty, since this is the frontloaded era. Differences in magnitudes of the size of Super Tuesday were much smaller during this period than between this period and the 1976-1984 era. Even the smallest Super Tuesday post-1988 was twice the size of Super Tuesday 1984. Effects of magnitude are likely to be difficult to detect because of the small amount of size difference between Super Tuesdays.

Also a concern is the time distance between New Hampshire. During the frontloaded era, Super Tuesday has been between two and five weeks after New Hampshire. While in 1984 Super Tuesday was just two weeks after New Hampshire[30], in

30 A legitimate argument can be made that Super Tuesday 1984 should also be at the end of the calendar, since that date had the same number of contests and many more delegates at stake. However, media reports from that period, as well as articles and books concerning the 1984 campaign, describe March 13th as Super Tuesday, not June 5th.

both 1976 and 1980 it came at the very end of the calendar, three and a half months after New Hampshire. This means there is not much deviation in the distance between Super Tuesdays across the campaigns, making it difficult to detect any effect.

Should the hypothesized effects be found, this would mean that there is very strong evidence of a frontloading effect, due to the fact that there is not much deviation between Super Tuesdays across the time period examined.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

Summary Statistics

5.1: All Candidates

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
% in IA and NH	57	49.24874	16.72172	5.6604	87.0968
Calendar Days	57	25.91228	7.119592	14	35
Size of Super Tuesday	57	30.11042	8.799218	13.9196	42.8571
Poll Standing	57	-25.92982	19.58212	-73	0
Ideological Difference	57	.2081228	.1954302	.0035	1.138
Home Region	57	.2280702	.4233178	0	1
Agenda Seeking	57	.1754386	.3837227	0	1

Table 5.2: Office Seeking Candidates

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
% in IA and NH	46	50.64587	15.95753	12.2449	87.0968
Calendar Days	46	25.71739	6.93033	14	35
Size of Super Tuesday	46	30.51147	8.642592	13.9196	42.8571
Poll Standing	46	-21.65217	17.81288	-63	0
Ideological Difference	46	.1825652	.1405575	.0035	.4695
Home Region	46	.2826087	.4552432	0	1

Candidates are spending about half of their time during the invisible primary in

Iowa and New Hampshire during the examined time period, which is a lot.[31] In 2008, Iowa and New Hampshire combined to send 2% of all delegates to the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. The average Super Tuesday is about 30% of delegates and takes place three and a half weeks after the New Hampshire Primary. About a quarter of candidates come from regions including Iowa or New Hampshire.[32] The typical candidate is about .2 points away from the electorate's average, which is not that large a gap, and is down over twenty points in the polls. When agenda seekers are removed, the remaining candidates are less ideologically distant and closer to the frontrunner, which makes sense because agenda seeking candidates are usually on the fringes of their party and are not trying to win.

Figure 5.1: Change over Time for All Candidates



31 According to the *Washington Post*, from January 2007 through November 2008 candidates for President made 7,917 campaign trips. Of these, 3,195, or a little over 40%, were to Iowa and New Hampshire. Because this includes general election numbers, where Iowa and New Hampshire were marginally contested states, it is likely that the percentage of trips to Iowa and New Hampshire throughout the primary season (invisible and active) is higher. Iowa and New Hampshire also make up 2% of all Electoral College votes.

32 Three of the ten nominations examined have been won by "Home Region Candidates:" Dukakis in 1988, Kerry in 2004, and Obama in 2008.

Figure 5.2: Change over Time for Office Seeking Candidates



For all candidates as well as office seeking candidates only, there looks to be an increase in Iowa and New Hampshire visits through 2000, and then a drop off in 2004. In fact, the average amount of visitation to Iowa and New Hampshire has ranged between 46% and 52% since 1996, which suggests less of an upward-downward trend and more of floating around the 50% marker.

Model I:

% of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Days Between IA and NH + Ideological Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing + Agenda Seeking

Table 5.3: Results of Model I

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Calendar Days	.3149296	.2906341	.284	-.2685427	.8984019
Ideological Difference	-7.468898	11.22293	.509	-29.99986	15.06206
Home Region	4.774415	4.919187	.336	-5.101265	14.65009
Poll Standing	-.4184612	.1164134	.001***	-.6521709	-.1847515
Agenda Seeking	-15.33881	6.489	.022*	-28.36602	-2.311594
Constant	33.39414	9.058041	.001***	15.20936	51.57891

Number of Observations: 57
R-Squared Value: .2722
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level

***Significant at the .001 level

Figure 5.3: Scatter Plot of % in IA and NH and Calendar Days



The main independent variable is insignificant and in the opposite theorized direction, that candidates spend more time as Super Tuesday moves away from New Hampshire. While the statistical insignificance of this variable was anticipated, the directionality was not. No support is leant to the hypothesis as a result of this model, and if anything points in either no direction or the opposite direction. The poll standing and agenda seeking variables are significant. With poll standing having a negative coefficient, this means that the better the candidates are doing in the polls, the less time they are devoting to Iowa and New Hampshire. This idea, that big shot and long shot candidates take different paths has been examined on many occasions in the literature, with the overall conclusion that Big Shot candidates only need to survive the early states, while Long Shots need to win to stay alive. Based on this, Big Shots can devote more of their time to building a national base of support, while Long Shots have to give most, if not everything, to winning early.

The Agenda Seeking variable is also negative, meaning that these candidates running not to win but to influence the issues and views the party discusses and holds are

spending less time in Iowa and New Hampshire. Since their candidacy is not based on winning, while other candidates are, they can beat a different path, and that path apparently is to other states.

Model II:
% of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Size of Super Tuesday + Ideology Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing + Agenda Seeking

Table 5.4: Results of Model II

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Size of Super Tuesday	.0772128	.2389201	.748	-.4024393	.5568649
Ideological Difference	-10.31361	11.32462	.367	-33.04873	12.4215
Home Region	5.300096	4.944167	.289	-4.625732	15.22592
Poll Standing	-.4127031	.1191006	.001***	-.6518074	-.1735987
Agenda Seeking	-13.7768	6.385135	.036*	-26.5955	-.9581109
Constant	39.5772	8.588854	.000***	22.33436	56.82005

Number of Observations: 57
R-Squared Value: .2570
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
***Significant at the .001 level

Figure 5.4: Scatter Plot of % in IA and NH and Size of Super Tuesday



The size of Super Tuesday variable, like its Days variable counterpart, is not significant. However, the coefficient is in hypothesized direction: Larger Super Tuesdays mean more time being spent in Iowa and New Hampshire. Even with this null result there remain interesting results. Poll standing is negative and significant, meaning that the better the candidate is doing in the polls, the less time they are spending in Iowa and New Hampshire. This again leads credence that Big Shot and Long Shot candidates are behaving differently, and it is Long Shots devoting their time to those two early states. The Agenda Seeking variable is again negative, once again suggesting that whatever their strategy is, it is different than the other candidates and it involves Iowa and New Hampshire less.

Model III:
% of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Days Between IA and NH + Size of Super Tuesday + Ideological Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing + Agenda Seeking

Table 5.5: Results of Model III

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Calendar Days	.3482114	.3332327	.301	-.3211063	1.017529
Size of Super Tuesday	-.0571102	.2711161	.834	-.601663	.4874425
Ideological Difference	-6.761073	11.81333	.569	-30.49185	16.9637
Home Region	4.738338	4.968884	.345	-5.24196	14.71864
Poll Standing	-.4145116	.119006	.001***	-.6535421	-.1754811
Agenda Seeking	-15.47775	6.583787	.023*	-28.70167	-2.253823
Constant	34.23967	9.986324	.001***	14.18155	54.29779

Number of Observations: 57
R-Squared Value: .2729
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
***Significant at the .001 level

The overall combined model shows that the size of Super Tuesday and the length of time between New Hampshire are both insignificant and in the opposite direction as theorized. Thus, in all three models for all presidential candidates from 1988 to 2008 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. It also shows that candidates doing well in the polls spend less time in Iowa and New Hampshire, as do candidates not actually trying to win.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

While it is not that major of a surprise that the main independent variables were statistically insignificant because of the small data set, it is a surprise that they point to an opposite relationship hypothesized in two of the three models. In Barbara Norrander's book on Super Tuesday 1988, she found that candidates spent a larger percentage of their funds in Iowa and New Hampshire in 1988 than they did in three previous Presidential primary cycles. She also found that candidates spent more time in Iowa and New Hampshire in 1988 than in 1976[33].

In all three versions tested, the coefficient for poll standing was both significant and negative, with a value hovering around -.415. This means that for every point a candidate gains in the polls relative to the frontrunner, the total percentage of time they spend in Iowa and New Hampshire during the invisible primary will decline by .415%. As an approximation, this means for every 2.5 points gained in the polls, a candidate will spend 1% less of their time in Iowa and New Hampshire. While this is a small amount, it shows that large changes in candidate standing have a large effect on time candidates spend in Iowa and New Hampshire. For example, in 2008 the combined model would expect John Edwards to spend 12.5% more of his time in Iowa and New Hampshire than Hillary Clinton.

33 Norrander used the Candidate Visits Data Set found in the Appendixes of Aldrich's *Before the Convention* for 1976 and USA Today for 1988. However, she used total days spent, not a percentage, thus the results are impacted by both the number of candidates running and number of available days to count. Because Aldrich's data set only begins in January 1976, Norrander could only examine what candidates were doing in January, February, and March of 1976 and January and February of 1988. Because there were more active candidates in 1988, and the fact that the Iowa Caucuses were later in 1988 than in 1976 (though the New Hampshire Primary was earlier in 1988), this could bias the numbers in favor of Iowa (and possibly New Hampshire) in 1988 relative to 1976.

It is possible that something is amiss. A likely culprit is those pesky Agenda Seekers, whose goal is not to win but to make a stand. While they have a place and purpose in American political campaigns, the goal of this paper is to find out what candidates who are trying to become the next president are doing. This next set of models (I-A, II-A, and III-A) uses only the 47 campaigns in the data set that are classified as office seeking. Likewise, the Agenda Seeking variable is removed, for there is no longer any variation within this subset.

CHAPTER 7

OFFICE SEEKING MODELS

Model I-A: % of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Days Between IA and NH + Ideological Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing

Model II-A: % of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Size of Super Tuesday + Ideology Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing

Model III-A: % of Time in Iowa and New Hampshire = Constant + Days Between IA and NH + Size of Super Tuesday + Ideological Difference + Home Region + Poll Standing

Model I-A

Table 7.1: Results of Model I-A

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Calendar Days	.3568207	.3185986	.269	-.2866022	1.000244
Ideological Difference	-29.83556	15.91512	.068^	-61.97679	2.305673
Home Region	3.794442	4.677207	.422	-5.651369	13.24025
Poll Standing	-.3141605	.120823	.013*	-.5581674	-.0701536
Constant	39.04171	10.31064	.000***	18.21894	59.86448

Number of Observations: 46
R-Squared Value: .2838
^Significant at the .1 level
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
***Significant at the .001 level

As is to be expected at this point, the Calendar Days variable is not significant and in the opposite direction theorized. The front running candidates continue to spend less time in Iowa and New Hampshire than long shots. However, while the ideological difference variable is still not significant at the .05 level, it is at the .1 level, and suggests a negative relationship. For every tenth of a point a candidate differs from the ideological average of Iowa and New Hampshire, the amount of time they spend in those two states decreases by almost 3%.

Model II-A:

% in IA and NH = Days Between NH and Super Tuesday + Ideology of the IA electorate + Candidate ideology + IA home region + NH home region + poll standing

Table 7.2: Results of Model II-A

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Size of Super Tuesday	.1296011	.2507792	.608	-.3768578	.6360599
Ideological Difference	-35.19066	15.50207	.029*	-66.49773	-3.883581
Home Region	4.269053	4.714181	.370	-5.251429	13.78953
Poll Standing	-.315258	.1264783	.014*	-.5646274	-.0658886
Constant	45.08365	9.364306	.000***	26.17205	63.99525

Number of Observations: 46
R-Squared Value: .2666
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
***Significant at the .001 level

The size of Super Tuesday, while in the hypothesized direction, is not significant and the null cannot be rejected. However, the ideological difference variable is significant and negative, as well as the poll positioning of candidates. Candidates closer to the ideological center of Iowa and New Hampshire spend more time there than candidates further away. This is an unexpected finding, since it was expected that because Iowa and New Hampshire are important targets of opportunity that candidates would try to win them even if they were not a good match. The subset of office seeking candidates appears to factor in how close they are to the views of Iowa and New Hampshire voters.[34]

Model III-A:

% in IA and NH = Days Between NH and Super Tuesday + % of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Ideology of the IA electorate + Candidate ideology + IA home region + NH home region + poll standing

34 However, location proximity is not significant. Even in models where Home Region is included and Ideological Difference is excluded, Home Region does not obtain statistical significance. It appears that candidates factor ideological proximity to voters more than geographical proximity to voters.

Table 7.3: Results of Model III-A

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Calendar Days	.3507428	.3582555	.333	-.3733186	1.074804
Size of Super Tuesday	.0108638	.2786806	.969	-.5523708	.5740984
Ideological Difference	-29.95592	16.40569	.075^	-63.11306	3.201218
Home Region	3.803171	4.740513	.427	-5.777762	13.38411
Poll Standing	-.3148357	.1235416	.015*	-.5645225	-.0651489
Constant	38.87144	11.31555	.001***	16.00186	61.74101

Number of Observations: 46
R-Squared Value: .2838
^Significant at the .1 level
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
***Significant at the .001 level

It is quite apparent that there is no linear relationship between how much of their time candidates devote to Iowa and New Hampshire and either the time proximity to Super Tuesday or the size of Super Tuesday. Whether it be on their own, or together, or with only office seeking candidates, those main independent variables remain statistically insignificant. Thus, the hypotheses that state there should be an increase in candidate visitations when Super Tuesday gets closer, larger, or both is not supported by the data, nor does the data support the opposite conclusions. Since statistical significance could not be achieved for these two variables in any model, the null hypothesis that this relationship between visits and changes to Super Tuesday cannot be rejected. On the other hand, the idea that big shot candidates behave differently than long shots, and that this behavior is to spend less time in Iowa and New Hampshire, is quite clear. It is interesting that the effect of where a candidate is in the polls on their travel agenda is less when agenda seeking candidates are excluded. Why this is, when Agenda Seeking

candidates, who usually languish far behind in the polls, spend far less time in Iowa and New Hampshire than their office seeking counterparts, is a mystery.[35]

Analysis and Observations

All six models show that the hypothesized relationships, that larger and closer Super Tuesdays mean more and more time spent in Iowa and New Hampshire, are not supported. On the other hand, the opposite result, that larger and closer Super Tuesdays mean less time in Iowa and New Hampshire, is not supported either. Something seems wrong about this. If candidates want to win the nomination, and the way to achieve that is to acquire enough delegates to do so, it would make sense for candidates to change where they seek out those delegates as where and when those delegates are available. However, the models cannot rule out the null; that there is no relationship.

What if the relationship existed, but it was not as hypothesized? It might be that there are thresholds that maximize or minimize the amount of time candidates spend in Iowa and New Hampshire. For example, it could be that very close or far away Super Tuesdays see a lot of visits, the former as hypothesized and the latter because there might be time to build a national campaign after winning Super Tuesday, but a "medium distance" Super Tuesday would see fewer visits. To test this idea, each model now includes the square of the main independent variables. This set of models uses the data set without the Agenda Seeking candidates, since this data set includes only the candidates this analysis is concerned about.

35 When the model is run with all candidates but with the Agenda Seeking variable excluded, the coefficient on poll standing decreases, while the coefficient for Ideological Difference becomes much larger. This implies that the actions of Agenda Seeking candidates are much more tied to their ideology than to their standing in the polls. While this makes sense, this should not apply to office seeking candidates.

Should the main independent variables have an effect, it is expected that the Calendar Days variable be negative and its square be positive. This would mean that as Super Tuesday gets closer to New Hampshire from the bottom of the curve, the amount of time in Iowa and New Hampshire is increasing. It is also expected that the Size of Super Tuesday variable be positive and its square be negative. This would mean that as Super Tuesday gets larger, more time is spent in Iowa and New Hampshire. Both ideas also mean that this relationship is not monotonic; that at some point a threshold is reached and candidates begin to do the opposite of what is hypothesized. This set of models will be run for office seeking candidates only, for it is their behavior that the analysis is most interested in.[36]

36 The models were also run with all candidates included. The results were not appreciatively different than for the Office Seeking candidates data set, and subsequently are not included here.

CHAPTER 8

THIRD SET OF MODELS: TESTING A HYPERBOLIC RELATIONSHIP

Model I-B: % in IA and NH = Days Between NH and Super Tuesday + Square of Calendar Days + Ideological Difference + Home Region + poll standing

Model II-B: % of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Square of the % of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Ideological Difference + Home Region + poll standing

Model III-B: % in IA and NH = Days Between NH and Super Tuesday + Square of Calendar Days + % of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Square of the % of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Ideological Difference + Home Region + poll standing

Model I-B:

% in IA and NH = Days Between NH and Super Tuesday + Square of Calendar Days + Ideological Difference + Home Region + poll standing

Table 8.1: Results of Model I-B

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Calendar Days	-1.983631	2.523513	.436	-7.083841	3.116578
Square of Calendar Days	.0456345	.0488089	.355	-.053012	.144281
Ideological Difference	-28.05516	16.05294	.088^	-60.49937	4.38904
Home Region	4.350223	4.721968	.362	-5.19323	13.89368
Poll Standing	-.2938306	.1229469	.022*	-.5423155	-.0453456
Constant	66.86403	31.49851	.040*	3.203157	130.5249`

Number of Observations: 46
R-Squared Value: .2991
^Significant at the .1 level
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
***Significant at the .001 level

Figure 8.1: Plot of % in IA and NH and Calendar Days as a quadratic function



While statistically insignificant, Calendar Days and its square are moving in opposite directions. This would suggest support for a non-linear, non-monotonic relationship. As Super Tuesday gets closer to the New Hampshire Primary, candidates are spending more time in Iowa and New Hampshire up to a point. When Super Tuesday reaches a certain point in its proximity to New Hampshire, this relationship reverses itself, and candidates begin to spend less of their time there. This juncture appears when Super Tuesday is about 22 days after the New Hampshire Primary.[37] However, these variables were again insignificant, thus the null cannot be thrown out. Candidate poll standing is negative and significant, and ideological difference is negative and close to being significant at the .05 level. These results are similar in magnitude and direction to what was found in the previous models what only included office seeking candidates.

Model II-B:

% of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Square of the % of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Ideological Difference + Home Region + poll standing

37 21.734 days

Table 8.2: Results of Model II-B

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Size of Super Tuesday	2.659708	1.556377	.095^	-.4858478	5.805264
Square of Size of Super Tuesday	-.044303	.0269109	.108	-.098692	.010086
Ideological Difference	-33.54626	15.22134	.033*	-64.30973	-2.782794
Home Region	2.6157	4.727289	.584	-6.942637	12.16578
Poll Standing	-.3162141	.1209822	.013*	-.5607282	-.0717
Constant	12.51502	21.80713	.569	-31.55883	56.58887

Number of Observations: 46
R-Squared Value: .3132
^Significant at the .1 level
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
***Significant at the .001 level

Figure 8.2: Plot of % in IA and NH and Size of Super Tuesday as a quadratic function



For the first time, one of the main independent variables is significant at the .1 level. This suggests that there is a relationship between what Super Tuesday looks like and how candidates are acting in the invisible primary, though it is not the relationship originally expected. While still statistically insignificant, the main independent variables

are in opposite directions, and in the directions expected. The curve maxes out at about 30%.[38] Ideological Difference and Poll standing remain significant and negative.

Model III-B:

% in IA and NH = Days Between NH and Super Tuesday + Square of Calendar Days + % of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Square of the % of Delegates on Super Tuesday + Ideological Difference + Home Region + poll standing

Table 8.3: Results of Model III-B

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	95% Low	95% High
Calendar Days	-12.60331	4.847945	.013*	-22.41746	-2.789156
Square of Calendar Days	.2314927	.0881494	.012*	.0530435	.4099418
Size of Super Tuesday	5.523473	2.103959	.012*	1.264231	9.782714
Square of the Size of Super Tuesday	-.0748089	.0318511	.024*	-.139288	-.0103297
Ideological Difference	-37.23274	15.3631	.020*	-68.33371	-6.131772
Home Region	5.325413	4.577003	.252	-3.940245	14.59107
Poll Standing	-.2809198	.1149078	.019*	-.5135385	-.0483011
Constant	116.578	44.50893	.013*	26.47433	206.6816

Number of Observations: 46
R-Squared Value: .4194
*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
***Significant at the .001 level

Both main independent variables and their squares achieve statistical significance, as does ideological difference and candidate standing in the polls. This model also achieves the highest R-square value of any tested, suggesting that it is the best explanation of what is going on with candidate visits among all models presented. That

38 30.017% , which is almost identical in size to both the Democratic and Republican Super Tuesday's in 2000.

explanation is that candidate visitation is affected by both the size and timing of Super Tuesday, but not in a consistent fashion.

Calendar days is negative while the squared term is positive. The combination of these two variables means that as Super Tuesday moves closer to the New Hampshire Primary, the amount of time candidates are spending in Iowa and New Hampshire is decreasing, with the nadir at about 27 days[39]. Past this point, as Super Tuesday moves even closer to the New Hampshire Primary, candidates begin spending more time in the two early states. Since 1988, Super Tuesday has on two occasions taken place more than four weeks after the New Hampshire Primary. Once, in 2008, it took place 28 days after New Hampshire, and on the other three occasions did it take place less than four weeks after New Hampshire.

When it comes to the size of Super Tuesday, as Super Tuesday gets larger, candidates spend more of their time in Iowa and New Hampshire, with the function maximizing when about 37%[40] of the total number of delegates that will attend the convention are up for selection. Once Super Tuesday exceeds that threshold, candidate visits begin to decline. For both the Democrats and Republicans, 2008 is the only time that the number of delegates available on Super Tuesday exceeded 37% of the total number.

While these results are different than what was hypothesized, they do offer some support. A majority of Super Tuesdays have taken place within a month of New Hampshire, and the hypothesis that candidate visits should increase while the time distance decreases is supported by the model. All Super Tuesdays save 2008 have seen

39 27.2218 Days
40 36.9173% of Delegates

the percentage of delegates available at less than 37%, and the hypothesis that candidate visits should increase as the % of delegates available increases is also supported.

So why does this relationship end? Why, when Super Tuesday is more than a month away from New Hampshire, does candidate visits to the early states increase? It is theorized that as Super Tuesday gets closer, the value of momentum becomes more valuable, thus the value of a visit increases. The upshot in visits when Super Tuesday is more than a month away cannot be caused by an increased value in momentum. It is possible that as Super Tuesday moves further down the road, a candidate could build a successful organization in the early states and then, after New Hampshire, build a second organization in the Super Tuesday states. When Super Tuesday is close to New Hampshire, it makes it very difficult to build two organizations at different times. Big Shot candidates build them simultaneously, while Long Shots ignore building the Super Tuesday organization and concentrate on Iowa and New Hampshire. However, as Super Tuesday gets further away, the possibility that the two organizations could be built at different times, one after the other, increases. While the value of a victory in Iowa or New Hampshire would decline in this situation, it would likely never actually become zero. If there are diminishing marginal returns on visits to Iowa and New Hampshire, there should also be diminishing marginal returns on visits in the Super Tuesday states, and at some point the momentum from Iowa or New Hampshire, while itself still declining, could outweigh another trip to different state.

It is harder to come up with an explanation for why the size of Super Tuesday is having such an effect. The ability for candidates to be able to have the necessary resources to mount successful campaigns in an increasing number of states should

decrease and the size increases. It was theorized that to counter this problem, candidates would increasingly seek momentum as a way to counteract their resource problems. Likewise, momentum leads to increased access to resources, which would be see their value increase as Super Tuesday gets larger.

However, there appears to be an end to this escalating situation. At some point, Super Tuesday becomes so large that it cannot be increasingly avoided; that the momentum gained from Iowa and New Hampshire will be swamped by the large size of the election contested. As Norrander theorized, winnowing becomes more important than momentum. Who survives Iowa and New Hampshire becomes more important than who wins. As long as a candidate can do enough to finish well in the early states, it makes sense for them to move on to Super Tuesday; a Super Tuesday whose increasing size makes it more likely to be able to deliver a knockout blow. However, if this relationship is a true reflection of what is occurring, more time and effort should be devoted into both the how and why larger Super Tuesdays result in both an increasing and decreasing amount of visits.

If the two political parties want to decrease the importance of Iowa and New Hampshire without getting into the messy business of moving other states past Iowa and New Hampshire into the leadoff spot,[41] it appears they can alter candidate behavior by changing the size and distance of Super Tuesday from New Hampshire. Either a massively large[42] or very small Super Tuesday[43] gets attention away from Iowa and New

41 Ask Florida and Michigan about how messy that game is.

42 Technically 100%, but that would mean no distinct Iowa or New Hampshire contest. A Super Tuesday with 73% of the delegates would suggest that Iowa and New Hampshire would get 2% of the campaign time during the invisible primary, which is a rough reflection of their delegate strength.

43 Technically 0% would be best, but that would mean a Super Tuesday of nothing but beauty contests. This idea, while intriguing, is practically impossible in the zero-sum game of candidate attention. The attention curve equals Iowa and New Hampshire's delegate strength at .4%, which would be a Super Tuesday consisting entirely of Alaska.

Hampshire, though the reasons why for a small Super Tuesday remain unclear. A Super Tuesday four weeks after New Hampshire seems to be close enough to make candidates pay attention to the large collection of contests, but far enough away that the momentum affects from Iowa and New Hampshire can subside. A massively large Super Tuesday four weeks after the New Hampshire primary would appear to have the desired effect of diminishing Iowa and New Hampshire to their actual importance in the delegate count.

CHAPTER 9

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

Following Super Tuesday 1988, a number of states moved their primary back on the calendar, seeking to regain individual attention lost during that campaign. It would not be until 2000 that a single day saw the percentage of delegates to be selected rose above 25%. It is possible that 2012 will see a similar retreat that occurred in 1992, as states lost in the pack wish to assert themselves. Should this happen, it may be possible to see if Iowa and New Hampshire remain independent of what follows them.

However, other than looking into the future for more data, looking back into the past would be extremely useful. It seems unlikely that campaigns in the near future see the back loaded calendars that existed in the pre-1988 era. Finding the schedules of these candidates and plugging them into the equation would be very valuable in finding if Super Tuesday is making a difference.

Other variables that could have an impact on candidate strategy should also be examined and included in future analyses. Bartels, in his examination of the 1984 campaign, used ideological, education, income, and demographic variables to help predict which candidate would carry which states. It seems possible that it is these groups, and not ideology, that drives decisions by candidates to select where they will plot their course.

However, future research into this topic should focus into the how and why candidate visits both increase and decrease while Super Tuesdays get larger and closer. What could be occurring is just an artifact of a small data set with little variation. However, if the results are supported by future analyses, an examination into the why

would be greatly appreciated. While there seems to be a plausible reasoning behind why the amount of time could have different effects, the author is somewhat at a loss as to why the size of Super Tuesday is doing the same. An answer to this question would provide great benefits into what the apparent thinking behind modern presidential primary strategy is.

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