

EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF THE DPRK'S FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD MAJOR STATES:
AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC POLICY PRIORITIES OF NORTH KOREA
ON FOREIGN POLICY

by

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(Under the Direction of Han S. Park)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation starts with the question of what factors influence whether North Korea chooses to implement risky or cooperative policies toward major states, as well as what role domestic politics and ideology play in the DPRK's formation and enactment of foreign policy. This study also seeks to explain why North Korea chooses a hard line foreign policy and when it chooses to engage with surrounding states. To find answers to these questions, the domestic priorities behind foreign policies are analyzed within the framework of human needs development theory. In this theory, North Korean foreign policy goals are motivated by three domestic priorities or preferences: security, identity and prosperity. This study set up three hypotheses based on this theoretical framework. The hypotheses assumed that the DPRK's foreign policy is determined primarily by the demands of "national security" relative to the U.S.; North Korea's foreign policy toward South Korea is determined by the "identity need"; Pyongyang's foreign policy toward China is mostly based on a desire for "economic prosperity." In order to test these hypotheses, this study employs the "process-tracing" method, and also

observes the official newspaper of Pyongyang regime, through content analysis in order to determine the DPRK's perception and policy preference toward major states such as the United States, South Korea and China.

From the theoretical standpoint, this study proposes that North Korea is not abnormal or atypical, that is, the foreign policy goals of North Korea are not drastically different from any other country. First of all, one must understand that the essential ideologies of *Juche* and *Songun* and historical experiences have formed the preferences of Pyongyang's leadership. It is clear that the DPRK's domestic priorities have great influence on its foreign policy toward major governments, more so than external pressures and direct diplomatic interactions. This study implies that, within its context of its own history and perceptions, Pyongyang has acted rationally in regard to its goals and strategic interest.

INDEX WORDS: North Korean Foreign Policy, Human Needs, Security, Identity, Prosperity, U.S.-DPRK Relations, Inter-Korea Relations, Sino-DPRK Relations.

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DEDICATION

To my parents,
Taepyo Hong and Soonan Shin

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. The Puzzle

The debate over the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has emerged in the recent decades as one of the most divisive foreign policy issues for South Korea, the United States, and their allies in Asia. Specifically, North Korea's provocative attitudes toward western states and their military facilities, including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and nuclear weapons, continue to serve as a threat to South Korea and the United States.

Following a successive string of tug of wars incidents with Washington, North Korea announced its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993.¹ The announcement elevated what was long viewed as a serious proliferation threat into a high stakes diplomatic confrontation between North Korea and the United States. The 1994 Agreed framework between the DPRK and the US turned out to be ill-fated and a North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 when the United States revealed that North Korea had been acquiring necessary equipment for uranium-based nuclear weapons program.² Since then, North

¹ "The North Korean nuclear program began in the mid-1960s with the construction of a 2-4-thermal-megawatts (MW) research reactor at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of its capital Pyongyang, supplied by the former Soviet Union, and the nearly simultaneous acquisition of a 0.1-MW critical facility. The ostensible rationale for the facilities was scientific research and the production of radioactive isotopes for medical and industrial use. Then, in the early 1980s, North Korea began construction of the 5-MW (e) research reactor in *Yongbyon*, followed by a "radiochemical laboratory," North Korea's euphemism for a plutonium reprocessing plant. The latter two facilities are widely suspected as having provided North Korea with enough weapons grade plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons," at <<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-905f.htm>>

² The second nuclear crisis between North Korea and the U.S. began in October of 2002 when U.S.

Korea has continued to provoke South Korea and the US. For instance, DPRK tested its nuclear device in 2006 and conducted its second nuclear test in 2009 in spite of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 which imposed economic and commercial sanctions on DPRK from 2006. In the celebration of Kim Il-Sung's 100th birthday anniversary (April 15, 2012), Pyongyang launched a terrestrial observation satellite, *Kwangmyongsong 3*. Recently, the successful launch of *Kwangmyongsong 3* on December 12, 2012 and the third underground nuclear test in the northern part of North Korea on February 12, 2013 severely strained relations with US and South Korea. These events have evoked rage in the western international community. In the two Koreas' relation, North Korea has maintained hardline policy politically and militarily: The sinking of South Korea's *Cheonan* warship and North Korea's artillery shelling of *Yeonpyeong* in 2010 are well represented as the frostiest military tension between North and South.

The Pattern of Pyongyang's policy strategy regarding the nuclear controversy has been one of "brinkmanship,"³ yet, at times, North Korea shown willingness to negotiate with the outside (i.e. U.S., South Korea, and Japan). For any negotiation, North Korea has used its nuclear program as a bargaining chip in its effort to secure concessions from the United States, Japan, and South Korea (Harrison 2002). In fact, on October 21, 1994 North Korea consented to the Geneva⁴ Agreed Framework and began the six-party talks leading to September 19th Joint

Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, confronted North Korean officials with evidence showing that it had been illegally enriching uranium, George Gedda, "North Korea Told to Renounce Nukes," *Associated Press* (October 17, 2002)

³ Dixit and Skeath (1999: 302) define brinkmanship as "a threat that creates a risk but not certainty of a mutually bad outcome." According to Scoot Snyder (1999: 76), brinkmanship is "a unilateral strategy in negotiation which involves mixing aggressive and provocative tactics, including issuing unconditional demands, blustering, bluffing, threatening, stalling, manufacturing deadlines, and even walking out of negotiation".

⁴ The U.S. and North Korea came to the brink of war in June 1994. But the visit of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang and negotiations with Kim Il-Sung averted war, and led to the U.S.-DPRK

Statement of 2005, and the February 29, 2012 nutrition aid agreement with Washington. In order to engage with Japan, Kim Jong-Il even admitted the abduction of Japanese citizens and in 2005 apologized to the visiting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi for these previous covert actions (Park 2012). Regarding inter-Korea relations, Pyongyang adopted the June 15th Declaration of 2000 and the October 4th Agreements of 2006. Regarding economic benefits, Pyongyang agreed to open and operate “the Mount Kumkang Tourism (1998)” and “the Kaesong Industrial Complex (2000)” with the South. These events illustrate Pyongyang’s serious interest in engaging itself in fruitful negotiations with the West and Asian community at large.

In foreign policy patterns and decision-making processes, “brinkmanship” is commonly regarded as being irrational, and defines any systematic explanation. In other words, to the outside observer, it seems that North Korean government is a black box. Some scholars mention that North Korea’s irrational, violent, and unpredictable style increases the danger of North Korea acting as a rogue state (Spector and Smith 1991, 8; Cha 2002). Furthermore, the opacity of its internal foreign policy process has raised many questions about this mysterious and isolated regime (Cha 2002, 46-50).

However, some scholars have seen in the actions of North Korea a unique internal logic and motivation (Kang 2003; Snyder 1999; Park 1997; Han Park 2010/2012). They suggest that North Korea’s brinkmanship is based, not on irrationality or roguish madness, but on its own version of rational calculation.⁵ In terms of North Korea’s nuclear provocation, specifically, Pyongyang has also seen its possession of such capabilities as a means for improving its bargaining power in the international community and as a means to address domestic political and economic challenges. For instance, Han S. Park (2010, 103-104) argues that North Korea’s

Agreed Framework of October 1994.

⁵ Specifically, some indicated that the U.S. policy toward North Korea is based on mistaken conceptualization of and assumptions about North Korea’s capabilities and intention (Kang 2003: 310).

nuclear weapons program has come as a rational choice for national security at the expense of economic opportunities.

As mentioned above, one can observe that Pyongyang's foreign policy behaviors have vacillated between confrontation and engagement as opposed to a consistent pattern of brinkmanship. Why does North Korea repeat these behaviors of meandering between cooperation and confrontation toward other countries? This question defines the contribution of this dissertation, which seeks to explain when North Korea chooses a hard line foreign policy and when it chooses to engage with surrounding states.

2. Research Questions

To analyze North Korea's foreign policy toward surrounding major states, this research is designed to find out the following questions:

- 1) What factors influence whether North Korea chooses to implement risky or cooperative policies toward major states? Or, alternatively, what main principles and goals guide the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's foreign policy decisions?
- 2) What is the relative weight of internal (i.e. domestic/societal) versus external (i.e. systemic) factors in the formation of North Korea's foreign policy behavior?
- 3) What have been the tactics and policy consequences of pursuing a particular foreign policy?
- 4) What role do historical context and ideology play in the DPRK's formation and enactment of its foreign policy?

CHAPTER 2

IR THEORIES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Theoretical Framework: Selected Feature of Leading Theories

The theoretical framework of this research is drawn from a combination of realism, liberalism, and constructivism to identify and examine possible variables that affect the North Korea's foreign policy behaviors. As Realism focuses on military power, allies, the international systems' structure, and security concerns, it provides a powerful explanation of most foreign policy choices for the Cold War politics. This is because realists tend to see a state's foreign policy through the logic of power-relationships evident during the bipolar competition of the post World War II relations. That is, it sees states as "satisficers," willing to enact foreign policy in so far as it meets their minimum-security needs, but no further. In contrast, liberals prefer the logic of "procedural legitimacy" because they are most interested in psychological prosperity or pragmatic values, and constructivists tend to use the logic of acceptability because they are most concerned with the values of community (Chittick 2006, 14). In order to analyze DPRK's foreign policy, liberal and constructivist interpretations of domestic and ideational factors are more appropriate to understand certain foreign policy priorities of North Korea, especially, in the post-Cold War era.

According to the realist school (specifically neo-realism), while no hierarchy of authority exists there is a hierarchy of power in the international system. As there is no world government to enforce stability on the international system, each state must provide for its own security to

ensure its “survival.” Thus anarchy is a principle that shapes the motives and actions of states as it encourages all states to engage in self-help behavior. As a result, realists view international relations as essentially conflictual. Moreover, when states act in their own interest, a “security dilemma” occurs. As Robert Jervis (1978) argues, security dilemma under anarchy occurs when an attempt by one state to increase its security (e.g. through increased military expenditures) has the effect of decreasing the security of others. Realists insist that states consider national security and survival as the most important goal of a foreign policy (thus establishing strong military capabilities) and that state behaviors are constrained by the international structure (external power dynamics).

North Korea’s security dilemma may best be explained in terms of defensive realism (Jervis 1978; Snyder 1991). Kenneth Waltz applies the logic of the security dilemma to North Korea after the Cold War when he writes, “Like earlier nuclear states, North Korea wants the military capability because it feels weak, isolated, and threatened” (1995, 38). Waltz argues that, from Pyongyang’s perspective, North Korea has been under a serious military disadvantage compared to South Korea. Even worse, North Korea’s two Cold War allies, the Soviet Union and China, became increasingly unreliable, while South Korea remained firmly allied with the United States, which provided a strong guarantee of security backed by nuclear weapons.

Though a security dilemma on the Korean peninsula may cause each state to worry about the other’s future intentions and generate a spiral of mutual hostility, defensive realists believe that states are willing to settle for the status quo and that conflict is avoidable under most circumstances. In this regard, North Korea’s nuclear program may be suspended if the current security dilemma is resolved. To support this claim, defensive realists argue that North Korea has not been involved in any expansionist or aggressive behaviors since the late 1980s. Moreover,

they suggest that if North Korea had aggressive ambitions, it would have used its atomic weapons in emerging confrontations. Since this has not transpired, these scholars argue instead that North Korean nuclear capability is a tool of regime survival and not a preparation in anticipation of military confrontation with the U.S. and South Korea (Kang 2003, 320-321). This view implies that the nuclear weapons program is intended as a deterrent to ensure the survival of the regime.

These scholars agree that North Korea is not the most reliable negotiating partner and may even cheat if it is able to do so. They predict, however, that it is likely to give up most, if not all, of its nuclear capabilities and engage the international community peacefully only if it feels its security concerns are alleviated (i.e. that the long-term military and economic benefits outweigh the short-term benefits of developing nuclear weapons) (E. Kang 2003). Defensive realists claim that this tactic was successful in 1994 when the Agreed Framework with the U.S. offered North Korea a way to break out of its security dilemma while saving the regime's face in front of both international and domestic audiences (Wit, Poneman and Galluci 2004, 390). Further, these scholars suggest that nuclear threat by North Korea worsened after 2002 when the Bush administration took an increasingly hard line (Cha and Kang 2003, 134-148).

In liberalism, Moravcsik (1997) emphasizes the importance of non-state actors' role in world politics. He argues that social actors such as individuals and private groups should be considered as the fundamental agents in international politics because non-state actors contribute to shaping states' preferences and on the basis of these social agents' interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics. In this sense, foreign policy is presented as a counterpart and an extension of domestic politics. Therefore, governments or their officials are the "actors" in international relations (Kaarbo, Lantis and Beasley 2002).

In other words, the state behavior and outcome in world politics are determined by the configuration of interdependent state preferences. Keohane and Nye (1977) reject the realist notion of a hierarchy of issues. Since the agenda of interstate relationship consists of multiple issues, state policy goals are not arranged in stable hierarchies as realists confine the policy goal to the high politics of security. Moreover, they argue that in this new era of complex interdependence, military force is becoming less usable and less important as a policy option. This point strongly qualifies the effects of realist notion of international anarchy that induces human aspiration for power to overcome the fear of survival in the Hobbesian state of nature.

Thus, whereas neorealists argue that cooperation exists between asymmetrical states only when the stronger nation desires it (Waltz 1979), liberals suppose that North Korea's cooperation with other countries is an exception to this rule (Sigal 1998). Though liberals acknowledge the Korean peninsula embodies a balance of power scenario, they argue that North Korea is changing its attitude toward cooperation and is redefining its strategy. Pyongyang's long-sustained isolation, they argue, is unsustainable. The North Korean regime senses this and is considering greater interaction, and even cooperation, with other actors in the international community. In North Korea, decision-makers have sought to negotiate foreign policies based on their preferences (i.e. regimes survival, economic benefits), rather than by structural determinants such as balance of power, and national interests.

Those who advocate a more positive, engaging policy toward North Korea argue that economic incentives may be more effective and produce more positive outcomes than economic sanctions (Snyder 1997). These same scholars use the Agreed Framework of 1994 as an example to support this claim. Because North Korea is more open to the world and thus more economically and politically vulnerable to external influence, they reason, if economic incentives

are offered it is more likely to cooperate with the international community rather than persist in its own view. Though the Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002, North Korea is expected to negotiate at new deal. These scholars believe that the North Korean nuclear crisis may be resolved peacefully if the United States is willing to offer positive incentives. Moreover, in order to understand the DPRK's foreign policy, one must understand domestic politics in North Korea ruled by one-party communist system. Kyung-Ae Park (1997) assumes that the dominant goal of the North Korean leadership is to stay in power. As a result, she contends that the most important determinant of Pyongyang's behavior is the leaders' drive to ensure their political and physical survival. Because economic recovery and the consolidation of power are the most important issues in Pyongyang's domestic policy, North Korean leaders often choose policies that encourage the survival of the regime at the expense of the larger interests of the nation. Specifically, both Pyongyang's cooperation and confrontation among surrounding states should be understood as a means to manage and consolidate domestic power.

The constructivist argue that states' identities and interests are not exogenously given but can emerge, change, and be institutionalized through interaction within different domestic and international environments. Thus, constructivism emphasizes "intersubjective structure" in international relations. This theoretical paradigm portrays the world in terms of identity groupings and social structures and emphasizes the role of ideas, beliefs and cultures. Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of national identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures. Therefore, constructivists argue that actors' identities are constituted by the norms, values and ideas formed within a social environment. Alexander Wendt posits that (1) structures of human association are determined

primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and (2) identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (1999).

In this sense, constructivist scholars seek to explain North Korea's diplomatic behavior in terms of its unique political culture and domestic politics. Also, since culture and ideologies are developed over long period of time, those who take a cultural approach also pay close attention to a nation's unique historical experience. For example, Oh and Hassig argue that North Korea's foreign policy is crafted against the backdrop of Korean history, especially the memory of recurring invasions from neighboring powers and years of political subjugation (2000, 148). Thus, according to this perspective, North Korea's 'paranoia' may be seen as more reasonable than it otherwise would have been. With regard to North Korea's unique political culture, Han S. Park (2002) argues that Pyongyang's foreign policy behavior can be explained through the belief system of its ruling elite. He suggests that the ideology of *Juche*, or self-reliance, has determined the course of Pyongyang's policy preference.

Those who emphasize North Korea's domestic politics contend that Pyongyang's foreign policy has not been realized in the way that structural approaches predicted (Park 1997). Although they acknowledge the importance of external variables, their primary explanation are the internal variables, such as North Korea's domestic political stability, leadership, history and culture (Park 2002). This focus on domestic politics implies that Pyongyang's foreign policy may appear to be a response to changes in other powerful states' foreign policy but they really reflect the domestic environment in a number of areas.

If one fails to consider how a state's leader and its prevailing ideas or ideologies shape its foreign relations, one may create an analysis that is inadequate and thus perpetuates

misunderstandings and misperceptions ⁶ (Youngho Kim 2011). In most cases, it is best to “translate” international variables using intervening domestic ones (Rose 1998, 146-147). Or, in the case of foreign policy analysis, it is imperative to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the most important determinants of state behavior including material and ideational factors (Hudson 2006, 7). This dissertation focuses primarily on how decision-makers’ domestic policy priorities impact North Korea’s foreign policy behaviors.

2. Human Needs Theory

Herbert Simon (1985) argues that one needs to know where policy preferences originate. In his research, domestic priorities of foreign policies are drawn from a theory of development advanced by Han S. Park (1984). Park’s paradigm relies on three basic assumptions regarding the relationship between human needs and development: First, human’s will work to satisfy their most immediate needs to the greatest possible extent. Second, the most immediate needs within a given society will determine that society’s course of political development. Finally, governments and political systems are legitimate insofar as they can enhance a population’s ability to satisfy these immediate needs (1984, 59) Corresponding to the first assumption, Park (1984) establishes the foundation of his development theory on a set of four hierarchical structured human needs: (1) the need to “**survive**”, (2) the need to interact and to share psychological attachments with others (“**belongingness**”), (3) the need to enjoy a leisurely mode of living (“**leisure**”), and (4) to attain superior quality of life relative to others by securing superfluous material goods and social status (“**control or relative gratification**”). In this hierarchical human needs theory, physical

⁶ Robert Jervis (1976) manifests perceptual and cognitive process of international decision making. Jervis argues that understating individual perception such as images, beliefs and intentions impacts on decision making in foreign policy and world politics. According to him, perception is influenced by immediate concerns, history perception and the other’s behavior perception.

survival is the most essential and basic requirement for human beings. It is universal that all of humankind wants and needs to survive. Park (1984, 61) defines the survival need simply as “the desire of all living beings to stay alive”, and notes that the high value placed on survival transfers a high value onto anything that is essential for survival. People want to obtain the basic necessities such as food, shelter, and safety. When the need of survival is sufficiently satisfied, human beings will begin to seek others with whom they can identify and share the day-to-day experiences of life (Han Park 1984, 61). In this stage, the need to belong supplants the now-satisfied need to survive.

Once the need to survive and the need to belong have been satisfied, humans will seek fulfillment of the need for leisure. Park (1984, 62) defines leisure as “a desire for material consumption beyond what is required for survival and belongingness.” Under Park’s definition, the need for leisure can include the desire for vacation time, the decision to seek out faster means of transportation, or the acquisition of time-saving appliances (62).

As man possesses time and material resources necessary for a leisurely life, he will become preoccupied with the desire to maintain a “superior” life relative to other individuals. At this point, social status will become salient consideration in an individual’s life. As Park states (63), this desire may manifest as a drive to win fixed-sum competitions. Social status is a relative value, thus winning by some necessitates losing by others.

In the second and third assumptions, Park argues that the structure of the process of political development⁷ corresponds to the four human needs. That is, for each set of human

⁷ Han S. Park suggested that “development has common objectives at any level of social complexity: individual, group, state, and the global community itself” and “one universal and important objective of development is need satisfaction. Need satisfaction is a concept that is applicable universally, and thus, a definition of development as the process in which members of the political system (country) pursue and obtain need-satisfaction. This conception of development is so universal that it will defy ideological and cultural barriers (Park 2012, 3)”.

needs, there is a corresponding stage of political development designed to meet that need. For the survival there is the political process of “**regime formation**”. For social interaction and belonging, there is the goal of “**political integration**”. For the enjoyment of leisure, there is the goal of “**resource expansion**,” and for the need to secure superfluous goods over others, there is the political goal of “**conflict management**”.

In this regard, North Korea is not abnormal or atypical, that is to say, the foreign policy goals of North Korea are not drastically different from any other country. The North Korean regime must constantly strive to satisfy people’s material needs to the greatest possible extent in order to maintain and reinforce its legitimacy. Congruent with outlined stages of human needs, North Korean regime establishes policy goals which fit its political system and situation. In order of importance, these are (1) national security, (2) political integration, (3) resource expansion, and (4) conflict management. The goal of national security remains paramount all other policy goals, followed by political integration and resource expansion (“these goals are to be pursued in this very order of preference”, Park 2012). In North Korea, first and foremost, the regime wishes to ensure its own survival. Once survival is assured, then, it is expected to pursue a system identity. Furthermore, North Korea seeks prosperity on the basis of the establishment of survival and identity.

Therefore, this dissertation shows that North Korean foreign policy goals are motivated by three domestic priorities or preferences: security, identity, and prosperity. By focusing on these preferences (or motivations) one can understand the logic of DPRK’s foreign policy decision making strategy.

1) Security

National security is the most important consideration of foreign policy for any country. Needless to say, security (e.g. the security dilemma) is a significant domestic factor in North Korea's foreign policy decision making process and priority. When a small country is confronted with a threat from enemies that are perceived to be hostile, irrational, and militarily superior, the importance of national security cannot be over-stated (Manwoo Lee). After the Cold War era, North Korea had to pursue foreign policy factors that would reduce the threat to its national security and promote its own unique socialism within the U.S.-dominated new world order (Oh 2001, 127).

DPRK decision-makers choose certain actions when they perceive other states as threats to their security. Thus, how they orient towards major players via security shapes the policy they will choose to implement.

2) Identity and Legitimacy

According to Park, every political system attempts to generate and maintain its own legitimacy. Through the support of the people, leaders are able to have their orders obeyed willingly rather than through the use of force. In addition, the key components of this legitimacy are the belief by the governed in the ruler's moral right to issue commands and the people's corresponding consent to obey such commands. Park argues that "North Korea is the most striking example of a system that uses values and beliefs as the foundation of power and authority" (2002, 163). When regime legitimacy is created and maximized on the basis of inculcating a belief system, leaders need not be concerned with economic performance to satisfy people's material needs.

Identity may be defined as a concept of the self, a selection of physical, psychological, emotional, or social attributes of particular individuals. Identity provides a framework within which people construct reality and determine their positions on a wide range of issues (Payne 2011, 338). When state identity is formed as a basis for legitimacy, this identity unifies people, and at times, may serve as a strong basis for mass mobilization. Often, identity builds on common characteristics such as ideology, language, race, religion, beliefs, a shared understanding of history.⁸

In an international context, this same identity can create allies or enemies of states that share or do not share these common characteristics. These identities, however, continue to change based upon how both the domestic and international context change and how the population related to common memories of the past. Thus identity is the major variable to be considered when analyzing how preferences shape North Korea's foreign policy.

3) Prosperity

If one assumes that leaders view foreign policy through domestic concerns and interests, then an examination of economic relations reveals that actors' economic goals influence their foreign policy's patterns. Moreover, prosperity preferences encourage actors to be more proactive with implementing foreign policy.

Recently, North Korea's foreign relations are reflected two crucial concepts, that is, *Songun Jeongchi* (military first policy), and *Kangsong Daekuk* (strong and prosperous great power). *Songun politics* represent as the "new higher stage" of the *Juche* idea, and is elevated to

⁸ According to Alexander Wendt (1999), "state identity" is formed to base claims for legitimacy on, as well as to create some sort of a unity of the people as a basis for mass mobilization, an image all can follow and identify with; thus, it may build on such common denominators as ideology, language, race, religion, beliefs, a shared understanding of history.

the position of North Korea's official ruling ideology (Kwak and Joo 2009, 1). By the same token, the goal of achieving *Kansong Daekuk* has become as the system identity in North Korea (Park 2012). In this doctrine, after accomplished concrete military capability such as the nuclear power, North Korea need to make an effort to achieve the goal of economic prosperity.

In short, foreign policy consists of strategic/ tactical maneuvers aimed at achieving a set of goals. These goals, in order of priority, are security, identity, and prosperity. Further, to understand North Korea's strategic and tactical maneuverings designed to pursue the policy goals, one must understand its domestic politics and belief systems.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

1. Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical reasoning above, several testable hypotheses can be derived:

H1: The DPRK's foreign policy toward the U.S. is determined by its goal of maintaining "national security."

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the U.S. have had a troubled relationship since the creation of the DPRK on September 9, 1948. The DPRK was created in the wake of the three preceding years of increasing tensions between the two post-World War II occupation zones and the subsequent creation of the American-backed Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948. Following its creation, the DPRK's tense relationship with the U.S. worsened during the Korean War, continued through the Cold War, and has deepened due to the DPRK's pursuit of an assertive geopolitical agenda (Olsen 2009, 54).

After the Japanese surrendered in World War II, the U.S. and Soviet forces remained in Korea (Park 2002, 118-199). These two superpowers were supposed to remain in Korea until an independent Korean government could be established. Each occupied a side of the 38th parallel, the U.S. to the South and the Soviet Union to the North. Both the Soviet Union and United States, however, used the Korean peninsula as means to assert their hegemonic aspiration and ideological stances. This tension led to a prolonged occupation of the peninsula by both powers

and culminated in the establishment of two separate governments with leaders handpicked by Washington and Moscow: Rhee Syng-Man in the south and Kim Il-Sung in the north. Thus, as Park notes, it was these “ideologically opposed hegemonic powers on the peninsula [that] perpetuated the conflict” (199).

North Korea and the United States have maintained an intense adversarial relationship since the Korean War. After the demise of the Soviet bloc, through the more strengthened the U.S. and South Korea’s military alliance, the U.S. became more committed to bolstering South Korea’s socioeconomic viability; thus South Korea was able to rebuild quickly after the war, while North Korea remained devastated. As U.S. hegemony strengthened, North Korea’s form of Marxism-Leninism-Kimism became increasingly antagonistic toward the U.S.

Though one may debate the degree to which the North Korean perception of the US was realistic and the degree to which it may be considered paranoid, what matters for present purposes is that these historical events have influenced how North Korea views the United States. North Korea is extremely suspicious of U.S. goals, wary of U.S. motivations, and fearful of American aggression. Therefore, it is assumed that this perceived threat to North Korean national security is the primary force in shaping the DPRK’s policies toward the United States.

H2: North Korea’s foreign policy toward South Korea is determined by the “identity need.”

North Korea’s identity is the basis of regime legitimacy. As a divided country, North Korea’s legitimacy is forged in the inter-Korean comparison. Han S. Park claims that “this imperative of maintaining legitimacy vis-à-vis South Korea has worked as a restraint on

Pyongyang's policy exploration" (2000/2001, 506). He further argues (2002, 149), "Pyongyang has been vigorously waging the legitimacy war against South Korea since the inception of its system. North Koreans believe that system change means system collapse. Therefore, their resistance to change is in fact their resistance to collapse." In other words, North Korean foreign policy, particularly in clashes with its southern neighbor, has centered on the establishment of regime legitimacy. From this point of view, the Korean War of 1950-1953 can be understood as an attempt by the North to settle the legitimacy issue (Koh 2004).

Historical context strongly contributes to an understanding of how each Korean political system was formed. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is considered by some to be a fossilized "guerrilla state" or "partisan state." Its founding myths and national identity were forged in the 1930s through armed resistance to a brutal Japanese colonial government and further hardened in the bitter contest of the Korean War in the early 1950s. These national identities have since been maintained by isolationism and tension of a half century of unresolved conflict with South Korea and its allies (McCormack 2004, 1).

What sets the Korean experience apart from other cases is the fact that the divided Koreas engaged in a brutal intra-ethnic conflict for three years (1950-1953), the Korean War.⁹ Moreover, the South Koreans viewed this intra-ethnic conflict not simply as a political war but a "moral war." Prior to the war, South Korea suffered under four decades of oppressive Japanese rule. Beginning in 1948, the U.S. acted as a guardian to South Korea, showering the Rhee regime both with economic and military aid and overseeing the establishment of a constitutionally-based democratic system, complete with democratic ideals, participatory politics, and democratic

⁹ An estimated three million Koreans, and nearly 37,000 Americans, died in the Korean War (1950-1953). Many consider the Korean War as a surrogate world war to the overarching Cold War conflict. Further, the Korean War ended without resolution (i.e. not in a peace settlement but in a fragile armistice) (McCormack 2004, 1).

institutions. As a result, the South Koreans viewed the Korean War as a struggle to protect democratic values and accompanying institutions.

North Korea, in contrast, has been compelled to follow a completely different course. The North Koreans regarded the Korean War as a continuation of the nationalist struggle against foreign domination, this time against the U.S. and its “surrogate” powers. This sentiment led the North Koreans to express pride that they served as their own representatives at the signing of the armistice agreement, whereas the South Koreans were represented by the officials from the United Nations.

Each of the two Koreas has repeatedly asserted that it is superior to the other. As a result, each citizenry has established norms and beliefs supporting a certain level of mutual antagonism between these states. Park noted, however, that throughout this process North Korea has almost always placed the emphasis on ideology; in contrast, South Korea has shown great emphasis in pursuing pragmatic economic interests (Park 2002, 118). Considering the fact that the South has been recognized internationally as an “economic miracle” in the last two decades, Pyongyang’s challenge in keeping pace is enormous. Each of these states struggles for recognition, and this struggle is ultimately linked to internal legitimacy and international sovereignty.

During the Cold War, the main policy of South Korea was strengthening its own military and maintaining a good alliance relationship with the U.S. As a result, an arms race occurred on the Korean Peninsula. Though the overarching Cold War security structure has ended, the Cold War-influenced legitimacy and security contest continues in inter-Korean relations.

Particularly, the DPRK’s regime legitimacy *is* founded upon *Juche*, an ideology that is known to be in effect an all-encompassing doctrine. In general terms of foreign policy, North Korea seeks economic self-sufficiency, political sovereignty, and military self-reliance. As North

Koreans have focused on these goals, *Juche* has become a source of political legitimacy and national pride for them. One can assume that Pyongyang's primary policy goal is to fulfill the edicts of *Juche*, fortifying its identity in relation to South Korea. This leads me to another expectation:

H3: Pyongyang's foreign policy toward China is mostly based on a desire for "economic prosperity."

Both North Korea and China are communist nations that share cultural characteristics. At this time, the Sino-North Korea alliance is still effective and valid. Moreover, DPRK's leaders consider that "China does not pose any security or ideological threat" (Park 2012). Given its military tensions with South Korea and the U.S. and its general diplomatic isolation, North Korea needs China's support (Lee 2010, 460-461).

Historically, China has used North Korea as a buffer zone between it and the United States. This is not the only role North Korea serves for China, however, as each side considers the relationship a "friendship cemented in blood." Historically, the Korean War served as a reminder to the Beijing leadership that Korea is important to its own national security. As a result, in October of 1950, China reentered the Korean Peninsula via the Yalu River and directly confronted the U.S. militarily. This conflict ended in a military stalemate three years later and resulted in very high number of casualties.¹⁰

In 1961 China and North Korea signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. This treaty committed either party to come to the aid of the other if attacked.¹¹ North Korea and China relations since developed within the context of the treaty.

¹⁰ Adelman and Shih (1993, 189) argued "the Chinese casualties were closer to 400,000."

¹¹ See, Nanto, Dick K. and Manyin, Mark E. 2010. *China-North Korea Relations*. Congressional Research Service (CRS R41043). pp. 5-6.

Both nations saw their mutual defense alliance in terms of protecting their shared communist ideology, and China became a huge economic supporter of North Korea.

Also, China had a great influence on political and social structure of North Korea. After the Cold War, the importance of ideology faded and economic interest began to shape the relationship between these countries. Since then subtle changes have occurred in China-North Korea relations. Starting in the early 1980s, China has implemented a pragmatic national developmental strategy of reform and openness. In doing so, China has moved to adjust its relationship with North Korea to one that is similar to its relationships with other countries.

In this context, North Korea does not perceive any struggle of security and regime legitimacy with China. Given that North Korea has no other substantial trade partners, it reasonable to assume that Pyongyang's policy toward China would be geared toward developing its economic relations with Beijing.

2. Methodology

1) A Case Study

This study employs a qualitative case-study methodology. A case study allows the researcher to uncover causal mechanisms and analyze more observable implications derived from the competing theories. Raging (1987) suggests that case studies are the best method for identifying invariant patterns that tend to be common in relatively small sets of cases. According to Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005), a qualitative case study can establish cause and effect between the independent variable(s) and the dependent variable.

This study is based on what Arend Lijphart (1971) called “interpretative case studies.”¹² An interpretive case study applies a theoretical explanation to an historical event. Thus, it is not meant to contribute to new theories or provide generalizations, but rather to simply explain why an historical event was the expected outcome (Lijphart 1971; Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 1999). Moreover, the interpretive case study method allows one to apply theory to a historical case by presenting a new interpretation of such case (Eckstein 1975, 99-104; George 1979, 47-51).

2) Process Tracing

In order to analyze the policy behaviors of North Korea, this study uses the “process-tracing” method. According to Bennett and George (2005), process-tracing is a special type of historical explanation that enables the analyst to identify causal links within a single case. Process-tracing is a suitable method for addressing the conditions that allowed an event to happen. In this way, it may complement the historical method such as genetic or sequential explanation that show in detail how one event leads to another (Bennett and George 2005). They argue that process-tracing has many advantages for theory development and theory testing, some of them unique: it can identify paths to an outcome, point out variables that were left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases or even a single case (223).

In other words, “process-tracing” assists not only in testing theory but also in explaining what truly happened and what actors thought happened. Therefore, the purpose of applying the process-tracing method to this study is to discover how the variations of North Korea’s domestic

¹² Lijphart divides case studies into six ideal types: (1) atheoretical case studies, (2) interpretative case studies, (3) hypothesis-generating case studies, (4) theory-confirming case studies, (5) theory-infirming case studies, (6) deviant case studies.

policy preferences, colored as they are by North Korea's perceptions of the outside world, have influenced its policy toward the U.S., China, and South Korea.

3) Content Analysis

In order to clarify the DPRK's foreign policy behavior, this dissertation also employs empirical methods such as content analysis and event data analysis. According to Krippendorff, content analysis is "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (2004, 18). As Samuel S. Kim points out, content analysis promises "a more reliable method if we are to minimize any vagueness or bias resulting from the normative predilections of analysts and to enhance empirical accuracy by making methodological procedure more exact and replicable" (1980, 291). This method provides a systematic and rigorous use of verbal symbols in mass or official communications (or even in interviews), employing an explicit conceptual scheme for assembling, typologizing, and measuring the content of communication. Yongho Kim insists that "most studies on the North Korean foreign policy lack Kremlinological evidence by quoting North Korea's first materials such as official memos and statements that appeared in its official media." Also, he notes that "very few official documents are released to the public for either journalistic or academic reasons; even the released materials are by and large propaganda" (2011, 28-29). Furthermore, very few are about decision making procedures. Finally, under this circumstance, there is no other effective way but to use Kremlinology, a classical way of analyzing communist countries' foreign policy through tracing symbolic interactions reported by media. Symbolic interactions include attendances, addresses, and speeches at celebratory occasions, newspaper editorials, and official comments or memoranda.

This dissertation features a content analysis of *Rodong Sinmun*¹³ articles in which the frequency of key words is counted. In North Korea, media is strictly controlled by the Korean Workers Party. Therefore, what the Pyongyang media report is a straight-forward reflection of Pyongyang's policy behavior and position. *Rodong Sinmun* is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP). This newspaper expresses the official position on important issues and delivers the propaganda of KWP rather than simply delivering news.

Rodong Sinmun (*The Worker's Daily*, an official newspaper for KWP), *Minchu Chosun* (*Democratic Korea*, the official newspaper for the KWP) and Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) are Pyongyang's three most important media organizations. Among these three, the KCNA uploads selected newspaper articles from *Rodong Sinmun* and *Minchu Chosun* in addition to its own wired news to its homepage on the Internet (<http://www.kcna.co.jp>). Korea News Agency, a subsidiary company run by a pro-North Korean residents' league known as *Choch'ongryon*, operates the site in Japan (Kim 2011, 28-29).

This study counts the frequency of key words as denoting security, identity, and prosperity aimed toward the US, South Korea, and China. Changes in frequency are a useful indicator for understanding Pyongyang's need for perception and preference of foreign policy. The Pyongyang regime presents its needs through the frequency of specific words in *Rodong Sinmun* compared to the prior period. Thus, this approach employs the Kremlinological method for providing more accurate analysis of the DPRK's policy goals and orientation. Long-term changes in frequency of specific words might present some patterns in the North Korean regime's priorities for foreign policy behaviors. More importantly, this approach allows us to

¹³ *Rodong Sinmun*, six pages long and as the official publication of the Korea Workers Party is the primary source of both domestic and international news, and editorials. Pages 5 and 6 pages mostly carry articles related to South Korea and international affairs.

search for correlation between the frequency and occurrence of key terms and the policy behaviors of high-ranking elites.

Sampling, Coding Rules and Procedures

This dissertation uses selected newspaper articles included in both Korean and English language translations from *Rodong Sinmun* uploaded by the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA)'s homepage (<http://www.kcna.co.jp>) operated in Japan by Korea News Agency¹⁴ and *Rodong Sinmun* provided by Tongilbu (Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea) in which all articles from *Rodong Sinmun* are accumulated. This research includes an English-language version provided by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) which supported North Korea articles in the FBIS's *Daily Report: East Asia* until September 1996. At first, editorials (*Saseol, Ronseol, Chungron, Danpyoung, Pyoungron*) from *Rodong Sinmun* from selected years will be categorized into three sorts of editorials: 1) editorials related with the United States' issues, 2) editorials of the inter-Korea relations, and 3) editorials and articles with Sino-North Korea relations. In terms of Sino-DPRK relations, this study implies both news articles and editorials from *Rodong Sinmun* because *Rodong Sinmun* is less prone to refer toward China in foreign policy-related content.

Secondly, this research counts the frequency with which proper nouns regarding with security concerns such as “war (*jyeonjaeng*)” “military (*gunsu*)”, “self-defense (*jawui*)”, “security (*anjon*)”, “attack (*chimgong, gongkeok*)”, are mentioned in the editorials toward the US, the South, and China in *Rodong Sinmun* from selected year. These words represent Pyongyang's security priorities and needs in foreign policy. In regard to national identity, the words “Self-reliance”

¹⁴ Korea News Agency, its subsidiary company run by a pro-North Korean residents' league known as Choch'ongryon.

(*Juche*, *Jaju*), “Military-first” (*Sungun*) and “National dignity” (*Jonum*) reveal Pyongyang’s identity needs and goals toward these states. Therefore, this study counts these words from articles which deal with the three states’ relations in *Rodong Sinmun*. In addition, this study will include identity signifiers such as the word “Enemy” (*wonsu*), “Puppet regime” (*gyerae*), “Cabal Party”; “Gang Group”; “Thief Group” (*paedang*; *ildang*; *dodang*), “Traitor”; “Treason” (*maeguk*; *banyeok*; *yeokjeok*; *yeokdo*), “Fascist” (*fashow*) and “Submission” (*sadae*) toward others. In the dissertation, finally, Pyongyang’s drive for economic priority is measured by occurrence of the words “prosperity (*byunyoung*; *kangsungdaekuk*)” and “economic self-help (*jaryeokgaengsaeng*)” as they pertain to economic development and prosperity in North Korea.

4) Sources of Information and Data

The independent variable in this study is Pyongyang’s domestic policy priorities (dominant determinants), which are security, national identity, and prosperity relative to their most important rivals. This dissertation posits that North Korean foreign policy behavior toward the U.S., China, and South Korea is motivated by three ordered preferences: security, identity, and prosperity. By focusing on these preferences (or motivations) one can understand the logic behind the DPRK’s foreign policy strategies and tactics.

The dependent variable is Pyongyang’s foreign policy behavior toward key states (i.e. the U.S., China, and South Korea). Since the collapse of Soviet Union and East European socialist countries, DPRK’s foreign policy behaviors have been focused on these three major countries. Moreover, the patterns of North Korean foreign policy through these states are relatively easily observable. Therefore, this dissertation in detail analyzes North Korea’s actions and policies toward the United States, South Korea, and China.

This variable's observed range is between a hard line policy choice (e.g. continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program despite international isolation) and a more cooperative policy (e.g. agreeing to engage other countries). This study presents several causal factors that explain when North Korea chooses a hard line foreign policy and when it chooses to engage with these key states.

It is often difficult to study North Korea's foreign policy because of the insufficiency of available and reliable data. Specifically, most foreign policy materials from the government is marked confidential and few interviews and observations are allowed. This study will rely on mainly three sources: *Rodong Sinmun*, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and open DPRK websites. In addition, this study uses data gathered from various documents including Congressional reports from the American, South Korean, and Chinese governments.

3. Expected Findings and Contributions

The major goal of this study is analyze to how domestic policy priorities influence North Korea's foreign policy behaviors. The primary findings will include an explanation as to why North Korea's decision-makers choose to enact an amicable versus a hostile posture toward the United States, China, as well as South Korea. These findings will explain how North Korea's decision makers forge foreign policy choices on issues of security, identity, and economics.

As a result, this analysis will provide a more accurate interpretation of Pyongyang's foreign policy outcomes toward these three states (the U.S., South Korea, and China) than other competing explanations. Analyzing both the Pyongyang's foreign policy behaviors toward major players and their domestic determinants is key in providing a roadmap for ending hostile relations and increasing cooperation among these countries.

4. Organization of the Dissertation

The subsequent chapters will unfold as follows: Chapter 4 illustrates how North Korean policy preferences are drawn from domestic politics. It shows that North Korean foreign policy goals are oriented by domestic priority such as security, identity and prosperity, and North Korea's strategic and tactical maneuverings tend to pursue the policy goals. Moreover, in order to understand foreign policy orientation, one must look at its domestic politics and belief systems. In Chapter 5, initially, I review the historical and cultural contexts of the relations between the US-DPRK. It shows how historical context and ideology play in the DPRK's formation of its foreign policy. I look at how the North Korean domestic priority has affected the Pyongyang policy behavior toward the United States. It also explains when North Korea chooses a hard line foreign policy stance and when it chooses to engage with the US. Chapter 6 proves that North Korean leaders to South Korean policy focused on significantly national identity through historical explanations. It also explains that North Korea's legitimacy is made in the contest of inter-Korean comparison. In this chapter, it reveals that the North Korean regime for the South's policy has chosen a hardline policy when it has felt its identity threats. In chapter 7, I review the blood-tied relationship between China and North Korea and Pyongyang leaders' perception for Beijing's leadership. It also shows that North Korean leaders seek economic prosperity through their policies toward China. Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the previous chapters' findings and emphasizes the importance of this study.

CHAPTER 4

DOMESTIC POLICY PRIORITIES OF NORTH KOREA: POLICY GOALS AND STRATEGIC CHOICES

This chapter attempts to observe the fundamental process by which North Korea's domestic politics give rise to their foreign policy. First of all, we conduct an analysis of North Korea's policy behavior as a function of the nation's mandated belief system and unique political culture.

1. The DPRK's Decision Making Process

To understand the DPRK's foreign policy, one must understand domestic politics in North Korea under the one-party communist system, as well as the North Korean mechanism for foreign policy decision-making. The decision-making process is not very different from the systems of China and other socialist countries. In North Korea, the pivot of the system is that "all major issues of international affairs were deliberated and decided upon at the level of the top leadership: at the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) congresses, at plenary meetings of the KWP Central Committee, and the meeting of the KWP Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat (Zhebin 2012, 184)." In the DPRK, the conditions for objective policy analysis are very limited because the major and crucial issues of foreign policy have been monopolized by a very narrow inner-circle of people at the top of the KWP. Therefore, the Politburo gets deeply involved in only the most important foreign policy issues (Zhebin 2012). In terms of North Korea's foreign

policy process, Alexander Zhebin (189) insists that North Korean diplomatic behavior is affected by the country's isolationist mode of foreign policy, by which the free flow of information is restricted to the highest levels of party leadership.

After Kim Il-Sung died in 1994, Kim Jong-Il emerged as the nation's undisputed leader (Park, 2002). North Korea fully committed itself to the succession of Kim Jong-Un as new leader without any power struggle. After Kim Jong-Il's death, North Korean leadership managed to normalize the activities of the KWP top policy-making bodies through KWP conferences (September 2010 and April 2012). The composition of the KWP Central Committee Politburo, the KWP Central Military Committee, and the National Defense Commission indicates that members of those bodies have been selected as truthful aids and supporters of Kim Jong-Il's successor, Kim Jong-Un. Because of this, North Korea's political system is likely to function with an improved level of organization and increased interdependence among people. Such a system can be more easily controlled and is favorable to survival under difficult circumstances (Zhebin 2012, 197).

The regime in Pyongyang has developed formidable tools to influence society, ranging from security organizations to ideological control. The two principal domestic security organizations are the Ministry of People's Security (MPS) and the State Security Department (SSD). Permission from the MPS is required to change one's residence, job, or even to travel within the country. Furthermore, the MPS controls the distribution system, which was the primary source of food for the population until the famine years of the mid-1990s. In other words, North Korea was characterized by a complete absence of any sign of political defiance, at least until the mid-1990s famine. The North Korean government maintained an almost perfect control over the population (Oh and Hassig 2000, 136; Kim & Choi 2011). Park argues that one

should not assume that the North Korean people have been oppressed by the iron fists of the Great Leaders, as one might expect to find in a totalitarian state. Rather, they submit to elite rule due to “a consistent and carefully engineered process of lifelong political socialization.” (Park 2002, 177-178)

2. Nominal Goals in Foreign Policy

In 1980, Kim Il Sung announced at the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party that North Korea would seek a foreign policy based upon “military strength, self-reliance, revolution, and liberation,” or *Juche*. Further, he stressed that North Korea would seek friendly relationship with other states (implying the US and South Korea) only if such states would not employ strong-arm tactics and fully respect North Korean sovereignty.¹⁵

Regime survival has remained paramount for North Korea even during its continued periods of isolation following the end of the Cold War. In 1992 the regime’s New Year’s address warned against “imperialists and enemies...concentrated on attacking our country” and proclaimed North Korea as “the last fortress of socialism” (*Sinnyeonsa*, New Year’s address, *Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 1992). In 1993, Kim Il-Sung made it clear that the DPRK’s foreign policy would remain focused on “independence, peace, and emphasizing friendly ties with socialist countries, non-aligned countries, and capitalist countries that respect North Korea” (*Sinnyeonsa*, New Year’s Address, *Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 1993). In 1998, Kim Jong-Il reiterated that stance, stating that the goals of “independence, friendly relations, and peace” mentioned in the North Korean constitution and by his predecessor were compatible with other foreign policy goals such as “military strength, self-reliance, revolution, and liberation.” After

¹⁵ Report to “the Sixth Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee,” (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Publishing House, 1980): p. 1.

Kim Jong-Il assumed power in 1995, North Korea held to a “military-first (*Seongun Jeongchi*)” ideology. It is important, however, for regimes to concentrate on internal economic difficulties as well as external threats, since regime survival as a lone ideology cannot serve as a basis for legitimacy (Park 2002, 159). In 1998 North Korea put forth that economic development (*Kangsong Daekuk*) was fundamental to achieving a strong and prosperous nation (Editorial, *Rodong Sinmun*, September 9, 1998).

In 2012 North Korea’s New Year’s Joint Editorial focused on strengthening internal solidarity around Kim Jong-Un. It did so by emphasizing the legacy of Kim Jong-Il and concentrating on building a “strong and prosperous nation (*Kangsong Kuk*).” Further, it reiterated that Pyongyang’s foreign policy goals are based on fundamentals of “independence, friendly relations, and peace.” The same editorial, however, takes a strong political stance. Specifically, Pyongyang stated an intention to proceed with its pro-China position. The editorial also demanded the removal of United States troops from South Korea and condemned the Lee Myung-Bak government of South Korea as traitors (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 2012).

3. Salient Manifest Goals and Strategies in the DPRK’s Foreign Policy

As discussed earlier, North Korea’s foreign policy orientation has evolved in pursuing its systematic objectives of national security, national identity and legitimacy, and economic prosperity. In this regard, DPRK’s policy preferences are hardly different from any other country’s political system. As noted above, physical survival in this hierarchy of human needs is the most essential requirement for human beings. It is a core axiom that all human (essentially, all living) beings want to stay alive. In order to ensure that physical survival, people need be free from the perception of physical threat. In other words, with respect to the goal of system

survival, what is unique about North Korea is the nature of the system itself (Park 2002). North Koreans believe that system change signifies system collapse. In this sense, North Korea's primarily foreign policy goal is "national security or regime survival" against the traditionally adversarial systems of the United States and its perceived "puppet" states, South Korea and Japan. All political systems try to legitimize their power from a single source: the support or consent of the people. Even in very authoritarian countries like North Korea, the regime tries to support itself by getting consent from the people. Any regime will collapse if it is not ultimately satisfying the people's needs. According to Park's theory, there are two strategies which the ruling elites utilize for generating political legitimacy: "the performance in meeting basic needs and promoting the prosperity of the people" and "promotion of a belief system through an ideology" (118). The first strategy is performance-based and usually refers to the regime's capability to achieve economic development. This premise suggests that the ruling elite can legitimize their policy-making power so long as they are facilitating the population's progression through the hierarchy of needs (118).

As shown before, regimes must strive to satisfy people's material needs to the greatest possible extent in order to maintain and reinforce legitimacy. Ruling elites generate political legitimacy for the purposes of meeting basic needs and promoting "the prosperity of the people" and promoting "a belief system through an ideology" (Park 2002, 118). Park (1984, 70) argues that "social institutions are invented to provide a regularized mechanism for the satisfaction of a particular human need. Institutions such as the family, religious groups, mass media, and educational systems are made for meeting the need for belonging. Institutions are human inventions designed to foster and maintain a belonging need. In this need stage, ideology as the foundation of regime legitimacy is "trivial and largely irrelevant" (Park 1984, 138). According to

him, ideology is also a means by which to inculcate into the population a belief system favorable to the regime's goals and strategies (70). He also describes the belief system as "a set of values" advanced by the ruling elites that becomes internalized and embedded among the members of the society, fortifying consent and loyalty to the regime on the basis of this shared belief system (1984, 71).¹⁶ Therefore, the regime responds to satisfy the belonging need of people by developing a political ideology which generates a common belief system for the populace to embrace. Regime legitimacy is formed from an ideology.

In the process of making foreign policy, there are three levels to the internal structure of a policy: design-objective, strategy, and tactics. Policy legitimacy is an inescapable and necessary requirement for achieving the consensus that leaders need (Smoke 1994, 101). Therefore, policy legitimacy is a prerequisite for an administration to gain the national consensus required to transmit a leader's policy preferences in actionable policy for the state as a whole. At this juncture, the most pressing policy concern for North Korean leadership is system survival. The primary conditions of system survival are defense against military provocation, the preservation of national legitimacy relative to South Korea, and preservation of culture against perceived western influence. To these ends, North Korean leadership has endeavored to create an ideological environment in which the population will share, and thus grant consensus to, these policy goals (Park 2002, 150).

¹⁶ Alexander L. George (1969) argues that "a political actor's belief system about the nature of politics is shaped particularly by his orientation to other political actors." He insists that this approach should be useful for studying an actor's decision-making type, and its application in specific situation. He explains that "the operational code is a particularly significant portion of the actor's entire set of beliefs about political life. These beliefs associated with the concept of operational code control as guides for political decision making and leadership type.

1) The *Juche* and the *Sungun* Ideology for DPRK's Legitimacy

The *Juche* Ideology

In order to figure out North Korea's foreign policy orientation, one must understand its unique political culture steeped in *Juche* ideology. Pyongyang's foreign policy behaviors mostly depend on *Juche* ideology as it has functioned over long periods of history and cultural development. North Korean policy makers endeavor to build their legitimacy through *Juche* ideology to guide international affairs and civilian governance in the DPRK.

Legitimacy within a regime or state is given when there is a sense of acceptance of authority in the law of governance, granting the regime or state has power to set norms and rules for the system of society. The DPRK can be examined through the lens of normative legitimacy, where, through set goals and a national consensus, a long-term direction for that regime is formed based on cultural values. There is also cognitive legitimacy, where the strategies and the tactics for achieving the goals of the state are stressed in logical fashion. The different historical events and the influence of the *Juche* ideology affect North Korea's address both forms of legitimacy for functional government policies.

In nondemocratic systems, it may seem as though there is little need to consider separating the legitimacy of a ruler with the policies he makes, because as the king or the divine ruler, he already has the respected authority to make decisions and policies. However, all policy includes aspects of consensus and the public perception of feasibility. Thus policy legitimacy has both a normative-moral component and a cognitive basis; the normative component establishes the desirability of the policy and the cognitive component of its feasibility (Smoke 1994, 100).

The only political concept that can be used to fully comprehend and understand the logic behind North Korea's politics is the *Juche* ideology. This political idea is the sole ideological

foundation of the nation of North Korea and without it, the country could potentially cease to exist. After numerous foreign interventions in the Korean peninsula, the *Juche* ideology was created by Kim Il-Sung to motivate the Korean people to be independent from foreign influences and become a nation that could survive on its own.

Juche was announced by Kim Il-Sung in 1955 to support the critical need for a Korea-centered revolution rather than one designed to benefit a foreign state. It was aimed at developing an effective system of authority under his exclusive leadership that could be used as a tool with which to stigmatize the foreign-oriented dissenters and remove them from the center of power (Han Park, 2002). After the Korean War, Kim Il-Sung contended withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea if necessary, inter-Korean unification under DPRK's leadership with "Korean-style (*uri-sik*) socialist" system. Furthermore, this ideology has three principles: self-sustaining economy (*Jarip*), self-reliance in defense (*Jawi*), and political independence (*Jaju*). According to Han Park (2012: 16-17), the doctrine of *Juche* is defined as "firstly, 'human centeredness' – that is, the idea that humanity is the master of the universe and secondly 'collectivism' in which the boundary of the collectivity is the nation." In order to realize these two principles, *Juche* advanced three policy goals: (Park 2012, 17), these being, 1) military self-defense, 2) economic self-subsistence, 3) political self-rule (sovereignty). North Korean leadership exploited their oppressive history under Japanese control to establish Kim Il-Sung's rule. They attributed the colonial humiliation to a lack of military forces that could have deterred the Japanese invasion and thus used this anti-Japanese sentiment to facilitate military preparedness (Park 2000/2001, 504). This inspired Kim's desire to develop more profound weaponry, and institute a stronger military.

The *Juche* Ideology was brought forth by Kim Il-Sung as a way to encourage North Korea to develop its economy without the help of foreigners. The *Juche* philosophy seeks self-reliance and a sense of self-dependence. With this mentality of political independence, economic sustenance, and self-reliance in defense, North Korea not only sees South Korea as merely a puppet that is reliant on foreign powers, engulfed by materialism and consumerism, but also as a threat to North Korea's central ideology.

North Korea does not "blindly claim anymore that *Juche* is the crystallization of all human ideas by which humanity itself will be saved" but claims, rather, that *Juche* is a road map to an acceptable state development (Park 2000/2001, 506). North Korea uses this philosophy to make policies and decisions.

While not entirely impressed with China's Cultural Revolution, Kim did appear to be following Mao's lead of creating a state ideology and building his own image as a charismatic leader by the 1960s (Park 2002). For example, North Korea modeled many of the programs that China implemented, including the *Chollima* campaign, and *Juche* ideology enjoyed strong support from China's Mao Zedong. The *Chollima* campaign was a mass movement in the late 1950s that focused on women's policy, and it socialized North Korean women's housework through the help of nurseries, kindergartens, laundries, and an efficient way of food production (Park 2000/2001, 505). This movement increased the number of female labor giving and women were being encouraged more and more to work towards achieving equal status as men.

The *Chollima* movement, according to other North Korean arguments, was also intended to build up the mood of innovation in the country and invigorate areas of politics, the military, society, and economics. The heavy presence of militarism and the military-first policies may support the persistence of the system, and the *Chollima* can be thought of as a mass movement of

traditional self-reliance. This reinforces their *Juche* ideals, which is a powerful vehicle for the mobilization of the people.

The end of the 1960s found North Korea with a stable government and economy that was stronger than South Korea's. *Juche* moved from a simple anti-hegemon sentiment to an ideology of nationalism defined by three objectives meant to promote nationalism among the masses and to demonstrate regime superiority over South Korea.

North Korea's primary basis for legitimacy is also shown through the repudiation of the South Korean regime. They are sharply divided in all areas including the political and social structures, norms, values, and beliefs. In order to examine the North, considerations in the South must be taken into account. Koreans both in the North and South are unable to see win-win relations; they only assume that all relations between them are zero-sum. South Korea's considerations of legitimacy include effective governing, popular consensus, development, and economics (I. Park, 186). It's in this context that, for the DPRK, the *Juche* ideology emerges as a guiding principle for North Korean policies.

By the 1980s, Kim had reached an unquestionable level of leadership as the ultimate charismatic father figure, a notion bolstered by the strong sense of paternalism and familial duty of Confucianism. This paternalism implicates not only the father himself but indeed the whole family as destined to rule, thus sanctifying the hereditary succession of power.

For a mass belief system instilled by the government to be effective in guiding the course of action at various levels of the society, it needs to be congruent with the prevailing sociocultural conditions seen in the context of history (Park 1996). *Juche* ideology has evolved in relation to North Korea's desire for national independence from the outside world since the fall of Eastern Europe socialist systems in the wake of the Cold-War. Park (2012) asserts, at this

time, “The very need for dissociation from other socialist countries has been instrumental to the rapid transition of *Juche* itself as a unique ideological system under the banner of ‘socialism in our style (*urisik sahoejui*).’”

Since the mid-1990s, the regime’s ritual worship of *Juche* ideology has evolved to a new state ideology known as *Songun* (Military-first). Kim Il-Sung also redirected and changed the day of their “Military Foundation Day” to the same day the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement started in order to recognize the indigenous Koreans who were involved in the resistance movement in 1971. The heavy presence of militarism continued throughout Kim Il-Sung’s time in power. Kim Jong-Il implemented the Military-First Policy, which prioritized national resources to the military. The reason North Korea adheres to the military-first policies may be because the state feels the need to maintain the system for survival’s sake, especially during the times of collapse of other socialist countries (Chung 2004, 291). Military-first politics are not governed by the military, but are based on the premise that “model party organization found in the army should permeate society, and that the army must be at the vanguard of ideology and construction” (Chung 2004, 291).

In sum, there are five distinct phases in the evolution of the *Juche* ideology. The first stage is Anti-Japanism. Kim’s past of fighting against Japanese rule exemplified him as a hero and a dedicated nationalistic soldier to his country. The Korean War shaped the second phase of *Juche* as anti-hegemonism because North Korea blamed the United States for the physical devastation to their nation and the division of the peninsula. When Sino-Soviet tensions grew in the 1960, North Korea was forced into a path of self-reliance in order to prevent favoritism toward a particular side. Ultimately, the last phase is *Juche* as *Weltanschauung*. Park noted originally in how the theory performs unique and diverse functions. With *Juche* as

weltanschauung, it becomes more obvious in its “exposition of the properties of the human mind” (Park 2002, 27) and human dignity is guaranteed when life is somewhat consistent.

In terms of the philosophical principles, *Juche* ideology can be compared to a religious doctrine. In a sense, eternal life is achieved as an “individual acquires a political-social life by overcoming innate human desires...and integrating himself thoroughly into the community, thus becoming part of the political social body” (Park 2002, 36). This can be achieved when one sacrifices his life for the nation. By adopting the afterlife element, *Juche* becomes more like a religious doctrine rather than a political ideology. Their God is the one person who they believe can improve their quality of life. *Juche* has evolved from a simple system of beliefs into a grand ideological structure that does more than justify Kim’s power (Park 2002).

Finally, Park examines how the contextual conditions made an easier transition for *Juche* ideology to settle into the minds of the North Korean society. Looking at history, the most successful charismatic leaders arise when the country is going through difficult times. North Korea is no exception. The Japanese attempted to uproot Korean heritage by banning the use of the Korean language, distorting textbooks, and depleting economic sources. From these hardships, the transition phase of establishing legitimacy became easier for the North Korean government, which promised its citizens that their nation would become a “paradise on Earth.” Inevitably, this led to an identity crisis, as well. Due to long periods of intervention from foreign powers, Korea was left with nothing with which to identify. With perfect timing, the Kim leadership came in with confidence to provide nationalism and self-reliance to the people instead of being vulnerable to foreign influence. Additionally, North Korea has gained a notorious penchant for isolating itself from the world, mainly because it perceives threats from hostile enemies like the United States. Exposure to external contacts might cause “cross-pressure,”

which is defined when “a person is subjected to new information that is contrary to old knowledge, thus creating cognitive dissonance” (Park 2002, 45).

***Songun* Politics**

Songun (Military First) was solidified by Kim Jong-Il’s leadership. The ideology of *Songun* presses for military preparedness to deter external threats to national security and thereby the sustenance of the system itself, to address domestic concerns of instability, and cope with the well-being of the people (Han Park 2012). In sum, *Songun* is a comprehensive system of values and norms, used as a political and social blueprint by the Kim Jong-Il regime. The *Songun* doctrine focuses more on the psychological and spiritual domains and has become the current foundation of North Korea’s political and social philosophy. In contrast, *Juche* ideology was more centered on the concept of a “political-social” body and more so the concept of human development, as well. To an extent, the *Songun* doctrine is an integration of the body, mind, and spirit, though there is military prominence on all three elements. The last identity Park mentions is the role of the military as the exemplar. In other words, the military is the only source of the best artists, scientists, or any other profession.

Songun traces its origins back to the days of Kim Il-Sung time as a guerrilla fighter in Manchuria, an event which set the early stage for militarism. Also, Kim Il Sung envied the Japanese for having such a strong military that could attack the United States, and was impressed by the power inherent in nuclear bombs as demonstrated near the end of WWII. After Japanese colonialism ended in Korea, the *Juche* ideology was born, specifically expressing the utmost urgency for self-defense and anti-foreignism within the peninsula.

One of the intermediate origins of *Songun* comes from the failure of the Communist bloc as a support system. After watching China and Russia’s relations falter and the fall of

neighboring communist regimes, Kim Il-Sung tightened up political education and concentrated more on increasing his military. The threat of the US-South Korean Relationship accelerated the development of the North Korea nuclear weapons program as well. Since the North cannot compete with the South in terms of economic prosperity, it turned to self-defense and national sovereignty as its prominent sources of legitimacy.

The immediate origin, however, is the abrupt death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994. Kim Jong-Il had the responsibility of consolidating the military to his control and by doing so, the *Songun* doctrine established his legitimacy and the rationale needed for restructuring the military elite. Following in 1998, the constitution was reformed with new objectives; one was creating Kim Jong-Il a basis of power legitimacy by declaring his father as the eternal leader. *Songun* became his basis of legitimacy and was the result of the new constitution in 1998.

In addition, the Bush administration's hostile policy toward North Korea motivated Kim Jong-Il to advance the *Songun* politics. This doctrine furthermore complemented Kim Jong-Il's unwavering persistence in pursuing a nuclear weapons program. When North Korea looks at the reason behind the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, they respond by saying that those countries lacked the military capability to defend themselves. In order to prevent a U.S. invasion, North Korea believes in heavily investing in their nuclear and military programs. This mindset is also a product of the *Songun* doctrine.

K. P. Chon describes the *Songun* doctrine with the 3-3-4 principles. The first one comes from the three functions of the military which are commitment, goals, and the spirit of sacrifice for the greater good. The second "three" represents the three objectives for education and training which are the importance of the group, discipline, and an uncompromising unity. The

four stands for the four virtues of the People's Army which are patriotism, love of the nation, care for the people, and the devotion to *Soryong* (Park 2007).

Within the context of a military-first strategy, *Songun* becomes more than just political propaganda for military power. It makes this ideology is the critical foundation of the North Korean society. Despite the popular belief that the government pushes this program without the consent of the people, this ideology has become a unique and identifiable part of the North Korean culture (Park 2007). For sake of its national security, the DPRK pushes its people to strengthen its defense capability through the *Songun* politics. Therefore, progressions of military capability such as building nuclear weapons become the national symbols of the dignity of a sovereign North Korea and signal the legitimacy of the North Korean regime toward adversarial countries.

Juche is consistent with the salient cultural conditions of Confucianism and Socialism, and it has exhibited a series of evolutions that culminated in current *Songun* (military-first) politics (Han Park 2012: 34). Even though this doctrine of self-reliance has a negative effect on economic development, *Juche* ideology and *Songun* politics have worked to affirm the morale of the North Korean people in the face of economic hardship.

2) Strategies and Tactics under the DPRK's Prime Priorities

Korea has responded with policy objective strategies and tactics that are consistent with its political system. North Korea requires specific set conditions such as a strong military for defense, the preservation of legitimacy over that of South Korea's and the protection of its ideologies from the corrupted capitalist culture. Economically, Pyongyang maintains a "closed door" policy which includes protecting against outside mass-media and interaction with the

outside world as an extension of its “information control” policy. From the perception of Pyongyang’s leaders, the demise of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc in East Europe created a need to protect the population and political system from the same adversarial forces that induced these collapses (Park 2002, 150). For North Korea, the economic reform and democratization resulting from western influence would lessen chances of regime survival. According to *Rodong Sinmun*, Pyongyang insists “if one defends socialism, it is victorious and if one discards socialism, it is death (January 13, 1999; Park 2002).” Therefore, the North Korean regime prevents its citizens from being exposed to the outside world. In order to reduce the possibility of regime collapse, Pyongyang maintains strict policies of information control.

Secondly, North Korea borrows various policies from the Chinese economic development model designed to alleviate its devastating economic reality. While a lot of Western observers claim that the food shortage is due to the failed government system, there are several reasons that contribute to this difficulty. In 1996, heavy rainfall and floods ruined most of its arable land. In addition, many farming areas have suffered erosion of the topsoil, which affects the production of food (Park 2000/2001, 507). Also, the reduction of trade relations, particularly with China, causes difficulties. Since there is a difficult balance between receiving humanitarian aid without being too dependent on foreign powers, North Korea has tried to localize its agricultural productivity through Yon Hyong-Muk’s model of regional self-help.¹⁷ Initially, in May 1990, Kim Il-sung reiterated North Korea would trade with capitalist countries while maintaining the commitment to *Juche* and socialism. Kim proposed that “the DPRK would establish friendly

¹⁷ In November 1990, during Premier Yon Hyong Muk’s Beijing visit, Vice Premiers Wu Xuenqian and Kim Tal Hyon signed an agreement on China’s economic assistance to North Korea. Yon met with Jiang Zemin at the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and carefully observed this model of China’s economic modernization policy. However, Pyongyang leaders was reluctant to adopt the Chinese model as a whole because they suspected that it might undermine the *Juche* ideology and create political problems similar to the Tiananmen Square protest against the Chinese Communist Party (Chae-jin Lee 1996, 138).

economic and cultural relations with capitalist countries which respect our sovereignty.” As a part of improving and rebuilding their economy, Chung suggests focusing on collective cooperatives that would improve the general manner of economic management. It would allow for “unprofitable enterprises to be closed down and reorganized into specialty-based enterprises” (Chung 2004, 289) and these changes would strengthen the cabinet’s role in the economy. Another aspect of economic rebuilding includes the emphasis on the advancement of scientific technology. This strategy would encourage economic and technological efficiency and promote better planning. North Korea also pursues a dualist strategy with their reform systems. Chung emphasizes the difference between a dual economy and how it emerges mostly during a transitional period of gradual reforms and market liberalization with a dual strategy, where a set of economic structures with different methodological characteristics follows a long-term goal (Chung, 2004: 286). There can be a shift from reforms within the system to a reform of the system, where the strength of autonomy remains while allowing and involving partial marketization. With the *Juche* philosophy still so deeply rooted, there may be ways to move the course of the policies for better economic benefit without changing the system all together.

After the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994, Kim Jong-Il regime adopted more pragmatic foreign policy strategies in economic relations with political adversarial countries such as South Korea and the US. Despite *Juche* ideology’s emphasis on a self-reliant system, North Korea has embraced economic assistance from the South and even the US. In the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program. North Korea accepted the engagement policy of South Korea through the June 15th summit talks in 2000 between Kim

Dae-Jung, the President of the ROK, and Kim Jong-II, the Chairman of the Defense Committee of DPRK.

Thirdly, during the Kim Jong-II era, Pyongyang incorporated “ultra-nationalism” into its general foreign policy strategy. North Korea’s national memory of the oppressive Japanese colonial rule, the partitioning of the peninsula, and the ongoing legitimacy competition with South Korea fuels this streak of nationalism. The nationalism of Kim Il-Sung solidified Pyongyang’s legitimacy against competing factions in the formative stages of the DPRK. After the death of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-II used his father’s nationalism to ensure regime survival and integrate the political system (Park 2002). The DPRK’s leadership advocates the people’s respect and reverence for Kim Jung II, the people’s adherence to *Jaju* (national independence), and, most importantly, the North’s policy toward inter-Korean unification without any intervention of countries such the U.S.

North Korea’s nationalist sentiment strongly affects its militarism. Kim Jong-II regime has advanced military capabilities along with the “Military-first (*Songun*)” politics. In the beginning of the 1990s, North Korea discerned former allies, China and USSR, as betrayers because both countries established diplomatic relations and economic cooperation with South Korea and supported the simultaneous entry of the North and South to the UN (Zhebin 2012, 205). This provides further context for the desperate manner in which North Korea handled its policies of military preparedness and general isolation.

In terms of the importance of the *Songun* Politics, Pyongyang (KCNA, March 3, 2008) asserts that “the *Songun* politics of the Workers’ Party of Korea is the noblest patriotic politics as it helps reliably protect the dignity and sovereignty of the country and nation and achieve their prosperity.” Also, *Rodong Sinmun* (KCNA, March 3, 2008) supports that:

“*Songun* politics of the WPK is the only genuine political mode as it most fully reflects the popular masses' desire and aspiration and helps most successfully achieve the independence of the country and nation., But for the invincible military power built up under the banner of *Songun*, the U.S. imperialists would have forced a nuclear war upon the Korean nation long ago and the territory of Korea would have suffered from the thermonuclear war ignited by them.”

Considering North Korea's militaristic leanings, it is not surprising that Pyongyang's leaders insisted on keeping developing nuclear deterrence at any price. After the Iraq war and events in Libya, the North Korean regime felt its security was threatened by the U.S. The turmoil in the Arab world brought about by U.S. and Western military intervention directed Pyongyang leadership to work towards a nuclear arsenal to deter against US military attack. The DPRK's leaders believe that nuclear armament is imperative to deterring a preemptive military attack led by the US (Park 2012). In 2012, Kim Jong-un, new leader of the DPRK, spoke at a military parade that “the time has gone forever when the enemies threatened and intimidated us with atomic bombs” (KCNA, April 15, 2012). The North Korean leadership appears to have made efforts toward these goals in its own way, all the while claiming to seek a nuclear resolution and attain security assurances from the United States. For North Korea, it was never an easy task to procure both national security and economic interests under the circumstances of its hostile relationship and confrontation with the United States over the state of its nuclear program. Given the external threats perceived by North Korean leaders, the ruling elites of Pyongyang may have viewed North Korea's efforts toward diplomatic normalization with the United States as the best strategy available to them by which to pursue both security and economic interests (Paik 2010, 514).

CHAPTER 5

NORTH KOREAN POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

In previous chapters, I tried to explain how belief systems have a leading role in shaping North Korean policy objectives. This chapter will address the first hypothesis of this study, specifically that the DPRK's foreign policy toward the U.S. is determined by the overarching goal of maintaining national security. At first, I attempt to explain how historical and cultural contexts play into the DPRK's formation of its foreign policy toward the U.S. I also examine *Rodong Sinmun*, the official newspaper of Pyongyang regime, through the lens of content analysis in order to determine the DPRK's perception and policy preferences toward the U.S.

1. Historical and Cultural Contexts of US-DPRK Relations

1) Legacies of the Korean War (1950 -1953) & Cold War

In the formative stages of both Korean regimes, a rather extreme set of historical events strongly contributed to the shaping of their political systems and policy objectives. Historically, the western imperialist activity that defined the early 19th Century in East Asia led a westernized Japan into war with China (the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95) over control over the Korean Peninsula. Not even a decade later, warfare broke out between Japan and Russia (the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05) over Korea as well, solidifying Japanese control over Korea (official annexation in 1910). While the official split of the Korean peninsula did not occur until after the surrender of Japan in 1945, the establishment of the Korean Communist Party occurred under Japanese annexation in 1925, led primarily by Pak Hon Yong.

With Japan out of the picture, the United States and the Soviet Union held a joint commission over Korea; with its spilt along the 38th parallel, the South was occupied by the democratic U.S. forces, while the north was occupied by the USSR's Red Army. This was somewhat troublesome for the communists, since many of the members of the Korean Communist Party were in the South rather than the north. It was at this time that Kim Il-Sung became the prominent figurehead of the Communist Party in the north. Thus, a split in the parties occurred, as the North established its own communist party, occurring along with the establishment of two separate governments; the South's UN and U.S. backed Republic of Korea and the North's People's Republic of China (PRC) and Soviet backed Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While Rhee Syngman led the ROK regime, Kim Il-Sung led the DPRK. Each regime leader intended to reunify the peninsula under his own party.

The Korean War officially broke out between the north and south in 1950, initiated by Northern invasion of the South. Shortly before the war began however, the Rhee Syungman initiated the Mungyeong Massacre, killing communist "collaborators" in the South, and blamed the incident on communist marauders. Rhee continued his extermination of communists within the South, ordering the *Bodo* League Massacre in Daejeon. (Victims of these massacres were usually women and children, families that were sympathizers of the communists.) On the 25th of June, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 was adopted, declaring North Korea's invasion over the 38th Parallel. June 27th, U.S. President Truman sent aid to South Korea, which led the USSR to blame the U.S. for arming what it called the ROK's illegitimate fight against the DPRK. Originally, Rhee's ROK Army was vastly unprepared for battle with the North Korean People's Army (KPA). By August, the KPA reduced the ROK's control over the peninsula to the Southeastern region of Pusan. However, U.S. General MacArthur launched the Battle of

Inchon, and tables began to turn again. War between the regimes continued, each being backed by their own foreign aid. After a few armistice negotiations, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the North and UN forces in July 27th 1953.¹⁸ According to this treaty, the agreement was designed to “insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.”¹⁹

The Korean War impacted essentially on the formation of the two Korean regimes and on several subsequent tumultuous events. The Korean War’s legacy has led Pyongyang to maintained by the isolation and unbroken tension of a half century of unresolved confrontation (Gavan 2004, 1). In addition, North Koreans believed that the Korean War was a liberation war against imperialist enemies, such as the U.S. and its puppet regime (South Korea) because the US military government insured the establishment of Rhee Sung-man’s rule after WWII. In terms of North Korean nationalism, North Koreans could point with pride to the fact that Pyongyang’s own representatives signed the armistice agreement of 1953. After the Korean War, the North Koreans viewed the U.S. as the leader of the capitalist world as well as a military imperialist allied with Japan. Accordingly, North Korea has shaped “anti-Americanism” or “anti-imperialism” as a core part of its “*Juche* ideology.”

In the Post Cold War era, the DPRK survived the collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc and end of the traditional Cold War security structure. Despite heightened expectations of its fall in the wake of the worsening economic crisis the loss of its major economic donors, North Korea has persisted, though it is increasingly diplomatically isolated.

¹⁸ The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed by U.S. Army Lieutenant General William Harrison, Jr. representing the United Nations Command (UNC), North Korean General Nam Il representing the North Korean People's Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (<http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/index.html?dod-date=727>).

¹⁹ See the Findlaw website: the <http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/korea/kwarmagr072753.html>

2) The DPRK and the U.S. Relations: North Korea's Nuclear Program

As mentioned above, North Koreans perceive what the U.S. as a national sworn enemy and an imperialist invader of the Korean Peninsula, and have viewed the U.S.'s actions through this lens. Due to the devastation inflicted upon North Korea during the Korean War, North Korea had little trouble shaping the U.S. image as a national enemy. The U.S. bolstered South Korea's socioeconomic viability – especially when the Park Chung-Hee government began to emulate the postwar Japanese paradigm, which had ties to the U.S. occupation of Japan. The North Korean regime's formation of “Korean Style Socialism” and its emphasis on anti-imperialism intensified its dislike of what the U.S. represented (Olsen 2009, 140). The problems between the two Koreas must be explained within the deeply rooted mutual distrust and political contradictions between the U.S. and North Korea.²⁰ Moreover, by examining key historical events, we can better explain North Korea's current policy intentions and priorities. That is, it is the continued Cold War mindset that poisons the political atmosphere on the Peninsula.

Korea's involvement with nuclear weapons goes back to the dawn of the nuclear age. During World War II, Japan vigorously pursued a nuclear weapons program, though it lagged behind the all-out campaigns of the U.S., Germany, and the Soviet Union. As the U.S. continued to bomb Japan's home islands, Japan moved its secret weapons program to the northern part of its Korean colony. In doing so, it protected the weapons program from attacks and allowed Japan to take advantage of Korea's undamaged electricity-generating capacity and abundant minerals (after the division of Korea in 1945, the Soviet Union mined monazite and other materials in the North for use in its own atomic weapons program) (Oberdorfer 2001). Korea has long been the

²⁰ James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen mention that “Progress in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula, never easy, has reached a dangerous impasse. The last six months have witnessed an extraordinary series of events in the region that have profound implications for security and stability throughout Northeast Asia, a region that is home to 100,000 U.S. troops and three of the world's 12 largest economies” (Laney and Shaplen 2003).

scene of nuclear tensions for the U.S. as well. Since 1945, both South Korea and the U.S. have compelled North Korea to develop nuclear weapons (Mazarr 1995).

North Korea's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons appears to date from the mid-1950s²¹ and appears to have initially been a response to U.S. nuclear threats rather than an offensive gesture (Marzarr 1995, 17). By 1980, however, North Korea perceived itself to be standing alone, trapped between the Sino-Soviet conflict to the north, the Sino-American alignment to the west, Japan to the east, and South Korea (with over half a million hostile soldiers) to the south. North Korea's nuclear program was seen as a response to the U.S.'s nuclear threat and a means by which to match its political and military power in East Asia. Moreover, North Korea used its nuclear program as a means to gain diplomatic leverage so as to increase independence from China and Russia and attempt to restrain South Korea's rapid economic growth.

By the late 1980s, as North Korea showed progress toward producing nuclear weapons, the U.S. began to rethink its policy toward the DPRK and to consider direct talks. The first official contact took place in Beijing in 1988. Between 1988 and 1992, there were numerous rounds of "working-level" talks between the United States and North Korea.²² The character of

²¹ Don Oberdorfer indicates that, "following the end of Korean War, the Soviet Union and North Korea signed two agreements on nuclear research, and a small number of North Korean scientists began to arrive at the Soviet Union's Dubna Nuclear Research Center near Moscow. The Soviet Union also provided a small experimental nuclear reactor, which was installed near Yongbyon. At Soviet insistence, the reactor was placed under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure it would not be used to create weapons, even though North Korea was not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the time. The Soviet Union maintained that its assistance to North Korea did not include weapons development but was limited to civilian activities" (Oberdorfer 2001, 252).

²² "The North Korean nuclear program began in the mid-1960s with the construction of a 2-4-thermal-megawatts (MW) research reactor at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of its capital Pyongyang, supplied by the former Soviet Union, and the nearly simultaneous acquisition of a 0.1-MW critical facility. The ostensible rationale for the facilities was scientific research and the production of radioactive isotopes for medical and industrial use. Then, in the early 1980s, North Korea began construction of the 5-MW(e) research reactor in Yongbyon, followed by a "radiochemical laboratory," North Korea's euphemism for a plutonium reprocessing plant. The latter two facilities are widely suspected as having provided North Korea with enough weapons grade plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons," at

the talks changed dramatically on March 12, 1993, however, when North Korea announced its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).²³ This announcement elevated what had long been viewed as a serious proliferation threat to a high-stakes, diplomatic confrontation between North Korea and the United States. After consultation with South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States decided to open high-level talks with North Korea in June of 1993 (Cronin 1994). Subsequent working-level talks and three rounds of high-level negotiations eventually led to an agreement on October 21, 1994 in Geneva.^{24 25}

In this agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze (and eventually dismantle) its nuclear program and to let international inspectors from the IAEA estimate the amount of plutonium that had been reprocessed before 1992. In return the Clinton administration pledged to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations” (i.e. to end enmity and economic sanctions) (Sigal 2004). Moreover, it agreed to provide North Korea with two new light-water reactors for generating electricity and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in the interim. The Clinton administration believed that:

North Korea’s threatening posture has arisen from its security fears, and saw the engagement policy as a good way to build a sense of trust, reduce its insecurity, and end its nuclear threat (Victor D. Cha 2002).

(<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-905f.htm>).

²³ ‘On March 12, 1993, the DPRK became the first country to attempt to withdraw from the NPT.’ (Strohmaier and Phillips, Fall 2005).

²⁴ The U.S. and North Korea came to the brink of war in June 1994. But the visit of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang and negotiations with Kim Il Sung averted war, and led to the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 1994.

²⁵ See Agreed Framework Between the U.S.A. and the DPRK (Oct. 21, 1994) at (<http://www.armscontrol.org/document/af.asp>).

This agreement emphasized freezing future nuclear activity. Some believe it underemphasized making North Korea's past nuclear activity more transparent. As a result, some suspicions about the North Korean nuclear development remain (Yeo 2006). The second nuclear crisis between North Korea and the U.S. began in October of 2002 when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, confronted North Korean officials with evidence showing that it had been illegally enriching uranium,²⁶ an activity that breaches the guidelines of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and violates agreements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Agreed Framework between the two countries in 1993 (Hwang 2003). To punish North Korea, the U.S. suspended heavy fuel oil delivery to North Korea. In response, North Korea expelled inspectors from the IAEA, withdrew from the NPT (it was the first country to do so), and reopened its Yongbyon nuclear plant that had been frozen since 1994 (*New York Times*, December 24, 2002).²⁷ Moreover, North Korean officials were reported to have told Mr. Kelly privately at a meeting in Beijing in April 2003 that North Korea already had a few nuclear bombs and was making more (*New York Times*, April 24, 2003).²⁸

Since these actions, North Korea's progress towards a nuclear weapons arsenal has been debated, but unquestionably, it is advancing. This deeply concerns the U.S. and other members of the international community (Strohmaier and Phillips 2005). In April of 2003, President Bush initiated three-party talks with North Korea and China and in August of the same year held six-party talks with North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia (Scott Snyder 2007).

Following September 11, 2001, the Bush administration failed to launch a comprehensive approach to North Korea. In President Bush's State of the Union address in 2002, the

²⁶ Gedda, George. "North Korea Told to Renounce Nukes," *Associated Press* (October 17, 2002)

²⁷ Stevenson, Richard W. December 24, 2002. "North Korea Begins to Reopen Plant for Processing Plutonium." *New York Times*.

²⁸ Sanger, David E. April 24, 2003. "North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Arsenal," *New York Times*.

administration vowed to take a harder line toward North Korea (Pollack 2003, 11-12). President Bush's view of North Korea was decidedly hawkish (Hwang 2003).

Two main strategies have been employed by the U.S. in the denuclearization of North Korea. Initially, the Clinton administration attempted engagement and exchanges as outlined in the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Bush administration, however, applied pressure and sanctions. The Obama administration has chosen to apply both pressure and engagement, the latter including the September 19th Joint Statement of 2005.

On April 15, 2012, in celebration of North Korea's founding father Kim Il Sung's 100th anniversary of his birthday, his grandson and the country's new leader, Kim Jong-un, announced plans to launch a terrestrial observation satellite, *Kwangmyongsong 3*. This plan nullifies the agreement from the U.S.-DPRK talks on Feb. 29, 2012.²⁹ In response, the Obama administration decided to announce the termination of a deal under which it would provide massive food aid.

2. The United States' Policy toward North Korea

After the end of the Korean War, the U.S. adopted "a general policy of military containment, diplomatic isolation, and economic sanctions against North Korea" (Suk Hi Kim 2011, 15). Washington signed a mutual security treaty with South Korea in 1953 to implement an anti-communist containment policy. The U.S. even codified the coalition with Japan against a counter-alliance of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union in order to maintain this containment policy in 1969. In February 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance agreed to use "necessary means" to prevent the revival of Japanese imperialism. This Sino-Soviet treaty became a model for North

²⁹ The Obama administration is expected to announce the termination of a Feb. 29 deal under which it would provide massive food aid.

Korea's mutual defense treaties with the Soviet Union and China that were signed in 1961 (Suk Hi Kim 2011, 15). These agreements help forge the rivalry that characterized the Cold War bipolar framework in East Asia.

Toward the end of the Cold War, there were several major factors affecting US policy in East Asia and the Korean peninsula. First, US trade activities in the Asia-Pacific region had drastically expanded, as U.S. trade in this region in 1990 accounted for 26% of total volume, already exceeding its volume with the European region (Dae-won Ko 1996, 216-217). The U.S. is faced with an absolute need to maintain stable regional security conditions in order to protect its interests. U.S. policies toward the Korean peninsula have been maintained within the framework of this concept. Second, the emergence of China and Japan as new powers had driven the region to form a new order, and Washington's vested interests moved to address the challenge (Jaechul Kim 1996, 129). In the new frame of East Asia, the U.S. has continued to maintain its military capabilities in the region, despite the fact that the immediate need for such capabilities diminished after the Cold War. Lastly, at that time, as the Communist bloc was waning, Washington introduced the concept of the "Washington Consensus" in 1989. This concept's purpose was to bring a pro-capitalist system of economic liberalism coupled with political democracy into the developing world, eventually expanding to the former Soviet Republics and Eastern European countries (Park 2012). After the demise of socialist bloc, as the United States emerged as the only superpower, this doctrine was encouraged by the "victory" of liberalist ideology of democracy (Park 2012).

The readjustment of the security strategy of the U.S towards North Korea and East Asia, in general, is aimed at two basic targets. The first is directed to two major real threats: terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This reflects the current and medium-

range interests of the U.S. The second aim is targeted at perceived potential threats, which are mainly concerned with major powers that may challenge the hegemonic position of the U.S. in this region, with China and Russia as the most probable sources of challenges of this kind. The second aim is a reflection of the long-range interests of the U.S. (Pollack 2004).

Under these conditions, U.S. strategy regarding North Korea had to be revised during the Clinton Administration to induce negotiations for friendly relations instead of rivalry. In fact, in the early stage of the post-Cold war era when the North Korean nuclear weapons program was still secret, the U.S attempted to approach North Korea as part of its efforts to map out necessary measures to cope with a possible power vacancy in the region. The U.S. has made concerted efforts to protect the existing NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and new CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty system), thus to prevent regional countries from engaging in nuclear and missile arms races (*Joongang Il-bo*, October 27, 1999).³⁰ North Korea's intentions to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities will most probably instigate Japan, South Korea, and China to launch their own nuclear and missile programs, thus expediting nuclear proliferation and provoking an arms race in the region. The North's development of nuclear capabilities, if it takes place, will be against U.S. policy. Also, the US has been seeking international cooperation through various channels including the IAEA and the U.N. to press North Korea to stop its nuclear program.

The Clinton administration employed economic engagement policy toward Pyongyang in an effort to lessen the security competition between the US and the DPRK. (Rotfeld 1997, 4-6). Mazarr (1995, 183-8) argued in his research on the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1990s that coercive military and economic punishment were neither likely to be selected nor likely to be an effective means of addressing North Korea's nuclear development because of the complexity of

³⁰ "US leadership is swaying," : <http://nwk.joongang.co.kr>.

the multilateral security framework among states and international institutions that had stakes in this event. Thus, Mazarr indicates that just as the bipolarity of military power was the essential geographical framework for the Cold War, so diplomatic multilateralism became the framework for the Post-Cold War period.

The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement³¹: 1) a broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership; 2) a specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state; 3) a bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state. The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of “Most Favored Nation” trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record. Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the U.S. and North Korea in October 1994, the U.S. agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors, and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program; 4) a bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction; 5) a bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state (Resnick 2001).

However, during the George W. Bush administration from 2001 to 2009, Bush chose to maintain a hawkish and hardline stance (Hwang, 2003). In addition, Leon V. Sigal (2004) points

³¹ Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement., Resnick. Evan. “Defining Engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, Issue 2, (Spring 2001).

out that President Bush would have nothing to do with deals involving North Korea. Bush policy seemed as simple as ABC- Anything But Clinton. He tried, instead, to mobilize international pressure on Pyongyang to working toward a nuclear arsenal. In so doing, he was following the lead of hard-liners in his administration who believed that only way to get rid of North Korea's nuclear programs is to get rid of the North Korean regime.

A key element in Bush's campaign against terror was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Proposed by President Bush on May 31, 2003, the PSI aimed to keep nuclear, chemical and biological weapons out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. In PSI language, proliferation is an activity designed to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials from entering or leaving "states of proliferation concern." First and foremost among so-called rogue states targeted was North Korea (Valencia 2005, 55-57). The PSI ruffled feathers in the Korean Peninsula because it stretched the limits of existing international law and operated outside the United Nations system. Several key countries like China, India and South Korea have not joined the effort, despite repeated U.S. requests to do so. And even some PSI "coalition" members like Japan and Russia are reluctant participants (Valencia 2005).

The Bush administration underestimated the South Korean government's "sunshine policy" intended to recover mutual trust and co-existence in two Koreas through cooperation. In this sense, the liberal-leaning Roh Moo-Hyun government refused to join the international cluster of the PSI, and differed from Bush's hawkish policy toward North Korea (Olsen 2009, 145).

When President Barack Obama took office in January 2009, the US government adopted a stance of "strategic patience" toward the DPRK (Paik 2010, 527). The Obama government's

policy has not explicitly broken from the approach adopted by the second term of the Bush administration (Chanlett-Avery and Taylor 2010, 4). The Obama administration has applied UN sanctions on Pyongyang, and continued to push for assurances of nonproliferation (Paik 2010). Although the Obama administration has tried to negotiate with Pyongyang through hard and soft line diplomacy, the stand-off over North Korea's nuclear ambitions has continued.

3. North Korea's Survival Policy toward the United States

Since the Korean War, North Korea has feared a military attack from the United States. Since the demise of the U.S.S.R. and the communist bloc, ensuring national security and regime survival have been the most essential missions for the DPRK. During the Cold war era, the military power of Pyongyang and Seoul maintained a relative balance. However, since the post-Cold War era, the maintenance of the military balance has tilted away from Pyongyang's side. The strengthened U.S.-R.O.K military alliance is perceived as a formidable security threat to North Korea. Pyongyang leadership has endeavored to pursue national security and economic recovery and development to maintain regime survival against what it perceives to be hostile countries.

As shown in Table 1, North Korea is no match for the U.S. in terms of military expenditure, or even South Korea. From the 1990s, North Korea has concentrated on building asymmetric forces such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, long-range ballistic missiles, and special operations forces (Michishita 2009, 105). Thus, Pyongyang developed its strategic capabilities at the regional level, with an aim of extending their military reach world-wide. Pyongyang realized that its greatest bargaining chip is its military capabilities to break its economic deadlock with the West.

Table 1. Military expenditure by country, 1988-2011 (unit: USD, Million)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
USA	540,415	534,906	510,998	448,806	474,215	449,281	421,917	399,043	377,342	375,375	366,918	367,822
China	..	16,600	17,943	18,860	22,919	21,233	20,308	20,875	23,016	23,842	27,070	31,191
North Korea	2,009	2,093	2,113	2,140	2,176	..	1,402	..	1,318	1,336
South Korea	13,262	13,667	13,881	14,321	15,154	15,850	16,315	17,161	18,087	18,524	17,883	17,397
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
USA	382,061	385,142	432,452	492,200	536,459	562,039	570,769	585,749	629,095	679,574	698,281	711,421
China	33,496	41,176	47,829	51,955	57,542	64,726	76,065	87,730	96,663	116,666	121,064	142,859
North Korea	1,370	1,448	1,493	350	391	461	476	507	548	763	818	918
South Korea	18,465	18,998	19,521	20,185	21,072	22,791	23,622	24,689	26,297	27,708	27,572	30,799

Sources: North Korea data are estimated by SIPRI materials (in local currency), SIPRI Yearbook 2012 (These estimated expenditures are applied to each year exchange rates from the Statistics Korea of the ROK: <http://kosis.kr/bukhan/>); *Figures are in US \$m., at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates, except for the last figure, which is in US\$m. at 2011 prices and exchange rates; ". ." = data unavailable.

1) The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1989-1994

In the first North Korean nuclear crisis, Pyongyang denied having any intention of developing nuclear weapons and argued that its nuclear program was designed only for the purpose of peaceful energy production. In his 1992 New Year's Address, Kim Il-sung mentioned that "we have made it clear over and over again that we have neither the willingness nor the capacity to develop nuclear weapons and that we are ready to accept the nuclear inspection under the impartial condition (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 1992)." When Kim Il-sung met the U.S. representative Stephen Solarz in December 1991, he asserted that North Korea had no nuclear reprocessing facilities (Oberdorfer 2001, 264). In January 1992, the two Koreas signed an agreement entitled the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which agrees "not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapon" or to "possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities" (Berry, Jr. 2006, 2).

However, in May 1992 North Korea reported to the IAEA the construction of a reprocessing plant and also admitted to have reprocessed about 90 grams of plutonium in 1990. The IAEA inspectors announced after the inspection in July 1992 that Pyongyang seemed to have withheld some information, as there was a discrepancy between materials reported and materials found upon inspection (Sigal 1998, 43).

For North Korea, developing nuclear armament was a very risky choice that would clearly involve confrontation with the U.S. as well as the international community. Although Kim Il-sung made several war-like statements, he clearly acknowledged the downside and negative outcome of developing the nuclear program. When Kim met Solarz, he acknowledged the disastrous outcome of using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. “What’s the use of a few nuclear weapons?” asked Kim. “Assume that we are producing nuclear weapons and have one or two nuclear weapons. What’s the point? If we fire them, they [Americans] will kill the Korean people” (Sigal 1998, 34). Also, in his 1991 New Year’s Address, he stated, “If a war occurs in our country in which the danger of war is always seriously hanging in the air, it will endanger even the existence of the nation, not to speak of national unification,” (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 1992). Kim’s statements imply that he understood the risk inherent in pursuing a nuclear arsenal, and that such actions could lead to a confrontation with the U.S. and South Korea that could bring about the end of the North Korean regime.

Thus, when the U.S. and South Korea resumed the US-ROK joint military exercise, “Team Spirit”, in early March, 1993, as a measure of warning for the North’s uncooperative policy with the IAEA regarding the special inspection, North Korea ordered its people and armed forces to enter a “state of semi-war” and denounced the “Team Spirit” exercise as a war game preliminary to an invasion. Kim Il-Sung recognized that such confrontation “is making inter-

Korean relations dangerous” and “may drive the situation into a catastrophe (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 1994).” This increased North Korean perception of the security threat from the United States as well as South Korea, and prompted an additional push toward military preparedness as a mean of ensuring regime survival. North Korean leaders expected that independent nuclear weapons would guarantee their regime survival. According to Hwang Jang-yup, North Korean leaders believed that “if North Korea has many nuclear weapons, the United States will be scared and give economic assistance to the North (Hwang 1999, 329).” On 14 March 1993, North Korea prevented IAEA inspectors to observe its nuclear facilities. Soon after, Pyongyang announced withdrawal from NPT (the Non-Proliferation Treaty) which it signed in 1985.

Since the early 1990s, Pyongyang has tried to normalize relations with the United States and introduce market economic reform for regime survival. Particularly Kim Il-Sung concentrated on the bilateral negotiation with Washington rather than multinational cooperation with other regional powers. He asserted in his 1994 New Year’s Address, “It is the United States that raised the suspicion of the North’s non-existent nuclear development and also that actually brought nuclear weapons into the Korean peninsula and threatened us. Thus, nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula should be resolved through the North Korean- U.S. talks in all respects (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 1, 1994).”

North Korea sought to reach out to the U.S. after the Cold War. In 1990, Kim Il-sung suggested that the U.S. could withdraw its troops from South Korea step by step instead of a general pullout, and supported a new disarmament proposal and a non-aggression agreement between two Koreas (In 1991 “New Year’s Address,” *Rodong Sinmun* January 1, 1991). North Korea finally held several high-level talks with the U.S. which produced a few agreements under

which the North sought to obtain regime security and economic benefits during the Clinton administration (Sigal 1998, 260-64).

In responding to the Clinton government's engagement policy, Pyongyang obtained the positive outcome of forcing U.S. engagement on some security and economic benefits. In particular, North Korea felt they had made progress toward a peaceful co-existence with the US without US military threats in the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, North Korea believed that maintaining amicable relations with the US would bring economic investment and aid from surrounding countries such as South Korea and Japan in which North Korea wanted to receive a large amount of reparations from Japan for its colonial rule (Oberdorfer 2001, 220-22).

In May 1994, after North Korea began to remove fuel rods from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor without consulting with the IAEA, the United States withdrew its offer to resume the third round of high-level talks and started to build international support for UN sanctions. According to U.S. officials who were in charge of the North Korean issue (Wit, Poneman and Gallucci 2004), Pyongyang was shocked that Moscow and Beijing did nothing to block sanction attempts. In early June, the Clinton government announced "its intentions to pursue global economic trade sanctions against North Korea if Pyongyang did not permit IAEA inspectors to be present for the examination of the spent fuel rods at *Yongbyon*" (Berry, Jr. 2006, 5). When South Korean President Kim Young-Sam visited Moscow, Russian President Boris Yeltsin expressed that Russia would not reject to UN sanctions due to economic cooperation with South Korea, whereas China announced its skepticism about sanctions but faced a dilemma regarding the North Korean issue because it did not wish to hurt the improving relations with the U.S. and South Korea (Hwang 2005). The Clinton government also developed a plan to initiate a preemptive attack on the North's nuclear facilities by the US-ROK military alliance. Pyongyang

was outraged by these actions. On June 1994, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman declared, "we will not compromise at all regarding unjust pressures... This is our determined will that regards sovereignty as our life." (*Rodong Sinmun*, June 2, 1994)

The first North Korean nuclear crisis was resolved after former President Carter visited Pyongyang and met with Kim Il-Sung in June 1994. Although controversial in the Clinton government, former President Carter mediated the two countries to reach the Agreed Framework. When Carter met Kim Il-sung, he found that "the administration's effort to impose economic sanctions on North Korea was serious mistake, and one that he hoped President Clinton would reconsider (Berry Jr. 2006, 5)." In this summit meeting, Kim Il-sung accepted the Carter proposal and agreed to freeze the North Korean nuclear program and allow IAEA monitoring in exchange for a guarantee that there would be no attacks from the US (Scalapino 2006, 146). After all, North Korea returned to the NPT. In short, Pyongyang had confronted Washington with the nuclear program through the early 1990s, but in June 1994 it accommodated the U.S. demand in order to prevent the extremely risky of regime survival implied by UN sanctions and a future military operation of the US.

2) The Missile Crisis of 1998

On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a missile to the Pacific Ocean over Japan. Although North Korea claimed later that it was a satellite launch, neighboring countries were convinced that "it was test-launch for an ICBM (Kim 2011, 140)." After this launch, Kim Jong-II had the post of chairman of the National Defense Commission officially bestowed on him by the tenth Supreme People's Assembly in September 1998 (Scalapino 2006, 146). It was a show of the power of Kim Jong-II's Songun Policy. However, in Pyongyang's intention, this missile test

was actually used as a bargaining chip to obtain diplomatic recognition, security assurances, and economic benefits from the United States. In reality, from 1995 to 1998, North Korean economy was on the brink of collapse due to repeated natural disasters as well as the inefficiency of the socialist command over the economy. GDP had declined by 55% from an already low \$23.1 billion in 1990 (Kim and Choy 2012, 75). Table 2 shows that North Korea has been suffering from a food shortage for some time. In this sense, Pyongyang was motivated to leverage its military capabilities for outside aid and economic assistance.

Table 2. Food Situation in the DPRK

(Unit: 10,000 ton)


Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Demand	534	529	530	495	504	518	524	536	542	548
Supply	413	345	369	349	389	422	359	395	413	425
Shortage	121	184	161	146	115	96	165	141	129	123
Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
Demand	545	560	543	540	548	546	534	540		
Supply	431	454	448	401	431	411	425	445		
Shortage	114	106	95	139	117	135	109	95		

Source: Tongilkyoyookwon, *Bukhan Yihae* (2013, 158)

Kim Jong-II wanted to appeal investments to revive the North’s economy. Pyongyang regime not only reduced the level of criticism to the South government (Kim Dae-Jung government), but also tried to accept the Kim’s engagement policy. At the same time, North Korea increased talks with the Clinton government to recover from its economic difficulties. In May 1999, US Special Envoy, William Perry visited Pyongyang and delivered a letter from President Clinton to Kim Jong-II. This proposal recommended that the U.S. should “adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons- and ballistic missile-related programs” and “specifically initiate negotiations with the DPRK based on the concept of mutually reducing threat” in a “step by step and reciprocal fashion” (Perry 1999). Also, the US

accepted “leadership of an international consortium that would finance and supply a light water reactor project with a total generating capacity of 2,000 megawatts by a target date of 2003,” with the US providing 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually until completion of the first reactor unit (Scalapino 2006, 147). North Korean leaders seemed quite satisfied with Perry’s visit and proposals, and their response was “positive” (Albright 2003, 458). Also, in September 1999, the sanctions on North Korea were cleared as a result of the US-DPRK missile talks in Berlin. From 2000, North Korea tried to normalize its relations with the US before the end of Clinton’s term (Han 2011: 37- 38). As show Figure 1, through Geneva Agreed Framework and the US-DPRK Joint Communiqué, Pyongyang received successively Washington’s Food aid to help somewhat its shortage of food. However, even if North Korea needed economic assistance from the U.S., Pyongyang’s regime never neglected its military preparedness.

Figure 1. Table Annual Food Aid by Major Donors, 1995-2008



Source: World Food Program’s International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) data

3) The Second Nuclear Crisis of 2002-2003

North Korean leaders perceived the North's external situation to be improving during the Clinton administration and hoped that such an improvement could continue. However, the North's Policy to the U.S. began to revert to hostile attitude after the Bush administration took office in January 2001. Pyongyang began to demonstrate a significantly more aggressive attitude toward Bush policies, although it even tried to maintain pragmatic strategy of improving relations.

The Bush administration's perception of North Korea

Seeing North Korea as reckless and aggressive, the Bush Administration largely refused to negotiate with the regime in Pyongyang. While Secretary of State Albright described Kim Jong-Il as a "very practical and serious" negotiating partner, President Bush had a deep animus toward Kim and said that he had a "visceral reaction" to him (Woodward 2002, 340). Bush did not trust North Korea's self-described peaceful intentions, and clarified his position to South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung in March 2001 when he visited Washington to persuade Bush to support his "sunshine policy," the South Korean policy of engagement with North Korea.

Most officials of the Bush administration have also doubted whether North Korea could be induced to cooperate. Condoleezza Rice, who was the Bush administration's first National Security Advisor and later became Secretary of State, argued that "the North Korean regime is malign, and has little to gain and everything to lose from engagement in the international economy" (Rice 2000, 60-61). In particular, President Bush's personal distrust of Kim Jong-Il led him to employ hard-liners as policy makers toward Pyongyang.³²

³² Representatives of hard-liner for North Korea: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John

After September 11th, the Bush administration's policy priorities focused on preventing terrorists' attack and the spread of WMDs. Bush announced that North Korea formed an "axis of evil" with Iraq and Iran, because "North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while starving its citizens" and might provide these arms to terrorist groups to threaten the peace of the world.

While the Bush administration continued to be embroiled with its ongoing war against terrorism, North Korea remained one of the administration's thornier issues ever since George Bush declared the Stalinist regime a member of the "axis of evil" in 2002.³³

The Bush administration's hard-line policy significantly altered Pyongyang's security perception of the U.S. In responding with the Bush's State of the Union address, North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained bitterly that "Bush's absurd speech of the Axis of Evil clearly shows why the Bush administration threw away the possibility of solving the nuclear and missile issues through the dialogue that the Clinton administration had constructed (North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman *Rodong Sinmun*, February 1, 2002)." In short, North Korean leaders' perception of security threats from the US increased significantly under the Bush administration.

October 2002: The Collapse of the Agreed Framework

On October 3-5, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited Pyongyang to hold meetings with the North Koreans, and presented to them evidence garnered from intelligence

Bolton.

³³ Bush announced that North Korea forms an "axis of evil" with Iraq and Iran, because it is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction and may provide these arms to terrorist groups to threaten the peace of the world., "President Delivers State of the Union Address," *Office of the Press Secretary*, January 29, 2002, at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>>.

sources that DPRK was engaged in a secret nuclear program in violation of the Agreement Framework and its obligations under the NPT (Scalapino 2006, 152). Moreover, Kelly confronted North Korean officials with U.S. intelligence findings that North Korea had been pursuing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program for more than two years (David Sanger, “North Korea Says It Has a Program on Nuclear Arms,” *New York Times*, October 17, 2002).

In response to the US, North Korea repeatedly insisted that “there had been no admission of an HEU program, and that this charge was false (Scalapino 2006, 152). Pyongyang also asserted that the US was attempting to make North Korea vulnerable to preemptive attack. As an immediate step, North Korea called for a “non-aggression treaty” between the US and the DPRK in order to guarantee a security assurance (*KCNA*, October 25, 2002). Pyongyang insisted that “If the US legally assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the nonuse of nuclear weapons against it by concluding such treaty, the DPRK will be ready to clear the former of its security concerns,” and “The settlement of all problems with the DPRK, a small country, should be based on removing any threat to its sovereignty and right to existence (A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK, *KCNA*, October 25, 2002).” Even though Pyongyang insisted on bilateral negotiations with Washington, this approach was denied to the Bush administration. Eventually, on January 10 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Its five megawatt nuclear reactor in *Yongbyon* was reactivated (Berry, Jr. 2006, 14). The Geneva agreement between US and DPRK was collapsed. Due to the termination of the Geneva agreement, North Korea failed to receive heavy oils,³⁴ fulfillment of the pledge to construct the light water reactor (LWR), and humanitarian aid, thereby damaging the North’s economy (Scalapino 2006, 152).

³⁴ The Bush administration stopped annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

4) From a Bi-lateral Approach to a Multi-lateral Approach: the Six-Party Talks

The Bush administration was still unwilling to accept bilateral talks with Pyongyang. On April 2003, trilateral talks with the U.S., China and North Korea were held in Beijing but closed without any agreement. North Korea agreed to attend talks in Beijing with South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan in order to resolve the North's nuclear program. China hosted a subsequent series of multi-lateral talks, the Six Party Talks, in August 2003 and February 2004 as well as June 2004. As North Korea's chief benefactor, China played a crucial role in hosting the Six-Party Talks. In fact, hosting the talks marked China's most significant contribution to international diplomacy up to that point. China emphasized regional stability throughout the talks, while protecting the North Korean "buffer" as a strategic asset. (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2013: 12-13). At the first round of talks, the US insisted that North Korea first dismantle its nuclear program before the discussion of normalization between two states could proceed. The DPRK foreign Ministry criticized that "the United States is forcing the DPRK to disarm, while persistently pursuing its hostile policy toward the DPRK, and asserted "US should be implemented by simultaneous actions (*KCNA*, August 30, 2003)." Another round of Six-Parties Talks was held in Beijing. However, these talks also failed to reach an agreement.

Under these circumstances, on September 19, the participating parties agreed to a Joint Statement in the fourth around six-party talks. North Korea committed to abandon its nuclear program, to return to the NPT, and to allow IAEA inspectors in at an early date. Furthermore, Pyongyang maintained that it has the right to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to have light-water reactors as part of this capability (Berry, Jr. 2006, 16). At the same time, the US "affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons." Also, this Joint Statement

included that “the Americans and North Koreans pledged to respect each other’s sovereignty and to begin the process of normalizing diplomatic relations (Berry, Jr. 2006, 16).” This agreement emphasized reciprocal concession: it would be implemented in “a phased manner” consistent with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action (“North Korea Talks Extended to Chinese,” New York Times, September 18, 2005)” But, according to Article 2 of this statement, US agreed to “exist peacefully together” with North Korea which was not a non-aggression agreement. Therefore, Pyongyang had only a limited security guarantee with US.

Washington halted its efforts to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear program before negotiations took place. However, in corresponding with the Bush administration’s sustenance of hawkish economic sanction policies, on September 15, 2005, North Korean funds at Banco Delta Asia in Macau were frozen by the United States Treasury with the use of Section 311 of the Patriot Act.³⁵ Pyongyang confronted this in the next round of six party talks, but also became more belligerent toward the US in response. On July 4-5, 2006, North Korea test fired missiles, including the Taepodong-2. On July 15, 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed resolution 1695, which demanded that “the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program” and urged Pyongyang to “return immediately to the six party talks without precondition (UNSC Resolution 1695, July 15, 2006).”³⁶ In response to this, Pyongyang indicated that the 2005 joint statement’s principle is “word for word” and “action for action,” and asserted that, rather, “the U.S. took the lead in wantonly violating the sovereignty of

³⁵ The U.S. Treasury Department designated the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia as a money laundering concern under the Patriot Act for laundering \$25 million in North Korea funds: US Department of Treasury. Press release, “Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Launderer Concern Under the Patriot Act.” Washington: September 15, 2005. (<http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2720.aspx>)

³⁶ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm>

the DPRK, much less abiding by the purpose and principles of the UN Charter (*Rodong Sinmun*, April 17, 2013)”

Despite the UNSC Resolution 1695, North Korea conducted its first underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. In response, the UNSC unanimously adopted UNSC 1718 which “prevents a range of goods from entering or leaving North Korea and imposes an asset freeze and travel ban on person related to the nuclear-weapon program in response to the North’s nuclear test”³⁷

Under UNSC’s sanctions, on February 13, 2007, the six party talks reached an agreement which detailed initial steps of implementation of the September 2005 statement of principle. The February 13 Declaration declared that North Korea agreed to shut down and seal of its all nuclear facilities in *Yongbyon*, and to allow IAEA inspectors back in within sixty days in exchange for emergency energy assistance in the form of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. In the next stage, a comprehensive list of its nuclear activities was offered in exchange for another 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Finally, the six parties would discuss peace on the Korean Peninsula and the dismantling of the North’s nuke program. This agreement reemphasized “in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘action for action’.” Also, Washington agreed to remove the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism, and terminate the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to Pyongyang (Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, February 13, 2007). In July 2007, the IAEA verified the closure of *Yongbyon* nuclear facilities in North Korea, and North Korea received the first fuel aid (“UN Verifies Closure of North Korea Nuclear Facilities,” CNN, July 18, 2007). North Korea was to give a complete declaration of all nuclear programs to be disabled by December 31, 2007.

³⁷ Ministry of Trade and Foreign Affairs, “Part 2 Balanced and Pragmatic Diplomacy for the Northeast Asian Era,” *White Papers*, 2007: 39.

Despite these successful negotiations, Pyongyang continued its belligerent behavior toward the US. In April 2009, North Korea test-launched a long range missile test and declared that it successfully launched a “satellite” into orbit.³⁸ However, military and private experts insisted the monitored long range object (a Taepodong-2 missile) failed to go into orbit and landed in the Pacific Ocean (The New York Times, April 6, 2009).³⁹ On April 13, 2009 the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement condemned the “DPRK’s satellite launch as violation of the resolution barring country’s use of ballistic missile technology (UNSC Resolution 1718).”⁴⁰ In his inaugural address, President Obama indicated “a willingness to engage with rouge government.” Despite North Korean provocation, the Obama administration has tarried in pressing Pyongyang’s return to the talks while maintaining economic pressure on it (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2013, 6).

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its second underground nuclear test. According to KCNA (May 25, 2009), Pyongyang stated openly that “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way as requested by its scientists and technicians.” The US tried to press for tighter sanctions through the Security Council, while China expressed opposition to strongly enforcing sanctions. The Lee administration of South Korea supported pushed for support on UNSC Resolution 1874 and the UNSC Presidential Statement. Finally, on 12 June, 2009, the UNSC adopted UNSC Resolution

³⁸ North Korea claims that this rocket launches is to place a satellite in orbit, and it is empower to develop space launch vehicles as a peaceful use of space, but long-range “ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicle use similar technology” (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart, 2013: 16).

³⁹ Broad. William J., “North Korean Missile Launch Was A Failure, Experts Say,” *The New York Times* (April 6, 2009):
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/world/asia/06korea.html?sq=north%20korea%20satellite%20test&st=cse&scp=3&pagewanted=prin>

⁴⁰ <https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10610.doc.htm>

1874⁴¹ imposing further economic and commercial sanctions on the DPRK, and also allowing UN members to request a search of suspicious cargo to prevent North Korea from obtaining material required for its nuclear weapons programs.⁴² Even under these sanctions, North Korea never abandoned its nuclear ambitions. Pyongyang conducted a third underground nuclear test in the northern part of North Korea on February 12, 2013, aggravating relations with the US. North Korea has repeatedly insisted that it will not return to the Six-Party Talks unless UN sanctions on North Korea are removed (Baik 2010, 519).

4. North Korea's Policy Priorities toward the United States

1) North Korea's Strategies toward the United States

Pyongyang has persistently pursued two essential goals: a peace treaty with the US and the withdrawal of the US armed forces in the South. At first, North Korea unilaterally nullified the armistice agreement from 1953 that guaranteed peace on the Korean peninsula. According to Edward A. Olsen, after the armistice agreement was signed, anti-American sentiment intensified in North Korea rather than lessened (2009, 139-140). This was in large part due to resentment by the North Koreans over the alliance formed between the United States and South Korea.

Recently, North Korea's move to withdraw from the Korean War armistice repeats a pattern begun in the 1990s and is often threatened as a response to South Korean and U.S. military moves. North Korea has announced that it will no longer abide by the armistice at least 6 times, in the years 1994, 1996, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2013 (English edition, *Yonhap News*, May 28,

⁴¹ See the website: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm>.

⁴² Hyundai Economic Research Institute, a Seoul-based research center, predicted that "If the U.N. enforces the sanctions North Korea will lose US\$1.5-3.7 billion which is calculated the loss estimates based on the losses North Korea reportedly incurred between 2005 and 2007, when financial sanctions against Pyongyang were imposed. (*Yonhap News Agency*, June 18, 2009)": <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/06/17/71/0401000000AEN20090617006700325F.HTM>
[L](#).

2009). For the first time, on April 28, 1994, the foreign ministry asserted a statement charging the United States had “completely scrapped” the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement and proposing a “new peace arrangement” with the US. In addition, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK Clarifies “Principled Stand on Building Peace Mechanism on Korean Peninsula: Successful progress in the process of building a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula would not only help towards achieving peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and the rest of the world but give a strong impetus to the process of the soon-to-be-resumed six-party talks aimed to settle the nuclear issue” (*Rodong Sinmun, KCNA, July 23, 2005*).

In this vein, North Korea has insisted on withdrawal of US forces in the Korean Peninsula, and has criticized the Joint US-South Korean military exercises every year. The DPRK’s Foreign Ministry (*Rodong Sinmun, May 23, 1994*) announced that “the country will no longer be bound by the armistice agreement should the United States go ahead with a multinational naval exercise called the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) drill (held from late May to mid-July), which South Korea ultimately participated in.” The DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman (*KCNA, March 3, 2008*) lambasted the joint military exercises: “The U.S. and the south Korean bellicose forces started the above-said military exercises throughout south Korea, thus rendering the situation on the Korean Peninsula to an extreme pitch of tension. The U.S. kicked off the nuclear war maneuvers against its dialogue partner though it has talked about a “peaceful solution of the nuclear issue” and the “establishment of a peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.”

2) DPRK's Policy Priorities for the United States (National Security)

The DPRK's policy behavior is determined as a function of its domestic priorities and the character of its ruling elites as they evaluate the actions of Washington. North Korea appears to make efforts to propose talks toward compromise and agreement whenever a progressive administration assumes power in Washington, whereas they increase the degree of military tension against administrations which are more conservative toward Pyongyang.

These paragraphs have already been stated. You could rewrite this into one paragraph leading into the graph below. Table 3 summarizes North Korean policy response across five U.S. presidential administrations.

Table 3. The DPRK's Policy behavior toward the US


Period		US Policy toward DPRK	DPRK Security Assurance	DPRK Policy toward US
The Clinton Government	Jan. 1993-June 1994.	Very Hard	Very Unstable	Very Hard-line
The Clinton Government	June 1994-Jan. 2001	Flexible (Engagement)	Stable	Soft-line
The Bush Government (1 st term)	Jan. 2001-Jan. 2005	Very Hard (PSI)	Very Unstable	Very Hard-line
The Bush Government (2 nd term)	Jan. 2005-Jan. 2009	Hard (Economic Sanction)	Unstable	Hard-line
The Obama Government	Jan. 2009 Present	Hard (Economic Sanction)	Unstable	Hard-line

When the Bush administration pushed to freeze the North's nuclear facilities as a condition of further diplomatic relations or economic aid, Pyongyang persisted in developing advanced nuclear technologies instead of accepting the offer from the US. In terms of its nuclear program, Pyongyang has constantly been on guard against US schemes to "entrap" North Korea (Baik 2010, 507). Under this perceived threat from Washington's military, North Koreans believe

that its nuclear armament preparedness and long-range ballistic missiles have deterred attacks from the US and its alliance.

In reality, even if North Korea had economic difficulties during the Bush administration, Pyongyang reaped economic benefits from South Korea’s “omnidirectional foreign policy (equidistance diplomacy)” to seek pragmatically economic cooperation for national interests. In this sense, Pyongyang had maintained positive economic relations with Seoul supported by “Sunshine policy (economic engagement)” from 1998 to 2007 (the Kim Dae-Jung government to Roh Moo-Hyun government). Figure 2 and Table 4 indicate that the economic trade between US-DPRK has been virtually nonexistent, while trade with Sino-DPRK has significantly increased after inauguration of the South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak in 2008.

Figure 2. Trade with the DPRK (US, ROK, PRC): 1997-2011 (Unit: USD, thousand)



Source: KOTRA, the ROK and U.S. Census Bureau, WTA

Table 4. Trade with the DPRK by Country, 2005-2011

(Unit: USD, thousand)

Total Trade (Import & Export)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Share of Total Trade (2011)
China	1,580,341	1,699,604	1,973,974	2,787,279	2,680,734	3,965,677	6,317,017	74.2%
South Korea	1,055,754	1,349,739	1,797,896	1,820,367	1,679,081	1,912,577	1,714,000	20.1%
Singapore	80,031	66,612	55,674	120,355	57,245	48,497	-	0.0%
India	36,209	116,502	126,388	120,200	60,439	58,476	50,788	0.6%
Russia	232,302	210,639	159,607	110,524	61,688	110,579	112,819	1.3%
Brazil	-	-	67,500	80,856	52,722	23,641	34,194	0.4%
Tailand	329,179	374,249	228,668	76,770	44,290	51,286	36,393	0.4%
Germany	76,767	76,294	51,265	52,353	69,975	58,947	58,409	0.7%
USA	5,760	3	1,728	52,151	903	1,939	9,406	0.1%
Holland	42,233	32,171	27,864	42,750	27,106	23,903	31,002	0.4%
Hong Kong	14,807	10,756	17,593	40,314	56,305	30,834	20,046	0.2%
Taiwan	24,614	24,378	24,937	28,792	20,376	21,304	38,752	0.5%
France	37,606	5,589	4,681	7,877	3,202	3,865	8,128	0.1%
Japan	193,619	121,592	9,311	7,664	2,722	-	-	0.0%
Total	4,057,432	4,345,542	4,736,177	5,636,060	4,882,662	6,399,585	8,513,982	

Source: KOTRA & KITA (<http://global.kita.net>), South Korea; U.S. Census Bureau, WTA; Trade Statistics of Japan (Ministry of Finance)

In response to the financial sanctions of 2005-2007, North Korea asserted that such actions on the part of the US constituted a deal-breaker and questioned the US's commitment to "the spirit of mutual respect and peaceful co-existence" in the September 19th Joint Statement (*Yonhap News Agency*, November 16, 2005).⁴³ Pyongyang insisted that punitive UNSC resolutions would violate the sovereign rights of North Korea with any attempt to freeze its nuclear armament program or change its regime. North Korea demanded the United States show concrete evidence that it had shifted its North Korea policy toward peaceful coexistence before it would consider any changes to its nuclear program (*Rodong Sinmun*, November 2, 2005).

⁴³ See "South Korea, China Call for 'Flexibility' to Continue North Talks," *Yonhap News Agency*, November 16, 2005.

Pyongyang also criticized the PSI (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 28, 2008), calling it “a measure aimed to isolate and blockade the DPRK by force of arms. Moreover, Pyongyang would tolerate no interference to with humiliation of national dignity for economic cooperation with the US. The DPRK will remain unfazed no matter how hard the U.S. may work to bring down the DPRK by employing every possible means and method.” On January 17 2009, Pyongyang insisted “the reason North Korea developed nuclear weapons was not because it wanted a normalization of relations with or economic assistance from the United States, but because it wanted to defend itself from the nuclear threat coming from the United States.” This statement emphasized that as long as of nuclear threat from the U.S. existed, there would be no change in North Korea’s nuclear-weapon-state status (*KCNA*, January 17, 2009; Baik 2010, 511). Recently, in the Obama administration, North Korea readily scuttled the US-DPRK agreement (Feb. 29, 2012) including 240,000 metric tons of nutrition in order to launch a terrestrial observation satellite, *Kwangmyongsong 3* for development of a long-range ballistic technology.

In short, tougher economic sanctions, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and other hard-line measures against North Korea have “neither deterred the country from developing WMDs, nor stopped it from exporting missiles and nuclear technologies (Kim and Seliger 2011, 248).” Pyongyang’s policy for Washington is motivated almost entirely by national security and preparedness for dealing with the perceived U.S. threat.

Pyongyang’s policy preference can be inferred by content analysis, particularly the manner in which North Korea’s perceptions of external threat from the U.S. color its actual foreign policy. According to an analysis of *Rodong Sinmun* detailed in Table 5, ‘war (*Junjaeng*)’ is the most counted word in media communications concerning Washington. This would initially indicate that North Korean leaders have perceived paramount security threat from the US.


Table 5. The Selected Word's Frequency for the DPRK' Policy Preference to the US, 2005-2009

Preference	Words		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Security	Invasion; Attack	<i>Chimryak, Gongkyeok</i>	1631	2171	986	1115	713
Security	War	<i>Junjaeng</i>	1979	2626	1298	1663	1197
Security	Military	<i>Gunsa; Muryeok</i>	1437	1648	1116	1109	1106
Security	Security; Self-defense	<i>Jawui; Anjun</i>	274	374	206	120	234
Identity	Self-reliance	<i>Juche</i>	5	25	11	22	5
Identity	Military-First	<i>Songun</i>	54	332	176	114	121
Identity	Independence	<i>Jaju</i>	569	619	337	423	332
Identity	Dignity	<i>Jonum</i>	120	130	77	54	75
Prosperity	Prosperity	<i>Byenyong</i>	41	27	39	101	41
Prosperity	Economic Cooperation	<i>Hyeopryeok</i>	72	65	34	6	7
Prosperity	Strong and prosperous great power	<i>Kangsung-daeguk</i>	4	5	2	4	2
Preference			2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Security			5568	7084	3861	4476	3523
Identity			748	1106	601	613	533
Prosperity			117	97	75	111	50

Source: *Rodong Sinmun* (Editorials related with inter-Korean relations from 2005-2009)

Note the increased occurrence of the *war* term in 2006. This spike coincides with the passage of a joint security agreement between the US and the DPRK, as well as the implementation of Washington's BDA sanctions. As the table indicates, Pyongyang became more belligerent in its behavior toward the US during this year, and presumably in response to these actions on part of the US and South Korea. On July 4-5 2006, North Korea test fired more missiles. In response, on July 15, 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed resolution 1695. Months later, Pyongyang conducted the underground nuclear test. Both Pyongyang and Washington have engaged in a certain degree of quid pro quo policy management.

Figure 3. North Korea’s Policy Priorities toward the United States, 2005-2009



Source: *Rodong Sinmun* (Editorials related with the US and DPRKK relations from 2005-2009)⁴⁴

In sum North Korea lost two major Cold War patrons, the Soviet Union and China, in the early ‘90s. These losses affected Pyongyang’s perception of its own external security dramatically. Also, as those two great-power allies began to curtail their economic assistance to the DPRK, its economy quickly deteriorated, heightening the perception of threat (Hwang 1993). Moreover, North Korea had also clearly lost the prosperity race to South Korea, which has surpassed the North in both military and economic spheres (Kang 2003). Based on the belief that as one nation feels more desperate, it may become more belligerent, North Korea’s commitment

⁴⁴ It counts the frequency of proper nouns regarding with security concern, identity needs and economic prosperity toward China in *Rodong Sinmun* from 2005-2009: 1) Security Words – “war (junjaeng)”; “military (gunsu),”; “self-defense (jawui)”; “security (anjon)” 2) National Identity Words – “self-reliance (juche)”; “military-first (sungun)”; “national independence (jaju)” “Puppet regime (gyerae)”; “Cabal Party; Gang Group; Thief Group (paedang; ildang; dodang)”; “Traitor; Treason (maeguk; banyeok; yeokjeok; Yekdo)”; “submission (sadae)” 3) Economic Prosperity Words – “economic self-help (jaryeokgaengsaeng)”; “prosperity (byunyoung; kangsungdaekuk).”

to its nuclear program is not surprising. North Korea appeared to have started its full-scale nuclear weapons program to maintain the balance of power on the Korean peninsula and secure the survival of its regime. In this regard, North Korea's nuclear program may be suspended if its security dilemma is resolved.

The feeling of threat has prompted North Korean leaders to adopt some riskier policy choices. In reality, when the U.S. offered some political and economic benefits in the early 1990s and the 2000s, Pyongyang did not always choose to engage with the U.S., and was especially reluctant to do so when North Korean leaders felt that the U.S. undermined their national security. Pyongyang's primary policy objective toward Washington is determined by its domestic preference for national security on its own terms. Through content analysis, Table 5 and Figure 3 confirm this study's first hypothesis.

CHAPTER 6

NORTH KOREAN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH KOREA

In this chapter, I attempt to examine the second hypothesis of this study (H2) that North Korea's foreign policy toward South Korea is determined by a competition for legitimacy. I will address this hypothesis again through the use of historical process-tracing method as well as content analysis. First, this chapter attempts to discern the historical and cultural nature of the legitimacy competition between two Koreas, and how domestic policy priorities in North Korea have been influenced by contextual changes in internal situation and international politics.

1. History and Culture of Inter-Korea Relations

As mentioned before, a better understanding of belief systems might assist to explain the behavior of a political system and policy objective. First of all, a nation's unique historical experiences constitute its political culture and ideologies which lead to policy preferences. Historically, inter-Korean relations have been characterized as constituting rivalry toward political legitimacy. At first, the two Koreas' confrontation and division originated owing to a historical experience of hostile confrontation since the devastating Korean War of 1950-1953. Despite the 1953 armistice agreement, the two Koreas continued to engage in a series of intense military conflicts and significant political confrontation.

As a result, the two regimes adopted quite different political system and paths. The South, led by Rhee Syngman, evolved toward the institutionalization of western democracy

institutionalization supported by the U.S. with a strong “anti-communism” orientation, whereas the North, led by Kim Il-Sung formed a communist system with a unique form of “nationalism” oriented by the *Juche* ideology against the South. Pyongyang has taunted the South Korean regime as a puppet government of the United States until now. In 1956, the North Korean Party Congress, in light of the emerging Sino-Soviet split, began to combine elements such as “Strong defensive nationalism, xenophobia, and Neo-Confucian traditions” to form an orthodox socialism (Rüdiger Frank 2010, 9).

Until 1960, North Korea eagerly tried to unify the Korean peninsula by military force, and overthrow the South government. In the 1970s, North Korea strongly proposed the conclusion of a peace agreement with the United States and encouraged the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South (Michishita 2009). Even though both political leaders, Kim Il-Sung and Park Chung-Hee, signed the “June 4 Joint Statement” during a brief period of inter-Korean dialogue in 1972, unfortunately the inauguration of the Reagan administration in 1980 and the return of Cold-War tensions throughout Northeast Asia eventually strained inter-Korean relations (Moon 2011). North Korea mostly maintained an offensive policy to the South until the mid-1980s.

Due to the collapse of the USSR and global communism in the 1990s, North Korea felt national security threats from adversarial countries. Moreover, this period saw the beginning of the South’s economic boom with the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, and the North Korean regime gradually adopted a defensive policy toward South Korea. To make matter worse, in the 1990s, Pyongyang saw severe economic difficulties result from the cessation of subsidies by the Soviet Union and lesser aid from China. For instance, in 1993, Pyongyang announced that the third seven-year plan had failed to produce expected results, blaming the failures on the collapse

of the socialist world market and the continued “imperialist offensive against socialism” (*Rodong Sinmun*, December 9, 1993). During the plan’s implementation, the growth rate was readjusted and the size of the economy reduced, with emphasis given to the self sufficiency of the national economy. In the early 1990s, North Korea’s policy toward the South had maintained a relatively defensive orientation focused on regime and economic survival.

During the 1990s, the ROK and DPRK developed significant positive relations. In 1991, the South and North managed to sign the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea, and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In 1998, the Kim Dae-Jung government of South Korea adopted an economic engagement policy called the “sunshine policy” toward North Korea. This new approach pursued the improvement of economic cooperation, and the achievement of peaceful coexistence with human interactions between Seoul and Pyongyang. Since 1998, the Kim Jong-Il regime was consolidated with a new constitution focused on a military-first politics, and positively accepted Seoul’s sunshine policy. Pyongyang’s design was to obtain economic assistance and to tide over economic difficulties with assistance from the South Korean government. The most essential feature of the DPRK’s foreign policy was its “equidistance” policy at that time. The equidistance policy was created as the Cold War ended and traditionally friendly countries were no longer as reliable (Michishita 2009). As a result, the June 15th summit talks between South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung and Chairman of the Defense Committee Kim Jung-Il were held in Pyongyang. This cooperative economic relationship between the South and North continues under Roh Moo-Hyun. In this stream, the second summit talks between Roh Moo-Hyun and Kim Jong-Il produced the October 4 Joint Summit declaration in 2007. From 1998 to 2007, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun government of ROK significantly improved

inter-Korean relations. The policy of separation of business in Pyongyang desperately pursues the sustenance of “North Korean Style’s Socialist system” with the “*Juche* ideology” and the “*Songun* politics.” During almost two decades of effort, the DPRK has developed a more cooperative relationship with South Korea. However, even with the effectiveness of the Sunshine Policy (economic engagement policy), military tensions and conflicts along in the West Sea and in the DMZ have continued.

Beginning with the Lee Myung-Bak government in office since February 2008, the South Korean policy toward North Korea has become much more conservative, criticizing the Sunshine policy and any progressive posture toward the North. The New Lee administration believed the economic engagement policy not only failed to change the North through “reform and opening,” but also resulted in strengthening the North's nuclear weapons capability and reinforcing its “military-first” politics. The Lee government also condemned the engagement policy as one that spoiled North Korea by giving unilaterally (*peojugie*) without a corresponding reciprocity principle. (Moon 2011, 2-3). Along with “De-nuke, Open 3000” (Bihaek Gaebang 3000) pledges to assist North Korea in achieving a \$3,000 per capita income within 10 years in exchange for denuclearization, the Lee government of South Korea adopted a mostly hostile position toward Pyongyang regarded by many in North Korea as humiliating behavior. In this response, North Korea viewed the South's unilateralism as a significant threat to its regime (Moon 2011). After the Lee government’s installation, the two Koreas’ military conflicts have significantly increased in the NLL region related with their sovereignty’s competitions. During the Lee government’s tenure, North Korea’s policy toward the South has aimed at trying to change the South’s hostile policy toward Pyongyang. As Seoul has engaged in reinforcing its national security through its alliance with the U.S., and in its anti-socialist and anti-Kim rhetoric, Pyongyang has engaged in

tactics such as a peace offensive, South-North cooperation, and a “Talk with the US, isolate South Korea (*Tongmibongnam*)” strategy (Han 2011, 48). Pyongyang has also, however, maintained a tough stance toward South Korea and continues to make gestures demonstrating its animosity. Indeed, North Korea closed the border-crossing and the liaison office, froze South Korean assets at Mt. *Kumgang*, and engaged in provocations such as the *Chenonan* warship incident and the shelling of *Yeonpyeong* Island.

2. South Korea’s Policy toward North Korea

Before assessing Pyongyang’s policy toward Seoul, it is useful to simultaneously assess Seoul’s policy orientations for Pyongyang that provide understandings of how North Koreans have dealt with South Korea, and responded to the South’s actions. As observed above, since the Korean War, the South Korean security environment after the Korean War was defined by the Cold War security structure. After the Korean War, the conflict’s legacy shaped the anti-communism and emotional perception of threats of the Red North regime. During the Cold War era, the Southern regime adopted “anti-communism (*bangong sasang*)” and “democracy” in the process of developing a national identity. Thus, during the Cold War era, South Korean policy toward North Korea concentrated on national security against the North’s threats. The security-first policy was centered on military competition and confrontation rather than cooperation with the North. In the Rhee Syng-Man presidency, South Korea strongly relied on the U.S. military force to diminish the South’s security vulnerability. President Rhee, supported by US, institutionalized democracy in the South against the nationalism of the North. In the 1960-70s, the Park Chung-Hee government oversaw a huge economic boom through export-led growth, and also concentrated on the strengthening of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to fortify military

self-reliance capability and further diminish security vulnerability to the North. In Chun Doo-Hwan presidency in 1980s, the South maintained the policy of strengthening its military capability with security cooperation with the United States against the Kim Il-Sung regime.

Since the Korean War, the United States has played a dominant role on the Korean Peninsula as an ally of South Korea. During the Cold War era, U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula was determined by the bipolarity between the U.S. and Soviet Union and China's changing role in the region. The primary foreign policy goal of the US and its allied countries in East Asia was relied on "containment" toward Socialist bloc. The US's dominant policy objectives maintained stability on the Korean peninsula to avoid any military conflict with China and North Korea. South Korea strongly depended on US military assistance to protect North Korea allied China and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the South Korean government couldn't adopt arbitrary foreign policy toward adversarial countries during the Cold-war era.

After Kim Dae-Jung came to power in 1998, however, South Korea employed a new approach called "Sunshine policy." Until 2007, President Roh Moo-Hyun's policy of Peace and toward North Korea was similar to Kim Dae-Jung's "Sunshine" Policy. The main core of this policy is engaging North Korea in world politics. For that purpose, Seoul has provided economic aids to Pyongyang and removed regulations on business activities in North Korea. South Korea's "Sunshine" policy of engagement with the economically reclusive North Korean government differs from previous policies in one all-important aspect (Foley 2003). This engagement policy reflects theoretical arguments concerning democratic peace.⁴⁵ As the long term perspective,

⁴⁵ Kant's claim that liberal states are pacific in their international relations with other liberal states was revived as "democratic peace theory" (Doyle, 1986). Of course, some scholars put more emphasis on the structural components of the theory, arguing that democratic states have a certain internal structure which prevents hasty decision-making, and that leaders are constrained by institutions and public opinion on waging a war. According to Snyder (1991, 320), "well-institutionalized democracies are more likely to have moderate foreign policies than are most undemocratic states."

increasing economic interdependence should allow for North Korea to develop human rights (Kim 2011, 172). The Kim Dae-Jung government believed that dialogue and foreign investment throughout inter-Korean relations should increase North Korea's human rights conditions, since human rights in North Korea had historically suffered in an environment of distrust. Furthermore, the South's government tried to decrease the threats of the North's military attack, and to democratize the North regime through enlarged trade and interaction with the South. Indeed, in terms of the South Korean government perspectives, if the DPRK wished to gain economic benefits through inter-Korean cooperation, then it needed to adopt voluntary measures that can alleviate political and military tensions with the South, and look for a new economic reform with the market economy. Furthermore, through inter-Korean economic cooperation process, the gap between ROK and DPRK would decrease. The Kim Dae-Jung government expected that diminishing the economic enormous gap of the North and South would contribute to unify the Korean peninsula (S. Lee 2012, 5-6). Focused on these assumptions, Seoul from the late 1990s to the Roh Moo-Hyun government (2007) has effectively adopted an inter-Korean economic cooperation policy with Pyongyang. Finally, in this engagement policy, the South Korean regime premised the South's superiority of democratic capitalism. South Korea also has never stop to compete its legitimacy with North Korea.

As a result, business between the two Koreas has increased gradually during almost two decades. This change also demonstrated that the North Korean government's openness towards economic cooperation with its counterpart to the South. The North seems likely to follow its "open-door policy" towards the South in order to affect a break on its severe food shortage and economic deadlock, while the South pursues "Engagement Policy" which has been based on the separate principle of economic matters from political issues.

President Lee Myung-Bak, President of South Korea from 2008 to 2012, proposed initiatives for denuclearization and North Korean openness designed to achieve a per capita income of \$3,000, once North Korea abandons its nuclear program and engages its neighbor economically and politically. Under this plan, South Korea would provide assistance to North Korea, so reach the per capita income goal within 10 years.⁴⁶ President Lee Myung-Bak's doctrine emphasized a "politics first, economy later" or "political-economic linkage" in dealing with North Korea. In other words, Lee's foreign policy is based on his doctrine, 'economic aid only after denuclearization.' Also, The Lee government stressed economic pragmatism. Inter-Korean relations should be followed by economic benefits both for North and South Korea. The Lee government's North Korean Policy has contrasting points compared with the Sunshine Policy. However, prior to the application of principle and pragmatism, the Lee administration's North Korea policy was first and foremost a reaction to the policies of the two previous governments of the South. The Lee regime's leaders were convinced that both the economic engagement policy (Sunshine Policy) of Kim Dae-Jung's government and Roh's Peace and Prosperity Policy were catastrophic failures. Lee's top policy priority toward the North began with the comprehensive negation of the engagement and reconciliation policies of his two predecessors. He adopted an 'ABR' (Anything But Roh Moo-Hyun) policy orientation and economic progressive approaches. In inter-Korean cooperation, the Lee government would not endorse both the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Joint Summit Declaration signed by its predecessors (Moon 2011, 2-3). In sum, the Lee government believed that in order to progress the promise of the progressive approach, North Korea would negotiate with the South government through its 'reform and opening' policy due to Pyongyang's economic isolation and

⁴⁶ *Inauguration speech*, Feb. 25, 2008.

economic development's needs. Lee's pragmatism resulted in fortified Pyongyang's military-first policy, particularly in regards to nuclear capacity. In turn, the South Korean government led by Lee Myun-Bak pursued to resume a strong US-ROK military alliance against the North's military threats.

3. North Korea's Security and Economic Policy toward the ROK

1) North Korea's Military Diplomatic Policy to the ROK

Following the collapse of the Cold War structure, each country is trying to cooperate diplomatically and economically for the national survival and interests. Nevertheless, uncertainty still lingers on the Korean Peninsula. As previously discussed, North Korea undertook a unilateral attempt to nullify the existing armistice agreement, a truce mechanism guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula since 1953.

In terms of military actions, North Korea's policy objectives have changed significantly over time, from ambitious, aggressive, and hostile ones in the 1960s to more defensive ones in the 1990s onwards (Mischishita 2010). In terms of politics, after the Korean War ended in 1953 to 1960, North Korea wrestled with domestic power struggles and the rehabilitation of its war-torn economy. Following Kim Il-Sung's nationalism with *Juche* ideology in 1961, Pyongyang began to push a revolutionary agenda vis-à-vis the South, and prepare military capability build-up against the powerful US-ROK alliance. In addition, when Kim Jong-Il grabbed his status in the North Korean Workers' Party in the early 1980s, North Korea attempted to carry out provocative action (Mischishita 2010, 1-7). In 1960, Pyongyang sustained assaults along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to provoke the ROK-US military. In the 1970s, North Korea used

naval and air activities operated to diminish the South's efforts to fortify the offshore islands in the West sea.

In order to overthrow the South government, Pyongyang conducted two significant assassination attempts on Seoul's president. On January 21, 1968, a 31-man assault team from the North Korea's 124th Army Unit, a special operations unit created in 1967, attempted to mount a raid on the South Korean presidential residence (the Blue House) to assassinate Park Chung-hee. Another operation, in June 1970, involved three North Korean agents infiltrating into Seoul to install a remote-controlled bomb at the gate of the National Cemetery three days before President Park appointed to make a speech there. Both assassinations attempts failed (Michishita 2010). In addition, in 1968, the DPRK not only captured the US intelligence-gathering ship *Pueblo*, but also tried to capsize the South's government during the Rangoon Incident in 1983.⁴⁷

However, since the 1990s, Pyongyang has depended on security assurances and the acquisition of economic assistance to create a foundation for regime survival. Since the mid-1980s, the world has begun to experience Copernican changes: a thaw of a Cold War glacier has brought about the collapse of socialism in East European countries. The principle of "peace and development" put forward by China seems to be coming into reality. The new stages of development in recent years have arisen from the normalization of Soviet-Chinese, Chinese, and Chinese-Indian relations, the improvement of the international ties between China and Vietnam and Indonesia, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the former Soviet Union, and the beginning of an active peaceful dialogue between the two Korean states.

⁴⁷ In October 9, 1983, The Rangoon bombing incident was an assassination attempt against Chun Doo-hwan, the South President, operated by North Korea to overthrow the South government. Two of the bombers were captured, one of whom confessed to being a North Korean military officer. Its killed people and wounded 46 others. Refer to the CIA document: http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000408056.pdf, 2008.

In this new international frame, Pyongyang's security environment was strongly aggravated by the end of the Cold War. Only, the military power of the North and the South had maintained a relative balance. But, even in the Post-Cold war era, the US and ROK alliance has remained strongly in the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, Pyongyang couldn't invest to build conventional weapons and arms race against the South. Table 6 shows that Pyongyang needed an effective instrument to sustain the inter-Korean military balance instead of competing conventional arms race due to the shortage of the North's military budget. During the 1990s, the North Korean military suffered from a budgetary shortage that limited their ability to build even effective military capabilities.

Table 6. DPRK & ROK Military Budget

(Unit: billion dollar)

Year	North Korea	South Korea
1990	16.6	38.8
1991	17.2	42.6
1992	18.5	42.7
1993	18.7	46.4
1994	19.2	53.5
1995	-	66.8
1996	-	72.7
1997	9.1	67.3
1998	9.1	52.3
1999	9.2	67.7
2000	9.6	77.4
2001	9.8	76.8
2002	-	87.6
2003	-	99.1
2004	2.5	105.0
2005	2.9	132.0
2006	3.0	153.8
2007	3.2	168.4
2008	3.5	162.8
2009	3.7	159.5
2010	5.2	174.1
2011	5.8	189.4

Source: The Bank of Korea

* these estimated budgets are applied to each year exchange rates from the Statistics Korea of ROK (<http://kosis.kr/bukhan/>)

In 1991, North Korea signed the South-North Basic Agreement of 1991, which is an agreement on mutual recognition, mutual non-aggression, and an increase of cooperation and exchange. It emphasized the importance of social and cultural exchange for increasing mutual trust. Also, North Korea sought to normalize diplomatic relations with US and Japan. Despite the military threats in the post-Cold War era atmosphere, Pyongyang's military policy maintained a defensive position during the 1990s.

However, although Pyongyang leadership made a progressive gesture toward the South to reduce the mutual distrust and military tension with the South Korean government, North Korea simultaneously prepared to inflict horrible damage on Seoul and punish any transgressions from their neighbor state. North Korea built and deployed a large number of long-range artillery and multiple-rocket launchers along the DMZ and the western front near Seoul. According to ROK's *'Defense White Paper (1998, 67),'* "North Korea reinforced its artillery capabilities in the forward areas from 1993, first in the central and western areas, and then in the eastern area." By forward-deploying a total of 12,000 long-range artillery and rocket systems, North Korea made it possible to fire 500,000 rounds per hour against the South by 2001 (Michishita 2009, 106).

North Korea also began to engage in provocative activities in various forms in 1996. In early April, 1996, it staged armed demonstrations three times in the truce village of Panmunjom by committing heavily armed troops. On September 17, 1996, a North Korean Sang-o-class special-purpose midget submarine ran off the east coast of South Korea while approaching the coast to recover infiltrators: 24 crew members were killed and one was captured.⁴⁸ After this incident, the North Korean Ministry of People's Armed Forces announced that the submarine

⁴⁸ Michishita (2010, 142); UNC, "Report of the Activities of the United Nations Command for 1996," p. 15.

was on a routine training mission and seemed to have drifted down the South Korean coast due to engine trouble (Michishita 2010, 142).

Moreover, since 1999, Pyongyang has claimed to nullify the Northern Limit Line (NLL). In the NLL's dispute, the 1953 Armistice Agreement signed by both the DPRK and the United Nations Command (UNC) specified that the five islands including *Yeonpyeong* Island and *Baengnyeong* Island would remain under the control of the UNC and South Korea.⁴⁹ However, both sides did not compromise to agree on a maritime demarcation line because the UNC wanted to base it on 3 nautical miles (5.6 km) of territorial waters, whereas North Korea wanted to use 12 nautical miles (22 km). On August 30, 1953, UNC set the NLL which was originally drawn to defend against South Korean incursions into the North that threatened the armistice.⁵⁰ In June 1999, the DPRK embarked on a military offensive incident to nullify the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The first stage, in June 6, 1999, the North Korean Central News Agency (*KCNA*, June 6, 1999) asserted that three South Korean warship had illegally crossed the "sea boundary line" and intruded deep into the "territorial waters" of the DPRK. The "Battle of *Yeonpyeong*" broke out on June 15, 1999. Seven North Korean and 13 South Korean warships were there. Firstly, four North Korean vessels initiated to cross the NLL into the South and conducted bumping operations against five South Korean fast craft. After this encounter, one patrol ship and three fast vessels were damaged and seven soldiers were wounded on the South side, whereas one North Korea torpedo boat was sunk, one patrol craft was severely damaged, tow 215-ton patrol

⁴⁹ See the Armistice Agreement, paragraph 13(b), "TEXT OF THE KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT"- findlaw (<http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/korea/kwarmagr072753.html>).

⁵⁰ In the NLL, North Korea strongly asserts, through North Korea's official state news agency *KCNA* (June 25, 2007), that the line is described as the "final line for stopping the defectors to the north" drawn to meet "Washington's self-justified interests." Also, the North denied the NLL: the reason why the northern limit line is called an illegal ghost line can be explained by the fact that it was unilaterally drawn without any agreement reached between the two sides and is in breach of the Korean Armistice Agreement as well as the universally recognized law of the sea, the article notes, citing specific facts to prove it."

ships were crippled, two 70-ton patrol ships were slightly damaged, and 17-30 or more North Korean crews were killed (Michishita 2010, 146). In another military incident in the West Sea, on June 29, 2002, two North Korean patrol boats separately crossed the NLL. As a result of the second “Battle of *Yeonpyeong*”, one South Korean vessel was sunk, six crews were killed, and 18 crews were injured. On the North side, it was estimated that one patrol boat was damaged and about 30 crews were killed or injured (Michishita 2010, 150).

Since the inauguration of the South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak in 2008, in terms of military policy toward the South, North Korea has increasingly maintained a hard-line approach. The first military tension in inter-Korean relations initiated in the shooting death of a South Korean female tourist at the Mt. *Kumgang* tourist resort by a North Korean soldier in July 2008. The Lee government demanded a joint investigation of the incident, an apology, and an official pledge to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents, but the North fell short of complying with these demands. Seoul firmly in turn banned further South Korean tourist visits to Mt. *Kumgang*, and the project came to a complete halt (Moon 2011, 8). In this response, on January 17, 2009, the DPRK military spokesman (*KCNA*, January 17, 2009) claimed a full confrontation against the South. Also, on January 30, the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF: *Jopyongtong*) declared that “all agreements concerning the resolution of political and military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula are invalidated,” and that “NLL (Northern Limit Line) related provisions of the Basic Agreement and the appendix will be discarded” against the hostile policy of Lee’s government (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 30, 2009).

Subsequently, North Korea launched its *Taepodong-2* missile on April 5 and carried out its second underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009. The South Korean government supported

international sanctions against the North, including the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1874, and the tit-for-tat continued (Moon 2011). On November 10, 2009, the two Koreas had another naval conflict in the West. One North Korean patrol vessel crossed the NLL into the South. The situation worsened when, on March 26, 2010, the ROK navy ship *Cheonan* was attacked by the North was sunk in the vicinity of *Baekryeong* Island. 40 sailors were killed and 6 sailors went missing. The international community eventually responded with the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement that condemned North Korea for the *Cheonan*, a navy corvette attack. It also led to the de facto end of previous attempts to get North Korea back into the Six-Party Talks without preconditions (Moon 2011, 8). After *Cheonan* incident, the South government proclaimed the ‘May 24 Measures’ which fortified the South’s military defense and shut-down all inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, excluding the *Kaesung* Industrial Complex.

On November 23, 2010, North Korea opened fire toward the South. The South Korean marines stationed in *Yeonpyong* Island prepared for a shelling exercise directed at the southwestern part of the NLL, which is deemed a part of South Korean territorial waters, even after North Korean warnings. The South military ignored them and undertook the exercise, code named ‘*Hoguk*’. Initially, the North did not respond to the relatively short-range shelling exercises. But North Korean artillery started to strike back on the grounds of self-defense when South Korean marines began shelling exercises with its K-9 self-propelled artillery, with a firing range beyond 40km (Moon 2011). In this response, North Korea said the incident stemmed from South Korean maritime military exercises, and called the exercises “war maneuvers for a war of aggression” (CNN, November 23, 2010).⁵¹ Also, the North military mentioned that “it is a

⁵¹ “Report: N. Korea fires on S. Korea, injuring at least 17.” November 23, 2010. *CNN*.

traditional mode of counter-action of the army of the DPRK to counter the firing of the provocateurs with merciless strikes,” which warned that it “will unhesitatingly continue taking merciless military counter-actions against it” if the border is crossed (*CNN*, November 23, 2010). The North Korean shelling killed four South Koreans, two marines and two civilians, and ruined civilian areas. It was a tremendous disaster, as well as the first shelling into the South Korean territory by the North since the 1953 armistice agreement (Delury and Moon 2011). Therefore, these NLL region’s disputes reflect on the competition of two regimes’ sovereignty. (You might want to elaborate on this point, maybe just a few more sentences.)


2) North Korea’s Economic Policy toward South Korea

Since the Cold-War era, North Korea’s strategy toward the South has been influenced by international isolation from the West. Pyongyang had severe natural disasters that exacerbated the effects of economic isolation due to the communist economic system’s collapse and economic blockade from western countries in the early 1990s. To make matter worse, with the success of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, the South’s economy has rapidly developed. Relatively, Pyongyang felt it had lost political and economic compared with the South. Figure 4 and Table 7 show that North Korea has decreased relative predominance with South Korea in terms of economic indicators since the late of 1980s.

Therefore, Pyongyang leadership attempted to adopt a recovery plan for its tough economic situation which was urgent for its regime’s survival. Although the DPRK under Kim Jong-Il is primarily portrayed characterized by the *Juche* ideology of Kim Il-Sung’s legacy, Pyongyang adopts pragmatic policy in a sticky wicket of post-Cold War framing. The notion of

‘*silli*’ was formed to rationalize Kim’s economic reforms.⁵² *Silli* is presented as a code of conduct of economic activities in the Kim Jong-II regime, and concerns itself with economic efficiency and profit (Lim 2009, 165). *Silli* also prescribes pragmatically seeking national interests in international arena. In sum, since the 1990s North Korea has adopted its equidistance strategy beyond the communist-bloc.

Figure 4. GNP: GNP Per Capita: DPRK vs. ROK



Source: Hwang Eui-gak, *Kankoku to Kitachoesn no Keizai Hikaku [The Korean Economies: A Comparison of North and South]* (Tokyo: Omura Shoten [Omura Publishing], 2005), 128-129. DPRK’s estimated GNP is converted into US dollars by using North Korea’s official exchange rate.

⁵² In January 2000, the New Year’s Day editorial in *Rodong Sinmun* asserts the importance of *silli* in economic activities (*Rodong sinmun*, January 1, 2000).

Table 7. Two Koreas' GNI (Gross National Income) and Growth Rate

Year	Nominal GNI (\$billion)		GNI per capita (\$)		Growth Rate (%)	
	North	South	North	South	North	South
1992	21.1	329.3	1013	7527	-6.0	5.9
1993	20.5	361.4	969	8177	-4.2	6.1
1994	21.2	422.3	992	9459	-2.1	8.5
1995	22.3	529.2	1034	11735	-4.4	8.9
1996	21.4	569.9	989	12518	-3.4	7.2
1997	17.7	528.7	811	11505	-6.5	5.8
1998	12.6	352.1	573	7607	-0.9	-5.7
1999	15.8	455.8	714	9778	6.1	10.7
2000	16.8	530.8	757	11292	0.4	8.8
2001	15.7	503.5	706	10631	3.8	4.0
2002	17.0	576.2	762	12100	1.2	7.2
2003	18.4	644.2	818	13460	1.8	2.8
2004	20.8	724.5	914	15082	2.1	4.6
2005	24.2	843.9	1056	17531	3.8	4.0
2006	25.6	952.5	1108	19722	-1.0	5.2
2007	26.7	1051.2	1152	21695	-1.2	5.1
2008	24.8	937.9	1065	19296	3.1	2.3
2009	22.4	837.2	960	17175	-0.9	0.2

Source: The Bank of Korea (Statistic Korea: <http://kosis.kr/bukhan>)

As a result of this omnidirectional foreign policy, North Korea has developed a more cooperative relation with the South. Most Kim Jong-Il tenure (1994-2011) pursued a framework of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation with South Korea (Paik 2010). In reality, in the inter-Korean realm, Kim must have thought that he had succeeded in completing such framework during the time of the two inter-Korean summits and the two joint declarations (Paik 2010, 515).

The first inter-Korean summit with South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Il (Chairman of the National Defense Commission) took place in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15 June, 2000. Finally, two Korean leaders agreed to sign in the June 15 Joint Declaration on July 15, 2000. This declaration includes 5 articles:

“South and North... agreed to solve the question of the country’s reunification independently,, agree to work together for the reunification in this direction,,, agree to settle humanitarian issues as early as possible,,, agreed to promote the balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchange in all fields, and agree to have dialogues between authorizes”⁵³

In terms of Pyongyang perspective, this agreement affirmed “national independence” in the Korean peninsula without US authority; it accepts the concept of confederation similar to the North’s formula of *Koryo* Confederacy⁵⁴ in reunification; it concerns itself with national reconciliation to humanitarian issues; it compromises to exchange and cooperation between two Korea without obligations; lastly, it guarantees both authorities’ dialogue.

On October 2, 2007, President Roh Moo-Hyun and Chairman Kim Jong-Il conducted the second inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang, which lasted two days. This inter-Korean summit ended in the “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity October 4, 2007.” This agreement upheld “the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration” and discussed issues that related to “realizing the advancement of South-North relations, peace on the Korean Peninsula, common prosperity of the Korean people and unification of Korea (posted by ‘United States Institute of Peace’)⁵⁵.” The 2007 inter-Korean summit continued to

⁵³ United States Institute of Peace, “Peace Agreements Digital Collection” : (http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea06152000.pdf).

⁵⁴ On October 10, 1980, at the Sixth Congress of the Korea Worker's Party on the Work of the Central Committee, Kim Il-sung proposed “Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” as a reunification formula of Korea in which their respective political systems would initially remain: (http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/027th_issue/98012104.htm).

⁵⁵ United States Institute of Peace, “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity October 4, 2007”: (http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea10042007.pdf).

maintain an engagement policy from the Kim Dae-Jung government. The result of the second inter-Korean summit was a rush to more concessions and economic cooperation toward the North, which agreed to work on the *Kaeseong-Sinuiju* railroad, shipbuilding in *Anbyeon* and *Nampo*, joint fishing zones in *Haeju* and vicinity, and continued development of the *Kaesong Industrial Complex*.⁵⁶

Table 8. North Korea's Trade with South Korea, 1995-2011 (unit: USD, thousand)

Year	DPRK's Exports	DPRK's Imports	Total	Total Trade of DPRK	Share of Total Trade
1995	222,855	64,435	287,290	2,051,921	14%
1996	182,399	69,638	252,037	1,976,293	13%
1997	193,069	115,269	308,338	2,176,854	14%
1998	92,264	129,679	221,943	1,442,194	15%
1999	121,604	211,832	333,436	1,479,547	23%
2000	152,373	272,775	425,148	1,969,537	22%
2001	176,170	226,787	402,957	2,270,499	18%
2002	271,575	370,155	641,730	2,260,388	28%
2003	289,252	434,965	724,217	3,115,591	23%
2004	258,039	439,001	697,040	3,554,151	20%
2005	340,281	715,473	1,055,754	4,057,432	26%
2006	519,539	830,200	1,349,739	4,345,542	31%
2007	765,346	1,032,550	1,797,896	4,736,177	38%
2008	932,250	888,117	1,820,367	5,636,060	32%
2009	934,251	744,830	1,679,081	4,882,662	34%
2010	1,043,246	869,331	1,912,577	6,399,585	30%
2011	914,000	800,000	1,714,000	8,513,982	20%

Sources: KOTRA, South Korea

As a result, inter-Korean economic activities increased dramatically. As shown in Table 8, in the Roh Moo-Hyun government of the South, the trade volume between the South and the North amounted to 1.8 billion US dollars in 2007, which was about 38% of the entire DPRK trade volume. Moreover, the two Koreas developed various economic cooperation projects,

⁵⁶ Ibid.

including the Mt. *Kumgang* tourist complex and the *Kaesong* Industrial Complex (KIC), through both government and private channels. As a result, the Roh government focused on three major economic cooperation projects: Kaesong Industrial Complex, linking of inter-Korean railroads, and the Mount *Kumgang* Tourism Zone (H.N. Kim 2006, 39). Particularly, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the embodiment of the idea of Inter-Korea Economic Cooperation. The significance and objective of the KIC are inevitably political in nature, and can be improving South Korean businesses as investors, improving North Korean economy and promoting peace, and developing inter-Korean economic relations. Accordingly, the KIC is not only an economic opening experiment, but also a political experiment as means to build peace regime in the Korean Peninsula. As shown, Table 9, indicates that even under ‘May 24 Measures (blockade for the North)’ of Lee Myung-Bak government in 2010, KIC had operated and steadily increased in annual production.

**Table 9. Number of Companies Operating in the KIC and Production Volume, 2005-2012
(unit: Numbers and ten thousand dollars)**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of Companies	18	30	65	93	117	121	123	123
Production Volume	1,491	7,373	18,478	25,142	25,648	32,332	40,185	46,950
North Korean Workers	6,013	11,160	22,538	38,931	42,561	46,284	49,866	53,448
South Korean Workers	507	791	785	1,055	935	804	776	786

Sources: Ministry of Unification, South Korea:

(<http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000541>)

Along with the growth in inter-Korean trade, South Korea also provided large-scale humanitarian assistance on a nearly regular basis. For instance, the South government provided

300,000-500,000 MT of food and fertilizer to the DPRK every year in the early and mid-2000s, and organized domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by providing aid in order to become more active in humanitarian aid projects (Suk Lee 2012, 7). According to Table 10, The South government supported official aid to the North in the amount of \$227.4 million in 2006, and in 2007, the amount \$304.61 million was provided to the North by both government and private assistance in humanitarian projects for Pyongyang. As a result, Seoul's humanitarian assistance toward Pyongyang hit a definite high point during Roh's tenure. As shown Figure 5, talks between two Koreas have been more focused on 'economic relations' and bilateral dialogue (2002-2007). However, the Lee Myungbak government was reluctant to cooperate with Pyongyang led by Kim's goals by pursuing a policy of "denuclearization, opening, and 3,000."⁵⁷ Complicating matters, after *Cheonan* incident in March 2010, the South government decided unilaterally to proceed with the 'May 24 Measures,' which closed all inter-Korean exchange and cooperation excluding *Kaesung* Industrial Complex.


Table 10. South Korea's Assistance to North Korea, 2001-2011 (unit: ten thousand dollars)

	Government Assistance and Grants	Private Assistance and Grants	Total
2001	7,522	6,017	13,539
2002	8,915	4,577	13,492
2003	9,377	6,386	15,763
2004	11,541	13,250	24,791
2005	13,588	7,666	21,254
2006	22,740	7,088	29,828
2007	20,893	9,568	30,461
2008	3,996	6,460	10,456
2009	2,420	2,858	5,278
2010	1,780	1,748	3,528
2011	565	1,173	1,738

Sources: Statistic Korea, ROK; Ministry of Unification, South Korea

⁵⁷ *Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of Republic of Korea*, The Blue House, March 2009.

Figure 5. Number of Inter-Korean Talks, 1993-2011



Sources: Drawn by the author based on data from Ministry Unification of the ROK (www.unikorea.go.kr)

Through the South’s “Sunshine Policy” and “Peace and Prosperity” from 1998 to 2007, Pyongyang has adopted the principle of the separation of economy and politics. This North Korean policy of separating economy from security and political affairs has derived economic benefits and built mutual trust between Pyongyang and Seoul. In this sense, North Korea has responded with a two way strategy, minimizing the negative influence of the South’s engagement policy (such as the potential spread of western capitalist culture) to harm its own system, while maximizing economic cooperation and co-existence without radical political confrontations with the South. Furthermore, in terms of Pyongyang’s economic openness policy, North Korea has derived certain benefits in which regime survival is better assured through Seoul’s economic aid. Also, Pyongyang’s pursuit of peaceful co-existence has made a path for potential normalization of diplomatic relations with the US and Japan.

4. The DPRK's Legitimacy Competition with the ROK

1) North Korea's Strategies toward South Korea

North Korean foreign policy toward South Korea has been guided by efforts to establish relative regime legitimacy. As one of the prime purpose of North Korea's policy to South Korea is its own regime survival and stability. Based on this purpose, Pyongyang has maintained its own system, namely "Korean style socialist system (*urisik sahejui*)" with the '*Juche* (self-reliance)' ideology against the South. Therefore, one must analyze the tactics and policy consequences of selecting a particular national identity.

The diverging paths of development between North and South Korea since the 1960s have intensified the competition for legitimacy. South Korea bases its legitimacy in capitalist development, while North Korea favors nationalist consolidation (Han Park 2002, 121). After the Korean War (1953) South Korea was unstable,⁵⁸ the South could never abandon the ideology of "democratic governance." In South Korea, political integration and power consolidation have been promoted through the ideal of "anticommunism" (Park 2002, 122). On the contrary, North Korea developed a unique nationalism under *Juche* (self-reliance). As mentioned before, North Korean nationalism linked its own system to issues such as foreign relations, economic development orientation, political legitimacy, technological improvement, and cultural

⁵⁸ After 1953, South Korea was both politically and economically unstable. Although Rhee had officially established the ROK, it was not a democratic regime in the immediate aftermath of the war. A fraudulent election in 1960 led to student demonstrations against Rhee Syngman, and his resignation from office in the same year. The Second Republic was established on incredibly instable grounds, and was overturned by General Park Chung-Hee in 1961. While his military coup oversaw a huge economic boom through export led growth, Park led South Korea under an intense dictatorship until his assassination in 1979. During his ruling, there were many student rebellions and labor unions against the human rights violations perpetrated under Park's dictatorship. The period after Park's assassination was burdened with political confusion. This is especially represented by the Kwangju Massacre, on May 18th 1980, when citizens seized the city in rebellion of another military coup, this time perpetrated by Chun Doo Hwan. It wasn't until Roh Tae Woo won the 1987 election by popular vote, that the democratic regime stabilized.

leadership of civilian society. This ideology systematically sticks to the premise that whatever South Korea stands for is wrong and illegitimate (Park 2002).

Based on these assumptions, North Korea has developed strong nationalism and the “military-first” politics designed by Kim Il-Sung and his son, Kim Jong-Il. Even though North Korea has been plagued by enormous economic difficulties and natural disasters, external political impasses resulting from the demise of the socialist bloc, and economic sanctions by western capitalist countries and their allies (the U.S. and Japan), Pyongyang has not given up its own system. Pyongyang has worked, rather, to fortify its military security and block outside information to Koreans through the ‘*Songun Politics* (military first)’ suggested by Kim Jong-Il. In regards to the *Songun* Politics, Park explains that “to address the domestic concerns for possible sources of instability and to cope with the wellbeing of the people, two distinct measures were advanced: the *Songun* politics and Controlled Economic Reforms” Also, he clarifies that “it would be not only too simplistic but wrong to understand this doctrine as a political strategy to put the military ‘first’ to provide it with privileges and power. Rather, *Songun* is a comprehensive system of values and norms designed to lay out a roadmap for politics and society; this doctrine is predicated on the principle of ‘the militarization of the civilian; and the civilianization of the military’ in which the civilian is mandated to be ‘combat ready’ at all times and the military is charged with the obligation and responsibility to be and to work for the civilian society. Thus, there will be no distinction between the two sectors (Park, 2012).” After Kim Jong-Il grabbed power in Pyongyang, *Songun* was the pivot of Pyongyang leadership.

According to *Rodong sinmun* (KCNA, March 3, 2008), Pyongyang insists the *Songun* Politics is “the noblest patriotic politics as it helps reliably protect the dignity and sovereignty of the country and nation and achieve their prosperity; it is thanks to “*Songun*” that the Korean

nation is demonstrating its dignity as a strong nation with tremendous a military deterrent whom no formidable enemy dares attack; it serves as a motivating force instilling true patriotism into the members of the nation and encouraging them to fully display it.” Therefore, the *Songun* politics is effective as a core policy strategy of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), particularly as it relates to the South.

Also, in terms of Pyongyang’s national identity orientation, North Korea adopted *Jaju* (national independence) originated by nationalism for the North’s policy strategy toward the South government. North Korea believes that “the legitimacy war with the South can be won by convincing the people that it embodies the spirit of nationalism derived from *Juche* ideology,” (Park 1996, 224). The principle of national independence is deeply related to the policy strategy of independent national unification of North Korea’s policy.⁵⁹ In *Rodong sinmun*, the official newspaper of the WPK (*KCNA*, February 11, 2008), National independence (*Jaju*) as Kim Jong-II’s idea “serves as an immortal torchlight as it clearly indicates the way of firmly defending the sovereignty and dignity of the Korean nation and achieving national reunification and the prosperity of the nation.” Also, the *Rodong Sinmun*’s article asserted:

“his [Kim Jong-II] idea of national independence has its historic roots in the immortal *Juche* idea founded by President Kim Il Sung., Kim Jong II scientifically elucidated the essence and basic criteria of the nation and the issue related to the formation of the nation, proceeding from the principle of the *Juche* idea long ago. He expounded a new and original idea that independence is what keeps the nation alive and clarified that the issue of carving out its destiny means meeting its requirements for independence., He clarified that the cause of national independence can be

⁵⁹ In 2001 Joint New Year editorial of newspapers, Pyongyang asserts the June 15 north-south joint declaration in 2000 is “a proclamation of independence, peaceful reunification and overall national unity anchored on the three principles of national reunification and a landmark of this cause in the 21st century (*KCNA*, January 1, 2001).

started only by an outstanding leader of the nation and it can be accomplished only when the popular masses are armed with the idea of national independence set forth by the leader and the principle of independence is strictly abided by under his leadership...,, Kim Jong Il's idea of national independence serves as a banner for achieving a sure victory in the cause of national reunification.”

In addition, the North Korean regime justifies inter-national cooperation through the shared national history of the two Koreas (Yang 2011, 233). North Korea holds that unification of the two Koreas is an inevitable result because the two Koreas shared one bloodline, language, and cultural ideology. North Korea calls for inter-Korean cooperation as a necessary orientation for unifying the South and North. Kim Jong-II stated that “our country’s unification problem is a problem of ending outside power’s control over and interference in the South and extending nationalistic independence to entre country to reconnect the severed national bloodline and nationalistically unite as one race.”⁶⁰

For the June 15 Joint Declaration in 2000, North Korea stressed that Article 1 includes the idea of “*Uri Minjeok Kiri* (by our nation itself)” as the heritage of national independence consistent in Pyongyang’s strategy for the South (Yang 2009, 235). In the interest of regime survival, North Korea has tried to nullify the 1953 armistice agreement with the US, and also pushed for the withdrawal of US military power in South Korea since the 1990s. Accordingly, Pyongyang has been encouraged by the increase in anti-American sentiment among South Korean youth (Swongji Woo 2006, 236). As a result, Pyongyang exemplifies the June 15 Joint Declaration, “an attitude and stand which calls for firmly maintaining independence in the

⁶⁰ Kim Jong-II, *Selected Works of Kim Jong Il, vol. 14* (Pyongyang: Chosun Workers’ Party Publishing House, 2000), pp. 341-2.

overall movement for reunification and settling all issues with overriding importance attached to the will and interest of the nation (*Rodong Sinmun*, January 11, 2008).

Through the South's "Sunshine policy" implemented by Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administration, South Korea expected Pyongyang is willing to take off its own socialist system based on '*Juche*' and strong nationalism against western capitalism and the South followed by comprehensive inter-Korean economic cooperation and exchange between two Koreas. However, even with the South's efforts, military confrontations along the NLL and DMZ have continued. Moreover, since the Lee Myung-Bak government from 2008, through strengthening the US-ROK joint military exercise, the South's hostile policy to Pyongyang has brought about more severe military tensions such as "*Cheonan incident*" and "*Yeonpyong island shelling*" in 2010.

2) North Korea's Policy Priority to South Korea (Legitimacy Competition)

At first, inter-Korean relations were a zero-sum game (Kim 2011, 171). Even after the inauguration of Kim the Dae-Jung government in 1998, inter-Korean economic relations progressed amazingly, but the North's military provocation of the South continued as seen in North Korean trade vessel's intrusion into a territorial water line (NLL) in June 2001 and the Yellow Sea battle in June 2002. The NLL (the Northern Limit Line)'s dispute is a contentious and competitive issue for both sides. Both regimes have not only security and economic interests at stake in the dispute, but also sovereignty issues. North Korea believes that the NLL is illegal, as it was drawn by the United Nation Command after the Korean War, and violates its sovereign, territorial waters (Roehrig 2011, 204). In this sense, Pyongyang insisted that the NLL's dispute be considered an essential sovereignty issue. The tragic naval battles of both Koreas show that

the legitimacy competition is still intact even after the growth of inter-Korean economic relations. Rather, table 11 shows that the frequency of North Korean military provocation had increased during Kim and Roh government's terms in the 2000s. Moreover, the North's testing of a nuclear bomb may threaten Korean peninsula's security as well as inter-Korean relations. In terms of North Korea's reciprocal activities, the Sunshine Policy has failed to encourage any real fundamental opening up or reform from North Korea during the previous Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun governments.

Table 11. North Korea's Military Provocation (number of times)

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010	2011	2012
Infiltration Operation	386	1,011	313	167	63	16	0	1	2
Local Provocation	19	329	96	61	168	276	10	18	17
Total	405	1,340	409	228	231	292	10	19	19

Sources: Ministry of National Defense, "Defense White Paper 2012," South Korea

At first the June 15th summit talks in 2000, Pyongyang likely sought to gain economic advantages from the South while also increasing their relative legitimacy (Han Park 2002). First, Pyongyang asserted that the format of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il responds to the South Korean president's request; Second, the DPRK insisted that the summit place is not Seoul, but Pyongyang was the only locus of a unification of Korea; Third, Pyongyang initially refused to name Kim Jong-Il as Kim Dae-Jung's counterpart, and intended Kim Yong-Nam, nominal head of state as the South president (Park 2002, 126). Secondly, from 2003 to 2007, the Roh government had pursued to reconcile and cooperate with the North Korea as the essential means for tension reduction and the main pivot for denuclearization. Even though the Roh government tried to fulfill the economic highest level-talks and humanitarian aid than any previous

governments, North Korea's response to such economic engagement seemed to fall short of the South's expectations. In the South's engagement policy, North Korea responded in kind by "firmly rebuffing" all attempts by the Roh's government to raise the nuclear issue through inter-Korean dialogue and maintained its posture of addressing their nuclear issue bilaterally with the United States (Synder 2005, 97).

In this sense, North Korea has continued to pursue its aggressive military first policy, which was clearly shown during the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun's presidential terms. In the Sunshine policy of ROK, the US suspected that through the South's economic assistances for North Korea, Pyongyang was able to prepare the equipment to start their highly enriched uranium nuclear program that started the second nuclear crisis.⁶¹ After *Cheonan* incident (the North's denial of attack on *Cheonan* warship), in accordance with the Lee government's "hardline policy" toward the North, the South has been strengthening US-ROK military exercises and engaging in an economic blockade for Pyongyang. In corresponding with Seoul's hawkish attitude, whatever the cost, Pyongyang has retaliated militarily such as the *Yeonpyong* shelling in the NLL.

Moreover, in the Lee government's new policy of 'De-nuke, Open 3000', North Korea strongly condemned that "the North's opening is nothing but an intolerable insult and provocation to Korean-style socialism centered on the popular masses and its dignified system and an anti-reunification act and a move for confrontation," and "by crying out for the North's opening traitor Lee and his gentries disclosed themselves that they are a group of traitors and criminals working hard to quell the desire of the fellow countrymen for national independence

⁶¹ In 2001, the CIA reported that North Korea was able to buy large quantities of equipment and material needed for the highly enriched uranium program: "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," *Central Intelligence Agency*, January 1-June 20, 2002 (www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2002.html).

and their unanimous resolution to usher in a new era of independent reunification, peace and prosperity by their concerted efforts (*Rodong Sinmun*, April 8, 2008).”

In 2010, the *Cheonan* Incident and the *Yeonpyoung* island Shelling illustrated that Pyongyang employed a tit-for-tat strategy toward Seoul. As a result, Pyongyang endeavored to punish the South each time they felt their national dignity was hurt. Recently, Pyongyang warned Seoul regarding the Day of the Sun in 2013: “the army and the people of the DPRK will wipe out the group of traitors who committed the thrice-cursed unpardonable crime and give vent to their pent-up grudge through powerful retaliation action without notice and immediate start of just military operation (*Rodong Sinmun*, April 17, 2013).”

Indeed, what is Pyongyang policy behavior’s orientation and policy preference toward Seoul? In terms of the legitimacy competition with the South, the foreign policy aim of the DPRK is to guide the inter-Korean relationship in accordance with its domestic priority and the character of the ruling elite. In terms of Northern legitimacy, North Korea endeavors to propose talks to alleviate tension whenever a progressive party assumes power in the South, while increasing the level of criticism against the ruling party and its North Korea policy whenever a conservative party is in power (Han 2011, 47). Whenever power shifts era of Seoul, Pyongyang eases its hostile attitude and opened up possibilities for talks to format a favorable environment.

Table 12. The DPRK’s Policy behavior toward the ROK

Period		Ruling Party in Seoul	Policy Behavior
Kim Young-sam Government	1993.3-1998.2	Conservative	Hard-line
Kim Dae-jung Government	1998.3-2003.2	Progressive	Soft-line
Roh Moo-hyun Government	2003.3-2008.2	Progressive	Soft-line
Lee Myung-bak Government	2008.3-2012.3	Conservative	Hard-line


In the 14th South Korean presidential election in 1992, Pyongyang infrequently criticized candidate Kim Young-Sam as a “fascist”. The reason why North regime restrained its criticism of the candidate from the conservative ruling party was because of the defensive stance they had adopted after the collapse of the socialist bloc, the trend set by the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, and the fact that, five years previously, as a member of the opposition party, Kim Young-Sam had urged the Party to select a single candidate (Kibum Han 2011, 46). Additionally, in April 1996 the Kim Young-sam government changed its North Korea policy from dovish to hawkish, and then rejected any food aid request from Pyongyang. One week before the general election on April 11, 1996, North Korean heavy armored troops violated the armistice treaty to enter in the DMZ (Kim 2011, 179). In 2002, Kim Dae-Jung terms, Pyongyang attempted to conciliate the South by sending a letter on July 25 expressing apologies for the West Sea battle which had occurred on June 29 and promising that this dispute would not occur again (Han 2011, 47-48). Before the 16th presidential election in 2002, North Korea drew attention to itself by resuming nuclear programs and missile exports.⁶² Lee Hoi-Chang, the Grand National Party’s candidate for the presidential election, used the North Korea’s threat issue regarding with resuming of nuke power to criticize Roh Moo-Hyun’s progressive position on ‘Inter-Koreans relations and unification. In 2007, North Korea condemned ‘South Korean Grand National Party (GNP)’ and its president candidate, Lee Myung-Bak as “national traitors” since GNP criticized the previous government’s Sunshine policy and had pessimistic perspectives toward inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Pyongyang (*KCNA*, March 7, 2007) asserted that “the GNP is throwing snags in the way of peace and reunification of the nation, revealing its true colors as

⁶² On December 2, 2002, DPRK’s minister of foreign Affairs sent a letter to the IAEA rejecting nuclear inspections. The US Navy intercepted Yemen-bound scud missiles on a North Korean ship (Sosan) on December 10, 2002. On December 12, 2002, DPRK’s Foreign Affairs Ministry announced a resumption of the nuclear program before the South Korea’s presidential election on December 12 (Han 2011, 46).

one fed on the residues of the era of division, they noted, adding: The fellow countrymen will never forgive it.”

As suggested earlier, a content analysis, particularly a word count method, is employed as an effective way to examine Pyongyang’s perception and policy priority toward South Korea. Figure 6 indicates sharp increases in North Korea’s criticisms and slanderous gestures toward the conservative ruling party and the Blue House of South Korea (Grand National Party & Lee Myung-Bak government inaugurated in 2008). This picture represents that the pattern of North Korean regime’s criticisms toward the South has presented a quite different perception between progressive Roh Moo-Hyun government (2002-2007) and conservative Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-2012). In the North’s foreign policy, there is an interrelation between verbal expresses and actual policy behavior of Pyongyang leadership toward Seoul.

Figure 6. North Korea’s Criticisms for South Korea, 2007-2009 ⁶³



Sources: *Rodong Sinmun* (Editorials related with inter-Korean relations from 2007-2009)

⁶³ Expressed criticisms’ words are counted as an item criticizing South Korea in *Rodong Sinmun*: “Enemy (*wonsu*), Puppet regime (*gyerae*), Cabal Party; Gang Group; Thief Group (*paedang; ildang; dodang*), Traitor; Treason (*maeguk; banyeok; yeokjeok*), Fascist (*fashow*), Submission (*sadae*)

Since the early 1990s, North Korea has adopted “*Uri Minjeok Kiri* (by our nation itself)” as an alternative expression of national independence (*Jaju*). The principle of national independence is aimed to the policy strategy of independent national unification of North Korea without the United States or other strong countries. Also, national independence is derived from Juche ideology, that is, “national identity” of North Korea. According to ‘content analysis’ in *Rodong Sinmun*, Table 13, Pyongyang strongly insisted that ‘*Jaju*’ is the most essential policy toward Seoul, in which *Jaju* represented its own assertions of legitimacy vis-à-vis the South.

Table 13. The Selected Word's Frequency for the DPRK' Policy Preference to the ROK, 2007-2009

(unit: frequency)

Preferences	Selected Words		2007	2008	2009
Security	Invasion; Attack	<i>Chimryak, Gongkyeok</i>	163	806	773
Security	War	<i>Junjaeng</i>	371	1074	1340
Security	Military	<i>Gunsa; Muryeok</i>	227	666	941
Security	Security; Self-defense	<i>Jawui; Anjun</i>	61	60	229
Identity	Self-reliance	<i>Juche</i>	205	167	121
Identity	Military-First	<i>Songun</i>	343	210	119
Identity	National Independence	<i>Jaju</i>	1776	2078	1805
Identity	Dignity	<i>Jonum</i>	190	192	250
Identity	Puppet government	<i>Gyerae</i>	1	438	523
Identity	Betrayal; Traitor; Treason	<i>Maeguk; Banyeok; Yeokjeok; Yekdo</i>	256	997	1632
Identity	Submission	<i>Sadae</i>	96	217	221
Prosperity	Economic prosperity	<i>Byunyoung</i>	310	583	467
Prosperity	Strong and prosperous great power	<i>Kangsungdaekuk</i>	13	1	8
Prosperity	Economic Cooperation	<i>Hyeopbryeok</i>	209	98	428
Preferences			2007	2008	2009
Security			822	2606	3283
Identity			2867	4299	4671
Prosperity			532	682	903

Source: *Rodong Sinmun* (Editorials related with inter-Korean relations from 2007-2009)


As shown above, North Korean leaders have depended on rejection of South Korean values as the basis of regime legitimacy (Han Park, 2002, 129). In terms of establishing national identity in the course of inter-Korean relations, North Korea depends on the legitimacy competition, which explains the fundamental orientation and policy priority toward South Korea. As shown in Figure 7, Pyongyang felt security threats from the South in each March of 2007, 2008, 2009, since these seasons used to bring the Joint US-ROK military exercises in the disputed territorial areas. On this point, Pyongyang sees the Joint US-ROK military exercises as a great security threat. It illustrates that for the DPRK, the US-ROK military alliance is one of the primary threat to its regime safety. Therefore, North Korea condemned the Joint US-ROK military exercises as “to all intents and purposes, maneuvers for a nuclear war” and “to seize the DPRK by force of arms,” and claimed that the training “threatens the sovereignty of the DPRK and take necessary countermeasures including those to further bolster up all its deterrent forces (A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry, KCNA, March 3, 2008).” During the Joint US-ROK military exercise (“Key Resolve”) - just before North Korea tested a long-range missile (North Korea declared it is a “satellite”), Pyongyang asserted maximally ‘security’ needs toward Seoul from 2006 to 2009. Indeed, after the second nuclear test, the Lee administration in South Korea pushed for support on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1874 and the UNSC Presidential Statement.⁶⁴ Under UNSC 1874 in June 2009, Pyongyang expressed sharply the legitimacy preference toward the South. In this relationship, the North Korean leadership tends to promote its national identity and legitimacy of Pyongyang regime toward the South Korean government in regards to justifying its nuclear armament.

In sum, under the Lee Myung-Bak government’s hardline policy toward the North and continued economic sanctions from western countries, Pyongyang leadership’s policy toward

⁶⁴ see “2010 Diplomatic White Papers,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, p. 21

South Korea has significantly relied on the policy orientation of establishing ‘national identity’ more than the Roh government’s policy preference of economic engagement. Also, we can observe that the ‘security’ need of Pyongyang’s policy increased sharply in the Joint US-ROK military drill period. However, most of Pyongyang’s policy priorities toward the South are determined by “identity” need.

Figure 7. North Korea’s Policy Priorities toward South Korea, 2007-2009



Source: *Rodong Sinmun* (Editorials related with inter-Korean relations from 2007-2009)⁶⁵

⁶⁵ It counts the frequency of proper nouns regarding with security concern, identity needs and economic prosperity toward China in *Rodong Sinmun* from 2005-2009: 1) Security Words – “war (junjaeng)”; “military (gunsu),”; “self-defense (jawui)”; “security (anjon)” 2) National Identity Words – “self-reliance (juche)”; “military-first (sungun)”; “national independence (jaju)” “Puppet regime (gyerae)”; “Cabal Party; Gang Group; Thief Group (paedang; ildang; dodang)”; “Traitor; Treason (maeguk; banyeok; yeokjeok; Yekdo)”; “submission (sadae)” 3) Economic Prosperity Words – “economic self-help (jaryeokgaengsaeng)”; “prosperity (byunyoung; kangsungdaekuk).”

Overall, in this chapter, I observed that the legitimacy competition between two Koreas has never stopped from the separation of two political systems at the end of World War II. Historically, South Korea's "Sunshine" policy of engagement with the economically reclusive North Korean government differs from previous policies of engagement in that it separated economic and political issues. Thus, as political conflict continued, North Korea has shown a willingness to cooperate economically and has favored openness. Since the election of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's in 2008, military tensions between the two states have only increased. Even though the Lee administration has proposed to offer economic assistance to North Korea (promising a \$3,000 per capita within 10 years) in exchange for its promise to abandon its nuclear program and continue its path towards openness,⁶⁶ North Korea has chosen a hard line policy toward South Korea. As a result, politically, North Korea has continued to compete the South.

In sum, through the process-tracing method, it should be emphasized that Pyongyang attempts to stand on a hostile position whenever the South government pursues to infringe Pyongyang's identity and dignity. In addition, the North Koreans perceive South Korea as merely a puppet that is reliant on US military power. In doing so, even though Pyongyang somewhat has felt security threats from Seoul, the North Korean policy to South Korea has mostly determined by "national identity." Table 13 and Figure 7 also proved hypothesis 2: North Korea's foreign policy toward South Korea is determined by the "identity need."

⁶⁶ Inauguration speech, Feb. 25, 2008.

CHAPTER 7

NORTH KOREAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA

This chapter deals with the North Korean policy preferences toward China. As discussed before, in this chapter, I examine about the third hypothesis of this study (H3) that Pyongyang's foreign policy toward China is mostly based on a desire for "economic prosperity." At first, I attempt to describe how both China and North Korea have built up the blood-tied relationship. As same as previous chapters, through historical explanation and content analysis, this chapter is to discern what main principles and goals guide the DPRK's foreign policy objectives toward the PRC. I also attempt to observe the DPRK's perception and policy preference toward China.

1. Historical and Cultural Contexts of Sino-DPRK Relations

Initially, it is useful to succinctly understand the historical and cultural legacy that supports discernments in how the North Korean leaders have perceived the Chinese government's identity, and formed its policy objectives toward China. The PRC-DPRK began unofficially when US forces came to South Korea's defense at the outset of the Korean War and was formalized in July, 1961, under the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Nanto and Manyin 2010, 5).

China and North Korea were bonded by their shared communist ideologies, by blood-ties with during the Korean War, and by China's reconstruction efforts to Pyongyang after the Korean War. In this regard, Sino-North Korea relations have long been considered as special

allies presented the relationship of “lips and teeth”. The shared interests and identities between the two governments were enough to assure cordial relations for decades. But these mutual affinities began to diverge in the early 1980s when the PRC initiated economic reforms and open marketing systems under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, and when Beijing normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992 (Nanto and Manyin 2010). While the relationship has fluctuated over the years, official ties (measured in terms of bilateral meetings) have grown stronger along with the economic ties between the two countries (Snyder 2009). While the basic Cold War relationship remains intact, China’s views on the DPRK have undergone some changes since Hu Jintao took power in 2002.

When examining the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula, one needs to first look at historical, strategic, and geographical factors. Historically, China and Korea have had a complex and intimate relationship, symbolized by a hierarchical tributary system. As Chae-Jin Lee (1996, 1) points out,

Korea’s tributary relations with China began as early as the fifth century, were regularized during the Koryo dynasty (918-1392), and became fully institutionalized during the Yi dynasty (1392-1910).

There have been many significant interactions between the two countries during the past centuries. Each ruler of China – whether the leader of a dynasty or republic – has, to some extent, regarded Korea as one of the prominent students of traditional Confucianist Chinese culture. Thus China sees Korea as an important component of what may be called the “East Asian civilization.” Moreover, Korea has often acted as a buffer between China and other nations (e.g. Japan).

The Korean War served as a reminder to the Beijing leadership that Korea is important to its own national security. As a result, in October of 1950, China reentered the Korean Peninsula via the Yalu River and directly confronted the U.S. militarily. This conflict ended in a military stalemate three years later. The casualties on both sides, however, were tremendous. According to Chinese statistics, the U.S. casualties reached 390,000 and Chinese casualties reached 115,000 (Lifeng 1994, 312-313). Another account claims that the Chinese casualties were closer to 400,000 (Adelman and Shih 1993, 189).

The Korean War had other lasting consequences for the Asia-Pacific region. First, it prompted President Harry Truman to order the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to guarantee Taiwanese security, thereby internationalizing the issue of Taiwan and making it a focus of future conflict between Beijing and Washington. Second, the war left the Korean peninsula with the long-term legacy of North-South division. Third, the Korean War has had strategic implications in East Asian international relations; that is, Korea historically has been known as a place of “*bingjia bizheng*” (meaning a strategic stronghold for military conflict) among major powers. This strategic importance is still very important today as all four East Asian major powers – China, Japan, Russia, and the U.S. – have their own vital stakes in the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula (Zhao 2003, 100).

In 1961 China and North Korea signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.⁶⁷ China and North Korea relations developed within the context of the treaty.

⁶⁷ By their wartime military cooperation, and by years of China reconstruction efforts and assistance to North Korea after Korean War, China leaders saw North Korea as a crucial buffer state between the China border and American military forces stationed in South Korea. In addition, both China and North Korea shared what one analysts has called the frustration of divided nation ideologies, which the separation of North Korea from South Korea on the Korean peninsula, and What Chinese leaders viewed as the separation of China on the mainland from the Republic of China on Taiwan. The shared interests and identities between the two governments were enough to assure cordial relations for decades. See, Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, 2010. *China-North Korea Relations*. Congressional Research Service (CRS).

Both nations saw their mutual defense alliance in terms of protecting their shared communist ideology, and China became a huge economic supporter of North Korea.

During the Cold War, China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union shared strong political ties and military cooperation, forming a Communist block against the capitalist states, notably the U.S and South Korea. During the Cold War years, political similarities were the main factors that consolidated this relationship (Koo 2006).

China and North Korea continued their military relationship until the 1980s. Prior, the relationship between these countries was fostered by frequent high-level meetings. However, a relationship once described as “close as lips to teeth” became distant and merely pragmatic as both states went through significant changes in the later 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the end of the Cold War and a rapidly changing international system. The change in this relationship was denoted in 1992 when China normalized relations with South Korea. The relationship continued to degrade when North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006. Since these tests, China has grown increasingly perplexed and frustrated over its inability to persuade, cajole, or pressure its previous friend and ally to give up its nuclear weapons program. Moreover, China has been unsuccessful in its efforts to turn what is perceived by some as a Stalinist, developmentally backward, ideologically constrained dictatorship into a rapidly growing, relatively stable and accepted member of the international community.⁶⁸

Historically, China has used North Korea as a buffer zone between it and the United States. This is not the only role North Korea serves for China, however, as each side considers the relationship a “friendship cemented with blood.” In this regard, China currently is focused on

⁶⁸ See Bonnie S. Glaser, Scott Snyder, and John S Park, 2008, “Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea,” *joint report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies & U.S. Institute of Peace*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace; and Bonnie S. Glaser, 2009, “China’s Policy in the Wake of the Second DPRK Nuclear Test,” *China Security*, Vol.5, No. 2, pp.1-11.

developing North Korea's economy so as to maintain a stable North Korea. In response, Pyongyang has not perceived to be threatened from security and political legitimacy since both North Korea and China have shared communist system and Confucius culture. Therefore, in historical and cultural contexts, the North Korean regime attempts to promote economic cooperation and mutual help with Beijing's government without the arrogation of its regime survival.

2. China's Foreign policy toward Korea

Before this study attempts to examine the North Korean's foreign policy to China, one must understand China's policy toward North Korea in order to explain what have been the tactics and policy consequences of a particular foreign policy between Sino-DPRK relations. To better understand China's position toward Korea, we need to look first at the general trends in the development of Chinese foreign policy. Contemporary Chinese foreign policy up to early 1997 can be divided into two eras- the era of Mao Zedong and the era of Deng Xiaoping (Zhao 2003, 104). Chinese foreign policy since 1949 is characterized by both continuity and change. Strategy has varied according to China's perception of international forces, and in order to achieve the fixed goals that have lent continuity to the PRC's foreign policy. In this process, foreign policy has evolved in a manner in which the PRC's international responses can be fairly described as '*pragmatism*' with Chinese characteristics (Dreyer 2004, 340).

Modernization has played a leading role in the shift of Chinese foreign policy toward the two Koreas. Economic development was one of Beijing's primary incentives for normalizing relations with South Korea. China's modernization programs could not be realized without extensive external support and exchanges from industrialized countries that can provide

advanced technology, capital, markets, and managerial skills. South Korea is a nearby supplier of these resources. The first official step to enhance bilateral relations was the agreement to set up trade offices in each capital in October 1990. South Korea quickly appointed a former assistant foreign minister as the head representative of its trade office, and both offices formally opened in the spring of 1991, leading to the normalization of relations between the two countries the next year. Since the late 1980s, South Korean businesspeople have been making direct investments and entering into joint ventures in China. Investment in China increased quickly, from \$48.3 million in 1990 to \$474.6 million in 1993. China has become the second-most-important destination for Korea's overseas investments. South Korean investments in China are primarily concentrated in the Bohai Sea area, most notably in Shandong Province, and the northeast region, which together accounted for 85.9 percent of investments by the end of 1993. South Korea has become increasingly important as a trading partner for China. In 1995, for example, China's trade with South Korea reached \$17 billion, thirty times more than its trade with North Korea of \$550 million. Bilateral trade between Beijing and Seoul further increased to \$31.3 billion in 2002, accounting for 9.4% of South Korea's total foreign trade. China is also the largest recipient of South Korea's overseas development assistance (Chung 2001, 781). Since 2004, China has been South Korea's first largest trading partner.⁶⁹

Most of all, since the beginning of the post-Cold War era, East Asian international relations have been greatly affected by the reconfiguration of power relations in the region. It is a common belief that the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s – especially with the collapse of the Soviet Empire – significantly altered the configuration of major power relations in the Asian-Pacific region. Beijing has to prepare itself to face the strategic challenge presented by this

⁶⁹ In 2012, Korea's export amount to China- USD 134,323 million, Korea's import amount from China - USD 80,785 million: Korea International Trade Association (<http://global.kita.net>)

development, including such events as the new guidelines of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and discussions of a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system in East Asia.

To counterbalance this perceived hostile environment, China has developed the following four strategies in its foreign policy. First, China has further enhanced its cooperation with Russia and other former Soviet states, not only in economic and political areas, but more importantly in security matters represented by the recently established Shanghai Security Cooperative. Second, Beijing has rekindled its interest in maintaining substantial influence over Pyongyang, so that China will have greater leverage in terms of political and strategic maneuvering in the Korean peninsula. Third, China has moved to improve its relationship with its neighbors in Southeast Asia, that is, with ASEAN countries. Finally, China has increased its community-building efforts in economics and technology (Zhao 2003, 110).

Naturally, China is opposed to any aggressive behavior on the part of either Pyongyang or Seoul because this will jeopardize regional stability and consequently impinge on Beijing's own security. Any aggressive behavior would also make it difficult for China to respond, given that Beijing still values its traditional friendship with North Korea while promoting closer economic ties with South Korea. Therefore, China welcomes the December 1991 historic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Co-operation between the South and the North (the Basic Accord), which provides the basis for establishing a peace system on the Korean peninsula. The Basic Accord also led to North Korea and South Korea agreeing on the joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, with both sides agreeing to allow mutual inspections of suspected nuclear facilities. Chinese President Jiang Zemin reiterated to the South Korean leadership that 'China supports the call for a nuclear free Korean peninsula' (Ong 2002, 66).

China wanted to have Korean unification both ways, supporting the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas under Kim Il-Sung's "Confederal" formula- "one country, one nation; two systems, two governments" – but also opposing any "dramatic change" (that is, German-style reunification). This was seen as the most feasible way to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Despite China's lip service to reunification, the central challenge of post-Mao foreign policy was and remains to create a congenial external environment, especially in Northeast Asia, for its own accelerated march to power and plenty. By mid-1994, when Kim Il Sung suddenly died, Pyongyang's reunification policy had turned into a kind of habit-driven trumpery, devoid of substantive relevance. The real issue for Pyongyang- and for Beijing- was how to avert system collapse, which would threaten not only the survival of the North Korean state, but also China's security environment. With the balance of national strength having already shifted decisively in favor of South Korea, thus enhancing the prospects for reunification by absorption, strengthening ties with the weaker North, albeit in a cost-effective way, has become one of Beijing's central strategic goals (Samuel Kim 2001, 400).

Despite the frustration Beijing has had with Pyongyang and the limits to what the Chinese can do to help the North Koreans, China clearly does not want to see a sudden collapse of North Korea. For one thing, Beijing would adamantly oppose an American military presence in a unified Korea along the China-Korean border of 1,400 kilometers. Such a situation could set the stage for a serious confrontation between China and the United States. Given this situation, China continues to provide energy and food support to North Korea. In October 1998, the Chinese ambassador, Wan Yongxiang, met with North Korea's president of the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Yong-Nam, Premier Hong Song-Nan, and Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun, informing them that the Chinese government has decided to deliver 80,000 tons of crude oil, free

of charge, to North Korea. China continues to remain North Korea's top trading partner. For example, in 1996 trade with China accounted for 28.6 percent of North Korea's total foreign trade, followed by trade with Japan, India and Germany (Zhao 2003, 114).

As a result, China's capacity to initiate and implement consistent policies toward the two Koreas is constrained by the positions of important domestic groups and other North-east Asian states, as well as the United States, Japan, and Russia. Meanwhile, the growing complexity, density, and multi-lateralization exemplified by the Korean issue have placed pressure on the Chinese foreign policy-making system to develop more effective coordinating mechanisms and a means to monitor what is really going on (Samuel Kim 2001, 407). Chinese leadership made a strategic decision to economically engage North Korea. China's leadership was concerned that regime in Pyongyang would collapse under pressure of U.S. containment policy (H. Kim 2010, 65).

China and North Korea have maintained cooperation in military matters, ideology, and culture. China has supported various forms of a free aid such as grain and crude oil toward North Korea in an effort to assist them in overcoming hardships brought about natural disaster and economic sanctions. Otherwise, since the normalization of diplomatic relations with China and South Korea in 1992, China has maintained an equidistance policy between South and North Korea. After establishing the strategic cooperative partnership both China and South Korea in 2008, the friendship between China and the DPRK is less important in China's foreign affairs than the strategic cooperative partnership with South Korea (H. Kim 2010, 58). The Chinese leadership, headed by Hu Jinto from 2002, accepted a new perspective on relations with North Korea, viewing them less as "the blood-shared ally" and more as participants in a "traditional friendly cooperative relationship" (H. Kim 2010, 58; Funabashi 2007, 395-7).

China has greater economic leverage with the two Koreas than any other country in Northeast Asia. China wants to and will keep its upper hand on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, China maintains that the Korean question must be solved through bilateral negotiations between the South and the North, but it still sticks to a position supporting Pyongyang's unification formula. This is an indication that China has never abandoned its role as a traditional ally of North Korea.

3. Security and Political relations with Sino-DPRK (Security & Legitimacy)

In response to China's policy, this study attempts to observe Pyongyang's security and political relations with Beijing and its policy consequences as well as tactics. After the Korean War, China completed the last phase of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV)'s withdrawal from North Korea in October 1958, but they retained a strategic interest in the Korean peninsula as the guarantors of North Korean security (Lee 1996, 59). As a manifestation of this interest, Zhou Enlai and Kim Il-Sung signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance at Beijing on July 11, 1961 – five days after Kim had signed a similar treaty with Nikita Khrushchev at Moscow. According to Chae-Jin Lee (1996), the Soviet Union and North Korea took the initiative in formulating the treaty with North Korea, but the Chinese also had a number of reasons for accepting the treaty. First, the US had revised its security treaty with Japan in 1960 in order to strengthen its military containment policy against communist countries in the Asian-Pacific region. Secondly, In South Korea, there was the student uprising against the Rhee Syngman government in 1960 followed by Park Chung-Hee's military coup. These disturbing events gave rise to serious uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula. Thirdly, China accepted this new

treaty as a primary instrument as a counterbalance to not only the US military presence in South Korea, but also to the Soviet Union's potential military ambitions in North Korea.

Article Two of the Sino-North Korean Treaty took effect September 10, 1961. Article Two was declared:

“The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.”⁷⁰

The Chinese worked to accommodate North Korea's requests, openly approaching boundary negotiations, diplomatic cooperation, and economic assistance programs. The two countries in effect formed a united front against Soviet “revisionists”, US “imperialists,” Japanese “militarists,” and South Korean “fascists” (Lee 1996, 60-61).

The Sino-DPRK militant friendship picked up steam when South Korea and Japan signed the Treaty on Basic Relations in June 1965 to normalize diplomatic ties, forming what Chin and North Korea considered to be “an anti-communist military mutual alliance.” In 1969 Mao Zedong invited Choe Young Kun to attend the twentieth anniversary of China's founding, and Zhou Enlai expressed enthusiasm for the “continuous growth and consolidation of the military friendship between the peoples of China and Korea” (Lee 1996, 62). In 1969, the Nixon-Sato

⁷⁰ See the *Peking review*, July 14, 1961 (<http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1961/PR1961-28a.htm>).

communiqué between the US and Japan,⁷¹ which codified Japan's security assurance including South Korea and Taiwan, aggravated the Sino-North Korea military alliance. A few months after the Nixon-Sato communiqué, Zhou Enlai visit to Pyongyang to fortify bilateral military alliance. Zhou announced the Nixon-Sato communiqué a "new U.S.- Japanese military alliance spearheaded against the peoples of Asia" and unequivocally stated:

"China and Korea are neighbors linked by mountains and rivers. There exists a traditional militant friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples. This friendship cemented with blood was forged and has grown in the course of the protracted struggle against our common enemies, US and Japanese imperialism. The militant friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples is the embodiment of the intimate relationship of our two peoples who share weal and woe and are as closely linked as lips and teeth. Common interests and common problems of security have bound and united our two peoples together. In the face of new threats of aggression and war by the US and Japanese reactionaries, the Chinese and Korean peoples must unite closely and enhance preparedness against war in our common fight against the enemies. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, work for the consolidation and development of the militant friendship and unity between China and Korea." ⁷²

⁷¹ China also was eager to strengthened military alliance with North Korea because the Chinese were interrupted by the joint communiqué signed with President Richard M. Nixon and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku on November 21, 1969. This communiqué declared "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security and maintaining peace and security in Taiwan was most important for the security of Japan (Lee 1996, 63).

⁷² Zhou's speech at the Banquet invited by Kim Il Sung, *Peking Review*, April 10, 1970, p. 13-14.

Also, Zhou and Kim signed a joint communiqué on April 7, 1970 which declared that:

“U.S. imperialism is the main force of aggression and war and the most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. Sly and cunning, U.S. imperialism is vainly to cover up its aggressive nature under the smoke-screen of “peace.” However, the people of the world can never be duped. Resolute and uncompromising struggles must be waged against U.S. imperialism through to the very end... The Chinese side wishes the Korean people still greater successes in their cause of simultaneously carrying out economic construction and the building of national defense in face of the daily intensifying new war provocation of US imperialism and their struggle to make the US imperialist aggressor troops withdraw from South Korea and realize the reunification of the fatherland independently.”⁷³

After Zhou’s visit to Pyongyang, China and North Korea agreed upon a package Chinese economic aids, including technical cooperation aids, long-term commercial transactions for Six-Year Plan of North Korea (1971-1976), and protocols on a border railway and mutual supply chain of goods. China also agreed to bolster North Korea’s military preparedness (Lee 1996, 64). For instance, during the Cold War, Kim Il Sung adeptly exploited the Sino-Soviet rivalry to obtain substantial economic assistance from both China and the Soviet Union (Nanto and Manyin 2010, 11).

After Hu Jinto’s inauguration in 2002, China joined the World Trade Organization and Sino-US relations began to generally improve. China maintained flexibility in its North Korea policy and endeavor to suppress the North Korean Nuclear program. China played a major role to host the Six-Party talks and facilitated DPRK-US negotiations. However, China fully

⁷³ The joint communiqué of the Sino-North Korea, *Peking Review*, April 10, 1970, p. 3-5.

recognized North Korea's perceived security threat, acknowledging that the DPRK is completely surrounded by hostile nuclear armament countries (US, South Korea and Japan under the US nuclear umbrella). Beijing has chosen to make economic stability in North Korea a policy priority, leaving the US and the international community to take the lead on denuclearization (Nanto and Manyin 2010, 11). Although China voted in favor of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 sanctioning the North Korean regime for its 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests, China's enforcement of the sanctions has been limited (Feng and Beauchamp-Mustafaga 2012, 36). In voting in favor of Resolution 1874, the Chinese representative Zhang Yesui stressed that the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legitimate security concerns and development interests of the DPRK should be respected and that after its return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the DPRK should be allowed to enjoy the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Zhang Yesui mentions that the Security Council's actions should not adversely impact the country's development or humanitarian assistance to it, and that if the DPRK complied with the relevant provisions, the Council would review the appropriateness of suspending or lifting the measure. He also highlight that under no circumstances should there be use of force or threat of force.⁷⁴ China hesitated to condemn the North Korean attacks against the South on March 26, 2010. China even blocked discussion of the attacks in the United Nations Security Council.

Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited Pyongyang on November 23, 2009. This trip was the initial stop on a three-nation Asian tour that included Japan and Thailand (*The China Post*, Nov. 23, 2009). The main objective of Minister Liang's North Korea visit was to bring "closer friendly exchange between the Chinese and DPRK armed forces and promote exchanges and cooperation between the people and armies of the two countries." In this trip,

⁷⁴ U.N. Security Council Statement, SC/9679, June 12, 2009.

denuclearization was not an announced goal of the visit. North Korean General Kim Jong-gak, the first vice director of the General Political Bureau and an influential leader in the North Korean Army, visited Beijing on November 17. After the May 2009 nuclear test, these military visits revealed that the influence of the military on DPRK policy had apparently grown, leading China to reestablish communication channels with the Korean People’s Army (*Chosun Ilbo*, Nov. 24, 2009).⁷⁵ In addition, Pyongyang learned that its alliance relationship with China was not nearly as operational as the US alliance with South Korea, and that strengthened military ties with China are crucial as it seeks to increase its security (Nanto and Manyin 2010, 13). In addition, even North Korea has been isolated from the arms trade by sanctions, China’s exports of small arms and ammunition to DPRK increased significantly in 2009 in terms of Table 14. According to a CRS report (Nanto and Manyin 2010, 19), China was the only reported exporter of small arms to North Korea. Kim Jong-Il visited China for the fifth and sixth times in 2010. Also, Kim had gone to China in 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2006 (*Chosun Ilbo*, Jan. 9, 2010).⁷⁶

Table 14. Reported Exports of Small Arms to the DPRK by Country (in U.S. dollars)

Country	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
China	0	26100	20,000	27,800	4,316,741
France	51,014	0	0	188,815	0
Switzerland	0	0	0	553,529	0
Canada	3,400	0	0	10,888	0
Germany	2,000	10,000	11,000	0	0
Italy	0	24,532	0	0	0
Spain	4,641	0	0	0	0
Total Reported	61,055	60,632	31,000	781,032	4,316,741

Source: Data downloaded through Global Trade Atlas via Nanto and Manyin (2010, 19).

⁷⁵ “Chinese Defense Minister Pledges Loyalty in N. Korea,” *Chosun Ilbo*, Nov. 24, 2009.

⁷⁶ When the Premier of PRC, Wen Jiabao, met Kim Jong-Il in October 2009, he offered Kim Jong-Il to visit China: “Unification Minister Seeks Central Role in Ties with N. Korea,” *Chosun Ilbo*, Jan. 9, 2010.


On the first day of January each year, North Korea's leaders release their annual goals in a joint editorial carried in several media in DPRK. It was landmarks in 2008 the 60th anniversary of the founding of both South and North regimes in Korean peninsula. According to *Rodong Sinmun*, it begins to mention North Koreans of the fact:

Always, North Korean regime is eager to justify its military renovation by emphasizing the need for a strong defense. DPRK leaders do not trust the outside world in historical and political contexts. In a 2008 editorial, Pyongyang states (*KCNA*, January 1, 2008): "Socialism is the destiny and future of our people. Everyone should cherish the firm faith in the fact that Korean-style socialism our people chose and built is the best in the world... It is imperative to resolutely smash the enemy's reactionary ideological and cultural infiltration and psychological warfare and not to tolerate any elements that undermine our system and corrode our socialist morality and culture and our way of life." In terms of diplomatic policy direction, this editorial suggests: "At present, defending global and security and advancing along the road of independence are the irreversible trend of times. The reality shows the strong-arm policy and arbitrariness of imperialism do not work anywhere. Under the banner of independence, peace, and friendship, the DPRK will continue to make earnest efforts for stability on the Korean Peninsula and peace in the world and further develop relations of friendship and cooperation with all the countries that are friendly toward it."

North Korea's definition of "friendly countries" is derived from whether or not the country in question supports the DPRK's ideological commitment to building a socialist fortress in the North, whether or not they support the DPRK's bid for national unification, whether they join with the US and its camp in "interfering with North Korean internal affairs" (like exerting pressure on North Korean abuse in human right issues), and whether if they will support

Pyongyang’s stance in the Six-Party Talks. Only if a nation fully supports North Korea in this regard can they be treated as North Korean “friends” (Ming Lee 2008). According Figure 8, *Rodong Sinmun* indicates that Pyongyang’s leadership respects and defines China as an “amicable comrade,” and never criticizes China’s leadership’s approach to North Korean relations. In October, 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Pyongyang on ‘a state visit’ to meet Kim Jong-Il. After the visit, Kim Jong-Il made a secret week-long visit to China along with every member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and follows the route taken by Deng Xiaoping’s famous “southern tour” of 1992 (Snyder 2009, 217). On October 4, 2009, the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the DPRK, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang accompanied by a large delegation of high ranking officials. Along with this visits, North Korea flaunted the friendship with China through *Rodong Sinmun*.

Figure 8. North Korea’s Behavior toward China, 2005-2009



Sources: *Rodong Sinmun* (2005-2009)⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Expressed and ‘amities’ and criticisms’ words are counted as an item friendship and criticizing China

July 11, 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of the Sino-North Korean “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” signed in 1961. Without a lavish commemoration parade in Beijing and Pyongyang, Chinese President Hu Jintao and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong-Il vowed to further strengthen ties between the two states in an exchange of letters (*The Yonhap News*, July 14, 2011). Since Kim Jong-Il’s sudden death in December 2011, China has behaved as expected, trying to prop up the regime in order to ensure stability in its nuclear-armed neighbor. China’s foreign ministry sent a message of strong support for Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-Il’s successor, and encouraged North Koreans to unite under the new leader.

4. The DPRK’s Economic Relations with China

With regard to regime survival with economic development, North Korea still tried to pursue to maintain indispensable relations with China. China and the Soviet Union provided military assistance to China during the Korean War. Until the early 1990s, both countries provided the DPRK with its most important trade markets and were its major suppliers of oil and other basic necessities as well as reliable strut of diplomatic and political assistance. Since dismantle of the Soviet Union, China has been North Korea’s largest economic trading partner and supporters of humanitarian aids. However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the former communist bloc in Eastern Europe, combined with the gradually warming relationship between Beijing and Seoul, significantly altered Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing and Moscow.

North Korea’s decision to favor heavy industry over light industry following the Korean War in the 1950s was the first fatal mistake that ultimately lead to DPRK’s economic downfall.

in *Rodong Sinmun*: Amicable Words - “Friendship (*Chinsun*; *Wooho*; *Sunrin*)”, Criticism Words - “Enemy (*wonsu*), Puppet regime (*gyerae*), Cabal Party; Gang Group; Thief Group (*paedang*; *ildang*; *dodang*), Traitor; Treason (*maeguk*; *banyeok*; *yeokjeok*), Fascist (*fashow*), Submission (*sadae*).”

The recent cause of North Korea's precipitous economic decline is also linked directly to the evaporation of decades of food and energy support from long-standing allies in Beijing and Moscow, which began as early as 1990. The situation was subsequently worsened by severe flooding in 1995 and 1996. The declining food situation is only one aspect of North Korea's failing economic system. Other parts of the economy are also faced with a similar situation. With the cessation of subsidies in grain, energy, and fertilizer from old allies, North Korea's agricultural production dropped by almost 50 percent from the late 1980s to a low of 2.5 to 2.6 million tons in 1995. Despite the major economic crisis threatening its very survival, the North Korean regime has been downplaying the severity of the situation, pretending as if the whole thing was concocted by western countries for propaganda purposes. With the possible exception of North Korea's efforts to promote the *Rajin-Sonbong* Economic Zone, North Korea has been slow to react to its own economic crisis. It has refused to accept Chinese suggestions to reform its economy along Chinese lines.

In some extreme cases, however, it has reluctantly applied "*Band-Aid*" fixes. According to Snyder, one such 'Band Aid fix' was "the devolution of economic authority from the central government to provincial and local authorities. In the absence of goods received through the public distribution system, local officials must now engage in the task of procuring resources to meet their own immediate needs. One result of assuming such responsibility is that hundreds of newly established North Korean trading interests representing local and provincial authorities have joined a small number of representatives of central government authorities in *Dandong* and other cities bordering North Korea" (Snyder 1992, 3). While all this was going on, North Korea lost its dear leader Kim Il-sung. To express its disagreement with North Korea over the nuclear program, China did not send an appropriate delegation to express its condolences. With China

distancing itself from North Korea, the north suddenly found itself virtually alone. Left with no choice, it thus followed a continuing path of isolationism (Singh 2004, 96-97).

After a three-year period of self-exclusion, North Korea finally returned to the international scene. It first attempted to amend its relations with its traditional ally, China. In 1998, Pyongyang proposed that economic development was fundamental to achieving a strong and prosperous nation (*Rodong Sinmun*, September 9, 1998) that could tide over domestic disasters, economic difficulties, and sparse relations with the international community. As a part of these efforts, Kim Jong-Il paid an official visit to Beijing in May 2000, and another to Shanghai in January 2002. Despite his benign intentions and subsequent confirmation of "lips and teeth" relations with China, China did not respond in kind. They snubbed Kim Jong-Il when he nominated Chinese-Dutchman Yang Bin in 2002 to head the special administrative zone of *Shinuiju*. Chinese authorities arrested Yang on charges of tax evasion and other economic crimes a few weeks later. Consequently, the bilateral relationship between China and North Korea remains in a stalemate (Jaewoo Choo 2003).⁷⁸

However, China currently is focused on developing North Korea's economy so as to maintain a stable North Korea. China has become North Korea's largest trading partner and the largest investor in North Korea (Ming Lee 2009, 177). North Korea and China have been transforming their relationship from a military alliance to a more pragmatic relations focused on pursuit of their economic needs (Lee 2010).

In terms of Pyongyang's economic reform, for the purpose of economic development under the North Korean style socialism, North Korea adopted "Chinese economic model" in order to recover its economic deadlocks. In Pyongyang's economic development policy, Park

⁷⁸ Choo, Jaewoo, "China's role in the Korean crisis," *Asia Times*, February 28, 2003 at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EB28Dg01.html>.

(2012) stresses “North Korea may have already decided to develop its economy through a strategy patterned after the Chinese model.” As long as China believes the partnership helps maintenance of a stable and peaceful international environment in its neighboring regions, the economic development assistance and cooperation will remain in effect.

Conclusively, through mutual economic cooperation with China, Pyongyang has adopted a sustained economic strategy influenced by the “Chinese model” while maintaining ‘Korean style socialist system (*urishik*)’ and a strong emphasis on self-reliance (*Juche*) ideology. The fruits of this approach have been limited, however, as North Korea’s overarching emphasis on regime survival have prevented the international openness that allows for successful trade and economic prosperity.

5. North Korea’s Policy Priority toward China


In Sino-DPRK relations, this study attempts to examine what determinants have influences on Pyongyang’s policy objectives toward Beijing. After the demise of the Socialist bloc, the North Korean leadership sought to learn from the experience of the Chinese leaders who had developed the economy while maintaining the authoritarian rule of the communist party. After the establishment of the North Korean constitution by Kim Jong-Il in 1998, Pyongyang tried to adopt a progressive “omni-directional foreign policy” to address the economic difficulties resulting from their isolation. Kim Jong-Il also revealed a new political vision for his regime known as the *Kangsong Daekuk* (strong and prosperous state), (JC Lim, 2009: 114; *Rodong Sinmun*, August 22, 1998). This vision detailed a ‘socialist state that has a strong national power and in which everything is prosperous and the people live without envying other countries’ (*Jong-Il Kim* 2000, 452). In April 1999, following an extended suspension of

high-level interaction between Pyongyang and Beijing, Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan visited North Korea. In March 2000, North Korea reciprocated, sending Kim Yong-Nam, president of the Supreme People's Assembly, together with a fifty-person delegation, to China. During the April 1999 exchange, Tan Jiaxuan and Zhu Rongji reached "common ground" and acknowledged that "friendly relations between North Korea and China have experienced new growth in recent years," and also acknowledged that senior-level exchanges between the two countries were being discussed (*Xinhua Hong Kong Service*, March 20, 2000; Snyder 2009, 121). During the visit, Tang promised that China would provide North Korea with 150,000 tons of grain and 400,000 tons of coal (Snyder 2009, 121). In October 1999, Tang made a second visit to North Korea to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of formal Sino-North Korean relations. These high-level visits between Sino-DPRK played a primary role in setting the stage for the North to adopt a more open market orientation.

China was likely afraid of the collapse of the North Korean regime, seeing as the DPRK had long been viewed as a strategic buffer zone against American forces in South Korea. Therefore, Chinese leadership hoped North Korea would adopt the Chinese model, along with the Chinese Northeast economic development project (H. Kim 2010, 65). In August 2001, Jiang Zemin, Chinese President, visited North Korea and offered increased humanitarian aid and economic assistance. In October of 2005, and January of 2006, Hu Jintao and Kim Jong-Il took reciprocal visits between the two countries. These visits reaffirmed their amicable relationship and allowed for further discussion of the North's nuclear programs and the ongoing economic cooperation between the two nations. The increase in high-level interaction brought along strengthened trade and investment relationships between the two China and the DPRK. Figure 9

indicates a rough correlation between bilateral trade and the frequency of high-level dialogues in Sino-North Korea (Snyder 2009, 132).

Figure 9. North Korea & China High-Level Visits and Trade, 1993-2005



Source: Ministry of Unification, South Korea; KOTRA; Snyder (2009), p.215-217.

Furthermore, when North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun visited Beijing in May 2006, the Chinese leaders suggested providing massive economic aid to North Korea if the Six Party Talks resumed. This economic assistance included massive investment of Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs), political loans, and establishment of an industrial complex (H, Kim 2006, 65). Unfortunately, this aid was never actually provided to North Korea because North Korea completed another nuclear test in October 2006. However, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between Sino-DPRK on October 4, 2009, Pyongyang signed additional documents reasserting their mutual economic and technological cooperation with China (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, 2010: 56). According to KCNA (October 4, 2009), at *Mansudae* Assembly Hall, both North Korea and

China signed the “Protocol on the Adjustment of treaties,” the “Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation between the Governments of the DPRK and China,” exchange documents on economic assistance and other agreed documents in the field of economy, an accord on exchange and cooperation between educational organs of the two countries, an MOU on exchange and cooperation in the field of software industry, a protocol on common inspection of export and import goods between the state quality control organs of the two countries, an MOU on tour of the DPRK sponsored by the tourist organizations of China, and an accord on strengthening cooperation in protecting wild animals.”

The DPRK’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and long-range missile test in April 2009, as well as the second nuclear test in May 2009, added tension to relations with the US, South Korea, Japan, and even China. After Pyongyang’s long-range missile test in April 2009, China agreed to stronger UN sanctions toward North Korean companies. Also, after Pyongyang’s second nuclear test in May 2009, China condemned North Korea in June 2009 and supported UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which carried additional sanctions toward the DPRK. North Korea still imported luxury goods estimated between \$100 million to \$160million from China in 2008, even under UN sanctions (Nanto and Manyin 2010).⁷⁹ North Korea continues to use air and land routes through China with little risk of inspection, and luxury goods from China and from other countries. It shows that China takes a minimalist approach to implementing sanctions on North Korea (Nanto and Manyin 2010). As shown in Table 14, merchandise trades from China to North Korea continued to increase, even after the UN economic sanction of 2009. In

⁷⁹ According CRS report (Nanto and Manyin, 2010), in 2009, North Korea’s major exports to PRC included mineral fuels (coal), ores, woven apparel, iron and steel, fish and seafood, and salt/sulfur/earths/stone. DPRK imports mineral fuels and oil, machinery, electrical machinery, vehicles, knit apparel, plastic, and iron and steel from China. Also, China is a major source for DPRK imports of petroleum. From Chinese data, in 2009, exports to the DPRK of mineral fuel oil totaled \$327 million and accounted for 17% of all Chinese exports to the DPRK.

November 2009, China announced new economic development zone (the Tonghua-Dandong Economic Zone) along the North Korean border to develop trade with North Korea. As shown in Table 15 and Figure 10, Sino-DPRK trade has steadily increased overall. Moreover, as Lee Myung-Bak government of South Korea withdrew the economic benefits characteristic of “Sunshine Policy,” the DPRK’s economic dependency on China has increased. As a result, the Lee government's hard-line policy has produced the unintended outcome of increasing North Korea’s economic dependence on China (Lee 2010).


Table 15. The DPRK’s Merchandise Trade with China, 1995-2011

(Unit: USD, thousand)

Year	DPRK's Exports	DPRK's Imports	Total
1995	63,606	486,187	549,793
1996	68,638	497,029	565,667
1997	121,610	534,680	656,290
1998	57,313	355,705	413,018
1999	41,709	328,660	370,369
2000	37,214	450,824	488,038
2001	166,797	570,660	737,457
2002	270,863	467,309	738,172
2003	395,344	627,583	1,022,927
2004	585,703	799,503	1,385,206
2005	499,157	1,081,184	1,580,341
2006	467,718	1,231,886	1,699,604
2007	581,521	1,392,453	1,973,974
2008	754,046	2,033,233	2,787,279
2009	793,048	1,887,686	2,680,734
2010	1,187,861	2,777,816	3,965,677
2011	2,788,590	3,528,427	6,317,017

Source: KOTRA & KITA (<http://global.kita.net>), South Korea and U.S. Census Bureau, WTA

Figure 10. China-DPRK Trade vs. Inter-Korean Trade, 1993-2011



Source: Ministry of Unification, South Korea

In spite of strong warnings from the international community, Pyongyang conducted another nuclear test on May 25, 2009. After the second nuclear test, the UN reproached North Korea with the passage of UNSCR 1874. North Korea's nuclear armament policy has resulted in further isolation from international communities and markets. To make things worse, the South Korean president Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012) has adopted a hardline policy toward North Korea. Pyongyang has worked to adopt the Chinese economic model as an extension of Kim's *Juche* ideology, fortifying themselves against the capitalist states.

Table 16. The Selected Word's Frequency for the DPRK' Policy Preference to China, 2005-2009


Preferences	Selected Words		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Prosperity	Strong and prosperous great power	<i>Kangsung-Daeguk</i>	20	24	10	0	38
Prosperity	Prosperity	<i>Byunyoung</i>	9	8	5	0	4
Prosperity	Economic Cooperation	<i>Hyeopryeok</i>	133	120	53	56	178
Prosperity	Mutual exchange, Support, Welfare	<i>Kyorwoo; Wonjo; Bokri</i>	26	46	2	19	90
Prosperity	Self-rehabilitation	<i>Jaryeokgaengsaeng</i>	6	5	7	3	5
Security	War	<i>Junjaeng</i>	13	19	9	6	11
Security	Military	<i>Gunsa</i>	3	4	0	0	0
Security	Self-defense, Security	<i>Jawui; Anjun</i>	3	5	2	2	4
Legitimacy	Independence	<i>Jaju</i>	12	6	2	1	3
Legitimacy	Military-first	<i>Songun</i>	2	4	0	1	4
Legitimacy	Dignity	<i>Jonum</i>		2	0	0	1
Legitimacy	Self-reliance	<i>Juche</i>	0	1	0	1	1

Sources: *Rodong Sinmun* (Editorials and articles related with inter-Korean relations from 2005-2009).

Along with some objective observations, this study examines the policy priority of the DPRK's regime through content analysis. As mentioned before, this study primarily employs *Rodong Sinmun*, which is official newspaper of the Pyongyang regime. With respect to determining policy preference, the frequency of words presented in *Rodong Sinmun* articles is the most effective way to recognize Pyongyang's orientation toward China. Table 16 indicates that North Korea has strongly asserted its need for economic cooperation ("*Hyeopryeok*"), and that need has colored its policy orientation toward China. Figure 11 explains actually that the DPRK's prime preference toward PRC is "economic prosperity" needs. In this relationship, Pyongyang's policy-makers pursue increasing aid, trade, and investment, all derived from its own sense of economic interest and development. North Korea's primary means of pursuing

these goals has been high-level talks between ranking elites such as Hu Jinto and Wen Jiobao. Also, when UN’s economic sanctions were imposed on North Korea in June, 2006 and April, 2009, Pyongyang sought Chinese economic cooperation as a means of overcoming its isolation from western communities and South Korea. Conclusively, economic prosperity and stability lies at the core of the Sino-DPRK relationship, and North Korea has pursued high-level friendships with China as a means of offsetting the effects of Western sanctions. Empirically, as shown as Figure 12, whenever Pyongyang needed economic cooperation with Beijing, North Korea emphasized strongly on friendship with Chinese leaders.


Figure 11. North Korea’s Policy Priorities toward China, 2005-2009



Source: *Rodong Sinmun* (Editorials and articles related with inter-Korean relations from 2005-2009).⁸⁰

⁸⁰ It counts the frequency of proper nouns regarding with security concern, identity needs and economic prosperity toward China in *Rodong Sinmun* from 2005-2009: 1) Security Words – “war (*Jyeonjaeng*)”; “military (*Gunsa*)”; “self-defense (*Jawoi*)”; “security (*anjun*)” 2) National Identity Words – “self-reliance (*juche*)”; “military-first (*sungun*).” 3) Economic Prosperity Words – “economic self-help (*jaryeokgaengsaeng*)”; “prosperity (*byunyoung; kangsungdaekuk*).”

Figure 12. Relations with Pyongyang’s Perception and Prosperity Needs to China, 2005-2009



Source: *Rodong Sinmun* (2005-2009)

The role of China is regarded as the most important external factor in dealing with the DPRK. Even though Pyongyang is deadlocked in economic isolation from the Western world and the South has adopted new, hardline policies in response to the development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, China’s cooperation has fortified North Korea both economically and ideologically. Beijing has maintained this relationship as a means of preserving the existing security order in East Asia. The Sino-DPRK relationship is mutually advantageous.

In short, North Korea has continued its “blood-tied relationship” in military, ideological, and social terms with China. Over time, however, North Korea’s foreign policy towards China has become less about military alliance and more about pragmatic economic relations. According to Table 16 and Figure 11, these analyses support hypothesis 3 (H3): Pyongyang’s foreign policy toward China is overwhelmingly influenced by the desire for economic prosperity.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This case study analyzes the extent to which domestic policy priorities influence North Korea's foreign policy behaviors within a theoretical framework of human needs. This chapter summarizes major findings of the preceding chapters and proposes suggestions for future study.

1. Summary of Key Findings

This dissertation began with the question of what factors influence whether North Korea chooses to implement risky or cooperative policies toward major states, as well as what role domestic politics and ideology play in the DPRK's formation and enactment of foreign policy. This study also seeks to explain why North Korea chooses a hard line foreign policy and when it chooses to engage with surrounding states.

Basically, the theoretical framework of this research is drawn from a combination of realism, liberalism, and constructivism to identify and examine possible variables that affect North Korea's foreign policy behavior. To find answers to these questions, the domestic priorities behind foreign policies are analyzed within the framework of human needs development theory. In this theory, North Korea is not abnormal or atypical, that is, the foreign policy goals of North Korea are not drastically different from any other country. North Korean foreign policy goals are motivated by three domestic priorities or preferences: security, identity and prosperity. The DPRK's foreign policy is determined primarily by the demands of "national

security” relative to the U.S.; North Korea’s foreign policy toward South Korea is determined by the “identity need”; Pyongyang’s foreign policy toward China is mostly based on a desire for “economic prosperity.” In order to analyze the policy behaviors of North Korea, this dissertation uses the “process-tracing” method, and also observes *Rodong Sinmun*, the official newspaper of Pyongyang regime, through content analysis in order to determine the DPRK’s perception and policy preference toward major states such as the United States, South Korea and China.

Chapter 4 examined the nature of North Korea’s foreign policy priorities. Like any other country, North Korea’s foreign policy orientation has evolved in pursuit of the systematic goals of national security, national identity or legitimacy, and economic prosperity. At first, to understand DPRK’s foreign policy, one must understand its norms, values, and belief system which influence systemic behavior. First of all, the North Korean belief systems founded in the *Juche* (Self-reliance) ideology in both historical and cultural contexts. This ideology is derived from the salient cultural condition of Confucianism and the political system of socialism. In short, the *Juche* ideology has affected North Korean society as well as its foreign policy behavior in a most absolute way. In the mid-1990s, the *Juche* ideology evolved into a new state ideology known as *Songun* politics (Military-first). Pyongyang has strengthened its defense capability through *Songun* politics, to the detriment of relations in the international arena. In sum, despite external pressures and economic difficulties, Pyongyang has increased North Korea’s reliance on its overly-nationalistic ideology of *Juche* and *Songun*. The *Juche* and *Songun* ideologies have guided North Korea’s foreign strategies and maneuverings with surrounding countries.

Chapter 5 has shown that North Korea’s policy preferences for the United States depend overwhelmingly on “national security” for the survival of the regime. In the legacy of the Korean War, North Korea has operated under the perceived threat of attack from the United States due to

the lingering armistice agreement of 1953. In this context, the *Juche* (Self-reliance) and *Songun* (Military first) ideology have influenced Pyongyang's effort to bolster its defense capabilities. In order to effectively sustain its regime survival, Pyongyang has pursued a nuclear weapon program as the essential tactic for self-reliance in national defense against the United States. North Korean leaders believe that their nuclear weapons capability has already deterred certain aggression by the US. Moreover, Pyongyang began to realize that its greatest bargaining tool was its military capabilities. In this pragmatic strategy, after the death of Kim Il-Sung, his son, Kim Jong-Il developed "omni-directional foreign policy" to seek the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with the US. In this sense, Pyongyang has sought after a peace treaty and the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula. As observed in this study, North Korea's foreign policy has focused on domestic preference rather than external pressures from the US. Pyongyang's leaders insisted that the North Korean nuke program was not because it wanted economic assistance or normalization of the US, but because it wanted to defend itself from the US security. Even though both Pyongyang and Washington agreed to the September 19th Joint Statement of 2005, North Korean leaders refused to implement this agreement because the US violated the principle of "commitment for commitment" and "action for action" by persisting in economic sanctions. Also, on Feb. 29, 2012, North Korea broke the nutrition aids' agreement with the Obama administration for the sake of launching a satellite or a long-range missile. This shows that whenever the North Korean government perceives a Western threat, Pyongyang responds hawkishly.

Chapter 6 discussed North Korea's preference for South Korea is defined by the desire for "national identity." In historical context, the legacy of the Korean War shaped the strong nationalism under *Juche* and emotional perception of the legitimacy competition with the South's

democratic capitalism. In order to win a legitimacy victory against the South, Pyongyang regime has maintained its “Korean style socialist system (*urisik sahejui*)” with “*Juche* (self-reliance)” ideology against Seoul. Both *Juche* and *Songun* ideology are tied into Pyongyang’s policy strategy toward Seoul. In this sense, in terms of Pyongyang’s national identity orientation, North Korea adopted “*Jaju* (national independence)” for its policy strategy toward the South government. Pyongyang demands the withdrawal of US armed forces in the South and tries to stir anti-American sentiment in South Korean society. With the success of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, South Korea’s economy rapidly developed and surpassed the North, creating the perception of an economic threat from the South. Pyongyang regime adopted a pragmatic policy (*silli*) as a new strategy for dealing with the South Korean government after the establishment of Kim Jon-Il’s regime in 1998. South Korea’s engagement policy (Sunshine Policy) toward North Korea is a strategy designed to reduce military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and democratize the North through commercial exchanges and cooperation. From this economic open policy, North Korea has derived certain benefits for regime survival, such as economic aid and some relief from Western sanctions. This engagement policy itself will not be enough to bring about a resolution of military tensions between the two Koreas. North Korea has continued to pursue its aggressive “military first” policy, resulting in numerous armed conflicts illustrating that the legitimacy competition is intact. North Korea proposes talks to alleviate tensions whenever a progressive party assumes power in the South, but increases the level of criticism against the ruling party whenever a conservation party is in power. In this vein, we infer that Pyongyang tends to stand on a hostile position whenever the South government is willing to infringe Pyongyang’s legitimacy and dignity regardless of the South’s economic assistance. North Korea also gets intimidated militarily by the US-ROK joint military exercises. During the

US-ROK military exercises, Pyongyang pursues security rather than legitimacy relative to Seoul's policy. However, this chapter confirmed that the Pyongyang leadership's policy priority has mostly depended on "identity need" in context of history.

Chapter 7 discussed the DPRK's foreign policy orientation toward the PRC. As examined in this chapter, Pyongyang's policy for Beijing is oriented toward "economic prosperity" as a means of alleviating difficulties caused by natural disasters and UN sanctions. Even though China condemned the North Korean nuclear tests and long-range missile launches and agreed to sever UN economic sanctions, North Korea imports luxury goods through Chinese channels and does significant commercial trade with China's SOEs. Since 2008, South Korea has forced an increase of North Korea's economic dependence. Pyongyang has adopted the Chinese economic model while maintaining Korean style socialist system (*urishik*) with strong self-reliance (*Juche* ideology). In historical context, DPRK and PRC have shared the socialist's political ideology and 'blood-tied friendship.' In other words, both countries have maintained bloody cooperation in the military, ideological, and social-cultural fields, even the normalization of diplomatic relations with China and South Korea in 1992. In this sense, Pyongyang seeks to develop its own economic system and overcome the serious economic predicament with the mutual trust of Beijing without any threat of regime survival. As shown in this chapter, whenever Pyongyang needed economic cooperation and aid, North Korean policy emphasizes strongly on friendship with Chinese leaders and organized bilateral high-level talks. Finally, this chapter revealed that Pyongyang's priority for the Chinese policy has relied overwhelmingly on "economic prosperity."

In sum, one must understand that the essential ideologies of *Juche* and *Songun* and historical experiences have formed the preferences of Pyongyang's leadership. It is clear that the

DPRK's domestic priorities have great influence on its foreign policy toward major governments, more so than external pressures and direct diplomatic interactions. This case study confirms that, within its the context of its own history and perceptions, Pyongyang has acted rationally in regard to its goals and strategic interest.

2. Suggestions for Future Study

This dissertation reveals a few issues which may require future research.

First of all, this study has some methodological limitations. In the process of content analysis of "*Rodong Sinmun*" (the North Korean official newspaper), the validity of this study may be undermined by the distorted interpretations of external events communicated by the regime in Pyongyang. There is simply no direct measurement which sufficiently explains the regime's intentions.

Moreover, this content analysis focused on limited years, which could limit the generalizability of the findings. Future research may extend the number of years open to analysis, developing a more reliable base of data for evaluating Pyongyang's policy priorities. Official documents, as well as survey research data, are recommended for future studies as additional sources for expanding this analysis beyond the pages of the party organ newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*.

This dissertation advances the view that foreign policies are a strategic means for the overall policy objectives of the system, and examines how domestic political priorities affect external behaviors of North Korea. Yet, additional studies are needed to examine how policies by foreign states affect the process of policy prioritization by Pyongyang with regard to the three policy goals of security, identity, and prosperity.

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